THE INVISIBLE HIGHWAY
WHO CONTROLS THE MIDDLE EAST’S INTERNET?
JAFAJ | MENA SPECIAL REPORT
| CENTRAL FINDING No single country or company controls the Middle East’s internet. Influence is distributed across cable consortia, landing-station operators, terrestrial transit networks, capacity buyers, cloud providers, data-center operators, and national regulators. The strategic advantage belongs to actors that can combine several of these layers—and keep services running when a route fails. |
15 NOVEMBER 2026
Prepared for JAFAJ
EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
The Middle East is not merely a destination for internet traffic. It is a transit region connecting Europe, Asia, and Africa through submarine fiber-optic cables and terrestrial networks. Its strategic importance comes from geography: a large share of intercontinental connectivity is concentrated in a limited number of corridors, especially the Egypt–Red Sea–Bab el-Mandeb route and the Gulf approaches.
The central question—who controls the Middle East’s internet?—has no single answer. Cable ownership is often shared by multinational consortia. Landing stations and cross-country fiber routes may be operated by national telecommunications companies. Capacity is purchased by carriers and technology companies. Data may be stored in domestic data centers but processed on foreign cloud platforms. Regulators and governments retain authority over national networks and landing permissions.
| KEY JUDGMENT The region’s digital power is best understood as layered influence, not simple ownership. Egypt has exceptional transit leverage; Gulf operators and sovereign investors are expanding regional routes and computing capacity; US, Chinese, European, Indian, and Asian companies participate in different parts of the system. No evidence supports the claim that one foreign power controls the whole network. |
KEY FINDINGS
- Egypt is the region’s principal Europe–Asia land bridge. CSIS estimated in November 2025 that roughly 17% of global internet traffic and more than 90% of Europe–Asia communications pass through the Egypt/Red Sea corridor. These are estimates of traffic traversing the corridor, not a claim that Egypt owns or controls that traffic. [1]
- The 2026 TeleGeography map lists Egypt as a hub for at least 20 named cable systems, active or under construction, and identifies 11 Egyptian landing points and multiple terrestrial crossings in Telecom Egypt’s own infrastructure description. [2]
- Cable ownership is multinational. The 2Africa consortium includes Meta, China Mobile International, Bayobab, Orange, stc’s center3, Telecom Egypt, Vodafone, and WIOCC. Its open-access model separates investment ownership from access to capacity. [3]
- SEA-ME-WE-6 demonstrates the same pattern: a 16-member consortium includes operators from Bahrain, Bangladesh, India, China, Maldives, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, France, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt, and Microsoft. SubCom is the system supplier, not the consortium owner. [4]
- China’s participation is significant but should be measured cable by cable. The Atlantic Council’s 2023 study identified Chinese firms as having built, upgraded, or acquired stakes in 13 of approximately 62 MENA cable systems at the time. That historical count is not a current 2026 market share. [5]
- The most consequential vulnerabilities are concentration of routes, cable cuts, landing-station disruption, repair delays, and insufficient alternate capacity—not simply the nationality of a cable investor. [6]
WHAT THIS REPORT DOES—AND DOES NOT—CLAIM
This report distinguishes ownership, construction contracts, operation, capacity rights, geographic transit, and data control. These are not interchangeable. A country through which a cable passes does not automatically control the cable’s traffic. A company that manufactures or installs a cable does not necessarily own it. A cloud provider’s presence in a country does not mean it owns the submarine routes serving that country.
Project announcements are labeled as announced or proposed unless a source confirms that the infrastructure is operational. Figures are attributed to the organization reporting them. Public information does not disclose every consortium member’s capacity share, commercial terms, or network-management arrangements.
1. THE GEOGRAPHY OF DIGITAL POWER
Submarine cables are the physical foundation of international internet connectivity. They carry the overwhelming majority of intercontinental data traffic. Satellites are important for reach, backup, and remote connectivity, but they do not currently provide a like-for-like replacement for the capacity, latency, and unit economics of major submarine fiber systems.
