The package of draft laws “On Identity Document” and related legislation, presented by Minister of Internal Affairs Arpine Sargsyan,
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The National Assembly of Armenia, at its special session Monday, adopted—in the second and final reading—the legislative amendments on
... continue reading.The party's proportional representation list for the upcoming parliamentary election is headed by the former Human Rights Defender of Armenia, Arman
... continue reading.Armenia parliament adopts law amendments on setting up diplomatic offices abroad Do you see a crisis in Armenian-Russian relations today?
... continue reading.If Iran cannot export enough oil and runs out of storage, it will be forced to slow or stop production. That may sound like a technical issue, but it has direct consequences for consumers. When this happens, gas prices tend to rise, food becomes more expensive, shipping costs increase, and inflation spreads across everyday goods.
Bottom Line:
This is not just an oil problem. It is a consumer cost problem that affects households, businesses, and entire economies.
THE CORE IDEA: WHEN OIL STOPS MOVING, COSTS START MOVING
Modern oil systems depend on continuous flow. Oil is produced, transported, temporarily stored, and then exported. That uninterrupted movement helps stabilize prices.
Iran produces roughly 3.0 to 3.5 million barrels per day.¹ Under normal conditions, between 1.5 and 2.0 million barrels per day are exported, while the remainder is used domestically.²
When exports slow or stop, oil builds up within the system. Storage facilities begin to fill, and eventually production must slow. As supply to global markets tightens, prices begin to rise.
Consumer Translation
When oil supply tightens, oil prices increase. As oil prices increase, fuel costs rise. As fuel costs rise, transportation becomes more expensive. When transportation becomes more expensive, the cost of goods increases. This chain reaction means that even consumers who do not directly purchase oil products will feel the impact through higher prices across the economy.
STORAGE FILLS — AND YOUR COSTS BEGIN TO RISE
Iran has limited storage capacity, estimated between 30 million and 90 million barrels.³ At current production levels, that capacity can be filled within a few weeks if exports are significantly disrupted.
As storage fills, oil cannot reach global markets efficiently. This reduces available supply and increases prices.
What This Means for You
Gas stations must pay more for fuel when oil prices rise, and those higher costs are passed directly to consumers at the pump. Delivery companies face higher fuel expenses, which increases shipping costs. Retailers absorb higher transportation and production costs, which are then reflected in higher prices for goods on store shelves.
Even products that appear unrelated to oil are affected. Oil is embedded in the cost structure of groceries, clothing, electronics, and online purchases. As a result, rising oil prices translate into a broad increase in the cost of living.
WHEN PRODUCTION STOPS — THE DAMAGE BECOMES LONG-TERM
Once storage is full, Iran must shut down oil production. This process is not without consequences.
When oil wells are shut in, underground pressure can decline, making it more difficult to extract oil in the future. Water can enter reservoirs, and debris can clog wells. These effects are particularly significant in older oil fields, which are more sensitive to disruption.
Consumer Impact Over Time
When oil production capacity is reduced, global supply becomes tighter over the long term. This leads to higher prices that persist beyond the initial crisis. Reduced production capacity also increases market volatility, making price spikes more frequent.
In practical terms, a temporary shutdown today can result in higher energy costs for consumers months or even years later.
MACHINERY BREAKDOWN — WHY PRICES STAY HIGH
When oil systems stop operating, they begin to degrade. Pipelines can corrode, pumps can fail, and refineries can become unstable. Restarting these systems requires time, investment, and technical expertise.
Restart timelines can range from weeks to months, depending on the extent of the damage. During this period, supply remains constrained.
Why This Matters for Consumers
Even after the initial disruption ends, oil supply does not immediately return to normal. This delay keeps prices elevated. As a result, consumers continue to experience higher costs even after the crisis appears to have passed.
INSIDE IRAN — AND WHY IT MATTERS GLOBALLY
Oil is the financial backbone of Iran’s economy. It provides government revenue, foreign currency, and funding for public services.
Iran has a population of over 90 million people.⁴ When oil exports decline, government revenue falls, the national currency weakens, and inflation rises.
Why This Affects Consumers Worldwide
Economic instability in a major oil-producing country creates uncertainty in global markets. That uncertainty drives prices higher. Markets respond not only to actual supply disruptions but also to the risk of future disruptions. As a result, consumers often pay higher prices even before shortages occur.
REGIONAL IMPACT — AND HOW IT TRANSLATES INTO HIGHER PRICES
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia may benefit from higher oil prices in the short term, as it can generate more revenue from exports. However, prolonged instability increases security risks and discourages investment. This instability can reduce long-term supply reliability, which contributes to higher global prices.
Consumer Effect
Higher global oil prices lead directly to higher fuel costs for consumers around the world.
United Arab Emirates
The UAE serves as a major global hub for trade, shipping, and finance. When regional instability increases, shipping costs rise due to higher insurance premiums and logistical disruptions.
Consumer Effect
Higher shipping costs increase the price of imported goods. Consumers pay more for products, and delivery times may also increase.
Qatar
Qatar is a major exporter of natural gas. Although it exports gas rather than oil, it relies on the same maritime routes.
Consumer Effect
Disruptions in energy supply increase electricity and heating costs. These higher energy costs are passed on to consumers through utility bills and product pricing.
Iraq
Iraq’s oil-dependent economy is vulnerable to regional instability.
