Understanding the Politics Behind One of the Middle East’s Greatest Misconceptions
JAFAJ Intelligence Analysis
July 19, 2026
KEY JUDGMENTS
- The principal strategic divide in today’s Middle East is driven by geopolitical competition and national interests rather than religion alone.¹
- Although the Sunni–Shia divide remains politically significant, governments consistently place security, economic stability, and regional influence above sectarian solidarity.¹²
- Many Arab governments increasingly view Iran as a regional competitor whose expanding influence challenges existing balances of power.²³
- Alliances throughout the Middle East are pragmatic and issue-specific, with governments frequently cooperating on some issues while competing on others.³⁴
- Understanding these dynamics is essential for accurately interpreting current conflicts and anticipating future regional alignments.¹²⁴
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
To many outside observers, the politics of the Middle East appear deceptively straightforward. Because the overwhelming majority of the region’s population is Muslim, it is often assumed that Muslim-majority governments naturally share common political objectives and will unite when confronted by external challenges. Current events demonstrate otherwise. The modern Middle East is characterized not by religious unity, but by a complex web of competing national interests, historical rivalries, economic priorities, security concerns, and regional ambitions.¹²
JAFAJ assesses that the defining strategic competition in today’s Middle East is not a struggle between Islam and the West, nor can it be adequately explained by the centuries-old Sunni–Shia divide. Rather, it is a contest among sovereign governments seeking to preserve their own security, expand their regional influence, strengthen their economies, and shape the future political order of one of the world’s most strategically important regions. Religion frequently provides governments with political legitimacy and influences public messaging, but it is national interest—not theology—that consistently drives foreign policy decisions.¹³
Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Tehran has pursued an ambitious strategy designed to expand its regional influence through diplomacy, military modernization, strategic partnerships, and long-term relationships with governments and allied organizations operating throughout Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. These efforts have transformed Iran into one of the Middle East’s most influential regional powers while simultaneously placing it in sustained strategic competition with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and numerous other governments that possess their own competing visions for regional leadership and security.²⁴
This strategic competition explains why Muslim-majority nations frequently support opposing sides during the same regional crisis despite sharing a common faith. Governments routinely cooperate on trade while competing on security matters, maintain diplomatic relations while opposing one another’s military objectives, and pursue independent foreign policies designed to advance domestic priorities rather than ideological or sectarian solidarity. As a result, regional alliances remain fluid, pragmatic, and subject to continuous adjustment as political and security conditions evolve.¹²³
Understanding these realities is essential for interpreting today’s headlines. Oversimplified narratives portraying the Middle East as divided exclusively along religious lines fail to explain the strategic behavior of governments across the region. The principal forces shaping contemporary Middle Eastern politics remain sovereignty, national security, economic resilience, energy security, military deterrence, and the pursuit of regional influence. Those realities—not religion alone—will continue to define regional alliances long after the current conflicts have subsided.¹²⁴
A STRUGGLE FOR REGIONAL LEADERSHIP
At the center of today’s Middle East lies a strategic competition that extends far beyond religion. While sectarian identity continues to influence political rhetoric and public opinion, the region’s principal governments are engaged in a broader contest over who will shape the Middle East’s future political, economic, and security architecture.¹ Rather than acting solely as representatives of religious communities, regional leaders increasingly pursue policies designed to strengthen national power, preserve regime stability, secure economic prosperity, and expand diplomatic influence throughout the Islamic world.²
For nearly five decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has sought to position itself as one of the region’s dominant strategic powers. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Tehran adopted a foreign policy that combines ideological messaging with long-term geopolitical objectives. Iranian leaders have consistently portrayed their government as a defender of regional resistance against foreign intervention, while simultaneously investing in military modernization, missile capabilities, intelligence operations, and strategic relationships with governments and allied organizations across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.³ These policies have significantly expanded Iran’s regional influence while also increasing concerns among neighboring governments regarding Tehran’s long-term strategic ambitions.⁴
Saudi Arabia represents the principal alternative vision for regional leadership. As the custodian of Islam’s two holiest cities and the Arab world’s largest economy, Riyadh has traditionally viewed regional stability, secure energy markets, and the preservation of sovereign governments as essential components of Middle Eastern security. Although Saudi-Iranian relations have experienced periods of diplomatic engagement and limited rapprochement, Saudi leaders continue to regard unchecked Iranian influence as a potential challenge to Gulf security and the broader regional balance of power.² ⁵
Turkey has likewise pursued an increasingly independent regional strategy. Ankara has expanded its diplomatic, military, and economic presence throughout the eastern Mediterranean, the Levant, the Caucasus, and North Africa while seeking greater influence over regional political developments. Egypt continues to view itself as one of the Arab world’s principal political and military powers, while Jordan remains focused upon border security, regional stability, and maintaining close strategic relationships with both Western and Arab partners. The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman each pursue distinct foreign policies designed to maximize national interests while preserving strategic flexibility in an increasingly competitive regional environment.² ⁵
These differing visions of regional order have produced a geopolitical environment in which cooperation and competition frequently exist simultaneously. Governments that cooperate on trade, energy production, maritime security, or counterterrorism may strongly disagree over proxy conflicts, military intervention, or regional influence. Diplomatic relations therefore should not be interpreted as indicators of strategic alignment. Instead, they often reflect the practical necessity of maintaining communication while managing competing national interests.¹ ³
