Who Would Be Best For MENA? A Preliminary Comparison Of the 2028 Presidential Field

 

WHO WOULD BE BEST FOR MENA?

A PRELIMINARY COMPARISON OF THE 2028 PRESIDENTIAL FIELD

JaFaJ STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

 

EXECUTIVE JUDGMENT

It is far too early for MENA governments—or anyone else—to choose a 2028 presidential winner. The field is fluid, the nominations are more than a year away, and several figures discussed here have not declared presidential campaigns. It is not too early, however, to examine the policy models those figures represent.

This is a **comparison, not an endorsement**. JaFaJ does not recommend a candidate. It asks a narrower strategic question: **If one of these figures ultimately became president, what would that presidency most likely mean for Israel, the Gulf states, Iran, the Palestinians, and the broader MENA region?**

The comparison remains intentionally preliminary. The source material identifies JD Vance and Marco Rubio among the leading Republican possibilities and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Gavin Newsom, and Kamala Harris among Democratic figures being discussed. The field is not settled.¹

Abdul El-Sayed requires separate treatment. He is **not a presidential candidate**. He is the Democratic nominee for the U.S. Senate in Michigan. His inclusion is therefore as a political-coalition indicator—particularly of progressive, Arab-American, and Gaza-focused currents within the Democratic Party—not as a conventional 2028 contender.²

THE JaFaJ TEST

MENA is not a single actor and has no single definition of what is ‘best.’ Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, and Iran would evaluate the same American president very differently.

JaFaJ therefore evaluates each figure against five strategic questions:

• **Israel:** How would the candidate approach Israel’s security relationship with the United States, military assistance, and Palestinian policy?
• **Iran:** How would the candidate balance deterrence, sanctions, diplomacy, and military force?
• **Gulf security:** How would the candidate approach Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other American security partners?
• **Regional stability:** Would the likely approach reduce or increase the risk of major regional escalation?
• **Strategic predictability:** How clearly can MENA governments infer the likely policy from the public record?

1. MARCO RUBIO — THE CONTINUITY MODEL

Rubio currently represents the clearest continuity-oriented MENA model among the figures examined. His public record emphasizes close U.S.-Israel ties, pressure on Iran, strong Gulf partnerships, and a willingness to use American diplomatic and economic leverage to advance U.S. interests.

That orientation was visible during Rubio’s June 2026 Gulf travel, when discussions included Iran, navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and the U.S. security commitment to the UAE.³

For Israel, a Rubio presidency would most likely mean substantial continuity in the security relationship. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it would likely mean a relatively familiar defense and strategic framework. On Iran, Rubio’s approach would likely emphasize deterrence and pressure rather than accommodation.

** JaFaJ assessment:** Rubio currently offers the **highest continuity and predictability** of the figures considered. That is an analytical finding—not an endorsement.

2. JD VANCE — THE TRANSACTIONAL REPUBLICAN MODEL

Vance is the most important Republican alternative to Rubio because his approach combines strong deterrence with a more explicit willingness to distinguish U.S. interests from those of individual allies.

His administration’s policy places preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon at the center of its Iran strategy. At the same time, Vance has publicly challenged Israeli government positions when he believes they conflict with U.S. strategic interests or diplomacy.⁴

His August 31 outreach to Jewish Republicans in Las Vegas is significant because Vance reaffirmed the strategic importance of the U.S.-Israel relationship while addressing concerns among pro-Israel Republicans about his broader foreign-policy approach.⁵

For MENA, Vance could therefore mean strong U.S. engagement without an assumption that every Israeli preference automatically becomes an American preference.

** JaFaJ assessment:** Vance is **less predictable than Rubio but potentially more strategically transactional**. His ultimate MENA doctrine is still developing.

3. KAMALA HARRIS — THE ALLIANCE-PLUS-CONDITIONALITY MODEL

Harris has the most extensive presidential-level foreign-policy record among the Democratic figures examined. Her established approach has combined support for Israel’s ability to defend itself with stronger emphasis on civilian protection, humanitarian concerns, and Palestinian political rights.

A Harris administration would therefore be unlikely to abandon the U.S.-Israel relationship. The more likely change would be in its terms: greater pressure concerning civilian harm and a stronger effort to connect regional diplomacy with Palestinian political outcomes.

For Gulf governments, the relationship would likely remain strategically important, but human-rights and governance questions would receive greater weight.