Consumer Effect
Market uncertainty increases what is known as a “risk premium.” Oil prices rise not only because of actual shortages but also because of the perceived risk of disruption. Consumers ultimately pay higher prices as a result.
GLOBAL IMPACT — WHERE YOU FEEL IT MOST
Approximately 20% of global oil supply passes through the Strait of Hormuz.⁵
If supply is disrupted, global oil prices increase.
DIRECT CONSUMER IMPACT
Higher oil prices lead directly to higher gasoline prices, which is typically the first and most visible impact for consumers. As fuel costs increase, transportation expenses rise, which in turn raises the cost of groceries. Food production and distribution depend heavily on fuel, so higher energy costs lead to higher food prices.
Energy is also embedded in manufacturing and shipping processes. As a result, higher energy costs increase the price of everyday goods, including clothing, electronics, and household items.
In addition, rising energy costs contribute to overall inflation. This reduces purchasing power, meaning consumers can afford less with the same amount of money.
GLOBAL COUNTRY IMPACTS (CONSUMER LEVEL)
In China, higher energy costs increase manufacturing expenses, which raises the price of goods exported worldwide. In India, consumers experience rapid increases in fuel and food prices due to reliance on imported energy. In the European Union, households face higher electricity and heating costs, which strain budgets. In the United States, rising gasoline prices increase commuting costs and reduce discretionary spending.
THE PARADOX — WHY THIS PROBLEM PERSISTS
Iran faces two unfavorable options. If it continues producing oil, storage capacity will be exceeded, leading to system congestion. If it stops production, oil fields and infrastructure risk long-term damage.
Consumer Reality
In either case, oil supply is constrained. When supply is constrained, prices remain elevated. This is why energy shocks often persist longer than expected and continue to affect consumers even after the initial disruption.
FINAL CONCLUSION — THIS IS A CONSUMER STORY
At first glance, this appears to be a technical issue within a single country’s energy sector. In reality, it is a global consumer issue.
Oil connects directly to:
transportation
food
manufacturing
energy
When oil systems break down, the effects spread through every part of the economy.
The most important takeaway is simple:
Energy is embedded in everything you buy.
When energy systems fail, the cost spreads across the entire economy—and ultimately reaches the consumer.
FOOTNOTES
Reuters, “Iran can go up to two months without oil exports before cutting output, analysts say,” April 15, 2026.
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Iran—Country Analysis Brief,” latest update.
Reuters, “Iran crude storage capacity estimates,” 2026.
World Bank, “Iran Population Data,” latest available estimate.
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” 2024.
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When Iran’s Oil System Stalls: How It Will Impact Consumer Life Read More »
The Kurds—spread across Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran—number roughly 30–40 million people, making them one of the largest stateless groups in the world.¹
They cannot single-handedly resolve the Middle East’s conflicts. However, they can play a meaningful role in stabilizing parts of the region. That role matters directly to consumers because regional stability influences energy prices, job creation, trade routes, and the overall cost of living.
Bottom Line:
If Kurdish regions become more stable and economically integrated, they could contribute to lower regional risk. Lower risk typically leads to more stable oil prices, fewer supply disruptions, and more predictable economic conditions, all of which benefit households and businesses.
THE CORE REALITY: WHY THE KURDS MATTER MORE THAN MOST PEOPLE REALIZE
The Kurdish population occupies one of the most strategically important geographic zones in the Middle East.
They are positioned between major oil-producing regions, critical pipeline routes, and politically sensitive borders. This location gives them influence over energy movement, regional security, and economic stability.
This influence is not theoretical. It is already visible in oil exports from northern Iraq, security operations in Syria, and political dynamics within Iran. As a result, the Kurds have become an important variable in regional stability rather than a peripheral issue.
THE IRAN QUESTION: COULD THE KURDS SHAPE A POST-IRAN SCENARIO?
If Iran were to weaken significantly due to economic collapse, internal unrest, or conflict, Kurdish regions within Iran would likely become strategically important.
Kurdish populations are concentrated in Iran’s northwest, near borders with Iraq and Turkey. In a destabilized scenario, these regions could disrupt internal logistics, influence border access, and shape territorial control.
This does not mean the Kurds would be responsible for the collapse of Iran. That assumption would oversimplify a complex geopolitical reality. However, Kurdish regions could influence the outcome of instability by affecting military movement, border security, and post-conflict negotiations.
Consumer-Level Impact
If Iran destabilizes, global oil markets react quickly. This can lead to higher gasoline prices, increased inflation, and broader economic uncertainty. If Kurdish regions help stabilize parts of that disruption, they could reduce supply shocks and improve market confidence, which would help moderate price volatility for consumers.
SECURITY ROLE: WHY THE KURDS GAINED GLOBAL CREDIBILITY
Kurdish forces gained international recognition during the fight against the Islamic State.
Between 2014 and 2019, Kurdish Peshmerga forces helped defend northern Iraq, while Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces played a central role in dismantling ISIS territorial control.² These forces later managed detention systems holding approximately 90,000 ISIS-linked individuals and family members.³
Why This Matters
Security is a prerequisite for economic stability. Without security, businesses are less likely to invest, employment opportunities decline, and supply chains become unreliable.
Consumer Impact
When regions are secure, trade increases, prices stabilize, and job opportunities expand. When regions are unstable, energy prices rise, goods become more expensive, and economic growth slows. Kurdish contributions to regional security therefore have direct economic implications.
CAN THE KURDS FORM THEIR OWN COUNTRY?
