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JaFaJ

Palestinian President Preparing His Son As Successor: A Big Gamble

Yasser Abbas, the eldest son of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, was elected to Fatah’s Central Committee, the movement’s highest executive body. His election significantly strengthens his political standing and has reignited speculation that he is being positioned to play a leading role in the Palestinian leadership after his father.

2.Yasser Abbas has steadily expanded his political profile over recent years by accompanying his father on official visits, representing him at high-level meetings, and becoming increasingly involved in Palestinian political affairs. His growing influence has fueled criticism among opponents who see it as an attempt to consolidate the Abbas family’s control over the Palestinian Authority.

The emergence of Yasser Abbas has intensified the broader succession battle within Fatah. While he is now viewed as a more prominent figure, several other senior Fatah leaders remain potential successors to Mahmoud Abbas, leaving the future leadership of the Palestinian Authority uncertain and likely to become the focus of increasing internal competition.
Jafaj has learned from a Palestinian political source serving within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), who spoke on condition of anonymity, that recent political developments surrounding Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas have intensified internal debate over succession within Fatah, the dominant faction of the PLO and the movement that has led the Palestinian Authority since its establishment.
According to the source, the election of Abbas’ son, Yasser Abbas, to Fatah’s Central Committee—the movement’s highest executive body—has been interpreted by many senior Fatah officials as an attempt to position him for a future leadership role following the eventual departure of his father. The source described the development as causing “significant dismay” among veteran Fatah figures, who reportedly believe that Yasser Abbas lacks the revolutionary credentials and long political experience of many senior members.
The source stated that many within the movement view Yasser Abbas as “a privileged little boy” who has not earned his position through the decades-long political and organizational struggle experienced by veteran PLO and Fatah leaders.
According to the same source, members of the Abbas family have historically held Jordanian, Qatari, and Canadian citizenships, although not every family member necessarily possesses all three nationalities. The source further claimed that Yasser Abbas spent part of his life in Canada.
The Palestinian source compared the reported succession effort to former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s attempt to prepare his son Gamal Mubarak for power, as well as the succession from Hafez al-Assad to Bashar al-Assad in Syria. The source argued that such models ultimately generated significant political instability. The source added: “Mark my words. Look me in the eye. This will not pass. This man will never become Palestinian president after his father’s death. We will not allow it. Palestinians are not prepared to accept hereditary political succession.”
An Israeli security source with close professional contacts to officials within the Palestinian Authority separately told JAFAJ that, in the source’s assessment, the succession issue extends beyond political leadership. According to the source, members of the Abbas family have accumulated substantial commercial interests and business monopolies in parts of the West Bank, and preserving both political influence and economic interests is viewed by some as an important consideration in the current succession debate.
The Israeli source further assessed that the Abbas family’s political influence and economic position could become significantly more vulnerable after Mahmoud Abbas leaves office, adding that competing factions within Fatah and the PLO would likely challenge the family’s position in the absence of his authority.
While Yasser Abbas’ election has renewed speculation regarding the post-Abbas era, multiple influential figures—including Hussein al-Sheikh, Majed Faraj, Jibril Rajoub, and Marwan Barghouti—remain widely viewed as potential contenders for future leadership, making the eventual succession within Fatah and the Palestinian Authority highly uncertain.

 

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The New Syria: The President’s Agenda – top 10 issues

The Ten Issues That Will Define President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Presidency
JaFaJ News Analysis
Military victory brought President Ahmed al-Sharaa to power. Governing Syria will determine whether history judges him as a revolutionary leader or a successful statesman.
The Syrian President inherits a country emerging from more than thirteen years of civil war, facing enormous political, economic, and humanitarian challenges. While the collapse of the Assad government ended one chapter of Syrian history, it also marked the beginning of an equally difficult phase: rebuilding a functioning state.¹
The following ten issues are expected to define President al-Sharaa’s administration over the next several years.

BUILDING A PERMANENT CONSTITUTION

The Constitutional Declaration of March 2025 established the legal framework for Syria’s transitional government, but it remains only a temporary governing document. One of President al-Sharaa’s greatest responsibilities will be overseeing development of a permanent constitution that balances executive authority with representative government, judicial independence, and the rule of law.²

REBUILDING THE ECONOMY

Economic recovery remains Syria’s highest domestic priority.
Years of war devastated industry, agriculture, commerce, transportation, and financial institutions. Millions of Syrians continue to struggle with unemployment, inflation, and declining purchasing power.
Without sustained economic growth, reconstruction, political stability, and public confidence will remain difficult to achieve.³

RECONSTRUCTING A NATION

Much of Syria’s physical infrastructure must still be rebuilt.
Hospitals.
Schools.
Roads.
Bridges.
Electric power systems.
Water networks.
Communications infrastructure.
Housing.
The scale of reconstruction is among the largest in the modern Middle East and will require years of investment, transparent governance, and effective administration.⁴

MODERNIZING THE SECURITY SERVICES

Winning a war and building professional security institutions are very different tasks.
President al-Sharaa must integrate former opposition organizations into unified military and police services operating under civilian authority and constitutional oversight. Long-term stability will depend upon disciplined security institutions serving the state rather than individual political movements.⁵

RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW

Strong governments depend upon strong legal institutions.
The administration has pledged to strengthen judicial independence, modernize the courts, improve transparency, combat corruption, and restore confidence in Syria’s justice system.
International investors and foreign governments will closely monitor progress in these areas.⁶

HEALING A DIVIDED SOCIETY

The civil war left deep political, religious, and ethnic divisions.
Rebuilding trust among Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, Druze, Kurds, Armenians, Turkmen, Circassians, and other communities will require sustained leadership and inclusive governance.
National reconciliation will likely become one of the defining measures of the administration’s success.⁷

BRINGING REFUGEES HOME

Millions of Syrians remain displaced inside and outside the country.
Their return depends upon more than improved security.
Housing.
Employment.
Healthcare.
Education.
Public services.
Economic opportunity.
Citizens generally return when they believe the future offers greater opportunity than continued displacement.⁸

RESTORING SYRIA’S PLACE IN THE WORLD

President al-Sharaa has devoted significant attention to rebuilding Syria’s diplomatic relationships.
Regional governments increasingly view Syria as a partner in reconstruction rather than solely as a conflict zone.
Continued diplomatic normalization could encourage expanded trade, foreign investment, development assistance, and economic growth.⁹

FIGHTING CORRUPTION

Corruption has long undermined economic development throughout conflict-affected states.
President al-Sharaa has pledged greater transparency, stronger financial oversight, improved procurement systems, and modern public administration.
Investors will judge these commitments by measurable reforms rather than public statements.¹⁰