** JaFaJ assessment:** Harris represents the **most institutionally established Democratic model of maintaining alliances while applying greater conditionality.**

4. GAVIN NEWSOM — THE DEVELOPING DEMOCRATIC MODEL

Newsom’s national foreign-policy profile remains less developed than those of Rubio, Vance, or Harris. His recent public positions indicate greater caution toward military escalation involving Iran and a willingness to criticize U.S.-Israeli military action.

At the same time, it would be premature to extrapolate a complete MENA doctrine from those statements. A future Newsom administration could combine alliance management, human-rights concerns, diplomacy, and California’s extensive economic relationship with the region.

** JaFaJ assessment:** Newsom represents a **potentially significant policy adjustment, but the evidence is not yet sufficient to define a stable MENA doctrine.**

5. ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ — THE TRANSFORMATIONAL MODEL

AOC represents the sharpest potential departure from the traditional U.S.-Israel security-assistance model among the presidential figures considered.

Her public record has emphasized Palestinian rights, greater scrutiny of U.S. military assistance to Israel, and broader accountability for U.S. arms transfers. Her approach would likely make congressional and executive conditions on military assistance substantially more important.

For Iran, the likely emphasis would be on diplomacy and constraints on military escalation. For the Gulf, strategic partnerships would likely continue, but arms sales and human-rights questions could receive substantially greater scrutiny.

This does not necessarily mean U.S. disengagement from MENA. It would mean a **different theory of engagement**.

** JaFaJ assessment:** AOC represents the **most transformational presidential model** in the comparison.

6. ABDUL EL-SAYED — THE PROGRESSIVE COALITION INDICATOR

El-Sayed is different from every other person in this comparison because he is not running for president. He is the Democratic nominee for the U.S. Senate in Michigan.²

His importance lies in what his campaign reveals about the changing Democratic coalition. El-Sayed won the Democratic Senate nomination in August and is facing Republican Mike Rogers. His campaign has sought to broaden its appeal beyond its progressive base while remaining associated with major debates over Israel, Gaza, antisemitism, and the direction of the Democratic Party.⁶

That makes Michigan strategically useful to JaFaJ. The race can provide an early indicator of whether progressive MENA positions translate into broader electoral strength in a competitive state.

** JaFaJ assessment:** El-Sayed is **not a presidential option in this comparison**. He is a useful indicator of the progressive end of the Democratic coalition and its potential influence on future presidential politics.

COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

FIGURE	ISRAEL	IRAN	GULF SECURITY	PALESTINIAN POLICY	REGIONAL STABILITY	PREDICTABILITY
Rubio	Very strong continuity	Strong deterrence	Very strong	Moderate	High	High
Vance	Strong, more transactional	Strong deterrence	Strong	Moderate	Moderate–High	Moderate
Harris	Strong alliance + pressure	Deterrence + diplomacy	Strong	High	High	High
Newsom	Alliance + greater scrutiny	More cautious	Moderate–Strong	High	Moderate–High	Moderate
AOC	Major change likely	Diplomacy emphasis	Greater scrutiny	Very high	Uncertain	Moderate
El-Sayed*	Progressive/conditional	Diplomacy emphasis	Greater scrutiny	Very high	Uncertain	Moderate

*El-Sayed is included as a Democratic coalition indicator, not as a presidential candidate.

SO, WHO WOULD BE ‘BEST’ FOR MENA?

The answer depends entirely on what a MENA government wants from Washington. There is no single regional answer.

• **For maximum continuity in U.S.-Israel security policy:** Rubio is the clearest model.
• **For strong deterrence combined with greater U.S. strategic independence from any individual ally:** Vance is the clearest model.
• **For continued U.S. alliances combined with greater humanitarian and Palestinian-policy pressure:** Harris is the clearest model.
• **For a more cautious approach to military escalation:** the Democratic candidates generally offer the stronger probability of restraint.
• **For the greatest transformation of U.S. policy toward Israel and U.S. arms transfers:** AOC represents the clearest model.
• **For understanding the progressive Democratic coalition:** El-Sayed’s Michigan Senate campaign is the most relevant indicator among the six.

AND WHO WOULD BE ‘WORST’?

JaFaJ should be careful here. Calling a candidate ‘worst for MENA’ without defining whose interests are being measured would be analytically weak. A candidate could be viewed as favorable by one MENA government and highly unfavorable by another.

The more rigorous conclusion is that **AOC represents the greatest departure from the current U.S.-Israel/Gulf security model**, while Rubio represents the least disruptive model. If the metric is continuity, AOC produces the greatest policy risk to the existing regional architecture. If the metric is reducing civilian harm or increasing Palestinian political leverage, the ranking changes substantially.

