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JORDAN’S MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD STRUCTURE, STATE LINKAGES, AND STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is a structure made up of two bodies. The first is a closed organizational leadership, similar to secret groupings, that controls strategy and manages engagement with the street, the state, and external actors. The most important characteristic of this leadership is secrecy and the lack of clarity in its organizational structure to any outside observer. This means that the Muslim Brotherhood, in its outward appearance, is different from what it is internally, such that individuals and their publicly visible positions do not reflect their real influence inside. This makes it difficult for anyone trying to confront them from the outside to understand how the group actually operates. They are organized as a secret group, and this is how they manage their affairs and maintain their existence.
The second part is the political arm of the group, currently represented by the Islamic Action Front Party. This arm is used in elections to deliver media messaging and apply pressure, and it serves as the channel for dealing with the outside world. However, real power within the group is highly centralized and hierarchical, operating through a strict chain of command, and does not match its public appearance. In other words, frequent visibility of any individual does not mean they are the most influential.
The names in the following paragraphs represent the most influential individuals in the group, as well as the internal dynamics, or hierarchy, through which they operate.
Murad al-Adailah, the General Controller. This man represents the highest organizational authority in theory. He is responsible for setting the strategic direction of the Muslim Brotherhood and maintaining non-public communication channels, including contact with the Royal Court in Jordan. He is considered the central point for escalation or de-escalation depending on what serves the group’s interests. If there is rapprochement with any party, Murad al-Adailah announces it, and if there is escalation, he is the first to declare it. [3]
Hammam Saeed, a former General Controller of the group. Despite his advanced age, he remains the organization’s top ideological authority. He maintains both public and non-declared, deeply rooted channels in Jordan with the Royal Court itself, including the Chief of the Royal Court, the Special Intelligence Office affiliated with the Court, Jordanian intelligence, Hamas, the core of the global Muslim Brotherhood organization, Turkey, and other locations including Morocco. Despite his strong secrecy, he is believed to be one of the most influential figures in the Muslim Brotherhood worldwide, and some even consider him to be what is referred to as number one in the global organization.
Hammam Saeed’s strength lies in his ability to think broadly and strategically, making him a mastermind within the Brotherhood. He understands the region and knows how to operate within it, and he has maintained advanced relations with the Iranians. He is also known for extreme harshness in managing the group, and even in managing his own family’s affairs. Many members of the group fear him.
Abdullah al-Akayleh, a prominent leader in the organization, former MP, and former minister. He strongly represents the East Jordanian wing within the group. Although he is not the only East Jordanian, most of the leadership is now East Jordanian, and he is more emotionally tied to the concept of East Jordanian identity. He is pragmatic and is considered a stabilizing channel within the organization, especially regarding the sometimes difficult relationship between East Jordanian and Palestinian-origin members. Although the organization is generally cohesive, this issue occasionally appears publicly. In addition, he strongly believes in and follows the Hashemite system in Jordan. He is known for his famous statement broadcast on Jordanian television in 2017: “We stood with the regime in every square.” Despite his strong loyalty, he is not the closest figure to the Palace or intelligence.
Zaki Bani Irshid, a former General Controller from Irbid and an East Jordanian from the north, is known for escalatory rhetoric and signaling pressure. He is used by the group as a spokesperson, typically to deliver ideas and statements, whether threats or pressure against certain parties. Despite his senior positions, he has no real authority beyond appearances. Although he is part of the leadership, he is among the least influential, despite the large image he projects publicly. His title is bigger than his actual weight. He is used by his superiors, particularly Hammam Saeed and Saleh al-Armouti, whose role will be explained later, to deliver pressure-driven messaging that is then managed by senior leadership for the organization’s benefit.
Wael al-Saqqa, Secretary General of the Islamic Action Front Party, which is currently the only licensed wing represented in parliament, is the most important operational tool of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. He controls election strategy, parliamentary representation, the behavior of the parliamentary bloc, and public positions, and he serves as the gateway for escalation through parliament. Although he is a high-level executive and his opinion is considered within the leadership, he has less decision-making authority than others, even though he manages a large number of people. He is an executor who contributes to strategic decisions but is not the final decision-maker. This is expected in an organization built on obedience since its founding by Hassan al-Banna, where a small number of individuals ultimately control decision-making, and he is among the most important of them.
Saleh al-Armouti, a prominent leader in the Islamic Action Front, an MP, and an experienced lawyer, acts as a legal shield for the Brotherhood both internally and externally when needed. He provides parliamentary protection, media management, and escalation. He is considered one of the most hardline hawks within the organization. He strengthens the rigidity of the Brotherhood structure and skillfully navigates the complex relationship between the Jordanian regime, the state, intelligence, and the Brotherhood. While they are allied, they are also careful to demonstrate power against one another at times, and al-Armouti is highly skilled in this area.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan enjoys deep support from the Jordanian intelligence apparatus, and the organization has had a close relationship with the Jordanian state since its inception. King Hussein summarized this relationship by saying: “The Muslims are the party of the state.” in a famous interview in 1996. [1]
The overlap and partnership between the Muslim Brotherhood and Jordanian intelligence is extensive, going beyond basic coordination into decades of joint activity. Cooperation began in 1970 during the Jordanian civil war, when the Brotherhood supported the Hashemite regime and assisted intelligence operations on the ground, including campaigns against Palestinian factions and framing opposition to them as jihad. This played a major role in stabilizing the state and its security structure after the conflict. King Abdullah II later acknowledged this period and the Brotherhood’s role during his interview with The Atlantic. [2]
The relationship between Jordanian intelligence and the Brotherhood is not hidden, but operational. One example is Dr. Abdullah Azzam, who was close to Jordanian intelligence, played a role in establishing the Afghan jihad, and had Osama bin Laden among his students.
