JAFAJ Strategic Intelligence Assessment
July 29, 2026
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The passing of Senator Lindsey Graham marks the end of one of the most influential congressional voices on Middle East policy in a generation. For more than two decades, Graham served as an advocate for the U.S.-Israel alliance, a strong supporter of Arab-Israeli normalization, and a trusted interlocutor among American, Israeli, and Gulf leaders. His funeral, attended by President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, underscored the breadth of his international relationships and his influence beyond Capitol Hill.
Yet Graham’s death raises a broader strategic question:
Who now becomes the principal political champion of the Abraham Accords?
JAFAJ assesses that this is the wrong question.
The more consequential issue is not who replaces Senator Graham, but whether the Abraham Accords have matured beyond requiring a single American political champion. JAFAJ assesses with high confidence that they have. The strategic incentives driving normalization—shared concerns over Iranian regional ambitions, expanding economic integration, technological cooperation, and collective security—are now rooted more deeply in the national interests of participating governments than in the influence of any individual policymaker.
Consequently, leadership of the Accords is expected to become progressively more decentralized, shifting from individual political advocates toward an institutional network of governments, military establishments, intelligence services, financial institutions, and private-sector partnerships whose shared interests make the normalization process substantially more resilient than during its initial phase.
ANALYTICAL CONFIDENCE
Unless otherwise noted, JAFAJ’s principal judgments in this assessment are made with moderate to high confidence.
Confidence levels reflect the quality of available information, the consistency of observable regional developments, historical patterns of state behavior, and the degree to which multiple independent indicators support a given assessment. High confidence does not imply certainty; rather, it reflects a judgment that available evidence strongly supports the conclusion while recognizing that unforeseen political, military, or diplomatic developments could alter future outcomes.
Specific forecasts involving future leadership decisions, Saudi normalization, and regional political dynamics necessarily carry greater uncertainty than assessments regarding established institutional trends.
KEY JUDGMENTS
- JAFAJ assesses with high confidence that Senator Lindsey Graham’s passing will not materially alter the long-term trajectory of the Abraham Accords. The strategic drivers supporting normalization have become increasingly institutional and are no longer dependent upon a single American political leader.
- JAFAJ assesses that the center of gravity for Arab-Israeli normalization is shifting from Washington toward regional capitals, particularly Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi, and eventually Riyadh, where national interests increasingly drive policy decisions.
- JAFAJ assesses with moderate confidence that Saudi Arabia remains the decisive strategic variable. Formal Saudi participation would fundamentally reshape the Middle East’s political, economic, and security architecture while encouraging additional Muslim-majority states to consider normalization.
- JAFAJ assesses with high confidence that Iran will continue efforts to impede normalization efforts through proxy organizations, cyber operations, diplomatic pressure, and information campaigns as regional security cooperation deepens.
- The future success of the Abraham Accords will be measured less by additional signing ceremonies than by the depth of practical integration in intelligence sharing, missile defense, trade, critical infrastructure, technology, and investment.
THE END OF A CONGRESSIONAL ERA
Senator Lindsey Graham occupied a role in American foreign policy that extended well beyond the traditional responsibilities of a legislator. While formal diplomacy remained the responsibility of the executive branch, Graham became one of Washington’s most effective unofficial strategic intermediaries, maintaining trusted relationships with presidents, Israeli leaders, Gulf monarchies, senior military officials, and congressional leadership.
This unique network allowed Graham to reinforce American policy through personal diplomacy. His influence frequently derived not from statutory authority, but from credibility, access, and the confidence he enjoyed among regional decision-makers. In an era when political polarization increasingly complicated bipartisan foreign policy, Graham remained one of the few members of Congress capable of communicating directly with multiple centers of power while retaining influence across successive presidential administrations.
From an intelligence perspective, Graham’s strategic value rested in his ability to reduce political friction between governments pursuing common security objectives. He helped translate executive policy into sustained congressional support while simultaneously providing regional partners with confidence that American commitments extended beyond changes in presidential administrations.
His passing therefore represents more than the loss of an experienced senator.
It marks the disappearance of one of the last American policymakers whose influence depended as much upon enduring personal relationships as formal institutional authority.
