The Legislation Nobody Reads: Do MENA Governments Actually Implement The Laws They Pass?

THE LEGISLATION NOBODY READS

DO MENA GOVERNMENTS ACTUALLY IMPLEMENT THE LAWS THEY PASS?

JaFaJ | MENA INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

Editor’s Note: A government can pass 100 laws in a year. It can announce sweeping reforms, publish new regulations, and promise economic transformation. But how many of those laws actually change the lives of its citizens?

Across the Middle East and North Africa, governments regularly announce legislative reforms covering employment, education, investment, taxation, public administration, consumer protection, and economic development.

Yet passing a law and implementing a law are two very different things.

A parliament may approve legislation. A president may sign it. A ministry may publish implementing regulations. A government may announce that the reform is complete.

But does the government have the personnel, funding, administrative capacity, political commitment, and enforcement mechanisms necessary to make the law work?

That is the question this investigation examines.

The central issue is not how many laws MENA governments pass. It is how many they successfully implement, enforce, and evaluate.

Passing legislation is easy. Making it work is considerably harder.

 

INTRODUCTION

Across the Middle East and North Africa, governments announce ambitious legislative agendas. New laws promise to attract foreign investment, eliminate corruption, improve education, protect consumers, modernize employment, strengthen public institutions, and transform national economies.

Parliaments debate and approve legislation. Governments publish official announcements. Ministries issue statements describing the reforms as historic achievements.

But what happens afterward?

Who ensures that government departments comply? Who checks whether businesses follow the new requirements? Who measures whether citizens actually benefit? And who is held accountable when a law is passed but never meaningfully enforced?

These questions expose a fundamental weakness in public administration: the distance between legislative promises and actual government performance.

A law can exist on paper for years without producing meaningful change.

A ministry can announce implementation without establishing an enforcement system. A government can create a new regulatory authority without providing sufficient funding or personnel. A parliament can pass legislation without requiring the executive branch to report whether it has been implemented.

The result is a potentially expensive cycle: governments legislate, announce, and move on, while the public waits for the promised results.

This is not a problem unique to MENA. Governments worldwide struggle with implementation. However, international assessments identify persistent regulatory coordination, enforcement, institutional capacity, and accountability challenges across much of the Middle East and North Africa.

This investigation examines the evidence, identifies countries making progress, and proposes a way to measure whether legislation actually works.

1. THE IMPLEMENTATION GAP: WHEN A LAW NEVER BECOMES REALITY

There are two separate achievements in public policy:

  • Legislative achievement: A government successfully passes a law.
  • Administrative achievement: The government successfully implements and enforces it.

The first is relatively easy to document. The second requires continuous work.

Consider what must happen after a parliament approves a new consumer protection law.

  1. The government must publish the legislation.
  2. The responsible ministry must issue implementing regulations.
  3. Administrative agencies must establish procedures.
  4. Inspectors must receive training.
  5. Businesses must be informed of their obligations.
  6. Complaint and enforcement systems must become operational.
  7. Violations must be investigated.
  8. Penalties must be applied consistently.
  9. Results must be measured and reported.

If these steps never occur, the law may have little practical effect.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) examined this problem in its 2024 report, Governing for Sustainable Prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa.

Its findings are significant.

The OECD identified fragmented institutional structures, insufficient coordination, and difficulties ensuring that regulations are properly enforced and monitored. Its 2024 review also reports that regulatory quality declined or stagnated in most MENA countries and territories between 2012 and 2022 (Chapter 4, Figure 4.2, p. 164). [1]

The OECD’s 2024 regional assessment provides a more specific diagnosis. It reports that regulatory quality declined or stagnated in most MENA countries and territories between 2012 and 2022, with Gulf countries and Algeria identified as exceptions in the regional trend. The report links this pattern to increasingly complex regulatory systems, fragmented institutional responsibilities, and the absence in many governments of coordinated, whole-of-government regulatory processes. [1]

The OECD also documents concrete reform activity rather than a uniform regional picture. Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority developed regulatory impact assessment guidance with OECD/SIGMA support. Jordan and the Palestinian Authority were also testing consultation and impact-assessment mechanisms in selected policy areas. Egypt’s ERRADA initiative was described as undertaking both ex-ante and ex-post assessment of policies and laws. These are meaningful institutional steps, but they should be distinguished from proof that individual laws achieved their intended outcomes. [1]

The OECD’s Figure 4.3 reports that 22% of governments in its MENA grouping conducted Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs), a process designed to evaluate the likely consequences of proposed regulations before adoption (Chapter 4, p. 165). The figure’s regional grouping includes 20 countries and territories, including Malta and the Palestinian Authority; it should not be described as a count of every possible definition of MENA governments. [1]

The OECD further identified inadequate consultation, insufficient civil-service training, and limited regulatory capacity as continuing obstacles.

The implications are important.

Governments are not necessarily failing because they lack legislation. They may be failing because they lack the administrative systems needed to turn legislation into results.

2. WHAT THE INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE TELLS US

One of the most useful international measurements is the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index.

Its 2025 edition evaluates countries across eight categories, including constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, civil justice, and regulatory enforcement.

The regulatory enforcement category is particularly relevant to this investigation.