Likewise, al-Qaeda, in which Jordanians were among its most important members, including the terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, has networks that are connected in Jordan. Because Jordan presents itself as a country with political freedom, yet in reality the Jordanian intelligence apparatus maintains near-total control over public and political life, no one can act or form such organizations without the knowledge of intelligence. At best, the intelligence services did nothing to stop it; otherwise, such activity would have been shut down at its earliest stage.
The situation developed to the point where the Muslim Brotherhood and their partners within the Jordanian intelligence apparatus operated across multiple arenas as one team. This included sending extremist Islamists to Iraq and Afghanistan during the second Afghan war, and later supplying ISIS with weapons, vehicles, money, and ammunition. American media reported that Jordanian intelligence sold weapons to ISIS in Syria.[4] British media also reported the theft of ammunition from the British army stationed in Jordan and its sale, with the knowledge of intelligence, to ISIS in Syria. [5] Russian media further reported that Toyota vehicles purchased by the Jordanian army ended up in the hands of ISIS. [6] At minimum, this reflects a failure to act; more realistically, it reflects awareness and tolerance within a system that tightly controls activity inside the country.
As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood organization has effectively become part of the state in Jordan. There are now officers within the security services who are aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood and influenced by its ideology. Where very few intelligence officers previously performed daily prayers, it has now become common to see officers praying in their offices, and the prayer room inside the intelligence building is nearly full during the five daily prayers.
In addition, this Brotherhood influence within the intelligence apparatus has extended to some senior officers in the Jordanian army and even into parts of the leadership, to the point that the state in Jordan has become “Brotherhoodized” while external actors remain largely unaware.
Therefore, confronting the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has become more urgent and at the same time more complex. This is not only because of the difficulty in understanding how they operate, as they function as a secret organization as explained above, but also because the Jordanian intelligence apparatus stands behind them, or at the very least allows their expansion, while maintaining full control over political life in the country. At the same time, the Jordanian state continues to present itself externally as modern and moderate.
The situation has now become more dangerous. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan reads the region carefully and understands that the current war on Iran is an American effort against the broader system established roughly 80 years ago, including the Brotherhood and extremist structures embedded in the region. They view any strike against Iran as a direct threat to themselves and also to the Jordanian state, which maintains close ties with the Iranian-Iraqi system in the region.
The Muslim Brotherhood is now preparing for the post-war phase. They believe the next step will be the dismantling of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, with the Jordanian branch serving as the spearhead and headquarters of the global organization. The Muslim Brotherhood is now concerned because of the recent designation by the United States government of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood as a terror organisation.
The Muslim Brotherhood is now studying “Plan B” to preserve itself and its organization, and they are convinced that they are up to a “serious” confrontation with the US Government. They are working to maintain influence in the country and keep Jordan as an international hub for the global Muslim Brotherhood organization. They have considered multiple options and understand that ignoring the situation or assuming things will remain the same until the end of Trump’s term will not work. They recognize that this is no longer possible after developments involving Iran, as they fear the U.S. administration might take tangible actions to destroy them after being designated as a terrorist organization by President Trump. 27. The option in front of them now, and the one they prefer, is to try to move toward a constitutional monarchy with Prince Hussein or another Hashemite prince becoming king, especially since they question and believe that Prince Hussein may never actually become king. In that sense, this situation is similar to what happened with the King’s half-brother Hamzah, who was strongly aligned with the Brotherhood and whom the Brotherhood openly and strongly defended in parliament.
That said, this same option has already been assessed by Jordanian intelligence, which remains in contact with the Brotherhood, as difficult to carry out at this stage, even though a Gulf state is backing the idea.
The other option is what can be described as the Samson option, “on my enemies and on me,” which the Brotherhood has seriously discussed. The idea is to create security problems targeting the United States and Israel inside Jordan, making it extremely difficult to control the country if regime change were to happen. In that scenario, the Brotherhood would position itself as the lesser evil for the United States, based on the logic of “two bad options.” At the same time, the Brotherhood continues to publicly reject regime change. What they are actually considering is igniting a jihadist situation inside Jordan. This option is supported by senior figures within the Jordanian intelligence apparatus, particularly through the creation of security incidents and operations along the Israeli border, and by relying on thousands of members tied to the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard who are currently in Jordan holding Iraqi passports and who have access to sufficient weapons. From the Brotherhood’s perspective, creating this kind of instability would disrupt any effort to eliminate them.
Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan requires understanding that the movement operates as a tightly controlled, secret organizational structure that is closely tied to the Jordanian regime and its intelligence apparatus. A first starting point is acknowledging that the Jordanian state is in a partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood itself.
Second, there needs to be a plan to weaken and contain the Brotherhood’s penetration inside the Jordanian intelligence apparatus, especially among senior and mid-level officers. This requires a focused and dedicated effort, particularly since major regional changes are already underway, including in Jordan, and time is limited.
Third, there needs to be an alternative, even if it has to be put together quickly. The Muslim Brotherhood has effectively had a monopoly over the political scene in Jordan, supported by the security establishment and by a level of media freedom that no other group has. That freedom still exists today, and there has been no real counterweight to it.
The Brotherhood has been operating largely alone in Jordan in both media and politics. On top of that, the regime itself changed election and party laws in 2006 in a way that pushed all other parties out while allowing the Brotherhood to remain. This political vacuum, combined with the Brotherhood’s resources, has left it with no real opposition on the ground, especially since secular movements opposing and/or the regime were pushed out of the country or forced into exile. The threat of a Muslim Brotherhood takeover of Jordan is real. Addressing this situation will require serious resources and sustained commitment to make sure Jordan does not become easy ground for the Brotherhood.