Consequently, describing the Middle East as divided into fixed political or religious blocs oversimplifies a far more dynamic reality. The region functions as a constantly evolving balance-of-power system in which governments routinely reassess alliances according to changing political, military, and economic conditions. Alliances form, dissolve, and evolve not because religious identities change, but because national interests change. Understanding that principle is essential for interpreting nearly every major diplomatic and military development occurring throughout the region today.¹ ² ⁴
ARAB VERSUS PERSIAN: CIVILIZATIONAL IDENTITY MATTERS
Religion represents only one dimension of identity in the Middle East. Equally important are history, language, ethnicity, culture, and the enduring influence of civilization. While many outside observers view the region primarily through the lens of Islam, governments throughout the Middle East frequently view themselves first as nation-states with distinct historical identities and strategic interests.¹
This distinction is particularly important when examining Iran’s relationships with its Arab neighbors. Although Iran is an overwhelmingly Muslim nation, it is also overwhelmingly Persian. Persian civilization predates the emergence of Islam by more than a millennium, and modern Iran continues to view itself as the heir to one of the world’s oldest continuous civilizations. Persian language, literature, national traditions, and historical memory remain central components of Iranian identity and continue to influence the country’s worldview and foreign policy.²
By contrast, most governments surrounding Iran identify politically and culturally with the Arab world. Shared Arabic language, centuries of cultural interaction, and institutions such as the Arab League reinforce a collective Arab political identity that frequently shapes regional diplomacy independent of religion. While Arab governments differ significantly in their domestic political systems and foreign policy priorities, many continue to emphasize Arab sovereignty, territorial integrity, and regional stability as central components of their national interests.³
These differing civilizational perspectives have important geopolitical consequences. Iranian policymakers frequently frame Tehran’s regional role through the broader concept of the Islamic Ummah while simultaneously emphasizing Iran’s revolutionary ideology and strategic independence. Many Arab governments, however, approach regional affairs through the framework of state sovereignty, Arab political leadership, and the preservation of existing regional institutions. These differing strategic perspectives often produce competing visions for the future political order of the Middle East, even when governments share religious traditions.¹ ³
The distinction between Arab and Persian identity should not be interpreted as evidence of inevitable conflict. History demonstrates that cooperation between Arab governments and Iran is both possible and, at times, mutually beneficial. Trade, energy development, maritime security, counterterrorism, and regional diplomacy have repeatedly brought Tehran together with neighboring governments despite broader political disagreements. Likewise, periods of tension have often been followed by renewed diplomatic engagement as governments reassess their strategic priorities.⁴
Nevertheless, historical memory continues to shape modern decision-making. Arab governments frequently view expanding Iranian influence through the lens of regional power politics rather than religious solidarity. Concerns over military influence, proxy organizations, ballistic missile development, maritime security, and political interference often outweigh shared Islamic identity when leaders evaluate Iranian policy. From Tehran’s perspective, many of these same activities are viewed as necessary components of national defense, strategic deterrence, and regional influence. The result is a continuing competition in which both sides frequently believe they are acting defensively while simultaneously perceiving the other as pursuing expansionist objectives.² ⁵
Understanding this distinction is essential for accurately interpreting regional events. The strategic competition unfolding across the Middle East is not fundamentally a conflict between Arabs and Persians, nor is it solely a conflict between Sunni and Shia Islam. It is a contest among sovereign states possessing different histories, identities, security concerns, and visions for regional leadership. Those competing identities help explain why governments that share a common religion often pursue dramatically different foreign policies and frequently align with different partners during periods of regional crisis.¹ ² ³
IRAN’S STRATEGY: PROJECTING POWER WITHOUT DIRECT WAR
Unlike many regional powers, Iran has spent decades developing a national security strategy that relies on far more than conventional military strength. While Tehran continues to invest in its army, navy, air force, missile forces, and expanding drone capabilities, Iranian military doctrine places equal emphasis on deterrence through strategic depth, asymmetric warfare, intelligence operations, and long-term partnerships with governments and allied non-state organizations throughout the Middle East.¹ ²
From Tehran’s perspective, this strategy reflects both historical experience and geographic reality. Iranian leaders frequently point to the devastating Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), repeated threats of military intervention, international sanctions, and the substantial American military presence surrounding Iran as evidence that national security cannot rely solely upon defending Iranian territory. Instead, Iran has adopted a forward-defense doctrine designed to discourage potential adversaries by extending its strategic influence well beyond its borders.³
Rather than projecting military power primarily through overseas bases or large expeditionary forces, Iran has cultivated long-term relationships with governments, political movements, and armed organizations operating across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories. These relationships provide Tehran with multiple avenues through which it can influence regional events while simultaneously increasing the strategic costs facing any nation considering direct military action against Iran.¹ ⁴
Supporters of Iranian policy frequently describe this network as an effective deterrence strategy. From their perspective, maintaining relationships with regional partners strengthens Iran’s national security, creates strategic depth beyond its borders, and reduces the likelihood that future conflicts will be fought exclusively on Iranian soil. Iranian officials have consistently argued that deterrence is achieved not merely through military capability, but by convincing potential adversaries that military action would generate significant regional consequences.² ⁵
