Key Takeaways · Hezbollah Rejects Direct Negotiations · 'State is Not Just the Government' · Resistance 'Necessary when State Fails'.
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Iran’s financial outflows are not anonymous, and specific actors are moving specific pools of money through identifiable channels—and those movements reveal, with precision, who holds operational power inside the state.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
U.S. Treasury tracking—referenced by Secretary Scott Bessent—now focuses not only on where Iranian money goes, but who is moving it, including IRGC-linked firms, state energy entities, clerical foundations, and elite family networks.¹
Iranian funds are being distributed globally across China, Gulf hubs, Turkey, Europe, Western countries, and crypto systems, with tens of billions held abroad and billions moving annually, and each flow can be tied to specific institutions or power blocs inside Iran.²
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) controls or influences 20–40 percent of Iran’s economy, giving it dominant control over both the generation and movement of capital.³
Crypto channels tied to IRGC-linked actors have reached $8–10 billion annually, including at least $1 billion directly associated with sanctioned networks, indicating a parallel financial system under military-linked control.⁴
This is not just capital flight. It is controlled capital redistribution, and the entities moving the money are the entities consolidating power.
THE TREASURY SIGNAL: TRACKING MONEY MEANS TRACKING ACTORS
The U.S. Treasury’s current posture is centered on identifying not only financial flows but the actors behind them. Statements tied to Secretary Scott Bessent indicate that enforcement efforts are focused on mapping networks of IRGC front companies, shipping operators, energy traders, and financial intermediaries.¹
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has specifically targeted individuals, corporate entities, and logistics networks tied to Iranian elites and military structures, which demonstrates that the objective is to identify decision-makers and controllers, not just transactions.¹
What makes this important is this: when you know who moves the money, you know who holds power.
WHERE THE MONEY IS GOING—AND WHO IS SENDING IT
Iran’s financial system is segmented. Different actors control different pipelines.
CHINA — STATE ENERGY NETWORKS AND IRGC-LINKED EXPORT CHANNELS
Funds flowing into China are primarily generated by Iran’s oil sector, including state-owned enterprises and IRGC-linked shipping and trading networks.
Oil sales—often routed through intermediaries and reflagged vessels—are coordinated by actors tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and state energy entities, with proceeds accumulating in Chinese-controlled accounts.²
With tens of billions of dollars tied to these flows and China absorbing 70–80 percent of exports, this channel reflects cooperation between state-level actors and military-linked logistics systems.²
GULF STATES — MERCHANT NETWORKS, FRONT COMPANIES, AND IRGC FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
Money moving through the UAE, Qatar, and Oman is typically routed by Iranian trading firms, front companies, and IRGC-affiliated commercial networks.
These actors use trade-based money laundering, over- and under-invoicing, and intermediary banking systems to move funds, including multi-billion-dollar transfers such as the $6 billion routed through Qatar and $1 billion through Oman-linked channels.²
Iranian business elites—many with ties to political and military structures—also use Gulf hubs to access hard currency and conduct transactions outside Iran.
Its clear that this is a mix of IRGC-linked commercial networks and politically connected business elites.
TURKEY — SANCTIONS EVASION OPERATORS AND BANKING INTERMEDIARIES
Funds routed through Turkey are typically moved by networks involving Iranian traders, state-linked financial actors, and banking intermediaries. These actors have historically used mechanisms such as gold-for-oil trades and banking channels to convert restricted funds into usable assets. ⁵ The system relies on coordination between Iranian financial operatives and Turkish institutions capable of facilitating conversion. This is operational money moved by sanction-evasion specialists tied to state and quasi-state actors.
EUROPE — STATE-HELD FUNDS AND LEGAL FINANCIAL CUSTODIANS
Funds held in European systems are often controlled by Iranian state entities, including central banking structures and government-linked accounts. These funds, often totaling billions of dollars, are typically frozen, disputed, or held in legal limbo under sanction regimes.² Movement into Europe is executed by formal state actors rather than informal networks.
WESTERN COUNTRIES — ELITE FAMILIES AND PERSONAL WEALTH TRANSFERS
This is one of the most revealing channels.
Funds moving into the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia are typically transferred by individual elites, political families, and senior officials, often through indirect mechanisms such as property purchases, educational payments, and private banking. Reports indicate that tens of millions of dollars have been moved out recently by elite-linked individuals, even as domestic conditions deteriorate.⁶ These transfers are often conducted by family members rather than officials themselves, creating distance from formal authority.