“Jordan Is Palestinian,” Middle East Forum, accessed May 6, 2026, https://meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/jordan-is-palestinian.
“Monarch in the Middle,” The Atlantic, April 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-middle/309270/.
“اعتقال المراقب العام لجماعة الإخوان,” Al Jazeera, June 23, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2025/6/23/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86.
“CIA Weapons for Syrian Rebels Funneled onto Black Markets: Report,” The Hill, June 2016, https://thehill.com/homenews/284963-cia-weapons-for-syrian-rebels-funneled-onto-black-markets-report/.
“87,000 Stolen British Bullets in Hands of Jihadis,” Daily Mail, June 2016, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3682655/87-000-stolen-British-bullets-hands-jihadis-cache-ammunition-stolen-Army-training-camp.html.

“بعد التحقيق، شركة تويوتا تؤكد…,” Tunisie Focus, accessed May 6, 2026, https://www.tunisiefocus.com/%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%8C-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9-181690/

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Diplomatic negotiations are often described as structured efforts to resolve conflict. That description breaks down quickly when applied to the current U.S.–Iran talks as they enter round 2. What is unfolding in Pakistan is not a traditional negotiation designed to produce agreement. It is a controlled strategic contest—one governed by leverage, constraint, signaling, and political survival.
At the center of this process are three actors with fundamentally different objectives: the United States, Iran, and Pakistan. Each enters the room with a mandate that limits flexibility, and each defines success in a way that makes compromise structurally difficult. The result is a negotiation that is less about resolution and more about managing tension without allowing it to spiral into open conflict.
 
