JAFAJ Intelligence Assessment
Date: 29 September 2026
Jordan Shields the Muslim Brotherhood Despite Its U.S. Terrorist Designation
The Jordanian regime claims to have outlawed the Brotherhood while allowing its political, media, financial, and charitable infrastructure to operate and expand
The Jordanian government continues to protect and enable the Muslim Brotherhood despite the United States’ designation of the movement’s Jordanian branch as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity.
President Donald Trump issued an executive order directing his administration to examine the activities of the Brotherhood’s Jordanian, Egyptian, and Lebanese branches. In January 2026, the U.S. Treasury designated the Jordanian and Egyptian branches as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, while the State Department designated the Lebanese branch as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Washington cited the branches’ support for Hamas and other violent activities. Reuters, Associated Press
Amman’s response, however, has been largely cosmetic. The Jordanian government has refused to dismantle the Brotherhood’s political, media, charitable, and financial infrastructure. Instead, it has allowed the movement to continue operating through renamed parties, alternative legal entities, online media platforms, and an extensive social-services network.
The clearest recent example came on 19 September 2026, when the Brotherhood’s political party, formerly known as the Islamic Action Front and now operating as the Umma Party, conducted internal leadership elections openly and without government interference.
This occurred in a country where independent political activism, organised opposition, and criticism of the authorities can result in arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment. Yet the Brotherhood was permitted to assemble hundreds of members, conduct a competitive election, announce the results, broadcast the winner’s speech, and outline plans for expanding the party’s national reach.
This was not the behaviour of an outlawed movement operating underground. It was the public activity of an organisation functioning with the state’s knowledge and permission.
The Election of Muath al-Khawaldeh
Muath al-Khawaldeh was elected secretary-general of the Umma Party after receiving 382 votes, narrowly defeating Ahmad al-Qatawneh, who received 369.
Al-Khawaldeh previously worked as a television presenter for the Brotherhood-affiliated Yarmouk satellite channel. In 2015, he was appointed media spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. He later became an additional member of the Shura Council of the Islamic Action Front, the organisation now rebranded as the Umma Party.
These affiliations are public. Al-Khawaldeh does not conceal them, and the party itself has published parts of his organisational history.
The significance of his election extends beyond the internal politics of the Brotherhood. Al-Khawaldeh is an East Jordanian and a member of the Bani Hassan tribe, one of Jordan’s largest and most politically influential tribal communities. His predecessor, Wael al-Sakka, was of Palestinian origin.
Al-Khawaldeh therefore offers the Brotherhood precisely the profile it currently needs: an established Islamist operative whose tribal background allows the movement to present itself as deeply rooted in the traditional East Jordanian establishment.
This profile gives the Brotherhood political cover. It weakens the argument that the organisation depends primarily upon Palestinian-Jordanian support and enables it to cultivate stronger relationships with tribal communities, state institutions, and regime-aligned constituencies.
A Figure Acceptable to Both the Brotherhood and the State
The Jordanian state and its intelligence establishment clearly permitted the election to proceed. The Brotherhood ultimately selected a figure who is well known to the authorities and whose political and media career developed in full public view.
Jordanian activist Samer al-Qassem previously described al-Khawaldeh to JAFAJ as connected to the Jordanian intelligence establishment, characterising him in local terminology as an informant. JAFAJ cannot independently verify that characterisation. Nevertheless, sustained access to Jordan’s political media environment and advancement through sensitive Islamist institutions would be extremely difficult without the authorities’ knowledge and tolerance.
Al-Khawaldeh consequently appears to be a consensus figure: trusted by the Brotherhood because of his longstanding organisational credentials and acceptable to the regime because of his tribal background, public positioning, and perceived familiarity with the state establishment.
His election illustrates a central reality of Jordanian politics: the marriage between the Hashemite regime and the Muslim Brotherhood remains intact.
The two sides do not need to agree ideologically. Their relationship is based on mutual political utility.
The Brotherhood gives the regime an organised mechanism for containing and directing public anger, particularly within Jordan’s Palestinian-majority population. In return, the regime allows the Brotherhood to retain its political organisation, charitable institutions, media presence, financial networks, and grassroots mobilisation capacity.
The relationship is therefore not one of genuine confrontation. It is a managed partnership in which periods of public tension conceal continuing cooperation behind the scenes.
What Al-Khawaldeh’s Speech Revealed
Al-Khawaldeh’s victory speech offered a clear outline of the party’s intended direction. He declared the internal election finished, called for organisational unity, praised the outgoing leadership, and promised to strengthen the party and build broader national partnerships.
More importantly, his remarks confirmed that the organisation’s ideological foundations remain unchanged.
His principal messages included:
Strengthening the party’s internal structure and expanding its national presence.
Building alliances with other Jordanian political and social forces.
Treating the Palestinian cause as both a religious obligation and a central component of Jordanian politics.
Supporting what he described as the Palestinian “resistance.
Rejecting “Israel’s integration into the region.” in reference to the Abrahamic accords.
Supporting the Jordanian regime’s opposition to the so-called “alternative homeland.”, the Jordan is Palestine concept.
Presenting the party as loyal to Jordan and supportive of the Jordanian military against external threats.
The speech was carefully constructed to serve two audiences. Its references to resistance, liberation, religious duty, and Palestine reassured the Brotherhood’s Islamist base. Its declarations of loyalty to Jordan, support for the army, and opposition to the “alternative homeland” reassured the regime.
