CAN THE BOARD OF PEACE SUCCEED?
JAFAJ SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
Publication Date: July 12, 2026
Prepared By: JAFAJ Intelligence Division
Estimated Reading Time: 18 Minutes
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The future of Gaza will be determined by more than ceasefires, reconstruction funding, or political agreements.
It will be determined by whether a legitimate governing authority can emerge before political fragmentation evolves into sustained internal conflict.
The recent decision by Hamas to dissolve its de facto civilian government and support the transfer of administrative authority to a Palestinian technocratic committee operating under the supervision of the Board of Peace represents the most significant proposed change in Gaza’s governance structure since Hamas assumed control in 2007. While the announcement creates an opportunity for institutional transition, it does not by itself resolve the fundamental issues of security, political legitimacy, reconstruction, or the future of armed organizations.
This report does not attempt to determine whether peace between Israel and Hamas will endure.
Instead, it addresses a narrower—and arguably more important—question:
Can the Board of Peace reduce the conditions that historically lead to civil war within Gaza?
Based upon the analytical framework established in JAFAJ’s State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East, this assessment concludes that Gaza presently exhibits several structural conditions commonly associated with elevated risks of internal conflict. These include fragmented political authority, severe economic disruption, weakened governmental institutions, competing claims of legitimacy, extensive physical destruction, and continuing external military pressure. At the same time, the proposed governance transition offers an opportunity to strengthen civilian institutions before those structural pressures evolve into sustained internal violence.
The Board of Peace should therefore be judged not by its political symbolism, but by its ability to strengthen civilian governance before institutional fragility evolves into organized internal violence. If it succeeds, the likelihood that future political disputes are resolved through force rather than functioning institutions will decline.
KEY JUDGMENTS
KEY JUDGMENT 1
The greatest immediate threat to Gaza is not necessarily renewed civil war, but continued political fragmentation.
If multiple institutions claim governing authority while security responsibilities remain divided, the probability of future internal confrontation will increase substantially.
KEY JUDGMENT 2
The Board of Peace is positioned to influence governance, not geopolitics. Its greatest potential contribution lies in strengthening civilian institutions, coordinating humanitarian assistance, and supporting reconstruction. Its ability to shape military organizations, border security, or regional diplomacy remains limited.
KEY JUDGMENT 3
Restoring public confidence in civilian government is likely to prove more important over the long term than announcing new governing structures.
Political legitimacy is earned through effective administration rather than institutional design alone.
KEY JUDGMENT 4
Civil wars rarely begin because governments fail to make political announcements.
They begin because governments fail to establish effective institutions capable of peacefully managing political competition.
KEY JUDGMENT 5
If the Board of Peace succeeds in restoring governance, coordinating reconstruction, and creating broadly accepted civilian institutions, it can significantly reduce the structural conditions associated with internal armed conflict.
It cannot, by itself, eliminate every source of instability.
INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENCE
This assessment is based upon publicly available reporting, official statements, comparative conflict research, and JAFAJ’s previously published analytical framework concerning civil war risk in the Middle East.
Judgments contained herein represent analytical assessments rather than predictions.
Confidence levels are defined as follows:
High Confidence – Multiple independent sources support the assessment with relatively little disagreement.
Moderate Confidence – Available evidence generally supports the assessment, although important uncertainties remain.
Low Confidence – Limited information or rapidly changing conditions reduce confidence in the assessment.
Unless otherwise noted, the principal judgments contained in this report are made with moderate confidence because implementation of the proposed governance transition remains incomplete.
INTRODUCTION
WHY THIS QUESTION MATTERS
Post-conflict transitions present some of the highest risks of institutional failure. While ceasefires may reduce violence and reconstruction can address immediate humanitarian needs, neither automatically produces stable governance. The period immediately following major conflict often determines whether political competition shifts toward functioning civilian institutions or returns to organized violence.
Gaza now enters that transitional phase. The proposed transfer of civilian authority from Hamas to a Palestinian technocratic committee operating under the Board of Peace creates an opportunity to strengthen civilian governance. It also introduces significant risks if competing claims of political authority, unresolved security arrangements, and weak institutions prevent the emergence of a legitimate governing structure.
