1

JaFaJ

A study of West Bank Middle and Secondary School Students’ Perceptions of Hamas and the Gaza War Post 7 October

By Tasneem Kelany 
 
Summary: This study provides a nuanced understanding of West Bank middle and secondary school students’ perceptions of Hamas and the Gaza war following the October 7 attacks. Several key findings stand out:
 
1.Limited Support for Hamas – Despite Hamas’s prominence in Palestinian politics, the majority of students in the West Bank did not view the group favorably. In fact, Hamas was the least preferred faction among students, with 69% identifying it as their least favorite. This suggests a growing disconnect between Hamas and younger generations in the West Bank.
 
2.Students prefer economic priorities over ideological or nationalist Aspirations – The overwhelming majority (89%) of students prioritized economic support from political factions, while only 8% listed Palestinian liberation as their main concern. This finding indicates a shift away from militant rhetoric toward practical concerns such as job opportunities and financial security.
 
3.Strong rejection of a potential war in the West Bank – A striking 94% of students expressed opposition to a potential war between Hamas and Israel in the West Bank. This suggests that, despite varying attitudes toward Hamas’s actions on October 7, most students preferred stability and opposed further escalation of the conflict in their region.
 
4.Mixed Views on Hamas’s Actions on October 7 – While 39% of students expressed some level of support for Hamas’s attack, a significant 56% responded with “Don’t Know,” suggesting uncertainty or reluctance to take a definitive stance. Only 5% explicitly condemned the attack, indicating either limited opposition or hesitation in expressing dissent.
 
5.Engagement with Hamas propaganda content but limited ideological alignment – While 56% of students reported enjoying watching Hamas-related material online, this engagement did not necessarily translate into direct support for the group. Peer influence played a role, as 54% of students noted that their friends supported Hamas, yet many still prioritized economic stability over armed resistance.
 
6.Perception of Hamas’s victory – A majority of students viewed Hamas’s ability to remain in power and inflict casualties on Israeli forces as a form of victory. However, fewer than half attributed this outcome to divine intervention, indicating that their views were shaped more by strategic considerations than religious ideology.
 
7.Moral Dilemmas Regarding Civilian Casualties – While many students justified Hamas’s attacks as acts of deterrence or revenge, a significant number condemned the killing of Israeli children on October 7, with some stating that such acts violated Islamic war ethics. However, some students attributed responsibility to Israel, arguing that its actions provoked Hamas.
 
8. Students reported that while teachers did not overtly support Hamas, students observed that nationalist rhetoric was embedded in daily instruction. Many students believed that educators should engage in anti-Israeli discourse as part of the broader Palestinian liberation struggle.
——————————————————————————
 
A study of West Bank Middle and Secondary School Students’ Perceptions of Hamas and the Gaza War Post 7 October War
 
Introduction
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long shaped the political, social, and economic realities of the region, particularly for Palestinian youth in both Gaza and the West Bank. While considerable attention has been given to the impact of conflict on Gaza’s population, the perspectives of West Bank students—who experience a different political and security environment—remain understudied. This research seeks to address this gap by examining how middle and secondary school students in the West Bank perceive Hamas, the Gaza war following the October 7 attack, and the broader dynamics of resistance and governance.
 
The study explores several critical themes, including the extent of support for Hamas among young Palestinians, the prioritization of economic stability over militant resistance, and the role of education in shaping political attitudes. Given Hamas’s governing presence in Gaza and its influence on Palestinian nationalism, understanding how West Bank youth perceive the group is essential for assessing future political trends. Additionally, the research considers the impact of peer influence, media exposure, and nationalist rhetoric within the education system on students’ views of conflict and governance.
 
By utilizing both quantitative and qualitative methods, including survey data and focus group interviews, this study provides a comprehensive analysis of the shifting priorities among Palestinian youth. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of whether younger generations in the West Bank continue to align with traditional political and ideological narratives or whether they are increasingly prioritizing stability, economic growth, and nonviolent resistance. In doing so, this research offers valuable insights into the evolving political consciousness of Palestinian youth and its potential implications for the future of the region.
 
Current Contexts
Following the war in Gaza between Hamas and Israel that erupted after October 7, the perspectives and voices of Palestinian youth in the West Bank have largely been overlooked. Recognizing this gap, the researcher found it essential to address a pressing set of questions to better assess the opinions and real outcomes of the war for West Banker youth, who constitute the majority of the population. The key issues examined include Hamas’s failure to provide decent living standards, its role in promoting radicalism and hatred rather than setting a positive example for young people, the absence of effective ideological alternatives to Hamas’s influence in educational institutions, and the discrimination and isolation faced by non-Hamas-affiliated students in the Hamas-controlled education system in West Bank.
 
