Part I: The Problem Is No Longer Uranium—It Is Trust
A JaFaJ Opinion Piece
Introduction
For more than two decades, Iran’s nuclear program has remained one of the international community’s most persistent diplomatic challenges. Governments have changed, sanctions have been imposed and lifted, military threats have intensified, covert operations have occurred, and multiple rounds of negotiations have produced both breakthroughs and setbacks. Despite these efforts, no lasting political settlement has emerged.¹
Much of the public discussion continues to focus on uranium enrichment percentages, centrifuge production, sanctions, and inspections. Those issues remain important. However, they are no longer the principal obstacle to an agreement.
The central obstacle today is trust.
Washington questions whether Tehran will honor long-term commitments. Tehran questions whether any agreement negotiated with one American administration will survive the next presidential election. European governments seek to preserve nuclear restraints while preventing another regional conflict. Gulf Arab states increasingly evaluate Iran’s nuclear activities alongside missile development, proxy organizations, maritime security, and regional influence.²
This article argues that future negotiations should no longer be built upon expectations of trust. They should instead be designed around verification, transparency, reciprocity, and incremental implementation.
Trust should become the result of successful diplomacy—not its prerequisite.
The Historical Record
Iran ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970 and entered into a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1974.³ Those agreements established Iran’s legal obligation to permit international safeguards intended to verify that nuclear materials remained dedicated to peaceful purposes.
International concern intensified after 2002 when previously undeclared Iranian nuclear activities became public. Subsequent IAEA investigations concluded that Iran had failed to declare certain nuclear activities required under its safeguards agreement. Those findings ultimately resulted in referral to the United Nations Security Council and a series of Security Council resolutions requiring Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and cooperate fully with IAEA investigations.⁴
Diplomatic negotiations eventually produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015 between Iran, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. Under the agreement, Iran accepted significant restrictions on uranium enrichment, centrifuge deployment, heavy-water reactor development, and stockpile limits in exchange for sanctions relief and expanded international monitoring. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 incorporated the agreement into the international legal framework governing Iran’s nuclear program.⁵
The agreement substantially reduced immediate proliferation concerns and was widely regarded as creating the most extensive nuclear verification regime ever negotiated with Iran.⁶
The diplomatic environment changed dramatically in May 2018 when the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions. Iran subsequently exceeded several of the agreement’s nuclear limitations, including restrictions involving uranium enrichment levels, stockpile quantities, and advanced centrifuge deployment. Since then, the relationship has largely evolved through reciprocal escalation rather than reciprocal compliance.⁷
The Collapse of Trust
Diplomatic negotiations usually require compromise.
Successful diplomacy requires something different.
It requires each government to believe that concessions made today will still have value tomorrow.
That confidence has largely disappeared.
From the American perspective, repeated disputes regarding safeguards implementation, enrichment activities, and transparency have reinforced longstanding concerns regarding Iranian compliance with international obligations.⁸
From the Iranian perspective, the American withdrawal from the JCPOA demonstrated that negotiated agreements may be reversed through domestic political decisions regardless of previous implementation.
Both governments therefore approach negotiations with fundamentally different assumptions.
Washington asks:
Can Iran be trusted to comply?
Tehran asks:
Can the United States be trusted to keep its promises?
Neither question has produced an answer acceptable to both governments.
Negotiating the Wrong Problem
One of the most persistent weaknesses in previous diplomatic efforts has been the attempt to negotiate every major dispute simultaneously.
Negotiators have attempted to resolve:
- nuclear enrichment;
- sanctions relief;
- ballistic missile development;
- proxy organizations;
- regional military activities;
- maritime security;
- prisoner exchanges;
- financial restrictions; and
- broader regional normalization.
This approach creates extraordinary political complexity.
Every additional issue introduces another opportunity for negotiations to collapse.
Instead of seeking one comprehensive settlement, negotiators should pursue parallel agreements with independent verification mechanisms.
Nuclear verification should remain a nuclear negotiation.
Regional security should become a regional security negotiation.
Economic sanctions should become an economic negotiation.
Prisoner exchanges should remain humanitarian negotiations.
Progress in one area should encourage progress elsewhere—but failure in one track should not automatically destroy every other agreement.
Verification Instead of Trust
History demonstrates that successful arms-control agreements rarely depend upon mutual friendship.
They depend upon inspection.
Verification allows governments to cooperate despite profound political disagreements.
The International Atomic Energy Agency exists for precisely this purpose.