The proposed transfer of civilian authority from Hamas to a technocratic governing committee offers an opportunity to establish a new model of governance. It also presents significant risks if expectations exceed institutional capacity or if competing centers of authority remain unresolved. Hamas has announced the dissolution of its civilian governing structure, but it has also indicated that ministries will continue functioning and that security responsibilities in areas under its control will remain in place pending further implementation. Israeli officials have argued that meaningful political transition also requires resolution of the question of armed authority.
Accordingly, this report does not evaluate the Board of Peace as a diplomatic initiative.
It evaluates the Board as an institution designed to reduce the structural conditions historically associated with civil conflict.
The central analytical question is therefore straightforward:
Can improved governance reduce the probability of future internal armed conflict in Gaza?
The answer depends less upon political declarations than upon whether civilian institutions can establish legitimacy, deliver essential public services, coordinate reconstruction, and create sufficient public confidence to manage political competition without violence.
The following chapters examine whether those conditions are achievable, identify the principal obstacles to success, and assess the extent to which the Board of Peace can realistically influence the outcome.
DOES GAZA EXHIBIT THE CONDITIONS FOR CIVIL WAR?
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
The central premise of this report is that civil wars do not begin spontaneously.
They emerge when political institutions lose the ability to manage competing interests peacefully and when rival groups conclude that force offers a greater opportunity than negotiation.
Applying the analytical framework developed in JAFAJ’s State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East leads to an important conclusion:
Gaza currently exhibits many—but not all—of the structural conditions historically associated with elevated risks of internal armed conflict.
This finding should not be interpreted as a prediction that a Palestinian civil war is inevitable.
Rather, it indicates that the institutional environment in Gaza is sufficiently fragile that failure to establish effective governance could allow political competition to evolve into organized violence. The proposed transition to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), overseen by the Board of Peace, creates an opportunity to reverse that trajectory, but only if authority is translated from political agreements into functioning institutions.
THE LESSON OF 2007
Gaza has already experienced one internal Palestinian conflict.
In 2007, tensions between Hamas and Fatah escalated into several days of intense fighting that ended with Hamas assuming control of the Gaza Strip while the Palestinian Authority retained authority in much of the West Bank.
The political consequences of that conflict continue to shape Gaza today.
For nearly two decades, Palestinians have operated under separate governing systems, separate security institutions, and different political leaderships.
This institutional division has become normalized.
Reunifying these systems will require considerably more than administrative restructuring.
It will require rebuilding political trust between institutions that have developed independently for almost twenty years.
Any assessment of future civil conflict must therefore recognize that Gaza’s greatest challenge is not simply reconstruction.
It is political reintegration.
FRACTURED POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
Stable governments generally derive legitimacy from some combination of constitutional authority, public confidence, effective administration, and the ability to deliver essential services.
Gaza presently faces challenges in each of these areas.
Years of armed conflict have weakened public administration.
Large portions of the territory remain physically devastated.
Millions of civilians continue depending upon humanitarian assistance.
Political authority itself is undergoing transition.
Although Hamas has announced the dissolution of its civilian governing body, the transition remains incomplete. Hamas has stated that ministries and civil servants will remain in place while it continues to oversee security and policing in areas under its control pending further implementation of the post-war plan.
This creates a period in which questions of authority may become as important as authority itself.
COMPETING CENTERS OF POWER
One of the strongest indicators of future instability is the existence of multiple organizations capable of exercising governmental authority.
In Gaza, several overlapping centers of influence either currently exist or may emerge during the transition.
These include:
- the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG);
- Hamas’ remaining political leadership;
- Hamas’ military structures;
- local municipal authorities;
- clan and family leadership networks;
- international humanitarian organizations;
- external actors participating in reconstruction.
Each performs a different function.
The challenge is ensuring that these functions complement rather than compete with one another.
If civilians become uncertain regarding who governs, who provides services, who controls policing, or who resolves disputes, institutional legitimacy may weaken before the new governing structure has an opportunity to mature.
THE SECURITY QUESTION
The most difficult issue confronting any post-conflict government is usually not reconstruction.
It is security.
Roads can be rebuilt.
Schools can reopen.
Electricity can be restored.
Establishing one legitimate authority over the use of force is considerably more difficult.
The current transition does not fully resolve this question.
Public reporting indicates that Hamas has agreed to dissolve its civilian administration but has not agreed to disarm or relinquish all security responsibilities. Israeli officials have argued that any meaningful political transition must include changes in the security environment, while the Board of Peace has emphasized that it will evaluate progress based on implementation rather than declarations.
