JAFAJ | Strategic Intelligence & Policy Analysis | Consolidated Master Edition | October 25, 2026

 Opinion & Strategic Analysis

THESIS: The central question is not whether fusion energy will immediately replace oil and natural gas. It is whether the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region will prepare for a future in which commercially viable fusion could reduce the strategic value of hydrocarbons—or allow energy-producing countries to turn today’s oil wealth into tomorrow’s technological advantage.

CORE DECISION RULE: Treat fusion as a material long-term contingency, not a budget assumption. Preserve the value of existing oil and gas assets, diversify fiscal exposure now, and expand fusion-specific commitments only when independent technical and commercial evidence clears predefined gates.

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Oil and natural gas have shaped MENA’s fiscal systems, international partnerships, security relationships, and economic development for generations. Commercial fusion energy could eventually challenge parts of that model—but the timing, cost, reliability, and scale of commercial deployment remain uncertain.

The U.S. Department of Energy’s finalized June 2026 Fusion Science and Technology Roadmap sets out a pathway intended to support a fusion pilot power plant and commercial fusion power in the mid-2030s. This is a government development objective, not a verified forecast that commercially competitive plants will operate on that schedule. DOE states that implementation depends on public-private partnerships and future congressional appropriations; unresolved materials, fuel-cycle, plant-engineering, and economic challenges remain. Major engineering, materials, fuel-cycle, and economic challenges remain.¹

 

Source: U.S. Department of Energy.

The strategic implications for MENA are substantial. If fusion becomes commercially competitive, countries that depend heavily on hydrocarbon exports could face pressure on export demand, pricing power, and long-term fiscal revenues. Countries that import energy could benefit from greater energy security, while regional economies with capital, research institutions, advanced manufacturing, and adaptable workforces could develop new industrial advantages.

However, fusion is not an immediate substitute for oil and gas. Oil serves as a transport fuel and petrochemical feedstock; natural gas supports electricity generation, industrial heating, fertilizer production, and other industrial uses. Replacing some electricity generation would not eliminate these other markets.

OPEC’s June 2026 World Oil Outlook projects global oil demand reaching 124 million barrels per day by 2050. This is OPEC’s outlook, not a consensus forecast; it reflects assumptions about economic growth, policy, technology, and energy demand. Its divergence from faster-transition scenarios is a reminder that long-term oil demand is uncertain and that no single forecast should anchor MENA fiscal planning.²

An independent comparison shows why forecast assumptions matter. The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2025 presents multiple scenarios, not a single forecast: its Current Policies Scenario projects oil demand rising to 113 million barrels per day in 2050, while its Stated Policies Scenario has demand flattening around 2030 at about 102 million barrels per day before a gradual decline. OPEC’s June 2026 outlook projects 124 million barrels per day by 2050—11 mb/d above the IEA’s 2050 Current Policies Scenario figure. The Stated Policies result describes a different trajectory, not a 2050 value. These scenarios use different assumptions and should not be treated as directly interchangeable forecasts. Neither source isolates a fusion-driven effect.¹⁰

 

Source: OPEC.

JAFAJ’s central judgment: MENA’s most consequential risk is not that fusion suddenly eliminates the value of oil. It is that governments wait until fusion is commercially proven before preparing for an energy system that may increasingly reward technological capability, electricity-intensive industries, and diversified revenue.

The region should prepare now while continuing to manage and monetize its existing energy resources.

DECISION IMPLICATIONS AT A GLANCE

For decision-makers, the central distinction is between what should be done now and what should wait for technical proof. The policy case for fiscal resilience is strong even if fusion commercialization is delayed; major fusion-specific capital commitments require much stronger evidence.

Decision area	What the evidence supports now	What should trigger a larger commitment
Fiscal policy	Run oil/gas price and volume stress tests now; reduce unbudgeted reliance on volatile hydrocarbon receipts.	Verified country-specific fiscal modeling showing a material change in expected market exposure.
Energy planning	Continue grid, efficiency, renewables, storage, and existing proven low-carbon options where economically justified.	Independently demonstrated fusion electricity delivered reliably at a competitive total-system cost.
Industrial policy	Build transferable capability in materials, power engineering, robotics, controls, and advanced manufacturing.	Credible local supply-chain demand, bankable projects, technology-access terms, and measurable local value added.
Public investment	Fund research partnerships and feasibility studies with milestones and exit criteria.	Repeatable plant performance, financeable construction/operating costs, workable fuel cycle, and licensing pathway.

KEY JUDGMENTS

HIGH

Confidence

1. Fusion is a strategic planning issue, not an imminent oil-market replacement.

Commercial deployment remains contingent on engineering and economic milestones. MENA governments have time to prepare, but should not treat proposed commercial timelines as guaranteed.

HIGH

Confidence

2. Hydrocarbon-dependent fiscal systems face greater long-term exposure than diversified economies.

A sustained decline in export demand or prices could weaken government revenue, public investment, and social spending. The magnitude would depend on each country’s production costs, fiscal reserves, debt, and diversification.

MODERATE

Confidence

3. Gulf states could convert energy wealth into fusion-era economic advantages.

Sovereign investment, advanced infrastructure, industrial capital, and existing energy expertise could support research, component manufacturing, engineering, and future deployment. Success will depend on execution and access to technology.

MODERATE

Confidence

4. Fusion could change the region’s geopolitical leverage.

If commercially competitive fusion reduces the need for hydrocarbon imports, some importing countries could become less exposed to oil-supply disruptions. Exporters’ influence would not disappear, because oil, gas, petrochemicals, and transport fuels would retain important markets.

MODERATE

Confidence

5. Human capital may become as strategically important as resource ownership.

Fusion-related research, advanced manufacturing, materials science, power engineering, and regulatory competence could create durable economic advantages for countries that invest before commercial deployment.

Confidence ratings refer to the underlying analytical judgment, not certainty about when fusion will become commercially viable.

BACKGROUND: TWO DIFFERENT ENERGY MODELS

Oil and natural gas: The established system

Hydrocarbons provide energy, industrial inputs, export revenue, and government income. Their importance varies considerably across MENA: some economies depend heavily on petroleum exports, while others import energy or possess more diversified production structures.

The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated that OPEC members earned approximately $550 billion in crude-oil and condensate export receipts in 2024. EIA’s July 2025 fact sheet used a revised methodology focused on crude oil and condensates, rather than the broader net-petroleum measure used in some earlier editions. Its 2025 and 2026 figures were forecasts made in July 2025 under then-current price and production assumptions; they must not be presented as current forecasts. The figures measure gross export receipts, not government revenue, and do not include natural gas or Qatar.³

 

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Hydrocarbon producers also face a more immediate strategic reality: export revenues can be disrupted by shipping constraints, conflict, price volatility, and production outages. The World Bank’s October 6, 2026, regional update described severe effects on Gulf exporters from disruptions associated with the Strait of Hormuz.⁴

 

Source: World Bank.

Fusion: The potential new system

Fusion releases energy by combining light atomic nuclei. Unlike conventional fission reactors, which split heavy nuclei, fusion seeks to reproduce the energy-producing process that powers the Sun.

Commercial fusion could eventually provide substantial, low-carbon electricity with high availability. But a practical power plant must do much more than produce a fusion reaction: it must sustain operations, manage extreme heat and radiation, maintain materials, handle its fuel cycle, generate electricity reliably, and compete economically with alternative energy sources.

The international ITER project continues to advance toward its revised technical milestones, while national programs and private companies pursue different approaches to commercial power. Neither research progress nor a proposed deployment date proves that economical, grid-scale fusion has been achieved.¹

Source: ITER Organization.

The distinction matters for MENA policymakers. They should plan for the possibility of fusion, not budget as though a commercial revolution is already guaranteed.

THE CENTRAL COMPARISON: WHAT FUSION CAN—AND CANNOT—DISPLACE

Oil, natural gas, and fusion are not interchangeable commodities. Oil is a traded liquid fuel and industrial feedstock; natural gas is both a fuel and a feedstock; fusion, if commercialized, would initially be a source of electricity and potentially high-grade heat. The strategic impact therefore depends on which end-use markets can electrify, how quickly competing technologies improve, and whether fusion plants can be built and operated at competitive total-system cost.