EGYPT: THE EUROPE–ASIA LAND BRIDGE
Egypt connects the Mediterranean and Red Sea through terrestrial fiber routes. This geography makes it a major transit corridor between Europe and Asia and a bridge between Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. CSIS reported in November 2025 that approximately 17% of global internet traffic and more than 90% of Europe–Asia communications traverse the Egyptian/Red Sea corridor. The figures describe traffic flows and corridor exposure; they do not measure Egyptian ownership. [1]
Telecom Egypt’s 2026 investor materials report 16 submarine cable systems in service, six or more planned, 11 active landing points, three or more planned landing points, and 12 diverse terrestrial crossing routes in service. These are company-reported operating figures and should be read as such. [7]
THE RED SEA AND BAB EL-MANDEB
The Red Sea is a high-value corridor connecting Mediterranean cable networks with the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. At Bab el-Mandeb, multiple cable routes converge near a narrow maritime passage. This creates a concentration risk: separate cable systems can still be exposed to the same geographic incident, even when they are owned by different consortia.
The 2024 Red Sea cable damage incident disrupted connectivity between parts of Asia, Africa, and Europe. CSIS reported that three cables were damaged in February 2024 and described the Red Sea as a telecommunications bottleneck. The cause and responsibility for cable damage must be assessed from incident-specific evidence; proximity to conflict does not by itself prove deliberate sabotage. [8]
THE GULF, HORMUZ, AND GULF OF OMAN
Gulf countries connect to international systems through a combination of submarine cables, regional cable systems, and terrestrial fiber. Several systems serve multiple Gulf states, while routes through Fujairah and Oman provide connectivity toward the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The Strait of Hormuz is therefore a security consideration, but it is not the only route serving the Gulf.
A 2026 Stimson Center analysis identifies cable systems and data centers as exposed to regional conflict and describes proposed investments intended to diversify routes. It also notes that cable construction and repair can be delayed by insecurity and maritime risk. [6]
DJIBOUTI: THE RED SEA–EAST AFRICA JUNCTION
Djibouti is a significant landing and interconnection location linking the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, East Africa, and routes toward Asia and Europe. Its strategic relevance is not limited to military basing or port access; it is also part of the region’s cable geography. The concentration of international systems at a small number of landing locations makes redundancy and physical protection important.
2. WHO OWNS THE UNDERSEA NETWORK?
Most major international cable systems are financed and owned by consortia. Members may include national telecommunications companies, international carriers, mobile operators, and large technology companies. The consortium agreement typically defines investment shares, capacity rights, governance, and operational responsibilities. Those commercial details are not always public.
SELECTED CABLE SYSTEMS AND PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS
The table below is a selected sample, not a complete ownership register. “Participants” means publicly identified consortium members or investors; it does not imply equal ownership shares or equal operational control.
| SYSTEM | REGIONAL ROLE / ROUTE | PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS | STATUS / IMPORTANT DISTINCTION |
| 2Africa | 45,000-km system linking Africa with Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia; includes Gulf extensions. | Meta; Bayobab (MTN); China Mobile International; Orange; stc/center3; Telecom Egypt; Vodafone; WIOCC. | Telecom Egypt announced completion of the core system in November 2025. The Pearls/Gulf extension had a separate 2026 deployment timeline. [3] |
| SEA-ME-WE-6 | 21,700-km Singapore–Marseille system; crosses Egypt between Red Sea and Mediterranean landing points. | Telecom Egypt; Beyon (Bahrain); China Unicom; Microsoft; Mobily; Orange; Singtel; PCCW Global; Bharti Airtel; and other Asian and regional operators. | Telecom Egypt and SubCom reported Egyptian landings in July 2025. SubCom is the cable supplier; the consortium comprises 16 operators. [4] |
| PEACE | Pakistan and East Africa Connecting Europe; links South Asia, East Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. | Atlantic Council describes the system as funded, owned, and constructed by Chinese entities. | A clear example of a China-linked system; it should not be generalized to all Chinese participation in MENA cables. [5] |
| Africa-1 | Planned/under-deployment system linking Europe, Africa, the Gulf, and South Asia. | Public project records identify e&, Telecom Egypt, Mobily, G42, and PTCL among participants. | Project status and readiness dates can change; check the current cable map and operator announcements before treating all segments as live. [9] |
| India Europe Xpress (IEX) | India–Oman–Djibouti–Egypt–Europe connectivity corridor. | Public project records identify Meta, China Mobile International, and Reliance Jio among participants. | The European Commission’s January 2026 toolbox reported segments in deployment and a Red Sea segment on hold at that time. [9] |
The table illustrates why national labels can be misleading. A single cable may include Chinese, American, European, Gulf, and South Asian investors. A US technology company may share a consortium with a Chinese carrier. A Gulf operator may own capacity on a system built by an American or European supplier. The ownership structure is commercial and multinational, not a clean division into rival national networks.