Accordingly, the greatest uncertainty confronting Gaza is not administrative.
It is institutional.
Until questions concerning policing, public security, and armed authority are resolved, the potential for competing centers of power will remain.
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Economic collapse does not automatically produce civil war.
It does, however, increase political pressure on governments already struggling to establish legitimacy.
Gaza enters the reconstruction period with extraordinary economic challenges.
Among them are:
- extensive destruction of housing;
- damaged public infrastructure;
- interrupted education;
- weakened healthcare systems;
- extremely high unemployment;
- dependence upon external assistance;
- widespread displacement.
These conditions increase the importance of effective governance.
Governments unable to deliver visible improvements in daily life frequently experience declining public confidence.
Conversely, successful reconstruction often strengthens political legitimacy more rapidly than constitutional reform alone.
For the Board of Peace, reconstruction is therefore more than an engineering project.
It is a governance strategy.
THE ROLE OF LOCAL CLANS
International reporting often focuses on governments, political parties, and armed organizations.
Less attention is paid to Gaza’s long-established family and clan networks.
Historically, these networks have played an important role in:
- dispute resolution;
- community organization;
- humanitarian assistance;
- local leadership.
During periods when formal institutions weaken, informal institutions frequently become more influential.
This presents both opportunities and risks.
Properly integrated, respected local leaders can strengthen community confidence in new governing institutions.
Ignored or marginalized, they may become alternative sources of political authority.
Successful governance therefore requires engagement beyond formal political institutions.
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
Using JAFAJ’s six structural indicators of civil conflict produces a mixed assessment.
| Indicator | Assessment |
| Government Legitimacy | High Risk |
| Economic Conditions | Very High Risk |
| Security Integration | High Risk |
| Armed Organizations | Very High Risk |
| Social Fragmentation | Moderate Risk |
| External Influence | Very High Risk |
This assessment does not conclude that civil war is imminent.
It does conclude that Gaza presently exhibits sufficient structural vulnerabilities that failure to establish credible governance could substantially increase future risks.
Conversely, rapid improvements in governance, reconstruction, public services, and institutional legitimacy could reduce those risks over time.
The significance of the Board of Peace therefore lies not in whether it governs Gaza permanently.
Its importance lies in whether it can strengthen civilian institutions before structural fragility evolves into organized internal violence.
CAN THE BOARD OF PEACE PREVENT CIVIL WAR?
FROM POLITICAL AGREEMENT TO FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
The Board of Peace cannot prevent civil war through diplomacy alone.
Its success or failure will ultimately be determined by whether it can help create institutions that are viewed as legitimate, effective, and broadly representative by the population of Gaza.
This distinction is critical.
Civil wars are rarely prevented because political leaders sign agreements.
They are prevented because populations conclude that political institutions provide a more effective means of resolving disputes than violence.
Accordingly, the Board of Peace should not be evaluated by the number of meetings it convenes, statements it issues, or agreements it negotiates.
It should be evaluated by a single question:
Does it increase the capacity of civilian government to peacefully manage political competition?
If the answer becomes yes, the probability of internal armed conflict declines.
If the answer remains no, the risk of future instability will remain elevated regardless of reconstruction funding or diplomatic progress.
WHAT THE BOARD OF PEACE CAN DO
One of the most common analytical errors in post-conflict assessments is assigning institutions responsibilities they were never designed to perform.
The Board of Peace is not intended to become Gaza’s permanent government.
Rather, it is designed to facilitate a political transition by supporting Palestinian civilian institutions until they are capable of governing independently. Current planning envisions the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) exercising day-to-day civil administration, supported by an International Stabilization Force (ISF) and a newly trained police service in designated areas.
If implemented successfully, the Board can make meaningful contributions in several areas.
These include:
- coordinating humanitarian assistance;
- supporting reconstruction planning;
- assisting the establishment of civilian ministries;
- facilitating international financial assistance;
- strengthening administrative capacity;
- supporting development of accountable public institutions.
These functions are not politically insignificant.
They represent the practical foundations upon which governmental legitimacy is built.
WHAT THE BOARD OF PEACE CANNOT DO
The Board’s limitations are equally important.
It cannot independently resolve the principal strategic disputes that continue to define Gaza’s security environment.