Oil exposure: The most direct early risk is indirect, not automatic displacement. If low-cost electricity supports electrified transport, synthetic fuels, or industrial electrification, oil demand could face additional pressure over time. Aviation, shipping, petrochemicals, lubricants, and other hydrocarbon-based materials would not disappear simply because electricity generation changes.

Natural-gas exposure: Gas used for power generation could face competition if fusion provides dependable electricity at a competitive cost. Gas may retain value for industrial heat, fertilizer and chemical production, balancing, and export markets; the scale of any substitution would vary by country, infrastructure, and alternative fuel economics.

Fusion’s own constraints: Commercial impact requires more than a successful plasma experiment. Investors and governments would need evidence of net electricity delivered to the grid, reliable operating hours, maintainable components, a workable fuel cycle, acceptable licensing and waste-management arrangements, financeable construction costs, and credible lifetime economics. Until these are demonstrated, fusion should be treated as a strategic contingency—not a budget assumption.

Analytical implication: The relevant comparison is not simply the cost of a fusion reaction versus a barrel of oil. It is the delivered cost and reliability of energy services, including generation, storage or backup where needed, grid connection, financing, fuel supply, and end-use conversion. JAFAJ therefore assesses fusion primarily as a potential disruptor of electricity and selected industrial markets, with broader oil-market effects emerging indirectly and over a longer horizon.

Dimension	Oil and natural gas	Commercial fusion (potential)
Primary role	Transport fuels, heat, power, feedstocks, export revenue	Initially grid electricity; potentially industrial heat
MENA economic role	Export receipts, fiscal revenue, jobs, industrial inputs	Potential new technology, manufacturing, investment and power-sector opportunity
Main transition risk	Lower demand/prices in exposed markets; stranded or lower-return assets	Delayed commercialization, high capital cost, technical underperformance
Likely substitution pathway	Demand changes through electrification, efficiency and alternative fuels	Could displace some fossil-fuel electricity first; wider effects depend on end-use conversion
Strategic response	Protect value, manage volatility, diversify public revenue	Build skills and partnerships; monitor independently verified performance; avoid premature bets

COMMERCIALIZATION GATES: WHAT COUNTS AS EVIDENCE

A fusion milestone should change policy only when it reduces a decision-relevant uncertainty. Plasma performance, private investment, or a company’s announced target can be meaningful indicators of activity, but none alone demonstrates a commercially viable power plant.

Gate	Evidence required	Insufficient evidence on its own	MENA policy implication
Net electricity	Metered net electricity delivered beyond the plant’s own operating load over a clearly defined period.	A high fusion gain inside an experiment or a brief pulse without plant-level balance-of-plant accounting.	Keep commercial revenue out of budgets until net output is demonstrated.
Reliability and maintainability	Sustained operation, credible availability data, repair intervals, and component replacement costs.	One successful shot, planned availability, or a design target.	Use staged demonstrations and independent engineering review.
Fuel cycle and materials	A viable fuel supply/breeding strategy where relevant, radiation-resistant materials, and credible component lifetime.	A conceptual fuel-cycle diagram or unvalidated material test.	Prioritize research partnerships and transferable materials skills.
Economics and finance	Auditable capital cost, operating cost, financing assumptions, construction schedule, and comparison with competing system costs.	A levelized-cost claim without transparent assumptions or financing treatment.	Require independent due diligence before sovereign investment.
Licensing and deployment	A credible regulatory route, safety case, site requirements, grid integration, and supply-chain capacity.	A memorandum of understanding or a proposed commercial start date.	Monitor readiness; do not treat announcements as projects ready for procurement.

WHY THIS MATTERS TO MENA

Fusion’s strategic impact would extend beyond the electricity sector. It could affect national budgets, industrial competitiveness, energy security, diplomatic leverage, and the long-term value of hydrocarbon infrastructure.

Country exposure is uneven. Iraq and Libya need to prioritize fiscal buffers, continuity of public services, and transparent resource management; Kuwait and Qatar should test whether long-term public spending can be sustained under lower hydrocarbon receipts; Saudi Arabia and the UAE can use their capital and diversification programs to build transferable capabilities, but execution matters more than announcements. For oil-importing economies, lower future electricity costs could create opportunities, but only where grid infrastructure, financing, and access to reliable supply make those benefits attainable.

1. Government revenue and fiscal stability

Hydrocarbon dependence differs sharply across countries. An IMF analysis published in 2026 reports average petroleum revenue during 2010–2020 equivalent to 49% of GDP in Kuwait, 34% in Iraq, 31% in Qatar, 27% in Saudi Arabia, and 20% in the United Arab Emirates; Libya’s figure was 55%. These are historical averages, not current revenue shares or forecasts of fusion’s effects. They demonstrate the scale of past exposure and should be read alongside each country’s fiscal breakeven oil price, export concentration, reserves, and non-oil revenue capacity.⁵

Source: International Monetary Fund.

These historical indicators establish that exposure varies materially across the region, but they do not rank current fiscal resilience. The country sections below distinguish historical dependence from current fiscal conditions and identify where comparable current data remain unavailable.

The central policy question is whether governments can develop alternative sources of productive employment, tax revenue, and export earnings before hydrocarbon rents become less dependable. The detailed stress tests that follow separate historical exposure, gross-receipt sensitivity, and actual budget transmission.

ECONOMIC AND FISCAL EXPOSURE: FROM DEPENDENCE TO MEASURABLE RISK

The fiscal question is not whether fusion will directly erase hydrocarbon income. It is how a sustained change in energy demand, prices, or export volumes would pass through each country’s production costs, export mix, state ownership, tax and royalty system, public spending commitments, and financial buffers. Fusion is only one possible driver of such a change; renewables, efficiency, electrification, climate policy, economic growth, and geopolitical disruptions can move the same variables independently. Country comparisons in this paper are selected cases, not a complete ranking of every MENA economy; indicators use different years and denominators and must not be treated as directly comparable.

Historical dependence is a starting point, not a forecast. The IMF’s Annex Figure 8.1.1 reports average petroleum revenue in 2010–2020 as a share of GDP. The figures cited in this paper—Libya 55%, Kuwait 49%, Iraq 34%, Qatar 31%, Saudi Arabia 27%, and the UAE 20%—show substantial variation in past exposure. They do not measure current fiscal dependence, the share of government revenue in every country, or the effect of a future technology. The same IMF annex separately presents fiscal breakeven oil prices and fuel exports as a share of merchandise exports; those indicators should be considered alongside petroleum revenue/GDP when judging resilience.⁵

A second distinction is essential: gross export receipts are not the same as government revenue. The state captures hydrocarbon value through different combinations of national oil-company earnings, royalties, production-sharing arrangements, corporate taxes, dividends, and state participation. The proportion reaching the budget can differ from one country and year to another. Consequently, a percentage change in gross export receipts cannot be reported as an equal percentage change in the budget without country-specific fiscal modeling.

A transparent crude-oil revenue sensitivity provides a useful scale check. EIA estimates that OPEC members earned about $550 billion in crude-oil export revenue in 2024. The country figures below are EIA’s 2024 estimates, in nominal U.S. dollars. The table reports JAFAJ arithmetic: a ±10% price movement with export volumes, grades, discounts, and country mix held constant, plus a combined stress case with price down 20% and volume down 5%. These are mechanical sensitivities—not forecasts or estimates of a fusion-driven price decline—and exclude natural gas, refined products, downstream earnings, and the share captured by governments.³

Source and method: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “OPEC Crude Oil Export Revenues,” updated July 2025, table 1. Calculations by JAFAJ. The combined stress case retains 76% of baseline receipts (0.80 × 0.95), a 24% decline. Qatar is not included in the EIA OPEC crude-oil table; this table must not be used to compare Qatar’s LNG exposure with oil-exporting countries.³

The table demonstrates why the paper should avoid a single “MENA impact” estimate. The same percentage shock produces materially different gross-receipt changes in absolute dollars, while budgetary consequences depend on fiscal capture and each government’s capacity to absorb a shock. Countries with smaller export receipts can still face severe fiscal stress if budgets are concentrated in hydrocarbons, export infrastructure is vulnerable, or liquid buffers are limited.

