SPECIAL REPORT | NOVEMBER 11, 2026
THE WATER THAT KEEPS
THE MIDDLE EAST ALIVE
WATER IS NO LONGER JUST A SCARCITY ISSUE. IT IS A QUESTION OF POWER, SOVEREIGNTY, FOOD, ENERGY AND NATIONAL RESILIENCE.
JaFaJ ANALYSIS | REGIONAL WATER, FOOD & GEOPOLITICAL SECURITY
| THE JAFAJ THESIS MENA’s water crisis is not only about how much water exists. It is about who controls the sources, infrastructure, energy, technology and cross-border arrangements that keep water flowing—and what happens when those systems are disrupted. |
A city can endure a difficult summer. It cannot endure the loss of dependable water for long. Water determines whether households remain healthy, farms produce, factories operate, hospitals function and governments retain public confidence. Across the Middle East and North Africa, that makes water more than a development challenge. It is a test of state capacity and, increasingly, a source of geopolitical leverage.
The region faces a chain of connected pressures: depleted aquifers, stressed rivers, rising demand, aging distribution networks, energy-intensive desalination, vulnerable coastal facilities and food systems that consume enormous quantities of water before products reach consumers. The IEA estimates that more than 70 percent of the MENA population remains exposed to high or extreme water stress. It also estimates that MENA hosts more than 40 percent of global desalination capacity, while Gulf Cooperation Council countries account for about one-third. The region produces roughly 12 billion cubic metres of desalinated water annually. [1]
But the deeper story is not simply that the region is running short of water. It is that countries have engineered new systems to overcome natural scarcity—and those systems have created new strategic dependencies. Water now sits at the intersection of energy security, national sovereignty, food imports, critical infrastructure, diplomacy and regional competition.
1. DESALINATION: LIFELINE, LEVERAGE AND TARGET
Desalination has transformed the Gulf. It sustains major cities, industrial zones, ports, hospitals and millions of households in places where natural freshwater is limited. For some states, it is not a supplementary source; it is the backbone of municipal supply. The IEA identifies the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait among systems that rely almost exclusively on desalination for municipal water. [1]
That dependence is not evenly distributed across MENA. Desalinated water accounts for a modest share of total freshwater withdrawals across the region as a whole, yet it can be indispensable to particular countries and cities. A regional average can therefore conceal a national vulnerability: where a small number of coastal plants supply most drinking water, the loss of one facility can have consequences far beyond its perimeter. [1][2]
A desalination plant is not an isolated machine. It depends on seawater intakes, pumps, filters, membranes or thermal systems, chemical treatment, electricity, control networks, trained operators, replacement parts, storage and distribution pipelines. If a power supply fails, a cyber incident disrupts controls, an intake is contaminated or a pipeline is damaged, output can fall sharply. Where water production and power generation are co-located, one disruption can cascade into the other.
The security implications are no longer hypothetical. The IEA reports that desalination facilities came under threat during the 2026 hostilities and that some were struck directly. It identifies an attack on a facility on Iran’s Qeshm Island that affected water supply to 30 villages, as well as a strike that damaged a desalination plant in Bahrain. The IEA also notes that some strategic water reserves may last only days or weeks. [1] This is a strategic vulnerability, not merely an engineering concern.
Governments must therefore treat major water facilities as critical civilian infrastructure. Protection should include physical security, cyber resilience, backup electricity, emergency inventories, redundant pipelines, alternate supply routes, strategic reserves and tested plans for allocating water during a crisis. The objective is not only to prevent an attack. It is to ensure that a single failure cannot disable an entire urban water system.
2. WATER IS GEOPOLITICS: THE UPSTREAM-DOWNSTREAM DIVIDE
Desalination dominates the Gulf story, but much of the wider region depends on water that crosses national borders. That creates a different kind of vulnerability: a country’s water security can be affected by decisions made beyond its territory. Dams, irrigation projects, reservoir operations, pollution and drought management can become matters of foreign policy.
The Nile is the clearest example. Egypt depends overwhelmingly on the river, with approximately 98 percent of its water supply originating beyond its borders, according to analysis published by the London School of Economics Middle East Centre. Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has therefore become more than an infrastructure project: it is tied to Egypt’s water security, Ethiopia’s development ambitions and Sudan’s interests in the operation and management of the river. [3]
The central challenge is not that upstream development is inherently illegitimate. Countries have legitimate development needs. The geopolitical problem arises when states cannot agree on predictable rules for filling and operating reservoirs, sharing data, managing droughts and resolving disputes. Without trusted arrangements, every dry season can become a diplomatic test.