Methodology
The research aimed to explore the perceptions of middle and secondary school students toward Hamas. Given the lack of similar studies, the primary goal was to gain a clearer understanding of how the younger segment of Gazans views the Hamas militant group. A questionnaire was distributed by phone to 621 students from 102 schools across Gaza. Of these, 62 schools were run by the Ministry of Education, which operates under the Hamas-controlled division of the Palestinian Authority, while the remaining 50 schools were managed by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
 
The collected data was analyzed using Excel, and eight additional focus group interviews were conducted via phone calls. These focus groups included students from six schools, totaling 92 participants. Data from the focus groups were analyzed using qualitative inductive methods based on open coding (Cohen et al., 2017). [Cohen, Louis, Lawrence Manion, and Keith Morrison. “Coding and content analysis.”
 
In Research methods in education, pp. 668-685. Routledge, 2017.] Text units were extracted from interview transcripts and notes, and emerging codes were categorized into themes based on recurring student responses, leading to the identification of common patterns.
 
Questionnaire Data
The first section of the questionnaire asked students to identify their preferred political faction in Gaza and whether they personally knew an active faction member.
Table 1: Students’ responses (percentage) indicating their preferred political faction in Gaza and their personal acquaintance with a faction member.
 
                                                                                               Hamas               Fattah               Other/None
———————————————————————————————————
 
1-My Favorite faction is                                           23                         32                         45
2- My least favourite faction is                           69                         25                         6
3- What I want the most from a faction         Economic        Personal           Liberating
Support             Freedom           Palestine
89                         3                            8
4-I personally know a faction’s member       Family                Friend                 None
11                         31                         58
———————————————————————————————————-
The data in Table 1 provides insight into students’ political preferences, their least favored factions, their primary expectations from political groups, and their level of personal acquaintance with faction members. The responses highlight key trends in political alignment, priorities, and social influences among Gazan youth.
 
When asked about their favorite political faction, Hamas was favored by 23 percent of students, Fatah by 32 percent, and 45 percent either preferred another faction or had no political affiliation. The fact that Hamas ranked the lowest among the major factions suggests a lack of broad support for the group among students, potentially reflecting dissatisfaction with its governance, policies, or broader ideological stance.
 
Conversely, when asked about their least favorite faction, Hamas was the most disliked, with 69 percent of students identifying it as their least favored faction, compared to 25 percent for Fatah and 6 percent for other factions or none. This finding further supports the notion that Hamas faces significant disapproval among students, indicating a potential disconnect between the group and younger generations.
 
When asked what they wanted most from a political faction, an overwhelming 89 percent of students prioritized economic support, while only 8 percent expressed a desire for Palestinian liberation as their primary goal. Additionally, only 3 percent valued personal freedom as their main concern. This suggests that, for most students, immediate economic well-being takes precedence over ideological or nationalist aspirations. The low emphasis on “liberating Palestine” may indicate a shift away from militant political rhetoric in favor of practical concerns such as job opportunities, financial stability, and basic needs.
 
When asked whether they personally knew a member of a political faction, 11 percent of students reported having a family member involved, while 31 percent knew a faction member as a friend, and 58 percent reported no personal connections. The fact that nearly half (42 percent) of students personally know a faction member suggests a significant degree of social integration between political factions and everyday life. However, the majority (58 percent) having no direct ties to faction members may indicate a degree of political detachment among many students.
 
Conclusion
The findings suggest a clear lack of strong support for Hamas among Gazan students, with the group being the least favored faction by a significant margin. Additionally, students overwhelmingly prioritize economic stability over ideological or nationalist concerns, indicating a shift in priorities away from traditional factional struggles toward more immediate socio-economic needs. While many students personally know a faction member, a majority do not, suggesting a level of political disengagement among a significant portion of the youth. These trends may have long-term implications for political engagement and factional dynamics in Gaza, as younger generations appear to be more concerned with economic survival than with political or ideological loyalty.
 
Table 2: Students’ Responses (Percentage)
 
————————————————————————————————————-
SA     A     DK     D     SD
5. I support what Hamas did on October 7                                           11     28    56     3      2 
6. I enjoy watching Hamas material online                                           18     38    42     1      0
7. I think Hamas actions on October 7th were justified                46     12    29     8      5
8. My friends at school support Hamas                                               51     3       28    18    0
9. I want an October 7th carried out by West Bank Factions      8       2       14      34     42
10. I do not want a war with Israel in the West Bank                       82     12     4        2       0
————————————————————————————————————–
The data from Table 2 provides insights into students’ attitudes toward Hamas, its actions on October 7, and broader views on conflict and war. Below is a breakdown of key patterns observed in the responses
 
The data exhibits mixed support for Hamas’s actions on October 7 among the surveyed students as thirty-nine percent of students strongly agreed or agreed with Hamas’s actions on October 7, while fifty-six percent responded with “Don’t Know,” indicating uncertainty or reluctance to take a clear stance.
 
On the other hand, only five percent explicitly opposed these actions, suggesting either limited opposition or hesitation in expressing dissent.
 