The 2025 regional average for the Middle East and North Africa was 0.50 on a scale of zero to one.

The WJP’s Factor 6 is especially relevant because it examines whether government regulations are effectively enforced, applied without improper influence, administered without unreasonable delay, and accompanied by due process. The Index uses household and expert surveys, and its scores are scaled from zero to one; consult the 2025 methodology and Factor 6 description when interpreting these measures. [2]

The distinction is important for JAFAJ. A factor score can identify where regulatory enforcement appears comparatively stronger or weaker, but it cannot tell investigators whether a particular law received its regulations, budget, inspectors, or intended results. Those questions require primary documents and law-specific fieldwork. [2]

Selected country results illustrate the differences:

Country 2025 Rule of Law score
United Arab Emirates 0.64
Qatar 0.62
Kuwait 0.58
Jordan 0.55
Tunisia 0.49
Algeria 0.49
Morocco 0.48
Lebanon 0.44
Iran 0.38
Egypt 0.35

Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2025. Scores are overall rule-of-law scores, not direct measurements of legislative implementation.

The UAE and Qatar have higher overall scores than several other countries in this sample. Egypt and Iran have lower scores.

However, an important distinction must be maintained: an overall rule-of-law score does not tell us what percentage of laws a government has implemented.

It measures a broader institutional environment.

The WJP separately evaluates regulatory enforcement, making that factor particularly useful when examining how effectively governments translate rules into practice.

The 2025 factor-level results make the distinction clearer. The UAE recorded 0.70 for regulatory enforcement; Qatar, 0.70; Jordan, 0.57; Morocco, 0.49; and Egypt, 0.35. These are WJP factor scores, not percentages of laws implemented and not direct audits of individual statutes. They offer a comparative signal about the environment in which rules are applied, while the law-level evidence required by the proposed MLII remains absent. [2]

This comparison also cautions against treating a country’s overall score as a complete description of its regulatory system. For example, the UAE’s 2025 overall score was 0.64, while its regulatory-enforcement factor was 0.70. Egypt’s overall score was 0.35 and its regulatory-enforcement factor was also 0.35. A sound JAFAJ analysis should report both the overall institutional context and the factor most closely related to implementation, without confusing either with a direct implementation rate. [2]

The real question is whether governments are measuring their own legislative performance with comparable precision.

Most do not publish a comprehensive annual accounting of laws passed, regulations issued, implementation deadlines met, inspections completed, violations identified, and outcomes achieved.

That missing information makes independent evaluation considerably more difficult.

EVIDENCE LIMITATION: The available regional indicators measure institutional conditions, not the share of laws implemented. They are useful context, but they cannot establish that a particular statute was ignored, delayed, or enforced. That determination requires a law-by-law audit using the statute, commencement provisions, implementing regulations, appropriations, agency records, enforcement data, and outcome evidence.

3. THE COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY PICTURE

There is no single MENA implementation story. Some governments have developed administrative reform programs, while others face institutional fragmentation, political instability, or limited enforcement capacity.

The following examples illustrate different approaches.

These are illustrative institutional case studies, not a ranking of national implementation performance. The examples identify relevant reform mechanisms and recurring risks. They should not be read as proof that every law in a country is implemented well or poorly.

United Arab Emirates: Administrative Reform as Government Policy

The UAE has pursued a government-wide effort to reduce administrative complexity.

For this investigation, the relevant question is how administrative simplification translates into execution: whether agencies adopt the required procedures, publish service standards, meet processing deadlines, resolve complaints, and report results. A government-wide reform programme is evidence of policy intent and administrative activity; it is not, by itself, proof that every affected law is fully implemented.

Its Zero Government Bureaucracy Programme sought to eliminate at least 2,000 government procedures and streamline government services by the end of 2024.

This is an important distinction: the initiative focuses not simply on passing legislation but on changing how government institutions deliver services.

The World Justice Project’s 2025 assessment gave the UAE an overall score of 0.64 and a regulatory enforcement score of 0.70.

Those results provide a useful indication of institutional performance, although they do not establish that every new law or reform has been successfully implemented.

LEGISLATIVE TRACE — UAE CONSUMER PROTECTION

The UAE provides a more concrete law-level example through Federal Law No. 15 of 2020 on Consumer Protection, as amended by Federal Decree-Law No. 5 of 2023. The official UAE government portal describes rights to safe goods and services, accurate product information, fair compensation, and protections for consumer data. It also identifies responsible consumer-protection departments and complaint channels, including the Ministry of Economy and local authorities. This establishes that the law has an identifiable legal framework and administrative complaint infrastructure. It does not, by itself, establish complaint-resolution rates, inspection coverage, enforcement consistency, or consumer outcomes. A JAFAJ audit should obtain complaint volumes, resolution times, substantiated violations, penalties, recalls, and annual agency performance data. [4]

The official portal also identifies Cabinet Resolutions Nos. 56 and 57 of 2024 on telemarketing rules and administrative penalties. These provide a second, narrower test: whether the rules are communicated to covered businesses, complaints are investigated, violations are substantiated, and penalties are applied consistently. The existence of a penalty schedule should not be mistaken for evidence that enforcement is effective. [4]

The lesson: Administrative performance must be treated as a government responsibility, not an afterthought following legislative approval.