The question of Kurdish statehood is central to their future role in the region.
A Kurdish state would have several strengths. It would have a population large enough to sustain a national economy, established governance structures in some areas, energy resources, and experienced security forces.
However, the obstacles are significant. The Kurdish population is divided across multiple countries, each with its own political system. Neighboring states, particularly Turkey and Iran, generally oppose Kurdish independence due to concerns about territorial integrity.
One of the most critical challenges is geographic.
THE LANDLOCKED PROBLEM: WHY GEOGRAPHY MATTERS
A potential Kurdish state would likely be landlocked, meaning it would not have direct access to the sea. This creates a structural economic challenge because exports must pass through neighboring countries.
Kurdish oil from northern Iraq currently reaches global markets through pipelines that run into Turkey and connect to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Export volumes have ranged between 200,000 and 300,000 barrels per day, depending on political and operational conditions.⁴
Why This Matters
Without access to export routes, oil cannot reach global markets, and revenue cannot be generated. This dependence on neighboring countries creates both economic vulnerability and political leverage.
Consumer Translation
If Kurdish oil exports flow smoothly, global supply increases and prices tend to stabilize. If those exports are disrupted, supply tightens and prices rise. This affects gasoline prices, heating costs, and the price of goods.
DO THE KURDS HAVE ENOUGH OIL TO MATTER?
The Kurdish region in northern Iraq contains meaningful oil reserves and production capacity. It already operates oil fields, refineries, and export infrastructure.
Refining capacity in the region is estimated at approximately 300,000 barrels per day.⁵ This level of production provides a foundation for economic activity.
What This Means Economically
A Kurdish state would not begin without resources. It would have energy production capabilities, export potential, and a base for generating revenue.
However, oil alone is not sufficient to sustain a modern economy. Long-term success would require diversified industries, stable governance, financial systems, and integration into global markets.
THE BIG OPPORTUNITY: A REGIONAL CONNECTOR
One of the most significant opportunities for Kurdish regions lies in their geographic position. They are located between major economies and energy systems, which creates the potential to function as a regional connector.
If stability improves, Kurdish regions could support pipeline networks, electricity transmission systems, trade corridors, and logistics infrastructure.
Consumer Impact
Improved trade routes reduce transportation costs, increase efficiency, and stabilize prices. This translates into lower costs for goods and more reliable supply chains for consumers.
THE RISKS: WHY A KURDISH STATE COULD ALSO CREATE INSTABILITY
The creation of a Kurdish state could introduce new challenges. Neighboring countries might resist independence, leading to political tension, economic restrictions, or even conflict.
Consumer Impact
Increased instability would disrupt energy markets, raise oil prices, and contribute to inflation. This would increase the cost of living and create economic uncertainty.
In this sense, Kurdish statehood is not automatically stabilizing. Its impact depends on how it is implemented and how neighboring countries respond.
FINAL CONCLUSION — WHY THIS MATTERS TO EVERYDAY PEOPLE
The Kurdish question is not a distant geopolitical issue. It is directly connected to economic conditions that affect consumers.
If Kurdish regions contribute to stability, energy markets become more predictable, supply chains strengthen, and prices stabilize. If instability persists, markets remain volatile, prices fluctuate, and economic pressure increases.
The most important takeaway is clear:
The Kurds are becoming a central factor in the future of the Middle East.
That future will influence energy prices, economic growth, and the cost of living for people around the world.
FOOTNOTES
Council on Foreign Relations, “The Kurds in the Middle East: Facts and Figures,” latest update.
U.S. Department of Defense, “Operation Inherent Resolve Reports,” 2019–2023.
The Guardian, “Latest betrayal of the Kurds risks undermining defeat of ISIS,” October 7, 2019.
The New Region, “Kurdistan Region exported over 19.5 million barrels of oil,” January 5, 2026.
Draw Media, “Kurdistan Region oil production and refining capacity,” 2026.
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In Islamabad, the mood was not ceremonial—it was calculated.
The government of Pakistan formally convened sessions of both houses of parliament this week, bringing together the National Assembly of Pakistan and the Senate of Pakistan under a unified legislative agenda. The move, while procedural on paper, carried deeper political weight: it was a test of control, alignment, and timing in a system where numbers—and discipline—determine outcomes.
At the center of the proceedings was Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, whose coalition government has been navigating a narrow governing margin. By convening both chambers simultaneously, the administration signaled urgency—an attempt to accelerate legislative movement on economic reforms, budgetary approvals, and regulatory adjustments tied to ongoing negotiations with international financial institutions.
The sessions were called under constitutional provisions that allow the president—currently Asif Ali Zardari—to summon parliament when required for governance continuity or national necessity. While such sessions are not uncommon, the timing matters. Pakistan’s economy remains under pressure, with inflation volatility, currency constraints, and external debt obligations shaping the legislative calendar.
Inside the chamber, the choreography was deliberate.
Government lawmakers moved quickly to table priority bills, focusing on fiscal stabilization measures and administrative reforms. Opposition figures, including members aligned with Imran Khan, challenged both the legitimacy and sequencing of the agenda, arguing that structural political issues—particularly electoral transparency and judicial independence—remain unresolved.
The friction was expected. What mattered more was attendance.
Joint parliamentary effectiveness in Pakistan depends less on debate and more on turnout discipline. A thin majority can pass sweeping legislation if fully present; a fragmented coalition can collapse under absence or defection. Early indicators from the session suggested that the ruling coalition maintained cohesion—enough to proceed, but not enough to operate comfortably.