Whether another individual can replicate that role is uncertain.
Whether that role is still necessary is the central question examined in this assessment.
THE ABRAHAM ACCORDS HAVE MOVED BEYOND THEIR FOUNDERS
The Abraham Accords no longer depend on any single American political figure.
Since their signing in 2020, normalization has expanded beyond symbolic diplomatic recognition into practical cooperation. Intelligence sharing, defense coordination, investment, energy development, cybersecurity, tourism, artificial intelligence, and technology partnerships have become central components of regional engagement.
These developments have created vested interests among participating governments, private industry, and security institutions. As a result, the Accords have become increasingly resilient to changes in political leadership.
The fundamental strategic logic that produced the Accords remains largely unchanged:
- concern over Iran’s regional ambitions,
- economic diversification across Gulf economies,
- technological cooperation with Israel,
- enhanced regional security,
- and continued American engagement in the Middle East.
These drivers continue to exist regardless of congressional turnover.
WHY THIS MATTERS
The evolution of the Abraham Accords carries implications well beyond Arab-Israeli relations.
For the United States, successful normalization represents an opportunity to transition from direct regional management toward a security model in which capable regional partners assume greater responsibility for collective defense, intelligence cooperation, maritime security, critical infrastructure protection, and economic resilience. Such a transition has the potential to reduce demands on American military resources while preserving U.S. strategic influence in one of the world’s most consequential regions.
Conversely, failure of the normalization process would likely reinforce longstanding regional rivalries, expand opportunities for Iranian influence, complicate efforts to counter violent extremist organizations, and increase the probability that future crises require more direct American diplomatic or military involvement.
Accordingly, the future of the Abraham Accords should be viewed not simply as a regional diplomatic initiative, but as a significant indicator of whether the Middle East is moving toward a more self-sustaining security architecture or returning to a pattern of recurring instability that places greater demands upon the United States and its allies.
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
The death of Senator Lindsey Graham is significant not because it creates a vacancy in the United States Senate, but because it marks the passing of one of the last American policymakers who exercised influence through personal diplomacy as much as legislative authority.
For more than two decades, Graham occupied a unique position within American foreign policy. He maintained direct relationships with presidents, Israeli prime ministers, Gulf monarchs, senior military commanders, and congressional leadership. In many respects, he functioned as an unofficial strategic intermediary—someone capable of carrying messages, building consensus, and reinforcing U.S. commitments outside formal diplomatic channels.
The more important strategic question, however, is not who replaces Lindsey Graham.
It is whether the center of gravity in Middle East diplomacy has permanently shifted away from Washington.
When the Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, American leadership was indispensable. Today, the political, economic, and security incentives supporting normalization increasingly originate within the region itself. Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and potentially Saudi Arabia now possess independent national interests that encourage continued cooperation regardless of which party controls Congress or who occupies individual Senate seats.
If that assessment is correct, then Graham’s passing represents something larger than the loss of a respected senator. It marks the symbolic conclusion of an era in which American political leadership served as the principal engine of Arab-Israeli normalization. The next phase will be driven less by Washington and more by the strategic calculations of Jerusalem, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Cairo, and Amman.
That evolution may ultimately prove to be the Abraham Accords’ greatest achievement. Diplomatic agreements become durable not when they are protected by political personalities, but when participating nations conclude that cooperation advances their national interests more effectively than confrontation.
The first phase of the Accords demonstrated that diplomatic normalization between Israel and Arab states was politically possible. The second phase will determine whether normalization evolves into a permanent regional security architecture capable of surviving changes in governments, elections, military crises, and leadership transitions.
This distinction is significant.
The strategic value of the Abraham Accords no longer rests primarily on diplomatic recognition. It now rests on integrated missile defense, intelligence cooperation, cybersecurity partnerships, joint military planning, infrastructure investment, artificial intelligence, water security, energy development, and expanding commercial ties. As these relationships deepen, the political cost of reversing normalization increases substantially for participating governments.
Iran’s Strategic Dilemma
For Tehran, the Abraham Accords represent more than a diplomatic setback; they threaten a core element of Iran’s long-term regional strategy.