EVIDENCE TEST — WHAT THE UAE CASE ACTUALLY SHOWS

The UAE’s Zero Government Bureaucracy Programme directed government entities to eliminate at least 2,000 unnecessary procedures, reduce processing time by at least 50%, and remove redundant requirements within one year. The Ministry of Finance describes the programme as a national effort to simplify procedures and improve service efficiency. These are measurable administrative targets. JAFAJ should test published completion data, agency-level baselines, processing-time changes, customer outcomes, and independent verification before describing the targets as achieved. The programme demonstrates an implementation-oriented administrative initiative; it does not establish that every law affected by the programme was fully implemented. [3]

Egypt: Too Many Regulations, Not Enough Coordination

Egypt offers an interesting example of regulatory simplification.

The Egyptian Regulatory Reform and Development Activity (ERRADA), established in 2008, undertook an effort to identify and eliminate contradictory or redundant legal instruments.

The OECD’s 2024 Public Governance Review reports that more than 2,000 regulations were streamlined following ERRADA recommendations between August 2008 and February 2012. It also describes Egypt’s electronic registry as providing public access to regulations. The OECD does not substantiate the claim in the earlier draft that approximately 30,000 legislative texts were published online; that number has therefore been removed. These are documented regulatory-simplification outputs, not proof that all affected rules were enforced effectively. [6]

This represents meaningful work on the regulatory framework.

A proper implementation test would select specific Egyptian statutes or regulatory reforms and trace each one from publication through commencement, secondary rules, agency assignment, budget, enforcement, and observable results. Without that law-level record, broad claims about implementation success or failure would be premature.

However, publishing and simplifying legislation does not automatically guarantee consistent implementation.

The OECD’s 2024 assessment continued to identify fragmented regulatory structures and difficulties with coordination, enforcement, and monitoring across the region.

The lesson: Governments must manage the entire body of legislation, not merely add new laws to an already complicated system.

LEGISLATIVE TRACE — EGYPT’S INVESTMENT LAW

Egypt’s investment-law experience illustrates why enactment and operational readiness must be examined separately. The OECD’s regional investment-policy analysis specifically documents a delay in issuing implementing regulations after enactment of Egypt’s 2015 investment law, temporarily leaving businesses in a ‘wait-and-see’ position. This OECD example concerns the 2015 law; it should not be incorrectly attributed to Investment Law No. 72 of 2017. Egypt’s official investment portal states that the executive regulations for Law No. 72 of 2017 were issued by Prime Ministerial Decree No. 2310 of 2017 on October 28, 2017 (the official page’s stated date). The two laws must be kept distinct. [5][7]

The OECD’s 2024 Public Governance Review reports that ERRADA was established in 2009 under Decree No. 1089/2008, later moved among ministries, and received high-level political endorsement and Cabinet affiliation in 2019 under Prime Ministerial Decrees Nos. 998/2019 and 1652/2019. The same review says ERRADA’s work has been hindered by institutional challenges and that its coordinating role needs clarification. It also documents the streamlining of more than 2,000 regulations between August 2008 and February 2012. These findings support a nuanced conclusion: Egypt has recorded substantial simplification activity, while institutional coordination remains a documented challenge. [6] The OECD account is in the chapter on streamlining public-service delivery, in its discussion of the institutional framework and past and ongoing administrative-simplification efforts. [6]

EVIDENCE TEST — THE EGYPTIAN REGULATORY REFORM EXPERIENCE

The OECD identifies Egypt’s ERRADA initiative as a mechanism for evaluating policies and laws through both ex-ante and ex-post assessment. This is particularly relevant to the investigation because ex-ante review asks whether a proposed rule is likely to work, while ex-post review asks whether an enacted rule was implemented and produced results. The OECD’s regional report describes ERRADA as an institutional effort in this area, but the report does not establish a comprehensive completion rate for Egyptian laws. JAFAJ‘s next step should be to select several specific statutes and obtain the relevant review, regulatory, budget, and enforcement records. [1]

Jordan: Building Better Regulatory Procedures

Jordan has worked with the OECD and its SIGMA initiative to develop regulatory impact assessment procedures.

The purpose is to evaluate proposed legislation, identify potential consequences, and improve consultation with affected parties.

Jordan has also developed plans to strengthen stakeholder consultation in the preparation of legislation and government policies.

The distinction matters: regulatory impact assessment improves the design of proposed rules, while post-legislative review tests whether enacted rules work in practice. Both are necessary. JAFAJ should examine whether consultation commitments are followed by published implementation plans, clear agency ownership, adequate funding, and measurable follow-through.

These efforts are important because they address a common problem: ministries sometimes develop regulations without sufficiently understanding how those regulations will affect businesses, citizens, and other government agencies.

However, the OECD describes many of these initiatives as developing or being implemented through pilot programs, rather than as fully established government-wide systems.

The lesson: Better legislation begins before a law reaches parliament. It requires planning for implementation from the beginning.