Many neighboring governments interpret the same strategy very differently. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, Israel, and several Gulf Cooperation Council members argue that Iranian support for armed organizations allows Tehran to influence political developments inside sovereign states while contributing to regional instability and prolonging proxy conflicts. These governments contend that the expansion of Iranian influence has increased tensions throughout the Middle East and complicated diplomatic efforts to resolve ongoing regional disputes.¹ ⁶
This difference in perspective lies at the heart of today’s geopolitical competition. Actions that Iranian officials characterize as legitimate defensive measures are frequently viewed by neighboring governments as offensive efforts to expand Iranian regional influence. Conversely, military cooperation among Gulf states, normalization agreements with Israel, and expanded American security partnerships are often viewed by Tehran as attempts to strategically encircle Iran. As a result, both sides increasingly perceive their own policies as defensive while viewing the actions of their rivals as aggressive.³ ⁶
The strategic consequences extend far beyond bilateral relations. Because many of these competing interests are advanced through local partners rather than direct confrontation between national militaries, regional crises increasingly develop into proxy conflicts involving multiple governments with overlapping interests. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and, at various times, Gaza have all become arenas in which larger regional rivalries are expressed through local political and military actors rather than conventional interstate warfare.² ⁴
JAFAJ assesses that this indirect approach to competition will remain one of the defining characteristics of Middle Eastern security for the foreseeable future. Conventional military conflict between major regional powers carries enormous political, economic, and human costs. Consequently, governments are likely to continue pursuing influence through diplomacy, economic leverage, intelligence activities, cyber capabilities, strategic partnerships, and proxy relationships rather than risking full-scale conventional war. Understanding this doctrine of indirect competition is essential to understanding nearly every major security crisis unfolding across the Middle East today.¹ ² ³
NATIONAL INTERESTS OUTWEIGH RELIGIOUS SOLIDARITY
One of the most persistent misconceptions in international affairs is the belief that governments conduct foreign policy primarily on the basis of religion, ideology, or historical friendship. While these factors often influence political rhetoric and public diplomacy, they rarely determine national strategy. Throughout history, states have consistently pursued policies designed to maximize their own security, economic prosperity, political stability, and long-term strategic interests.¹
The Middle East is no exception. Although religion remains an important component of national identity, governments throughout the region continuously evaluate a far broader range of strategic considerations before making foreign policy decisions. Territorial integrity, military readiness, maritime security, energy infrastructure, economic development, foreign investment, trade relationships, domestic political stability, and diplomatic flexibility frequently outweigh sectarian identity when leaders determine how to respond to regional crises.²
This reality explains why governments sharing the same religion often adopt dramatically different foreign policies. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for example, have periodically disagreed over regional security priorities despite their shared Arab identity and Sunni-majority populations. Likewise, Oman has traditionally pursued a policy of neutrality and diplomatic mediation, maintaining productive relationships with Iran while simultaneously preserving close ties with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf Cooperation Council members.³
Iraq presents perhaps the clearest example of competing national interests overriding simple religious explanations. Although Iraq possesses a Shia-majority population and maintains extensive political, religious, and economic ties with Iran, successive Iraqi governments have also sought to preserve close relationships with the United States, neighboring Arab governments, Turkey, and the broader international community. Baghdad’s foreign policy has therefore reflected an ongoing effort to balance competing strategic relationships rather than align exclusively with any single regional power.⁴
Pakistan illustrates a similar strategic balancing act. Sharing a border with Iran while simultaneously maintaining longstanding defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia and close security relationships with Western governments, Islamabad has consistently attempted to avoid becoming fully aligned with either side of regional rivalries. Instead, Pakistani leaders have generally pursued policies intended to preserve regional stability while protecting Pakistan’s own national security interests and economic development.⁵
Even governments that publicly criticize Iranian regional activities frequently continue diplomatic engagement with Tehran. Economic necessity, shared maritime boundaries, energy markets, border security, counterterrorism cooperation, and regional trade all encourage governments to maintain channels of communication despite significant political disagreements. Diplomatic engagement should therefore not be interpreted as political endorsement, just as public criticism does not necessarily eliminate opportunities for future cooperation.¹ ⁶
The same principle applies beyond the Middle East. Throughout modern international relations, governments routinely cooperate with strategic competitors on selected issues while simultaneously opposing them in other areas. The United States and China, for example, maintain extensive commercial relationships despite growing strategic competition. India continues to purchase military equipment from multiple international partners while pursuing an increasingly independent foreign policy. European governments cooperate closely within NATO while occasionally disagreeing over trade, energy policy, and regional security. These examples illustrate that strategic competition and diplomatic cooperation are not mutually exclusive but frequently occur simultaneously.⁷
JAFAJ assesses that this principle remains essential for understanding contemporary Middle Eastern politics. Governments do not select allies on the basis of religion alone. They evaluate every major foreign policy decision according to whether it enhances national security, strengthens economic resilience, protects political stability, and advances long-term strategic interests. Religious identity remains influential, but it operates within a broader framework dominated by calculations of national advantage. Those realities explain why alliances across the Middle East remain flexible, why governments frequently shift diplomatic positions as circumstances change, and why regional politics continue to defy simplistic religious explanations.¹ ²
WHO SUPPORTS IRAN—AND TO WHAT DEGREE?
