Nine Presidents. One Strategy: How Every Administration Has Tried To Contain Iran

For nearly half a century, every American president—from Jimmy Carter to Donald Trump—has confronted the same strategic dilemma: How do you contain Iran’s regional ambitions without becoming trapped in another major Middle East war? Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution transformed Iran from a close American ally into one of Washington’s principal geopolitical adversaries, successive administrations have pursued remarkably similar strategic objectives despite significant differences in political philosophy and foreign policy doctrine.¹

Administrations have changed. Political parties have alternated in power. Strategies have evolved from diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions to covert operations, military deterrence, coalition-building, cyber operations, and direct military strikes. Yet the underlying objective has remained consistent: **limit Iran’s ability to project power, protect American interests and allies, prevent nuclear proliferation, and avoid a large-scale conventional war in the Middle East.**²

The methods have changed far more than the mission. Every administration has adjusted its tactical approach in response to changing regional circumstances—from the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf Wars to the Global War on Terror, the rise of Iranian-backed proxy organizations, and renewed competition among major powers. Each president inherited a strategic environment shaped largely by the decisions of previous administrations while confronting new crises that required adapting, rather than abandoning, the broader policy of containment.³

The cumulative cost of that strategy has been substantial. Over nearly five decades, the United States has invested hundreds of billions—and likely well over one trillion—dollars in military deployments, intelligence operations, sanctions enforcement, missile defense systems, maritime security, coalition operations, and regional partnerships. Thousands of American service members have lost their lives in conflicts directly or indirectly connected to Iran’s expanding regional influence, while countless others have served in one of the longest continuous security commitments in modern American history.⁴

 

President Jimmy Carter (1977–1981): Isolation Begins

The modern U.S. strategy of containing Iran began with the collapse of one of America’s closest Middle Eastern alliances. The 1979 Islamic Revolution overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, replacing a pro-Western monarchy with the Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The revolution fundamentally altered the strategic balance in the Persian Gulf, transforming Iran from a regional partner into one of Washington’s principal geopolitical adversaries. President Jimmy Carter responded by suspending military cooperation, freezing Iranian assets held in the United States, imposing economic sanctions, and ultimately severing diplomatic relations after Iranian militants seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979.⁵

The ensuing hostage crisis became one of the defining foreign policy challenges of Carter’s presidency. Fifty-two American diplomats and citizens were held captive for 444 days while repeated diplomatic negotiations failed to secure their release. As international pressure mounted, Carter authorized Operation Eagle Claw, a complex joint military rescue mission launched on April 24, 1980. Mechanical failures, severe weather, and operational complications forced the mission’s cancellation at a remote desert staging site known as Desert One. During the withdrawal, a collision between an RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter and a U.S. Air Force EC-130 transport aircraft killed eight American servicemen and destroyed both aircraft. The failed operation exposed significant shortcomings in U.S. joint special operations capabilities and directly influenced the later creation of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and improvements in interservice coordination.⁶

At the same time, Carter fundamentally reshaped American strategic doctrine in the Middle East. In his January 1980 State of the Union Address, he announced what became known as the Carter Doctrine, declaring that any attempt by an outside power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and would be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. Although originally intended to deter Soviet expansion following the invasion of Afghanistan, the doctrine became the foundation for four decades of sustained American military engagement in the Gulf and provided the strategic framework within which future administrations would confront Iran.⁷

Human Cost: Eight American servicemen lost their lives during Operation Eagle Claw, while fifty-two U.S. diplomats and citizens endured 444 days of captivity under harsh conditions before their release on January 20, 1981. The hostage crisis profoundly affected American public confidence and permanently altered U.S.-Iranian relations.⁸

Financial Cost: The immediate costs of sanctions enforcement, military mobilization, and Operation Eagle Claw were modest when compared to later decades. However, Carter’s response initiated a long-term American commitment to defending the Persian Gulf that would ultimately require hundreds of billions of dollars in military infrastructure, naval deployments, regional partnerships, and forward force posture over the next four decades.⁹

 

President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989): Military Containment and the Rise of Proxy Conflict

President Ronald Reagan inherited the Iran hostage crisis on his first day in office, but his administration quickly shifted from crisis management to long-term strategic containment. Reagan viewed Iran as both a sponsor of international terrorism and a destabilizing force in the Persian Gulf. His administration expanded intelligence operations, strengthened military partnerships with Gulf allies, increased the U.S. naval presence in the region, and sought to protect the free flow of oil through one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.¹⁰

The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) dominated Reagan’s Middle East policy. Although officially neutral, the United States increasingly tilted toward Iraq as Iranian forces gained battlefield momentum. At the same time, Iran expanded its use of proxy organizations—including Hezbollah in Lebanon—to advance its regional objectives while maintaining plausible deniability. The October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 American service members, demonstrated the growing effectiveness of Iranian-backed proxy warfare and profoundly influenced future American military planning. Intelligence assessments later concluded that Hezbollah carried out the attack with significant support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).¹¹

As attacks against commercial shipping intensified during the so-called “Tanker War,” the Reagan Administration launched Operation Earnest Will in 1987, reflagging and escorting Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Persian Gulf under U.S. protection. The operation marked one of the largest naval convoy missions since World War II and significantly increased the American military footprint in the Gulf. The mission culminated in Operation Praying Mantis on April 18, 1988, after the guided missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian naval mine. During the one-day operation, U.S. naval forces destroyed Iranian oil platforms used for military purposes, sank or severely damaged several Iranian warships, and established overwhelming American naval superiority in the region. It remains the largest surface naval engagement fought by the United States since World War II.¹²