OWNERSHIP IS NOT THE SAME AS CONTROL
- Ownership: the legal or consortium stake in the cable system.
- Construction: the contractor that manufactures, lays, or repairs the cable.
- Landing rights and stations: the facilities and permissions where the cable reaches land.
- Terrestrial transit: the fiber routes that move traffic across a country between landing points.
- Capacity rights: the bandwidth a consortium member or customer is entitled to use.
- Network operations: the systems, staff, and procedures that route and manage traffic.
- Data control: the location, legal jurisdiction, encryption, access rights, and cloud platform governing stored or processed information.
| ANALYTICAL TEST When a report says that a country or company “controls” a cable, ask: Does it own a stake, operate the landing station, manage the network, hold capacity rights, regulate access, or control the data carried? Without that distinction, the claim is incomplete. |
3. THE GLOBAL PLAYERS: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND THE GULF
CHINA: A SIGNIFICANT INVESTOR AND SUPPLIER ECOSYSTEM
Chinese firms have built, upgraded, or invested in submarine cable systems serving MENA. The Atlantic Council’s May 2023 study identified Chinese entities in 13 of approximately 62 systems traversing the region at that time. It also described PEACE as a system funded, owned, and constructed by Chinese entities. These findings establish meaningful participation, but the 2023 count is not a current inventory and should not be presented as a 2026 market share. [5]
China’s influence operates through several channels: state-owned telecommunications carriers, cable suppliers, financing, technical services, and consortium participation. The presence of a Chinese consortium member does not establish that Beijing can read, redirect, or shut down all traffic on that system. Such claims require evidence about network architecture, access controls, legal authority, and operational procedures.
UNITED STATES: HYPERSCALERS AND CAPACITY BUYERS
US technology firms participate in cable consortia and invest in connectivity to support cloud computing, content delivery, and artificial intelligence. Microsoft is a named member of the SEA-ME-WE-6 consortium; Meta is a member of 2Africa. Their role is not limited to selling software: large content and cloud companies can help finance capacity and shape where high-volume data infrastructure is built. [3][4]
This influence is distinct from national control. A technology company may own a cable stake or reserve capacity, while national regulators retain jurisdiction over landing stations and domestic telecommunications networks.
EUROPE, INDIA, AND OTHER ASIAN OPERATORS
European operators such as Orange and other international carriers are participants in major regional systems. Indian carriers contribute investment and connectivity links between South Asia, the Gulf, and Europe. Singaporean, Malaysian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and other operators also participate. The result is a dense commercial network in which strategic interests overlap.
GULF OPERATORS AND SOVEREIGN CAPITAL
Saudi Arabia’s stc/center3 and Mobily, the UAE’s e&, Qatar’s Ooredoo, and Bahrain’s Beyon are among the regional operators involved in international connectivity. Their investments can help Gulf countries move from being end users of international bandwidth toward becoming owners, investors, transit providers, and data-center hosts.
Sovereign wealth funds and state-backed investment vehicles can finance large infrastructure projects, but financing alone does not establish operational control. The terms of ownership, access, governance, and regulatory oversight matter.
4. DATA CENTERS: THE SECOND HALF OF DIGITAL POWER
Submarine cables move data between markets. Data centers store and process it. Cloud platforms provide computing, databases, artificial intelligence services, and enterprise applications. These functions are interdependent, but they are not the same business.
A country can host a data center while relying on a foreign cloud provider. A domestic telecommunications operator can own a cable landing station while an international company purchases large blocks of capacity. A government may require certain records to remain in-country but still depend on foreign software, updates, or technical support.