Further, the data exhibits students’ engagement with Hamas-related content Online. A notable fifty-six percent of students enjoy watching Hamas material online, suggesting widespread exposure or engagement with their content. However, forty-two percent were unsure about their stance on this matter.
 
Further, students exhibit a huge justification of Hamas’s actions on October 7 as fifty-eight percent of students believed Hamas’s actions were justified, reflecting a significant level of approval. At the same time, twenty-nine percent were unsure, which could indicate either a lack of understanding or hesitation to express a firm opinion. Only thirteen percent actively disagreed with the justification of the attacks.
 
Peer influence seem to play a role in Hamas’s support amongst the students as fifty-four percent of students reported that their friends support Hamas, indicating a strong social influence within their peer groups. However, twenty-eight percent were unsure, and eighteen percent stated their friends did not support Hamas, suggesting some level of diversity in opinions among students.
 
On the other hand, the data exhibits limited Support for Similar Attacks in the West Bank as only ten percent of students wanted a repeat of October 7 in the West Bank, suggesting low enthusiasm for expanding the conflict. A combined seventy-six percent rejected this idea, indicating a clear opposition to further violence in the West Bank. Fourteen percent were unsure, possibly reflecting political uncertainty among some students.
 
The date exhibits a strong desire to avoid war with Israel in the West Bank as ninety-four percent of students stated that they do not want a war with Israel in the West Bank. Only two percent disagreed, and none strongly disagreed, indicating a strong preference for avoiding conflict with Israeli by West Banker students of the Middle and High School. This suggests that, despite some levels of support for Hamas, there is overwhelming opposition to further escalation in the West Bank.
 
Conclusion
The responses show a complex and sometimes contradictory perspective among students. While many students engage with Hamas content and justify its actions, there is also a strong desire to avoid further conflict in the West Bank. The high percentage of “Don’t Know” responses in multiple questions indicates uncertainty or reluctance to openly express opinions. Peer influence appears significant, with many students reporting that their friends support Hamas.
 
Focus Group Interviews: Analysis of Student Perspectives
Focus group interviews were conducted with student groups ranging in size from 10 to 20 participants. The majority of students expressed a preference for Fatah as their Palestinian faction of choice. They emphasized that while they did not support war or aspire to a situation similar to that of Gaza, they believed that the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority had maintained stability in the West Bank. Additionally, they perceived Fatah as more relevant to their local community, as many of their family members and relatives were employed in institutions controlled by the Palestinian Authority.
 
Despite their preference for Fatah, students were critical of both Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, particularly regarding issues of corruption. Many expressed a focus on achieving a higher quality of life, such as acquiring luxury items like cars and gaming consoles, rather than engaging in armed conflict. Nevertheless, some students viewed Hamas as a vehicle for revenge and as an entity that contributed to Palestinian deterrence against Israel. They described Hamas’s actions as a means to make Israel “consider the consequences” of its policies.
 
The overwhelming majority of students stated that a Hamas-style armed conflict with Israel was not a practical course of action. Instead, they advocated for peaceful resistance and economic development as strategies to safeguard Palestinian rights and maintain their presence in the region. However, many admitted to deriving a sense of satisfaction from news of Hamas attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians, characterizing such acts as “revenge,” “deterrence,” and “the only way to deal with Israel.” Students acknowledged that they rarely accessed Hamas propaganda online due to legal risks posed by the Palestinian Authority but frequently shared Hamas-related videos through the WhatsApp messaging platform.
 
Regarding the role of education, students noted that while their teachers did not openly support Hamas, they exhibited a strong nationalist stance in their daily instruction. Many believed that teachers should incorporate anti-Israeli rhetoric in their lessons, viewing it as a necessary component of Palestinian liberation efforts. While students expressed openness to the possibility of peace with Israel, they conditioned it on a complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the removal of settlements.
 
A majority of students expressed disapproval of the killing of Israeli children in the October 7th attack, with several acknowledging that such actions constituted a violation of Islamic laws of warfare. When specifically asked about the deaths of the Bibas children, all respondents agreed that they “should not have been killed.” However, while the majority acknowledged Hamas’s responsibility for the killings, some attributed blame to Israel, arguing that its actions had provoked Hamas.
 
Most students believed that Hamas was unlikely to take control of the West Bank and expressed concern over the potential destruction of the area in the event of a Hamas takeover. When discussing Hamas leaders assassinated by Israel, students unanimously referred to them as “martyrs.” However, they declined to apply the same designation to Israeli children killed by Hamas, instead asserting that the children were “innocent and would go to heaven.”
 
A majority of students viewed Hamas’s ability to remain in power and inflict casualties on Israeli forces as evidence of its victory in the conflict. Fewer than half attributed this perceived success to divine intervention. Despite these views, all students expressed a desire to avoid further harm to both Israeli and Palestinian children in future conflicts. Nonetheless, the majority placed primary responsibility for the destruction of Gaza following the October 7th attack on Israel rather than Hamas.
 