The Tigris-Euphrates basin presents a similar imbalance. Türkiye’s upstream dams and irrigation projects affect flows reaching Syria and Iraq; Iran’s water infrastructure and diversions also affect tributaries flowing into Iraq. The International Institute for Strategic Studies describes Iraq and Syria as downstream states exposed to upstream decisions, while noting that the practical resolution of long-standing disputes remains uncertain. [4]
For Iraq, the issue is especially consequential. Water scarcity compounds the country’s agricultural, electricity and reconstruction challenges. For Syria, years of conflict have weakened infrastructure and institutional capacity. Both countries need dependable flows, but neither controls all the decisions that shape them. Water diplomacy is therefore inseparable from broader questions of regional influence, state rebuilding and economic recovery.
The Jordan River basin adds another layer. Jordan relies on shared water resources with several neighbours and faces severe domestic scarcity. In February 2026, Jordan acceded to the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, becoming its 59th party. UNECE reports that the move strengthens the framework for cooperation, data exchange and agreed rules. [5]
A legal distinction matters here: the 1992 UNECE Water Convention that Jordan joined is not the same instrument as the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. The two frameworks should not be conflated when assessing treaty participation or legal obligations. [5][9]
These examples point to a central geopolitical reality: water can create leverage, but it can also create incentives for cooperation. Upstream states may have physical control over infrastructure; downstream states may have diplomatic, legal, economic or security tools. Durable water security requires negotiated rules, transparent data, joint monitoring and practical mechanisms for managing drought—not simply declarations of national entitlement.
The region should be careful about treating every water dispute as a likely conflict. Most water tensions are managed through negotiation, technical arrangements or political bargaining. But where institutions are weak, trust is low and scarcity intensifies, water decisions can deepen existing rivalries and undermine fragile relationships. The strategic risk is often cumulative: a river dispute may not cause a crisis by itself, but it can worsen food insecurity, displacement, economic stress and domestic instability.
| THE GEOPOLITICAL DIVIDE For a downstream country, water security may depend on decisions made upstream. For a desalination-dependent state, it may depend on power, technology and the security of a handful of coastal facilities. Different vulnerabilities. The same strategic consequence: water supply is not fully within national control. |
COUNTRY SNAPSHOT: SEVEN DISTINCT WATER-SECURITY PROFILES
Regional averages conceal very different national risk profiles. The following comparison is a strategic snapshot, not a league table: it identifies the principal exposure documented in the cited sources and the corresponding policy or investment priority.
| COUNTRY / SYSTEM | PRINCIPAL EXPOSURE | STRATEGIC PRIORITY |
| Saudi Arabia | Large-scale desalination is central to the Gulf supply model; Ras Al-Khair is among the region’s mega-plants. [1] | Pair efficient desalination with agricultural water productivity, reuse, storage and diversified power. |
| UAE | Municipal systems rely heavily on desalination; coastal facilities and power supply are strategic dependencies. [1] | Protect critical plants, diversify power, strengthen storage and build redundancy into distribution. |
| Bahrain | Municipal water is highly desalination-dependent; the IEA reports damage to a desalination plant during 2026 hostilities. [1] | Prioritize facility protection, emergency reserves, backup power and rapid repair capacity. |
| Kuwait | Municipal water relies almost exclusively on desalination, creating concentrated infrastructure exposure. [1] | Reduce single-point failures through reserve capacity, redundant pipelines and tested emergency allocation. |
| Egypt | Approximately 98% of water supply originates beyond its borders, principally through the Nile system. [3] | Pursue predictable Nile operating rules, transparent data, drought protocols and domestic efficiency. |
| Iraq | Downstream dependence on the Tigris-Euphrates and tributaries intersects with infrastructure and energy-system vulnerabilities. [3][4][7] | Combine basin diplomacy with wastewater reuse, network rehabilitation, irrigation efficiency and energy resilience. |
| Jordan | Among the world’s most water-scarce countries; its Aqaba-Amman project is a major supply and energy undertaking. [2][5][10][11] | Deliver the project with affordable lifecycle costs, renewable power, reduced network losses, wastewater reuse and strong environmental safeguards. |
3. THE ENERGY-WATER TRAP
Desalination converts a water shortage into an energy requirement. That trade can be worthwhile, but it is not free. The IEA notes that the region’s desalination sector has historically relied heavily on fossil fuels. Reverse-osmosis membranes have improved efficiency compared with older thermal technologies, but modern plants still require dependable electricity for intake, pumping, treatment and distribution. [1][6]
The current energy shock sharpens the issue. In its November 3, 2026 assessment, the IEA described severe disruption to regional energy flows following the conflict and repeated obstruction of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The crisis has increased pressure on fuel supplies, export revenues, electricity systems and public finances across MENA. [7] For water-dependent states, this is not a separate crisis. Energy disruption can raise the cost of producing water or threaten the electricity needed to keep plants operating.