CRYPTO AND SHADOW FINANCE — IRGC AND TECH-ENABLED NETWORKS
Crypto flows are driven by a combination of IRGC-linked actors, sanctioned entities, and private financial operators.
With $8–10 billion in annual activity, including at least $1 billion tied to IRGC-controlled channels, this system operates as a parallel financial infrastructure.⁴
These networks use stablecoins, offshore exchanges, and decentralized wallets to move funds globally without reliance on traditional banking.
This hybrid movement is military-linked, state-tolerated, and technologically enabled.
WHAT THIS MEANS (POWER ANALYSIS THROUGH MONEY MOVEMENT)
The movement of money reveals the hierarchy of power more clearly than formal titles. Actors who control oil revenue channels, logistics networks, and offshore financial pathways—primarily the IRGC and its affiliated structures—have the strongest position.³
State institutions control formal reserves but lack flexibility, while political elites move personal wealth as a hedge against instability. The fragmentation of financial control mirrors the fragmentation of political authority, but the concentration of operational control within IRGC-linked systems indicates where consolidation is likely to occur.
NEGOTIATION IMPLICATIONS: WHO WILL SPEAK FOR IRAN
As financial control consolidates, negotiation authority will follow.
Actors who can:
Generate revenue
Move capital
Protect assets
Enforce outcomes
will define Iran’s negotiating position.
This strongly favors the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which controls all four dimensions.³
Future negotiations will therefore likely:
Be more rigid
Be more security-focused
Reflect operational realities rather than political messaging
That is because the “negotiator” will be the one who controls the money—and can guarantee delivery.
STRATEGIC CONCLUSION
Iran’s capital flight is not anonymous, and it is not chaotic.
It is structured, controlled, and faction-driven.
The most likely outcome is consolidation under the IRGC, because it is the only actor that:
Generates large-scale revenue
Controls financial movement
Operates globally
Enforces decisions
Under this scenario, negotiations will resume under a centralized authority capable of delivering outcomes.
If consolidation fails, competing actors controlling different financial pipelines could drive the system toward internal conflict, as economic fragmentation translates into political confrontation.
FINAL WORD
This is no longer about where the money is going.
It is about identifying the actors who have both the ability and the confidence to move it at scale—because those are the actors who are already operating as the real centers of power.
U.S. Treasury tracking, combined with observed capital flight—where tens of millions are already being wired out by regime-linked elites —confirms that this is not passive wealth preservation. It is active repositioning during a system-level transition.
At the same time, intelligence and reporting show that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is consolidating control across military, economic, and decision-making structures, sidelining competing factions and increasingly acting as the only entity capable of executing national strategy.
That combination—capital flight plus power consolidation—is decisive.
The actors moving personal wealth abroad are signaling lack of confidence in the system.
The actors controlling large-scale financial pipelines are signaling control over the system.
Those are not the same people—and that gap defines the outcome.
Final judgment:
The future of Iran will not be decided by formal titles or public statements.
It will be decided by the small group of actors who control both the movement of capital and the enforcement of decisions.
And right now, those two lines are converging.
Whoever controls the money flows—and can protect them—will not just influence Iran’s future.
They will define it.
REFERENCES + FOOTNOTES (CHICAGO STYLE)
U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Sanctions and Enforcement Actions on Iran Networks,” 2026.
Wall Street Journal, “How Much Money Does Iran Have Locked Abroad?” 2026.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, The IRGC’s Expanding Economic Role, 2024.
Reuters, “Iran’s Surging Crypto Activity Draws U.S. Scrutiny,” 2026.
U.S. Department of Justice, “Halkbank Case and Sanctions Evasion,” 2023.
Fox News, “Iranian Elites Move Tens of Millions Abroad,” 2026.
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WHY THE U.S. REFUSAL TO GO TO PAKISTAN SIGNALS A DEEPER POWER BREAKDOWN INSIDE IRAN
If Iran is “seriously fractured,” as Donald Trump has stated, then the central issue is no longer whether Iran will negotiate, but whether it can produce a single authority capable of negotiating—AND ENFORCING—an agreement.¹
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
President Donald Trump has extended the ceasefire while simultaneously instructing American negotiators not to travel to Pakistan because Iran has failed to commit to attending the talks, which demonstrates that the breakdown is structural rather than procedural.¹
Iran has not sent a delegation and continues to reject negotiations “under pressure,” even while indirect communication channels remain open, which reflects internal disagreement rather than a unified policy position.²
Iran’s internal power struggle spans five distinct centers—the presidency, parliament, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Quds Force, and the Supreme Leader structure—each with separate leadership, funding streams, and operational priorities.