For decades, Iranian policy has benefited from a fragmented Middle East in which Arab governments viewed Israel primarily as a political adversary rather than a strategic partner. That division complicated regional security cooperation, limited intelligence sharing, and reduced the likelihood of a coordinated response to Iranian military activities or proxy operations.
The Abraham Accords gradually reverse those conditions.
As normalization expands, regional governments gain stronger incentives to coordinate intelligence, integrate missile-defense capabilities, improve maritime security, protect critical infrastructure, and develop common approaches to emerging cyber threats. Each additional layer of institutional cooperation increases the strategic cost to Iran of coercive diplomacy and proxy warfare.
Consequently, Tehran’s objective extends beyond preventing additional normalization agreements. Iran has a broader interest in preventing the emergence of a durable regional security architecture capable of coordinating political, military, economic, and intelligence activities among Israel, Gulf states, and the United States.
From an intelligence perspective, this distinction is important.
Iran is likely to oppose not only new diplomatic agreements but also the quieter expansion of joint military planning, intelligence cooperation, infrastructure investment, technology partnerships, and integrated defense systems that collectively give the Abraham Accords their long-term strategic value.
Hamas faces a parallel dilemma.
The organization’s political legitimacy has long rested upon the assumption that widespread Arab acceptance of Israel would remain impossible until the Palestinian issue was resolved. Every additional normalization initiative weakens that narrative while shifting regional priorities toward economic development, technological cooperation, and collective security. Consequently, Hamas retains a strong incentive to disrupt normalization through violence, political agitation, or actions intended to trigger broader regional confrontation.
Jordan and Egypt occupy a different strategic position. Both governments have longstanding peace agreements with Israel and are likely to continue serving as stabilizing actors. Neither is expected to lead expansion of the Abraham Accords, but both have significant interests in preventing regional escalation, preserving economic stability, and maintaining close security cooperation with the United States and Israel. Their continued participation lends institutional credibility to the broader normalization process.
The decisive variable remains Saudi Arabia.
No country possesses greater potential to reshape the strategic balance of the Middle East. Saudi accession to the Abraham Accords would extend normalization beyond bilateral diplomacy into the political and religious center of the Arab world. Such a development would likely encourage additional Muslim-majority nations to reconsider their own relationships with Israel while accelerating regional investment, transportation, technology, and defense integration. Although substantial political obstacles remain—including security guarantees, Palestinian governance, and regional stability—the strategic incentives for eventual Saudi participation continue to grow.
The United Arab Emirates is expected to remain the practical engine of the Accords. Abu Dhabi has consistently demonstrated that normalization can produce measurable economic and technological benefits while maintaining pragmatic relations with multiple regional actors. The UAE model increasingly serves as a template for other governments evaluating the long-term advantages of normalization.
Taken together, these developments suggest that leadership of the Abraham Accords is becoming increasingly decentralized. Rather than relying on a single American political champion, the initiative is evolving into a network of governments, defense establishments, intelligence services, financial institutions, and private-sector partnerships that collectively possess far greater resilience than any individual political figure.
JAFAJ Assessment
History may ultimately conclude that Lindsey Graham’s greatest contribution to the Abraham Accords was not his advocacy for their creation, but his role in helping move them beyond the point where they depended upon him. Successful geopolitical initiatives become enduring not because their architects remain in office, but because participating nations conclude that cooperation serves their national interests better than confrontation.
The Abraham Accords appear to be approaching that threshold. If this assessment proves correct, Graham’s passing will mark the end of an important chapter in Middle East diplomacy—not the end of the story, but the beginning of a new phase in which the success of normalization will be measured not by political speeches or signing ceremonies, but by the strength of the strategic institutions that emerge in their wake.
WHO IS MOST LIKELY TO PICK UP THE LEAD?
The search for a single successor to Senator Lindsey Graham may overstate the importance of individual leadership.
JAFAJ assesses that the future of the Abraham Accords will depend less upon identifying another congressional champion than upon the ability of multiple institutions to sustain strategic momentum simultaneously. The White House will continue shaping executive policy, Congress will provide legislative oversight and political support, regional governments will determine the pace of normalization, defense establishments will deepen military cooperation, and private-sector investment will reinforce the economic incentives that make normalization increasingly durable.