Among the issues largely beyond its direct authority are:
- Hamas’ military capabilities;
- Israeli military operations;
- long-term border arrangements;
- regional diplomacy;
- external state sponsorship of armed groups;
- final political status negotiations.
These issues require decisions by sovereign governments and political organizations.
The Board may facilitate discussions.
It cannot impose political settlements.
These limitations do not diminish the Board’s strategic importance. Rather, they define the scope of its influence. This assessment therefore evaluates the Board according to the responsibilities it is designed to perform—strengthening civilian governance, supporting institutional development, and reducing the structural conditions associated with internal conflict.
THE THREE PILLARS OF SUCCESS
Based upon comparative post-conflict governance research and JAFAJ’s civil war framework, three conditions will largely determine whether the Board contributes to long-term stability.
Pillar One: Legitimacy
Governments derive authority from public confidence as much as from legal authority.
Citizens are more likely to support institutions that consistently provide:
- healthcare;
- education;
- utilities;
- public safety;
- transparent administration;
- equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance.
Visible improvements in daily life may strengthen legitimacy more effectively than constitutional declarations.
Pillar Two: Administrative Capacity
Good governance requires functioning institutions.
The NCAG and supporting ministries must demonstrate the ability to:
- process aid efficiently;
- manage public finances;
- supervise reconstruction;
- coordinate municipal services;
- resolve administrative disputes.
Institutional competence creates confidence.
Administrative failure undermines it.
Pillar Three: Security Integration
The most difficult challenge remains security.
History demonstrates that durable post-conflict governance generally depends upon one widely recognized principle:
The legitimate use of force should ultimately be exercised through accountable public institutions.
Whether Gaza can gradually move toward that objective remains uncertain.
Current planning envisions locally recruited police operating alongside the International Stabilization Force within pilot humanitarian zones, but broader security arrangements remain unresolved.
THE JAFAJ GOVERNANCE MATRIX
The Board’s influence varies considerably across different sectors.
| Governance Function | Expected Board Influence |
| Humanitarian Coordination | High |
| Reconstruction Planning | High |
| Civil Administration | High |
| Ministry Development | High |
| Budget Coordination | Moderate |
| Police Development | Moderate |
| Judicial Reform | Moderate |
| Elections | Low–Moderate |
| Hamas Military Wing | Low |
| Israeli Security Policy | Very Low |
| Regional Diplomacy | Very Low |
This assessment illustrates an important analytical conclusion.
The Board’s greatest strength lies in governance.
Its greatest limitations lie in security and geopolitics.
HOW SUCCESS SHOULD BE MEASURED
Success should not be measured by political symbolism.
Instead, JAFAJ recommends monitoring measurable indicators.
Within twelve months, analysts should ask:
- Are ministries functioning?
- Are salaries being paid?
- Is humanitarian aid reaching intended recipients?
- Has reconstruction begun at scale?
- Are police performing routine public safety functions?
- Are civilians increasingly relying upon public institutions rather than informal power structures?
Positive answers would indicate improving institutional resilience.
Negative answers would suggest increasing structural vulnerability.
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
The Board of Peace represents an opportunity—not a guarantee.
Its comparative advantage lies in strengthening civilian governance during a period when Gaza faces exceptional institutional weakness.
If governance improves more rapidly than political fragmentation, the Board may substantially reduce the structural conditions associated with civil conflict.
If governance fails to improve—or if competing institutions emerge with overlapping claims to authority—the transition itself could become another source of instability.
Current reporting suggests that implementation remains in its earliest stages. The planned pilot humanitarian zone is intended to demonstrate whether Palestinian technocratic governance, supported by international security arrangements, can function in practice before broader expansion is attempted. Participation is expected to be voluntary, with administration carried out by the NCAG and support from the ISF.
Accordingly, JAFAJ assesses that the Board of Peace has the potential to reduce the probability of internal armed conflict, but only if it succeeds in transforming political commitments into functioning institutions capable of earning and maintaining public legitimacy.
INTELLIGENCE OUTLOOK
CAN THE BOARD OF PEACE SUCCEED?
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
The Board of Peace enters Gaza at a decisive moment.
The military phase of the conflict has largely given way to a political and institutional phase in which the principal challenge is no longer defeating an adversary, but establishing a functioning system of civilian governance.
History suggests that this transition is often the most difficult stage of post-conflict recovery.