Approximately 20–21 million barrels of oil per day, representing about 20 percent of global supply, pass through the Strait of Hormuz, which means that even indecision inside Iran produces immediate global economic consequences.³
The current ceasefire is enabling Iran to rearm, redeploy, reorganize, and internally realign while external actors pause escalation.⁴
Combined, the United States is no longer waiting for a deal—it is waiting for Iran to prove it has a decision-making structure capable of delivering one.
THE BREAKING SHIFT: THE U.S. STOPS SHOWING UP
The United States has effectively halted forward diplomatic engagement because Iran has not demonstrated that it can produce a unified negotiating position.¹ Additionally, Iran has not confirmed attendance, has not deployed a delegation, and has not clarified negotiating authority, which indicates that internal alignment has not been achieved.²
This shift represents a transition from negotiation failure to recognition of state-level fragmentation, and can only be interpreted this way: the issue is no longer disagreement over terms; it is uncertainty over who has authority to negotiate.
THE CEASEFIRE: STRATEGIC PAUSE AND FORCE MULTIPLIER
The ceasefire allows Iran to rearm its forces, reposition military assets, and reinforce internal security structures without the pressure of active conflict.⁴ The pause in hostilities enables competing factions to reorganize command chains, reassess strategy, and consolidate influence. As such, the ceasefire reduces external pressure while intensifying internal competition, which increases the probability of either consolidation or internal conflict.
The key takeaway here is this: The ceasefire is simultaneously stabilizing the external environment and destabilizing the internal one.
THE FIVE POWER CENTERS INSIDE IRAN (STRUCTURED ANALYSIS)
Iran’s internal structure is defined by five major power centers, each with distinct leadership, scale, and financing.
THE SUPREME LEADER (FORMAL AUTHORITY)
Mojtaba Khamenei is structurally Iran’s Supreme Leader. This structure is supported by clerical networks and oversight bodies, including the Assembly of Experts (~88 members), which provides formal legitimacy.⁵
The Assembly’s financing is derived from religious foundations (bonyads), state allocations, and clerical economic networks that control billions of dollars in assets.⁶
What has harmed the Supreme Leader is this: Mojtaba Khamenei’s lack of public visibility weakens his ability to enforce decisions across competing factions, and the Supreme Leader provides legitimacy but lacks independent enforcement capability.
THE IRGC (REAL POWER CORE)
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) consists of approximately 190,000 active personnel, including ground forces, naval units, aerospace divisions, and the Basij militia, which itself can mobilize millions.⁷ Their key leaders are Hossein Salami and Esmail Qaani.
The IRGC controls or influences 20–40 percent of Iran’s economy, including construction (Khatam al-Anbiya), energy, telecommunications, and black-market trade,⁸ their financing comes from state budgets, commercial enterprises, sanctions evasion networks, and regional operations.
This makes the IRGC is a parallel state with independent funding, force, and decision-making capability.
THE QUDS FORCE (EXTERNAL LEVERAGE ENGINE)
The Quds Force operates with an estimated 10,000–20,000 personnel focused on foreign operations.⁹ The Quids Force is responsible for funding and coordinating with Iran’s proxy networks across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, including groups such as Hezbollah.⁹ Financing is derived from IRGC budgets, covert financial channels, and regional partnerships.
This makes the Quds Force extends Iran’s strategic reach, while reducing internal pressure to compromise.
THE PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT (DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL)
The executive branch oversees a bureaucracy and operations of millions of public-sector employees and controls formal economic policy.⁵ Their revenues come from oil exports, taxation, and sovereign financial mechanisms.³ They are led by figures such as Ebrahim Raisi represent the hardline executive structure.
Structurally, the government can negotiate internationally but cannot enforce decisions internally.
PARLIAMENT (POLITICAL SIGNALING ARM)
Iran’s parliament (Majles) consists of 290 members and is led by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.⁵ It is funded through the state budget and plays a legislative and signaling role because it reinforces ideological narratives and supports resistance policies. The Parliament shapes messaging but does not control operational outcomes.