FOUR QUESTIONS FOR EVERY NATIONAL DIGITAL STRATEGY
| LAYER | QUESTION | WHY IT MATTERS |
| Physical location | Where are the servers, storage systems, and backup facilities? | Determines physical resilience, power and cooling exposure, and which jurisdiction can exercise local authority. |
| Cloud ownership and operation | Who owns and operates the cloud platform and its control plane? | Determines vendor dependence, service continuity, technical access, and the ability to migrate workloads. |
| Data jurisdiction | Which laws govern the data, operator, and customer relationship? | A domestic data center does not automatically resolve cross-border legal access or contractual dependencies. |
| Connectivity and power | Can the facility remain connected and powered if a cable, landing station, grid link, or fuel supply fails? | A data center without diverse routes and reliable power may not provide meaningful national resilience. |
A country’s data-center count alone is a weak measure of digital sovereignty. Counts can vary depending on whether a directory includes enterprise server rooms, colocation facilities, hyperscale campuses, or announced projects. A more useful assessment measures operational megawatts, available capacity, independent network routes, power resilience, cloud service availability, and the ability to move critical workloads.
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS
- UAE: Its international telecommunications ecosystem, cloud investment, and Gulf of Oman access make it an important regional connectivity and computing hub.
- Saudi Arabia: Its national operators, sovereign investment, and data-center ambitions support a strategy to expand regional digital infrastructure and transit.
- Qatar and Bahrain: Their operators participate in regional cable systems, while cloud and data-center investments increase the importance of resilient external connectivity.
- Egypt: Its cable landings and terrestrial crossings make it a critical transit location, while its own data-center and cloud services add a domestic digital layer.
- Oman: Its location on the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman provides a route-diversification opportunity for Gulf and South Asian connectivity.
5. THE STRATEGIC CHOKEPOINTS: WHERE THE NETWORK IS EXPOSED
| LOCATION | DIGITAL SIGNIFICANCE | PRINCIPAL EXPOSURE |
| Egyptian land bridge | Multiple submarine systems connect through terrestrial routes between Mediterranean and Red Sea landings. | Concentration of traffic; terrestrial corridor outages; landing-station and power disruption. |
| Bab el-Mandeb | Gateway between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden; several cable routes converge in the wider area. | Maritime insecurity, anchor damage, conflict risk, limited repair access. |
| Red Sea | Major route linking Europe, Africa, the Gulf, and Asia. | Multiple cable faults can affect a broad region; repair vessels may face delays. |
| Strait of Hormuz | Important for several cable systems serving Gulf states. | Conflict, maritime restrictions, cable repair delays, and exposure of nearby infrastructure. |
| Gulf of Oman / Fujairah | Provides alternative access to the Arabian Sea and international systems. | Alternative routes may still depend on shared landing sites, terrestrial backhaul, and sufficient spare capacity. |
| Djibouti and Gulf of Aden | Interconnection point for Red Sea, East African, and international routes. | Concentration of landings and regional instability. |
The main risk is not that every cable passes through one narrow strait. It is that multiple systems can share a corridor, landing area, terrestrial crossing, power supply, or repair bottleneck. Two cables with different owners may therefore fail from the same event.
HOW AN OUTAGE BECOMES A REGIONAL PROBLEM
- A cable is cut, damaged, or taken out of service.
- Network operators attempt to reroute traffic through other systems and terrestrial paths.
- If spare capacity is insufficient, congestion, latency, and service degradation may follow.
- If multiple routes or landing stations are affected, the outage may become regional rather than local.
- Repair time depends on fault location, weather, vessel availability, permits, security conditions, spare cable, and access to the seabed.
The 2026 Stimson Center analysis describes the relationship between Gulf conflict, data-center exposure, and undersea cables. It reports that insecurity can halt construction and complicate repair activity. The analysis should be read as a risk assessment, not proof that every disruption is deliberate or state-directed. [6]
| IMPORTANT DISTINCTION A cable outage is not automatically a cyberattack. Submarine cables can be damaged by anchors, fishing activity, seabed events, equipment failure, or deliberate action. Attribution requires incident-specific evidence. |
6. THE NEW DIGITAL SILK ROAD—AND THE ROUTE-BUILDING CONTEST
The Digital Silk Road describes China’s effort to expand its role in international digital infrastructure, including telecommunications, data centers, cloud services, and technology networks. MENA is relevant because it lies between Asian production and technology markets, European customers, and African growth markets.
