BRICS, CHINA, INDIA, AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW REGIONAL BALANCE
Series: JAFAJ MENA Legislative & Geopolitical Intelligence
Publication Date: September 12, 2026
Subject Areas: Diplomacy • Economics • Security • Trade • Regional Mediation
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
KEY JUDGMENT
The Gulf is not abandoning the United States. It is reducing its
dependence on any single outside power.
ASSESSMENT AT A GLANCE
Assessment dimension JAFAJ judgment
Core trend Strategic diversification—not abandonment of
Washington
Primary drivers Security uncertainty, economic opportunity, and
diplomatic flexibility
China’s role Economic leverage and diplomatic access; limited
military substitution
India’s role Bridge across Gulf, Asian, Western, and competing
diplomatic networks
Regional mediation A form of economic and security risk management
Strategic confidence Moderate
China, India, BRICS, and regional mediators are creating additional channels for trade, investment,
diplomacy, and crisis management. The emerging order is not a clean replacement of American influence.
It is a more complicated system in which Gulf governments seek security from Washington while
expanding economic and diplomatic relationships elsewhere.
THE DIPLOMATIC SHIFT
The Gulf’s realignment is occurring through practical decisions: who supplies infrastructure, who buys
energy, who provides technology, who finances development, and who can help manage a crisis. These
decisions are not necessarily ideological. They are instruments of state resilience.
The 2026 BRICS summit in New Delhi illustrates the change. The expanded grouping includes China,
India, Iran, the UAE, Egypt, and other major emerging economies. Its members adopted a joint declaration
calling for restraint and diplomacy amid the escalating Middle East conflict. The presence of Iran and the
UAE in the same forum—despite their conflicting security interests—demonstrates both the ambition and
the limits of the grouping. [1]
BRICS is not NATO. It has no unified military command or common defense commitment. Its importance
lies in providing a platform where governments can coordinate economic and diplomatic positions without
relying exclusively on Western institutions. Its value to Gulf governments is therefore less about collective
defense than about optionality.
For the Gulf, flexibility is the objective. The region’s governments are attempting to preserve American
security relationships while ensuring that trade, investment, technology, and diplomatic access are not
controlled by one external actor.
JAFAJ | MENA DIPLOMATIC INTELLIGENCE
JAFAJ • Strategic Analysis • September 12, 2026
COUNTRY DIFFERENCES MATTER
The Gulf is not pursuing one identical diplomatic strategy. The common pattern is diversification, but the
motivations and instruments differ by state.
• Saudi Arabia is using multiple relationships to widen its strategic room for maneuver. Its engagement
with China, Iran, India, and other partners supports economic transformation, energy diplomacy, and
regional de-escalation while its security relationship with Washington remains important.
• The UAE is emphasizing commercial connectivity, technology, investment, and diplomatic access. Its
engagement with Iran during the BRICS summit illustrates a preference for maintaining channels even
when political and security differences remain unresolved. [8]
• Qatar’s value is closely associated with mediation, diplomatic access, and its ability to maintain
relationships across competing political networks. Its role demonstrates that a smaller state can
increase strategic relevance through access rather than military weight.
• Oman’s and Qatar’s mediation channels show how regional governments can seek to manage crises
without waiting for the major powers to reach agreement.
• The wider Gulf strategy is therefore not a unified anti-American bloc. It is a set of overlapping national
strategies built around resilience, access, and freedom of action.
CHINA: ECONOMIC LEVERAGE, DIPLOMATIC ACCESS
China’s influence is built on trade, energy, infrastructure, investment, and technology. Carnegie analysis
reports that China’s 2024 trade with Gulf states reached approximately $288 billion, compared with
approximately $86 billion in GCC–U.S. trade. [6] These figures demonstrate the scale of China’s
commercial position, although trade volume alone does not measure strategic influence.
Beijing also demonstrated diplomatic reach in 2023, when it helped facilitate the restoration of Saudi–Iran
diplomatic relations. As the current conflict threatens shipping and energy flows, Gulf states are testing
whether China can use its relationship with Tehran to help reduce tensions. Reuters reported that Chinese
officials have engaged in diplomatic efforts aimed at de-escalation, while analysts questioned whether
Beijing was willing or able to exert sufficient pressure on Iran. [3]
China’s limitation is equally important. Beijing has economic leverage and diplomatic access, but it has not
demonstrated that it wants to assume the full military responsibilities of the United States in the Gulf. China
can expand the Gulf’s options without replacing the American security architecture.
INDIA: THE STRATEGIC BRIDGE
India offers the Gulf a different kind of partnership. New Delhi maintains relationships with Washington,
Russia, Iran, China, and the Gulf monarchies. It is a major energy importer, a growing technology power,
and an increasingly important commercial partner.