BUILDING INSTITUTIONS THAT OUTLAST THE PRESIDENT

Perhaps no issue is more important.
Successful republics are not built upon powerful individuals.
They are built upon strong institutions.
Independent courts.
Representative legislatures.
Professional civil servants.
Accountable security forces.
Transparent financial systems.
Effective local government.
President al-Sharaa’s ultimate legacy will depend upon whether these institutions become permanent features of Syrian government.¹¹
JaFaJ Assessment
President Ahmed al-Sharaa faces one of the most difficult governing agendas of any contemporary world leader.
His greatest challenge is no longer defeating political opponents.
It is rebuilding public confidence in the Syrian state.
The administration has demonstrated measurable progress in restoring government institutions, expanding regional diplomacy, and initiating reconstruction. Nevertheless, success will ultimately depend upon sustained economic growth, constitutional development, institutional accountability, and the government’s ability to improve the daily lives of ordinary Syrians.
**JaFaJ assesses that President al-Sharaa has established a credible foundation for Syria’s recovery. Whether that foundation becomes a durable constitutional republic will depend upon the decisions made during the next two to three years. History will remember this presidency not for the revolution that brought it to power, but for whether it succeeded in building institutions capable of preserving peace, prosperity, and representative government for future generations.**¹²
FOOTNOTES

Reuters, “Syria’s De Facto Leader Ahmed al-Sharaa Declared President for Transitional Period,” January 29, 2025; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Syria: Reconstruction and Recovery Framework (New York: UNDP, 2025).
Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic (Damascus: Transitional Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, March 13, 2025); Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Syria’s Political Transition: Challenges for the New Government (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2025).
World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor: Charting a Path toward Recovery (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025); International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, October 2025).
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Needs and Response Overview 2026 (New York: United Nations, 2026); UNDP, Syria: Reconstruction and Recovery Framework.
International Crisis Group, What Lies in Store for Syria as a New Government Takes Power?, Middle East Briefing No. 96 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 2025); Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic, arts. 25–32.
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2026: Syria (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2026); Amnesty International, Syria 2025/26 (London: Amnesty International, 2026).
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Syria Regional Refugee Response (Geneva: UNHCR, 2026); Carnegie Middle East Center, Rebuilding Syria’s Institutions after Assad (Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, 2025).
UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response; OCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Needs and Response Overview 2026; World Health Organization (WHO), Syrian Arab Republic Health Situation Report (Geneva: WHO, 2025–2026).
European Union External Action Service, “Council Conclusions on Syria,” Brussels, 2025; U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Syria (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2025); Reuters, regional diplomatic reporting, 2025–2026.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), States of Fragility 2025 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2025); World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor.
Chatham House, Syria’s Transition: Governance, Reconstruction and Regional Security (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2025); Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Syria’s Political Transition: Challenges for the New Government; Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic.
JaFaJ Research & Intelligence Division, analytical assessment based on the Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic; United Nations Development Programme, Syria: Reconstruction and Recovery Framework; World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor; International Crisis Group, What Lies in Store for Syria as a New Government Takes Power?; Chatham House, Syria’s Transition: Governance, Reconstruction and Regional Security; Reuters reporting, January 2025–July 2026.

 

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The New Syria: From Insurgent To President

Who Is President Ahmed al-Sharaa?
JaFaJ Executive Profile
July 5, 2026
The rise of President Ahmed al-Sharaa represents one of the most remarkable political transformations in the modern Middle East. Within little more than two decades, he evolved from a relatively unknown Syrian student into an insurgent commander, later becoming the leader of Syria’s most powerful opposition movement before assuming the presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic following the collapse of the Assad government in December 2024. His personal journey closely mirrors Syria’s own transition from authoritarian rule and civil war toward an uncertain but increasingly hopeful period of national reconstruction.¹²
Born Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa on October 29, 1982, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to Syrian parents, he returned to Damascus during childhood and was raised in an educated middle-class family. His father was an engineer and economist, while his mother worked as a teacher. Those who have written about his early life generally describe him as quiet, disciplined, and academically capable. Like many young Arabs of his generation, however, the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq profoundly shaped his political outlook and ultimately altered the course of his life.³
Following the invasion of Iraq, al-Sharaa traveled there and became involved in the insurgency against coalition forces. He was later detained for several years by the United States military before eventually returning to Syria after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. During the conflict he became internationally known under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, first leading Jabhat al-Nusra and later establishing Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Throughout much of the war he was viewed internationally through the prism of armed insurgency, although his public messaging gradually shifted from transnational Islamist ideology toward Syrian nationalism, local governance, and state administration.⁴⁵
The dramatic collapse of President Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024 fundamentally changed Syria’s political landscape. Opposition forces entered Damascus, bringing an end to more than five decades of Assad family rule. On January 29, 2025, Syria’s transitional leadership formally appointed Ahmed al-Sharaa as President of the Syrian Arab Republic. The appointment marked not only a transfer of political authority but also the beginning of an ambitious effort to rebuild the country’s political institutions, economy, and international relationships.⁶
Since assuming office, President al-Sharaa has deliberately sought to redefine his public image. Abandoning the name by which he became internationally known during the civil war, he has governed under his birth name while emphasizing constitutional government, economic modernization, national reconciliation, institutional reform, and regional diplomacy. His administration has established a Constitutional Declaration, formed a transitional cabinet, restored the operation of key ministries, reopened legislative institutions, and expanded diplomatic engagement with neighboring states and the international community.⁷⁸
President al-Sharaa’s immediate responsibilities extend well beyond the traditional duties of a head of state. His administration must rebuild a damaged economy, restore public confidence in government, reconstruct national infrastructure, reform the judiciary, integrate competing security organizations into professional national institutions, encourage the voluntary return of millions of displaced Syrians, and attract the foreign investment necessary to finance reconstruction. Few contemporary leaders have inherited such a broad and demanding agenda.⁹
The international community continues to evaluate President al-Sharaa’s leadership with cautious optimism. Regional governments have expanded diplomatic engagement, while the United States, the European Union, and international financial institutions have signaled that broader political normalization and expanded economic cooperation will depend upon measurable progress in constitutional development, judicial independence, anti-corruption reforms, protection of minority rights, and accountable governance.¹⁰
President al-Sharaa has consistently framed his presidency around rebuilding the Syrian state rather than celebrating military victory. Speaking shortly after assuming office, he declared:
*”Syria belongs to all Syrians. The state must protect every citizen without distinction.”*¹¹
On another occasion, emphasizing reconstruction over ideology, he stated:
*”Our greatest task is rebuilding the institutions of the Syrian state.”*¹²
Perhaps the clearest indication of his governing philosophy came during remarks on national reconstruction:
*”Our responsibility is not only to rebuild Syria, but to rebuild confidence in the Syrian state.”*¹³
These statements reflect a recurring theme throughout his presidency: that legitimacy will ultimately depend upon effective governance rather than revolutionary credentials.
JaFaJ Assessment
President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s greatest political challenge is no longer overthrowing an old government—it is constructing a new one. His administration has demonstrated greater pragmatism, administrative discipline, and diplomatic engagement than many international observers anticipated following the collapse of the Assad government. Yet his long-term legacy will depend less upon his personal leadership than upon whether he succeeds in building durable constitutional institutions capable of governing Syria after the transitional period has ended.
**JaFaJ assesses—with moderate confidence—that President al-Sharaa has successfully guided Syria beyond the immediate uncertainty that followed the fall of the Assad government. Whether he ultimately becomes remembered as the founder of a stable new Syrian Republic or simply the leader of another transitional government will be determined by the strength of the institutions his administration leaves behind.**¹⁴
FOOTNOTES