THE U.S. POSITION: NEGOTIATION THROUGH PRESSURE
The U.S. delegation, anchored by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, reflects a deliberate dual-track strategy.
Witkoff is an American real estate investor and founder of Witkoff Group, a firm built on acquiring distressed or underperforming properties and converting them into high-value assets across major U.S. markets. Trained as a lawyer at Hofstra University, he began his career in real estate law before shifting into principal investing—where he demonstrated a consistent ability to identify mispriced assets, structure complex deals, and execute large-scale repositioning projects. His portfolio spans luxury residential developments, hospitality assets, and mixed-use urban projects, often in environments where capital is constrained and risk tolerance is low. This background matters in a negotiation setting: Witkoff operates with a transactional mindset, prioritizing leverage, enforceability, and asymmetric outcomes. He is not oriented toward incremental compromise; he is oriented toward structuring deals where terms are clear, compliance is measurable, and downside risk is contained through control mechanisms. His long-standing relationship with Donald Trump also situates him within a broader doctrine that favors pressure, timing, and decisive execution over prolonged diplomatic balancing.
Kushner, by contrast, represents a hybrid profile that blends real estate investment, political strategy, and international dealmaking. As the former senior advisor to Donald Trump, he played a central role in shaping U.S. Middle East policy, most notably as a key architect of the Abraham Accords—a series of agreements that normalized relations between Israel and multiple Arab states and reconfigured regional alignment without resolving underlying conflicts. Before his government role, Kushner led Kushner Companies, managing a portfolio of office, residential, and retail assets, including high-profile and, at times, highly leveraged acquisitions such as 666 Fifth Avenue. His approach to negotiation is broader in scope than Witkoff’s: he tends to integrate economic incentives, regional power dynamics, and long-term geopolitical positioning into deal structures. Rather than focusing solely on immediate concessions, Kushner’s framework seeks to reshape incentive systems—aligning state actors through investment flows, normalization pathways, and strategic partnerships. His presence signals that the negotiation is not limited to nuclear containment but extends into a wider effort to realign the Middle East’s economic and political architecture.
Witkoff’s role is precise and transactional: define terms, extract concessions, and build enforceable mechanisms. Kushner’s presence signals something broader. He represents an attempt to expand the negotiation beyond immediate nuclear constraints into a wider regional framework that could incorporate economic incentives and geopolitical realignment.
This posture is heavily shaped by the doctrine associated with Donald Trump. The expectations are not designed for compromise. They are designed to force compliance.
Washington is seeking near-total constraints on Iran’s nuclear capability, intrusive inspections aligned with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and regional de-escalation—including stability in the Strait of Hormuz. Sanctions relief, critically, is not positioned as goodwill. It is a conditional tool—phased, reversible, and tightly controlled.
This approach carries implications far beyond Iran. It signals a return to hard enforcement diplomacy, where outcomes are driven by pressure rather than negotiated equilibrium. Markets read this clearly: geopolitical risk premiums rise, alliances harden, and the probability of soft diplomatic settlements declines across multiple regions.
IRAN’S POSITION: RESISTANCE AS STRATEGY
Across the table, Abbas Araghchi operates within a fundamentally different system. Araghchi is a career diplomat and one of Iran’s most experienced nuclear negotiators, having served as Deputy Foreign Minister and as a central figure in talks leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Educated in international relations and deeply embedded within Iran’s foreign policy establishment, he combines technical fluency on nuclear issues with a disciplined understanding of regime priorities. His negotiating style is structured, patient, and deliberately controlled—focused less on rapid agreement and more on preserving strategic optionality. Importantly, Araghchi does not operate as an independent dealmaker. His mandate is bounded by directives from Iran’s senior leadership, including the office of Ali Khamenei, where regime durability, ideological consistency, and internal legitimacy override speed or flexibility in negotiations.
Supporting Araghchi is a layered diplomatic and technical team that reflects Iran’s centralized decision-making model. Senior officials within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Iran) provide legal, diplomatic, and sanctions-related expertise, while coordination with the Supreme National Security Council ensures alignment with broader strategic and security objectives. Technical input is often informed by Iran’s nuclear establishment, including figures linked to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, which provides operational insight into enrichment capabilities, inspection frameworks, and breakout timelines.
This structure matters. Unlike Western delegations that may have wider tactical flexibility at the negotiating table, Iran’s team is optimized for consistency and message discipline. Positions are rarely improvised. Concessions, when they occur, are pre-calibrated and politically conditioned. The negotiating table is not where decisions are made—it is where decisions already made are executed and tested.
Iran’s objectives are consistent and non-negotiable in their own way. It seeks sanctions relief to stabilize its economy, preservation of nuclear capability at least in latent form, and—perhaps most importantly—the avoidance of any outcome that can be framed domestically as surrender.
This produces a strategy of calibrated resistance. Delay is not a problem for Iran; it is a tool. Indirect communication allows engagement without concession. Ambiguity preserves flexibility. Time, in this framework, becomes leverage.
The broader implication is significant. Iran’s approach demonstrates that sustained resistance under sanctions can remain viable, particularly when supported by alternative economic relationships. For other states under pressure, this becomes a model worth studying.
 