QUANTIFIED GROSS-REVENUE STRESS TESTS

The stress test uses two transparent shocks against the 2024 EIA estimate: (1) a ±10% crude-price movement with volume unchanged; and (2) a 20% price decline combined with a 5% volume decline. In the combined case, receipts equal 76% of baseline (0.80 × 0.95), a 24% decline. These are mechanical sensitivities, not predictions, probability-weighted forecasts, or estimates of fusion’s causal effect. They exclude gas, refined products, changes in grades or discounts, and the share captured by governments.

Country	2024 baseline gross crude-oil receipts	Gross change at ±10% price	Combined stress: −20% price and −5% volume
Saudi Arabia	$179.0bn	±$17.9bn	−$43.0bn
Iraq	$93.0bn	±$9.3bn	−$22.3bn
United Arab Emirates	$89.0bn	±$8.9bn	−$21.4bn
Kuwait	$41.0bn	±$4.1bn	−$9.8bn
Libya	$29.0bn	±$2.9bn	−$7.0bn
Algeria	$13.0bn	±$1.3bn	−$3.1bn

Interpretation: the absolute gross-receipt exposure is largest for Saudi Arabia in this selected group, but fiscal stress cannot be ranked from gross receipts alone. A smaller exporter may have less room to absorb a shock if public spending is rigid, liquid buffers are limited, or hydrocarbon receipts dominate government income. Comparable country-specific fiscal capture rates and current budget assumptions have not been established here; budget impacts therefore remain unquantified.

FISCAL TRANSMISSION: FOUR CHANNELS

1. Price and volume. Export receipts can fall because prices decline, export volumes fall, or both. A fusion-driven change, if it occurs, would likely operate over time through electricity-sector substitution and wider electrification; it should not be treated as an immediate, one-for-one reduction in oil demand. A shipping closure, sanctions, conflict, or production outage can reduce volumes much faster than a new energy technology can alter global demand.⁴
2. Government capture. Gross export-revenue changes pass into budgets through each country’s fiscal regime and national oil-company structure. The IMF’s Chapter 8 explains the roles of royalties, production-sharing arrangements, corporate income taxes, state participation, and resource-rent taxation. These mechanisms affect the timing and proportion of revenue the state receives; they also shape incentives for investment and production.⁵
3. Spending rigidity and buffers. The same revenue loss has different consequences depending on the share of spending committed to public wages, subsidies, transfers, security, and capital projects; the availability of sovereign financial assets; debt-service costs; and access to domestic and external financing. A government with large financial buffers may smooth adjustment, while a government with rigid spending and limited financing options may be forced into rapid cuts, arrears, borrowing, or tax increases.
4. Non-oil revenue and employment. A resilient transition requires more than replacing oil exports with electricity sales. Governments need taxable private-sector activity, competitive non-hydrocarbon exports, productive employment, and skills that can move across industries. A fusion supply chain could create opportunities, but it should not be booked as future revenue before commercially viable projects, local value added, workforce demand, and tax arrangements are demonstrated.

COUNTRY FISCAL PRIORITIES

Iraq and Libya should emphasize fiscal buffers, continuity of public services, transparent oil-revenue management, and growth in non-oil firms. Their risks are not interchangeable: conflict, institutional capacity, and production interruptions may dominate near-term outcomes regardless of fusion’s eventual pace. The IMF’s historical dependence indicators support treating both as exposed, but current fiscal stress tests require updated budget and production data.⁵

Kuwait and Qatar should pair their capacity to invest with explicit tests of long-run public spending and hydrocarbon income. Kuwait’s historical petroleum-revenue/GDP ratio was 49% on average during 2010–2020, but that is not a current share of government revenue. The IMF’s 2025 Article IV report, published February 3, 2026, identifies a large intergenerational fiscal-sustainability gap and recommends further consolidation while noting Kuwait’s large fiscal buffers; these are IMF staff assessments and model-based projections, not a direct measure of how much of a future fusion shock Kuwait could absorb. Qatar’s exposure must be assessed with LNG and gas-contract data, not crude-oil figures alone; EIA, citing the IMF, reports hydrocarbons accounted for 83% of Qatar’s total government revenue in 2023.⁵,⁹,¹¹

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have more room to invest in diversification and technology, but capital availability does not guarantee successful industrial transformation. Their stress tests should separately track crude oil, natural gas, downstream products, non-oil tax receipts, state-company dividends, and spending commitments. The UAE’s broader economic base may reduce direct exposure, while Saudi Arabia’s larger crude-oil revenue base creates greater absolute sensitivity to global oil-price changes.³⁻⁶

The IMF’s September 2026 Article IV assessment projected Algeria’s central-government deficit at 9.6% of GDP in 2026 and gross government debt at 53.2% of GDP; both are projections, not final outturns. The IMF also reported a 2025 fiscal deficit of 10.5% of GDP and gross government debt of 52.1% of GDP, while warning that large deficits had depleted fiscal buffers and that declining hydrocarbon exports contributed to external pressure. These measures refer to central-government finances and must not be confused with the EIA’s gross crude-oil export receipts.⁸

Hydrocarbon-importing economies may benefit if fusion eventually lowers the cost of reliable electricity, but lower wholesale generation costs do not automatically produce lower consumer bills or stronger public finances. Outcomes depend on grid access, financing, import arrangements, tariff policy, currency exposure, and whether cheaper energy improves productivity in tradable sectors. For these countries, the near-term fiscal risk may be the cost of financing infrastructure and adapting industry—not lost hydrocarbon export revenue.

RECOMMENDED FISCAL STRESS-TEST DESIGN

JAFAJ recommends that each government publish or internally maintain a common three-case stress test: (A) no material fusion effect on hydrocarbon markets through the 2030s; (B) limited, competitive fusion deployment in selected electricity markets; and (C) faster deployment accompanied by wider electrification. Each case should specify assumptions for timing, capacity, utilization, delivered electricity cost, competing technologies, and the share of demand actually displaced. These are planning cases, not probability-weighted forecasts.

For each case, model the effects on oil and gas prices, export volumes, gross receipts, government capture, fiscal balance, debt, liquid assets, public investment, transfers, public employment, and foreign-exchange availability. Run separate sensitivities for price-only, volume-only, and combined shocks. Compare the fusion cases against independent stressors—renewables, energy efficiency, electric vehicles, carbon policy, demand growth, conflict, and shipping disruption—so that the model does not incorrectly attribute all change to fusion.

The first numerical pass should use current country budget data and the most recent official fiscal forecasts. The historical IMF dependence indicators and EIA 2024 export figures in this paper are baselines for orientation, not substitutes for updated data. If current budget capture rates, gas revenues, production volumes, or sovereign asset liquidity cannot be verified, the report should mark them “not established” rather than infer them.

SELECTED COUNTRY EXPOSURE MATRIX

This matrix applies a common lens to the countries discussed in the paper. Historical petroleum-revenue/GDP figures are IMF averages for 2010–2020; crude-oil export receipts are EIA 2024 estimates. They measure different things and should not be merged into a single ranking. “Not established” means this paper does not provide a comparable verified figure.

Country / group	IMF petroleum revenue / GDP	2024 crude exports	Distinct exposure	Priority stress-test variables
Saudi Arabia	27% historical average	$179bn	Large absolute crude-revenue exposure; budget transmission depends on fiscal capture, spending, and buffers.	Track oil price/volume separately; quantify budget revenue and spending break-even.
Iraq	34% historical average	$93bn	High historical petroleum dependence; production continuity and public-sector financing are important near-term risks.	Model oil receipts, public payroll/transfers, non-oil revenue, and financing needs.
United Arab Emirates	20% historical average	$89bn	Large crude-revenue base with a broader economic base; exposure differs by emirate and state entity.	Disaggregate federal/emirate revenue, state-company receipts, and non-oil tax base.
Kuwait	49% historical average	$41bn	High historical petroleum revenue relative to GDP; absolute receipts are lower than Saudi Arabia’s in this table.	Stress-test public spending commitments, fiscal breakeven, and liquid assets.
Libya	55% historical average	$29bn	High historical dependence; production outages and institutional instability can dominate technology effects.	Model volume interruptions separately from global price shocks; protect essential services.
Qatar	31% historical average	Not in EIA table	LNG and gas-contract exposure cannot be inferred from crude-oil figures; EIA, citing IMF, reports hydrocarbons were 83% of government revenue in 2023.⁹	Build an LNG-focused model using contract structure, volumes, pricing, and state capture.
Algeria	Not in cited IMF figures above	$13bn	Crude-only figures understate total hydrocarbon exposure because gas is important; IMF identifies fiscal and external buffer pressures.	Separate oil, gas, subsidies, fiscal balance, debt, and foreign-exchange reserves.
Hydrocarbon importers	Not comparable	Not applicable	Potential gains depend on imported-fuel costs, electricity access, grid capacity, financing, and tariff pass-through.	Measure import bill, power-system costs, subsidy exposure, currency risk, and industrial productivity.

