EXCLUSIVE: PALESTINE ON THE BRINK—IS A CIVIL WAR IN THE MAKING?
Executive Summary
JAFAJ has held a series of private conversations with influential Palestinian political figures, community leaders, and underground networks in the West Bank to assess the direction of the expected Palestinian elections. The information gathered presents a political arena approaching an internal confrontation rather than an ordinary electoral contest. Public anger toward Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority, and Fatah has reached dangerous levels, while the formal entry of Yasser Abbas into Fatah’s senior leadership has strengthened fears of political inheritance. Hamas, meanwhile, has emerged from the Gaza war severely weakened and does not intend to compete for every available parliamentary seat. According to sources on the ground, the movement’s present strategy is to limit its participation, avoid dividing the opposition vote, and leave more electoral space for the coalition associated with Mohammed Dahlan and for other candidates opposed to Abbas. This is not necessarily a joint campaign or a formal partnership. It is primarily a calculation by Hamas that removing Abbas and preventing the rise of his son are now more urgent than maximizing its own representation. Although many Palestinians blame Hamas for the destruction in Gaza, their hostility toward the existing Palestinian leadership could still lead them to support Hamas candidates, the Dahlan coalition, or almost any credible opposition list. The decisive factors will be economic collapse, internal divisions within Fatah, the absence of public confidence, and whether Abbas ultimately allows elections that could seriously weaken his rule.
A Battle Over the Palestinian Leadership
The expected elections are developing into a wider struggle over who will control the Palestinian political system after Mahmoud Abbas.
Elections for the Palestinian National Council, the legislative body of the Palestine Liberation Organization, are due to take place on November 1, 2026. Palestinian Legislative Council elections are then expected on November 28.
The first vote concerns representation within the PLO, while the second will determine the composition of the Palestinian parliament. Together, the two elections could reshape both the PLO and the Palestinian Authority.
Yet the contest is not limited to Fatah and Hamas. It involves rival currents inside Fatah, the coalition associated with Mohammed Dahlan, independent opposition candidates, Hamas-linked networks, and Palestinians who are prepared to support almost anyone capable of defeating the official Abbas bloc.
The central issue is no longer simply who wins the most seats. It is whether Mahmoud Abbas can preserve control, whether his son can inherit a meaningful political position, and whether the existing Palestinian political structure can survive the accumulated anger on the ground.
The Rise of Yasser Abbas
In May 2026, Yasser Abbas was elected to Fatah’s Central Committee, the movement’s most powerful executive body. This was his first formal position within Fatah.
Before receiving this position, Yasser Abbas was known mainly as a businessman with interests in construction, property, and other commercial activities. His elevation into Fatah’s senior leadership has therefore attracted considerable attention.
Many Palestinians now view his appointment as evidence that Mahmoud Abbas is attempting to prepare his son for a larger political role and to preserve the family’s influence after his departure.
This perception has produced additional resentment inside Fatah as well as among the wider Palestinian public. The idea of political inheritance is deeply unpopular, and many Fatah members do not regard Yasser Abbas as a product of the movement’s political or national history.
His presence has therefore changed the meaning of the coming elections. They are increasingly being viewed as a confrontation over succession and the future ownership of Fatah, rather than merely another institutional vote.
What JAFAJ Heard in the West Bank
JAFAJ spoke privately with a well-connected Palestinian political and community figure in the Hebron area. The source maintains relationships with Palestinian activists, Israeli officials, local power centres, and individuals close to Hamas.
JAFAJ is withholding the source’s name and identifying information to protect him and the broader network involved in obtaining this assessment.
The source was asked to examine the political atmosphere surrounding the proposed elections, the internal condition of Hamas, public attitudes toward Fatah, and the electoral prospects of the different anti-Abbas currents.
Information previously supplied by this source has been checked through contacts on the Israeli side, and important parts of his earlier reporting were found to be reliable. The conclusions presented here nevertheless represent his assessment and the accounts he received from people operating on the ground.
Hamas Will Not Contest Every Seat
The most important information provided to JAFAJ is that Hamas has decided against full participation in the parliamentary elections.
According to the source, Hamas does not intend to compete for every available seat or present a complete electoral list under its own name. Instead, the movement may enter a limited number of candidates, support selected independent lists, or avoid competing in constituencies where its presence would divide the vote against Abbas.