PAKISTAN’S ROLE: KEEPING THE SYSTEM FROM COLLAPSING
Pakistan, led by Shehbaz Sharif, occupies a position that is both central and constrained. It is the host and mediator, but not an enforcer. It cannot impose outcomes or compel agreement.
Sharif is a veteran political operator with a governance profile shaped more by administration and economic management than by ideological positioning. As a senior leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (N) and younger brother of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, he built his reputation through multiple terms as Chief Minister of Punjab, Pakistan’s most economically significant province. There, he focused heavily on infrastructure development, energy stabilization, and public service delivery—priorities that translated into a results-oriented, execution-first leadership style.
At the national level, Sharif’s leadership has been defined by constraint management. Pakistan faces persistent economic pressure, reliance on external financing, and a delicate civil-military balance that shapes foreign policy boundaries. His government has had to coordinate closely with institutions such as the International Monetary Fund while maintaining working relationships with major powers including the United States and China. This produces a diplomatic posture that is pragmatic rather than ideological—focused on stability, access, and risk containment.
That profile directly informs Pakistan’s role in these negotiations. Sharif is not attempting to dominate the process; he is attempting to keep it intact. His comparative advantage is not leverage—it is access and continuity. Pakistan maintains functional relationships with Iran, the United States, and regional actors, allowing it to serve as a credible communication bridge when direct trust between primary parties is limited.
His approach to mediation reflects this reality:

He prioritizes process over breakthrough, ensuring talks do not collapse under pressure.
He emphasizes controlled engagement, reducing the probability of miscalculation or rapid escalation.
He operates within tight structural limits, recognizing that Pakistan cannot afford to alienate any major stakeholder involved.

For Pakistan, the stakes are tangible. Hosting these talks elevates its diplomatic relevance, but it also exposes the country to regional spillover risk. Economic fragility amplifies that exposure—any escalation affecting energy flows, trade routes, or regional security dynamics would have immediate downstream effects on Pakistan’s already constrained fiscal position.
If negotiations collapse into confrontation, Pakistan is not a distant observer. It becomes part of the risk surface—geographically, economically, and politically.
That is why Sharif’s role, while understated, is strategically critical. He is not there to win the negotiation. He is there to prevent the system from breaking.
 
WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS INSIDE THE TALKS
The mechanics of these talks are often misunderstood. This is not a setting where two sides sit across a table and negotiate line by line toward agreement. It is a fragmented process where control is exercised through sequencing, timing, and signaling.
Each side attempts to define the agenda. Whether nuclear constraints, sanctions relief, or regional security is discussed first is not procedural—it is strategic. Communication may occur indirectly, through intermediaries, allowing both sides to engage without appearing to concede.
Small gestures—subtle changes in language, limited concessions, shifts in tone—serve as probes, testing the other side’s flexibility. Delays and pauses are not breakdowns. They are tactical resets. Public messaging often diverges sharply from private discussions, as both sides seek to project strength regardless of actual movement.
What emerges is a negotiation that moves forward, but only in controlled, reversible increments.
SCENARIOS: HOW THIS ACTUALLY PLAYS OUT IN REAL TERMS
The most optimistic pathway is controlled de-escalation, but even this unfolds cautiously. Iran might quietly signal a willingness to cap enrichment at lower levels without publicly abandoning its program. The United States, in response, could authorize narrowly defined sanctions relief—perhaps allowing limited oil exports under strict monitoring. Inspection regimes might expand incrementally, giving the International Atomic Energy Agency greater access, though still short of full transparency.
Even in this best-case scenario, the system remains fragile. Verification disputes would emerge quickly. Domestic critics on both sides would challenge the legitimacy of the arrangement. The result would be temporary stabilization rather than lasting resolution.
Far more likely is a staged stalemate. Talks continue, but without breakthrough. Minor technical issues are discussed, partial understandings are tested, and then everything pauses. Iran incrementally advances its nuclear capabilities without crossing clear red lines, while the United States maintains pressure through sanctions and deterrence.
Over time, this produces a stable but tense equilibrium. Energy markets absorb a persistent risk premium. Regional actors adjust their security postures independently. The system holds—but it does not resolve.
Symbolic engagement sits just below this as a constant layer. Meetings occur, statements are issued, and progress is implied, but nothing substantive changes. This is diplomacy as optics—useful for political positioning, irrelevant for structural outcomes.
The most dangerous pathway remains breakdown and escalation. A single triggering event—a maritime incident in the Strait of Hormuz, a proxy attack, or a sudden shift in nuclear activity—could collapse the negotiation entirely. In such a scenario, escalation would be rapid. Oil markets would react immediately. Supply chains would feel the impact within weeks. Financial systems would shift toward risk aversion almost instantly.
There is also a more ambitious pathway, tied to the strategic thinking of Jared Kushner. This would expand the negotiation into a broader regional and economic framework, integrating multiple actors and redefining incentives. The upside is significant—but so are the barriers. Without trust, alignment, and sustained commitment, this pathway remains unlikely.
 
GLOBAL IMPACT: WHY THIS MATTERS BEYOND THE ROOM
The implications of these talks extend far beyond the immediate participants.

Energy markets remain tightly linked to stability in the Strait of Hormuz. Even minor disruptions—or the perception of risk—can drive volatility. That volatility feeds directly into inflation, transportation costs, and industrial production worldwide.
Supply chains are equally exposed. Energy is a foundational input. Disruption cascades quickly, affecting everything from manufacturing to food distribution.
Financial markets respond in real time. Prolonged instability raises capital costs, reduces investment confidence, and shifts capital toward safer assets.

More broadly, this negotiation signals a shift in how global conflicts are managed. Power-based diplomacy is increasingly replacing consensus-based frameworks.
 
WHAT CHINA AND RUSSIA SHOULD TAKE FROM THIS
For China and Russia, this negotiation is not peripheral—it is instructive.
It demonstrates that U.S. strategy is hardening, relying more heavily on sustained pressure than negotiated compromise. At the same time, it highlights opportunities to expand influence by providing alternative economic pathways to sanctioned states.
However, it also underscores risk. Any escalation affects global energy flows—critical for both China as a consumer and Russia as a producer. This is not just a regional issue; it is a test case for how power will be exercised in a multipolar system.
 
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR PAKISTAN AND THE BROADER “BOARD OF PEACE”
For Pakistan, the negotiation is a balancing act. It gains diplomatic relevance but absorbs risk. Its optimal outcome is not resolution—it is continuity without escalation.
For the broader international system—the “board of peace”—the implications are more structural. Traditional diplomacy is weakening. Agreements alone are no longer sufficient. Enforcement, backed by power, is becoming the dominant model.
Institutions like the International Atomic Energy Agency remain essential, but their effectiveness depends on the alignment of power behind them.
The uncomfortable reality is that peace is no longer being engineered through agreement. It is being maintained through managed tension.
 