Many societies have successfully ended major combat only to experience renewed instability because governing institutions failed to develop quickly enough to replace wartime political structures.
For Gaza, the challenge is particularly acute.
The territory must simultaneously rebuild infrastructure, restore essential public services, establish legitimate civilian authority, coordinate international assistance, and manage unresolved security issues.
These objectives are mutually reinforcing.
Failure in one area is likely to affect progress in the others.
Consequently, the Board of Peace should not be judged solely by reconstruction projects or humanitarian deliveries.
Its long-term success will depend upon whether those activities strengthen durable Palestinian governing institutions capable of functioning after international involvement declines. Current planning envisions the pilot humanitarian zone as the first step in testing whether Palestinian technocratic governance can operate effectively with multinational support before broader implementation.
MOST LIKELY SCENARIO
MANAGED TRANSITION
Estimated Probability: 55–65 Percent
Under this scenario:
- The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) gradually establishes civilian authority within designated areas.
- Reconstruction expands incrementally.
- Humanitarian conditions improve unevenly.
- Hamas’ political role diminishes within civilian administration but questions surrounding its military structure remain unresolved.
- Israeli military operations continue on a limited basis against perceived security threats.
- The Board of Peace expands its administrative role through demonstrated performance rather than formal political agreements.
This scenario does not produce comprehensive peace.
It does produce sufficient institutional stability to reduce the likelihood of widespread internal Palestinian violence.
BEST-CASE SCENARIO
SUCCESSFUL INSTITUTIONAL CONSOLIDATION
Estimated Probability: 20–25 Percent
The Board of Peace successfully facilitates:
- functioning civilian ministries;
- transparent financial administration;
- effective humanitarian coordination;
- expanding reconstruction;
- growing public confidence;
- professional civilian policing;
- broader international investment.
In this scenario, Palestinian institutions gradually become the primary source of political legitimacy.
Competing centers of authority decline in importance because functioning government increasingly meets public expectations.
While broader regional political disputes remain unresolved, internal governance becomes progressively more stable.
WORST-CASE SCENARIO
RETURN TO POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION
Estimated Probability: 15–20 Percent
The greatest long-term danger is not immediate civil war.
It is institutional failure.
This scenario develops if:
- competing governing authorities emerge;
- reconstruction stalls;
- humanitarian assistance becomes politicized;
- public confidence declines;
- armed organizations increasingly substitute for civilian institutions;
- external political actors pursue competing governance models.
Under these conditions, localized confrontations could gradually evolve into sustained internal conflict.
Importantly, such a development would likely occur over months rather than days.
Civil wars generally emerge through institutional deterioration rather than sudden political collapse.
EARLY WARNING INDICATORS
JAFAJ recommends continuous monitoring of the following indicators during the next twelve months.
Positive Indicators
- NCAG operating inside Gaza.
- Expansion of functioning ministries.
- Regular delivery of public services.
- Increased reconstruction activity.
- Successful operation of the pilot humanitarian zone.
- Growing public participation in civilian institutions.
- Expanded international financial commitments.
Negative Indicators
- Parallel governing authorities.
- Competing police or security organizations.
- Political assassinations.
- Armed clashes among Palestinian factions.
- Suspension of reconstruction projects.
- Diversion of humanitarian assistance.
- Declining public confidence in civilian governance.
The appearance of several negative indicators simultaneously would warrant reassessment of the Board’s overall prospects.
THE JAFAJ STABILITY MATRIX
| Category | Current Assessment | Trend |
| Civil Governance | Moderate | ▲ Improving Potential |
| Humanitarian Coordination | Moderate | ▲ Improving |
| Reconstruction Capacity | Low | ► Stable |
| Public Legitimacy | Low | ▲ Conditional |
| Security Integration | Low | ► Uncertain |
| International Support | High | ▲ Improving |
| Overall Stabilization Capacity | Moderate | ▲ |
Analytic Note: The Board’s greatest opportunity lies in improving governance and reconstruction. Its greatest vulnerability lies in unresolved questions concerning security authority and political legitimacy.
FINAL JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
The central question posed by this report is straightforward:
Can the Board of Peace stop a civil war in Gaza?
The available evidence suggests a qualified answer.
The Board of Peace cannot prevent civil war by itself.
It does not control all armed organizations.
