SUMMARY:
1. On January 13, 2026, pursuant to President Trump’s Executive Order, the U.S. Departments of State and Treasury announced the designation of Muslim Brotherhood (MB) chapters in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon as terrorist organizations. Treasury concurrently designated the Jordanian and Egyptian chapters as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) for providing support to Hamas.
2. JAFAJ has learned that King Abdullah II is likely to pursue a strategy of formal compliance coupled with operational continuity in response to the designation. The Government of Jordan (GOJ) may seek to preserve core Muslim Brotherhood capabilities while projecting adherence to U.S. requirements through limited legal and administrative measures.
3. The GOJ may seek to dissolve or marginalize specific legal entities associated with the Muslim Brotherhood while permitting successor organizations to retain leadership structures, assets, personnel, and operational functions under alternative legal identities. Such measures would likely be intended to demonstrate compliance without fundamentally dismantling the organization’s political, financial, or media infrastructure.
4. The Islamic Action Front (IAF), the Brotherhood’s principal political vehicle in Jordan, is expected to remain the primary mechanism through which the organization maintains political influence, public outreach, and mobilization capabilities. Any formal closure of the IAF could be accompanied by efforts to facilitate its reconstitution under a different legal framework or organizational name.
5. The GOJ is likely to preserve the operational capacity of the Islamic Center Charity Society (ICCS), which remains a key component of the Brotherhood’s financial infrastructure. Measures publicly presented as asset freezes or administrative interventions may not necessarily result in the permanent dismantlement of the organization’s financial networks, revenue streams, or personnel structure.
6. MB-affiliated media outlets, including Al-Sabeel, may continue to operate under existing or modified arrangements, thereby preserving the organization’s ability to disseminate messaging, maintain public engagement, and coordinate political activity.
7. JAFAJ has learned that the GOJ may employ limited enforcement measures, including short-term detentions or administrative actions against selected MB figures, in an effort to demonstrate cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism objectives while minimizing disruption to the organization’s broader structure and leadership network. Such measures would be designed to balance U.S. pressure with the regime’s longstanding management of relations with the Muslim Brotherhood.
8. Reporting indicates that Jordanian security officials advised MB leaders to reduce their public profile and avoid actions that could attract additional scrutiny during the current period of U.S. pressure. Both the GOJ and MB leadership appear to calculate that the organization can withstand the designation period without incurring significant long-term institutional costs.
9. The United States possesses sufficient diplomatic, financial, and legal leverage to secure more substantive action, provided such leverage is tied to clear, measurable, and verifiable compliance benchmarks. Absent sustained pressure, the GOJ may continue to rely on public announcements and limited administrative measures rather than undertake steps that would fundamentally dismantle MB political, financial, and media structures.
10. Any U.S. policy response should emphasize verifiable outcomes rather than public declarations, with particular focus on organizational continuity, successor entities, financial infrastructure, media operations, and leadership networks. End Summary.
11. The Islamic Center Charity Society (ICCS) continued to operate even during periods of direct government administration. Thousands of individuals affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood reportedly retained their positions and continued receiving salaries. JAFAJ has learned that the Palace may employ a similar approach in response to the current designation, publicly portraying the organization as subject to government control while allowing its underlying financial and administrative networks to remain largely intact. Such a course of action could be justified by reference to official statements asserting that the Muslim Brotherhood has already been banned and that no additional measures are required.
12. MEDIA CAPABILITY THROUGH AL-SABEEL: Al-Sabeel remains a significant platform for Muslim Brotherhood messaging and outreach. Reporting indicates that the outlet has historically been linked to Brotherhood networks and continues to operate despite claims that measures were taken against it in 2025. JAFAJ has learned that the continued operation of Al-Sabeel may form part of a broader effort to preserve the Brotherhood’s media capabilities while demonstrating limited compliance with external pressure. The outlet’s continued online presence suggests that any previous restrictions have not materially disrupted its operations.