Most students considered themselves “fortunate not to be living in Gaza at this time,” while a smaller minority expressed a desire to become martyrs in Gaza.
 
Conclusion
The findings from these focus group interviews highlight the complex and often contradictory perspectives among Palestinian students regarding political factions, resistance, and the ongoing conflict with Israel. While a majority expressed a preference for Fatah due to its perceived role in maintaining stability in the West Bank, they also voiced frustration over corruption within the Palestinian Authority. Their attitudes toward Hamas were similarly nuanced—while they largely rejected a Hamas-style armed conflict as impractical, some students still viewed Hamas as a symbol of deterrence and retribution against Israel.
 
The students’ perspectives also reflect a broader generational shift in priorities. Many expressed a preference for economic development and personal aspirations over engaging in militant resistance, emphasizing the importance of securing a higher quality of life. At the same time, nationalist sentiments remained strong, particularly in the educational sphere, where students believed anti-Israeli rhetoric was essential for Palestinian liberation.
 
Despite disapproving of the killing of Israeli children in the October 7th attack, many students struggled to reconcile Hamas’s actions with their own ethical and religious beliefs, sometimes attributing blame to Israel rather than Hamas itself. Their views on the war’s outcome further illustrate a sense of duality—while Hamas’s endurance and military operations were perceived as a victory, few believed it had the capacity to take over the West Bank.
 
Overall, these findings suggest that while ideological affiliations and nationalist sentiments remain deeply ingrained, many young Palestinians are increasingly prioritizing stability, economic growth, and a better quality of life over armed conflict. Their perspectives reflect both a desire for peaceful resistance and an enduring sense of grievance, shaping their outlook on the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
 
 
Conclusion to the Study
The study provides valuable insights into the perceptions of middle and secondary school students in the West Bank regarding Hamas, the Gaza war, and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The findings reveal a complex and often contradictory set of attitudes, shaped by political, social, and economic factors. While students expressed significant dissatisfaction with Hamas, viewing it as the least favored faction, many still engaged with its content and justified its actions in the conflict. This suggests a tension between ideological opposition to Hamas’s governance and a lingering perception of its role as a force of deterrence against Israel.
 
A key finding of this study is the generational shift in priorities among West Bank youth. The overwhelming majority of students prioritized economic stability over nationalist or militant aspirations, indicating a growing focus on improving living conditions rather than engaging in armed conflict. This shift is also reflected in their broad rejection of a Hamas-style war in the West Bank and their preference for peaceful resistance and economic development as a means of securing Palestinian rights. At the same time, nationalist sentiments remained deeply embedded, particularly within the education system, where students expected anti-Israeli rhetoric to be integrated into their learning experience.
 
The responses regarding Hamas’s actions on October 7 further illustrate the complexity of student perspectives. While a considerable portion of students justified the attack, a significant number expressed uncertainty, suggesting either reluctance to take a firm stance or a lack of clear ideological alignment. Importantly, students largely opposed the idea of a similar escalation in the West Bank, demonstrating a strong preference for avoiding further destruction and instability.
 
Overall, these findings suggest that while nationalist and ideological sentiments remain prevalent, many young Palestinians in the West Bank are shifting their focus toward economic well-being and stability rather than militant resistance. The study underscores the evolving attitudes of Palestinian youth and highlights the potential for alternative political and social narratives that prioritize development, peace, and long-term stability over continued conflict. These insights offer a crucial foundation for policymakers, educators, and community leaders seeking to address the aspirations and concerns of the younger generation in the West Bank.
 
Dr. Tasneem Kelyany Mazarib is an Israeli-Arab academic and educator and a specialist on research of students at risk and in conflict zones.
 
 

... continue reading.

A study of West Bank Middle and Secondary School Students’ Perceptions of Hamas and the Gaza War Post 7 October Read More »

Palestinian Militants Use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s): A New Menace for Israel