LEGISLATIVE TRACE — JORDAN’S INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK

The OECD’s MENA investment-policy analysis identifies a concrete Jordanian example: successive amendments and repeals of earlier investment regulations in the early 2000s created regulatory gaps, which remained until the unified 2014 Investment Law. The OECD also cautions that frequent legal changes can create temporary uncertainty before implementing regulations are issued (chapter ‘Towards modernised legislative frameworks for investment’). [5]

Jordan’s regulatory impact assessment pilots should be treated as a separate, forward-looking reform. They concern the quality and consultation process for proposed rules; they do not prove that enacted laws were later enforced or evaluated. The distinction between ex-ante assessment and ex-post review should remain explicit throughout the article. [1]

EVIDENCE TEST — JORDAN’S PILOT APPROACH

The OECD records that Jordan developed a consultation portal and an action plan to systematise stakeholder consultation in policy- and law-making. The plan envisaged requiring institutions to document which stakeholders were consulted and how their feedback was treated in draft policies or laws submitted to the Cabinet. The OECD also reports that line ministries in Jordan were implementing pilot regulatory impact assessments on selected regulations. This is evidence of procedural development and pilot activity—not proof of universal application across ministries. A useful follow-up would examine which ministries used the process, how many draft measures were assessed, whether feedback altered proposals, and whether post-enactment reviews followed. [1]

Morocco: Institutional Reform and Accountability

Morocco has established anti-corruption institutions and pursued reforms intended to strengthen public integrity.

The next stage of analysis is operational: whether institutions have clear jurisdiction, sufficient independence and resources, access to information, case-processing capacity, and publicly reported results. The existence of an institution should be treated as an input, not an outcome.

The OECD identifies Morocco among the countries that have created national anti-corruption agencies and strengthened institutional frameworks.

But establishing an agency is not the same as demonstrating that corruption has been reduced or that every relevant law is enforced consistently.

The distinction between institutional creation and measurable performance remains essential.

EVIDENCE TEST — MOROCCO’S REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT CONTEXT

The WJP’s 2025 profile gives Morocco an overall rule-of-law score of 0.48 and a regulatory-enforcement score of 0.49. Those figures place Morocco below the UAE, Qatar, and Jordan on this particular measure, but they do not identify which statutes were or were not enforced. The figures should therefore be used as institutional context, not as a verdict on the performance of Morocco’s anti-corruption institutions. To make this case study investigative, JAFAJ should select a defined group of laws—such as public integrity, procurement, or access-to-information measures—and trace their implementation through agency mandates, budgets, enforcement records, and reported outcomes. [2]

The lesson: Institutions must be evaluated by what they accomplish, not simply by whether they exist.

MOROCCO — A MEASUREMENT GAP, NOT A PROVEN FAILURE

The WJP’s 2025 regulatory-enforcement factor score for Morocco is 0.49, compared with 0.70 for the UAE and Qatar and 0.57 for Jordan. This is a comparative institutional signal, not a finding that a named Moroccan statute was ignored. The available evidence in this report does not yet identify a specific Moroccan law for which the full chain—commencement, regulations, budget, agency operations, enforcement, and outcomes—has been documented. The next reporting step should be a focused audit of one statute in public procurement, access to information, or anti-corruption, using the official law, responsible agency records, audit findings, and enforcement data. [2]

Yemen, Libya, and Syria: When Government Capacity Breaks Down

Countries experiencing prolonged conflict face a different implementation challenge.

These cases should be assessed separately from states with functioning nationwide administrations. Where territorial control, public finance, or basic administrative authority is fragmented, a national implementation score may conceal major subnational differences. JAFAJ should report geographic coverage and evidence gaps rather than treating the absence of accessible records as proof of non-implementation.

Even when legislation exists, governments may lack effective territorial authority, functioning courts, adequately funded ministries, or the personnel necessary to enforce national regulations.

The OECD’s regional governance analysis identifies the particular difficulties faced by countries experiencing prolonged conflict, including Yemen, Libya, and Syria.

In these environments, the question is not simply whether parliament passed a law.

It is whether the government has the institutional capacity to apply that law throughout the country.

The lesson: Legislative effectiveness depends on functioning institutions, territorial authority, and the ability to deliver public services.

Jurisdiction Documented example What the evidence establishes What JAFAJ must still verify
UAE Consumer Protection Law 15/2020; amendments 2023; complaint channels Legal rights, assigned agencies, complaint channels and related telemarketing rules are publicly described Complaint outcomes, inspection coverage, sanctions, resolution times and consumer impact
Egypt 2015 investment law (delayed regulations); Law 72/2017; ERRADA OECD documents a delay after the 2015 law; Egypt’s official portal dates Law 72/2017 executive regulations to 28 October 2017; OECD documents ERRADA outputs Provision-by-provision implementation, agency delivery, current ERRADA capacity and outcomes
Jordan Unified Investment Law 2014; RIA pilots OECD documents earlier regulatory gaps and the later unified framework; pilots aim to improve rule design Whether gaps were closed, implementation consistency, investor experience and ex-post review
Morocco WJP 2025 regulatory-enforcement factor Comparative institutional context: factor score 0.49 A selected statute’s regulations, funding, enforcement records and measured outcomes
Yemen, Libya, Syria Fragmented public authority and administrative reach A single national measure may hide major territorial differences Subnational law validity, controlling authority, service delivery and record availability