This combination is the essence of the Brotherhood’s political formula in Jordan: Islamist mobilisation without directly threatening the monarchy.
Al-Khawaldeh’s endorsement of the regime’s position on the “alternative homeland” is particularly significant. The Jordanian government has long used this slogan to justify denying the country’s Palestinian majority full political representation and basic political rights. The Brotherhood’s adoption of the same argument helps the regime present political discrimination as a necessary measure to protect both Jordan and the Palestinian cause.
The arrangement serves both parties. The regime uses the Brotherhood to discipline and control the Palestinian street. The Brotherhood, in exchange, receives institutional protection and room to organise.
Rebranding Without Ideological Change
The conversion of the Islamic Action Front into the Umma Party should not be mistaken for ideological moderation. It is better understood as a political rebranding operation.
The organisation has changed its name, adjusted its public messaging, and placed greater emphasis on national partnerships and cross-community engagement. These changes appear designed to soften its image abroad, particularly in Washington, following the American terrorist designation.
Al-Khawaldeh is ideally positioned to lead that effort. His East Jordanian identity, membership in the Bani Hassan tribe, Brotherhood credentials, and acceptability to the state allow the movement to market itself as an indigenous Jordanian political party rather than the local branch of a transnational Islamist organisation.
His speech, however, demonstrated ideological continuity. He repeatedly referred to the party’s religious mission, the Palestinian “resistance,” liberation, and opposition to Israel’s regional integration.
The presentation has changed. The political project has not.
The Fiction of Jordan’s 2025 Ban
In 2025, the Jordanian government announced that it had banned the Muslim Brotherhood. The measure was presented internationally as decisive action against the organisation.
In practice, the government closed the Brotherhood “Society,” an entity that had already been effectively defunct since 2021, while allowing the movement’s active political, social, charitable, and organisational structures to continue operating through other legal vehicles.
The distinction between the defunct “Society” and the functioning “Association” allowed Amman to claim that it had outlawed the Brotherhood without dismantling the Brotherhood itself.
This legal manoeuvre appears intended to mislead both Israel and the United States. Jordan could publicly advertise a crackdown while privately preserving the movement’s operational infrastructure.
The September 2026 leadership election exposes the fiction behind that supposed ban. An organisation that has genuinely been prohibited cannot openly assemble hundreds of members, conduct leadership elections, publish the results, broadcast the new leader’s speech, and announce plans for national expansion.
Jordan did not dismantle the Brotherhood. It reorganised the legal framework under which the Brotherhood could continue operating.
The Brotherhood’s Media and Financial Infrastructure Remains Operational
The Jordanian government continues to permit the Brotherhood newspaper Al-Sabeel to publish online, despite previously presenting its closure as part of the campaign against the movement.
The continued operation of Al-Sabeel gives the Brotherhood an established platform for communicating with supporters, shaping political narratives, and influencing public opinion.
This tolerance becomes more revealing when compared with the restrictions imposed on independent journalists, opposition activists, and unauthorised political platforms. The state suppresses political voices it cannot control while preserving the Brotherhood’s media operation.
The difference is not accidental. The regime appears to regard the Brotherhood’s media network as manageable and politically useful. At the same time, the Brotherhood’s financial and social arm, the Islamic Charity Center, which JAFAJ estimates controls or administers assets and operations worth approximately $6 billion, continues collecting donations, providing social assistance, supporting the movement’s ranks, cultivating community loyalty, and preserving the Brotherhood’s nationwide recruitment and patronage network with the full knowledge of the Jordanian authorities.
A Long-Term Strategy for Political Power
The election of al-Khawaldeh was a strategically significant move. His tribal identity, East Jordanian background, Brotherhood credentials, and perceived acceptability to the security establishment make him well suited to the organisation’s next political phase.
The Brotherhood’s strategy has always depended on patience. It has little reason to confront the monarchy directly when gradual entry into the state’s political structure offers a safer and potentially more effective path to power.
Under al-Khawaldeh, the movement may be positioning itself to become a formal partner in a future Jordanian government, or eventually to dominate such a government, while presenting itself as a loyal, East Jordanian national party rather than a branch of an international Islamist movement.
This would allow the Brotherhood to advance toward power with the cooperation of the same regime that claims to have banned it.
Assessment
Jordan’s policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood cannot credibly be described as passive tolerance. The regime is actively preserving the conditions under which the organisation can survive, reorganise, recruit, and expand.
Amman claims to have outlawed the Brotherhood while permitting its political party to conduct elections, its newspaper to operate online, and its multibillion-dollar financial and charitable arm to collect donations and maintain the movement’s social base.
Meanwhile, political actors outside this protected arrangement face detention and prosecution for activities far less organised and far less consequential.
The contradiction is deliberate. The Jordanian government wants Washington and Jerusalem to believe that it is confronting the Brotherhood while retaining the organisation as an instrument of domestic political control.
The marriage between the Jordanian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood therefore remains strong. It has merely entered a new phase, one defined by legal camouflage, organisational rebranding, and increasingly sophisticated political coordination.
The Brotherhood in Jordan is not weaker than it was before the supposed ban. It is better positioned, more carefully packaged, and more deeply integrated into the political order protected by the regime.