Its safeguards system was designed to verify compliance through inspections, declarations, technical monitoring, and material accountancy—not political assurances.⁹
Future negotiations should therefore focus less on obtaining rhetorical commitments and more on strengthening practical verification mechanisms acceptable to all participating governments.
Trust is earned.
Verification is measured.
Diplomacy should be built upon measurements.
The Real Question
For years, diplomats have debated how much uranium Iran may enrich.
That remains an important technical question.
It is not the most important political question.
The more significant question is this:
Can governments design an agreement capable of surviving changes in leadership, domestic politics, regional crises, and international pressure?
If the answer is no, then even the most technically sophisticated agreement will ultimately fail.
If the answer is yes, then negotiations no longer depend upon trust.
They depend upon institutions.
That distinction should become the foundation of the next generation of diplomacy.
Iran’s Greatest Strategic Miscalculation
History is filled with examples of nations that unintentionally strengthened the very coalitions they hoped to weaken. One of the central arguments of this article is that Iran risks making the same mistake.
For decades, Iranian policymakers have viewed their nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and regional network of allied armed groups as essential components of national security. Iranian officials have consistently argued that these capabilities are defensive measures intended to deter foreign intervention and preserve national sovereignty.¹
Many of Iran’s neighbors, however, interpret the same activities very differently.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel increasingly assess Iran’s military posture as a regional challenge extending beyond the nuclear issue alone. Missile development, support for armed non-state actors, attacks on maritime commerce, and expanding enrichment capabilities are often viewed collectively rather than as isolated policies.²
Whether those perceptions are entirely accurate is almost secondary.
In international politics, perception often shapes policy as much as reality.
The Security Dilemma
Political scientists have long described this phenomenon as the security dilemma.
A government strengthens its military because it believes it is improving its own security.
Neighboring governments interpret those same actions as preparation for aggression.
They respond by strengthening their own militaries.
The original government then interprets those responses as new threats requiring even greater military capabilities.
Neither side necessarily desires war.
Both become less secure.³
The Middle East increasingly exhibits many characteristics of this cycle.
A New Nuclear Era
One of the least discussed consequences of Iran’s nuclear program may be its effect on neighboring states.
Several governments across the Middle East have expanded or announced civilian nuclear energy programs during the past decade. Although each government cites domestic electricity demand, economic diversification, desalination requirements, or long-term energy planning, regional security considerations inevitably influence strategic planning.⁴
Saudi Arabia has repeatedly stated its intention to develop a civilian nuclear industry and has publicly indicated that if Iran were to obtain a nuclear weapon, Riyadh would consider its own strategic options.⁵
The United Arab Emirates operates the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant under one of the region’s most comprehensive civilian nuclear regulatory frameworks. Egypt continues construction of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant with Russian assistance. Türkiye is developing the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. Each project has distinct economic and energy objectives, yet together they represent a significant expansion of nuclear expertise across the region.⁶
None of these programs should automatically be viewed as military in nature.
Nevertheless, they demonstrate that nuclear technology is becoming increasingly common throughout the Middle East.
The Unintended Consequence
Iran’s leaders have consistently argued that their nuclear activities are peaceful and fully consistent with their rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Yet strategic outcomes are determined not only by intentions but also by how those intentions are interpreted by others.
If neighboring governments conclude that Iran’s long-term trajectory increases regional uncertainty, they are likely to invest more heavily in missile defense, intelligence cooperation, advanced conventional weapons, cybersecurity, and civilian nuclear infrastructure.
Ironically, policies intended to enhance Iran’s security may encourage a broader regional military modernization effort.
This is not necessarily because neighboring governments seek confrontation.
It is because governments routinely prepare for capabilities rather than intentions.
Toward a Middle East Security Architecture
The Middle East is witnessing unprecedented levels of security cooperation among governments that historically maintained only limited formal relationships.
The Abraham Accords demonstrated that political alignments once considered unlikely can become possible when governments identify common strategic interests. Since their signing in 2020, cooperation among Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and the United States has expanded into areas including trade, technology, intelligence, air defense, and maritime security.⁷
Although no formal “Middle East NATO” currently exists, regional defense cooperation has become significantly more integrated than it was a decade ago.
Joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, missile defense discussions, and maritime coordination increasingly reflect common concerns regarding regional stability.⁸
Should these trends continue, Iran may ultimately find itself confronting not isolated bilateral relationships but a more interconnected regional security network.