IN-DEPTH CONCLUSION: A SYSTEM DESIGNED TO CONTINUE
These talks are not failing. They are operating exactly as intended.
The United States, shaped by the doctrine associated with Donald Trump, is applying structured pressure to force compliance. Iran is absorbing that pressure while preserving its core capabilities. Pakistan is ensuring that the interaction does not escalate beyond control.
This creates a closed loop: pressure leads to resistance, resistance leads to negotiation, negotiation leads to pause, and the cycle repeats.
For this system to break, something external must change—politics, economics, or a sudden shock. Until then, the most likely outcome is not resolution.
It is endurance.
A prolonged state of controlled instability where negotiation persists—not because it succeeds, but because the alternative is far more costly.
 

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Iran is not yet in a civil war, but it is no longer functioning as a unified state. What appears to be a ceasefire is not stability—it is a reorganization phase that historically precedes internal conflict. Civil wars begin when authority becomes contested, duplicated, and operationally unclear—not when systems visibly collapse.¹
Iran already exhibits three of the four structural conditions required for civil war onset: elite fragmentation, sustained public grievance, and parallel authority structures.² The final condition—fracture of control over force—is no longer theoretical. It is structurally primed.
The trigger will not necessarily originate from elite conflict alone. When information flows normalize and public awareness synchronizes, the population itself becomes a force multiplier capable of accelerating instability.³
Bottom line: Iran is moving toward internal conflict unless control over force is rapidly and decisively re-centralized.
 
THE CEASEFIRE IS NOT CALM—IT IS PREPARATION
The current ceasefire is being misinterpreted. It is not a pause—it is a preparation phase for internal repositioning.
Iran is actively:

auditing force capabilities,
repositioning strategic assets, and
reassessing command authority.

These actions indicate uncertainty over who controls coercive power, not confidence in stability.
Conflict research shows that such phases are strongly associated with pre-fragmentation dynamics, where systems test internal cohesion before either reconsolidating or breaking.⁴
Once a state begins questioning command authority, fragmentation is no longer a distant risk—it is an active process.
 
WHO CONTROLS FORCE—AND WHY THAT DECIDES EVERYTHING
At the center of formal authority is supposedly Mojtaba Khamenei, the new supreme leader who has not been seen in a few weeks. His position depends on alignment with security institutions rather than purely clerical legitimacy.
Masoud Pezeshkian controls administrative governance but does not control force. This creates a structural divide between legitimacy and coercion.
Real power flows through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which operates as a military, political, and economic system simultaneously. ⁵
This produces a binary outcome:

If the IRGC remains unified, the state stabilizes under centralized control.
If the IRGC fragments, the state immediately loses its monopoly on force.

There is no gradual transition between these states. Fragmentation of force shifts the system directly from governance to contest.
 
FACTIONS ARE NOT COMPETING—THEY ARE COLLIDING
Iran’s internal blocs are advancing incompatible strategies:

The Pezeshkian–Larijani bloc seeks stabilization through reform and external engagement.⁶
The Salami–Qaani bloc seeks control through force, ideological continuity, and confrontation.⁷

These approaches cannot coexist in execution.
The moment either faction attempts to operationalize its strategy at scale, it will undermine the other’s power base. This creates forced confrontation, not political competition.
This is the point at which governance transitions into conflict.
 
HOW CIVIL WAR CONDITIONS FORM—AND WHERE IRAN STANDS
Civil war onset requires four converging conditions:

Elite fragmentation
Division within security forces
Sustained public grievance
A triggering event

Iran has already crossed the first three thresholds.²
The remaining condition—fracture within the security apparatus—is now structurally primed.
This shifts the analysis from possibility to trajectory.
 
HOW ESCALATION WILL ACTUALLY BEGIN
Escalation will begin with command inconsistency, not mass violence.

Orders will conflict across institutions.
Enforcement will become uneven.
Security units will default to factional loyalty.

This leads to localized divergence in enforcement and the emergence of selective violence as actors test boundaries.⁸
Once this phase begins, re-centralization becomes unlikely. Conflict evolves into multi-sided competition between state factions and aligned security forces.⁹
 
THE STRUCTURAL FAILURE: THERE ARE NO RULES FOR TRANSITION
Iran lacks:

a clear succession mechanism,
a binding dispute resolution framework, and
a defined structure for control over military authority during contested transitions.