The deeper story is structural.
Pakistan’s parliamentary system is designed to balance power between elected representatives and institutional actors, but in practice, it operates under constant pressure from political fragmentation, judicial intervention, and civil-military dynamics. Convening both houses is not just about passing laws—it is about demonstrating that the system still functions as a coordinated mechanism.
Economically, the stakes are immediate. Legislative approval is often a prerequisite for unlocking external funding programs, including those tied to the International Monetary Fund. Delays or disruptions inside parliament can translate directly into financial instability outside it.
Politically, the sessions serve another purpose: narrative control.
For the government, a functioning parliament reinforces legitimacy and governance capability. For the opposition, the same forum becomes a stage to challenge both. The result is a dual-track reality—law-making on one level, power contestation on another.
By the close of the first session, the outcome was clear but incomplete. The machinery was moving. Bills were advancing. But the underlying tensions—between coalition stability, opposition resistance, and institutional balance—remained intact.
Pakistan did not resolve its political equation this week.
It proved that it can still run it.
FOOTNOTES
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Article 54, regarding summoning of parliament sessions.
National Assembly of Pakistan, official legislative procedures and session rules.
Senate of Pakistan, constitutional role and legislative authority.
International Monetary Fund, “Pakistan: Financial Stability and Reform Programs,” 2025–2026 reports.
Reuters, “Pakistan Government Faces Tight Numbers in Parliament Amid Economic Reforms,” 2026.
Al Jazeera, “Pakistan Parliament Sessions Reflect Deep Political Divisions,” 2026.
REFERENCES
Constitution of Pakistan. “Articles 54–56: Parliamentary Sessions and Procedures.”
Reuters. “Pakistan’s Coalition Government Navigates Parliamentary Challenges.” 2026.
Al Jazeera. “Political Tensions Rise as Pakistan Convenes Parliament.” 2026.
International Monetary Fund. “Pakistan Country Reports and Economic Outlook.” 2025–2026.
Dawn News. “Joint Parliamentary Sessions and Legislative Priorities in Pakistan.” 2026.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) announced this week that it will end its boycott of Iraq’s parliament sessions and return to legislative participation in Baghdad, closing a tense political standoff that had raised concerns about Kurdish representation and government stability in Iraq.
The boycott began in April 2026 after the disputed election of Iraqi President Nizar Amedi, a development the KDP argued violated political understandings surrounding Kurdish representation within Iraq’s federal system. The party rejected both the process and legitimacy of the vote, accusing parliamentary leadership of bypassing constitutional and procedural norms.
The decision to resume participation follows several weeks of negotiations between Kurdish leaders and major Iraqi political blocs, including representatives tied to the powerful Coordination Framework coalition. According to KDP statements, the return was made possible after what the party described as “positive understandings” regarding constitutional rights, budgetary obligations, and political cooperation between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region.
The move is politically significant for several reasons.
First, the KDP is the largest Kurdish bloc in Iraq’s parliament, holding 29 seats. Its absence weakened Kurdish leverage during a critical period of cabinet formation and negotiations over federal authority, oil revenues, and regional funding. The return restores a major political actor to Iraq’s legislative process at a moment when Baghdad is attempting to stabilize coalition politics and finalize the next government structure.
Second, the end of the boycott reflects the reality of Iraq’s informal power-sharing system, where the presidency is traditionally held by a Kurd, the premiership by a Shiite Arab, and the speakership by a Sunni Arab. Kurdish disengagement from parliament threatened to disrupt this fragile balancing arrangement, which has defined post-2003 Iraqi governance.
The KDP stated that its return is tied directly to monitoring whether Baghdad fulfills political and financial commitments to the Kurdistan Region. In particular, Kurdish officials remain focused on disputes involving budget transfers, public-sector salaries, and energy policy coordination between Erbil and the federal government.
The political tensions underlying the boycott are rooted in a broader rivalry between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the two dominant Kurdish parties that have jointly shaped Kurdish politics for decades. Disputes between the two factions have repeatedly delayed elections, complicated coalition-building, and intensified competition over Kurdish influence in Baghdad.
Recent years have also seen mounting friction between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad over oil exports and constitutional authority. The suspension of Kurdish oil exports through Turkey in 2023 significantly damaged the regional economy and increased pressure on Kurdish leaders to negotiate more stable arrangements with the federal government.
Analysts view the KDP’s return as pragmatic rather than ideological. By reentering parliament, the party regains direct influence over cabinet negotiations, federal legislation, and budget discussions that could shape the future economic position of Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, Baghdad benefits from the appearance of renewed national cohesion during a politically sensitive government transition.
Still, the underlying disputes remain unresolved. The boycott may be over, but the structural tensions between Kurdish autonomy and federal authority continue to define Iraqi politics. The current thaw appears less like a permanent settlement and more like a tactical pause in a long-running struggle over power, resources, and constitutional interpretation inside the Iraqi state.
FOOTNOTES
Rudaw, “KDP Ends Boycott of Iraq’s Parliament Sessions,” May 6, 2026, Rudaw article.
The New Region, “KDP Says Will Return to Iraqi Parliament for Cabinet Vote,” May 2026, The New Region report.
Shafaq News, “KDP Bloc to Resume Activity in Iraqi Parliament,” May 2026, Shafaq News report.