WHAT FRACTURE MEANS (HIGH-STRUCTURE ANALYSIS)
Decision latency in a fractured form, increases because competing power centers that cannot reach consensus. That means that a projected policy divergence emerges because each faction optimizes for its own strategic interests. This allows enforcement gaps to widen because no single authority can guarantee compliance across the system. Thanks to this fracturing, Iran is functioning as a decentralized power system rather than a unified state.
WHY FRACTURE TEMPORARILY BENEFITS IRAN
Fracturing temporarily benefits Iran because it allows them to avoid committing to unfavorable agreements because no single authority can be pressured into acceptance.²
Furthermore, Iran has the ability to “test multiple negotiating positions simultaneously through different channels without formal contradiction”.
This helps Iran increase global uncertainty, which directly affects oil prices, insurance costs, and geopolitical risk.³
It also allows Iran to shift negotiation timelines outward, forcing external actors to absorb economic and strategic costs.
Fragmentation converts internal weakness into external leverage.
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT: PHASED OUTCOME MODEL
Phase 1 (Current): Iran delays participation while the United States pauses engagement, creating a negotiation freeze.¹
Phase 2: Internal factions compete for dominance, with the IRGC expanding operational control.
Phase 3: A dominant power center emerges, most likely the IRGC.
Phase 4: Iran either re-enters negotiations under consolidated authority or escalates conflict.
DEEP ANALYSIS
It should be clear to the educated reader that a fractured state cannot produce reliable agreements because authority is contested and enforcement is uncertain¹ and that Historical patterns show that such systems resolve through consolidation or conflict.
Iran is currently positioned at this transition point, with momentum favoring actors that control force and funding.
WHAT NEGOTIATIONS LOOK LIKE
The most likely outcome is IRGC-led consolidation because it controls military force, intelligence, financing, and organizational structure.⁸ They will most likely keep the Supreme Leadership structure as “symbolic authority”, while the nation’s real power will shift towards military control.
Once in place, after consolidation, the negotiations will become more rigid, security-focused, and enforceable because they will be controlled by actors capable of delivering outcomes.
ALTERNATIVE OUTCOME: CIVIL WAR AND REGIONAL INSTABILITY
This this option fails, an internal fracture could escalate into civil conflict between competing factions. This would impact regional proxy networks who would expand instability across the Middle East. That would make the Strait of Hormuz a contested zone, disrupting global energy markets.³
FINAL WORD
Iran will not remain in a fractured state indefinitely because systems under sustained internal and external pressure are structurally forced to resolve toward either consolidation or collapse.
The current fragmentation—defined by competing power centers, inconsistent messaging, and degraded command structures—has already reached a level where it is impairing Iran’s ability to act coherently on the global stage.
If consolidation occurs, it will almost certainly favor the actors that control force, funding, and enforcement mechanisms, which places the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the strongest position to emerge as the dominant authority.
Historical and intelligence assessments indicate that in conflict-driven environments, political systems tend to consolidate around security institutions capable of maintaining order and projecting power, rather than civilian or symbolic leadership structures.
Under this outcome, Iran would transition into a more explicitly militarized state, where negotiations would resume under a hardened, centralized authority that prioritizes regime survival, regional leverage, and security guarantees over political compromise.
However, consolidation is not guaranteed.
If internal competition intensifies rather than resolves, the fracture can evolve into open conflict between factions, particularly if command-and-control systems continue to degrade and no single authority can impose unity.
In that scenario, Iran risks entering a civil conflict phase characterized by:
Fragmentation of central authority into competing regional or institutional blocs.
Expansion of proxy conflicts across neighboring states.
Disruption of global energy markets, particularly through instability in the Strait of Hormuz.
Escalation of internal unrest fueled by economic pressure and political instability.
This is not theoretical. Multiple strategic assessments already identify fragmentation scenarios as credible outcomes in Iran’s current trajectory, particularly under conditions of leadership uncertainty and sustained external pressure.
What defines the outcome is simple: control.
If one actor consolidates control, Iran stabilizes under a more rigid and militarized system.
If no actor consolidates control, Iran destabilizes into conflict with regional spillover effects.
What defines the next phase of negotiations is equally clear:
Negotiations will not resume based on diplomacy alone.
They will resume only when a single actor inside Iran can both make a decision and enforce it.
STRATEGIC JUDGMENT
Iran is no longer at the negotiation stage, it is at the decision stage about who controls the state, and until that decision is resolved: No agreement will hold, no signal will be reliable and no timeline will matter.