This is not a gap—it is a system-level failure condition.
Systems without institutionalized transition mechanisms are significantly more prone to violent conflict because disputes cannot be resolved within the system.¹⁰
Iran is operating inside that condition now.
 
WHERE CONFLICT WILL EMERGE FIRST
The first fractures will appear inside the state’s enforcement structure, not at its borders.
Indicators include:

conflicting directives within security forces,
divergence between central and regional command, and
selective enforcement aligned with factional interests.

Public unrest will follow—but it is not the origin point.
The primary battlefield is control over force.
 
REGIONAL IMPACT: OIL, ENERGY MARKETS, AND SYSTEMIC SHOCK
A civil war in Iran would immediately translate into a regional and global energy shock.
Iran sits at the center of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of global oil supply flows daily. Any disruption—real or perceived—would rapidly impact global markets.
The escalation pathway is predictable:

Risk Pricing Surge: Oil prices spike immediately based on perceived instability.
Disruption Risk: Fragmented control over military assets increases the threat to tanker traffic.
Regional Spillover: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and United Arab Emirates face elevated security pressure and proxy spillover risks.
External Intervention Pressure: The United States and allies are drawn into maintaining open shipping lanes.

Oil markets do not require actual disruption to destabilize—they respond to credible risk.
A fragmented Iran introduces persistent uncertainty over:

command and control of force,
security of maritime corridors, and
stability of regional infrastructure.

This shifts global energy markets from volatile to structurally unstable.
 
THE HARD TRUTH
Iran is not deciding whether it will fragment. It is determining who will control the fragmentation.
Authority is already contested. Force is the last centralized variable—and it is under pressure.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is the system’s final point of cohesion.

If it holds, the state survives in consolidated form.
If it fractures, the state transitions directly into conflict.

There is no stable middle ground.
 
THE PUBLIC VARIABLE: THE TRIGGER MOST ANALYSIS MISSES
The population is not a passive factor—it is a trigger amplifier.
When information is restricted, dissatisfaction remains fragmented.
When connectivity returns, fragmentation becomes coordination.
At that point:

legitimacy is reassessed,
internal divisions become visible, and
collective action scales rapidly.³

If this occurs during elite fragmentation, the effect is exponential.
The population does not need to defeat the system. It only needs to overload it while divided.
 
WILL CIVIL WAR FORCE A NEW CONSTITUTION—AND WHAT MUST CHANGE
A civil war would make Iran’s current constitutional structure unsustainable—but it does not guarantee effective reform.
The existing system is built on dual sovereignty:

elected institutions, and
unelected authority controlling force.

This separation between legitimacy and coercion is the core instability.
A post-conflict constitution would only stabilize the system if it resolves that contradiction.
At minimum, five structural changes are required:

Unified Control of Force: All military entities, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, must operate under a single civilian-controlled command.
Elimination of Dual Sovereignty: Authority must be consolidated into a clearly defined and accountable structure.
Enforceable Succession Mechanism: Leadership transitions must be rule-based and institutionally enforced.
Judicial and Legislative Constraints: Independent institutions must have real authority to limit power.
Legitimacy Through Participation: Electoral and governance systems must be credible and transparent.

Without these changes, a new constitution would replicate the same instability under a different structure.
 
THE BOTTOM LINE
Iran is on a directional path toward internal conflict unless control over force is re-established.
The decisive variables are clear:

whether the IRGC remains unified, and
whether public mobilization coincides with elite fragmentation.

If force remains centralized, the system stabilizes.
If force fractures, conflict becomes highly likely.
If public mobilization intersects with that fracture, escalation accelerates beyond state control.
At the same time, the consequences extend far beyond Iran:

global energy markets destabilize,
regional security fractures, and
external powers are pulled into containment efforts.

A civil war would likely force constitutional change—but only a restructuring of power and control over force can produce stability.
If that does not occur, conflict will not end with one cycle—it will repeat.
FOOTNOTES (CHICAGO STYLE)

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.
Barbara F. Walter, How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them (New York: Crown, 2022).
Zeynep Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).
Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Ali Alfoneh, Iran Unveiled (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2013).
Suzanne Maloney, Iran’s Political Economy since the Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

 

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