One of the most common misconceptions surrounding Middle Eastern geopolitics is the belief that the region is divided into two clearly defined camps: nations that support Iran and nations that oppose it. JAFAJ assesses that this framework oversimplifies a far more complex strategic reality. Very few governments align completely with Tehran across every issue, and even fewer oppose Iranian interests in every circumstance. Instead, most states maintain relationships that vary according to security concerns, economic interests, domestic politics, geography, and changing regional conditions.¹
Rather than existing as rigid alliances, Iran’s regional relationships should be viewed as a spectrum. At one end are governments that maintain extensive political, military, and economic cooperation with Tehran. In the middle are states that pursue pragmatic diplomatic engagement while simultaneously opposing certain aspects of Iranian regional policy. At the opposite end are governments that increasingly view Iranian strategic ambitions as inconsistent with their own national security objectives. Between these positions lies considerable diplomatic flexibility, allowing governments to adjust policy as regional circumstances evolve.²
STRONG STATE PARTNERS
Iraq
Iraq maintains perhaps the most complicated relationship with Iran anywhere in the Middle East. Geography, religion, commerce, and decades of political interaction have created deep connections between the two countries. Since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, Iran has significantly expanded its influence within Iraq through political relationships, economic investment, religious institutions, and security cooperation with various Iraqi organizations.³
Despite these close ties, Iraq cannot accurately be described as an Iranian client state. Baghdad continues to maintain important strategic relationships with the United States, neighboring Arab governments, Turkey, the European Union, and numerous international organizations. Iraqi leaders have consistently sought to avoid becoming the central battlefield in the broader competition between Iran and its regional rivals. As a result, Iraqi foreign policy remains one of strategic balancing rather than exclusive alignment with Tehran.⁴
Syria
For decades, Syria represented Iran’s closest Arab state partner. Long before the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Damascus and Tehran maintained extensive political, military, and intelligence cooperation based upon shared regional interests. During Syria’s civil conflict, Iranian military, financial, and logistical support became a critical component of the Assad government’s survival strategy, further strengthening the bilateral relationship.⁵
Although Syria’s domestic political landscape continues to evolve, decades of institutional cooperation have produced enduring security relationships that are likely to influence both governments well into the future. Even as Damascus seeks broader diplomatic engagement with Arab governments, Iran remains an important strategic partner within Syria’s long-term security calculations.⁶
COUNTRIES MAINTAINING WORKING RELATIONS
Qatar
Qatar has traditionally pursued one of the Middle East’s most independent foreign policies. While remaining a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council and maintaining close security cooperation with the United States, Doha has also preserved diplomatic and economic relations with Tehran. Shared development of the South Pars/North Field natural gas reserve—the world’s largest natural gas field—creates powerful economic incentives for continued cooperation despite broader regional disagreements.⁷
Rather than serving as an Iranian ally, Qatar has frequently positioned itself as a diplomatic intermediary capable of maintaining communication with multiple regional actors simultaneously. This flexibility has enhanced Doha’s regional influence while allowing it to preserve productive relationships across competing political blocs.⁸
Oman
For decades, Oman has cultivated a reputation as one of the Middle East’s most respected diplomatic mediators. Muscat has consistently maintained productive relationships with Iran while simultaneously preserving close partnerships with Saudi Arabia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Gulf governments. Rather than choosing sides in regional disputes, Omani leaders have frequently sought to reduce tensions through quiet diplomacy and confidential negotiations.⁹
Oman’s strategic value lies not in military alignment but in diplomatic credibility. Numerous regional negotiations involving Iran and Western governments have relied upon Oman’s neutral position, making Muscat one of the region’s most influential behind-the-scenes diplomatic actors.¹⁰
Pakistan
Pakistan demonstrates how strategic relationships often resist simple political labels. Sharing a lengthy border with Iran while maintaining extensive military cooperation with Saudi Arabia and long-standing security partnerships with Western governments, Islamabad has consistently attempted to balance competing regional interests without fully aligning itself with any single power.¹¹
Pakistani policymakers generally seek stable relations with Tehran while simultaneously honoring defense commitments with Gulf partners and preserving access to Western military and economic assistance. This multidirectional approach reflects Pakistan’s broader national security strategy rather than ideological preference for any one regional actor.¹²
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
Iran possesses a relatively small number of close state partners, a larger group of pragmatic diplomatic relationships, and an even broader network of governments willing to cooperate selectively on issues of mutual interest. Most regional governments neither fully embrace nor fully reject Tehran. Instead, they continually adjust their relationships according to changing security conditions, economic opportunities, domestic political considerations, and evolving regional threats.