Reuters, “Syrian Leader Sharaa’s Path from Global Jihad to White House Meeting,” May 14, 2025.
International Crisis Group, What Lies in Store for Syria as a New Government Takes Power?, Middle East Briefing No. 96 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 2025).
Reuters, “The Secret History of Syria’s New Leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa,” March 7, 2025; PBS Frontline, The Jihadist, originally broadcast 2021.
Reuters, “Syrian Insurgent Golani, Once an al Qaeda Commander, Leads New Push Against Assad,” December 5, 2024.
The Economist, “The Transformation of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani,” December 2024; Financial Times, “Ahmed al-Sharaa Seeks to Recast Syria’s Future,” May 2025.
Reuters, “Syria’s De Facto Leader Ahmed al-Sharaa Declared President for Transitional Period,” January 29, 2025; Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic (Damascus: Transitional Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, March 13, 2025).
Reuters, “Syria’s President al-Sharaa Forms New Transitional Government,” March 29, 2025.
Reuters, “Syria’s Sharaa Appoints Lawmakers, Paving Way for New Parliament to Convene,” July 1, 2026; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Syria’s Political Transition: Challenges for the New Government (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2025).
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Syria: Reconstruction and Recovery Framework (New York: UNDP, 2025); World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor: Charting a Path toward Recovery (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025).
European Union External Action Service, “Council Conclusions on Syria,” Brussels, 2025; U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Syria (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2025); International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, October 2025).
President Ahmed al-Sharaa, remarks following his appointment as President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Damascus, January 29, 2025.
President Ahmed al-Sharaa, address on constitutional transition and national reconstruction, Damascus, March 2025.
Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic, official statements on national reconstruction and institutional reform, 2025–2026.
JaFaJ Research & Intelligence Division, analytical assessment based upon the Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic; United Nations Development Programme, Syria: Reconstruction and Recovery Framework; International Crisis Group, What Lies in Store for Syria as a New Government Takes Power?; Reuters reporting, January 2025–July 2026.

 

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The New Syria: The Office Of The President

Constitutional Duties and Responsibilities
Under Syria’s Constitutional Declaration of March 13, 2025, the President serves as both Head of State and Head of Government, making the office the nation’s chief executive authority during the transitional period. The Presidency is responsible for ensuring continuity of government, directing national policy, safeguarding Syria’s sovereignty, and supervising the reconstruction of the Syrian state.¹
Chief Executive
The President directs the executive branch, oversees the implementation of national policy, supervises ministries and executive agencies, appoints senior government officials, and ensures the effective administration of government programs.²
Commander-in-Chief
The President exercises civilian authority over the Syrian Armed Forces and is responsible for national defense, military readiness, border security, intelligence coordination, and the continued integration and modernization of Syria’s security institutions.³
Chief Diplomat
As Syria’s principal representative in international affairs, the President directs foreign policy, appoints ambassadors, negotiates treaties and international agreements, and represents the Republic in regional and international organizations. Restoring Syria’s diplomatic standing remains one of the administration’s highest priorities.⁴
Head of Government
The President appoints and supervises the Council of Ministers, coordinates cabinet policy, establishes national priorities, and directs implementation of reconstruction and economic recovery programs.⁵
Guardian of the Constitutional Transition
The Presidency oversees implementation of the Constitutional Declaration while supporting development of permanent constitutional institutions, representative government, judicial independence, and the rule of law. The transition from emergency governance to a durable constitutional system remains one of the office’s defining responsibilities.⁶
Leader of National Reconstruction
The President directs Syria’s reconstruction strategy, promotes economic modernization, encourages domestic and foreign investment, rebuilds critical infrastructure, and works to restore public confidence in national institutions after more than a decade of conflict.⁷
JaFaJ Assessment
The Syrian Presidency is currently one of the most demanding executive offices in the Middle East. President Ahmed al-Sharaa must simultaneously govern, rebuild state institutions, restore economic growth, strengthen national security, oversee constitutional reform, and rebuild Syria’s international relationships. **His long-term success will be measured less by the authority he exercises today than by the institutions he leaves behind for future generations.**⁸
FOOTNOTES

Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic (Damascus: Transitional Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, March 13, 2025), Preamble and arts. 1–12.
Ibid., arts. 13–24.
Ibid., arts. 25–32; International Crisis Group, What Lies in Store for Syria as a New Government Takes Power? Middle East Briefing No. 96 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 2025).
Reuters, “Syria’s President al-Sharaa Forms New Transitional Government,” March 29, 2025; U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Syria (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2025).
Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic, arts. 33–42.
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Syria’s Political Transition: Challenges for the New Government (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2025); Carnegie Middle East Center, Rebuilding Syria’s Institutions after Assad (Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, 2025).
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Syria: Reconstruction and Recovery Framework (New York: UNDP, 2025); World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor: Charting a Path toward Recovery (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025).
JaFaJ Research & Intelligence Division, analytical assessment based on sources cited in this briefing.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Needs and Response Overview 2026 (New York: United Nations, 2026).
Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic; CSIS, Syria’s Political Transition.
World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor; International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia (Washington, DC: IMF, October 2025).
UNDP, Syria: Reconstruction and Recovery Framework; OCHA, Humanitarian Needs and Response Overview 2026.
International Crisis Group, What Lies in Store for Syria as a New Government Takes Power?
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2026: Syria (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2026); Amnesty International, Syria 2025/26 (London: Amnesty International, 2026).
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Syria Regional Refugee Response (Geneva: UNHCR, 2026); Carnegie Middle East Center, Rebuilding Syria’s Institutions after Assad.
UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response; OCHA, Humanitarian Needs and Response Overview 2026.
European Union External Action Service, “Council Conclusions on Syria,” Brussels, 2025; Reuters, regional diplomatic reporting, 2025–2026.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), States of Fragility 2025 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2025); World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor.
CSIS, Syria’s Political Transition; Chatham House, Syria’s Transition: Governance, Reconstruction and Regional Security (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2025).
JaFaJ Research & Intelligence Division, analytical assessment based upon the Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic and the sources cited above.

