When States Fracture: State Fragility And Civil War Risk

Prepared by: JAFAJ Intelligence Division

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Middle East is entering a period of strategic uncertainty unlike any since the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

Over the past two decades, the region has experienced interstate wars, terrorist insurgencies, revolutions, and proxy conflicts. Today, however, another pattern is emerging. In several countries, the principal threat to national stability no longer originates from foreign invasion but from internal political fragmentation, weakened state institutions, economic deterioration, and increasingly powerful non-state armed groups.

This Intelligence Estimate examines the probability that one or more Middle Eastern states could experience significant internal armed conflict over the next twenty-four months. Rather than predicting that civil wars are inevitable, this report evaluates structural conditions that historically have preceded civil conflict and assesses where those conditions are converging.

Three countries stand out as presenting the greatest potential for renewed or expanded internal conflict: Iran, Lebanon, and Syria. Each faces a unique combination of political uncertainty, economic stress, competing centers of power, and external interference. Other states—including Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories—also remain vulnerable, though the nature and likelihood of conflict vary considerably.

Current evidence does not support the conclusion that a region-wide wave of civil wars is imminent. However, several independent assessments have identified rising instability in Lebanon and persistent fragmentation in Syria, while Iran faces an uncertain political transition following recent leadership changes and military confrontation. These developments warrant close observation over the coming months.

This report concludes that the greatest danger is not a simultaneous collapse across the region, but rather the emergence of one major internal conflict capable of producing cascading political, humanitarian, and security consequences for neighboring states.

KEY JUDGMENTS

Key Judgment 1

The Middle East is entering a period in which internal instability is becoming a greater strategic concern than conventional interstate warfare.

While external military conflict remains possible, many governments now face more immediate challenges from declining public confidence, weakened institutions, armed political movements, and deteriorating economic conditions.

Key Judgment 2

Lebanon currently exhibits one of the region’s highest risks of internal political violence.

Growing disputes over Hezbollah’s future, debates surrounding state sovereignty, continued Israeli military pressure, and deep sectarian divisions have created conditions that many analysts believe could evolve into broader internal conflict if political compromise fails. Recent reporting by the Council on Foreign Relations and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data similarly identifies Lebanon as one of the region’s principal conflict flashpoints.

Key Judgment 3

Syria remains politically fragmented despite reductions in nationwide fighting.

The decline in large-scale combat should not be interpreted as the restoration of a fully consolidated state. Competing armed groups, foreign military deployments, economic weakness, and unresolved governance questions continue to limit long-term stability. Several analysts caution that Syria has not entered a new civil war, but that its recovery remains fragile.

Key Judgment 4

Iran faces a period of elevated political uncertainty.

Recent military conflict, economic pressure, sanctions, and questions surrounding national leadership have increased uncertainty regarding Iran’s internal political trajectory. These factors do not necessarily indicate imminent civil war, but they increase the importance of monitoring succession dynamics, elite cohesion, regional unrest, and public dissatisfaction.

Key Judgment 5

Civil wars rarely begin with one defining event.

Historical experience demonstrates that internal armed conflicts generally emerge after prolonged institutional weakening combined with one or more triggering events, including contested elections, economic collapse, military defections, leadership succession disputes, or major security incidents.

INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENCE

This report relies upon open-source government publications, international organizations, academic research, conflict-monitoring databases, and reporting from established news organizations.

The judgments contained herein represent analytical assessments rather than predictions.

Confidence levels are defined as follows:

High Confidence — Supported by multiple independent sources with consistent reporting.

Moderate Confidence — Supported by credible reporting, although future developments remain uncertain.

Low Confidence — Based upon limited information or rapidly evolving events.

Unless otherwise stated, the principal assessments contained in this report are made with moderate confidence.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This Intelligence Estimate evaluates the structural conditions associated with civil conflict across the contemporary Middle East. It does not attempt to forecast the precise timing of political crises, military confrontations, or regime change. Instead, it identifies conditions historically associated with increased internal instability and assesses their presence within selected countries.

For the purposes of this report, the term civil war refers to sustained organized armed conflict occurring primarily within the borders of a sovereign state and involving governmental forces and one or more organized domestic armed actors.

The assessment examines six principal indicators:

1. Government legitimacy.
2. Economic stability.
3. Political succession and leadership continuity.
4. Strength and influence of non-state armed groups.
5. Sectarian, ethnic, or ideological polarization.
6. Foreign intervention and proxy competition.

No single indicator is sufficient to predict civil war. Rather, the interaction of multiple indicators over time provides a more reliable basis for assessing conflict risk.

 

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

WHY CIVIL WARS BEGIN

Civil wars rarely begin as civil wars.

More often, they emerge from a gradual deterioration of political, economic, and security conditions that weakens the state’s ability to manage competing interests peacefully. This deterioration can take years or even decades before a single triggering event transforms chronic instability into organized armed conflict.

Contrary to popular perception, most civil wars do not originate solely from ideological disputes, ethnic differences, or religious divisions. Such differences exist in many societies that never experience large-scale internal violence. Modern conflict research instead suggests that civil wars are more likely when political grievances intersect with weak state institutions, declining government legitimacy, economic distress, and opportunities for organized armed groups to mobilize.

For intelligence analysts, this distinction is important.

The question is not whether a society contains political, ethnic, or religious divisions. Nearly every nation does.

The more important question is whether the institutions responsible for managing those divisions continue to function effectively.

When governments lose the ability—or the public confidence necessary—to resolve disputes through political processes, competing groups increasingly seek alternative means of protecting their interests. In some cases, those alternatives remain peaceful. In others, they evolve into organized violence.