Despite Reagan’s public commitment to isolating Tehran, his administration became embroiled in one of the most controversial foreign policy scandals of the Cold War. Between 1985 and 1986, senior administration officials secretly authorized the sale of American weapons to Iran in hopes of securing the release of U.S. hostages held in Lebanon while using the proceeds to fund the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. The Iran-Contra Affair exposed deep contradictions within U.S. policy toward Iran, damaged the administration’s credibility, and generated years of congressional investigations. Although the scandal did not fundamentally alter the broader strategy of containment, it illustrated the complex and often conflicting priorities confronting American policymakers in the Middle East.¹³

Human Cost: The Beirut Marine Barracks bombing claimed the lives of 241 American service members, while additional casualties occurred during naval operations in the Persian Gulf, including injuries sustained during Iranian mining attacks. Beyond direct casualties, the growing threat posed by Iranian-backed terrorist organizations forced a permanent reassessment of U.S. force protection and counterterrorism doctrine.¹⁴

Financial Cost: Operations Earnest Will and Praying Mantis, expanded intelligence activities, increased naval deployments, and enhanced military cooperation with Gulf allies required billions of dollars in defense expenditures. More importantly, these operations institutionalized a sustained American naval presence in the Persian Gulf that has continued—with varying intensity—for nearly four decades.¹⁵

 

President George H. W. Bush (1989–1993): Building a Regional Security Architecture

President George H. W. Bush inherited a Middle East transformed by the final stages of the Iran-Iraq War and the gradual decline of Soviet influence. Rather than pursuing major new initiatives toward Iran, Bush focused on preserving regional stability through coalition-building, military deterrence, and strategic partnerships with America’s Gulf allies. His administration adopted what officials described as a policy of “goodwill begets goodwill,” signaling a willingness to improve relations with Tehran if Iran moderated its support for terrorism, released Western hostages held through proxy organizations, and demonstrated greater regional restraint. Those conditions were never fully met, and the broader policy of containment remained intact.¹⁶

The defining event of Bush’s presidency was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Although Iran officially condemned Saddam Hussein’s aggression and remained largely neutral during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, American policymakers remained deeply concerned that Tehran might exploit the conflict to expand its regional influence. The successful U.S.-led coalition not only liberated Kuwait but also established a permanent American military infrastructure throughout the Persian Gulf, including expanded bases, logistics hubs, and defense agreements with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. While directed primarily at deterring Iraq, this new security architecture also strengthened America’s long-term ability to contain Iran.¹⁷

Following the Gulf War, the Bush Administration maintained comprehensive economic sanctions against Iran while expanding intelligence cooperation with regional partners. American officials increasingly viewed Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Palestinian militant organizations, and other proxy groups as the principal long-term threat to regional stability. Rather than relying solely on military power, Bush emphasized diplomatic coalition-building and multinational security arrangements that could deter Iranian aggression without requiring direct confrontation. This approach established the framework that subsequent administrations would continue to refine throughout the 1990s and beyond.¹⁸

Bush also oversaw significant improvements in America’s military posture following lessons learned from Operation Eagle Claw and the Iran-Iraq War. Joint command structures, rapid deployment capabilities, integrated air defense systems, and pre-positioned equipment became central components of U.S. planning for future contingencies in the Gulf. These investments reflected a growing consensus that the United States would require a sustained forward presence to protect global energy markets and reassure regional allies against both Iraqi and Iranian threats.¹⁹

Human Cost: Compared with both the Reagan and George W. Bush administrations, relatively few American casualties were directly attributable to Iran during Bush’s presidency. Nevertheless, thousands of U.S. military personnel remained deployed throughout the Gulf, operating in an increasingly complex security environment where Iranian capabilities and intentions continued to shape American force posture.²⁰

Financial Cost: Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm represented one of the largest military mobilizations since Vietnam. Although coalition contributions offset a significant portion of combat expenses, the long-term costs of maintaining permanent bases, expanding naval operations, pre-positioning equipment, and strengthening regional defense partnerships required billions of dollars annually. Much of this infrastructure would become the foundation for every subsequent American military operation involving Iran or the broader Middle East.²¹

 

President Bill Clinton (1993–2001): Institutionalizing Dual Containment

President Bill Clinton transformed the policy of containing Iran from a largely military strategy into a comprehensive diplomatic and economic campaign. Recognizing that both Iraq and Iran posed significant threats to American interests and regional stability, the Clinton Administration formally adopted the doctrine of Dual Containment, abandoning the traditional balance-of-power approach that had previously relied on one regional rival to offset the other. Instead, the United States sought to isolate both governments simultaneously through economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, intelligence operations, and strengthened security partnerships with America’s Gulf allies.²²

The administration significantly expanded the use of economic sanctions as a principal instrument of national security. In 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Orders 12957 and 12959, prohibiting virtually all American trade and investment with Iran. Congress reinforced these measures the following year by passing the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996, authorizing sanctions against foreign companies investing substantially in Iran’s petroleum sector. The legislation reflected a growing bipartisan consensus that limiting Iran’s energy revenues would constrain its ability to finance terrorism, develop advanced weapons programs, and expand its regional influence.²³

Throughout the 1990s, American intelligence agencies also increased their focus on Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. U.S. officials concluded that Tehran had adopted proxy warfare as a cost-effective means of challenging American interests while avoiding direct military confrontation. The 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia, which killed nineteen U.S. Air Force personnel and wounded hundreds more, reinforced concerns regarding Iran’s growing operational reach. Subsequent investigations by U.S. authorities concluded that members of Saudi Hezbollah carried out the attack with support from elements of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, although Tehran has consistently denied responsibility.²⁴