Why This Matters for Negotiations
Diplomacy succeeds when governments believe that negotiated outcomes will improve their security more effectively than continued confrontation.
If Iranian decision-makers conclude that present policies are accelerating regional military cooperation, expanding civilian nuclear capabilities among neighboring states, and encouraging deeper security integration with outside powers, negotiations may become more attractive—not because of coercion, but because of strategic self-interest.
The objective should not be to force Iran into negotiations through humiliation.
The objective should be to demonstrate that a negotiated settlement offers greater long-term security than an indefinite cycle of escalation.
That is a fundamentally different diplomatic message.
Preliminary Conclusion
Iran’s greatest strategic challenge may not be sanctions.
It may not be uranium enrichment.
It may not even be military pressure.
Its greatest strategic challenge may be that policies designed to strengthen national security are encouraging neighboring governments to become more closely aligned with one another.
History suggests that regional security competitions often produce outcomes that none of the participants originally intended.
The challenge for future diplomacy is to interrupt that cycle before it becomes permanent.
Stop Negotiating Everything at Once
One of the principal weaknesses of previous negotiations has been the assumption that every disagreement between Iran and the international community must be resolved within a single comprehensive agreement.
That approach has repeatedly proven vulnerable to failure.
Nuclear enrichment, ballistic missiles, sanctions relief, regional proxy organizations, maritime security, cyber operations, prisoner exchanges, and humanitarian concerns have often been treated as one interconnected package. A breakdown on one issue has frequently jeopardized progress on every other issue.¹⁸
Large diplomatic agreements are politically attractive because they promise sweeping solutions. In practice, however, they create numerous opportunities for negotiations to collapse. Every additional issue adds another political constituency, another domestic debate, and another point of potential disagreement.
Future negotiations should instead follow a modular approach.
Separate the Tracks
Rather than pursuing one comprehensive agreement, negotiators should establish several independent negotiating tracks.
Track One: Nuclear Issues
This track should focus exclusively on uranium enrichment, centrifuge deployment, safeguards implementation, inspections, stockpile limitations, and technical verification. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should remain the primary technical authority responsible for monitoring compliance.¹⁹
Track Two: Regional Security
Regional military issues—including maritime security, deconfliction mechanisms, missile transparency, and crisis communications—should be negotiated separately by regional governments with appropriate international participation.
Track Three: Humanitarian Issues
Prisoner exchanges, missing persons, humanitarian access, disaster cooperation, and medical coordination should remain insulated from political disputes whenever possible.
Track Four: Economic Measures
Sanctions relief should be negotiated independently using clearly defined benchmarks that are transparent, measurable, and reversible.
Progress on one track should encourage cooperation on the others without making success in every area dependent upon complete agreement elsewhere.
Replace Political Promises with Technical Verification
Diplomatic history demonstrates that verification mechanisms generally outlast political assurances.
Governments change.
Legislatures change.
Political priorities change.
Verification systems remain.
Future agreements should therefore rely upon objective measurements rather than subjective confidence.
Verification mechanisms may include:
- expanded IAEA inspections;
- continuous monitoring technologies;
- agreed reporting schedules;
- reciprocal compliance reviews;
- independent dispute-resolution procedures; and
- automatic technical consultations following alleged violations.
Such mechanisms reduce uncertainty while allowing governments to cooperate without requiring complete political trust.²⁰
Reciprocity Must Be Immediate
Another recurring weakness in previous negotiations has been the perception that one side must act first while the other side promises future action.
This sequencing creates political risk for every participant.
Future agreements should instead emphasize simultaneous implementation.
For example:
- verified technical compliance should trigger immediate, predefined sanctions relief;
- verified sanctions relief should trigger immediate reciprocal technical implementation;
- verified violations should trigger proportional, predefined responses rather than automatic collapse of the entire agreement.
Negotiations should become predictable.
Predictability reduces political risk.
Give Diplomacy Room to Succeed
Public negotiations frequently become political theater.
Statements intended for domestic audiences often complicate discussions taking place behind closed doors.
Governments should therefore distinguish between public diplomacy and operational diplomacy.
Public officials should clearly explain objectives to their citizens while allowing professional negotiators sufficient flexibility to explore practical solutions.
History demonstrates that many successful international agreements required extensive confidential diplomacy before public announcements were possible.²¹
Confidential discussions should not replace democratic accountability.
They should facilitate it.
The Role of Regional Governments
Regional governments must become participants rather than spectators.