Accordingly, leadership of the Abraham Accords is expected to become increasingly distributed rather than concentrated.
Instead of asking who replaces Lindsey Graham, policymakers should ask which leaders are best positioned to advance specific components of the normalization agenda. The following individuals are therefore assessed as the most influential contributors to the Accords’ next phase—not as Graham’s successors, but as leaders whose respective institutions collectively shape the future of regional normalization.
President Donald Trump
If any individual assumes Graham’s role as the public face of normalization, it will almost certainly be President Trump.
The Abraham Accords remain one of the signature foreign-policy achievements of his administration, and current diplomatic efforts suggest the White House continues to view expansion of the Accords as a strategic priority. Trump’s direct relationships with Gulf leaders, combined with his close ties to Prime Minister Netanyahu, give him unmatched leverage in shaping the next phase of regional diplomacy.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio
The day-to-day diplomatic effort is likely to fall increasingly to Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
Rubio combines strong congressional foreign-policy credentials with longstanding support for Israel and an emphasis on countering Iranian influence. As Secretary of State, he is positioned to translate presidential objectives into sustained diplomatic engagement with regional partners.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
No leader has invested more political capital in expanding regional normalization than Netanyahu.
Israel views additional normalization agreements not simply as diplomatic victories but as components of a broader regional security architecture. Netanyahu is therefore expected to remain one of the strongest advocates for expanding the Accords, particularly with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
Saudi Arabia remains the strategic prize.
If Riyadh ultimately joins the Abraham Accords, it would fundamentally alter the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Although normalization remains tied to broader regional security considerations and Palestinian issues, Saudi participation would likely encourage additional Arab and Muslim-majority nations to follow.
For that reason, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman may ultimately become the most influential regional figure in determining the Accords’ future.
CAN CONGRESS PRODUCE ANOTHER GRAHAM?
Perhaps not another Lindsey Graham—but Congress is unlikely to leave the position vacant.
Graham’s greatest strength was not simply his voting record. He combined foreign-policy expertise, personal relationships with world leaders, credibility within the national security community, and direct access to multiple presidential administrations. Those qualities are difficult to replicate in a single individual.
Instead, JAFAJ assesses that responsibility will likely be shared among several senior lawmakers.
- Senator Tom Cotton (Arkansas)
Tom Cotton is perhaps the most likely successor from a national security perspective.
A former Army officer with extensive experience on defense and intelligence issues, Cotton has consistently supported Israel, advocated a hard line against Iran, and maintained strong credibility within Republican foreign-policy circles. While he lacks Graham’s decades-long diplomatic relationships, he possesses many of the strategic credentials necessary to become one of Congress’s leading voices on Middle East security.
- Senator Ted Cruz (Texas)
Ted Cruz has become one of the Senate’s most outspoken defenders of Israel and has repeatedly supported expanding Arab-Israeli normalization.
His influence extends beyond legislation through his visibility in conservative media and his ability to mobilize political support among Republican voters. Cruz is likely to continue championing policies that strengthen the Abraham Accords and counter Iranian regional influence.
- Senator Jim Risch (Idaho)
As Chairman (or senior Republican leader, depending on Senate organization) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jim Risch may ultimately exercise the greatest institutional influence.
Unlike Graham, Risch generally operates with less public visibility, but his committee position gives him substantial authority over foreign-policy legislation, diplomatic oversight, and confirmation of senior State Department officials. His influence may prove more procedural than political, yet no less significant.
JAFAJ Assessment
Rather than producing another Lindsey Graham, Congress is more likely to divide his responsibilities among multiple senators—one providing strategic vision, another public advocacy, and another institutional leadership. The result may actually produce a more durable congressional foundation for the Abraham Accords.
STRATEGIC BENEFICIARIES AND LOSERS
Major geopolitical developments rarely produce equal outcomes. The continuing evolution of the Abraham Accords is expected to redistribute political influence, economic opportunity, and regional security advantages across the Middle East. As leadership transitions following Senator Graham’s passing, JAFAJ assesses that the following actors are positioned to gain—or lose—the most over the next five years.