 

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The New Syria: Can President Ahmed al-Sharaa Hold the Country Together?

JaFaJ Executive Analysis
July 5, 2026
DAMASCUS — Eighteen months after the collapse of President Bashar al-Assad’s government, Syria finds itself at one of the most important crossroads in its modern history. The immediate question that once dominated international headlines—whether the Assad government would survive—has been answered. The question now confronting policymakers is far more consequential: **Can President Ahmed al-Sharaa successfully rebuild the Syrian state and prevent the country from sliding back into instability?**¹²
President Ahmed al-Sharaa assumed office on January 29, 2025, after opposition forces brought an end to more than five decades of Assad family rule. He inherited a nation devastated by over thirteen years of civil war, with damaged infrastructure, weakened public institutions, millions of displaced citizens, and an economy requiring comprehensive reconstruction. Unlike most newly elected heads of state, al-Sharaa did not inherit an established government; he inherited the responsibility of rebuilding one.³
Since taking office, President al-Sharaa has worked to redefine both his leadership and Syria’s political direction. Once known internationally as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani during his years leading opposition forces, he has increasingly presented himself as a national leader focused on constitutional governance, economic recovery, institutional reform, and diplomatic engagement. His administration has introduced a Constitutional Declaration, established a transitional government, restored key ministries, and resumed legislative activity through the People’s Assembly.⁴⁵
Those efforts have begun to change how Syria is viewed abroad. Regional governments that once concentrated almost exclusively on the conflict are now devoting greater attention to reconstruction, trade, humanitarian recovery, and regional stability. Diplomatic engagement has expanded, and several governments have cautiously reopened political dialogue with Damascus while emphasizing that broader normalization will depend upon continued reforms, judicial independence, transparency, and protection of minority rights.⁶
Despite this progress, Syria’s challenges remain immense. The country continues to face high unemployment, damaged infrastructure, weakened public services, and the long-term task of rebuilding public confidence in government. Millions of Syrians remain displaced, and reconstruction will require years of sustained domestic reform supported by international investment and development assistance.⁷
For President al-Sharaa, the greatest challenge is no longer military victory—it is effective governance. Rebuilding roads, schools, hospitals, and public utilities is only part of the task. The administration must also strengthen the judiciary, modernize public administration, integrate security institutions, combat corruption, and create conditions capable of attracting long-term private investment. These reforms will ultimately determine whether Syria’s transition produces lasting political stability.⁸
Regional dynamics have also shifted. Türkiye, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, the Gulf states, the United States, and the European Union all possess strategic interests in preventing renewed nationwide conflict. Although these governments differ on broader regional issues, there is growing recognition that a stable Syria serves shared security, humanitarian, and economic interests. This convergence provides Damascus with important diplomatic opportunities but also places greater emphasis on demonstrating measurable progress in governance and accountability.⁹
One question continues to dominate strategic discussions in diplomatic and intelligence circles: Is Syria at risk of another civil war?
Current evidence suggests that the answer is not immediately. While localized violence, terrorist threats, and regional tensions remain ongoing concerns, the conditions that fueled the nationwide conflict beginning in 2011 are substantially different today. The transitional government exercises national authority, regional governments broadly favor stability over renewed confrontation, and international organizations remain engaged in supporting reconstruction and humanitarian recovery.¹⁰
That does not mean Syria’s future is assured. Economic stagnation, delayed reconstruction, institutional weakness, or stalled political reforms could gradually erode public confidence in the government. Such developments are more likely to produce prolonged political fragility than an immediate return to nationwide conflict, but they remain important risks that policymakers will continue to monitor.¹¹
JaFaJ Assessment
President Ahmed al-Sharaa has demonstrated greater political pragmatism and administrative discipline than many international observers anticipated following the fall of the Assad government. His administration has shifted Syria’s national priorities from armed conflict toward governance, reconstruction, diplomacy, and economic recovery.
JaFaJ assesses—with moderate confidence—that Syria is more likely to continue along a path of gradual stabilization than to experience renewed nationwide civil war during the next twenty-four months. The country’s greatest strategic challenge is no longer defeating an opposing army; it is building institutions capable of earning and sustaining the confidence of the Syrian people.
History is unlikely to judge President Ahmed al-Sharaa by the revolution that brought him to power. It will judge him by whether he succeeds in leaving behind a Syrian Republic that is more stable, more accountable, and more resilient than the one he inherited.¹²
This format is well suited for a recurring JaFaJ News series. It combines straight reporting with a clearly labeled analytical conclusion, making it distinct from conventional news coverage while remaining accessible to policymakers, journalists, and general readers.
FOOTNOTES

Reuters, “Syria’s De Facto Leader Ahmed al-Sharaa Declared President for Transitional Period,” January 29, 2025.
Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic (Damascus: Transitional Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, March 13, 2025); Reuters, “Syrian Leader Sharaa’s Path from Global Jihad to White House Meeting,” May 14, 2025.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Syria: Reconstruction and Recovery Framework (New York: UNDP, 2025); World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor: Charting a Path toward Recovery (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025).
Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic, arts. 1–42; Reuters, “Syria’s President al-Sharaa Forms New Transitional Government,” March 29, 2025.
Reuters, “Syria’s Sharaa Appoints Lawmakers, Paving Way for New Parliament to Convene,” July 1, 2026; International Crisis Group, What Lies in Store for Syria as a New Government Takes Power? Middle East Briefing No. 96 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 2025).
European Union External Action Service, “Council Conclusions on Syria,” Brussels, 2025; U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Syria (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2025); International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia (Washington, DC: IMF, October 2025).
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Needs and Response Overview 2026 (New York: United Nations, 2026); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Syria Regional Refugee Response (Geneva: UNHCR, 2026); World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor.
Financial Times, “Ahmed al-Sharaa Seeks to Recast Syria’s Future,” May 2025; Carnegie Middle East Center, Rebuilding Syria’s Institutions after Assad (Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, 2025); Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Syria’s Political Transition: Challenges for the New Government (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2025).
Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relations between Türkiye and Syria,” Ankara, 2025; European Union External Action Service, “Council Conclusions on Syria”; Gulf Cooperation Council Secretariat General, official communiqués regarding Syria, 2025–2026; Reuters, regional diplomatic reporting, 2025–2026.
United Nations Security Council, Reports of the Secretary-General on the Syrian Arab Republic, 2025–2026; Chatham House, Syria’s Transition: Governance, Reconstruction and Regional Security (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2025); International Crisis Group, What Lies in Store for Syria as a New Government Takes Power?
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), States of Fragility 2025 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2025), Syria chapter; World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor; International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia.
JaFaJ Research & Intelligence Division, analytical assessment based upon the Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic; United Nations Development Programme, Syria: Reconstruction and Recovery Framework; World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor; International Crisis Group, What Lies in Store for Syria as a New Government Takes Power?; Center for Strategic and International Studies, Syria’s Political Transition: Challenges for the New Government; Chatham House, Syria’s Transition: Governance, Reconstruction and Regional Security; Reuters reporting, January 2025–July 2026.