WHAT THE COUNTRY COMPARISON DOES — AND DOES NOT — ESTABLISH

The evidence supports three careful conclusions. First, MENA regulatory systems face documented challenges involving complexity, coordination, monitoring, and enforcement. Second, some governments have developed specific tools—regulatory impact assessments, consultation portals, ex-post review initiatives, and administrative simplification programmes—to address those challenges. Third, the existence of a programme or institution is not evidence that every relevant law has been implemented successfully. The available sources do not provide a comparable region-wide database of individual laws, budgets, enforcement actions, and outcomes. The proposed MLII is designed to fill that gap through transparent, law-level research. [1][2][3]

EVIDENCE TEST — FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES

The OECD’s regional assessment treats regulatory delivery as a system-wide challenge, but the conditions in Yemen, Libya, and Syria require a different research design. Where public authority, territorial control, and administrative records are fragmented, a single national score can obscure whether a law operates in government-controlled areas, contested areas, or not at all. JAFAJ should therefore use subnational coverage, identify the authority issuing and enforcing each rule, distinguish formal legal validity from practical reach, and label inaccessible evidence as ‘not verified.’ A missing national record should not automatically be scored as proof that no implementation occurred. [1]

4. WHY LAWS FAIL AFTER THEY ARE PASSED

There are several recurring explanations for the implementation gap.

1. No implementing regulations

Some laws require additional regulations before government agencies and private organizations can comply.

If ministries delay issuing those regulations, the legislation may remain difficult to apply.

2. No dedicated budget

A law requiring inspections, new government offices, training, or technology cannot function without financial resources.

A parliament may approve the policy without providing sufficient funding for its execution.

3. Conflicting government responsibilities

Several ministries may have overlapping authority.

One ministry may issue regulations while another controls enforcement. A third may be responsible for funding.

Without a clearly designated lead agency, implementation becomes fragmented.

4. Insufficient personnel

Government agencies may lack inspectors, lawyers, administrators, technical specialists, and trained employees.

Legislation cannot enforce itself.

5. Political interference

A government may support a law publicly but hesitate to enforce it when enforcement creates political or economic costs.

Selective enforcement can undermine the credibility of the entire legal system.

6. No measurement of results

Perhaps the most important problem is the absence of a formal system for determining whether a law has achieved its intended purpose.

Governments often report how many laws they passed, but not how many were fully implemented or what changed as a result.

A further problem is the difference between activity measures and outcome measures. Counting regulations issued, inspections conducted, or staff trained can show administrative effort. It does not establish that compliance improved, services reached the public, or the policy achieved its stated purpose. Evaluations should report both process milestones and real-world outcomes.

The OECD has specifically identified weaknesses in regulatory monitoring and evaluation across MENA.

5. THE ECONOMIC COST OF UNIMPLEMENTED LEGISLATION

The implementation gap is not simply an administrative problem.

It has direct economic consequences.

Consider a government that passes a law promising to simplify business registration.

If the ministry responsible never changes its procedures, entrepreneurs continue experiencing the same delays.

Or consider a government that passes a law protecting foreign investors.

If contracts are not enforced consistently, disputes take years to resolve, and regulatory decisions are unpredictable, investors may remain reluctant to commit capital.

The same problem affects:

Legislative area Consequence of poor implementation
Consumer protection Businesses may continue harmful practices
Education New standards may never reach classrooms
Employment Worker protections may remain unenforced
Investment Investors face uncertainty and administrative delays
Taxation Unequal compliance and potential revenue losses
Public procurement Oversight requirements may not prevent irregularities
Healthcare Patient protections may exist without adequate enforcement
Anti-corruption Agencies may exist without producing measurable results

The economic consequences extend beyond the immediate failure of a particular law.

When businesses and citizens cannot predict whether government rules will actually be enforced, confidence in public institutions can deteriorate.

The OECD’s regional governance research identifies weaknesses in public integrity, regulatory quality, and government effectiveness as important challenges to sustainable prosperity.

A government cannot legislate its way to economic development if it cannot administer what it legislates.

For investors, the practical issue is predictability. A published rule that is applied inconsistently can create uncertainty comparable to an unclear rule. Businesses need to know which agency is responsible, when requirements take effect, what documentation is required, how decisions can be appealed, and whether enforcement is consistent across firms and regions.

6. THE MISSING ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM

Here is the central finding of this investigation:

MENA governments need a way to measure legislative implementation that is separate from the process of passing legislation.

A parliament should not consider its work finished when a bill becomes law.

It should require the executive branch to demonstrate what happened next.

Every new law should have an implementation record.

That record should identify:

  • The responsible ministry or government agency.
  • The implementing regulations required.
  • The implementation deadline.
  • The approved implementation budget.
  • The personnel responsible.
  • The enforcement procedures.
  • The number of inspections or compliance reviews.
  • The number of violations identified.
  • The penalties or corrective actions applied.
  • The measurable results achieved.

This information should be made available to the legislature and, where appropriate, the public.