Clinton also sought limited diplomatic engagement when opportunities emerged. The election of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami in 1997 generated cautious optimism regarding improved bilateral relations. Khatami’s calls for a “Dialogue Among Civilizations” prompted modest cultural exchanges and limited diplomatic contacts. Nevertheless, fundamental disagreements over Iran’s support for terrorist organizations, missile development, and suspected nuclear activities prevented any meaningful normalization of relations. Containment remained the cornerstone of American policy despite occasional diplomatic openings.²⁵

By the end of Clinton’s second term, the United States had constructed an increasingly sophisticated system of financial sanctions, intelligence cooperation, counterterrorism coordination, missile defense planning, and military partnerships that would become the foundation for future administrations. The policy of containing Iran had evolved beyond military deterrence into an integrated strategy employing nearly every instrument of American national power.²⁶

Human Cost: Direct American combat casualties attributable to Iran remained relatively limited during the Clinton years compared with earlier and later administrations. However, the Khobar Towers bombing claimed nineteen American lives and underscored the continuing threat posed by Iranian-backed proxy organizations. Thousands of U.S. military personnel remained deployed throughout the Persian Gulf to enforce regional security and deter both Iraqi and Iranian aggression.²⁷

Financial Cost: Maintaining Dual Containment required billions of dollars annually for sanctions enforcement, intelligence collection, naval patrols, air operations, missile defense initiatives, and forward military deployments. Although these expenditures were considerably lower than the costs of major conventional wars, they represented a sustained long-term investment in a permanent American security presence throughout the Middle East.²⁸

 

President George W. Bush (2001–2009): Containment in the Age of the Global War on Terror

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 fundamentally reshaped American foreign policy and transformed the strategic context in which the United States confronted Iran. Although Iran initially provided limited cooperation against the Taliban during the opening stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, the relationship deteriorated rapidly as President George W. Bush expanded the Global War on Terror. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush identified Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil,” arguing that the Islamic Republic supported terrorism, pursued weapons of mass destruction, and threatened both regional stability and American national security.²⁹

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 dramatically altered the balance of power in the Middle East. While the removal of Saddam Hussein eliminated one of Iran’s principal regional adversaries, it also created opportunities for Tehran to expand its political, military, and intelligence influence inside Iraq. Iran cultivated close relationships with Shi’a political parties, supported numerous militia organizations, and supplied increasingly sophisticated weapons—including explosively formed penetrators (EFPs)—to insurgent groups responsible for attacks against coalition forces. As the Iraqi insurgency intensified, American commanders concluded that Iranian support for proxy organizations had become one of the most significant challenges confronting U.S. operations.³⁰

The Bush Administration responded by expanding intelligence collection, strengthening regional missile defense initiatives, increasing sanctions targeting Iranian financial institutions, and enhancing security cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Naval deployments in the Persian Gulf increased substantially as the United States sought to deter Iranian interference with international shipping and reassure regional allies concerned about Tehran’s growing influence following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The administration also pursued international diplomatic efforts through the United Nations Security Council to pressure Iran over its advancing nuclear enrichment program, resulting in multiple rounds of multilateral sanctions beginning in 2006.³¹

American concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions became a defining feature of Bush’s second term. Intelligence agencies assessed that Iran possessed the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons if it chose to do so, although the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate concluded with “high confidence” that Tehran had halted its structured nuclear weapons program in 2003 while continuing uranium enrichment and other activities that preserved its future options. This assessment reinforced the administration’s dual-track strategy of maintaining diplomatic pressure while preserving the credible threat of military action should Iran move toward acquiring a nuclear weapon.³²

By the conclusion of Bush’s presidency, the policy of containing Iran had expanded beyond traditional military deterrence to include counterinsurgency operations, financial warfare, multinational sanctions, intelligence campaigns, cyber capabilities, and missile defense. Iran had emerged not merely as a regional competitor but as a central strategic challenge influencing nearly every aspect of American policy in the Middle East.³³

Human Cost: The Iraq War claimed the lives of more than 4,400 American service members and wounded more than 32,000 others. While responsibility for the conflict extended far beyond Iran, senior U.S. military officials concluded that Iranian-backed militias contributed significantly to coalition casualties through the use of advanced roadside bombs, rockets, and other sophisticated weaponry supplied by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force. The broader human cost also included hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilian deaths, widespread displacement, and years of regional instability.³⁴

Financial Cost: The Iraq War became one of the most expensive military operations in American history. Direct congressional appropriations exceeded $800 billion during the Bush Administration, while long-term estimates—including veterans’ care, interest on borrowed funds, and future obligations—have exceeded $2 trillion according to multiple independent studies. In addition, billions of dollars were spent annually on naval deployments, intelligence operations, sanctions enforcement, missile defense, and regional security initiatives designed specifically to contain Iran’s expanding influence.³⁵

 

President Barack Obama (2009–2017): Diplomacy Backed by Deterrence

President Barack Obama entered office determined to test whether sustained diplomacy could reduce tensions with Iran while preserving America’s long-standing strategy of regional containment. Unlike his predecessor, Obama emphasized engagement alongside pressure, arguing that diplomatic negotiations, combined with economic sanctions and credible military deterrence, offered the best opportunity to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon without initiating another major conflict in the Middle East. Although the administration’s methods differed significantly from previous approaches, its strategic objectives remained largely unchanged: limit Iran’s regional influence, prevent nuclear proliferation, protect U.S. allies, and maintain stability throughout the Persian Gulf.³⁶

The administration significantly expanded international economic pressure during its first term. Working closely with the European Union, the United Nations Security Council, and other international partners, the United States implemented some of the most comprehensive financial sanctions ever imposed on Iran. These measures targeted Iran’s banking sector, oil exports, shipping industry, and access to the international financial system. By 2013, sanctions had sharply reduced Iranian oil exports, contributed to severe inflation, weakened the Iranian currency, and placed substantial pressure on Tehran’s economy, creating conditions favorable for renewed diplomatic negotiations.³⁷