 

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From Dictatorship To Debate: Can syria’s New Parliament Build A Nation?

The People’s Chamber Faces the Greatest Reconstruction in Modern Arab History
A JaFaJ Strategic Briefing
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Syria has entered one of the most consequential periods in its modern history. The collapse of the Assad-era political order has created an opportunity to replace decades of centralized authoritarian governance with representative institutions capable of restoring public confidence, attracting international investment, and rebuilding a nation devastated by war.
At the center of this transition stands Syria’s newly constituted parliament.
Its significance extends far beyond legislative procedure. The institution will determine whether Syria evolves into a constitutional republic governed by law or merely replaces one concentration of power with another. The decisions made by this parliament will shape regional security, refugee repatriation, foreign investment, counterterrorism cooperation, minority protections, and the geopolitical balance across the Middle East.
The challenges confronting the parliament are unprecedented in the modern Arab world. It must legislate while simultaneously rebuilding the institutions of government, restoring the economy, reconciling deeply divided communities, and establishing the legal certainty required for reconstruction. Few legislatures have begun their work under such extraordinary circumstances.
The international community should view Syria’s parliament not simply as a political body but as the principal institution through which national reconstruction, constitutional legitimacy, and long-term stability may be achieved.
KEY JUDGMENTS
1.       Syria’s new People’s Assembly represents the country’s most significant institutional political reform since the collapse of the Assad government. While the Assembly alone cannot guarantee democratic governance, it provides the first opportunity in decades to establish a legislature capable of exercising meaningful oversight, debating public policy, and contributing to constitutional development.¹
2.       The long-term legitimacy of Syria’s transitional government will depend less on how the parliament was formed than on how it governs. The Assembly’s independence, transparency, legislative effectiveness, and willingness to hold the executive accountable will determine whether Syrians and the international community view it as a genuine democratic institution or merely a continuation of centralized executive authority.²
3.       Parliament’s greatest challenge is not political—it is institutional. Syria must simultaneously rebuild its constitutional framework, economy, judiciary, public administration, infrastructure, education system, healthcare network, and public confidence after years of civil conflict. Few legislatures in modern history have assumed responsibility for reconstruction on such a comprehensive scale.³
4.       Economic recovery will ultimately determine the success or failure of Syria’s political transition. Reconstruction requires predictable commercial law, enforceable contracts, protection of private property, transparent procurement, independent courts, and effective legislative oversight. Without these foundations, domestic and international investment will remain limited regardless of political reform.⁴
5.       Regional acceptance of Syria’s new government will be driven primarily by security concerns rather than ideology. Neighboring governments—including Israel, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon—will judge the new parliament according to its ability to stabilize Syria, secure its borders, suppress extremist organizations, facilitate the return of refugees, and prevent renewed regional instability.⁵
6.       The international community should evaluate Syria’s parliament based upon measurable institutional performance rather than symbolic political milestones. The election of parliamentary leadership, establishment of standing committees, legislative transparency, anti-corruption initiatives, constitutional reforms, and public accountability will provide more meaningful indicators of democratic progress than ceremonial events or official declarations.⁶
7.       The People’s Assembly has the opportunity to become the institutional cornerstone of a new Syrian republic. Its success will not be measured by the number of laws enacted but by whether it develops into a legislature capable of balancing executive authority, protecting minority rights, strengthening the rule of law, and restoring confidence in representative government.⁷
8.       JaFaJ assesses that Syria’s transition remains in its earliest stage. The inauguration of the People’s Assembly marks the beginning—not the completion—of the country’s political transformation. Future developments, including the election of parliamentary leadership, committee formation, constitutional amendments, legislative priorities, and regional diplomatic engagement, will determine whether Syria’s transition produces durable democratic institutions or merely a revised structure of executive governance.⁸
THE END OF THE PRESIDENCY-CENTERED STATE
For decades, political authority in Syria was concentrated within the presidency and the national security apparatus. Parliament existed as a constitutional institution but exercised limited independent authority. Legislative debate rarely altered executive policy, and political competition remained tightly controlled.
The transition now underway offers Syria an opportunity to redefine governance through institutions rather than personalities. This transformation requires more than constitutional amendments or new elections. It demands a sustained commitment to legislative independence, judicial integrity, executive accountability, and public participation.
Whether Syria succeeds will depend largely on whether parliament becomes a genuine center of policymaking rather than a symbolic institution.
PARLIAMENT AS THE FOUNDATION OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
No nation emerging from prolonged conflict can achieve lasting stability without legitimate governing institutions.
Syria’s parliament must become the national forum where competing political, religious, ethnic, and regional interests are resolved through legislation rather than violence.
Its responsibilities extend well beyond drafting laws. Parliament will establish the legal framework for reconstruction, oversee public expenditures, approve national budgets, supervise executive agencies, enact anti-corruption reforms, protect civil liberties, and provide oversight of international reconstruction assistance.
Its effectiveness will directly influence Syria’s domestic legitimacy and its credibility abroad.
THE GREATEST RECONSTRUCTION CHALLENGE IN MODERN ARAB HISTORY
The scale of Syria’s reconstruction is extraordinary.
Years of conflict damaged or destroyed housing, schools, hospitals, transportation networks, utilities, industrial capacity, and public infrastructure. Millions of Syrians remain displaced inside and outside the country. Economic production has been severely disrupted, while institutional capacity has eroded across multiple levels of government.
Reconstruction therefore requires more than financial assistance.
It requires functioning institutions capable of administering contracts transparently, protecting property rights, enforcing commercial law, combating corruption, and maintaining public confidence.
Without legislative oversight, reconstruction risks becoming fragmented, politicized, or vulnerable to corruption.
Parliament must therefore become the guardian of national accountability.
 
STRATEGIC ISSUES FACING THE NEW PARLIAMENT
The legislature’s immediate agenda is likely to include:
•         Constitutional reform and clarification of executive authority.
•         Judicial independence and rule-of-law reforms.
•         National reconciliation and transitional justice.
•         Property restitution and compensation for displaced citizens.
•         Refugee return and reintegration.
•         Reconstruction financing and procurement oversight.
•         Security-sector reform.
•         Local government decentralization.
•         Economic modernization and foreign investment.
•         Protection of religious, ethnic, and political minorities.
•         Anti-corruption legislation and public financial transparency.
Each of these issues carries significant implications for regional stability and international engagement.
 