1. Summary: Two Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were used to target Israeli armored army vehicles today, May 22, 2024. These are the latest of sixty similar attacks that have been recorded over the past twelve months. Palestinian militants are reported to have been taught the IED technology by Iranian operatives in third countries. Despite the growing concern about IEDs, a top Israeli military source confirmed to JaFaJ that the Palestinian militants have not been able to use those effectively. At the same time, with limited geographic areas and access to resources, American sources do not believe the Palestinians will be able to expand IED attacks. Nonetheless, IEDs remain a concern for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).
2. JaFaJ has learned that two Israeli armored vehicles were targeted today, May 22, 2024, by Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) in the West Bank’s Jenin Refugee Camp. [COMMENT: The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) has been making consistent incursions into identified “hot spots” in the West Bank since the breakout of the Gaza war. The Israeli incursions have been recurring at the Jenin, Balta and Tulkarem refugee camps where Palestinian militants run rampant. END COMMENT]
3. JaFaJ has confirmed that today’s IED attacks are the latest in more than sixty similar attacks that have taken place over the past year. JaFaJ was told by an Israeli intelligence source that the Iranians taught IED technology to Palestinian militants back in 2023. The source added, “A group of low profile Palestinian militants travelled to Jordan where they were welcomed/received by their Palestinian and Jordanian handlers. Once there, they arranged flights to a third undisclosed country, in which they met the Iranians who trained them on how to make and deploy the devices, including how to deliver the highest amount of damage to Israeli military vehicles”. The source reported that the first IED attacks began in Jenin refugee camp in the spring of 2023 and concluded by saying that “It came as a surprise as the IED method was rather uncommon in the [Palestinian] territories”.
4. A high ranking Israeli military source reported to JaFaJ that, “We are aware of the risks IEDs pose to our troops, and the terrorists have not been the most effective at using them. Overall, the damages have been minimal and have mainly destroyed the vehicle’s wheels”. The source continued by saying that “they can damage vehicles, but rarely do they injure our soldiers inside those”. The source concluded, “Yes, it is a risk, but we have dealt with much bigger risks before”.
5.JaFaJ has also learned that the IDF has been using drones and “undisclosed technology” to stop the Palestinian militants from using IEDs against Israeli foot soldiers in Palestinian hot spots. An American military source told JaFaJ that, “The Israelis are exceptionally good at using drones for reconnaissance and have been deploying those very effectively in Gaza. The source continued by saying that the Israelis have “learned from our Iraq experience where IEDs were averaging thirty a day against our troops”. He added, “I understand that the Israelis may be concerned about the potential expansion of IED use against them, but because of the condensed geographic area of their adversaries [the Palestinians] and their limited access to resources, they will not be able to deploy enough IEDs, soon enough, to change the outcome of their confrontations.”

... continue reading.

Palestinian Militants Use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s): A New Menace for Israel Read More »

Gaza Daily Update: Israeli Forces Engage Hamas Fighters in Northern Gaza

1. JaFaJ sources inside Gaza, minutes ago (on March 22, 2024), confirmed that troop engagements between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Hamas terrorists have been taking place in Beit Lahya, Northern Gaza.
2. The confirmed sources reported gunfire being exchanged, peppered by the deafening sounds of bombings falling in the area. JaFaJ sources in Gaza say the first shots were heard at 12:10 AM.
3. The second and third weeks of March 2024 has seen an increase in Hamas activities in Northern Gaza, an area that was deemed to be fully purged by the IDF. Despite the number of limited Hamas attacks in Northern Gaza, the source added that the “pockets of resistance” responsible for those have been vicious and determined”.
4. Sources closed by saying that “this proves the IDF mission is far from finished in Gaza, and is likely to extend for more months to come”.

... continue reading.

Gaza Daily Update: Israeli Forces Engage Hamas Fighters in Northern Gaza Read More »

The Drone That Killed 3 US Soldiers Was Launched from Northern Jordan

1.JaFaJ has learned from Western military sources based in Jordan that the US Central Command has identified the exact launching place of the Iranian drone’s that struck the United States military installation Tower 22 in Northern Jordan, killing 3 soldiers and wounding dozens of others.
2. JaFaJ sources have confirmed that the drone in question was launched from a location in Northern Jordan, not far from the Jerash City [COMMENT: Jerash City is located just over 30 miles north to Jordan’s capital Amman END COMMENT]. [Reftel: See JaFaJ’s report about the strike https://acuitywebtechnologies.com/jafaj/drone-attack-on-american-troops-in-jordan-the-untold-facts/’]
3.The Government of Jordan (GOJ) has been desperately trying to cover the fact that the attack took place on Jordanian soil. GOJ’s spokesman Muhannad Mubaidein told the media that “the attack took place at an American base inside Syria”. GOJ-controlled news sites, as well as additional news agencies, reported that the attack took place in Syria, not in Jordan.
4. Al-Arabiya, an internationally recognized Arab News Network, has also been promoting the GOJ’s claim(s). [COMMENT: Al-Arabiya is the second most watched TV network in the Arab world, after Aljazeera. It has been known to give “good press” to the GOJ and King of Jordan. END COMMENT]. On social media, the Jordanian public has ridiculed these claims, especially once President Biden acknowledged the attack and clearly stated that it took place in Jordan.
5.Comment: the GOJ’s bizarre actions, behavior and statements about the incidents, are possibly motivated by fears that fighting might escalate into a direct war against the Iranian militias based in Jordan with the King’s permission. Additionally, the GOJ has been welcoming to Iranian agents, especially those who hold Iraqi passports, and have extended that “welcoming” to others like Houthis agents, the Iranian-backed terror group controlling Yemen who have received the “red carpet treatment” when arriving at Jordanian airports. The special treatment stems from them being “fellow Hashemites, Hashemites whom are directly related to King Abdullah II, the Hashemite King of Jordan”.