At the BRICS summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi engaged both Chinese President Xi Jinping and
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. India’s approach emphasizes cooperation without turning BRICS
into an anti-Western alliance. [5]
India’s relationship with the UAE includes cooperation in defense, artificial intelligence, space, critical
minerals, and connectivity. [5] India’s value is access without requiring complete alignment. It can serve as
a bridge between Gulf markets, Asian supply chains, Western technology, and competing diplomatic blocs.
India is therefore strategically useful to the Gulf precisely because it is not a substitute for every other
partner. It adds another channel, another market, another technology relationship, and another diplomatic
interlocutor.
JAFAJ | MENA DIPLOMATIC INTELLIGENCE
JAFAJ • Strategic Analysis • September 12, 2026
REGIONAL MEDIATION: DIPLOMACY AS ECONOMIC SECURITY
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, and other regional governments increasingly recognize that they
cannot rely exclusively on outside powers to manage every crisis. Their economies depend on stable
shipping, energy exports, foreign investment, tourism, logistics, and infrastructure. When those systems
are threatened, diplomacy becomes an economic necessity.
The UAE’s engagement with Iran during the BRICS summit illustrates this approach. Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to
discuss regional stability and de-escalation. The meeting did not erase their differences. It maintained a
channel. [8]
Mediation is not agreement. It is risk management.
WHAT BRICS CAN—and CANNOT—DO
BRICS can provide a political venue for states that do not share a common security outlook. It can facilitate
diplomatic contact, reinforce calls for restraint, encourage economic coordination, and give members a
platform from which to challenge the assumption that Western institutions are the only source of
international legitimacy.
BRICS is less capable of delivering unified action. Its members have divergent interests, different
relationships with Washington, competing regional priorities, and no common defense commitment. Iran
and the UAE may participate in the same forum while retaining sharply different security calculations. The
grouping’s near-term significance is therefore likely to be incremental: more coordination, more signaling,
and more institutional experimentation—not a unified alternative security system.
For Gulf governments, that limitation is not necessarily a weakness. A loose platform is useful because it
expands diplomatic options without requiring permanent alignment.
WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO?
COMPETE THROUGH VALUE, NOT EXCLUSIVITY
The United States should take Gulf diversification seriously—but should not demand that regional
governments choose between Washington and every other major power. The objective should be to
remain the most reliable security and advanced-technology partner while accepting that Gulf governments
will maintain other relationships.
1. Strengthen security credibility. Improve integrated air and missile defense, maritime security,
intelligence-sharing, and protection of critical energy infrastructure.
2. Offer a competitive economic alternative. Expand American investment in AI, infrastructure, energy
technology, advanced manufacturing, finance, education, and space.
3. Improve market access. Help American companies compete for Gulf contracts and partnerships rather
than relying on diplomatic goodwill alone.
4. Support regional mediation. Encourage Gulf-led de-escalation efforts and maintain diplomatic channels
with competing powers.
5. Partner with India. Cooperate on maritime security, technology, energy resilience, supply chains, and
regional diplomacy.
6. Compete on reliability and transparency. Emphasize trusted finance, intellectual-property protection,
cybersecurity, and predictable regulation.
JAFAJ | MENA DIPLOMATIC INTELLIGENCE
JAFAJ • Strategic Analysis • September 12, 2026
7. Avoid demanding exclusive loyalty. The stronger message is: “Work with everyone you need to work
with. But America should remain your first choice for security, advanced technology, and long-term
strategic partnership.”
The United States should make its partnership more valuable—not merely insist that it is indispensable.
WHAT SHOULD MENA BUSINESSES DO?
TREAT GEOPOLITICAL DIVERSIFICATION AS BUSINESS CONTINUITY
MENA businesses should prepare for a more multipolar commercial environment. Diplomatic diversification
will affect procurement, financing, logistics, technology standards, sanctions exposure, and access to
skilled labor.
• Diversify supply chains and identify single-source dependencies.
• Develop alternative shipping routes and contingency plans.
• Review sanctions and export-control exposure.
• Avoid excessive dependence on one technology ecosystem.
• Strengthen cybersecurity and data-governance practices.
• Prepare for payment-system and currency fragmentation.
• Use competing suppliers and investors to improve bargaining power.
• Invest in workforce development and local capabilities.
BCG identifies concentrated import relationships in sectors such as semiconductors, pharmaceuticals,
industrial machinery, food, and critical minerals as significant sources of geopolitical and inflation risk. [7] A
cheaper supplier is not always the cheapest supplier if it cannot deliver during a crisis.
WHAT SHOULD CONSUMERS EXPECT?
MORE CHOICE, MORE OPPORTUNITY, AND CONTINUED VOLATILITY
Consumers will experience diplomatic realignment through prices, employment, technology, transportation,
and access to goods.
• Energy-price volatility. Shipping disruptions and threats to energy infrastructure can affect fuel,
transportation, and food costs. [1]
• More technology competition. American, Chinese, Indian, and regional providers may expand access to
digital services, AI, telecommunications, and consumer electronics.
• New employment opportunities. Technology, logistics, manufacturing, space, and advanced services
may benefit from expanded investment.