Reuters, “KDP Wins Iraqi Kurdish Parliamentary Election,” October 30, 2024, Reuters election report.
Reuters, “KDP Leads in Iraqi Kurdish Parliamentary Election Results,” October 21, 2024, Reuters regional election analysis.
Reuters, “Kurdish Leader Barzani Pushes for Leverage with Baghdad in Iraq Vote,” November 6, 2025, Reuters Barzani analysis.
Wikipedia contributors, “2026 Iraqi Presidential Election,” Wikipedia, accessed May 7, 2026, Wikipedia entry on 2026 Iraqi presidential election.
REFERENCES
Reuters. “Iraq’s Kurdistan Region to Hold Delayed Parliamentary Election on Oct. 20.” June 26, 2024. Reuters report.
Reuters. “KDP Leads in Iraqi Kurdish Parliamentary Election Results, Commission Says.” October 21, 2024. Reuters election report.
Reuters. “KDP Wins Iraqi Kurdish Parliamentary Election, Commission Says.” October 30, 2024. Reuters election report.
Reuters. “Kurdish Leader Barzani Pushes for Leverage with Baghdad in Iraq Vote.” November 6, 2025. Reuters analysis.
Rudaw. “KDP Ends Boycott of Iraq’s Parliament Sessions.” May 6, 2026. Rudaw article.
Shafaq News. “KDP Bloc to Resume Activity in Iraqi Parliament.” May 2026. Shafaq News report.
The New Region. “KDP Says Return to Iraqi Parliament Comes After ‘Positive Understandings.’” May 2026. The New Region analysis.
JORDAN’S MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD STRUCTURE, STATE LINKAGES, AND STRATEGIC OUTLOOK
The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is a structure made up of two bodies. The first is a closed organizational leadership, similar to secret groupings, that controls strategy and manages engagement with the street, the state, and external actors. The most important characteristic of this leadership is secrecy and the lack of clarity in its organizational structure to any outside observer. This means that the Muslim Brotherhood, in its outward appearance, is different from what it is internally, such that individuals and their publicly visible positions do not reflect their real influence inside. This makes it difficult for anyone trying to confront them from the outside to understand how the group actually operates. They are organized as a secret group, and this is how they manage their affairs and maintain their existence.
The second part is the political arm of the group, currently represented by the Islamic Action Front Party. This arm is used in elections to deliver media messaging and apply pressure, and it serves as the channel for dealing with the outside world. However, real power within the group is highly centralized and hierarchical, operating through a strict chain of command, and does not match its public appearance. In other words, frequent visibility of any individual does not mean they are the most influential.
The names in the following paragraphs represent the most influential individuals in the group, as well as the internal dynamics, or hierarchy, through which they operate.
Murad al-Adailah, the General Controller. This man represents the highest organizational authority in theory. He is responsible for setting the strategic direction of the Muslim Brotherhood and maintaining non-public communication channels, including contact with the Royal Court in Jordan. He is considered the central point for escalation or de-escalation depending on what serves the group’s interests. If there is rapprochement with any party, Murad al-Adailah announces it, and if there is escalation, he is the first to declare it. [3]
Hammam Saeed, a former General Controller of the group. Despite his advanced age, he remains the organization’s top ideological authority. He maintains both public and non-declared, deeply rooted channels in Jordan with the Royal Court itself, including the Chief of the Royal Court, the Special Intelligence Office affiliated with the Court, Jordanian intelligence, Hamas, the core of the global Muslim Brotherhood organization, Turkey, and other locations including Morocco. Despite his strong secrecy, he is believed to be one of the most influential figures in the Muslim Brotherhood worldwide, and some even consider him to be what is referred to as number one in the global organization.
Hammam Saeed’s strength lies in his ability to think broadly and strategically, making him a mastermind within the Brotherhood. He understands the region and knows how to operate within it, and he has maintained advanced relations with the Iranians. He is also known for extreme harshness in managing the group, and even in managing his own family’s affairs. Many members of the group fear him.
Abdullah al-Akayleh, a prominent leader in the organization, former MP, and former minister. He strongly represents the East Jordanian wing within the group. Although he is not the only East Jordanian, most of the leadership is now East Jordanian, and he is more emotionally tied to the concept of East Jordanian identity. He is pragmatic and is considered a stabilizing channel within the organization, especially regarding the sometimes difficult relationship between East Jordanian and Palestinian-origin members. Although the organization is generally cohesive, this issue occasionally appears publicly. In addition, he strongly believes in and follows the Hashemite system in Jordan. He is known for his famous statement broadcast on Jordanian television in 2017: “We stood with the regime in every square.” Despite his strong loyalty, he is not the closest figure to the Palace or intelligence.
Zaki Bani Irshid, a former General Controller from Irbid and an East Jordanian from the north, is known for escalatory rhetoric and signaling pressure. He is used by the group as a spokesperson, typically to deliver ideas and statements, whether threats or pressure against certain parties. Despite his senior positions, he has no real authority beyond appearances. Although he is part of the leadership, he is among the least influential, despite the large image he projects publicly. His title is bigger than his actual weight. He is used by his superiors, particularly Hammam Saeed and Saleh al-Armouti, whose role will be explained later, to deliver pressure-driven messaging that is then managed by senior leadership for the organization’s benefit.