Those negotiations culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed on July 14, 2015, by Iran and the P5+1 nations (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), with the European Union serving as coordinator. Under the agreement, Iran accepted strict limitations on uranium enrichment, reduced its stockpile of enriched uranium, dismantled thousands of centrifuges, redesigned the Arak heavy-water reactor, and agreed to an extensive inspection regime administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In exchange, the United States, European Union, and United Nations agreed to suspend or remove specified nuclear-related sanctions. Supporters viewed the agreement as the most significant nuclear nonproliferation achievement in decades, while critics argued that it temporarily delayed—rather than permanently eliminated—Iran’s pathway to a nuclear weapon and failed to address Tehran’s ballistic missile program, regional proxy activities, or sponsorship of terrorist organizations.³⁸

Despite the emphasis on diplomacy, the Obama Administration maintained a robust American military presence throughout the Middle East. U.S. naval forces continued regular operations in the Persian Gulf, missile defense cooperation with Gulf allies expanded, and intelligence operations targeting Iranian activities remained active. Following the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, American forces returned to combat operations in Iraq under Operation Inherent Resolve. Although both the United States and Iran opposed ISIS, they coordinated only indirectly through the Iraqi government, while continuing to compete for political influence throughout the region. Simultaneously, the administration responded to repeated incidents involving Iranian naval harassment of U.S. vessels operating in international waters, underscoring that diplomatic engagement had not eliminated military tensions.³⁹

The administration also intensified the use of cyber capabilities against Iran. Building upon programs initiated during the George W. Bush Administration, the United States reportedly participated in cyber operations—including the Stuxnet malware campaign—that disrupted Iran’s uranium enrichment infrastructure. These operations represented a new dimension of containment, demonstrating how cyber warfare could complement sanctions, diplomacy, intelligence, and conventional military deterrence without escalating into open conflict.⁴⁰

By the conclusion of Obama’s presidency, the United States had demonstrated that diplomacy and containment were not mutually exclusive. While the JCPOA temporarily reduced concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program, fundamental disagreements over ballistic missiles, regional proxy warfare, human rights, and terrorism remained unresolved. The broader strategy of containing Iranian influence endured, even as the tools employed became more sophisticated and increasingly multilateral.⁴¹

Human Cost: Compared with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan during the previous administration, American casualties directly associated with Iran declined substantially. Nevertheless, U.S. service members continued to deploy throughout the Middle East in support of counterterrorism operations, regional deterrence, maritime security, and coalition missions against ISIS. American personnel also faced recurring risks from Iranian-backed militia groups operating in Iraq and Syria, although large-scale direct confrontations remained relatively limited during this period.⁴²

Financial Cost: The Obama Administration continued to spend tens of billions of dollars annually maintaining military forces throughout the Middle East, supporting naval operations in the Persian Gulf, funding missile defense systems, conducting intelligence and cyber operations, enforcing sanctions, and leading coalition operations against ISIS. While the JCPOA reduced the likelihood of immediate military conflict over Iran’s nuclear program, it did not substantially reduce the long-term costs of America’s regional security commitments.⁴³

 

President Donald Trump (2017–2021): Maximum Pressure and Renewed Confrontation

President Donald Trump entered office determined to reverse what he viewed as the shortcomings of the Obama Administration’s Iran policy. Arguing that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile program, regional proxy network, support for terrorist organizations, and sunset provisions governing nuclear restrictions, Trump adopted a strategy of “Maximum Pressure.” Rather than seeking to modify the nuclear agreement, the administration sought to compel Iran to negotiate a broader settlement by combining comprehensive economic sanctions with credible military deterrence and diplomatic isolation.⁴⁴

On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA and ordered the reimposition of all previously suspended American sanctions. The administration subsequently expanded restrictions targeting Iran’s banking system, petroleum exports, shipping industry, construction sector, and access to international financial markets. The Department of the Treasury designated hundreds of Iranian individuals, companies, financial institutions, and government entities under various sanctions authorities, while secondary sanctions discouraged foreign businesses from maintaining commercial relationships with Tehran. The resulting economic pressure contributed to a sharp decline in Iranian oil exports, significant currency depreciation, and one of the country’s deepest economic contractions since the Iran-Iraq War.⁴⁵

The administration also intensified efforts to isolate Iran diplomatically and militarily. In April 2019, the United States designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), marking the first time Washington had applied the designation to an official branch of another nation’s armed forces. The decision reflected the administration’s assessment that the IRGC functioned not only as Iran’s principal military institution but also as the primary coordinator of Tehran’s regional proxy network, including Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and numerous militia organizations operating in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.⁴⁶

Tensions escalated dramatically throughout 2019 following attacks on commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, the downing of an American RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance drone by Iranian forces, and missile and drone strikes against Saudi Arabian oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais. Although the United States attributed the attacks to Iran, the administration deliberately avoided launching a large-scale military response, instead increasing sanctions, deploying additional forces to the Gulf, and strengthening regional missile defense capabilities. Trump’s restraint demonstrated that the administration’s objective remained deterrence rather than regime change or prolonged conventional war.⁴⁷

The defining moment of Trump’s Iran policy occurred on January 3, 2020, when an American MQ-9 Reaper drone strike near Baghdad International Airport killed Major General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force, along with Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. The administration justified the operation as an act of self-defense intended to prevent imminent attacks against American personnel. Iran responded several days later by launching ballistic missiles against Al Asad Air Base and other facilities housing U.S. forces in Iraq. Although no American personnel were killed in the attack, more than one hundred service members were later diagnosed with traumatic brain injuries, illustrating both the risks of escalation and the restraint exercised by both governments in avoiding a broader regional war.⁴⁸