Conclusion:
Iran’s fracture is not the end state—it is the transition. And whether that transition leads to consolidation or civil conflict will determine not only Iran’s future, but the stability of the region and the structure of global energy markets.
REFERENCES + FOOTNOTES (CHICAGO STYLE)
Reuters, “Trump Extends Ceasefire, Halts Negotiators,” April 2026.
Wall Street Journal, “Iran Rejects Talks Under Pressure,” April 2026.
U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, 2025.
RAND Corporation, Ceasefire Dynamics and Strategic Pause, 2023.
Council on Foreign Relations, Leadership Dynamics in Iran, 2024.
Brookings Institution, Iran’s Bonyads and Economic Power, 2023.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance: Iran, 2025.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, The IRGC’s Expanding Economic Role, 2024.
International Crisis Group, Iran’s Regional Proxy Networks, 2025.
Trump Halts Negotiators: Iran’s Fracture Stops Talks Before they Begin – Civil War Looms Read More »
Iran is not yet in a civil war, but it is no longer functioning as a unified state. What appears to be a ceasefire is not stability—it is a reorganization phase that historically precedes internal conflict. Civil wars begin when authority becomes contested, duplicated, and operationally unclear—not when systems visibly collapse.¹
Iran already exhibits three of the four structural conditions required for civil war onset: elite fragmentation, sustained public grievance, and parallel authority structures.² The final condition—fracture of control over force—is no longer theoretical. It is structurally primed.
The trigger will not necessarily originate from elite conflict alone. When information flows normalize and public awareness synchronizes, the population itself becomes a force multiplier capable of accelerating instability.³
Bottom line: Iran is moving toward internal conflict unless control over force is rapidly and decisively re-centralized.
THE CEASEFIRE IS NOT CALM—IT IS PREPARATION
The current ceasefire is being misinterpreted. It is not a pause—it is a preparation phase for internal repositioning.
Iran is actively:
auditing force capabilities,
repositioning strategic assets, and
reassessing command authority.
These actions indicate uncertainty over who controls coercive power, not confidence in stability.
Conflict research shows that such phases are strongly associated with pre-fragmentation dynamics, where systems test internal cohesion before either reconsolidating or breaking.⁴
Once a state begins questioning command authority, fragmentation is no longer a distant risk—it is an active process.
WHO CONTROLS FORCE—AND WHY THAT DECIDES EVERYTHING
At the center of formal authority is supposedly Mojtaba Khamenei, the new supreme leader who has not been seen in a few weeks. His position depends on alignment with security institutions rather than purely clerical legitimacy.
Masoud Pezeshkian controls administrative governance but does not control force. This creates a structural divide between legitimacy and coercion.
Real power flows through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which operates as a military, political, and economic system simultaneously. ⁵
This produces a binary outcome:
If the IRGC remains unified, the state stabilizes under centralized control.
If the IRGC fragments, the state immediately loses its monopoly on force.
There is no gradual transition between these states. Fragmentation of force shifts the system directly from governance to contest.
FACTIONS ARE NOT COMPETING—THEY ARE COLLIDING
Iran’s internal blocs are advancing incompatible strategies:
The Pezeshkian–Larijani bloc seeks stabilization through reform and external engagement.⁶
The Salami–Qaani bloc seeks control through force, ideological continuity, and confrontation.⁷
These approaches cannot coexist in execution.
The moment either faction attempts to operationalize its strategy at scale, it will undermine the other’s power base. This creates forced confrontation, not political competition.
This is the point at which governance transitions into conflict.
HOW CIVIL WAR CONDITIONS FORM—AND WHERE IRAN STANDS
Civil war onset requires four converging conditions:
Elite fragmentation
Division within security forces
Sustained public grievance
A triggering event
Iran has already crossed the first three thresholds.²
The remaining condition—fracture within the security apparatus—is now structurally primed.
This shifts the analysis from possibility to trajectory.
HOW ESCALATION WILL ACTUALLY BEGIN
Escalation will begin with command inconsistency, not mass violence.
Orders will conflict across institutions.
Enforcement will become uneven.
Security units will default to factional loyalty.