Wael al-Saqqa, Secretary General of the Islamic Action Front Party, which is currently the only licensed wing represented in parliament, is the most important operational tool of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. He controls election strategy, parliamentary representation, the behavior of the parliamentary bloc, and public positions, and he serves as the gateway for escalation through parliament. Although he is a high-level executive and his opinion is considered within the leadership, he has less decision-making authority than others, even though he manages a large number of people. He is an executor who contributes to strategic decisions but is not the final decision-maker. This is expected in an organization built on obedience since its founding by Hassan al-Banna, where a small number of individuals ultimately control decision-making, and he is among the most important of them.
Saleh al-Armouti, a prominent leader in the Islamic Action Front, an MP, and an experienced lawyer, acts as a legal shield for the Brotherhood both internally and externally when needed. He provides parliamentary protection, media management, and escalation. He is considered one of the most hardline hawks within the organization. He strengthens the rigidity of the Brotherhood structure and skillfully navigates the complex relationship between the Jordanian regime, the state, intelligence, and the Brotherhood. While they are allied, they are also careful to demonstrate power against one another at times, and al-Armouti is highly skilled in this area.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan enjoys deep support from the Jordanian intelligence apparatus, and the organization has had a close relationship with the Jordanian state since its inception. King Hussein summarized this relationship by saying: “The Muslims are the party of the state.” in a famous interview in 1996. [1]
The overlap and partnership between the Muslim Brotherhood and Jordanian intelligence is extensive, going beyond basic coordination into decades of joint activity. Cooperation began in 1970 during the Jordanian civil war, when the Brotherhood supported the Hashemite regime and assisted intelligence operations on the ground, including campaigns against Palestinian factions and framing opposition to them as jihad. This played a major role in stabilizing the state and its security structure after the conflict. King Abdullah II later acknowledged this period and the Brotherhood’s role during his interview with The Atlantic. [2]
The relationship between Jordanian intelligence and the Brotherhood is not hidden, but operational. One example is Dr. Abdullah Azzam, who was close to Jordanian intelligence, played a role in establishing the Afghan jihad, and had Osama bin Laden among his students.
Likewise, al-Qaeda, in which Jordanians were among its most important members, including the terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, has networks that are connected in Jordan. Because Jordan presents itself as a country with political freedom, yet in reality the Jordanian intelligence apparatus maintains near-total control over public and political life, no one can act or form such organizations without the knowledge of intelligence. At best, the intelligence services did nothing to stop it; otherwise, such activity would have been shut down at its earliest stage.
The situation developed to the point where the Muslim Brotherhood and their partners within the Jordanian intelligence apparatus operated across multiple arenas as one team. This included sending extremist Islamists to Iraq and Afghanistan during the second Afghan war, and later supplying ISIS with weapons, vehicles, money, and ammunition. American media reported that Jordanian intelligence sold weapons to ISIS in Syria.[4] British media also reported the theft of ammunition from the British army stationed in Jordan and its sale, with the knowledge of intelligence, to ISIS in Syria. [5] Russian media further reported that Toyota vehicles purchased by the Jordanian army ended up in the hands of ISIS. [6] At minimum, this reflects a failure to act; more realistically, it reflects awareness and tolerance within a system that tightly controls activity inside the country.
As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood organization has effectively become part of the state in Jordan. There are now officers within the security services who are aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood and influenced by its ideology. Where very few intelligence officers previously performed daily prayers, it has now become common to see officers praying in their offices, and the prayer room inside the intelligence building is nearly full during the five daily prayers.
In addition, this Brotherhood influence within the intelligence apparatus has extended to some senior officers in the Jordanian army and even into parts of the leadership, to the point that the state in Jordan has become “Brotherhoodized” while external actors remain largely unaware.
Therefore, confronting the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has become more urgent and at the same time more complex. This is not only because of the difficulty in understanding how they operate, as they function as a secret organization as explained above, but also because the Jordanian intelligence apparatus stands behind them, or at the very least allows their expansion, while maintaining full control over political life in the country. At the same time, the Jordanian state continues to present itself externally as modern and moderate.
The situation has now become more dangerous. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan reads the region carefully and understands that the current war on Iran is an American effort against the broader system established roughly 80 years ago, including the Brotherhood and extremist structures embedded in the region. They view any strike against Iran as a direct threat to themselves and also to the Jordanian state, which maintains close ties with the Iranian-Iraqi system in the region.
The Muslim Brotherhood is now preparing for the post-war phase. They believe the next step will be the dismantling of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, with the Jordanian branch serving as the spearhead and headquarters of the global organization. The Muslim Brotherhood is now concerned because of the recent designation by the United States government of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood as a terror organisation.
The Muslim Brotherhood is now studying “Plan B” to preserve itself and its organization, and they are convinced that they are up to a “serious” confrontation with the US Government. They are working to maintain influence in the country and keep Jordan as an international hub for the global Muslim Brotherhood organization. They have considered multiple options and understand that ignoring the situation or assuming things will remain the same until the end of Trump’s term will not work. They recognize that this is no longer possible after developments involving Iran, as they fear the U.S. administration might take tangible actions to destroy them after being designated as a terrorist organization by President Trump. 27. The option in front of them now, and the one they prefer, is to try to move toward a constitutional monarchy with Prince Hussein or another Hashemite prince becoming king, especially since they question and believe that Prince Hussein may never actually become king. In that sense, this situation is similar to what happened with the King’s half-brother Hamzah, who was strongly aligned with the Brotherhood and whom the Brotherhood openly and strongly defended in parliament.