2. Industrial competitiveness

Cheap, dependable electricity could change the economics of energy-intensive production. Potential beneficiaries include data centers, desalination, metals, chemicals, advanced manufacturing, and some forms of hydrogen production.

MENA countries already possess relevant advantages, including industrial zones, ports, energy infrastructure, and investment capital. But fusion alone would not guarantee industrial success. Workforce skills, logistics, access to markets, regulatory quality, and technology transfer would remain decisive.

The UAE’s published Energy Strategy 2050 emphasizes expanding clean energy, improving efficiency, and investing in technology and innovation. Its National Hydrogen Strategy also targets development of low-emission hydrogen production and related supply chains.⁶

Source: United Arab Emirates Government.

JAFAJ assessment: Existing diversification programs could provide a foundation for fusion-era industrial policy. Governments should avoid treating fusion as a substitute for current investments in renewables, nuclear fission, grids, storage, and efficiency.

3. Oil and gas companies

Fusion could eventually create risks for upstream producers, but the impact would depend on how quickly the technology becomes competitive and which energy markets it displaces.

Oil companies could face pressure if fusion-powered electricity accelerates electric transport, industrial electrification, or alternative fuel production. Natural gas producers could face pressure if fusion displaces gas-fired electricity generation.

Conversely, hydrocarbon companies may retain important roles in petrochemicals, aviation fuels, shipping fuels, lubricants, industrial materials, and other applications that are harder to replace directly.

Their assets, engineering capabilities, capital, and project-management experience could also be useful in developing new energy infrastructure.

The strategic error would be assuming either that hydrocarbons will remain dominant indefinitely or that fusion will make them obsolete overnight.

REGIONAL & INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Arabia has the capital and industrial scale to pursue a dual strategy: continue monetizing oil while developing advanced energy technology, manufacturing, and non-oil industries. Its official Vision 2030 program sets out a broader diversification agenda and reports progress across non-oil sectors and energy initiatives.⁷ These policies establish direction and reported activity, not proof that fusion-specific capabilities or commercial outcomes have already been achieved.

Source: Saudi Vision 2030 Annual Report 2025.

JAFAJ assessment: The Kingdom’s long-term advantage will depend less on predicting the exact arrival of fusion than on converting energy revenues into productive capabilities that remain valuable under multiple technology scenarios. The EIA’s 2024 estimate of $179 billion in gross crude-oil export receipts is the largest among the countries in the selected sensitivity table, but it is not Saudi government revenue and cannot, by itself, quantify budget exposure. The cited Vision 2030 report is an official government progress report; it supports attribution of stated policy and reported activity, not independent verification of commercial fusion capability or realized returns.³,⁷

 

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

The UAE’s energy diversification, clean-energy investment, and hydrogen strategy offer a foundation for potential participation in advanced energy supply chains.⁶

Source: United Arab Emirates Government.

JAFAJ assessment: The UAE could pursue a role as an investor, research partner, advanced-component manufacturer, and future deployment hub. These are opportunities, not established outcomes. The EIA’s $89 billion figure is a 2024 estimate of gross crude-oil export receipts; it excludes gas and downstream income and does not capture the distribution of revenue across emirates or state-owned entities. UAE energy and hydrogen strategies are official policy statements and targets, not independent evidence that targets have been achieved or that fusion-related supply chains already exist.³,⁶

 

QATAR

Qatar’s LNG industry creates a distinct exposure: crude-oil receipt comparisons miss the principal scale and structure of its natural-gas position. EIA reports that hydrocarbons accounted for 83% of total government revenue in 2023, citing the IMF; that is a historical share of government revenue, not a share of GDP and not a current-year estimate. EIA also reports that Qatar generated 96.4% of its electricity from natural gas in 2023 and that it was the world’s second-largest LNG exporter in 2024. Its planned North Field expansion could raise LNG export capacity substantially by 2030, but planned capacity is not the same as delivered exports or realized revenue.⁹

JAFAJ assessment: Qatar should protect the value of its LNG position while investing in expertise and assets that can generate returns across a wider range of future energy systems. The 83% hydrocarbon share of government revenue is explicitly for 2023; the EIA’s electricity and LNG indicators refer to 2023 and 2024, while the expansion dates and capacities are plans or expectations reported in the October 2025 brief. A robust Qatar stress test must model LNG volumes, contract duration and pricing where disclosed, condensates and other liquids, domestic gas use, and the fiscal capture of QatarEnergy earnings separately.⁹

 

IRAQ

Iraq’s dependence on oil revenue makes fiscal diversification especially consequential. IMF analysis identifies significant exposure to oil-price fluctuations and the difficulty of expanding non-oil revenue.⁵

 

Source: International Monetary Fund.

JAFAJ assessment: Iraq should prioritize reliable public finances, electricity infrastructure, workforce development, and non-oil private-sector growth before attempting to compete in capital-intensive fusion research. The 34% petroleum-revenue/GDP figure cited here is an IMF average for 2010–2020, not a current budget share. The $93 billion figure in the stress-test table is EIA’s 2024 estimate of gross crude-oil export receipts, not government revenue. This revision does not establish a comparable, current Iraq budget capture rate or a verified current-year fiscal baseline; those values should remain marked ‘not established’ until checked against current Iraqi budget data and the latest IMF country assessment.³,⁵

 

ALGERIA AND LIBYA

Both countries have substantial hydrocarbon exposure, although their institutional and economic circumstances differ. Algeria’s 2026 IMF assessment highlights continued dependence on hydrocarbon revenue and the need to strengthen fiscal and external buffers.⁸

Source: International Monetary Fund.

JAFAJ assessment: Their first priority should be converting resource income into resilient public finances, infrastructure, education, and competitive non-hydrocarbon industries. Algeria and Libya should not be treated as a single fiscal case. For Algeria, the September 2026 IMF report provides a current dated fiscal baseline and identifies depleted buffers; its 2026 deficit and debt figures are projections. Algeria’s $13 billion in the EIA table is crude-oil export receipts only and excludes the important natural-gas channel. For Libya, the 55% petroleum-revenue/GDP indicator is a 2010–2020 historical average; the $29 billion EIA figure is 2024 gross crude-oil receipts. The present paper does not establish a comparable current Libyan fiscal capture rate, budget baseline, or liquid-buffer measure. Production interruptions and institutional conditions must be analyzed separately from a hypothetical long-run fusion effect.³,⁵,⁸

THE GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSION

Hydrocarbon exports have historically provided producer states with revenue, strategic partnerships, and influence over energy supply. If fusion eventually reduces fossil-fuel use in electricity generation, it could weaken one channel of energy leverage—but not erase the importance of oil in transport and petrochemicals, gas in industrial markets, or the influence associated with geography, spare production capacity, finance, military capability, and diplomacy. The timing and distribution of any effect would depend on where fusion is deployed, which countries can access it, and whether it substitutes for fossil generation or enables new demand for electricity.

However, geopolitical power is not determined by energy alone. Geography, military capability, financial assets, technology, trade relationships, and diplomatic influence would continue to matter.

Fusion technology itself could become a strategic asset. Countries that control key components, advanced materials, specialized manufacturing, intellectual property, and operating expertise could gain economic leverage. Export controls and restrictions on sensitive technologies may limit access, while international partnerships could provide alternative pathways.