No long-term agreement involving Iran can succeed if neighboring states conclude that their own security concerns have been ignored.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Iraq, Türkiye, Jordan, Egypt, and other regional governments each possess distinct security interests.
Those interests deserve structured consultation rather than informal observation.
Inclusive diplomacy is more likely to produce durable agreements than negotiations conducted solely among global powers.
A Different Definition of Success
Success should not be defined as producing a perfect agreement.
Success should be defined as reducing the probability of future conflict.
A durable agreement that lowers regional tensions by twenty percent may ultimately prove more valuable than an ambitious agreement that promises complete normalization but collapses within a few years.
Diplomacy is rarely perfect.
Its purpose is to make conflict less likely.
That objective remains achievable.
Looking Ahead
The next stage of diplomacy requires a fundamental shift in thinking.
Negotiators should stop asking how to restore the past.
Instead, they should ask how to build a framework capable of surviving future political changes.
The objective is not simply another agreement with Iran.
The objective is the creation of institutions, verification mechanisms, and regional relationships capable of sustaining peace even during periods of political disagreement.
That should become the measure of diplomatic success.
The European Union
The European Union has historically served as one of the principal diplomatic bridges between Iran and the United States. European diplomacy helped facilitate negotiations that ultimately produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, and the EU has continued to coordinate discussions following the deterioration of the agreement.²²
The European Union should continue emphasizing diplomacy while improving transparency regarding sanctions, compliance benchmarks, and dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Future negotiations should avoid ambiguity.
Every obligation should have a corresponding benchmark.
Every benchmark should have a measurable standard.
Every standard should have a clearly defined consequence.
Diplomacy functions best when expectations are understood before disagreements emerge.
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom remains one of Europe’s most experienced diplomatic actors in Middle Eastern affairs.
London should continue supporting multilateral negotiations while expanding efforts aimed at maritime security in the Persian Gulf, intelligence cooperation against illicit weapons trafficking, and coordinated sanctions enforcement where appropriate.²³
At the same time, British diplomacy should continue encouraging dialogue between regional governments whose communications remain limited or intermittent.
Diplomatic engagement and deterrence should reinforce—not replace—one another.
France
France has traditionally combined strong support for nuclear non-proliferation with an independent diplomatic approach toward Middle Eastern security.
Paris should continue encouraging negotiations that strengthen verification rather than merely extending political commitments.
France also possesses considerable expertise in civilian nuclear regulation.
That experience could prove valuable if future regional agreements include expanded civilian nuclear cooperation accompanied by strengthened international safeguards.
Germany
Germany has consistently emphasized diplomacy, economic engagement, and international institutions as mechanisms for reducing conflict.
Berlin should continue supporting negotiated settlements while expanding technical cooperation involving export controls, nuclear security, industrial safeguards, and scientific exchanges consistent with international law.
Economic relationships often create additional incentives for political stability.
Those opportunities should not be ignored.
China
China occupies a unique position.
Unlike many Western governments, Beijing maintains extensive economic relationships with Iran while simultaneously expanding strategic partnerships throughout the Gulf region.
China demonstrated its growing diplomatic influence by facilitating the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023.²⁴
Future negotiations should encourage Beijing to use that influence in support of regional stability, transparency, and continued diplomatic engagement.
China’s long-term economic interests depend upon secure energy supplies and regional stability.
Those interests align with preventing military escalation.
Russia
Russia remains an important participant in discussions involving Iran’s nuclear program through both the JCPOA framework and its longstanding nuclear cooperation with Tehran.
Although geopolitical tensions between Russia and many Western governments have increased substantially in recent years, Moscow continues to possess technical expertise and diplomatic relationships that remain relevant to future negotiations.²⁵
Where practical, cooperation on nuclear verification should remain separated from broader geopolitical disputes.
Preventing nuclear proliferation remains a shared international interest regardless of disagreements elsewhere.
India
India has traditionally maintained productive relationships with both Iran and the Gulf Arab states.
Its investments in the Chabahar Port project demonstrate India’s interest in regional connectivity while preserving strategic autonomy in foreign policy.²⁶
New Delhi could contribute by encouraging economic cooperation, infrastructure development, and commercial integration that increase the long-term costs of regional conflict.
Economic interdependence does not eliminate political disagreements.
It frequently reduces incentives for war.
The United Nations
The United Nations remains the only international organization with universal legitimacy to convene governments representing competing regional interests.
Future negotiations should utilize existing UN institutions whenever possible while avoiding unnecessary duplication of international mechanisms already in place.