Despite heightened tensions, the administration continued to strengthen strategic partnerships with America’s regional allies. The signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 normalized diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Although framed primarily as a regional peace initiative, the agreements also strengthened a growing coalition of countries sharing concerns regarding Iran’s expanding regional influence and ballistic missile capabilities.⁴⁹

By the conclusion of Trump’s first term, the policy of containing Iran had shifted decisively away from negotiated accommodation and toward coercive diplomacy backed by overwhelming economic pressure and selective military force. Yet despite unprecedented sanctions and the elimination of one of Iran’s most senior military leaders, the administration did not fundamentally alter Tehran’s regional behavior, demonstrating both the strengths and limitations of economic coercion as an instrument of national strategy.⁵⁰

Human Cost: Compared with the Iraq War years, direct American combat fatalities attributable to Iranian actions remained relatively limited. Nevertheless, repeated attacks by Iranian-backed militia organizations injured numerous American personnel, while the January 2020 Iranian missile strike against Al Asad Air Base resulted in more than one hundred diagnosed traumatic brain injuries among U.S. service members. Regional instability also continued to produce significant humanitarian consequences throughout Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon.⁵¹

Financial Cost: The Maximum Pressure campaign required billions of dollars in sanctions enforcement, intelligence operations, naval deployments, missile defense initiatives, and expanded military readiness throughout the Middle East. Although considerably less expensive than sustained ground combat operations, these expenditures reflected the continuing financial burden of maintaining a credible deterrent against Iran while supporting regional allies and protecting international maritime commerce.⁵²

 

President Joe Biden (2021–2025): Deterrence Amid Regional Escalation

President Joe Biden entered office pledging to restore diplomacy as the primary instrument of American policy toward Iran. His administration initially sought to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), arguing that a negotiated agreement remained the most effective means of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Early indirect negotiations in Vienna, conducted through European intermediaries, attempted to bring both Washington and Tehran back into compliance with the agreement. Despite months of negotiations, however, disagreements over sanctions relief, verification mechanisms, Iran’s expanding nuclear program, and broader geopolitical developments ultimately prevented a return to the accord. By 2023, the administration had largely shifted from diplomatic engagement back toward a strategy centered on deterrence, sanctions enforcement, and regional security cooperation.⁵³

The strategic environment changed dramatically following Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. Although the United States did not conclude that Iran directly planned the attack, American intelligence agencies assessed that Tehran had long provided Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other regional proxy organizations with financial support, weapons, training, and intelligence assistance. The conflict rapidly expanded beyond Gaza as Iranian-backed militias launched repeated attacks against American military installations in Iraq and Syria, while the Houthi movement in Yemen began targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. These developments transformed the administration’s Iran policy from one focused primarily on nuclear diplomacy into one centered on regional deterrence and force protection.⁵⁴

In response, President Biden ordered a substantial increase in American military deployments throughout the Middle East. The United States deployed multiple aircraft carrier strike groups, strategic bombers, air defense systems, and additional fighter aircraft to reassure regional allies and deter further escalation. U.S. Central Command also conducted repeated precision strikes against facilities used by Iranian-backed militia organizations in Iraq and Syria following attacks that killed and wounded American personnel. The administration consistently emphasized that these operations were intended to deter future attacks while avoiding a broader regional war with Iran itself.⁵⁵

The administration also led multinational efforts to protect one of the world’s most important maritime trade routes. Beginning in late 2023, Houthi attacks against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea disrupted global shipping, increased insurance costs, and threatened international commerce. In response, the United States established Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational maritime security initiative designed to defend commercial shipping against missile and drone attacks. American and coalition naval forces subsequently conducted repeated defensive operations and precision strikes against Houthi missile launch sites, radar systems, weapons storage facilities, and command-and-control infrastructure in Yemen. These operations represented one of the largest sustained naval security missions in the region since the Tanker War of the 1980s.⁵⁶

One of the most significant escalatory events occurred on January 28, 2024, when an Iranian-backed militia conducted a drone attack against Tower 22, a U.S. logistics facility located in northeastern Jordan near the Syrian border. Three American Army Reserve soldiers were killed, and more than forty service members were injured. The attack marked the first combat deaths of U.S. personnel resulting directly from Iranian-backed militia operations since the beginning of the Gaza conflict and prompted a series of coordinated American airstrikes against militia facilities in Iraq and Syria. The administration emphasized that the strikes were directed at proxy organizations rather than Iran itself, reflecting its continuing effort to impose costs without triggering direct interstate conflict.⁵⁷

Meanwhile, Iran continued expanding its nuclear capabilities beyond the limitations established under the JCPOA. Reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency documented increased uranium enrichment, expanded centrifuge operations, and reduced international monitoring access following the collapse of the nuclear agreement. Although American officials continued to state that diplomacy remained preferable, the administration increasingly relied on sanctions, military deterrence, intelligence cooperation, and regional coalition-building to prevent further escalation. By the end of Biden’s presidency, American policy had effectively returned to a modernized version of long-standing containment—one relying on integrated military, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and multinational tools rather than a single dominant strategy.⁵⁸

Human Cost: During the Biden Administration, repeated attacks by Iranian-backed militias injured dozens of American service members across Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. The January 2024 attack on Tower 22 killed three U.S. Army Reserve soldiers and marked the deadliest attack on American forces in the region in several years. Beyond direct casualties, thousands of U.S. military personnel remained deployed throughout the Middle East under increasingly hazardous conditions as regional conflicts expanded following October 2023.⁵⁹