GEOPOLITICAL TRANSMISSION CHANNELS

The geopolitical outcome is likely to be uneven. Fusion could reduce some importers’ exposure to fuel-supply disruptions while creating new dependencies on equipment, intellectual property, specialized materials, maintenance, and technology access. The region’s strategic position will therefore depend on both hydrocarbon-market exposure and its role in the emerging technology supply chain.

Channel	Potential effect	What JAFAJ should monitor
Energy diplomacy	Some importers may become less dependent on fossil-fuel electricity, but oil and gas retain uses beyond power generation.	Power-sector fuel shares, electrification rates, and actual fusion deployment—not announcements.
Technology concentration	A small number of firms or states could control key components, know-how, and maintenance services.	Supplier concentration, export controls, licensing terms, local manufacturing, and repair capability.
Fiscal leverage	Long-term changes in hydrocarbon demand could alter exporter budgets and their capacity to fund foreign policy.	Government capture of hydrocarbon rents, liquid buffers, debt, and non-oil revenue.
Regional divergence	Capital-rich states may invest in supply chains while less-diversified states remain technology importers.	R&D capability, workforce depth, investment governance, and realized local value added.
Contract and infrastructure exposure	Existing LNG contracts, pipelines, ports, and power assets may adjust at different speeds.	Contract duration, take-or-pay provisions where disclosed, asset utilization, and replacement economics.

JAFAJ assessment: The next energy competition may increasingly concern who owns the technology, who manufactures the equipment, who supplies the expertise, and who can deploy it reliably—not simply who possesses underground resources.

SCENARIO ANALYSIS: THREE POSSIBLE FUTURES

SCENARIO 1 — SLOW COMMERCIALIZATION

Near-term planning baseline

Fusion remains technically promising but expensive or difficult to deploy at scale through the 2030s and beyond.

MENA impact: Oil and gas remain strategically important. Existing diversification, renewables, conventional nuclear energy, and grid investment continue to determine competitiveness.

Policy response: Invest in research partnerships and workforce development without diverting essential funding from current economic priorities.

SCENARIO 2 — COMMERCIAL BREAKTHROUGH

High-impact contingency

Fusion plants achieve reliable, competitive electricity generation and begin scaling faster than expected.

MENA impact: Some electricity markets could become less dependent on fossil fuels. Long-term hydrocarbon demand and pricing expectations could weaken, with the largest fiscal risks falling on highly dependent exporters.

Policy response: Accelerate revenue diversification, develop advanced industries, and assess exposure of oil and gas assets to changing demand.

SCENARIO 3 — TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP

Fusion commercialization progresses unevenly, but a limited number of countries and companies control the most valuable intellectual property, components, and expertise.

MENA impact: Capital-rich states could become technology investors and deployment partners. Countries lacking research capacity and skilled workers could remain technology importers even if they possess substantial hydrocarbon wealth.

Policy response: Build international research partnerships, train engineers, strengthen intellectual-property frameworks, and develop advanced manufacturing capabilities.

These scenarios are analytical frameworks, not probability-weighted forecasts. They do not assign a date or probability to commercialization, and none attributes a specific oil-price decline to fusion. In every case, observed market outcomes must be decomposed into global growth, OPEC+ policy, renewables, efficiency, electrification, climate policy, conflict, and supply disruptions before a causal role is assigned to fusion.

QUANTITATIVE SCENARIO FRAMEWORK: ASSUMPTIONS, TRANSMISSION, AND DECISION USE

The purpose of scenario analysis is not to predict a fusion-driven oil-price path. It is to expose the conditions under which a country’s fiscal and industrial choices would change. The following framework deliberately separates (A) an illustrative market shock from (B) evidence that fusion caused that shock. Until credible country-specific models and observed commercial deployment exist, scenario outputs should be reported as sensitivities rather than forecasts.

Mechanical sensitivity formula: gross export receipts = price × exported volume, holding grade mix, discounts, and other factors constant. A 10% price decline with volume unchanged reduces gross receipts by 10%; a 20% price decline combined with a 5% volume decline reduces receipts by 24% (0.80 × 0.95 = 0.76). This arithmetic does not estimate government revenue. Budget effects require a country-specific model of fiscal capture, national oil-company transfers, tax and royalty rules, spending commitments, debt service, liquid assets, and financing access.

For gas and LNG, the same crude-oil formula must not be applied mechanically. Models should separately represent benchmark and contract pricing, contract duration and destination flexibility where disclosed, LNG volumes, pipeline exports, domestic gas use, condensates, state-company earnings, and the cost of any domestic price subsidies. For Qatar and Algeria in particular, an oil-only comparison would omit a material gas channel.

Scenario	Illustrative assumptions	Potential transmission to MENA	Policy response
A. Slow commercialization	No sustained, commercially competitive net electricity at scale through the planning horizon; demonstrations remain costly or limited.	Fusion milestones do not alter fiscal baselines. Existing energy transition drivers continue independently.	Fund transferable skills and monitoring; do not build public budgets around fusion revenue or presumed hydrocarbon displacement.
B. Selective commercial deployment	One or more designs demonstrate sustained net electricity, credible availability, maintainability, licensing progress, and financeable project economics; deployment remains concentrated in selected markets.	Competition is initially concentrated in electricity and selected industrial heat markets; oil and gas effects are indirect and country-specific.	Stress-test power-sector gas demand, industrial location, and long-lived assets; assess partnership opportunities only after independent due diligence.
C. Faster-than-expected scale-up	Multiple projects pass technical and commercial gates; construction, financing, supply chains, and regulation support repeatable deployment across several markets.	Greater potential pressure on gas used in power and on long-run expectations for some hydrocarbon demand; effect on oil remains slower and mediated by transport and feedstocks.	Accelerate fiscal resilience and industry diversification; update asset and budget scenarios annually; avoid assuming all hydrocarbons become uneconomic.

The three scenarios are deliberately qualitative at this stage. A numeric probability or fusion-attributable price path would imply precision the evidence does not support. A country may add quantitative estimates only after publishing the baseline, model equations, source data, and sensitivity ranges; JAFAJ should label such outputs as scenario calculations, not forecasts.

COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EXPOSURE: A COMPARABLE DECISION MATRIX

The matrix below is a decision-priority guide, not a ranking of countries by current fiscal vulnerability. Historical IMF petroleum revenue/GDP averages, EIA gross crude receipts, Qatar’s hydrocarbon share of government revenue, and current fiscal projections use different periods and denominators. They must not be combined into a single numerical score without harmonized current data.

Country / group	Required comparable data	Analytical interpretation	Priority action
Saudi Arabia	Oil receipts, state-company transfers, spending commitments, non-oil revenue, liquid assets	Large absolute crude-receipt exposure; diversification and capital can support adaptation, but policy targets are not realized outcomes.	Annual budget stress test with price-only, volume-only, and combined cases; separate state-company earnings from budget transfers.
United Arab Emirates	Federal and emirate revenue; state-company earnings; oil, gas, downstream and non-oil tax bases	Broader economic base, but exposure and fiscal capture vary by emirate and entity.	Disaggregate fiscal perimeter; identify credible local fusion supply-chain roles and test them against commercial demand.
Qatar	LNG volumes and contracts, pricing, condensates, domestic gas demand, QatarEnergy fiscal transfers	Gas/LNG is central; crude-only comparisons materially understate the relevant energy channel.	Build a gas/LNG-specific scenario model; separate planned capacity from delivered exports and realized fiscal receipts.
Iraq	Oil receipts, production/export continuity, payroll and transfers, non-oil revenue, financing needs	High historical petroleum exposure; near-term fiscal and institutional risks can dominate any fusion effect.	Prioritize budget transparency, continuity buffers, non-oil private activity, and updated official execution data.
Algeria	Oil and gas receipts, subsidies, FX reserves, non-hydrocarbon revenue, budget execution	Oil-only receipt data omit an important gas channel; IMF projections must be distinguished from outturns.	Model oil and gas separately; publish current execution and external-buffer indicators before assigning fiscal impact.
Libya	Production interruptions, export volumes, budget capture, institutional capacity, liquid buffers	Historical petroleum dependence is high, but current comparable fiscal indicators are not established in this paper.	Separate outage/conflict shocks from global market scenarios; disclose data gaps rather than infer a current vulnerability score.
Kuwait	Hydrocarbon revenue, public wage bill, non-oil balance, liquid assets, spending path	Large historical petroleum revenue/GDP exposure; current resilience requires current budget and asset data.	Stress-test long-run spending and financing needs; do not treat historical dependence as a current government-revenue share.
Oil-importing MENA economies	Import bill, generation mix, tariffs/subsidies, grid capacity, currency exposure, financing cost	Potential benefit from reliable lower-cost electricity is conditional on access, infrastructure, financing, and market design.	Evaluate named countries individually; do not infer a regional consumer benefit without tariff and grid analysis.