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
The success or failure of Syria’s parliament will influence governments well beyond Damascus. The establishment of a functioning legislative institution represents more than a domestic political development; it is a strategic event with implications for regional security, economic integration, refugee repatriation, counterterrorism cooperation, and the future balance of power across the Middle East.
 
Neighboring states seek a stable Syria that no longer exports instability across its borders. Western governments require confidence that reconstruction assistance will be administered transparently and in accordance with international standards. Regional investors seek predictable commercial law, enforceable contracts, and an independent judiciary before committing long-term capital. International financial institutions require accountability, fiscal oversight, and legal certainty before financing major reconstruction projects. Humanitarian organizations likewise depend upon effective governmental partners capable of coordinating relief operations and facilitating the safe, voluntary return of displaced persons.
 
The parliament therefore represents Syria’s principal interface with the international community. Its legislative performance, institutional independence, and commitment to the rule of law will shape foreign governments’ willingness to normalize diplomatic relations, ease sanctions where appropriate, expand economic engagement, and support long-term reconstruction.
 
Regional Perspectives
Israel
Israel will likely evaluate Syria’s new parliament primarily through the lens of national security rather than domestic politics. Israeli policymakers will closely monitor whether the new government demonstrates the willingness and capability to prevent hostile armed groups from operating near the Golan Heights, disrupt weapons transfers to organizations such as Hezbollah, and prevent the re-establishment of Iranian military influence within Syria. A parliament that supports stronger border security, institutional accountability, and a unified national security policy could contribute to reducing regional tensions. Conversely, continued instability or the re-emergence of extremist organizations would reinforce Israeli security concerns and limit prospects for broader regional engagement.
 
Jordan
Jordan has perhaps the most immediate economic and humanitarian interest in Syria’s recovery. The kingdom has hosted hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees while managing significant cross-border security challenges, including narcotics trafficking and weapons smuggling. Amman is likely to welcome a parliament capable of strengthening border governance, restoring legitimate commerce, and creating conditions that encourage the voluntary return of refugees. Jordan also has an interest in reopening regional trade corridors linking the Levant with the Gulf states, making Syria’s economic stabilization a matter of direct national interest.
 
Lebanon
Lebanon remains deeply interconnected with Syria through geography, commerce, security, and refugee movements. The country continues to face substantial economic pressures while hosting one of the world’s largest refugee populations relative to its own population. Lebanese leaders will likely assess Syria’s parliament according to its ability to restore border stability, facilitate refugee repatriation consistent with international law, improve bilateral economic cooperation, and reduce the risk that renewed instability spills across the border. Developments affecting Hezbollah’s position within Syria will also remain an important factor in Lebanon’s domestic political calculations.
 
Turkey
Turkey will judge Syria’s new parliament through several strategic priorities: border security, counterterrorism, refugee policy, and northern Syria’s political future. Ankara has consistently emphasized the need to prevent armed Kurdish organizations that it considers security threats from operating along its southern border. At the same time, Turkey seeks conditions that would permit the safe, voluntary, and sustainable return of millions of Syrian refugees currently residing within its territory. A functioning parliament capable of producing credible governance, economic recovery, and improved security could support Turkish interests while creating opportunities for expanded trade and infrastructure development.
 
Iraq
Iraq shares extensive security and economic interests with Syria. Both countries continue to confront the residual threat posed by extremist organizations operating across porous border regions. Iraqi officials are likely to support efforts that strengthen Syrian state institutions, improve border management, and enhance intelligence cooperation. Increased stability would also facilitate cross-border trade, energy cooperation, and regional transportation networks connecting Iraq with Mediterranean markets.
 
The Gulf States
The Gulf Cooperation Council countries—including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman—are likely to evaluate Syria’s parliament through the dual lenses of regional stability and investment risk. These governments possess significant financial resources that could contribute to Syria’s reconstruction, but large-scale investment will likely depend upon improvements in governance, transparency, anti-corruption measures, legal certainty, and political stability. The extent to which the parliament demonstrates independence and accountability will influence confidence among both sovereign investors and private-sector partners.
 
The United States and Europe
The United States and European governments will likely evaluate Syria’s parliament according to measurable institutional performance rather than political symbolism alone. Priority indicators include respect for the rule of law, protection of minority communities, legislative transparency, judicial independence, anti-corruption initiatives, and adherence to international human rights obligations. Progress in these areas could encourage expanded diplomatic engagement and greater international support for reconstruction, while persistent governance deficiencies would likely limit normalization efforts.
 
A Parliament Under International Observation
Few newly established legislatures begin their work under such intense international scrutiny. Every major legislative decision—whether concerning constitutional reform, economic policy, refugee repatriation, judicial independence, minority protections, or national security—will be examined not only by the Syrian people but also by neighboring governments, international financial institutions, humanitarian organizations, and foreign investors.
 
For Syria’s new parliament, legitimacy will ultimately be earned through performance rather than proclamation. Its ability to govern effectively, legislate transparently, and strengthen public institutions will determine whether the international community views the People’s Assembly as the foundation of a stable and sovereign republic or merely another transitional institution struggling to emerge from decades of conflict.
OPPORTUNITIES
If parliament establishes itself as an independent legislative institution, Syria may achieve several strategic objectives:
•         Restoration of domestic political legitimacy.
•         Gradual return of refugees.
•         Increased foreign direct investment.
•         Expansion of regional trade.
•         Improved international diplomatic engagement.
•         Greater transparency in reconstruction.
•         Reduced opportunities for corruption.
•         Enhanced cooperation with democratic partners.
•         Sustainable long-term economic growth.
RISKS
Several significant risks remain.
Concentration of executive authority could undermine legislative independence.
Political fragmentation may impede consensus on constitutional reforms.
Weak administrative capacity could delay reconstruction.
Entrenched corruption may discourage international investment.
Residual extremist organizations could exploit political instability.
External powers may continue to compete for influence within Syria’s institutions.
Failure to address these challenges would diminish public confidence and jeopardize long-term stability.
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
History demonstrates that nations are rarely rebuilt through infrastructure projects alone.
Roads, bridges, schools, and hospitals are essential, but they do not create public trust.
Trust is created when citizens believe that government institutions operate fairly, transparently, and within the rule of law.
Syria’s parliament now bears that responsibility. It has the opportunity to become more than a legislative chamber. It can become the institutional foundation upon which a modern Syrian republic is constructed. Its debates will influence not only legislation but also national identity. Its oversight will determine whether reconstruction strengthens public confidence or reinforces old patterns of patronage and corruption.
Its independence will signal whether Syria has truly entered a new political era.
JaFaJ POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
JaFaJ recommends that democratic partners support Syria’s parliamentary transition through:
1.       Technical assistance for parliamentary administration and committee development.
2.       Comprehensive ethics, transparency, and anti-corruption standards.
3.       Independent legislative budget and research offices.
4.       Judicial and constitutional capacity-building programs.
5.       International election observation where appropriate.
6.       Public access to legislative proceedings and voting records.
7.       Procurement transparency for reconstruction projects.
8.       Strengthened protections for minority communities and political pluralism.
9.       Expanded economic and commercial legal reforms to encourage investment.
10.     Continued diplomatic engagement conditioned upon measurable institutional progress.
CONCLUSION
The rebuilding of Syria will ultimately be judged not by the number of buildings reconstructed, but by the strength of the institutions that govern them.
For decades, Syria was defined by centralized executive authority.
Its future now depends upon whether debate can replace decree, accountability can replace impunity, and representative government can replace authoritarian rule.
The new parliament stands at the center of that transformation.
If it succeeds, it will not simply pass laws—it will help rebuild a nation.
If it fails, Syria risks repeating the very political patterns that contributed to decades of instability.
The People’s Chamber now carries one of the greatest responsibilities entrusted to any legislature in modern Middle Eastern history.
EDITORS NOTE: LOOKING AHEAD: INDICATORS TO WATCH
This section would identify the specific developments JaFaJ will monitor over the next 6–12 months, including:
•         Election of the Speaker and Deputy Speakers.
•         Formation of standing committees.
•         The Assembly’s first legislative agenda.
•         Parliamentary oversight of executive ministries.
•         Constitutional reform proposals.
•         Judicial independence measures.
•         Anti-corruption legislation.
•         Transparency of reconstruction contracts.
•         Refugee return policies.
•         Foreign investment trends.
•         Diplomatic recognition and engagement.
•         Reactions from Israel, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Gulf states.
•         Public confidence in the new institutions.
 