Financial Cost: The United States committed billions of dollars annually to sustaining regional military operations, reinforcing air and missile defense systems, expanding naval deployments, protecting international shipping lanes, supporting Israel’s defense, conducting retaliatory strikes against Iranian-backed militia organizations, and maintaining intelligence and surveillance operations across the Middle East. These expenditures demonstrated that, despite the absence of another major ground war, the financial costs of containing Iran continued to grow as proxy conflicts spread across multiple theaters.⁶⁰

 

President Donald Trump (2025–Present): Direct Strategic Deterrence

President Donald Trump returned to office in January 2025 facing a Middle East fundamentally different from the one he had left four years earlier. Iran’s nuclear program had advanced significantly beyond the limitations once imposed by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), regional proxy conflicts had intensified following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, and Tehran’s strategic partnership with Russia and expanding ties with China had elevated Iran’s importance within broader great-power competition. Unlike previous administrations that alternated between diplomacy and coercion, Trump’s second administration adopted a strategy centered on direct strategic deterrence—using overwhelming military capability, economic pressure, and explicit demonstrations of American resolve to prevent Iran from altering the regional balance of power.⁶¹

The administration maintained comprehensive economic sanctions while accelerating efforts to isolate Iran diplomatically and financially. The Department of the Treasury expanded sanctions targeting Iranian financial institutions, shipping networks, oil exports, procurement organizations, and companies supporting Iran’s missile and drone industries. Simultaneously, Washington strengthened security cooperation with Israel and key Arab partners while expanding integrated regional air and missile defense initiatives designed to counter Iran’s growing arsenal of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems.⁶²

Military deterrence became increasingly visible throughout 2025. American naval forces maintained a continuous presence in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and eastern Mediterranean, while long-range bombers, carrier strike groups, and additional fighter aircraft rotated through the region. The administration consistently emphasized that these deployments were intended to deter Iranian aggression, reassure allies, preserve freedom of navigation, and prevent the emergence of conditions that could lead to a broader regional war. At the same time, U.S. intelligence agencies expanded surveillance and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, missile production facilities, and proxy organizations operating throughout Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.⁶³

The defining feature of the administration’s Iran policy became its willingness to employ limited but decisive military force against strategically important targets. During Operation Midnight Hammer, American B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, supported by submarine-launched cruise missiles and other precision strike assets, attacked key elements of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including facilities associated with uranium enrichment and nuclear research. The administration stated that the operation was narrowly focused on degrading Iran’s nuclear capabilities rather than pursuing regime change or initiating a prolonged military campaign. Officials described the strikes as a demonstration that the United States would act decisively if diplomatic and economic measures failed to prevent Iran from approaching a nuclear weapons capability.⁶⁴

Although the operation represented one of the most significant direct American military actions against Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the administration deliberately sought to limit escalation. Following the strikes, American officials publicly reiterated that the United States remained prepared to defend its interests while expressing no intention to occupy Iranian territory or engage in a long-term ground war. Iran’s response remained comparatively restrained, allowing both governments to avoid a broader conventional conflict while preserving their respective deterrent postures. The episode demonstrated how the American strategy of containment had evolved from indirect competition through proxies into occasional direct military intervention designed to impose strategic costs without crossing the threshold into full-scale war.⁶⁵

Trump’s second administration therefore represented the culmination of nearly five decades of evolving containment policy. Earlier presidents relied primarily on sanctions, diplomacy, coalition-building, proxy competition, or limited military operations. By contrast, the 2025 strategy integrated every major instrument of national power—economic sanctions, intelligence operations, cyber capabilities, regional alliances, missile defense, maritime security, and precision conventional strikes—into a single doctrine intended to deter Iran through overwhelming capability and demonstrated willingness to act. Whether this approach ultimately produces long-term regional stability remains an open question, but it reflects the most direct application of American military power against Iran in the post-revolutionary era.⁶⁶

Human Cost: Direct American combat casualties associated with operations against Iran have remained relatively limited during the administration. Nevertheless, thousands of American military personnel continue to serve throughout the Middle East under heightened force-protection conditions, while the persistent threat posed by Iranian missiles, drones, proxy organizations, and maritime harassment continues to place U.S. forces at significant operational risk. Civilian populations throughout the region also remain vulnerable to escalation resulting from any direct confrontation between Iran, Israel, and the United States.⁶⁷

Financial Cost: Initial estimates indicate that Operation Midnight Hammer and associated force deployments required tens of billions of dollars in operational expenditures, precision-guided munitions, strategic bomber operations, intelligence collection, logistics, missile defense, and regional force reinforcement. More broadly, sustaining America’s military posture across the Middle East continues to require annual expenditures measured in the tens of billions of dollars, underscoring that nearly five decades after the Iranian Revolution, the financial burden of containment remains substantial and ongoing.⁶⁸

 

Forty-Seven Years of Containment

From Jimmy Carter to Donald Trump, every American president has inherited the same strategic problem: how to prevent Iran from dominating the Middle East without committing the United States to another large-scale regional war. Administrations have disagreed over tactics, political rhetoric, and diplomatic priorities, yet the fundamental objective has remained remarkably consistent. Whether through economic sanctions, military deterrence, diplomatic engagement, intelligence operations, cyber warfare, coalition-building, or precision military strikes, every administration has sought to limit Iran’s ability to project power while preserving regional stability and protecting American interests.⁶⁹