... continue reading.

The Drone That Killed 3 US Soldiers Was Launched from Northern Jordan Read More »

Drone Attack on American Troops in Jordan, the Untold Facts

1. JaFaJ has learned from Western military sources stationed in Jordan that the drone attack that targeted the US military base in Jordan, Tower 22, was carried out using A Shahed-136 kamikaze drone. According to the sources, the Iranian-manufactured drone targeted the soldiers while they were eating dinner at the base’s chow hall. The sources noted that this “underscores the fact that whoever fired the drone had good intelligence about when and where to cause significant damage”. [COMMENT: Tower 22 is one of several American bases in Jordan. Located in the North Eastern part of Jordan, Tower 22 is the closest American outpost to the Syrian borders. END COMMENT]
2. The sources noted that Tower 22 is covered by “proper air defense systems”, but failed to detect the drone because it originated from within the Jordanian territories. Apparently the air defense systems were focused on scanning the skies above the Iraqi and Syrian borders, and not Jordanian skies. An American intelligence source refused to confirm the kamikaze drone had come from within Jordan and reported to JaFaJ that the matter was being “closely examined and investigated by the United States Central Command.” The source added that “We cannot rule anything out at this moment”.
3. The sources confirmed reports circulating in the media that 3 US soldiers were killed and 25 injured. The sources added that “the two servicemen were in severely critical condition,” and therefore the number of causalities might increase.
4. Comment: The attack comes at very tense times, as the war between Hamas and Israel rages in Gaza following Hamas’ incursion into Israel’s borders on October 7, 2023. In that attack, more than 1,200 Israeli civilians were killed. Because the region expects an expansion of Israel’s war with the Iranian-backed militias in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, the attack on US troops in Jordan is likely to invoke a staunch American military response against Iran’s militias in both Syria and Iraq. Military action, as expected, will only increase King Abduallah of Jordan’s desire for militarily engaging his troops inside Syria, allegedly in the name of “fighting drug smugglers and inflators,” a pitch the King has been promoting for months.

... continue reading.

Drone Attack on American Troops in Jordan, the Untold Facts Read More »

Updates on the Anglo-American Strikes on Yemen

1. American and British warplanes carried out twelve strikes on several military sites and installations belonging to the Iran-backed Houthi militant group in Yemen. Strikes targeted military sites in the vicinity of Sanaa and Hodeidah Saada, Hajah, Dhamar, Abs and Taiz.
2. The list of military installations targeted includes radar sites, drone and missile platforms, and coastal observation sites. JaFaJ Western military sources in Qatar confirm reports of heavy casualties among the Houthi forces. They also confirmed an internet and cell phone communications outage in Houthi-controlled areas because of the air strikes.
3. The sources also confirmed the attacks were carried out from US aircraft carriers in the Red Sea as well as Al Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar [COMMENT: Al Udeid Air Base is one of the largest military bases in the Middle East. Based in the small Arab state of Qatar, Al Udied houses the United States Air Forces Central Command and No. 83 Expeditionary Air Group of Britain’s Royal Air Force and is positioned at a very strategic location in the heart of the Persian Gulf. END COMMENT]
4. Meanwhile, JaFaJ has learned that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has placed its air force and air defense system on alert as it is expecting the Houthis to carry retaliatory attacks on its oil fields, an act Houthis have carried out in the past.

... continue reading.

Updates on the Anglo-American Strikes on Yemen Read More »

Israel to Step Up Targeted Killing of Hamas Leaders Beyond the Usual Borders

1. Summary: JaFaJ has confirmed that Israel will target Hamas leaders outside of the usual boundaries. Previously, Israel has targeted Hamas leaders in territories deemed hostile to the United States (US), such as Gaza, West Bank, and Lebanon while Hamas leaders in Qatar and Jordan have thrived under the protection of two supposed US allies. If Israel follows through with its new policy, it will be a game changer for Hamas leaders because they will lose two preciously protected sanctuaries, sanctuaries that they have enjoyed for over two decades.
2. JaFaJ has learned that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has authorized the Israeli intelligence agency [the Mossad], to carry out the assassinations of Hamas political and military leaders “outside of the usual borders.” An Israeli government source confirmed to JaFaJ that “Hamas leaders will pay the price for the atrocities committed on 7 October, no matter where they live.”
3. An American intelligence source has confirmed with JaFaJ that, “the Israelis have already notified their allies in the US that they were going to carry out targeted killings outside of the usual realm.” The source explained “Israel has been targeting Hamas leaders in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and occasionally at other places.” The source continued by saying that, “The Israelis have refrained from killing Hamas leaders and operatives residing in countries deemed friendly to the United States,” but that this has changed.” The source continued that “The Israelis have already informed us that Arab countries hosting Hamas leaders are no longer out of the Mossad’s reach”.
4. Comment: Most of Hamas’ political leaders reside outside of Gaza, and consider Qatar and Jordan as their safest havens. Both countries are considered staunch allies of the United States. It is believed that in January 2010, Israeli agents took out Hamas leader and weapons provider, Al-Mabhough in Dubai. Al Mabhough was the Chief of Logistics and Weapons Procurement for Hamas’s military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The authorities of the United Arab Emirates accused Mossad agents of being the assassins carrying fake or fraudulently obtained Western passports. World media picked up this claim. As a result of this experience, Israel has refrained from targeting Hamas leaders in those two countries in an effort to avoid causing embarrassment to the USG.
5. Several Hamas leaders and affiliates reside in a variety of countries, including Algeria and several European nations. Nonetheless, Israel’s targeting of Hamas leaders has been limited to other countries, including Lebanon and Syria. Recently, speculation has it that Israel “took out” the West Bank’s Hamas leader, Saleh Al-Arouri in Lebanon. This shift in policy will destabilize Hamas leaders as they have enjoyed more than two decades of immunity and protection in Qatar and Jordan.