That said, this same option has already been assessed by Jordanian intelligence, which remains in contact with the Brotherhood, as difficult to carry out at this stage, even though a Gulf state is backing the idea.
The other option is what can be described as the Samson option, “on my enemies and on me,” which the Brotherhood has seriously discussed. The idea is to create security problems targeting the United States and Israel inside Jordan, making it extremely difficult to control the country if regime change were to happen. In that scenario, the Brotherhood would position itself as the lesser evil for the United States, based on the logic of “two bad options.” At the same time, the Brotherhood continues to publicly reject regime change. What they are actually considering is igniting a jihadist situation inside Jordan. This option is supported by senior figures within the Jordanian intelligence apparatus, particularly through the creation of security incidents and operations along the Israeli border, and by relying on thousands of members tied to the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard who are currently in Jordan holding Iraqi passports and who have access to sufficient weapons. From the Brotherhood’s perspective, creating this kind of instability would disrupt any effort to eliminate them.
Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan requires understanding that the movement operates as a tightly controlled, secret organizational structure that is closely tied to the Jordanian regime and its intelligence apparatus. A first starting point is acknowledging that the Jordanian state is in a partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood itself.
Second, there needs to be a plan to weaken and contain the Brotherhood’s penetration inside the Jordanian intelligence apparatus, especially among senior and mid-level officers. This requires a focused and dedicated effort, particularly since major regional changes are already underway, including in Jordan, and time is limited.
Third, there needs to be an alternative, even if it has to be put together quickly. The Muslim Brotherhood has effectively had a monopoly over the political scene in Jordan, supported by the security establishment and by a level of media freedom that no other group has. That freedom still exists today, and there has been no real counterweight to it.
The Brotherhood has been operating largely alone in Jordan in both media and politics. On top of that, the regime itself changed election and party laws in 2006 in a way that pushed all other parties out while allowing the Brotherhood to remain. This political vacuum, combined with the Brotherhood’s resources, has left it with no real opposition on the ground, especially since secular movements opposing and/or the regime were pushed out of the country or forced into exile. The threat of a Muslim Brotherhood takeover of Jordan is real. Addressing this situation will require serious resources and sustained commitment to make sure Jordan does not become easy ground for the Brotherhood.
“Jordan Is Palestinian,” Middle East Forum, accessed May 6, 2026, https://meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/jordan-is-palestinian.
“Monarch in the Middle,” The Atlantic, April 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-middle/309270/.
“اعتقال المراقب العام لجماعة الإخوان,” Al Jazeera, June 23, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2025/6/23/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86.
“CIA Weapons for Syrian Rebels Funneled onto Black Markets: Report,” The Hill, June 2016, https://thehill.com/homenews/284963-cia-weapons-for-syrian-rebels-funneled-onto-black-markets-report/.
“87,000 Stolen British Bullets in Hands of Jihadis,” Daily Mail, June 2016, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3682655/87-000-stolen-British-bullets-hands-jihadis-cache-ammunition-stolen-Army-training-camp.html.
“بعد التحقيق، شركة تويوتا تؤكد…,” Tunisie Focus, accessed May 6, 2026, https://www.tunisiefocus.com/%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%8C-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9-181690/
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Breakdowns at the negotiation table are not temporary setbacks—they are indicators that Iran is no longer moving toward a controlled political transition. The system is moving toward structural fracture, the condition that precedes civil conflict.
Even without open violence, the signals are clear. Negotiations are stalling. Political factions are no longer debating policy—they are competing over control, survival, and future exposure. Once conflict reaches that level, instability is no longer the primary risk. Escalation becomes the default trajectory.
The underlying data reinforces this shift. Protest activity has reached nationwide scale, involving millions across provinces.¹ Arrests number in the thousands.³ Fatalities range from the hundreds to several thousand depending on the source.² At the same time, survey data indicates that roughly 70% of the population opposes the current system.⁴
This combination—mass opposition, sustained mobilization, and elite fragmentation—matches early-stage conditions observed in states that later entered internal conflict.
The system lacks a shared framework capable of absorbing this pressure.
Bottom line: Without structural intervention, escalation becomes increasingly likely. A new constitution—credible, enforceable, and broadly accepted—is the only mechanism capable of converting zero-sum power competition into managed political conflict while enabling long-term national recovery.
WHEN POLITICS FAILS, SURVIVAL LOGIC TAKES OVER
Every unstable system reaches a threshold where politics ceases to function as a negotiation mechanism.
That threshold is visible in Iran today. Negotiations stall, positions harden, and compromise is replaced by strategic positioning. The conflict is no longer about policy direction—it is about control of the system itself.
More importantly, there is no trusted framework to resolve that competition.
At that point, the internal logic shifts:
From: “What outcome can we agree on?”
To: “What happens to us if we lose?”
If losing carries existential risk—loss of power, prosecution, or elimination—compromise becomes irrational. Actors optimize for survival, not agreement.
That is the inflection point where political systems transition toward conflict environments.
WHY THIS TRAJECTORY LEADS TO CIVIL CONFLICT
Civil conflict does not emerge from disagreement. It emerges when disagreement cannot be resolved safely.
Iran currently exhibits three reinforcing conditions:
Legitimacy erosion
When roughly 70% of the population opposes the governing system,⁴ the issue is not unrest—it is systemic legitimacy failure.