The historical record demonstrates that containment has been a strategy of continuity rather than revolution. Carter established the framework following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Reagan expanded military deterrence while confronting the emergence of Iranian proxy warfare. George H. W. Bush institutionalized a permanent Gulf security architecture after Operation Desert Storm. Clinton formalized Dual Containment through economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. George W. Bush integrated Iran policy into the Global War on Terror. Obama pursued diplomacy through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action while maintaining robust military deterrence. Trump’s first administration shifted toward Maximum Pressure, Biden returned to deterrence amid expanding regional conflict, and Trump’s second administration embraced direct strategic deterrence through precision military operations against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Although the instruments changed, the strategic objective did not.⁷⁰

The cumulative costs of this policy have been extraordinary. Over nearly five decades, the United States has committed well in excess of one trillion dollars to military deployments, naval operations, intelligence collection, missile defense, coalition-building, sanctions enforcement, force protection, counterterrorism operations, and regional security partnerships associated directly or indirectly with containing Iran. These expenditures extend far beyond combat operations, encompassing the long-term costs of maintaining one of the largest sustained American military commitments outside Europe since the Second World War.⁷¹

The human costs have been equally significant. Thousands of American service members have lost their lives in conflicts shaped by Iran’s expanding regional influence, while many thousands more have been wounded in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and throughout the Persian Gulf. Iranian-backed proxy organizations—including Hezbollah, Iraqi militia groups, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis—have repeatedly targeted American personnel and allies, forcing successive administrations to balance military retaliation with the broader objective of preventing uncontrolled regional escalation. Beyond American casualties, millions of civilians throughout the Middle East have experienced displacement, economic hardship, and prolonged instability resulting from conflicts in which Iran has been either a direct participant or a principal external supporter.⁷²

Containment has nevertheless achieved several important strategic objectives. Since 1979, the United States has successfully prevented Iran from establishing military dominance over the Persian Gulf, preserved freedom of navigation through critical maritime chokepoints, maintained the security of key regional allies, and delayed or constrained aspects of Iran’s nuclear program through a combination of sanctions, diplomacy, intelligence operations, and military pressure. At the same time, containment has not eliminated Iran’s influence. Tehran has continued to expand its regional proxy network, improve its missile capabilities, strengthen strategic relationships with Russia and China, and demonstrate increasing sophistication in cyber operations, unmanned systems, and asymmetric warfare.⁷³

This mixed record raises a central strategic question that remains unresolved after nearly half a century: Has containment succeeded because it prevented a catastrophic regional war, or has it merely managed an enduring conflict whose financial and human costs continue to accumulate? The answer depends largely upon how success is defined. If success means preventing a direct conventional war between the United States and Iran while preserving the regional balance of power, containment has largely achieved its objective. If success requires ending Iran’s sponsorship of proxy organizations, eliminating its nuclear ambitions, or fundamentally changing the character of the Islamic Republic, the evidence is considerably less conclusive.⁷⁴

The history of American policy toward Iran is therefore not the story of nine different strategies. It is the story of one enduring strategy, continuously adapted by nine presidents confronting different crises, changing geopolitical realities, and evolving threats. Future administrations will almost certainly continue to debate the appropriate balance between diplomacy, economic pressure, military deterrence, and direct action. Yet unless the strategic environment changes fundamentally, the United States is likely to remain committed to the same central objective that has guided American policy since 1979: **containing Iran while avoiding a wider Middle East war.**⁷⁵

 

Footnotes

1. David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 3–18; Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1–12.
2. Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy, CRS Report R44017 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated periodically); U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations With Iran, Fact Sheet.
3. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 23–47; David Crist, The Twilight War, 19–41.
4. Brown University, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project (Providence, RI: Brown University); Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress.

1. David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 43–69; Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 33–58; James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 238–289.
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operation Eagle Claw: The Rescue of American Hostages in Iran (Washington, DC: Department of Defense); Air Force Historical Support Division, “Operation Eagle Claw,” U.S. Air Force Historical Studies Office; Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 563–612.
3. Jimmy Carter, The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress, January 23, 1980 (Washington, DC: The White House); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, rev. ed., 2005), 357–360; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
4. Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah, 617–623; Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 289–305; U.S. Department of State, The Hostage Crisis in Iran.
5. Congressional Research Service, The Carter Doctrine and U.S. Military Commitments in the Persian Gulf; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 65–83.

1. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, National Security Decision Directives relating to the Persian Gulf; David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 71–118; Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 84–118.
2. U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act (Washington, DC, 1983); National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission Report), 48–52; Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 21–39.
3. Naval History and Heritage Command, Operation Earnest Will; Naval History and Heritage Command, Operation Praying Mantis; Crist, The Twilight War, 233–269; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 503–540.
4. Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993); Malcolm Byrne, ed., The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New York: The New Press, 1993); Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991).
5. Department of Defense, Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act; Levitt, Hezbollah, 21–39; National Counterterrorism Center, Hezbollah Profile.
6. Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Naval History and Heritage Command, Operation Earnest Will.

1. George H. W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 31, 1990; George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, National Security Directive 26: U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf (October 2, 1989); Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 119–143.
2. U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992); Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 17–642; Congressional Research Service, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy.
3. Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Military Forces in Transition (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 1999), 3–26; Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 189–212.
4. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson, A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994); Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
5. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
6. Congressional Budget Office, The Costs of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1992); Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project.

1. Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 3, no. 1 (1999); Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 144–176; Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy.
2. Executive Order No. 12957, “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources,” March 15, 1995; Executive Order No. 12959, “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran,” May 6, 1995; Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996); U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), History of Sanctions Against Iran.
3. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khobar Towers Investigation; U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C. 2006); Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 89–113; Congressional Research Service, Iran’s Support for Terrorism.
4. Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006), 91–118; Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 166–176; U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999.
5. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Military Forces in Transition (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; National Security Council, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (1998).
6. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khobar Towers Investigation; Department of Defense, Report to Congress on the Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad; Levitt, Hezbollah, 89–113.
7. Congressional Budget Office, Long-Term Implications of U.S. Military Operations in the Persian Gulf; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project.