The purpose of this approach is to prevent the official Fatah bloc from benefiting from a fragmented opposition. It would also leave more seats available to the coalition associated with Mohammed Dahlan and to other candidates challenging the current leadership.
This should not be interpreted as evidence that Hamas and Dahlan are operating as a single organization or running a joint campaign. Hamas has reached its decision according to its own political interests.
Its calculation is that removing Mahmoud Abbas and preventing Yasser Abbas from consolidating power are currently more important than winning the largest possible number of seats for itself.
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are expected to direct much of their political influence against Abbas. The various forces opposing him have not yet announced a single alliance or adopted an official collective name. Several potential candidates have also avoided naming their electoral blocs while uncertainty continues over whether the elections will actually be held.
The source did not indicate that Mohammed Dahlan is confronting serious political difficulties. On the contrary, the decision by Hamas to limit its participation could indirectly strengthen the electoral position of the Dahlan coalition without requiring the two sides to campaign together.
Hamas Turns Its Attention Toward Abbas
The Gaza war has fundamentally changed Hamas, according to the source.
After speaking with members and senior activists connected to the movement in the West Bank, he concluded that their immediate objective is no longer the removal of Israel. Their current priority is the removal of Mahmoud Abbas.
The source described Hamas as politically, militarily, financially, and psychologically exhausted. Individuals who once presented themselves as powerful leaders now recognize that their former position has largely disappeared.
Senior figures connected to the movement are reportedly more concerned with personal security, income, and avoiding arrest or assassination than with expanding Hamas’s control in the West Bank.
The source said Hamas members privately admit that the Gaza war devastated their movement. Their confidence has collapsed, and the arrogance that previously characterized discussions about taking control of the West Bank has largely vanished.
This weakness is another reason Hamas does not want to assume full responsibility for the next political stage. It may seek parliamentary influence, but it does not necessarily want to form or administer the next government.
A Movement Under Severe Pressure
The source described a recent meeting with a formerly prominent Hamas figure from the Hebron district.
During the meeting, the Hamas figure said that the movement had “eaten the air,” a Palestinian expression meaning that it had lost almost everything.
According to the source, the man had once behaved like a hero and projected considerable confidence. During their latest meeting, however, his principal concern was avoiding another arrest by Israel.
He reportedly became emotional and pleaded for assistance, explaining that he had already been arrested several times even though he was now quiet, no longer politically active, and no longer creating problems.
The source presented the incident as an example of the psychological condition of Hamas members in the West Bank. He argued that the security environment has become so restrictive that the movement cannot carry out meaningful operations.
In his assessment, even organizing an attack has become almost impossible. Openly presenting a large electoral bloc carrying the Hamas name would expose candidates and organizers to additional political and security pressure.
Limited participation therefore gives Hamas a way to retain some influence while reducing its exposure and leaving more electoral space to other anti-Abbas lists.
The Public Does Not Trust Hamas—but It Rejects Abbas
Hamas’s weakness does not mean that Fatah is secure.
According to the source, many Palestinians in the West Bank no longer trust Hamas. They blame the movement for initiating a war that devastated Gaza while repeatedly promising a decisive victory that did not materialize.
The source claimed that Hamas made enormous promises before eventually surrendering its weapons, leaving many Palestinians unwilling to believe what the movement says.
Nevertheless, hostility toward Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority, and the official Fatah leadership may be even stronger than public distrust of Hamas.
Many West Bank residents are prepared to vote for almost anyone who can defeat the existing leadership. Depending on the constituency, this could mean supporting a Hamas-linked candidate, the Dahlan coalition, an independent list, or another opposition figure.
Hamas could therefore influence the outcome without competing everywhere. By limiting the number of its candidates, it could help concentrate the anti-Abbas vote and prevent official Fatah candidates from winning because several opposition figures divided the same constituency.
The source believes that a credible popular bloc emerging from within the West Bank could eliminate much of Abbas’s electoral influence with relative ease.
Economic Collapse Is Driving the Political Mood
The political crisis cannot be separated from the economic conditions in the West Bank.
The source said conditions began deteriorating sharply after October 7 and have since reached one of the worst stages in recent Palestinian history.
Closures, restrictions on movement, the loss of jobs inside Israel, and the suspension or reduction of work permits have destroyed the income of many families.
For a growing proportion of the population, employment, food, and basic survival have become more important than political ideology. This creates an unpredictable electorate that may vote primarily to punish those currently in power.