But the region is not simply a contest between China and the United States. European, Indian, Gulf, and other Asian firms participate in the same cable systems. The ownership of 2Africa and SEA-ME-WE-6 demonstrates overlapping participation by companies from different countries.
THREE PROPOSED GULF-LINKED CORRIDORS
| PROJECT | ANNOUNCED SCOPE | REPORTED INVESTMENT | EDITORIAL STATUS |
| SilkLink | Approximately 4,500 km of fiber infrastructure across Syria, with cable landing facilities and data centers. | $800 million | Stimson described the project as an stc/center3 investment plan. Treat as announced project, not completed network. [6] |
| WorldLink | Hybrid UAE–Iraq fiber corridor linking the UAE to Iraq’s Al Faw Peninsula and onward across Iraq toward Turkey. | $700 million | Stimson described an Emirati-Iraqi consortium project. Confirm construction milestones before describing it as operational. [6] |
| Fibre in the Gulf (FIG) | Proposed corridor from the Gulf of Oman through the Gulf and Iraq toward Turkey and Europe. | $500 million | Ooredoo-linked project described by Stimson as a planned corridor. Its announced route includes exposure to the Strait of Hormuz. [6] |
These proposals matter because they aim to create new terrestrial and submarine paths. They should not be counted as resilience until the routes are financed, permitted, built, connected to live networks, and supplied with enough capacity to carry traffic during a failure elsewhere.
THE STRATEGIC TEST FOR NEW ROUTES
- Does the new route avoid the same maritime or terrestrial chokepoint as existing systems?
- Does it connect to different landing stations and power supplies?
- Is capacity commercially available to multiple carriers, or reserved for a small group of investors?
- Are repair vessels, spare cable, and maintenance contracts available?
- Can the route remain operational during conflict, sanctions, or diplomatic disruption?
- Does the route provide a genuine alternative, or merely shift the bottleneck to another border or landing station?
7. WHAT THIS MEANS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Digital infrastructure is now essential to banking, trade, aviation, shipping, health systems, government services, emergency response, and military logistics. A loss of international connectivity can disrupt these functions when they depend on affected commercial networks or foreign-hosted services. The effect will vary by country, operator, service architecture, and available backup.
FIVE SECURITY RISKS
- Concentration risk: too much international capacity depends on a small number of geographic corridors or landing locations.
- Supplier and operator dependence: critical services may rely on a limited number of foreign vendors, cable contractors, cloud platforms, or maintenance providers.
- Data jurisdiction and access: governments and businesses may not know which legal regimes, contracts, or technical administrators can access data and systems.
- Repair and recovery dependence: a country may lack nearby cable-repair vessels, spare parts, specialist crews, or pre-agreed emergency permissions.
- Power and facility dependence: cable stations and data centers require reliable electricity, cooling, physical security, and terrestrial backhaul.
A PRACTICAL NATIONAL RESILIENCE STANDARD
Every government should require critical operators to demonstrate that essential services can continue during the loss of their largest single international route. The test should be based on actual spare capacity and recovery time—not simply the number of cables shown on a map.
Governments should also identify which services can operate domestically during an international outage, which require foreign cloud access, and which have no tested alternative. Sensitive government and emergency systems should have documented continuity plans, secure backups, and independently tested recovery procedures.
8. A MENA DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE AGENDA
The region has an opportunity to move beyond being a transit zone for global internet traffic. It can become a major center of cable investment, regional interconnection, cloud computing, data-center operations, and digital services. The following proposals are designed as practical steps rather than general declarations.
1. ESTABLISH A MENA DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE COUNCIL
Bring together telecommunications ministries, national operators, cable investors, data-center operators, cybersecurity authorities, and emergency-management agencies. The council should publish a regional infrastructure map, establish common incident-reporting standards, and coordinate cross-border repair permissions.