... continue reading.

Israel to Step Up Targeted Killing of Hamas Leaders Beyond the Usual Borders Read More »

Israel’s Massive Offense in Southern Gaza; the Good, the Bad and the Horrendous

1. Summary: Israel has been conducting a massive ground incursion into the Southern part of the Gaza Strip. As part of the incursion, Israeli tanks have taken over Al-Qararah, a village located just 3.5 miles northern to Khan Younis city, the Governorate’s main town. The Israelis have also been carrying out aerial and artillery bombings because reports are circulating that Hamas militants are reported to be hiding among civilians. This has caused another wave of refugees with almost half a million departing Khan Younis to the Southern city of Rafah, which is located at the border with Egypt.
2. Since the late hours of December 1st, 2023 when the ceasefire fell apart, Israel has been conducting a massive military offense in the Southern half of Gaza against the Palestinian terror group Hamas. JaFaJ has learned through American and Israeli military intelligence sources that the offense has been focused on the Eastern part of the Khan Younis Governorate, South of Gaza. An American military intelligence source has confirmed with JaFaJ that “Hamas fighters have used the tunnels to flee the Northern part of Gaza to the South as Israel keeps sweeping and destroying the tunnels in the Northern region”.
———————————–
The Battel for Khan Younis
———————————–
3. JaFaJ sources in Gaza have confirmed that Israeli tanks and armoured vehicles have broken their way through Al-Qararah, a village in the Northern section of the Khan Younis Governorate, less than 3.5 miles away from Khan Younis city, the Governorate’s main town. A Gazan source said the following, “With the Israelis taking over Al-Qararah, it means that it’s just a matter of time before they take over Khan Younis.” [COMMENT: Al-Qararah is connected to Khan Younis City with the Salah Al-Dean Highway, which makes the Israelis’ mission easier than their very torturous progress in the densely populated Northern Gaza: END COMMENT].
4. JaFaJ’s Gazan source has reported that Israeli troops and tanks have been stationed at the Al-Tawaheen, “Windmills” region in Al-Qararh, a landmark for having Gaza’s largest wheat mills. At the same time, Hamas resistance was limited when compared to the Northern part of Gaza. Reports of Hamas’s militants using improved explosive devices [IEDs] and rocket launchers that have been effective at targeting Israeli troops. Nonetheless, the Israelis sustain their ability to advance and mobilize their troops across most parts of the Gaza Strip, and the number of Israeli casualties remains very low compared to the size of the operations.
——————————–
A Staggering Human Cost
———————————
5. Since launching its offense on Southern Gaza, Israel has strategically been bombing several blocks in and around Khan Younis. This has proven to be highly effective in covering Israel’s troops as they advance into their designated zones. Nonetheless, it has come at a hefty cost to innocent lives. According to an American source, “It is easy to blame Israel, but the truth of the matter is that Hamas is hiding amongst the public, using them as both shields and cover to escape.” The source added, “The Israelis have provided an abundance of evidence to us that Hamas uses the public as cover (shields) and that they have switched to wearing civilian clothes.” The source continued by saying that “Israel has no other way of operating, either they give the terrorists a pass or it chases them where they hide, and sadly, this means many innocent people will die. The best advice we can give to the Israelis is to make sure their bombings are as surgical as possible to avoid civilian casualties”.
6. An American military source opined, “We are not giving Israel a carte blanch for a wholesale slaughter, but what can they do? There are 40,000 Hamas fighters and at least another 30,000 Hamas operatives purposely hiding behind civilians.” The source continued by saying, “This is a very complicated situation, and we do not have an answer to this. For now, we know the terrorists must be eliminated.” He added, “We cannot rule out mistakes, there have been certain incidents in which we still have questions on whether Israel did the right thing by causing so many casualties, but we are still jointly looking into those along with the Israelis”.
7. Sources in Gaza have confirmed that, “Hundreds of civilians have been killed in Khan Younis, and that most of them have been buried under rubble.” According to one medical source, “We cannot cope with the number of people injured, our medical facilities were never designed to handle this many people.” The source continued by saying, “Many of our emergency doctors have not slept in days, and first responders cannot cope with the deluge.” The source added, “This is a disaster and Israel must help us by providing medical assistance to the civilians.” The source continued by saying that, this cannot go on because the world will blame Israel.” The source concluded by saying, “Let’s cooperate with the Israeli army to provide medical assistance to the people, we are not Hamas”.
————————
The Refugee Crisis
————————-
8. Southern Gaza was already burdened with 1.6 million Gazan refugees who fled the fighting in Northern Gaza and Gaza City. Makeshift tents can be seen all over and around Khan Younis, at schools and public facilities, housing families with no access to clean water or sanitation. The already dreadful conditions of Gazan refugees worsened over the past few days, as tens of thousands of residents fled different regions in Khan Younis governorate itself and the refugees began moving to Rafah city in the very southern tip of the Gaza strip right at the borders with Egypt. An estimated 450,000 refugees have relocated to Rafah since the 2nd of December 2023 amid growing fear that this might be another “Nakba,” in reference to the exodus of Palestinian Arab refugees from their homes in Israel in 1948.
9. Despite efforts by the United Nations and other international bodies, delivery of aid goods has been limited and the scarcity of food, medicine, blankets, and tents has been evident. Meanwhile, refugees are reporting Hamas operatives to be selling some of the aid material which is labelled “free” at unaffordable prices to the needy refugees.