Strategic Beneficiaries
Israel
Israel remains the principal long-term beneficiary of expanding normalization. Every additional Arab partner reduces Israel’s diplomatic isolation while increasing regional intelligence cooperation, missile defense integration, trade, tourism, and investment. Most importantly, normalization allows Israel to shift greater strategic attention from regional legitimacy toward confronting shared security threats.
Saudi Arabia
If Riyadh ultimately joins the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia could emerge as the political center of a new regional security framework. Participation would expand access to Israeli technology, strengthen defense cooperation with the United States, attract additional foreign investment, and reinforce the Kingdom’s role as a leading Arab power.
United Arab Emirates
The UAE has already demonstrated that normalization can generate measurable economic returns. As additional nations consider participation, Abu Dhabi is well positioned to become the financial, technological, and logistical hub connecting Israel with the broader Gulf region.
The United States
Although leadership may become increasingly regional, the United States remains the indispensable external security guarantor. A broader normalization network reduces the long-term burden on U.S. forces by encouraging regional partners to assume greater responsibility for collective security while preserving American strategic influence.
Strategic Losers
Iran
Iran faces the greatest strategic challenge.
The Abraham Accords steadily weaken Tehran’s long-standing objective of preventing cooperation between Israel and Arab governments. Every new security partnership reduces Iran’s ability to isolate Israel diplomatically while increasing the possibility of coordinated regional responses to Iranian military or proxy activities.
Hamas
Hamas derives much of its political legitimacy from opposition to normalization. As additional Arab governments deepen cooperation with Israel, Hamas risks increasing political isolation unless it can successfully reframe the regional debate or disrupt normalization through renewed conflict.
Hezbollah
A stronger regional security architecture—particularly one emphasizing intelligence sharing and integrated air and missile defense—would reduce Hezbollah’s operational freedom and complicate Iran’s ability to project influence through Lebanese territory.
Extremist Organizations
Militant organizations that depend upon perpetual regional instability are likely to encounter greater intelligence cooperation, improved border security, enhanced financial monitoring, and broader diplomatic coordination among participating states.
JAFAJ Net Assessment
The strategic balance is gradually shifting away from ideological confrontation and toward pragmatic cooperation based on shared national interests. The principal beneficiaries are governments seeking stability, investment, technological development, and collective security. The principal losers are those whose political influence depends upon sustaining regional conflict and preventing Arab-Israeli cooperation.
STRATEGIC OUTLOOK
The Middle East is entering a transition from conflict management to strategic competition.
Military operations will remain important, but the principal contest over the next decade may center on diplomacy, economic integration, technological cooperation, and regional security alliances.
Israel
Israel will almost certainly continue making expansion of the Abraham Accords one of its highest foreign-policy priorities.
Jerusalem is expected to deepen defense cooperation with existing partners, expand intelligence sharing, pursue additional regional infrastructure projects, and continue encouraging Saudi participation. Israeli leaders increasingly view normalization as a long-term national security strategy rather than simply a diplomatic achievement.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia remains the decisive strategic prize.
Should Riyadh formally recognize Israel, the geopolitical balance of the Middle East would shift dramatically. Such a decision would likely encourage additional Muslim-majority nations to consider normalization while accelerating regional investment, technology partnerships, aviation links, and energy cooperation.
United Arab Emirates
The UAE will likely continue serving as the Accords’ economic engine.
Abu Dhabi is expected to expand investment partnerships with Israel while carefully maintaining working economic relations with Iran. This balanced approach reflects the UAE’s broader strategy of maximizing regional stability without becoming overly dependent on any single alliance.
Jordan
Jordan is expected to remain one of the region’s most cautious partners.
Amman’s security relationship with Israel remains essential, yet domestic political sensitivities surrounding the Palestinian issue will likely limit the government’s willingness to embrace highly visible normalization initiatives. Jordan will probably continue emphasizing regional stability, border security, water cooperation, and intelligence coordination while avoiding steps that could inflame internal opposition.
Egypt
Egypt is likely to continue serving as a diplomatic mediator.