Understanding this spectrum of relationships is essential for interpreting Middle Eastern diplomacy. The region is not divided into fixed camps. It is characterized by overlapping partnerships, shifting priorities, and governments that consistently place national interests above ideological or sectarian alignment.¹ ²
IRAN’S MOST IMPORTANT PARTNERS ARE NOT STATES
Perhaps the most misunderstood aspect of Iran’s regional strategy is that many of its most influential partners are not sovereign governments. Although Iran maintains diplomatic relationships with numerous states, much of its regional influence has historically been exercised through long-standing relationships with non-state political and armed organizations operating throughout the Middle East.¹
This strategy differs significantly from the traditional alliance systems employed by most nation-states. Rather than relying exclusively on formal defense treaties or permanent overseas military bases, Tehran has cultivated networks of organizations capable of advancing Iranian strategic interests while simultaneously increasing the political and military costs facing potential adversaries.²
Among the best-known of these organizations is Hezbollah in Lebanon. Established during the early 1980s, Hezbollah has evolved from a local militia into one of Lebanon’s most influential political and military organizations. Its military capabilities, political representation, and extensive social service infrastructure have made it a central component of Lebanon’s domestic political landscape while also serving as one of Iran’s closest regional partners.³
Iran has likewise maintained extensive relationships with numerous Iraqi militia organizations that emerged following the 2003 invasion of Iraq and later participated in military operations against the Islamic State. While these organizations differ considerably in ideology, leadership, and political influence, several have maintained close military, financial, or ideological relationships with Tehran. Their participation within Iraq’s broader security structure has significantly expanded Iran’s political influence inside its western neighbor.⁴
In Yemen, Iran has developed relationships with the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah), a political and military organization that has become one of the principal actors in Yemen’s prolonged civil conflict. Although analysts continue to debate the precise scope of Iranian support, most governments in the region assess that Tehran has provided varying degrees of political backing, military assistance, and technical expertise that have enhanced Houthi capabilities over time.⁵
Iran has also maintained relationships with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and, at various times, Hamas. These relationships have not always been consistent or free of political disagreement. Hamas, for example, has periodically distanced itself from Tehran over regional issues—particularly regarding Syria—while later rebuilding portions of the relationship as strategic interests evolved. These fluctuations illustrate an important reality: even Iran’s closest non-state partners pursue their own interests and are not simply instruments of Iranian foreign policy.⁶
Collectively, these organizations are frequently described by analysts as part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” From Tehran’s perspective, this network serves as a forward-defense system intended to deter military threats, expand strategic depth, and strengthen regional deterrence. Iranian officials have consistently argued that supporting allied organizations contributes to national security by reducing the likelihood that conflicts will occur solely within Iranian territory.⁷
Many neighboring governments reach very different conclusions. Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and several Western governments contend that Iranian support for armed organizations undermines state sovereignty, fuels proxy warfare, prolongs regional instability, and complicates diplomatic efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts. These governments frequently argue that Iran’s regional influence extends beyond traditional diplomacy into the internal political affairs of neighboring states.⁸
These competing interpretations help explain why Iran’s network of regional partners remains one of the Middle East’s most controversial strategic issues. Supporters view these relationships as a legitimate deterrence strategy designed to protect Iranian national security. Critics view the same relationships as mechanisms through which Tehran projects influence beyond its borders while avoiding the costs and risks associated with direct military confrontation.⁹
JAFAJ assesses that both perspectives are essential for understanding the region. Policymakers who examine only one interpretation risk misunderstanding the strategic calculations driving regional decision-making. Whether viewed as deterrence, power projection, or a combination of both, Iran’s network of non-state partners has become one of the defining characteristics of contemporary Middle Eastern security and will likely remain a central factor shaping regional stability for years to come.¹⁰
WHY DO THESE RELATIONSHIPS EXIST?
Although each relationship is unique, several common strategic factors help explain why governments and non-state organizations continue to cooperate with Iran despite increasing regional tensions.