Jordan illustrates the scale of the challenge outside the wealthy Gulf. The proposed Aqaba-Amman project is designed to produce 300 million cubic metres of water annually and move it roughly 445 kilometres inland. The World Bank reports that Jordan had only 61 cubic metres of water available per person in 2025. The project is expected to require 200–300 megawatts of installed capacity, with energy estimated to account for about 40 percent of total project cost and 70 percent of annual operating costs. [2]
The project also demonstrates the scale of the investable market. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank lists USD 250 million in approved funding and describes a 438-kilometre conveyance system, a 281-megawatt solar plant and annual production of 300 million cubic metres. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development separately lists a senior loan of up to USD 475 million and a 30-year public-private partnership structure. These are lender-specific figures for the same project and should not be added together as if they were independent project costs or total capital expenditure. [10][11]
This is a long-term fiscal and energy commitment. Governments must finance construction, secure electricity, maintain plants and pipelines, manage tariffs and keep water affordable. A desalination plant does not guarantee water security if the state cannot reliably power, operate and maintain it.
New projects should be evaluated on lifecycle energy costs, grid reliability, exposure to fuel-price shocks, emissions, maintenance requirements and performance during emergencies. Renewable power, storage, energy recovery and efficient membranes can reduce exposure, but they must be integrated into a dependable operating system—not treated as a branding exercise.
4. WATER SECURITY IS FOOD SECURITY
Agriculture is the largest user of freshwater across the region. The World Bank’s regional food-security assessment estimates that agriculture accounts for 87 percent of water use in the world’s most water-stressed region. It also reports that one in six people across the broader MENAAP region lacks reliable access to food, 42 percent cannot afford a healthy diet and food demand is projected to rise 67 percent by 2050. [8]
These figures expose a difficult policy choice. Governments cannot solve water scarcity by expanding supply alone while leaving inefficient irrigation, poorly targeted subsidies, leaky networks and avoidable food losses untouched. The World Bank estimates that nearly one-third of food is lost or wasted between farm and consumer. That waste also discards the water, energy, fertilizer, land, labour, storage and transport used to produce the food. [8]
Food security should therefore be measured not only by domestic production, but by water consumed per unit of food, post-harvest losses, the resilience of import routes and whether scarce freshwater is being allocated to crops that justify its cost. Desalinated water may support selected high-value agricultural uses, but it is generally too expensive and energy-intensive to replace conventional freshwater for all field crops.
A more durable strategy combines desalination where economically justified with safe wastewater reuse, modern irrigation, improved crop selection, groundwater protection, cold-chain investment, better storage and diversified food imports. Water policy and food policy should be planned together. Treating them as separate ministries’ problems is an institutional weakness.
5. THE HIDDEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL COST
Desalination produces concentrated brine. If poorly managed, discharge can affect marine environments, particularly in semi-enclosed or naturally high-salinity waters such as the Arabian Gulf, Red Sea and parts of the Mediterranean. The World Bank identifies brine management, seawater intake design, cumulative environmental assessment and community engagement as important safeguards for new projects. [2]
This is not an argument against desalination. It is an argument against measuring success only by production capacity. Projects must also be assessed for their effects on fisheries, coastal livelihoods, marine habitats, energy consumption and long-term operating costs. A water project that damages the coastal ecosystem on which communities depend may simply move the problem from one part of the economy to another.
Affordability matters just as much. Water tariffs that recover costs but place essential supply beyond the reach of low-income households can undermine public trust. Subsidies that conceal waste or disproportionately benefit high-volume users can undermine financial sustainability. The policy challenge is to protect basic household access while creating incentives to conserve water and maintain infrastructure.