... continue reading.

Israel’s Massive Offense in Southern Gaza; the Good, the Bad and the Horrendous Read More »

US and Israel Convinced American Hostages Are Kept Under Shiffa Hospital in Gaza

1. JaFaJ has learned that both the United States (USG) and Israeli Governments (IG) are convinced that “Hamas is keeping more than a dozen hostages underneath the Shiffa hospital in Gaza.” JaFaJ has confirmed that, “most of those are dual nationals with passports from Israeli and other Western countries, including the United States.”
2. Al-Shiffa Hospital, better known as Al-Shiffa Medical Center, is the largest medical complex in Gaza. It is strategically located in Northern Gaza, in the Rimal Neighborhood, right in Gaza’s heart. The medical complex has been at the heart of international controversy during the war, especially as the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) make advances around it.
3. Israeli military sources have confirmed to JaFaJ that, “IDF tanks have been deployed around the complex since November 13th, 2023.”
4. An Israeli source reported to JaFaJ that, “Al-Shiffa hospital is a major riddle for the IDF. We know that some Hamas terrorists are inside, along with thousands of patients and civilians and potentially a dozen of hostages, but we don’t know how many.” The source added that, “Attacking the hospital will cost innocent lives, and that is the last thing the IDF wants.” The source concluded by saying whats worse is that Hamas might “kill the hostages, and we are dealing with a very delicate and complicated situation.”
—————————————-
Uncle Sam to the Rescue
——————————————
5. American intelligence sources have confirmed with JaFaJ that the USG is convinced that “at least one American hostage is being held within the premises of Al-Shiffa hospital.” The source added that “Talks are ongoing in Qatar between the Central Intelligence Agency, the Mossad and Qatari mediators representing Hamas, to secure the safe release of all hostages.” The source continue by saying that, “The Israelis share our concern for the safety of hostages as well as the civilians in the Al-Shiffa hospital.”

... continue reading.

US and Israel Convinced American Hostages Are Kept Under Shiffa Hospital in Gaza Read More »

Israeli Forces Engaged in Battle Royal in West Gaza

1. JaFaJ military intelligence source have confirmed the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have been engaged in a fierce door to door battle with Hamas terrorists in Western Gaza. The fighting ensued with the Israelis entering Southern tip of the Beit Hanoun area which is located West to Gaza. The IDF began their incursion around daw time as the tanks rolled in followed by hundreds of the Israeli elite commando force. A very fierce battle has been raging since then as the Israeli armored vehicles have strategically retreated out of the kill zone. Our military forces confirm Hamas terrorists have been putting up an “epic resistance” sustaining heavy causality.

... continue reading.

Israeli Forces Engaged in Battle Royal in West Gaza Read More »

WordPress Bazaar Refix – Appliance Repair Company Elementor Template Kit Reformoa – Architecture & Interior Design Elementor Template Kit Regina – Creative Blog WordPress Theme Regulations – Law Firm WordPress Theme Relaxa – Yoga Teacher & Studio Elementor Template Kit Relazio – Public Relation Agency Elementor Template Kit Relevanssi Premium Relife Physiotherapy & Chiropractor Elementor Template Kit Remake – Minimal Theme Renovate – Construction WordPress Theme