Shared Security Interests
Several governments and organizations view Iran as an important counterweight to competing regional powers. Where national security concerns overlap, cooperation often becomes a practical strategic choice rather than an ideological commitment.¹¹
Economic Cooperation
Energy infrastructure, cross-border trade, transportation corridors, investment opportunities, and shared natural resources encourage continued engagement with Tehran even among governments that disagree with certain Iranian regional policies. Economic interdependence frequently survives periods of political tension because mutual commercial interests remain significant.¹²
Strategic Independence
Many governments seek to avoid dependence upon any single regional or global power. Maintaining productive diplomatic relations with Iran provides additional flexibility, reduces strategic vulnerability, and strengthens negotiating positions with competing international partners.¹³
Domestic Political Considerations
In several countries, political parties, religious institutions, and armed organizations maintain longstanding historical, ideological, or cultural ties with Iran. These domestic relationships often influence foreign policy and help sustain bilateral cooperation even during periods of heightened regional tension.¹⁴
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
The relationships surrounding Iran cannot be explained through religion alone. Security, economics, geography, domestic politics, and strategic necessity all shape the decisions of governments and organizations throughout the Middle East. While ideology influences public rhetoric, national interest remains the principal force determining the durability of regional partnerships.
Understanding these motivations provides a more accurate picture of the Middle East than simplistic narratives portraying governments as permanently aligned for or against Tehran. The region continues to function as a dynamic strategic environment in which cooperation, competition, and diplomacy evolve continuously in response to changing political realities.¹⁵
THE STRATEGIC REALITY
One of the greatest analytical mistakes made by outside observers is assuming that the Middle East is divided into two permanent camps: nations that support Iran and nations that oppose it. JAFAJ assesses that this framework fails to capture the region’s strategic complexity. Middle Eastern governments rarely maintain absolute positions. Instead, they continually adjust policy in response to changing political circumstances, economic conditions, military developments, domestic pressures, and international events.¹
The modern Middle East is better understood as a dynamic balance-of-power system than as a collection of rigid alliances. Governments frequently cooperate with one another in one area while competing vigorously in another. A nation may oppose Iranian influence in Syria while simultaneously maintaining extensive trade with Tehran. Another government may criticize Iranian military activities while preserving diplomatic relations and cooperating on maritime security or energy development. These overlapping relationships often appear contradictory to outside observers but represent standard practice in international politics.²
Economic considerations remain among the most powerful influences on regional decision-making. Energy exports, shipping lanes, financial investment, cross-border commerce, and access to international markets all encourage governments to preserve working relationships even during periods of political tension. Severing diplomatic ties or economic cooperation often imposes substantial costs on both parties, creating incentives for continued engagement despite significant strategic disagreements.³
Security considerations are equally important. Governments throughout the Middle East must simultaneously prepare for conventional military threats, terrorism, cyber operations, ballistic missile proliferation, maritime security challenges, and domestic political instability. As a result, policymakers often seek to reduce the number of active adversaries they face at any given time. Diplomatic engagement therefore becomes a practical security tool rather than an indication of political agreement.⁴
This pragmatic approach explains why many governments publicly advocate restraint during regional crises while privately strengthening military readiness and expanding security cooperation with international partners. Diplomatic statements intended for public audiences frequently differ from private strategic planning conducted by national security officials. Understanding this distinction is essential for accurately interpreting official government statements during periods of heightened regional tension.⁵
The same flexibility extends beyond the Middle East. Throughout history, governments have routinely balanced cooperation with competition. During the Cold War, numerous nations maintained commercial relationships across ideological divides. Today, major powers continue to trade, negotiate, and cooperate on selected issues despite strategic rivalry in other areas. Middle Eastern governments operate according to the same principles of statecraft that have guided international relations for centuries.⁶
Perhaps the most important conclusion is that regional politics remain fluid rather than permanent. Alliances evolve as leadership changes, security threats emerge, economic priorities shift, and diplomatic opportunities arise. Governments that compete today may cooperate tomorrow if strategic circumstances change. Likewise, longstanding partners may gradually drift apart as their national interests diverge. Stability in the Middle East therefore depends not upon permanent friendships but upon the continuous management of competing interests.⁷
For policymakers, investors, journalists, and citizens attempting to understand regional events, this distinction is critical. Headlines often focus upon military confrontation, diplomatic disputes, or ideological rhetoric, yet those events frequently represent only one element of a much broader strategic calculation. Governments rarely make decisions for a single reason. Instead, every major foreign policy decision reflects the interaction of political, economic, military, diplomatic, and domestic considerations that collectively determine national strategy.⁸
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE CURRENT CONFLICT
The ongoing confrontation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States illustrates these broader strategic realities. Although governments throughout the Muslim world have expressed concern regarding the possibility of wider regional conflict, their responses have varied considerably according to their individual national interests rather than religious affiliation alone.¹