Fatah and the Palestinian Authority are particularly vulnerable because they are expected to provide services and economic stability. Hamas may be blamed for the destruction in Gaza, but Abbas and the Authority are blamed for the daily conditions experienced by Palestinians in the West Bank.
The result is not necessarily increased loyalty to Hamas. It is a broad willingness to support any political vehicle capable of challenging the existing order.
Fatah’s Political Message Is Failing
The source described the attempts to promote the official Fatah bloc and Yasser Abbas as naïve, provocative, and disconnected from the concerns of ordinary Palestinians.
Public reactions, he said, have been overwhelmingly negative. Instead of presenting a convincing response to poverty, unemployment, corruption, and political stagnation, Fatah has relied on personalities and messages that mean little to the street.
The source referred to Zakaria Zubeidi’s public demand that Hamas apologize for what it did in Gaza. In his view, this position could also damage Zubeidi because he had previously been regarded as one of the Fatah figures closest to Hamas, while his release from prison resulted from an agreement secured during the Gaza war.
The episode reflects the contradictions facing Fatah. Many Palestinians distrust Hamas, but they still regard it more favourably than the Palestinian Authority.
Fatah’s official messaging has failed to convert public anger toward Hamas into renewed support for Abbas. Instead, it has often appeared concerned with internal positioning and succession while the population remains focused on hunger and economic survival.
Abbas Could Still Prevent the Vote
Despite the published electoral timetable, the source doubts that Mahmoud Abbas will ultimately allow the elections to proceed.
People working close to Abbas reportedly say that the Palestinian president has been shocked by the scale of public opposition to him.
The source believes Abbas considered himself a leader comparable to Yasser Arafat: personally popular, widely accepted, and emotionally connected to the Palestinian public. The reaction on the ground has challenged that perception.
The November 1 Palestinian National Council elections could provide the first practical indication of the balance of power. The November 28 legislative elections would present an even greater risk to Abbas and the official Fatah bloc.
Yasser Abbas’s election to Fatah’s Central Committee has made the succession issue impossible to ignore. What had previously been treated as speculation concerning the president’s son has now become a formal political matter.
If the leadership concludes that the elections could produce a humiliating defeat or permanently weaken its control, postponement or cancellation remains a serious possibility.
Reorganizing Former Hamas Networks
The source believes that the weakened condition of Hamas also presents an opportunity to draw its local networks into a different political framework.
This would require sustained engagement, political organization, financial resources, and a credible alternative capable of giving former Hamas supporters security and a future.
The Hebron district has historically been one of the movement’s principal strongholds in the West Bank. Yet many activists there have been financially devastated by the war and by the general impoverishment of Palestinian society.
Individuals who were previously governed by rigid ideological commitments are now primarily concerned with safety, employment, and supporting their families.
The source argued that some of these networks could be incorporated into a new popular bloc if they were offered a realistic political alternative. He claimed to have contact with individuals capable of generating political change and said he was seeking a channel through which to approach Mohammed Dahlan.
JAFAJ Assessment
JAFAJ assesses that the coming elections, if they occur, will represent a struggle over the survival and succession of the present Palestinian leadership.
Hamas is significantly weakened, but it has not become politically irrelevant. Its leadership may no longer possess the confidence or resources required to seek full control, yet the movement retains networks and a body of voters capable of affecting results in key West Bank constituencies.
Its decision to limit electoral participation may prove more consequential than entering a complete list. It could reduce the fragmentation of the anti-Abbas vote, deny seats to official Fatah candidates, and create greater room for the Mohammed Dahlan coalition and independent opposition figures.
This strategy would also allow Hamas to influence the political outcome without accepting responsibility for forming the next government.
At the same time, the elevation of Yasser Abbas has deepened the internal crisis within Fatah. Many Palestinians now interpret the electoral contest as an attempt to decide whether authority will remain concentrated around the Abbas family.
The decisive force may ultimately be neither Hamas nor Fatah, but the anger of an economically exhausted population that has lost confidence in both.
If the elections proceed, the official Fatah bloc could suffer a major defeat. If they are cancelled, the cancellation itself may intensify internal Palestinian tensions and reinforce the belief that the existing leadership cannot survive a genuine public vote.
What is emerging is therefore larger than an electoral disagreement. It is an internal Palestinian struggle over legitimacy, succession, money, security, and control—one that increasingly carries the characteristics of a political civil war.