Cairo maintains long-standing peace with Israel and remains indispensable in negotiations involving Gaza, border security, and ceasefire arrangements. Egypt’s role as an intermediary between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Arab governments is expected to grow as regional diplomacy becomes increasingly complex.
Hamas
Hamas faces perhaps its most uncertain strategic environment since taking control of Gaza.
Military losses, international isolation, and growing pressure from Arab governments could significantly reduce its political influence. To remain relevant, Hamas may seek to disrupt normalization through renewed violence, propaganda campaigns, or efforts to provoke broader regional crises. The organization understands that every new normalization agreement weakens its long-standing narrative that Israel cannot be accepted within the Arab world.
Iran
Iran remains the Abraham Accords’ principal strategic opponent.
Tehran views normalization as an effort to build an informal regional coalition designed to contain Iranian influence. Consequently, Iran is expected to continue employing proxy organizations, cyber capabilities, diplomatic pressure, and asymmetric operations to discourage additional Arab participation.
Iran’s broader objective is unlikely to change: preventing the emergence of a unified regional security architecture aligned with the United States and Israel.
Syria
The trajectory of Syria will depend largely on the durability of its current political transition and the extent of external influence.
If the new government consolidates authority, Damascus may prioritize reconstruction, sanctions relief, and regional reintegration over confrontation with Israel. However, unresolved territorial disputes, Iranian influence, and internal security challenges could continue to complicate any movement toward broader regional normalization. Syria is therefore more likely to remain an observer than an active participant in the Abraham Accords over the near term.
Turkey
Turkey is expected to continue balancing strategic competition with pragmatic engagement.
Ankara will likely maintain support for the Palestinian cause while preserving economic ties with Israel and seeking to expand its regional influence. Turkish policy will probably remain transactional, adjusting to changes in regional security and domestic political priorities rather than aligning fully with or against the Abraham Accords.
MONITORING INDICATORS
Intelligence assessments should be judged not only by the logic of their conclusions but also by whether observable developments support or contradict those judgments. JAFAJ identifies the following indicators as the most important measures of whether the Abraham Accords continue to gain strategic momentum over the next five years.
Indicator 1 — Saudi Arabia’s Diplomatic Position
The single most significant indicator will be Riyadh’s willingness to expand formal or informal cooperation with Israel. Progress in security coordination, civil aviation, commercial investment, technology partnerships, or public diplomatic engagement would suggest that normalization continues moving forward despite political obstacles.
Indicator 2 — Regional Defense Integration
Increasing cooperation in missile defense, intelligence sharing, cybersecurity, naval security, and joint military planning would demonstrate that the Abraham Accords are evolving beyond diplomacy into a functional regional security architecture.
Indicator 3 — Economic Integration
Growth in bilateral trade, cross-border investment, transportation links, tourism, energy projects, artificial intelligence partnerships, and digital infrastructure will provide measurable evidence that participating governments view normalization as a long-term strategic investment rather than a temporary political initiative.
Indicator 4 — Iranian Response
Changes in Iranian proxy activity, cyber operations, political messaging, and diplomatic initiatives should be closely monitored. An increase in efforts to disrupt regional cooperation would suggest that Tehran views continued normalization as a growing strategic threat.
Indicator 5 — Congressional Engagement
The degree to which Congress continues supporting security cooperation, defense assistance, and normalization initiatives following Senator Graham’s passing will provide an important measure of whether bipartisan institutional support remains durable.
Indicator 6 — Expansion of Participation
Formal participation by additional Arab or Muslim-majority states—or significant movement toward such participation—would represent one of the strongest indicators that the Abraham Accords have become a durable feature of the regional political landscape rather than a temporary diplomatic achievement.
JAFAJ Intelligence Assessment
If these indicators continue to trend positively over the next five years, the Abraham Accords will likely be remembered not simply as a diplomatic breakthrough, but as the foundation of a new Middle Eastern security and economic order. Conversely, sustained deterioration across multiple indicators would suggest that normalization remains vulnerable to political change, regional conflict, or renewed great-power competition.
ALTERNATIVE ASSESSMENTS
While JAFAJ assesses that the Abraham Accords are becoming increasingly institutionalized, alternative outcomes remain plausible.