Footnotes

Reuters, “Syria’s President Appoints Final Members of New Parliament,” July 1, 2026.
Associated Press, coverage of Syria’s transitional parliament, July 2026.
Financial Times, reporting on Syria’s political transition, July 2026.
United Nations, reports on Syria reconstruction and humanitarian conditions.
International Crisis Group, Syria analysis.
Carnegie Middle East Center, Syria political transition.

 
Selected Bibliography

Associated Press. Coverage of Syria’s Transitional Parliament. July 2026.
Financial Times. Coverage of Syria’s Political Transition. July 2026.
International Crisis Group. Syria reports.
Coverage of Syria’s New Parliament. July 2026.
United Nations. Syria reconstruction and humanitarian reports.

 

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The USA Is Considering F-35 Stealth Fighter Sales to the UAE

IN APPRECIATION OF ITS EFFORT DURING THE IRAN WAR
1- JaFaJ has learned that the Trump administration is considering approving and strongly pushing the sale of 20 F-35 stealth fighter jets to the United Arab Emirates in appreciation of the Gulf country’s commitment and contribution during the war with Iran.
2- A U.S. source close to the proposed deal informed JaFaJ, on the condition of anonymity, that the Trump administration has seen enough evidence that the United Arab Emirates is an ally that can be depended on during difficult times, not only in good times. The source added that this is not the first time the UAE has received very advanced fighter aircraft. The UAE was the first customer in the world to receive the F-16 Block 60/62 variant, which was the most advanced F-16 in the world at the time, around 2009. The source noted that the country’s wisdom means these advanced jets will be in good hands.
3- The sale is being discussed in appreciation of the UAE’s efforts during the war with Iran. During that conflict, the Emirates used its F-16 Fighting Falcons to strike military sites inside Tehran itself, flying alongside U.S. fighters in several joint operations.
4- President Trump himself referred to the UAE’s war effort before the media, confirming that the UAE took part in the retaliatory bombing campaign against Iran.
5- Reports indicate that the United Arab Emirates received more Iranian missile and drone attacks during the conflict than any other country, including Israel.
6- The United States first agreed in principle to sell the F-35 to the UAE after the historic Abraham Accords during President Trump’s first administration. Despite that initial approval, the deal did not go through.
7- JaFaJ has learned the current administration is now eager and convinced it can secure legislative approval for the sale to the UAE. If approved, that process should conclude no later than February of next year.
8- Delivery of the first UAE F-35s is still expected to take considerably longer because of production and integration timelines.
9- An Israeli military source told JaFaJ that Israel supports the deal because it would only make the UAE stronger in confronting Iran. The source said: “If the Americans are okay with it, we will have no objections. The UAE is a very significant and moderate nation, and a stronger UAE will be better for everyone in the region.”
10- JaFaJ sources state that the initial deal is for the sale of 20 F-35s, with an option for another 20. The sources added that the UAE will receive aircraft advanced enough to meet its operational needs in confronting regional threats.
– A Washington source described the upcoming sale as a clear sign that the UAE is not just another partner, but a key strategic ally for the United States in the Middle East. Adam said, “This shows the level of trust we have in the UAE. It’s someone we can rely on, and this is only the beginning. There will be additional military upgrades, including advanced missile and air defense systems such as THAAD.”
 

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Is Lebanon On The Brink Of A Civil War Following The Ceasefire Framework With Israel?

 