The Security Council should continue supporting non-proliferation objectives.
Specialized agencies should continue strengthening technical cooperation.
The Secretary-General should remain available to facilitate dialogue when requested by the participating governments.
The United Nations cannot create peace.
It can provide institutions through which governments pursue it.
The International Atomic Energy Agency
No institution is more important to future nuclear negotiations than the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The IAEA’s credibility depends upon political independence, technical competence, and consistent application of international safeguards.
Future agreements should strengthen—not weaken—the Agency’s ability to verify compliance.
Governments may disagree politically.
Scientific measurements should remain objective.
Confidence in verification depends upon confidence in the institution performing the verification.
Maintaining the IAEA’s technical independence should therefore become one of the highest priorities in any future agreement.²⁷
The Path Forward
The international community should abandon the search for a single diplomatic breakthrough capable of resolving every disagreement simultaneously.
Instead, governments should pursue continuous diplomacy supported by permanent institutions.
Negotiations should become routine rather than extraordinary.
Communication should continue even during periods of heightened tension.
Verification should replace speculation.
Transparency should replace ambiguity.
Incremental progress should replace unrealistic expectations.
The objective is not to eliminate every disagreement.
The objective is to reduce the probability that disagreement becomes war.
That goal remains achievable.
What Should Never Happen Again
The history of negotiations with Iran demonstrates that diplomatic failures rarely occur because governments stop talking.
They occur because governments stop believing.
When confidence disappears, every military exercise becomes a threat.
Every intelligence report becomes evidence of bad faith.
Every political speech becomes another reason to delay negotiations.
Future diplomacy must avoid repeating several recurring mistakes.
First, negotiations should never become hostage to domestic political calendars. Election cycles, coalition politics, and changes in government should not automatically invalidate years of diplomatic progress. Stable institutions—not temporary political majorities—should provide continuity.²⁸
Second, governments should avoid public ultimatums whenever possible. While public statements can reassure domestic audiences, diplomacy often succeeds only when negotiators retain sufficient flexibility to explore compromise privately. The most durable international agreements have frequently been preceded by extensive confidential negotiations.²⁹
Third, negotiations should avoid “all-or-nothing” diplomacy. International agreements should be designed so that limited disagreements do not automatically destroy years of successful implementation. Arms-control history demonstrates that dispute-resolution mechanisms often preserve agreements during periods of political crisis.³⁰
Build Institutions, Not Headlines
Diplomatic success should not be measured by the signing ceremony.
It should be measured by whether the agreement still functions ten years later.
Too often, governments focus on negotiating documents while neglecting the institutions necessary to implement them.
Future agreements should establish permanent organizations responsible for:
- technical verification;
- scientific cooperation;
- maritime communications;
- military deconfliction;
- sanctions review;
- humanitarian coordination;
- emergency consultation;
- dispute resolution.
Institutions survive political disagreements.
Personal relationships rarely do.
The objective should therefore be to institutionalize diplomacy rather than personalize it.
The Role of Economic Integration
History demonstrates that nations engaged in substantial economic cooperation generally possess stronger incentives to avoid military conflict.
Economic interdependence is not a guarantee of peace.
It does, however, increase the political and financial costs of confrontation.
Future diplomacy should therefore encourage:
- regional infrastructure projects;
- energy cooperation where appropriate;
- transportation connectivity;
- environmental initiatives;
- scientific research partnerships;
- public health cooperation;
- educational exchanges.
These initiatives should complement—not replace—security negotiations.
Peace is strengthened when governments develop multiple reasons to cooperate.
The Human Dimension
Diplomatic negotiations often focus upon governments.
Peace ultimately belongs to people.
Millions of Iranians, Israelis, Saudis, Emiratis, Jordanians, Iraqis, Egyptians, Turks, Europeans, and Americans share remarkably similar aspirations.
They seek security.
Economic opportunity.
Educational advancement.
Stable families.
Predictable futures.
These common interests rarely dominate diplomatic discussions.
They should.
Expanding academic exchanges, scientific collaboration, cultural programs, disaster-response cooperation, and medical partnerships cannot resolve strategic disagreements by themselves.
They can, however, reduce mutual misunderstanding.
Long-term peace depends not only upon agreements signed by governments but also upon relationships developed among societies.
Leadership Matters
Diplomatic breakthroughs rarely occur because governments suddenly become friends.
They occur because leaders conclude that continued confrontation no longer serves their national interests.
Effective leadership requires recognizing when previous strategies have reached diminishing returns.