One competing assessment argues that the Accords remain heavily dependent upon sustained American political leadership. Under this view, changes in U.S. foreign policy, shifting congressional priorities, prolonged regional conflict, or renewed disagreement over the Palestinian issue could significantly slow or even reverse the pace of normalization.
A second assessment suggests that normalization may continue economically while stalling politically. Governments could expand trade, investment, technology partnerships, and security cooperation without pursuing additional formal diplomatic recognition, resulting in a less visible—but still meaningful—evolution of the Accords.
JAFAJ considers both outcomes possible.
However, current evidence favors the assessment that institutional cooperation is expanding more rapidly than political rhetoric. Growing defense coordination, intelligence sharing, infrastructure investment, and commercial integration suggest that normalization increasingly rests upon enduring strategic interests rather than temporary political alignment.
Consequently, JAFAJ assesses that the long-term trajectory of the Abraham Accords remains positive, although the pace of expansion will likely vary according to regional security conditions and domestic political developments.
JAFAJ STRATEGIC FORECAST (2026–2031)
JAFAJ assesses that the defining challenge of the next five years is no longer achieving normalization, but consolidating it.
The strategic objective has shifted from negotiating diplomatic recognition to building durable institutions capable of sustaining defense cooperation, intelligence integration, economic development, technological innovation, and regional security regardless of future political leadership or changes in government.
Over the next five years, the defining indicators will not be the number of signing ceremonies but the depth of cooperation in missile defense, intelligence sharing, cybersecurity, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, energy, trade, and transportation.
Lindsey Graham’s passing closes an important chapter in the Accords’ political history. The more consequential question is no longer who replaces Lindsey Graham, but whether the strategic interests binding Israel, the Gulf states, and the United States have become strong enough to make the Abraham Accords effectively irreversible.
JAFAJ FINAL ASSESSMENT
The death of Senator Lindsey Graham closes an important chapter in the history of the Abraham Accords, but it is unlikely to alter their long-term trajectory. The strategic forces that produced normalization in 2020 are stronger today than they were at the time of the Accords’ signing. Shared concerns over Iranian regional ambitions, expanding economic integration, technological cooperation, and evolving regional security requirements continue to reinforce incentives for cooperation among participating states.
The more significant development is the changing nature of leadership itself.
During the first phase of the Abraham Accords, American political leadership provided the diplomatic momentum necessary to overcome decades of mistrust. The next phase is expected to be driven increasingly by regional governments pursuing their own national interests. As the practical benefits of cooperation expand—from missile defense and intelligence sharing to trade, investment, artificial intelligence, and critical infrastructure—the Accords become progressively more resistant to changes in political leadership in Washington or elsewhere.
For that reason, Senator Graham’s passing should not be viewed as a test of whether another American politician can assume his role. The more important test is whether the institutions created during the first phase of normalization have matured sufficiently to sustain strategic cooperation without relying upon a single political champion.
JAFAJ assesses with high confidence that they have.
This judgment does not imply that future setbacks are unlikely. Armed conflict, domestic political change, leadership transitions, shifts in U.S. policy, or renewed great-power competition could all slow or complicate the pace of normalization. Nevertheless, the underlying incentives encouraging cooperation among Israel, several Arab governments, and the United States appear stronger than the political forces seeking to reverse them.
History rarely identifies the precise moment when a diplomatic initiative becomes permanent. More often, that transformation is recognized only in retrospect, after institutions prove capable of surviving wars, elections, and changes in leadership.
JAFAJ assesses that the Abraham Accords are approaching that threshold.
If this assessment proves correct, Lindsey Graham’s enduring legacy will not be that he championed the Abraham Accords. It will be that he helped advance them to the point where their future depended less on individual leadership than on the strategic interests of the nations themselves.
The defining question for the next decade is therefore no longer whether the Abraham Accords will survive.
It is whether they will become the foundation upon which a new Middle Eastern security order is built.
This article is an analytical assessment. Forecasts and judgments represent JAFAJ’s strategic analysis based on current diplomatic developments, public statements, and observable regional trends, rather than predictions of future events.