Summary: The signing of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire framework has dramatically reshaped Lebanon’s internal political landscape and placed Hezbollah in direct political confrontation not only with Israel but increasingly with the Lebanese state itself. The framework’s reported provisions, which envision the gradual extension of exclusive Lebanese state authority throughout the country and the eventual disarmament of Hezbollah, have widened the divide between Hezbollah and large sections of Lebanese society that increasingly view implementation of the agreement as the only viable path toward restoring state sovereignty. Since the agreement was signed, Hezbollah supporters and loyalists have organized demonstrations, roadblocks, tire burnings, and acts of unrest concentrated in Beirut’s Southern District but increasingly spilling into mixed and predominantly Christian neighborhoods, including Ain al-Rummaneh. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri has publicly appealed for calm and warned against sectarian strife, while Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem has categorically rejected the agreement, describing it as illegitimate and refusing any discussion of disarmament. Additional political actors, including the Coalition of Arab Peace in Lebanon, have publicly accused Hezbollah of attempting to intimidate the Lebanese government through orchestrated unrest. Although tensions are the highest they have been in years, current indicators suggest Lebanon is not yet on the brink of a full-scale civil war. Any armed confrontation initiated by Hezbollah would likely pit the organization not only against rival political factions and communities but also against the Lebanese government itself, which has reportedly committed to implementing the ceasefire framework. Hezbollah’s weakened military position following recent Israeli military operations, combined with Israel’s continued presence in parts of southern Lebanon, reduces the likelihood that the group would deliberately initiate a nationwide conflict at this stage. Nevertheless, the situation remains highly volatile and could deteriorate rapidly following any major security incident or political miscalculation.
Since the signing of the ceasefire framework between Israel and Lebanon, Hezbollah supporters and loyalists have carried out demonstrations and disturbances throughout Beirut, particularly in the organization’s traditional stronghold in the Southern District (Dahiyeh). The unrest has gradually spread into other parts of the capital, including the predominantly Christian district of Ain al-Rummaneh, raising concerns over the possibility of broader sectarian confrontation.
Demonstrators protesting the framework agreement blocked major roads, burned tires, and gathered outside the Grand Serail (Prime Minister’s headquarters), disrupting public order and creating an atmosphere of heightened political tension.
These disturbances followed the signing of the framework agreement in Washington after the fifth round of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. The reported purpose of the agreement is to facilitate Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territory while allowing the Lebanese Armed Forces to assume responsibility for security in those areas under internationally supported arrangements.
The framework has been widely interpreted within Lebanon as establishing a pathway toward restoring the Lebanese state’s exclusive authority over national security, including addressing the long-standing issue of Hezbollah’s independent military structure.
Numerous Lebanese politicians, media outlets, and civil society figures have described the agreement as historic and as the first realistic opportunity in decades to restore full Lebanese sovereignty and end the existence of parallel military authority inside the country.
Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem has publicly rejected the agreement, describing it as “humiliating,” “null and void,” and a surrender of Lebanese sovereignty. He has insisted that Israeli withdrawal should instead proceed according to what he described as the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding while rejecting any linkage between Israeli withdrawal and Hezbollah’s disarmament.
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri appealed publicly for restraint, warning Lebanese citizens against allowing themselves to become instruments of sectarian discord and urging preservation of national unity during an exceptionally sensitive political period.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah supporters continued demonstrations and public mobilization against the agreement. According to statements released following the unrest, Hezbollah supporters protesting the framework agreement established roadblocks, burned tires, and created disturbances outside the government headquarters in Beirut.
On 25 June 2026, the Coalition of Arab Peace in Lebanon publicly announced its opposition to Hezbollah’s position, accusing Hezbollah and its political and military loyalists of attempting to provoke unrest, intimidation, and instability in response to the framework agreement. The coalition called on Lebanese authorities to continue implementing the agreement and to reinforce the authority of the Lebanese state over all Lebanese territory.
The emerging political divide increasingly places Hezbollah and its core support base on one side, while much of Lebanon’s Sunni, Christian, Druze, and independent political establishment appears to support implementation of the agreement and the strengthening of state institutions. The dispute is therefore evolving beyond a traditional sectarian disagreement into a struggle over whether Lebanon should continue to tolerate an armed organization operating independently of the state.
Hezbollah retains the ability to mobilize supporters and generate localized instability. However, its military capabilities have reportedly been significantly degraded following recent Israeli military operations, limiting its ability to sustain a prolonged nationwide confrontation while simultaneously facing continuing Israeli military pressure along the southern border.
Comment: Lebanon is entering one of its most politically sensitive periods since the end of the civil war. Hezbollah’s rejection of the ceasefire framework increasingly places the organization in opposition not only to Israel but also to the Lebanese government itself, which has reportedly endorsed the agreement and accepted the principle of extending exclusive state authority throughout Lebanon, including the eventual disarmament of Hezbollah. As a result, any major armed confrontation initiated by Hezbollah would no longer represent a conflict solely with rival sectarian communities but would also constitute a direct challenge to the authority of the Lebanese state. Despite Hezbollah’s threats and continued efforts to generate unrest, a full-scale civil war does not currently appear to be the most likely outcome. Israel continues to maintain a military presence in portions of southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah has reportedly suffered significant military degradation following recent Israeli operations, making it less capable of sustaining a prolonged nationwide conflict. Furthermore, there appears to be little appetite among the broader Lebanese population for a return to the civil war era. Nevertheless, the security environment remains exceptionally volatile and highly flammable. A major security incident, political assassination, or serious miscalculation by any of the principal actors could rapidly transform localized unrest into a much broader internal crisis.

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Exclusive: How The Lebanon-Israel Ceasefire Framework Is Expected To Work

 CAMERAS AND DEEP SURVEILLANCE ARE THE KEY
Summary: A senior Lebanese official with close connections to the Lebanese Prime Minister’s Office has told JAFAJ that Israeli withdrawals from Shiite villages and towns in southern Lebanon will take place under the recently signed Israel-Lebanon peace framework, but only under an extensive and highly advanced surveillance system. According to the source, cameras and other surveillance equipment will be installed throughout southern Lebanon, including Hezbollah strongholds and other sensitive areas such as the southern district of Beirut. The source said this was one of Israel’s key conditions and that implementation will be overseen through the U.S.-backed Military Coordination Group for Lebanon.
1- JAFAJ has learned from a Lebanese government source with close proximity to the Lebanese Prime Minister’s Office, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, about the details of the recent ceasefire framework signed between Israel and Lebanon and brokered by the United States.
2- The source, who was very close to the negotiations, said that the key issue the Americans were persistent about was the introduction of surveillance and the installation of cameras at every single location of significance in southern Lebanon, especially those that have historically been used by Hezbollah, including unannounced surveillance in the southern district of Beirut, which is considered Hezbollah’s stronghold in the sect-divided capital of Lebanon.
3- The source said that the installation of these surveillance systems remains one of the key conditions for Israel to evacuate certain areas it has occupied in southern Lebanon.
COMMENT: Israel has occupied large areas in southern Lebanon, mainly Shiite villages and towns loyal to Hezbollah, most of which have served as operational areas and launching grounds for military actions against Israel by Hezbollah. It is estimated that Israel now fully occupies up to 40% of southern Lebanon, including virtually the entire border strip in the southern part of the country. END COMMENT.
4- The Lebanese source added that the Israelis will start with what they call pilot areas, where they expect both the Lebanese Army to replace them and members of the Lebanese Peace Group founded by President Trump to be present and oversee the Lebanese Army’s entry and takeover. The source added that both Israel and the Americans have made it clear that they have trust issues with the Lebanese Army, which has many connections to Hezbollah, with thousands of Shiites already serving among its personnel.
5- He added that there will therefore be a significant American presence, including U.S. military personnel and officers from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, to oversee the Lebanese Army’s compliance, help keep the area peaceful, and prevent the return of Hezbollah terrorists to the areas from which Israel will be withdrawing.
6- The source said that the Military Coordination Group for Lebanon, to be established by the Trump administration, will conduct both surveillance and very gradual on-the-ground operations that will, in many ways, work alongside the Lebanese Army while also monitoring it. At the same time, he made it clear that the Israelis have confirmed they are not going to withdraw from a single location without tangible guarantees and concrete steps that make the return of Hezbollah to those areas impossible.
 

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