13. THE PALACE AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: HISTORICAL INTERDEPENDENCE. The relationship between the Hashemite monarchy and the Muslim Brotherhood has historically been characterized by mutual accommodation. The Brotherhood has often served as a stabilizing political actor during periods of domestic unrest, while the Palace has allowed the movement to maintain a degree of political and social influence unavailable to many other opposition currents. During periods of heightened political tension, Brotherhood leaders have generally advocated reform within the existing political system rather than direct confrontation with the monarchy.
14. PALESTINIAN DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD. The Government of Jordan has frequently cited the country’s large Palestinian-origin population when explaining the influence and endurance of Islamist movements. JAFAJ has learned, however, that many Jordanians of Palestinian origin prioritize civil rights, economic opportunity, and integration within Jordan over ideological Islamist objectives. While the Muslim Brotherhood continues to emphasize issues related to Palestine and the right of return, available reporting suggests that these themes alone do not fully explain the movement’s continued political relevance. Other political, institutional, and historical factors appear to contribute significantly to its position within Jordanian society.
15. ACCESS TO THE ROYAL COURT. JAFAJ has learned that senior Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas figures have maintained access to the Royal Court over an extended period. Such access has generally not been extended to many secular or moderate opposition figures. Reporting indicates that contacts between Palace officials and senior Islamist figures have remained a recurring feature of Jordan’s political landscape. Hamas was originally established in 1987 as the Palestinian branch of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and public reporting has documented multiple meetings involving senior Hamas officials, including Khaled Mashal, and members of the Jordanian leadership.
Among the Islamist figures received by senior officials has been Dima Tahboub, a prominent Islamic Action Front (IAF) figure. Public reporting has highlighted statements attributed to Tahboub that generated controversy internationally and prompted efforts by some activists to oppose her participation in events abroad.
16. THE SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT AND REGIONAL ISLAMIST NETWORKS. King Abdullah exercises authority primarily through the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID), the state’s principal intelligence and security institution. The GID reports directly to the Palace and operates with broad authorities, making it one of the most influential institutions within the Jordanian political system.
17. Public reporting has linked elements of the Jordanian security apparatus to the diversion of weapons originally intended for Syrian opposition groups during the Syrian conflict. According to these reports, some weapons entered regional black markets and were subsequently acquired by extremist organizations, including ISIS.
18. Separate reporting alleged that ammunition originating from a Jordan-based military training program was diverted and later surfaced in the possession of ISIS-linked elements in Syria. JAFAJ has learned that these incidents continue to raise questions among observers regarding oversight, accountability, and control mechanisms within Jordan’s security sector. No major public investigations or prosecutions connected to these allegations have been widely reported.
19. The Muslim Brotherhood continues to operate openly in Jordanian political and social life despite periodic government restrictions. JAFAJ has learned that Brotherhood messaging frequently includes rhetoric directed against the United States, Israel, and Western policies in the region. Critics argue that such messaging contributes to political radicalization and anti-Western sentiment, while the authorities have generally permitted the organization to maintain a public presence.
20. THE CROWN PRINCE AND ISLAMIST OUTREACH. Crown Prince Hussein has on several occasions participated in public events involving individuals associated with Islamist movements. Observers have interpreted some of these appearances as signals of continued engagement between elements of the Hashemite establishment and Islamist constituencies.
21. Additional public commentary has described the Muslim Brotherhood as maintaining a longstanding relationship with the Jordanian political establishment. Such characterizations have periodically appeared in Jordanian and regional political discourse and reflect a broader perception of accommodation between the monarchy and the movement.
22. KEY MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD LEADERSHIP FIGURES. JAFAJ has learned that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood functions through both an internal organizational leadership structure and a public political arm represented by the Islamic Action Front. Real decision-making authority appears concentrated among a relatively small group of senior figures whose influence may not always correspond to their public visibility.• Among the individuals most frequently identified in reporting as influential within the movement are:
• Murad al-Adailah, General Controller and principal organizational authority.