This leads to localized divergence in enforcement and the emergence of selective violence as actors test boundaries.⁸
Once this phase begins, re-centralization becomes unlikely. Conflict evolves into multi-sided competition between state factions and aligned security forces.⁹
THE STRUCTURAL FAILURE: THERE ARE NO RULES FOR TRANSITION
Iran lacks:
a clear succession mechanism,
a binding dispute resolution framework, and
a defined structure for control over military authority during contested transitions.
This is not a gap—it is a system-level failure condition.
Systems without institutionalized transition mechanisms are significantly more prone to violent conflict because disputes cannot be resolved within the system.¹⁰
Iran is operating inside that condition now.
WHERE CONFLICT WILL EMERGE FIRST
The first fractures will appear inside the state’s enforcement structure, not at its borders.
Indicators include:
conflicting directives within security forces,
divergence between central and regional command, and
selective enforcement aligned with factional interests.
Public unrest will follow—but it is not the origin point.
The primary battlefield is control over force.
REGIONAL IMPACT: OIL, ENERGY MARKETS, AND SYSTEMIC SHOCK
A civil war in Iran would immediately translate into a regional and global energy shock.
Iran sits at the center of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of global oil supply flows daily. Any disruption—real or perceived—would rapidly impact global markets.
The escalation pathway is predictable:
Risk Pricing Surge: Oil prices spike immediately based on perceived instability.
Disruption Risk: Fragmented control over military assets increases the threat to tanker traffic.
Regional Spillover: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and United Arab Emirates face elevated security pressure and proxy spillover risks.
External Intervention Pressure: The United States and allies are drawn into maintaining open shipping lanes.
Oil markets do not require actual disruption to destabilize—they respond to credible risk.
A fragmented Iran introduces persistent uncertainty over:
command and control of force,
security of maritime corridors, and
stability of regional infrastructure.
This shifts global energy markets from volatile to structurally unstable.
THE HARD TRUTH
Iran is not deciding whether it will fragment. It is determining who will control the fragmentation.
Authority is already contested. Force is the last centralized variable—and it is under pressure.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is the system’s final point of cohesion.
If it holds, the state survives in consolidated form.
If it fractures, the state transitions directly into conflict.
There is no stable middle ground.
THE PUBLIC VARIABLE: THE TRIGGER MOST ANALYSIS MISSES
The population is not a passive factor—it is a trigger amplifier.
When information is restricted, dissatisfaction remains fragmented.
When connectivity returns, fragmentation becomes coordination.
At that point:
legitimacy is reassessed,
internal divisions become visible, and
collective action scales rapidly.³
If this occurs during elite fragmentation, the effect is exponential.
The population does not need to defeat the system. It only needs to overload it while divided.
WILL CIVIL WAR FORCE A NEW CONSTITUTION—AND WHAT MUST CHANGE
A civil war would make Iran’s current constitutional structure unsustainable—but it does not guarantee effective reform.
The existing system is built on dual sovereignty:
elected institutions, and
unelected authority controlling force.
This separation between legitimacy and coercion is the core instability.
A post-conflict constitution would only stabilize the system if it resolves that contradiction.
At minimum, five structural changes are required:
Unified Control of Force: All military entities, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, must operate under a single civilian-controlled command.
Elimination of Dual Sovereignty: Authority must be consolidated into a clearly defined and accountable structure.
Enforceable Succession Mechanism: Leadership transitions must be rule-based and institutionally enforced.
Judicial and Legislative Constraints: Independent institutions must have real authority to limit power.
Legitimacy Through Participation: Electoral and governance systems must be credible and transparent.
Without these changes, a new constitution would replicate the same instability under a different structure.
THE BOTTOM LINE
Iran is on a directional path toward internal conflict unless control over force is re-established.
The decisive variables are clear:
whether the IRGC remains unified, and
whether public mobilization coincides with elite fragmentation.
If force remains centralized, the system stabilizes.
If force fractures, conflict becomes highly likely.
If public mobilization intersects with that fracture, escalation accelerates beyond state control.
At the same time, the consequences extend far beyond Iran:
global energy markets destabilize,
regional security fractures, and
external powers are pulled into containment efforts.
A civil war would likely force constitutional change—but only a restructuring of power and control over force can produce stability.
If that does not occur, conflict will not end with one cycle—it will repeat.
FOOTNOTES (CHICAGO STYLE)
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.
Barbara F. Walter, How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them (New York: Crown, 2022).
Zeynep Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).
Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Ali Alfoneh, Iran Unveiled (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2013).
Suzanne Maloney, Iran’s Political Economy since the Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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