MEASURABLE INVESTMENT GATES FOR FUSION-SPECIFIC PUBLIC COMMITMENTS

JAFAJ recommends staged commitments, with each stage requiring evidence that resolves a defined risk. The thresholds below are governance requirements, not claims that the technology currently meets them. A public project should not advance simply because a company announces a date, attracts investment, achieves a plasma milestone, or receives political endorsement.

Gate	Evidence required	Permitted policy response
Gate 0 — Observe	Official roadmap, independently documented technical milestone, or credible peer-reviewed result.	Record in dashboard; no material public capital commitment based on the announcement alone.
Gate 1 — Technical due diligence	Independent review of net electricity accounting, plant boundary, operating duration, fuel cycle, materials, safety, licensing path, and component lifetime.	Permit limited feasibility or research funding with deliverables, review dates, and termination clauses.
Gate 2 — Commercial due diligence	Transparent capital and operating cost range; credible construction schedule; financing structure; insurance/warranty assumptions; grid connection; fuel and maintenance plan; comparison with alternatives.	Require a published whole-system cost comparison and downside sensitivity before procurement or large guarantees.
Gate 3 — Demonstrated operation	Metered net electricity delivered to the grid over a stated period; independently verified availability, outages, repair intervals, and repeatable component performance.	Only now consider a larger demonstration or conditional offtake; do not equate a brief experiment with a power plant.
Gate 4 — Scale and local value	Bankable project economics, regulatory approval, credible supply chain, workforce plan, technology-access terms, and measured local value added.	Scale public support only if economic additionality and local capability gains are independently demonstrated.

A decision log should record the evidence reviewed, source and date, independent reviewer, unresolved risks, amount committed, next review date, and conditions for suspension or exit. This creates an auditable link between technical progress and public spending.

MINIMUM INDICATOR SET FOR ANNUAL REVIEW

To make the recommended stress tests comparable over time, JAFAJ recommends that each participating government track at least the following indicators annually, using published definitions and a consistent fiscal perimeter:

Indicator family	Minimum measures	Measurement discipline
Revenue concentration	Hydrocarbon revenue as a share of total government revenue; non-hydrocarbon tax revenue as a share of GDP.	Disclose state-owned-enterprise dividends separately.
Export concentration	Oil and gas receipts as a share of total merchandise exports; separate crude, products, and gas/LNG.	Use national statistics and customs data; document valuation basis.
Price and volume exposure	Revenue change under price-only, volume-only, and combined shocks.	Show benchmarks, discounts, production, exports, and contract lags.
Fiscal resilience	Overall and primary balances, gross debt, interest costs, liquid assets, and financing needs.	Distinguish liquid assets from total sovereign wealth and contingent liabilities.
Spending rigidity	Wage bill, transfers/subsidies, interest, and capital spending as shares of total expenditure.	Separate recurring commitments from discretionary capital projects.
Diversification outcomes	Non-oil exports, private-sector employment, productivity, and non-oil tax receipts.	Report real and nominal trends; do not count announced projects as realized output.

Where a country cannot provide a reliable measure, report it as “not established,” with a responsible agency and target date for improvement. Do not silently replace missing national data with an estimate or regional average.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MENA POLICYMAKERS

1. Establish a regional fusion-monitoring capability. Track demonstrated technical milestones, independently verified plant performance, projected levelized electricity costs, fuel-cycle solutions, and commercial contracts. Separate company announcements from independently validated results.
2. Conduct hydrocarbon stress tests. Assess national budgets, sovereign wealth funds, public employment, debt, and export earnings under several oil and gas demand scenarios. Include scenarios where fusion has little effect and scenarios where it accelerates electricity-sector substitution.
3. Invest in transferable skills. Expand training in plasma physics, advanced materials, robotics, power engineering, industrial safety, computer modeling, and manufacturing. These capabilities have applications beyond fusion.
4. Create targeted international partnerships. Evaluate research collaborations, university programs, supply-chain agreements, and investment opportunities based on technical performance and commercial viability.
5. Protect current energy revenues while diversifying. Continue responsible development of competitive hydrocarbon assets while directing a defined share of resource income toward productive non-oil industries, education, infrastructure, and fiscal reserves.
6. Avoid premature infrastructure bets. Require independent technical and economic due diligence before committing public funds to proposed fusion facilities or suppliers. Do not base national budgets on unproven commercial deployment dates.

IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP: FROM MONITORING TO DECISION

NEXT 12 MONTHS — Establish a small interagency monitoring group. Publish a baseline inventory of hydrocarbon fiscal exposure, electricity-generation mix, industrial demand, workforce capabilities, and existing fusion-related investments. Name a lead ministry and require quarterly updates.

12–36 MONTHS — Run country-specific stress tests against at least three cases: slow fusion commercialization, competitive deployment in selected markets, and accelerated deployment. Test oil and gas prices, export volumes, budget balances, sovereign-wealth-fund withdrawals, public employment, and household support. Keep fusion assumptions separate from other drivers such as renewables, storage, efficiency, electric vehicles, and climate policy.

3–5 YEARS — Fund targeted research, technical education, and supply-chain feasibility studies only where they complement national capabilities and have measurable milestones. Prioritize transferable skills and commercially useful engineering over prestige projects.

DECISION GATES — Increase exposure only when independent evidence demonstrates sustained net electricity output, credible plant availability, repeatable component performance, realistic construction and operating costs, a viable fuel cycle, licensing progress, and a financeable project structure. Announcements, laboratory milestones, and private investment totals are not substitutes for these gates.

IMPLEMENTATION ACCOUNTABILITY MATRIX

The roadmap becomes more actionable when each task has a responsible lead, a dated deliverable, and a measurable output. The following is a recommended governance model; it does not imply that any government has adopted it.

Workstream	Suggested lead	First deliverable	Performance measure
Fiscal exposure baseline	Finance ministry / budget office	Within 12 months: baseline covering hydrocarbon receipts, price/volume sensitivity, spending rigidity, debt, and liquid assets.	All major assumptions disclosed; annual update published or formally reviewed.
Energy-market monitoring	Energy ministry / regulator	Quarterly dashboard of oil/gas exports, generation mix, demand drivers, and verified fusion milestones.	Each claim labeled as observed data, target, estimate, or scenario.
Technology assessment	Science/industry ministry with independent experts	Technical due-diligence protocol and capability inventory.	Every publicly supported project has milestones, review dates, and exit criteria.
Workforce and supply chain	Education / labor / industry agencies	Skills-gap assessment and shortlist of transferable training priorities.	Training completion, placement, employer demand, and local value-added measures.
Public accountability	Audit office / legislative budget committee	Annual report on commitments, spending, risks, and scenario assumptions.	No projected fusion revenue entered into the budget without demonstrated commercial contracts and auditable assumptions.

CONSUMER AND PUBLIC IMPACT

The public will experience energy transitions through electricity prices, transport costs, employment, government services, and the cost of goods.

If fusion eventually delivers affordable electricity at scale, it could reduce exposure to some fossil-fuel price shocks and support energy-intensive services such as desalination. But consumers would not automatically receive lower bills: plant construction, financing, grid upgrades, regulation, and market structure would determine how savings are distributed.

For hydrocarbon-dependent states, the most serious social risk is a fiscal adjustment that reduces employment opportunities, public services, or household support before replacement industries mature.