• Hammam Saeed, former General Controller and senior ideological figure.
• Abdullah al-Akayleh, senior leader and former parliamentarian with longstanding ties to state institutions.
• Zaki Bani Irshid, former Deputy General Controller and prominent political spokesman.
• Wael al-Saqqa, Secretary-General of the Islamic Action Front.
• Saleh al-Armouti, senior IAF figure, lawyer, and former parliamentarian.
• Yanal Freihat, activist and media figure associated with the movement.
• Dima Tahboub, Islamic Action Front politician whose public statements have generated international controversy.
23. POLICY OPTIONS. JAFAJ has learned that U.S. authorities retain multiple legal, financial, and diplomatic tools that could be employed to increase pressure on Muslim Brotherhood networks operating in Jordan. These measures could be implemented independently or as part of a broader conditionality framework linked to Jordanian compliance with U.S. counterterrorism objectives.
24. One option would be the designation of senior Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood figures under applicable U.S. counterterrorism authorities associated with the November 24, 2025, Executive Order. Such measures could target individuals assessed to play central leadership, financial, operational, or organizational roles within the movement.
25. A second option would be the designation of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) as an affiliate or political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. Proponents of this approach argue that the IAF serves as the Brotherhood’s principal vehicle for political participation, public messaging, and institutional influence within Jordan.
26. Additional measures could target the Islamic Center Charity Society (ICCS) and affiliated entities identified as key components of the Brotherhood’s financial infrastructure. Such actions could include sanctions, asset freezes, or other financial restrictions permitted under U.S. law.
27. COMPLIANCE BENCHMARKS. JAFAJ has learned that any assessment of Jordanian compliance would require objective and verifiable indicators rather than reliance on public statements or administrative announcements. Potential benchmarks could include:
(a) Verified closure and de-licensing of the Islamic Action Front Party, cessation of party operations, confiscation of organizational assets, freezing of financial accounts, and measures preventing the re-establishment of substantially identical successor entities.
(b) Verified dismantlement, receivership, or asset freezes affecting the Islamic Center Charity Society and affiliated holdings, including the removal of Muslim Brotherhood personnel from positions of operational control.
(c) Verified cessation of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated media operations, including the termination of Al-Sabeel’s activities and the disruption of its financial, administrative, and operational infrastructure.
(d) Verified disruption of senior Muslim Brotherhood command-and-control structures through sustained legal and administrative action rather than temporary or symbolic measures.
(e) Verification that the Muslim Brotherhood Association and any successor organizations are not continuing operations under alternative legal names, structures, or organizational fronts.
COMMENT: Supporters of this approach argue that such measures are available under existing Jordanian legal authorities, including counterterrorism, electronic crimes, and public security legislation. They further contend that meaningful compliance should be evaluated on the basis of demonstrable organizational disruption rather than formal declarations alone. END COMMENT.
28. CONDITIONALITY AND DIPLOMATIC LEVERAGE. JAFAJ has learned that compliance could be encouraged through a phased conditionality framework linking specified categories of U.S. assistance to measurable benchmarks and implementation timelines.
Potential measures could include:
(a) Establishing a graduated assistance framework under which designated categories of aid would be suspended or delayed if compliance benchmarks are not met within specified timeframes.
(b) Imposing escalatory measures, including visa restrictions, financial sanctions, or procurement limitations, against individuals determined to be facilitating the continued operation of designated Muslim Brotherhood networks.
(c) Communicating clearly that organizational rebranding, nominal dissolutions, temporary suspensions, or short-term detentions would not, by themselves, constitute sufficient evidence of compliance.
29. COMMENT. The effectiveness of any future U.S. approach is likely to depend on the degree to which compliance requirements remain measurable, verifiable, and linked to sustained implementation. Public announcements alone are unlikely to provide a reliable indicator of institutional change absent corresponding evidence of organizational, financial, and operational disruption.
END COMMENT.