Every government represented in future negotiations will need to make politically difficult decisions.
Iran.
The United States.
Israel.
Saudi Arabia.
European governments.
Regional partners.
No agreement can succeed if compromise is viewed as weakness.
Compromise is often the practical expression of strategic confidence.
Strong governments negotiate because they possess choices.
Weak governments negotiate because they possess none.
Recognizing that distinction changes the political narrative surrounding diplomacy.
The Strategic Choice
The Middle East now faces two competing futures.
One path continues the familiar cycle of sanctions, military escalation, proxy conflict, cyber operations, missile development, intelligence competition, and periodic crises.
The other path accepts that strategic competition will continue while creating institutions capable of preventing competition from becoming war.
Neither future promises perfection.
One offers greater stability.
History will judge today’s leaders not by the speeches they deliver but by the institutions they leave behind.
Final Thoughts
The question confronting policymakers is not whether Iran should negotiate.
The question is whether every government involved can design a negotiating framework capable of surviving disagreement.
Trust alone cannot accomplish that objective.
Verification can.
Institutions can.
Transparency can.
Predictability can.
Diplomacy succeeds when governments no longer depend upon optimism.
It succeeds when they construct systems capable of functioning despite political differences.
That is the central lesson of the past two decades.
It should become the foundation for the next two.
Conclusion
Bringing Iran back to the negotiating table will require more than sanctions, incentives, or military deterrence.
It will require a different philosophy of diplomacy.
One that accepts political disagreement as permanent.
One that measures compliance rather than intentions.
One that rewards verified progress instead of rhetorical promises.
One that recognizes regional security cannot be achieved by any nation acting alone.
Negotiations without trust are possible.
Negotiations without verification are not.
The challenge before the international community is therefore not to create perfect trust.
It is to create durable institutions capable of preserving peace despite imperfect trust.
That objective remains difficult.
It is also achievable.
Footnotes
- Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, Congressional Research Service Report R40094 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated August 7, 2025).
- Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program; Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program and UN Sanctions Reimposition, Congressional Research Service In Focus IF11583 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 9, 2026).
- Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program, discussing Iran’s ratification of the NPT in 1970 and conclusion of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1974.
- Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program, sections on IAEA safeguards, Board of Governors findings, and United Nations Security Council actions.
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015); summarized in Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program.
- Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program, discussion of JCPOA verification and monitoring provisions.
- Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program; Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program and UN Sanctions Reimposition.
- Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program, discussion of IAEA safeguards compliance and subsequent Board of Governors findings.
- Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program, section describing the purpose and scope of the IAEA safeguards system.
- Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, Congressional Research Service Report R40094 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated August 7, 2025).
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025 (London: IISS, 2025).
- Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214.
- International Atomic Energy Agency, Power Reactor Information System (PRIS); World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in the United Arab Emirates,” “Nuclear Power in Egypt,” and “Nuclear Power in Türkiye.”
- Remarks by Saudi officials on nuclear policy summarized in Congressional Research Service reporting and public statements regarding regional nuclear competition.
- World Nuclear Association, country profiles for the UAE, Egypt, and Türkiye; IAEA PRIS reactor database.
- The Abraham Accords Declaration, September 15, 2020; U.S. Department of State, The Abraham Accords.
- U.S. Central Command, public releases on regional integrated air and missile defense cooperation and multinational military exercises.
- Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, Congressional Research Service Report R40094 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated August 7, 2025).
- International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency).
- International Atomic Energy Agency, The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Reference Series (Vienna: IAEA).
- George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993); Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
- European External Action Service, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), official background materials and statements on EU coordination of negotiations.
- UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, UK Policy Toward Iran and official statements regarding Gulf maritime security.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Trilateral Statement by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the People’s Republic of China,” March 10, 2023.
- Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, Congressional Research Service Report R40094 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated August 7, 2025).
- Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, official materials concerning the Chabahar Port Project and India-Iran economic cooperation.
- International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Overview; IAEA Statute; and official safeguards documentation describing the Agency’s verification responsibilities.
- Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, Congressional Research Service Report R40094 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated August 7, 2025).
- George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993); Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
- Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961); Steven E. Miller and Scott D. Sagan, eds., Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
- Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence, 4th ed. (Boston: Pearson, 2012).
- United Nations Charter, Preamble and Chapters I–VI; United Nations, Our Common Agenda (New York: United Nations, 2021).
- International Atomic Energy Agency, The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966 and 1968), IAEA Safeguards Series; Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, CRS Report R40094.