JAFAJ assessment: The public-policy test is straightforward: can governments translate resource wealth and technological opportunity into more reliable public services, productive jobs, and durable household prosperity?

Causal boundary: fusion is one potential long-term contributor to changes in electricity markets. Any observed movement in oil and gas prices, export volumes, or public revenue would also reflect global growth, renewables, efficiency, electrification, climate policy, OPEC+ decisions, conflict, and supply disruptions. JAFAJ should not attribute a market movement to fusion without evidence that separates these competing drivers.

FINAL JAFAJ ASSESSMENT

Fusion energy does not yet constitute a commercially proven replacement for oil and natural gas. Its future contribution to the global energy mix remains uncertain, and current deployment targets should not be treated as guaranteed outcomes.

Nevertheless, fusion deserves a place in MENA’s long-term strategic planning because its potential consequences extend beyond electricity. If commercial fusion becomes reliable and economically competitive, it could alter the economics of power generation, influence industrial location decisions, reduce some forms of fossil-fuel dependence, and reshape the strategic value of energy exports.

The region’s countries are not equally exposed. States with substantial financial reserves, diversified economies, strong institutions, and technology partnerships have more options. Economies heavily dependent on hydrocarbon revenue have greater reason to build fiscal resilience before market conditions change.

The correct response is neither to abandon oil and gas nor to dismiss fusion as distant speculation. It is to protect existing revenues while preparing for several possible energy futures.

JAFAJ INTELLIGENCE OUTLOOK

Judgment: MENA’s long-term energy security will depend on whether its governments convert today’s hydrocarbon advantages into diversified economic capabilities before the global energy system changes materially.

Confidence: High that diversification and technological preparedness are strategically prudent; moderate that commercially viable fusion could become a material factor in global electricity markets over the coming decades; low regarding the precise timing, cost, deployment scale, and resulting effect on hydrocarbon demand.

Bottom line: Oil and gas built much of MENA’s modern economic power. Fusion could eventually change the terms on which that power is exercised. The countries that prepare early will have more choices than those that wait for the market to force their hand.

CHICAGO-STYLE NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. U.S. Department of Energy, “Energy Department Releases Finalized Fusion Science and Technology Roadmap to Accelerate Commercial Fusion Power,” June 9, 2026, https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-department-releases-finalized-fusion-science-and-technology-roadmap-accelerate; ITER Organization, “38th ITER Council Meeting: ITER’s Strong Project Execution Continues,” June 26, 2026, https://www.iter.org/38th-iter-council-meeting-iters-strong-project-execution-continues.
2. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), “OPEC Launches World Oil Outlook 2026 and Sees Global Oil Demand Reaching 124 mb/d by 2050,” June 18, 2026, https://www.opec.org/pr-detail/1854607-18-june-2026.html.
3. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “OPEC Crude Oil Export Revenues,” updated July 2025, table 1, “OPEC crude oil export revenues,” including country estimates for 2024 and forecasts for 2025–2026. https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/OPEC_Revenues_Fact_Sheet. The 2024 country figures are estimates; the 2025–2026 values were forecasts published in July 2025, not current forecasts.
4. World Bank, “Middle East Conflict Further Weakens Regional Outlook, with Gulf Oil Exporters Hit Hardest,” October 6, 2026, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/10/06/middle-east-conflict-further-weakens-regional-outlook-with-gulf-oil-export.
5. International Monetary Fund, Taxation in the Middle East and North Africa: Prospects and Possibilities, ed. Mario Mansour and Shafik Hebous (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2026), chap. 8, “Taxation of Upstream Oil and Gas and Implications of Carbon Levies,” especially Annex 8.1, Figure 8.1.1, “Oil and Gas Economic Dependence Indicators,” printed pp. 201–202 (average petroleum revenue, 2010–2020; fiscal breakeven oil price; fuel exports as a share of merchandise exports). https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400281501.071.
6. United Arab Emirates Government, “UAE Energy Strategy 2050,” updated December 30, 2024, https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/strategies-initiatives-and-awards/strategies-plans-and-visions/environment-and-energy/uae-energy-strategy-2050; and “National Hydrogen Strategy,” updated December 30, 2024, https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/strategies-initiatives-and-awards/strategies-plans-and-visions/environment-and-energy/national-hydrogen-strategy. These sources establish stated policy objectives, not proof of achieved targets.
7. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030, “Vision 2030 Annual Report 2025,” executive summary and energy/diversification discussion, https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/media/vcjnuhsn/vision2030_annual_report_2025-executive_summary_en.pdf. This source documents stated programs and reported progress; it does not establish fusion-specific capability.
8. International Monetary Fund, “Algeria: 2026 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Algeria,” IMF Staff Country Reports 2026, no. 252 (September 21, 2026), especially Table 1, “Algeria: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2021–2031,” and the fiscal-policy discussion, https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2026/09/21/algeria-2026-article-iv-consultation-press-release-staff-report-and-statement-by-the-579770. The 2026 fiscal balance and debt figures cited in the paper are IMF staff projections, not final outturns.
9. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief: Qatar,” updated October 20, 2025, Overview, Natural Gas, and Energy Trade sections. The brief reports that hydrocarbon earnings accounted for 83% of government revenue in 2023, citing the IMF, and details Qatar’s LNG export position. https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/countries/qat.
10. International Energy Agency (IEA), The Future of Electricity in the Middle East and North Africa (Paris: IEA, September 18, 2025), Executive Summary and country-level electricity analysis. https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-electricity-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa. The report supports regional electricity-demand, generation-mix, cooling, desalination, and grid-planning context; it does not assess commercial fusion or quantify fusion-driven hydrocarbon losses.
11. International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2025 (Paris: IEA, November 12, 2025), Executive Summary, “Twists and Turns for Oil Markets and EVs,” and “Overview and Key Findings.” https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2025/executive-summary. The Current Policies Scenario projects oil demand reaching 113 mb/d in 2050; the Stated Policies Scenario has demand flattening around 2030 at about 102 mb/d before a gradual decline. These are scenarios, not forecasts, and neither isolates fusion’s effect.
    11. International Monetary Fund, “Kuwait: 2025 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; and Staff Report,” IMF Country Report No. 26/052 (February 3, 2026), fiscal-policy discussion, especially paragraph 14 and the discussion of the permanent-income-hypothesis fiscal target. The report describes a model-based intergenerational fiscal gap, recommended consolidation, and large fiscal buffers; its projections depend on stated assumptions and should not be treated as a direct fusion-impact estimate. https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1kwtea2026001-source-pdf.pdf
12. U.S. Department of Energy, “Fusion Energy,” Office of Fusion, updated June 2026, describing the finalized Fusion Science and Technology Roadmap, its mid-2030s pathway, unresolved technical gaps, and dependence on future public-private partnerships and congressional appropriations, https://www.energy.gov/fusion/fusion-energy.
13. Congressional Research Service, “Toward Commercial Fusion Energy: Considerations for Congress,” R48866, February 27, 2026, discussing technical hurdles, commercialization uncertainties, and international competition, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R48866.html.

SOURCE VERIFICATION REGISTER & CLAIM BOUNDARIES

The register states what each core source can support and what it cannot support. A credible institution’s name is not a substitute for claim-level evidence.

Consolidation standard: this master edition uses the most developed analytical structure, fiscal sensitivity tables, country-level discussion, source verification register, and country-level claim audit from the four supplied revisions. Where the drafts used different formulations, the text prioritizes explicit distinctions between historical data, estimates, projections, scenario outputs, and JAFAJ calculations. The presence of a source in the register does not independently validate every claim; the cited locator and stated limitation govern how each figure should be used.