A minimum public implementation record should also identify the law’s commencement date, the regulations still outstanding, the agency’s published service or enforcement standards, the latest implementation status, and the date of the next review. Where information cannot be disclosed for a legitimate legal reason, the government should identify the category withheld and the legal basis.

A law should not be classified as successfully implemented merely because a ministry has published a press release announcing its completion.

It should be evaluated against measurable results.

7. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE MENA LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION INDEX

JAFAJ proposes the creation of a regional measurement system: the MENA Legislative Implementation Index (MLII).

The objective would be straightforward:

Measure how effectively governments turn approved legislation into functioning public policy.

Rather than counting the number of laws passed, the index would evaluate what happens after passage.

Proposed scoring methodology

LAW-LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION AUDIT: For every selected law, reviewers should answer six questions: (1) Was the law officially published and has it commenced? (2) Were all required regulations issued by the deadline? (3) Was funding approved and released? (4) Is the responsible agency operational and adequately staffed? (5) Is there documented enforcement or service delivery? (6) Is there credible evidence that the law produced its intended result? Each answer should cite a primary record or be marked ‘not verified.’

Proposed JAFAJ methodology — not an existing international ranking.

Measurement category Weight
Implementing regulations issued 15%
Funding and budget allocated 15%
Responsible agencies established 10%
Implementation deadlines met 10%
Personnel and administrative capacity 10%
Enforcement and compliance 15%
Public reporting and transparency 10%
Measurable policy outcomes 15%
TOTAL 100%

Proposed performance classifications

90–100

Fully implemented

Implementation verified, enforcement functioning, and outcomes measured.

75–89

Substantially implemented

Most requirements operational, with limited outstanding deficiencies.

60–74

Partially implemented

Significant progress, but important requirements remain incomplete.

40–59

Limited implementation

Some administrative action, but enforcement or delivery remains weak.

0–39

Largely unimplemented

Little demonstrable implementation or measurable progress.

A critical safeguard: laws must be assessed according to their actual requirements and implementation deadlines. A law that does not require additional regulations should not be penalized for lacking them. Similarly, outcomes must be evaluated against realistic objectives, not simply government announcements.

PROPOSED INDICATOR SCALE — 0 TO 4

0 — No evidence of action, or authoritative evidence that the required step did not occur. 1 — Formal action announced or initiated, but not operationally demonstrated. 2 — Partially operational, with material gaps in coverage, timing, funding, staffing, or enforcement. 3 — Substantially operational, with documented implementation and limited deficiencies. 4 — Fully operational for the law’s applicable requirements, supported by current records and outcome evidence. Each score must be accompanied by a source citation, date, reviewer note, and confidence grade. ‘Not applicable’ is excluded from the denominator; ‘not disclosed’ and ‘not verified’ are reported separately and must not be silently converted to zero.

The index should also separate implementation outputs from outcomes. Regulations issued, money allocated, staff hired, and inspections conducted are outputs. Reduced violations, faster services, improved compliance, and measurable public benefits are outcomes. A high output score cannot substitute for missing outcome evidence. Country aggregates should be published only where the law sample, reference period, and evidence standard are comparable.

How JAFAJ could use the index

  1. Select 10–15 significant laws from each participating country.
  2. Identify the responsible ministries and implementation deadlines.
  3. Collect official records, budgets, regulations, and enforcement statistics.
  4. Verify implementation through independent documentation and stakeholder interviews.
  5. Score each law using the published methodology.
  6. Publish an annual country assessment and regional comparison.

The index should initially be a pilot research project, with country participation and independent verification.

SCORING SAFEGUARDS: The index should score individual laws before aggregating results by ministry or country. Each indicator should be rated against published documentary criteria, with evidence links and a confidence grade. ‘Not applicable’ should be distinguished from ‘not disclosed’ and ‘not verified.’ Missing information must not automatically be scored as failure; it should be reported separately and may lower the evidence-confidence rating. The pilot should publish its sample-selection rules, reference period, weighting, reviewer methodology, and correction procedure.

It could eventually become a valuable tool for investors, legislators, businesses, journalists, and citizens.

A pilot should begin with a small, transparent sample of high-impact laws in a limited number of volunteer countries. JAFAJ should publish the underlying law list, scorecards, source register, and limitations before expanding coverage. This will make the index reproducible and reduce the risk that country comparisons reflect different law samples or unequal access to records.

8. SEVEN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MENA GOVERNMENTS

JAFAJ recommends the following reforms:

1. Require an Implementation Plan With Every Major Bill

Every major bill should be accompanied by a costed implementation plan before final passage. The plan should name the lead ministry, supporting agencies, required regulations, implementation timetable, staffing needs, budget source, consultation obligations, enforcement approach, and measurable outcomes. Parliament should be able to see whether the executive has the capacity to deliver the law it is asking legislators to approve.

No significant legislation should reach final approval without identifying the responsible agency, required funding, implementation schedule, and enforcement mechanism.

2. Establish Legislative Implementation Offices

Each parliament should designate a nonpartisan implementation-monitoring office with authority to request progress reports, maintain a register of enacted laws, flag missed deadlines, and prepare committee briefings. The office should monitor implementation without taking over the executive’s responsibility to administer the law.