2. CREATE A REGIONAL CABLE RESILIENCE AGREEMENT
Develop protocols for rapid notification, fault reporting, repair-vessel access, customs clearance, maritime coordination, and emergency restoration. The agreement should distinguish accidental damage from suspected deliberate interference and require evidence-based incident attribution.
3. BUILD INDEPENDENT ALTERNATIVE CORRIDORS
Prioritize routes that are geographically diverse, not simply additional cables laid through the same chokepoint. New projects should disclose their landing points, terrestrial backhaul, capacity, ownership structure, and planned maintenance arrangements.
4. ESTABLISH A MENA DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT FACILITY
Invite sovereign wealth funds, private operators, development banks, and institutional investors to finance cable systems, terrestrial fiber, neutral data centers, power resilience, and repair capabilities. Investment terms should protect open access, competition, and transparent governance.
5. ADOPT A REGIONAL DIGITAL RESILIENCE INDEX
Measure each country against comparable indicators. Publish the methodology and distinguish verified operating assets from projects under construction or announcement.
| INDICATOR | MEASUREMENT |
| Route diversity | Number of genuinely independent international routes, including separate landing sites and terrestrial backhaul. |
| Capacity resilience | Spare capacity available during the loss of the largest route; time to restore normal service. |
| Landing-station resilience | Geographic separation, backup power, physical protection, and independent backhaul. |
| Cloud and data resilience | Location of critical data, provider concentration, portability, backup, and tested recovery. |
| Repair readiness | Access to repair vessels, spare cable, technical crews, permits, and emergency agreements. |
| Governance and transparency | Public ownership disclosures, incident reporting, regulator capability, and independent audits. |
6. REQUIRE ANNUAL CRITICAL-INFRASTRUCTURE STRESS TESTS
Telecommunications operators, banks, major cloud users, and public agencies should conduct annual exercises simulating the loss of a major cable corridor, a landing station, a data center, or a power supply. Results should be reported to regulators, with sensitive operational details protected.
7. STRENGTHEN REGIONAL DATA AND CLOUD PORTABILITY
Governments should avoid becoming dependent on a single cloud provider or platform for essential services. Procurement rules should require documented data-export procedures, interoperable backups, recovery testing, and clear contractual rights to retrieve data and migrate workloads.
9. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
| COUNTRY / AREA | CURRENT STRATEGIC POSITION | PRIORITY QUESTION |
| Egypt | Major intercontinental cable landing and terrestrial transit hub. | How can Egypt preserve its transit advantage while reducing corridor concentration and improving repair resilience? |
| Saudi Arabia | Large national operator, sovereign investment capacity, Red Sea and Gulf connectivity interests. | Can investment create truly diverse routes and a regional data/compute ecosystem? |
| United Arab Emirates | International telecom ecosystem, Gulf of Oman access, cloud and data-center investment. | Can the UAE convert connectivity and data-center assets into resilient regional services? |
| Oman | Geographic access to the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman; international cable landings. | Can Oman provide independent route diversity for Gulf and South Asian traffic? |
| Qatar and Bahrain | Operators participate in regional cable consortia and cross-Gulf connectivity. | How much capacity and route diversity remains available during a major Gulf disruption? |
| Iraq | Potential terrestrial bridge between the Gulf, Turkey, and Europe. | Can cross-border projects deliver secure, competitively priced transit with stable operating arrangements? |
| Djibouti | Important Red Sea and East African cable landing and interconnection point. | Can it expand capacity and resilience while managing concentration and regional security exposure? |
These are strategic observations, not country rankings. Each country’s actual resilience depends on route topology, available capacity, operator contracts, regulatory arrangements, and the ability to recover after a disruption.
10. WHO CONTROLS THE MIDDLE EAST’S INTERNET?
No single government, company, or technology provider controls the Middle East’s internet. The network is a layered system in which influence is distributed. Egypt’s geography gives it exceptional transit importance. Gulf operators and investors are expanding cable, terrestrial, and data-center infrastructure. Chinese companies are meaningful participants in selected systems. US technology companies are investing in cables and cloud infrastructure. European, Indian, and Asian carriers remain important consortium partners.