Note / source locator	Supports	Does not establish
1. DOE Fusion Roadmap (June 9, 2026), roadmap release; ITER Council update (June 26, 2026), project update	DOE’s published roadmap target and ITER’s stated project status at those publication dates.	Neither source proves net electricity delivered to a grid, competitive whole-plant cost, commercial availability, or a guaranteed mid-2030s launch.
2. OPEC, World Oil Outlook 2026, June 18, 2026 release	OPEC’s own projection of 124 mb/d global oil demand by 2050.	Not a consensus forecast; assumptions differ from IEA scenarios. It does not isolate fusion’s effect.
3. EIA, ‘OPEC Crude Oil Export Revenues,’ updated July 2025, Table 1 and methodology	2024 estimated gross crude-oil and condensate export receipts; basis for the six-country sensitivity calculations.	Not government revenue; excludes natural gas and Qatar; 2025–2026 values were forecasts made in July 2025, not current forecasts. Results depend on unchanged volume, price and mix assumptions.
4. World Bank, regional update / release (October 6–7, 2026)	World Bank assessment of regional economic effects associated with the 2026 conflict, trade-route disruption, and Gulf export disruption.	A contemporaneous shock assessment; it does not isolate or estimate a fusion-driven market effect.
5. IMF, Taxation in the Middle East and North Africa (2026), chap. 8, Annex 8.1, Figure 8.1.1, printed pp. 201–202	Historical 2010–2020 average petroleum revenue as a share of GDP and separately reported dependence indicators.	Not current fiscal dependence, not the share of total government revenue, and not a forecast. Do not compare directly with Qatar’s 2023 hydrocarbon share of total government revenue.
6. UAE Government, Energy Strategy 2050 and National Hydrogen Strategy	Officially stated policy priorities and targets for energy diversification and hydrogen.	Policy commitments and targets do not prove realized investment, output, employment, fiscal returns, or fusion readiness.
7. Saudi Vision 2030 Annual Report 2025, executive summary and energy/diversification discussion	Officially reported programs and progress indicators.	Government-reported progress should be attributed to the source; it is not independent evidence of fusion-specific capability.
8. IMF, Algeria 2026 Article IV, Staff Country Report No. 252, Table 1 and fiscal-policy discussion	2025 reported estimates and 2026–2031 staff projections for central-government revenue, expenditure, balance and gross debt; qualitative assessment of fiscal/external buffers.	The 2026 deficit (9.6% GDP) and debt (53.2% GDP) are projections, not final outturns; these are not oil-receipt figures.
9. EIA, ‘Country Analysis Brief: Qatar,’ updated October 20, 2025, Overview; Table 1; Natural Gas and Energy Trade sections	Hydrocarbon share of total government revenue in 2023 (83%, attributed by EIA to IMF); 2023 electricity generation mix; 2024 LNG exporter position; announced capacity plans.	The 83% share is for 2023, not current; announced LNG capacity is not realized exports/revenue; do not compare this denominator directly with petroleum revenue/GDP.
10. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2025, Executive Summary and Overview/Key Findings	IEA scenario outputs for oil demand and the differences between the Current Policies and Stated Policies scenarios.	Scenarios are conditional pathways, not predictions; neither isolates a fusion-driven demand effect.
11. IEA, The Future of Electricity in the Middle East and North Africa (2025), Executive Summary and country-level analysis	Regional and country-level electricity demand, generation mix, cooling/desalination demand, and grid investment context.	Does not establish fusion viability, commercial deployment dates, or country-specific revenue losses caused by fusion.

Source standard applied in this revision: use primary institutional sources for reported data; identify the exact publication, table, figure, or section when available; label historical values, estimates, projections, and JAFAJ calculations separately; and state when the available evidence does not establish a number. The quantitative scenario framework added in this upgrade is intentionally non-probabilistic; no fusion-attributable oil-price decline is asserted. The country matrix is a decision-priority guide, not a fiscal-resilience ranking, because current data do not yet share a common year, denominator, and fiscal perimeter.

COUNTRY-LEVEL CLAIM VERIFICATION: DATA STATUS AND GAPS

The following audit separates evidence already cited from the additional evidence needed before country comparisons can be treated as a current fiscal ranking. “Verified in cited source” means the source supports the stated figure or description; it does not mean the figure is current or directly comparable with every other row.

Country	Claim/data used	Period and denominator	Verification status	Required next evidence / limit
Saudi Arabia	EIA $179bn gross crude-oil receipts; IMF 27% petroleum revenue/GDP; Vision 2030 diversification statements.	2024 EIA estimate; IMF average 2010–2020; official report 2025.	Source supports each claim within its own scope.	Current budget hydrocarbon revenue, oil-company fiscal transfers/dividends, non-oil revenue, liquid assets and budget assumptions needed to quantify budget impact.
Iraq	EIA $93bn gross crude-oil receipts; IMF 34% petroleum revenue/GDP historical average.	2024 EIA estimate; IMF average 2010–2020.	Historical and gross-receipt claims supported; current budget transmission not established.	Verify latest Iraqi budget execution, oil revenue share, export volumes, payroll/transfers, liquid buffers and fiscal deficit from current official/IMF sources.
UAE	EIA $89bn gross crude-oil receipts; IMF 20% petroleum revenue/GDP; official energy/hydrogen strategies.	2024 EIA estimate; IMF average 2010–2020; policy strategies as cited.	Claims supported with different periods and denominators.	Disaggregate emirate/federal budgets, state-company earnings, gas and downstream exposure, non-oil tax base, and actual rather than target outcomes.
Kuwait	EIA $41bn gross crude-oil receipts; IMF 49% petroleum revenue/GDP; IMF Article IV fiscal sustainability analysis.	2024 EIA estimate; IMF average 2010–2020; IMF report published Feb. 3, 2026.	Historical indicators and current IMF fiscal assessment supported; fusion effect unquantified.	Use current budget execution, oil receipts, non-oil balance, public wage bill, liquid assets and the IMF model assumptions; do not treat permanent-income gap as a fusion forecast.
Qatar	83% hydrocarbon share of total government revenue; EIA natural-gas-dominant power mix and LNG position.	Government revenue share 2023; electricity generation 2023; LNG exports 2024; expansion plans in Oct. 2025 brief.	Verified in EIA brief, which attributes 83% to IMF. Not comparable with petroleum revenue/GDP.	Build a gas/LNG-specific model with contract pricing/duration, export volumes, condensates, gas use in power, fiscal capture and actual delivered expansion capacity.
Libya	EIA $29bn gross crude-oil receipts; IMF 55% petroleum revenue/GDP historical average.	2024 EIA estimate; IMF average 2010–2020.	Historical and gross-receipt claims supported; current comparable fiscal indicators not established in this paper.	Verify current production/export interruptions, budget execution, state capture, institutional conditions, reserves and arrears. Model outages separately from global price shocks.
Algeria	EIA $13bn gross crude-oil receipts; IMF 2026 deficit 9.6% GDP and debt 53.2% GDP; IMF identifies buffer erosion.	2024 EIA estimate; IMF 2026 projections; 2025 deficit/debt estimates.	Source supports figures; 2026 values are projections, not outturns. Crude-only receipts omit gas.	Add gas export receipts, domestic subsidy costs, current FX reserves, non-hydrocarbon revenue and actual budget execution; keep fiscal and external accounts separate.
Hydrocarbon importers / diversified economies	Potential benefit from lower-cost electricity; no single comparable country statistic used.	Conditional future scenario; country-specific data not presented.	Analytical inference, not a quantified finding.	Select named countries and use current generation mix, import bill, tariff/subsidy regime, grid investment needs, currency exposure and industrial structure before ranking benefits.

INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENCE STATEMENT

This paper combines official energy roadmaps, international economic assessments, and JAFAJ analysis. The IMF dependence figures are 2010–2020 historical averages; EIA’s 2024 crude-oil export figures are estimates published in July 2025, and its 2025–2026 figures were forecasts at that time. OPEC’s long-run projection is distinguished from the IEA’s multi-scenario framework. Gross export receipts are not government revenue. Fusion’s timing, cost, scale, and market effects remain uncertain; the paper’s scenarios and price sensitivities are not forecasts of a fusion-driven shock.

DECISION RULE

Prepare early; commit incrementally. Governments should act now on fiscal diversification, transferable skills, and evidence monitoring because those measures retain value across multiple energy futures. They should scale fusion-specific public commitments only when independently verified technical, economic, regulatory, and supply-chain evidence passes predefined decision gates.

ABOUT JAFAJ

JAFAJ publishes strategic intelligence and policy analysis focused on the Middle East and North Africa, regional governance, economic security, and geopolitical developments. Its objective is to connect verified information with clear, decision-relevant analysis.