1. George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 2002; The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, September 2002); Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 285–318.
2. U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (various reports, 2005–2008); General David H. Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, September 2007; Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012), 177–284.
3. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008); Congressional Research Service, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Iran Sanctions Program.
4. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate: Iran—Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (Washington, DC, November 2007); International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (2003–2008); Congressional Research Service, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status.
5. Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 247–291; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy.
6. Department of Defense, Operation Iraqi Freedom Casualty Status; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; General David H. Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq; Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame, 385–471.
7. Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook (2008); Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Linda J. Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008); Congressional Research Service, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11.

1. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt, June 4, 2009; The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC, May 2010); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy.
2. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Iran Sanctions; Congressional Research Service, Iran Sanctions; International Monetary Fund, Islamic Republic of Iran: Selected Issues (Washington, DC, 2014).
3. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Vienna, July 14, 2015; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015–2016); U.S. Department of State, Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; Congressional Research Service, The Iran Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA): Status and Issues for Congress.
4. Department of Defense, Operation Inherent Resolve Lead Inspector General Reports; U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Maritime Security Operations in the Arabian Gulf; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
5. David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 181–248; Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (New York: Crown Publishers, 2014); Congressional Research Service, Cyber Operations in International Law.
6. Ray Takeyh, The Last Shah: America, Iran, and the Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021), concluding analysis; Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iran and the Changing Balance of Power in the Gulf.
7. Department of Defense, Operation Inherent Resolve Reports; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
8. Congressional Budget Office, Long-Term Implications of U.S. Overseas Military Operations; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Department of Defense, Annual Budget Justification Materials.

1. Donald J. Trump, Remarks on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, The White House, May 8, 2018; The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, December 2017); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy.
2. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Iran Sanctions Program; Congressional Research Service, Iran Sanctions; International Monetary Fund, Islamic Republic of Iran: 2019 Article IV Consultation (Washington, DC, 2020).
3. U.S. Department of State, Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, April 8, 2019; Congressional Research Service, The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): Background and U.S. Designation; Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).
4. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Posture Statement (2020); Congressional Research Service, Attacks on Oil Tankers in the Persian Gulf; International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report (2019).
5. Department of Defense, Statement by the Department of Defense on the Death of Qasem Soleimani, January 3, 2020; U.S. Central Command, Iranian Ballistic Missile Attack on Al Asad Air Base; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions; Department of Defense Inspector General, Operation Inherent Resolve Quarterly Reports (2020).
6. The White House, The Abraham Accords Declaration, September 15, 2020; U.S. Department of State, The Abraham Accords; Congressional Research Service, The Abraham Accords: Background and U.S. Policy.
7. Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Maximum Pressure and Its Limits; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2021.
8. Department of Defense Inspector General, Operation Inherent Resolve Quarterly Reports (2020); Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; U.S. Central Command, Posture Statement (2020).
9. Congressional Budget Office, Defense Budget Overview (2020); Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project.

1. Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2021); Congressional Research Service, The Iran Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA): Status and Issues for Congress; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran (2021–2023).
2. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (2024); Congressional Research Service, Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2023.
3. U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM Posture Statements (2023–2024); Department of Defense, Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on U.S. Force Posture in the Middle East; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
4. U.S. Department of Defense, Operation Prosperity Guardian Fact Sheet (2023); U.S. Central Command, Red Sea Maritime Security Operations; Congressional Research Service, Red Sea Shipping Disruptions and U.S. Military Operations.
5. Department of Defense, Statement on the Attack on Tower 22, January 28, 2024; U.S. Central Command, U.S. Strikes Against Iranian-Backed Militia Targets, February 2024; Congressional Research Service, Recent Attacks on U.S. Forces in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan.
6. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran (2024); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iran’s Nuclear Program and Regional Strategy.
7. Department of Defense, Casualty Information and Force Protection Updates (2023–2024); Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; U.S. Central Command, Posture Statements (2024).
8. Congressional Budget Office, Defense Budget Overview (2024); Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Department of Defense, Annual Budget Justification Materials (2024).

1. The White House, National Security Presidential Directives (2025); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy (updated 2025); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025.
2. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Iran Sanctions Program (2025); Congressional Research Service, Iran Sanctions; U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review.
3. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Posture Statement (2025); Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress (2025); Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
4. U.S. Department of Defense, Operation Midnight Hammer Briefing (2025); The White House, Remarks by President Donald J. Trump Following U.S. Military Operations Against Iranian Nuclear Facilities (2025); International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran (2025).
5. Congressional Research Service, U.S.-Iran Military Confrontation: Issues for Congress (2025); Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Assessing the Strategic Impact of Operation Midnight Hammer (2025); Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Iran Update (2025).
6. Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy (2025); Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and the Gulf Military Balance (Center for Strategic and International Studies); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025.
7. Department of Defense, Force Protection Condition Reports (2025); U.S. Central Command, Regional Security Assessment (2025); Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project.
8. Congressional Budget Office, Defense Budget Outlook (2025); Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress; Department of Defense, Annual Budget Justification Materials (2025).

1. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War and After, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 357–388; Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy (updated 2025).
2. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004); David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (New York: Penguin Press, 2012); Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
3. Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Congressional Budget Office, The Budgetary Effects of U.S. Military Operations Since 2001; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
4. Department of Defense, Operation Iraqi Freedom Casualty Reports; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism (various years); Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).
5. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran (various reports); Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iran and the Changing Balance of Power in the Gulf; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025.
6. Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and the Gulf Military Balance (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 383–388.
7. The White House, National Security Strategy (various administrations); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; National Defense Strategy reports (various administrations).