3. Require Annual Ministerial Reports

Every ministry should submit an annual report identifying the laws for which it is responsible and reporting progress against the original implementation plan. Reports should disclose regulations issued or delayed, budget allocations and spending, staffing, inspections, enforcement actions, complaints, service-delivery measures, and reasons for missed milestones. The responsible minister should answer questions before the relevant parliamentary committee.

4. Establish a Public Legislative Tracking Database

A searchable public database should list each enacted law, publication and commencement dates, required regulations, responsible agencies, implementation deadlines, budget references, progress status, and links to official documents. Updates should be dated. The database should distinguish ‘not started,’ ‘in progress,’ ‘operational,’ ‘under review,’ and ‘not verified’ rather than using a single vague completion label.

5. Introduce Mandatory Post-Legislative Reviews

Major laws should receive a formal review after a defined period, normally two to five years depending on the law’s purpose and implementation cycle. Reviews should test whether the law achieved its stated objectives, imposed unintended costs, created unequal effects, or requires amendment. Reviews should include affected businesses, civil society, professional groups, and the public where appropriate.

6. Connect Legislative Implementation to Government Budgets

Every major implementation plan should identify its full cost and the budget line responsible. Finance ministries should flag unfunded mandates before enactment and report actual spending against approved allocations. Parliament should be told when a law is delayed because funding, procurement, staffing, or technology was not provided.

7. Establish an Annual MENA Legislative Performance Report

JAFAJ should publish an annual report based on a consistent, disclosed sample of laws and a common evidence standard. The report should present law-level scorecards, country context, confidence grades, missing-data disclosures, and examples of effective implementation. It should avoid ranking countries where samples or evidence quality are not comparable.

9. THE QUESTION EVERY PARLIAMENT SHOULD ANSWER

The Middle East and North Africa have no shortage of legislative proposals.

Governments have introduced laws covering economic diversification, investment, employment, education, healthcare, public integrity, and administrative modernization.

But legislative production is not the same as government performance.

A parliament that passes 100 laws but cannot determine whether those laws work has an incomplete understanding of its own effectiveness.

A ministry that announces a reform but cannot demonstrate its implementation has not established its success.

And a government that measures its achievements exclusively by the number of laws it passes risks confusing activity with results.

The real measure of legislative achievement is what happens after the vote.

Did the regulations become operational?

Did the responsible ministry receive funding?

Were the requirements enforced?

Did businesses change their practices?

Did citizens receive the promised protections?

Did the country achieve the intended economic or social improvement?

These are the questions that deserve answers.

THE JAFAJ CONCLUSION

The Middle East does not necessarily need more legislation.

It needs better implementation of the legislation it already has.

Governments should be measured not by the number of laws they announce, but by the number they successfully put into practice.

Parliaments should demand implementation reports. Ministries should be held accountable for results. Citizens should have access to information showing whether their governments are delivering on legislative promises.

A law that is passed but never implemented is not a completed public policy achievement. It is an unfinished government obligation.

And perhaps the most important question for every MENA parliament is not:

How many laws did we pass this year?

It is:

How many of those laws actually made a difference?

Until governments publish that evidence, legislative activity should not be confused with public performance. A law is not a completed reform when it is passed; it is a completed reform only when its obligations are operational, its enforcement is credible, and its intended benefits can be demonstrated.

JAFAJ EDITORIAL ASSESSMENT

Recommended for publication

Why this investigation matters:

  • It examines an institutional weakness that affects economic development across the region.
  • It moves beyond conventional political reporting into measurable government performance.
  • It identifies differences among countries without assuming that all MENA governments operate identically.
  • It introduces an original JAFAJ policy concept: the MENA Legislative Implementation Index.
  • It creates a potential annual research and publication series.

Recommended follow-up investigations

  1. The 100-Day Test: What happens during the first 100 days after a major law is passed?
  2. The Regulatory Graveyard: How many outdated or contradictory laws remain on the books?
  3. The Ministry Accountability Test: Which ministries consistently miss implementation deadlines?
  4. The Cost of Inaction: What does regulatory non-enforcement cost businesses and citizens?
  5. The MENA Parliament Scorecard: How effectively do regional parliaments oversee executive implementation?