Sustained mass mobilization
Nationwide protests involving millions represent continuous structural pressure, not isolated events.¹
Coercive containment strategy
Arrests and force-based suppression may stabilize conditions in the short term, but historically they increase long-term volatility.²³
Layered onto this are economic constraints, demographic complexity, and competing power centers.
Hard conclusion:
Absent a shared framework, this configuration does not stabilize. It fragments—either through institutional breakdown or organized internal conflict.
WHO HOLDS POWER — AND WHY THAT MATTERS
Any credible analysis must identify actual power centers.
In Iran, authority is distributed across overlapping structures:
The clerical establishment, which retains constitutional and ideological authority
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which controls significant military and economic assets
Elected political institutions, which operate with constrained authority
Reform-oriented and opposition networks, both internal and external
These actors operate without a neutral arbitration system. Their incentives are misaligned, and in many cases directly conflicting.
Most critically:
Actors with coercive power are not structurally subordinate to a universally trusted legal framework.
This is the system’s core instability.
WHAT A CONSTITUTION ACTUALLY DOES IN THIS ENVIRONMENT
In stable systems, constitutions define governance.
In unstable systems, they determine whether conflict becomes violent.
A functional constitution answers four non-negotiable questions:
Who exercises power
How that power is limited
What happens when power is lost
What protections remain regardless of outcome
At present, these answers are contested or unclear.
A credible constitutional framework replaces uncertainty with enforceable rules. That shift changes incentives:
From: “Win or face consequences”
To: “Compete, lose, and remain protected”
That transition is what prevents political conflict from becoming violent conflict.
WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MUST DO — SPECIFICALLY
General principles are insufficient. The design must directly address current failure points.
Fragment and balance executive authority
A hybrid or parliamentary structure reduces the risk of total system capture.
Establish enforceable judicial independence
Courts must have both authority and insulation from political override.
Lock in non-revocable rights protections
Rights must apply regardless of political outcomes, particularly for losing factions.
Consolidate control over armed forces
All security institutions—including IRGC elements—must operate under a unified civilian-controlled command structure.
Introduce structured decentralization
Regional governance authority reduces center-periphery tension while preserving national cohesion.
Define a credible transitional justice framework
Without mechanisms for amnesty or adjudication, incumbents lack incentive to relinquish power.
These are not theoretical features. They directly correspond to identifiable instability drivers.
A CONSTITUTION MUST ALSO DEFINE A POSITIVE NATIONAL RESET
A constitution in this environment cannot function solely as a constraint on power. It must also serve as a forward-looking foundation for economic and societal renewal.
Iran is not transitioning from stability. It is emerging from prolonged economic contraction, inflationary pressure, and structural isolation.
A framework that only prevents conflict is insufficient.
It must also:
Establish immediate economic credibility
The system must signal that contracts are enforceable, capital is protected, and regulatory rules are stable. Without this, domestic and foreign investment will not return.
Enable reintegration into the global economy
A credible constitutional order must support normalization pathways that restore access to capital markets, reduce transaction risk, and reopen trade and financial flows.
Support diversified, long-term growth
Reducing dependence on energy revenues requires enabling private sector expansion, industrial development, technological investment, and service-based economic activity.
This is not an economic policy document—but it must create the conditions under which economic policy can function.
ENFORCEMENT REALITY: WHY MOST CONSTITUTIONS FAIL
Design is not the limiting factor. Enforcement is.
Most transitional constitutions fail for three reasons:
Coercive actors defect
If armed institutions—particularly the IRGC—do not recognize the framework, the system fractures immediately.
Commitments lack credibility
Factions may agree initially but defect when power dynamics shift.
Early violations go unpunished
If the system fails to enforce protections at the outset, trust collapses quickly.
Critical constraint:
A constitution only functions if those with the capacity to break it choose not to.
That requires alignment of incentives—not just legal design.
TRAJECTORY ANALYSIS
If current conditions persist:
Short term: escalating political and social tension
Medium term: institutional fracture or parallel power structures
Long term: resolution through either constitutional order or force-based dominance
There is no stable equilibrium under current conditions.
FINAL TAKE
Iran is operating at a structural breaking point.
Elite fragmentation, mass opposition, and the absence of a trusted governing framework have created conditions where civil conflict is no longer a remote possibility—it is a plausible outcome.
A new constitution is not a guarantee of stability.
But it is the only mechanism capable of converting zero-sum power competition into a system where conflict can be managed without violence.
More importantly, it is not only a defensive instrument.
It is the foundation for a new era.
If designed and enforced effectively, it can do more than prevent fragmentation—it can restore economic credibility, reestablish access to global markets, and create the conditions for sustained national growth after years of isolation and decline.
Without that forward-looking function, even a stable system risks stagnation.
With it, the trajectory changes:
from survival to recovery
from fragmentation to reintegration
from instability to growth
It does not eliminate disagreement.
It determines whether disagreement unfolds inside a collapsing system—or within one capable of rebuilding, stabilizing, and moving forward.
REFERENCES
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), “Iran Protest Data,” 2025–2026.
Amnesty International, “Iran: Protest Crackdown Casualty Estimates,” 2025–2026; Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) reports.
Reuters, “Iran Arrests and State Response,” 2026.
GAMAAN, “Iranians’ Political Preferences Survey,” 2025.
World Bank, “Iran Demographic Profile,” latest available data.
HOW A NEW IRANIAN CONSTITUTION COULD PREVENT CIVIL WAR — AND WHAT MUST BE IN IT Read More »