The distinction between ownership and control is decisive. A cable investor may hold a share but not operate the landing station. A national operator may manage terrestrial transit but not own every cable. A cloud company may process data without owning the network that delivered it. A government may regulate domestic access without controlling the international systems carrying traffic into the country.
| BOTTOM LINE The strategic question is not simply who owns the cables. It is which countries and companies can keep essential digital services operating when a route, landing station, data center, supplier, or political relationship fails. |
The Middle East spent much of the twentieth century competing over oil, gas, ports, and shipping lanes. In the twenty-first century, the region’s economic influence will also depend on the routes that carry information and the facilities that process it. The invisible highway is already part of the region’s strategic infrastructure. The competition is over who finances it, who operates it, who has access to it, and who can keep it running.
JAFAJ EDITORIAL CONCLUSION
The Middle East’s digital infrastructure deserves the same level of strategic attention traditionally given to energy and maritime transport. Governments should map dependencies, disclose ownership and capacity arrangements where possible, build geographically diverse routes, and test whether critical services can survive a major outage. Digital sovereignty is not achieved by declaring ownership. It is demonstrated through resilience, transparency, competition, and the ability to operate when external connections fail.
RESEARCH NOTES AND SOURCES
Research cut-off: 15 November 2026. Figures and project descriptions are attributed to the sources below. Cable maps and project statuses can change; readers should consult the latest operator announcements before relying on a project’s operational status.
[1] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “The Strategic Future of Subsea Cables: Egypt Case Study,” 12 November 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategic-future-subsea-cables-egypt-case-study
[2] TeleGeography, “Submarine Cable Map 2026.” The map depicts 694 cable systems and 1,893 landings active or under construction; Egypt hub listing and sponsor description. https://submarine-cable-map-2026.telegeography.com/
[3] 2Africa, “FAQ” and “About”; Telecom Egypt, “The Completion of 2Africa: A Consortium Milestone for Global Connectivity,” 19 November 2025. https://www.2africacable.net/faq | https://www.2africacable.net/about | https://ir.te.eg/en/CorporateNews/PressRelease/232
[4] Telecom Egypt and SubCom, “SEA-ME-WE-6 Subsea Cable Completes its Two Landings and Crossing Activities in Egypt,” 2 July 2025. https://ir.te.eg/IRMedia/Corporate_News/2025/Corporate_Newsf61ab500-43da-4a6c-ab48-e7911a236fa7.pdf
[5] Atlantic Council, Dale Aluf, “China’s Subsea-Cable Power Play in the Middle East and North Africa,” May 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/ChinasGrowingInfluence_052423-1.pdf
[6] Stimson Center, Masha Kotkin, “Beneath the Strait: Iran Could Threaten Gulf Data Centers, Undersea Cables,” 16 April 2026. https://www.stimson.org/2026/beneath-the-Strait-iran-could-threaten-gulf-data-centers-undersea-cables/
[7] Telecom Egypt, 2026 investor presentation, “Our International Connectivity Network.” https://ir.te.eg/IRMedia/Financial_Information/2026/Financial_Information8f2a2527-554a-4f60-ba46-f3bbf8f03030.pdf
[8] CSIS, “Red Sea Cable Damage Reveals Soft Underbelly of Global Economy,” 7 March 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/red-sea-cable-damage-reveals-soft-underbelly-global-economy
[9] European Commission / Submarine Cable Infrastructures Expert Group, “Security and Resilience of EU Submarine Cable Infrastructures: Submarine Cable Security Toolbox and Cable Projects of European Interest,” January 2026. https://www.mtc.government.bg/sites/default/files/documents/2026-02/Submarine%20Cable%20Toolbox.pdf
EDITORIAL METHODOLOGY
This report uses a layered-control framework. It distinguishes cable ownership, construction, landing facilities, terrestrial transit, capacity rights, network operations, data storage, cloud platforms, and regulatory authority. Where public sources provide only partial consortium information, the report identifies named participants without implying equal shares or exclusive control. Announced projects are not treated as operational assets unless an identified source confirms service or completion. Estimates are attributed to their originating organizations.
This report is an open-source strategic assessment, not a classified intelligence product. It does not infer intent from nationality, ownership, or geography alone. Claims of espionage, deliberate sabotage, or state direction require evidence beyond the existence of a cable investment or a cable fault.