Several governments have publicly called for restraint while simultaneously strengthening domestic security measures, protecting critical infrastructure, increasing military readiness, and coordinating closely with international partners. Others have emphasized diplomatic mediation, fearing that a broader regional war would threaten energy exports, disrupt global shipping, damage tourism, undermine economic growth, and increase domestic political instability.²
Even governments highly critical of Israeli military operations have often stopped short of endorsing direct Iranian military action. Likewise, governments maintaining cooperative relations with the United States have frequently urged restraint rather than escalation. These differing responses illustrate the central conclusion of this report: national strategy—not religious solidarity—continues to drive regional decision-making.³
JAFAJ assesses that future crises are likely to follow a similar pattern. Governments will continue evaluating events through the lens of national security, economic resilience, political stability, and strategic advantage. Public statements may emphasize solidarity, diplomacy, or humanitarian concerns, but the policies ultimately adopted will continue to reflect each government’s assessment of its own national interests.⁴
CONCLUSION
The question posed at the beginning of this report—Why are so many Muslim nations aligned against Iran?—cannot be answered by religion alone. While sectarian differences between Sunni and Shia Islam remain politically significant, they represent only one element within a much broader strategic landscape. JAFAJ assesses that national interests, regional security, economic priorities, historical rivalries, and geopolitical competition collectively provide a far more accurate explanation for the policies adopted by governments throughout the Middle East.¹
Contrary to popular perception, the Muslim world is not united either in support of or opposition to Iran. Instead, it is characterized by a complex network of partnerships, rivalries, and pragmatic relationships that continue to evolve as regional circumstances change. Governments cooperate where interests overlap, compete where interests diverge, and frequently pursue both strategies simultaneously. The resulting diplomatic landscape is considerably more nuanced than the simplified narratives often presented in political debate or media reporting.²
Iran has successfully developed a regional strategy centered on strategic depth, deterrence, and long-term relationships with both governments and influential non-state organizations. Supporters argue that these relationships provide necessary protection against external threats and strengthen regional deterrence. Critics contend that they expand Iranian influence beyond its borders, undermine state sovereignty, and contribute to prolonged proxy conflicts. Both interpretations shape how governments formulate policy toward Tehran, and both influence the broader regional balance of power.³
Likewise, many Arab governments have increasingly strengthened security cooperation among themselves and with outside partners, including the United States and, in some cases, Israel. These relationships should not be interpreted solely through the lens of ideology or religion. Rather, they reflect shared concerns regarding regional stability, missile proliferation, maritime security, terrorism, economic resilience, and the protection of critical national infrastructure.⁴
Perhaps the most enduring lesson is that international politics rarely operates according to permanent friendships or permanent enemies. States continuously reassess their strategic environment and modify policy as circumstances evolve. Changes in political leadership, military capability, economic conditions, technological development, or regional conflict can alter diplomatic relationships that once appeared fixed. Consequently, today’s adversaries may become tomorrow’s negotiating partners, while today’s allies may discover important areas of disagreement.⁵
For analysts, journalists, policymakers, and citizens alike, understanding these dynamics is essential. Interpreting Middle Eastern affairs primarily through religious identity risks overlooking the strategic calculations that ultimately drive government decision-making. Successful analysis requires consideration of geography, history, economics, military capability, domestic politics, alliance structures, energy security, and diplomacy alongside religious and cultural influences. Only by integrating these factors can observers accurately assess regional developments and anticipate future policy decisions.⁶
Looking ahead, JAFAJ assesses that competition between Iran and many of its regional neighbors will likely persist, although its form may continue to evolve. Direct conventional warfare remains costly and unpredictable, making diplomacy, economic pressure, intelligence operations, cyber capabilities, strategic partnerships, and proxy competition more likely instruments of statecraft. Periods of confrontation will almost certainly alternate with periods of negotiation, reflecting the continuing effort by regional governments to balance security, prosperity, and political stability.⁷
Ultimately, the central finding of this report is straightforward: the Middle East is not divided primarily by religion—it is shaped by national interest. Governments may invoke religious language, historical identity, or ideological principles in public discourse, but the policies they ultimately adopt are overwhelmingly determined by calculations of security, economic advantage, political survival, and strategic opportunity. Appreciating that distinction is fundamental to understanding not only Iran’s relationships with its neighbors, but the future trajectory of the Middle East itself.⁸
JAFAJ INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
Confidence Level: High
JAFAJ assesses with high confidence that the principal factor driving the policies of most Muslim-majority governments toward Iran is national interest rather than religious solidarity. Historical rivalries, security concerns, economic interdependence, and geopolitical competition consistently outweigh sectarian affiliation in shaping regional decision-making.
Key Intelligence Judgments
- Regional alliances remain fluid and should not be viewed as permanent.
- Iran will continue relying upon strategic partnerships and indirect influence to enhance deterrence and expand regional leverage.
- Arab governments are expected to deepen security cooperation while preserving selective diplomatic engagement with Tehran where national interests require.
- Proxy competition, cyber operations, economic pressure, and diplomacy will remain more likely than sustained conventional interstate warfare.