• Continued exposure to imported-goods inflation. Diversification can reduce risk, but cannot eliminate
geopolitical shocks.
• More regional economic integration. Greater connectivity with Asian and Western markets may expand
consumer choice and investment.
The benefits will not be automatic. They will depend on whether governments and businesses convert
diplomatic relationships into reliable infrastructure, competitive services, and productive employment.
ANALYTIC ASSESSMENT
Confidence: Moderate. The available evidence supports a judgment of strategic diversification, but does
not demonstrate that Gulf governments are preparing to replace the United States as their principal
JAFAJ | MENA DIPLOMATIC INTELLIGENCE
JAFAJ • Strategic Analysis • September 12, 2026
external security partner. Economic and diplomatic indicators are stronger than military indicators, where
Gulf dependence on Washington remains substantial.
The most important analytical distinction is between diversification and replacement. Gulf governments can
deepen relations with China, India, BRICS, and regional mediators while retaining the United States as
their principal external security partner. These choices are not mutually exclusive.
INDICATORS TO WATCH
• Evidence that Gulf diversification produces durable procurement, financing, and supply-chain shifts
rather than temporary diplomatic signaling.
• BRICS initiatives that move beyond diplomatic coordination into payment systems, investment
mechanisms, logistics, or technology standards.
• Additional Saudi–Iran, UAE–Iran, or Oman- and Qatar-mediated channels during regional escalation.
• Formal changes in U.S. security commitments, air-defense integration, maritime protection, or crisis-
response arrangements.
• New Gulf–China or Gulf–India agreements involving defense technology, critical infrastructure, energy,
or strategic finance.
• Evidence that Gulf governments are translating diplomatic access into measurable domestic capabilities,
employment, and infrastructure outcomes.
BOTTOM LINE
The Gulf is pursuing strategic autonomy—not strategic isolation.
China offers economic leverage and diplomatic reach. India offers connectivity and middle-power flexibility.
BRICS offers a broader multilateral platform. Regional mediation offers a way to manage disputes without
waiting for great powers to agree.
The United States should respond with stronger security, better economic opportunities, and more effective
diplomacy. MENA businesses should diversify suppliers, technology, financing, and markets. Consumers
should expect a region with more economic choices and investment opportunities—but also continued
exposure to energy shocks, shipping disruptions, and geopolitical competition.
The Gulf is not choosing one new master. It is building a system in which it has more choices.
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
SOURCE NOTE
This brief combines reported developments, cited institutional analysis, and JAFAJ analytical judgments.
Claims about future consumer, employment, and investment effects are assessed possibilities rather than
confirmed outcomes.
REFERENCES
1. Reuters. “BRICS Adopts Joint Declaration, Urges ‘Maximum Restraint’ in Mideast.” September 12, 2026.
2. Reuters. “India Hosts BRICS Summit as Iran War Tests Bloc Unity.” September 10, 2026.
3. Reuters. “Can China Restrain Iran? Gulf States Test Beijing’s Influence.” July 30, 2026.
4. Reuters. “The Evolution of BRICS and Its Challenges Today.” September 12, 2026.
5. Associated Press. “India’s Modi and China’s Xi Seek to Reset Ties on BRICS Sidelines.” September
2026.
JAFAJ | MENA DIPLOMATIC INTELLIGENCE
JAFAJ • Strategic Analysis • September 12, 2026
6. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “In the Middle East and North Africa, America and China
Converge More Than They Diverge.” July 1, 2026.
7. Boston Consulting Group. “How Economic Resilience Will Shape Growth in the Gulf States.” June 23,
2026.
8. Gulf News. “Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled Meets Iran President Pezeshkian at BRICS
Summit in New Delhi to Discuss Regional Stability.” September 12, 2026.
ENDNOTES
1. BRICS is treated in this brief as a diplomatic and economic grouping, not a military alliance. Its members
have different strategic interests and no common defense commitment.
2. China’s Gulf influence extends beyond energy trade into infrastructure, technology, logistics, and
investment. The Carnegie trade comparison is used to illustrate economic scale, not to measure total
strategic influence.
3. India’s strategic autonomy allows it to maintain relationships with competing powers. Its participation in
BRICS does not automatically make it an opponent of the United States.
4. The United States recommendations are JAFAJ analytical judgments, not claims that Washington has
adopted these policies.
5. The term “strategic autonomy” refers to a state’s effort to preserve freedom of action by maintaining
multiple partnerships and avoiding excessive dependence on one external power.
6. Consumer impacts described in this brief are potential consequences of geopolitical developments. The
timing and magnitude of price, employment, and investment effects will vary by country and sector.
JAFAJ EDITORIAL CONCLUSION: The Gulf’s diplomatic realignment is not a story of one power replacing another. It is a story of
governments, businesses, and consumers adapting to a world where security, trade, technology, and diplomacy are increasingly
interconnected—and increasingly contested.