6. THE INVESTMENT MARKET: BEYOND THE NEXT MEGA-PLANT
The water challenge creates a major market for technology, infrastructure, finance and operating expertise. But the strongest opportunities may not all be in building another giant desalination facility. Governments and investors should examine the full water value chain:
- Network rehabilitation and leak detection: recover usable supply by reducing non-revenue water and repairing distribution systems.
- Wastewater treatment and reuse: reserve higher-quality freshwater for essential uses by expanding safe industrial, landscaping and agricultural reuse.
- Efficient desalination: deploy advanced reverse osmosis, energy recovery, renewable-power integration, storage and predictive maintenance.
- Distributed and modular systems: add resilience for remote communities, hospitals and industrial sites where a centralized plant creates a single point of failure.
- Brine treatment and monitoring: improve discharge systems, environmental sensors and resource-recovery technologies.
- Agricultural productivity: invest in precision irrigation, soil monitoring, greenhouse efficiency, crop research, cold chains and post-harvest storage.
- Water data and cybersecurity: strengthen metering, leak analytics, operational-technology security, emergency communications and basin-level data.
The World Bank’s 2025 desalination assessment emphasizes that technology must match national circumstances, institutional capacity, environmental conditions and the ability to finance operations over time. Public-private partnerships can help mobilize capital and expertise, but contracts must allocate risks transparently and protect affordability and public access. [2]
For investors, the real question is not whether a country needs more water. It is whether a project can deliver reliable supply at an affordable lifecycle cost, with credible power, transparent procurement, enforceable operating standards and a realistic plan for climate and security risks. A poorly structured water project can become a long-term fiscal liability.
A disciplined investment screen should compare projects using the same core measures: cost per cubic metre delivered; energy consumed per cubic metre; dependable output under stress conditions; non-revenue water reduced; water reused; lifecycle operating and maintenance cost; emissions and brine impacts; tariff affordability; procurement transparency; and the allocation of construction, demand, currency and political risks. Capacity announced is not the same as water reliably delivered. Investors should distinguish announced projects, approved financing, signed contracts and operating assets.
WATER SECURITY AS NATIONAL SECURITY
Water continuity should be built into national security and emergency-management planning, not left solely to utilities or environment ministries. Governments should maintain a single, regularly updated risk picture covering source-water availability, desalination and treatment capacity, power dependencies, pipelines, storage, cyber exposure, spare parts and emergency reserves. Water operators, energy providers, civil defence, public-health agencies and national cyber authorities should conduct joint exercises for compound disruptions. Plans should establish minimum essential-service allocations for hospitals, sanitation, food supply and households, with clear public communication and independent oversight.
7. WHAT GOVERNMENTS SHOULD DO NOW
Treat water as critical national infrastructure. Require compound-risk assessments that test simultaneous power loss, physical attack, cyber disruption, contamination and pipeline failure—not just one hazard at a time.
Diversify supply and distribution. Combine large desalination facilities with storage, interconnections, backup power and distributed systems where practical. Build clear emergency allocation rules.
Make demand management a core investment. Expand metering, reduce leakage, improve water efficiency and design tariffs that reward conservation while protecting vulnerable households.
Put agriculture at the centre of water policy. Measure water productivity, modernize irrigation, support farmers through transition, reduce food losses and reconsider production that consumes scarce water without adequate economic or social return.
Negotiate shared-water rules. Strengthen basin-level agreements, joint monitoring, data exchange, drought protocols and dispute-resolution mechanisms. Upstream and downstream states need predictable rules, not crisis-by-crisis bargaining.
Protect public trust. Publish clear information on water quality, reserves, tariffs, outages and project performance. Transparency is part of resilience, not a communications afterthought.
Apply investment discipline. Require transparent procurement, independently verified demand forecasts, lifecycle costing, measurable service standards, public reporting and credible allocation of construction, operating and political risks before approving major projects.
THE STRATEGIC CONCLUSION
The Middle East has used engineering to overcome some of the limits imposed by geography. Desalination has sustained cities and economies that could not have grown to their present scale on natural freshwater alone. But the next phase of water security cannot be built on production capacity alone.