- Future regional stability will depend less upon religious reconciliation than upon the successful management of competing national interests.
Readers should therefore approach future developments in the Middle East with an understanding that governments are likely to continue making decisions based on pragmatic strategic calculations rather than ideological alignment alone.
Footnotes
- Council on Foreign Relations, The Sunni-Shia Divide.
- United States Institute of Peace, Iran’s Regional Strategy and Proxy Networks.
- Baker Institute for Public Policy, Gulf States and Iran: Misunderstandings and Regional Security.
- Reuters, “Pakistan Weighs Regional Security Risks Amid Iran Conflict,” July 2026.
- Religion Unplugged. Islam’s Sunni-Shia Divide: Why It Matters Today.
- Council on Foreign Relations. The Arab League and Regional Politics.
- Encyclopaedia Iranica. Persian Identity and Iranian Civilization.
- Brookings Institution. Identity, Nationalism, and Power Politics in the Middle East.
- United States Institute of Peace. Iran’s Regional Strategy and Proxy Networks.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2026.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. Iran’s Missile and Drone Strategy.
- Congressional Research Service. Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies.
- Reuters. “Regional Security Developments Following the Iran-Israel Crisis,” 2026.
- Atlantic Council. Iran’s Network of Regional Partners and Strategic Deterrence.
- Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
- Council on Foreign Relations. The Sunni-Shia Divide.
- Baker Institute for Public Policy. Gulf States and Iran: Misunderstandings and Regional Security.
- Congressional Research Service. Iraq: Politics, Governance, and U.S. Policy.
- Reuters. “Pakistan Weighs Regional Security Risks Amid Iran Conflict.” July 2026.
- United States Institute of Peace. Iran’s Regional Strategy and Proxy Networks.
- Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Cornell University Press, 1987).
- Council on Foreign Relations. The Sunni-Shia Divide.
- Baker Institute for Public Policy. Gulf States and Iran: Misunderstandings and Regional Security.
- Congressional Research Service. Iraq: Politics, Governance, and U.S. Policy.
- United States Institute of Peace. Iran’s Regional Strategy and Proxy Networks.
- International Crisis Group. Syria, Iran, and Regional Security.
- Reuters. “Regional Diplomacy and Syria,” 2026.
- U.S. Energy Information Administration. Qatar Country Analysis Brief.
- Reuters. “Qatar Maintains Regional Diplomatic Balance,” 2026.
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Oman’s Regional Mediation.
- Middle East Institute. Oman as a Diplomatic Intermediary.
- Reuters. “Pakistan Weighs Regional Security Risks Amid Iran Conflict.” July 2026.
- Congressional Research Service. Pakistan: Political and Security Issues.
- United States Institute of Peace. Iran’s Regional Strategy and Proxy Networks.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. Iran and Its Regional Network.
- Congressional Research Service. Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress.
- Congressional Research Service. Iraq: Politics, Governance, and U.S. Policy.
- International Crisis Group. Yemen’s Houthi Movement and Regional Security.
- Council on Foreign Relations. Iran’s Regional Influence and Proxy Organizations.
- Atlantic Council. The Axis of Resistance: Strategy and Structure.
- Reuters. “Regional Security Developments Following the Iran-Israel Crisis,” 2026.
- Baker Institute for Public Policy. Gulf States and Iran: Misunderstandings and Regional Security.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2026.
- World Bank. Middle East Trade and Regional Economic Integration.
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Strategic Autonomy in the Middle East.
- Brookings Institution. Political Movements and Regional Alliances in the Middle East.
- Stephen M. Walt. The Origins of Alliances. Cornell University Press, 1987.
- Stephen M. Walt. The Origins of Alliances. Cornell University Press, 1987.
- Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
- Baker Institute for Public Policy. Gulf States and Iran: Misunderstandings and Regional Security.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2026.
- Reuters. “Regional Security Developments Following the Iran-Israel Crisis,” 2026.
- Council on Foreign Relations. The Sunni-Shia Divide.
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Strategic Competition in the Middle East.
- Brookings Institution. Middle East Geopolitics and Regional Power Competition.
Selected Bibliography
- Baker Institute for Public Policy. Gulf States and Iran: Misunderstandings and Regional Security.
- Brookings Institution. Middle East Geopolitics and Regional Power Competition.
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Strategic Competition in the Middle East.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. Iran and Its Regional Network.
- Congressional Research Service. Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress.
- Congressional Research Service. Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies.
- Congressional Research Service. Iraq: Politics, Governance, and U.S. Policy.
- Council on Foreign Relations. The Sunni-Shia Divide.
- Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
- International Crisis Group. Syria, Iran, and Regional Security.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2026.
- Reuters. Various reports on Middle East regional security and diplomacy, 2026.
- Stephen M. Walt. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987.
- United States Institute of Peace. Iran’s Regional Strategy and Proxy Networks.
- World Bank. Middle East Trade and Regional Economic Integration.