Likewise, a government seeking maximum deterrence against Iran may prefer a different model from a government seeking to minimize the probability of U.S.-Iran military escalation.

JaFaJ therefore does **not** identify a universal ‘best’ or ‘worst’ candidate. It identifies the policy consequences of each possible direction.

THE ISRAEL VARIABLE

Israel is the clearest dividing line in the comparison. The debate is no longer adequately captured by the question, ‘Is the candidate pro-Israel?’ The more useful questions are:

• Does the candidate view Israel’s security relationship with the United States as strategically fundamental?
• Should military assistance remain broadly unconditional?
• Should U.S. policy respond to Israeli conduct in Gaza and the West Bank?
• How much weight should Palestinian political rights receive in U.S. diplomacy?
• How should Washington balance Israeli security, Arab normalization, Iranian deterrence, and regional stability?

Rubio currently offers the strongest continuity answer. Harris offers alliance continuity with greater conditionality. Vance offers alliance continuity with greater transactional independence. Newsom remains less defined. AOC represents the strongest potential restructuring of the relationship. El-Sayed represents the progressive coalition’s pressure for an even more substantial shift.

WHAT MENA SHOULD WATCH NEXT

• Whether Vance and Rubio begin to develop clearly differentiated MENA doctrines.
• Whether Vance’s outreach to Jewish Republicans produces a durable position on Israel and antisemitism.
• Whether AOC formally enters the 2028 presidential contest.
• Whether Newsom develops a comprehensive MENA platform rather than issue-specific positions.
• Whether Harris re-enters the presidential field and how she modifies her Israel/Gaza policy.
• Whether El-Sayed’s Michigan Senate campaign broadens or narrows the electoral space for progressive MENA policy.
• Whether Democratic candidates increasingly make Palestinian policy part of their national platforms.
• Whether Gulf governments begin cultivating relationships with multiple potential 2028 administrations rather than placing strategic bets on one party.

JaFaJ ASSESSMENT

**It is too early to pick a winner. It is not too early to understand the choices.**

The 2028 field will almost certainly change. Candidates will enter and leave the race. Positions will evolve. International events—including developments involving Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Gaza—could radically alter the political debate.

For now, the six figures examined here represent six different analytical signals: Rubio’s continuity, Vance’s transactional Republicanism, Harris’s alliance-plus-conditionality model, Newsom’s developing Democratic internationalism, AOC’s transformational approach, and El-Sayed’s progressive coalition politics.

The central lesson for MENA governments is therefore not to choose a candidate today. It is to **build relationships across the emerging American political spectrum and understand what each possible administration would mean for regional interests.**

JaFaJ will continue to track the field as it develops.

REFERENCES

1. Ballotpedia, “Presidential candidates, 2028,” accessed September 1, 2026.
2. Abdul El-Sayed for U.S. Senate, official campaign website, accessed September 1, 2026.
3. Reuters, reporting on 2028 Republican presidential prospects and current Vance/Rubio positioning, 2026.
4. U.S. administration and public statements concerning Iran, Israel, and regional security, 2026.
5. Axios, “Vance reaches out to Jewish Republicans in Vegas speech,” September 1, 2026.
6. Associated Press, “Abdul El-Sayed wins Michigan Senate primary in defining race for Democrats,” August 2026.
7. Washington Post, “El-Sayed’s win triggered wave of anti-Muslim rhetoric online,” August 23, 2026.

ENDNOTES

1. The 2028 field remains preliminary. Early prediction markets and polling are indicators of political attention, not reliable forecasts of nominations or election outcomes.
2. Abdul El-Sayed is the Democratic nominee for Michigan’s U.S. Senate seat in 2026, not a presidential candidate. His inclusion is explicitly analytical and comparative.
3. Rubio’s June 2026 Gulf engagement is used as evidence of the continuity-oriented regional-security model.
4. Vance’s public position combines strong opposition to an Iranian nuclear weapon with a more transactional view of alliance interests.
5. Vance’s August 31, 2026 outreach to Jewish Republicans is significant because it directly addressed U.S.-Israel relations and concerns among pro-Israel Republicans.
6. El-Sayed’s August 2026 primary victory placed him in the November Senate race against Republican Mike Rogers.
7. All candidate assessments are analytical judgments based on the public record available as of September 1, 2026. They are not endorsements, predictions, or statements of candidate policy beyond the evidence cited.
8. Information current through September 1, 2026.

EDITORIAL NOTE

Neutral JaFaJ strategic assessment. The brief distinguishes documented developments and public positions from forward-looking analytical judgments. It does not endorse a political party or candidate.