RESEARCH SOURCES

  1. OECD. (2024). Governing for Sustainable Prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa. OECD Public Governance Reviews. Paris: OECD Publishing. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1787/d0da1d30-en. Pinpoints: Chapter 4, ‘Delivering public services effectively’; regulatory-quality trend, Figure 4.2, p. 164; RIA prevalence, Figure 4.3, p. 165; Jordan consultation and regulatory-policy initiatives, Chapter 4. The OECD’s Figure 4.3 reports 22% for its defined MENA grouping.
  2. World Justice Project. (2025). Rule of Law Index 2025. Main report: https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPIndex2025.pdf. Regional overall scores: ‘Scores and Rankings’, p. 30. Factor definitions and methodology: https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/factors-rule-law and https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/Index-Methodology-2025.pdf. Country profiles: UAE https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2025/United%20Arab%20Emirates; Qatar https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2025/Qatar; Jordan https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2025/Jordan; Morocco https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2025/Morocco/; Egypt https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2025/Egypt%2C%20Arab%20Rep./. Use Factor 6 values separately from overall scores.
  3. United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Finance. Zero Government Bureaucracy Programme. https://mof.gov.ae/en/about-us/initiatives/zero-bureaucracy/. This official programme page states the targets to eliminate at least 2,000 procedures, reduce processing time by at least 50%, and remove redundant requirements within one year. These are stated targets; do not describe them as achieved without outcome evidence.
  4. United Arab Emirates, Official Government Portal. Consumer Protection. https://u.ae/en/information-and-services/justice-safety-and-the-law/consumer-protection. Covers Federal Law No. 15 of 2020 as amended by Federal Decree-Law No. 5 of 2023, scope, consumer rights, complaint channels, Cabinet Resolution No. 56 of 2024, and Cabinet Resolution No. 57 of 2024. Primary legal text for Cabinet Resolution No. 56 of 2024: https://u.ae/en/information-and-services/justice-safety-and-the-law/consumer-protection/-/media/Information-and-services/Infrastructure/Cabinet-Resolution-No-56-of-2024-Concerning-the-Telemarketing-Regulations-1.pdf.
  5. OECD. (2021). Middle East and North Africa Investment Policy Perspectives. Chapter: ‘Towards modernised legislative frameworks for investment’. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/middle-east-and-north-africa-investment-policy-perspectives_6d84ee94-en/full-report/towards-modernised-legislative-frameworks-for-investment_3ed02c6e.html. Pinpoint: discussion of Egypt’s 2015 investment law and delayed implementing regulations, and Jordan’s regulatory gaps before the unified 2014 Investment Law. The Egypt example concerns the 2015 law, not Law No. 72 of 2017.
  6. OECD. (2024). OECD Public Governance Reviews: Egypt. Chapter: ‘Streamlining public service delivery in Egypt: Harnessing administrative simplification and digital solutions’. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-public-governance-reviews-egypt_d5a42670-en/full-report/streamlining-public-service-delivery-in-egypt-harnessing-administrative-simplification-and-digital-solutions_51b381bd.html. Pinpoints: ERRADA institutional structure and 2019 Cabinet affiliation, paragraphs on institutional challenges and mandate clarification; ERRADA simplification outputs, including more than 2,000 regulations streamlined between August 2008 and February 2012. The OECD states ERRADA was established in 2009 under Decree No. 1089/2008.
  7. Arab Republic of Egypt, General Authority for Investment and Free Zones / State Information Service. Legislation Governing the Investment Climate. https://sis.gov.eg/en/economy-investment/economy/investment/legislation-governing-the-investment-climate/. Official government page states that the executive regulations for Investment Law No. 72 of 2017 were issued by Prime Ministerial Decree No. 2310 of 2017 on 28 October 2017. English text of Investment Law No. 72 of 2017 and its provisions: https://www.investinegypt.gov.eg/flip/library/PDFs/InvestmentLaw72/InvestmentLaw72_EN.pdf.
  8. OECD. (2013). OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Jordan 2013. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2013/12/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-jordan-2013_g1g30b23/9789264202276-en.pdf. Provides background on Jordan’s investment-law and regulatory framework before the unified 2014 Investment Law. Use alongside Source 5 for historical context; it is not a post-2014 implementation audit.
  9. Research limitation and citation standard. WJP scores are institutional/experiential indicators and not statute-by-statute implementation rates. OECD regulatory-quality and RIA figures are regional indicators with defined country groupings and reference periods. Government programme pages establish legal mandates, published targets, or reported administrative outputs—not independent proof of enforcement effectiveness or citizen outcomes. Any future MLII country score should cite the statute, commencement notice, implementing regulations, budget, responsible-agency records, enforcement data, and outcome evidence separately.

SOURCE NOTE: The numbered references identify the specific publication, chapter or figure, and direct source link supporting the principal claims. OECD and WJP publications provide regional and institutional context. Official government portals and legal texts establish the content and formal status of laws, regulations, and programmes. They do not, without implementation records, establish enforcement rates or public outcomes. Country-specific implementation conclusions must be based on the primary records identified in the evidence hierarchy below.

EVIDENCE HIERARCHY FOR THE NEXT MLII PILOT: (1) Official gazette and enacted legal text; (2) implementing regulations and commencement notices; (3) approved budgets, procurement and staffing records; (4) agency procedures and service standards; (5) inspection, complaint, court, penalty and audit records; (6) independent evaluations and stakeholder interviews. Press releases may identify a programme or target, but should not be the sole evidence of implementation or results.

Research qualification: The available international evidence establishes significant regional implementation and regulatory-delivery challenges. It does not establish a comprehensive percentage of MENA laws that are unimplemented. The proposed index is a framework for generating that missing evidence, not a claim that such a ranking already exists.

WJP interpretation: The Rule of Law Index draws on household and expert surveys and assesses eight factors, including regulatory enforcement. It is an institutional and experiential measure, not a statutory implementation audit. JAFAJ should cite the overall score and the regulatory-enforcement factor separately whenever both are used. [2]

My editorial recommendation: This should become more than a one-time JAFAJ article. The proposed Legislative Implementation Index has the potential to become a recurring annual regional research product.

 

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