It cannot independently determine Israeli security policy.
It cannot resolve every regional political dispute.
Those responsibilities lie beyond its institutional authority.
However, the Board can influence one factor that comparative conflict research consistently identifies as decisive:
The strength of civilian governance.
If the Board succeeds in helping establish legitimate Palestinian institutions that deliver public services, coordinate reconstruction, administer humanitarian assistance, and earn public confidence, it can substantially reduce the structural conditions associated with internal armed conflict.
Conversely, if governance remains fragmented, reconstruction falters, and competing authorities continue exercising overlapping political and security responsibilities, the risk of future instability will remain elevated regardless of diplomatic agreements.
JAFAJ assesses that the long-term stability of Gaza will depend less on diplomatic agreements than on the strength and legitimacy of the civilian institutions that emerge during the current transition. The Board of Peace cannot determine every outcome, but it can influence whether political competition is increasingly managed through governance rather than violence.
The success or failure of this transition will therefore be measured not by political declarations, but by whether durable institutions emerge before structural fragility hardens into renewed internal conflict. That is the central finding of this assessment.
FOOTNOTES
- Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt’,” July 6, 2026.
- Associated Press, “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a UN-Backed Committee,” July 6, 2026.
- Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt’,” describing the proposed transfer of civilian authority while Hamas retains security influence.
- Associated Press, reporting on the role of the technocratic committee and the Board of Peace in the proposed governance transition.
- JAFAJ Intelligence Division, State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East (2026–2028), analytical framework on structural indicators of civil conflict (internal reference).
- Reuters, reporting that Hamas stated ministries would continue operating during the transition while security arrangements remained unresolved.
- Associated Press, reporting that the transition leaves unresolved questions concerning disarmament and security authority.
- JAFAJ comparative assessment derived from the Middle East Civil War Risk framework (internal analytical reference).
- Reuters, statements by the Board of Peace emphasizing that implementation would be judged by actions rather than announcements.
- JAFAJ analytical judgment based on the sources cited above and comparative post-conflict governance research.
- JAFAJ Intelligence Division, State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East (2026–2028), methodology chapter on structural indicators of civil conflict.
- Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt’,” July 6, 2026, reporting that Hamas agreed to dissolve its civilian government while ministries and personnel would remain in place during the transition.
- Reuters, “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza,” July 8, 2026, discussing the role of the NCAG and the Board of Peace in post-war governance planning.
- Reuters, July 6, 2026, noting that Hamas stated it would continue overseeing security and policing in areas remaining under its control during implementation of the agreement.
- Reuters, July 8, 2026, reporting that the Board of Peace would evaluate implementation based on “actions, not promises.”
- Reuters, July 6, 2026, describing the establishment of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) as the proposed civilian governing authority.
- JAFAJ comparative conflict analysis based on the Civil War Risk framework.
- Reuters, July 8, 2026, discussing the proposed humanitarian zone and the planned role of a new police force under the transition framework.
- JAFAJ assessment derived from comparative post-conflict governance literature and the evidence cited in this report.
- JAFAJ analytical judgment synthesizing the structural indicators evaluated in this chapter
- Reuters, “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza, Official Says,” July 8, 2026.
- Associated Press, “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a UN-Backed Committee,” July 6, 2026.
- Reuters, describing the proposed role of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) in exercising civilian authority.
- Reuters, reporting that the pilot humanitarian zone would include a newly recruited police force supported by the International Stabilization Force.
- Reuters, noting that participation in the pilot zone would be voluntary and administered by the NCAG with ISF support.
- Associated Press, reporting that Hamas’ announcement did not resolve questions concerning weapons or long-term security authority.
- Reuters, reporting that the Board of Peace stated its assessment would be based on “actions, not promises.”
- JAFAJ Intelligence Division, State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East (2026–2028), governance and institutional resilience framework.
- JAFAJ comparative assessment based on post-conflict governance literature and the evidence cited in this report.
- JAFAJ analytical judgment synthesizing the governance, legitimacy, and security findings presented in this chapter.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
- Board of Peace. Official statements and planning materials released June–July 2026.
- “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt.'” July 6, 2026.
- “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza, Official Says.” July 8, 2026.
- Associated Press. “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a UN-Backed Committee.” July 6, 2026.
- JAFAJ Intelligence Division. State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East (2026–2028). Internal analytical reference.