The region must secure the electricity that powers water production, protect the plants and pipelines that deliver it, manage environmental consequences, reduce waste in agriculture and food distribution, and negotiate workable arrangements for rivers and aquifers that cross borders. It must also build institutions capable of allocating water fairly when shortages arrive.
For governments, water is a test of state capacity. For upstream states, it can become a source of leverage—and a responsibility to cooperate. For downstream states, it is a question of sovereignty and diplomatic security. For businesses and investors, it is a growing infrastructure and technology market. For citizens, it is more immediate: water is the foundation of health, food, employment and daily life.
The next water crisis may not begin when the last reservoir runs dry. It may begin when a power supply fails, a coastal plant goes offline, a river flow is reduced, a pipeline is interrupted or a food system wastes the water already consumed.
The countries that recognize water as a strategic system—not simply a natural resource—will be better positioned to protect their economies, preserve regional relationships and withstand the pressures ahead. The central question for MENA is no longer just how to find more water. It is how to secure the systems, agreements and institutions that keep water flowing.
| JAFAJ BOTTOM LINE Water is becoming a measure of geopolitical resilience. The region’s winners will not simply be those that build the most desalination capacity, but those that secure energy, diversify supply, protect infrastructure, use water more productively and negotiate dependable arrangements with their neighbours. |
SOURCES & REFERENCE NOTES
[1] International Energy Agency (IEA), “Wired for Water: How Electrification Is Transforming Desalination,” 22 March 2026.
https://www.iea.org/commentaries/wired-for-water-how-electrification-is-transforming-desalination
[2] World Bank, Fresh Perspectives: Emerging Issues and Opportunities for Desalination in the Middle East and North Africa, 2025.
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/43759
[3] London School of Economics, Middle East Centre, Greg Shapland, “Transboundary Water in MENA: Cooperation and Competition,” 6 March 2026.
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2026/03/06/transboundary-water-in-mena-cooperation-and-competition/
[4] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Noor Hammad, “Water Geopolitics of Disputed River Basins in the Levant,” 27 October 2025.
https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2025/11/water-geopolitics-of-disputed-river-basins-in-the-levant/
[5] United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), “Jordan Joins the UN Water Convention as Water Scarcity and Climate Pressures Intensify,” 17 February 2026.
https://unece.org/media/press/411535
[6] International Energy Agency (IEA), “Energy Is Vital to a Well-Functioning Water Sector.”
https://www.iea.org/commentaries/energy-is-vital-to-a-well-functioning-water-sector
[7] International Energy Agency (IEA), “How the Energy Crisis Is Redefining Energy Security in the Middle East and North Africa,” 3 November 2026.
https://www.iea.org/commentaries/how-the-energy-crisis-is-redefining-energy-security-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa
[8] World Bank Group, “Building Food Security, Creating Jobs: Policy Pathways for the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 2026.
https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/building-food-security-creating-jobs-policy-pathways-for-the-middle-east-north-africa-afghanistan-and-pakistan
[9] Cansu Güleç and Ayşegül Kibaroğlu, “A Discourse Analysis of Bilateral Water Agreements between Türkiye and Iraq,” International Negotiation, published 21 February 2026.
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10784-026-09712-5
[10] Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), “Jordan: Aqaba-Amman Water Desalination and Conveyance Project (AAWDCP),” project summary; financing approved 25 March 2026. https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/details/2025/approved/jordan-aqaba-amman-water-desalination-and-conveyance-project-aawdcp.html
[11] European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), “Jordan Water Desalination PPP,” Project ID 53620; approved 25 February 2026. https://www.ebrd.com/home/work-with-us/projects/psd/53620.html
COUNTRY COMPARISON NOTE: The country snapshot is a qualitative risk comparison, not a statistically uniform ranking. It draws on the cited institutional and analytical sources, which differ in scope and measurement. Investment figures describe lender disclosures for the Aqaba-Amman project; they are not summed because the financing structures may overlap or represent different portions of the same project.
EDITORIAL NOTE: This is an independent JAFAJ analysis. Country examples and regional statistics are drawn from the cited sources, which use different geographic definitions and reporting periods. MENA, Near East and North Africa, and MENAAP are not interchangeable statistical groupings. The country snapshot is qualitative rather than a standardized ranking. Financing announcements are not equivalent to completed investment or operating performance. The article distinguishes reported facts from analytical interpretation; water disputes should not be read as evidence that armed conflict is inevitable.