THE FRAGILITY CASCADE

Historical experience suggests that internal conflicts generally develop through a recognizable progression rather than through sudden collapse.

Although every conflict follows its own path, many begin with a series of reinforcing failures:

• Economic deterioration reduces public confidence.
• Political polarization erodes consensus.
• Government legitimacy declines.
• Security institutions become increasingly politicized.
• Armed non-state actors expand their influence.
• Foreign powers support competing domestic factions.
• A triggering event accelerates existing tensions into violence.

None of these conditions alone produces civil war.

Together, however, they can overwhelm the institutions designed to maintain political order.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development describes fragility as a multidimensional condition encompassing political, security, economic, societal, environmental, and human factors rather than a single measurable characteristic. Importantly, the OECD notes that fragility and conflict are related but distinct: many fragile states do not experience war, while fragility nonetheless reduces a state’s ability to absorb shocks without violence.

STATE LEGITIMACY AS A STRATEGIC VARIABLE

One of the strongest indicators of long-term stability is not military strength but political legitimacy.

Governments generally maintain authority through a combination of law, public confidence, institutional effectiveness, and coercive capability.

When confidence in political institutions declines, governments often become increasingly dependent upon coercion.

While coercion may restore short-term order, excessive reliance upon force can further weaken legitimacy if significant portions of the population conclude that political participation no longer offers meaningful influence.

This creates a dangerous feedback loop:

Reduced legitimacy encourages greater coercion.

Greater coercion further reduces legitimacy.

Eventually, portions of the population may conclude that violence offers greater political leverage than peaceful participation.

Research examining state fragility has consistently found that governance quality—particularly when weaker than expected for a country’s level of development—is associated with a higher subsequent risk of civil conflict.

THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ARMED ACTORS

Few contemporary civil wars begin with the spontaneous creation of armed movements.

Instead, many countries already possess organizations capable of conducting sustained military operations independent of central government control.

These may include:

• political militias;
• sectarian organizations;
• tribal armed groups;
• insurgent movements;
• terrorist organizations;
• criminal networks with military capabilities.

The existence of such organizations does not guarantee civil conflict.

However, they significantly reduce the time required for political disputes to become armed confrontations because organizational structures, weapons, leadership, financing, and recruitment networks may already exist.

Throughout the contemporary Middle East, the continued presence of heavily armed non-state actors remains one of the region’s defining security characteristics.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND PROXY DYNAMICS

Modern civil wars rarely remain purely domestic.

External governments frequently intervene to protect allies, expand regional influence, counter perceived threats, or prevent hostile actors from gaining power.

As a result, internal conflicts increasingly become proxy conflicts involving multiple regional and international powers.

The Syrian conflict demonstrated how rapidly domestic unrest can evolve into an internationalized war involving neighboring states, regional competitors, and global military powers.

The OECD has similarly observed that internationalized civil wars have become increasingly common, particularly in regions characterized by weak governance, transnational armed movements, and strategic competition among outside powers.

For the Middle East, foreign intervention should therefore be viewed not simply as a consequence of civil war, but as a factor capable of extending conflicts, increasing their intensity, and complicating negotiated settlements.

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

The principal lesson from comparative conflict research is straightforward.

Civil wars are rarely the product of a single grievance or isolated political crisis.

Instead, they emerge when multiple structural vulnerabilities accumulate faster than governments can resolve them.

For JAFAJ’s purposes, this report evaluates each country through the same analytical framework rather than attempting to predict a single triggering event.

The objective is not to determine whether civil war will occur.

The objective is to assess where the underlying conditions associated with internal armed conflict are becoming more pronounced, how rapidly they are evolving, and what indicators would suggest either escalation or stabilization.

 

REGIONAL RISK FRAMEWORK

HOW JAFAJ ASSESSES THE RISK OF CIVIL WAR

Intelligence analysis is not prediction.

Its purpose is to identify developing trends, assess their significance, and estimate the probability that those trends will produce specific outcomes. In the case of civil conflict, analysts are not attempting to predict the exact day a government may collapse or when the first shots will be fired. Rather, they seek to determine whether the underlying conditions that have historically preceded civil wars are becoming stronger or weaker over time.

Accordingly, this report employs a structured analytical framework designed to evaluate relative—not absolute—risk across the Middle East.

This framework recognizes two fundamental realities.

First, no single factor causes civil war.

Second, civil wars almost always emerge from the interaction of multiple political, economic, security, and social pressures rather than from a single crisis. Numerous early-warning models developed by governments, research institutions, and international organizations similarly rely upon combinations of structural indicators rather than isolated variables.

THE JAFAJ CIVIL WAR RISK MODEL

This report evaluates each country across six principal categories.

1. GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY

Governments derive authority from more than military strength.

Legitimacy reflects whether citizens believe political institutions possess the legal and moral authority to govern.

Indicators include:

• public confidence
• corruption
• electoral credibility
• judicial independence
• effectiveness of government services
• ability to peacefully resolve political disputes

As legitimacy declines, governments often rely increasingly upon coercive measures to maintain authority, creating additional political tension.

2. ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

Economic conditions rarely create civil wars by themselves.

They can, however, magnify existing political grievances.

Analysts therefore examine:

• inflation
• unemployment
• currency stability
• public debt
• government revenues
• energy dependence
• food security
• youth employment

History demonstrates that prolonged economic deterioration often weakens public confidence while simultaneously reducing a government’s ability to provide services and maintain political stability.

3. SECURITY APPARATUS

One defining characteristic of stable states is the government’s ability to exercise effective control over the legitimate use of force.

Questions considered include:

• Does the government control the national military?
• Are security services politically divided?
• Do regional commanders operate independently?
• Are military defections increasing?
• Are police institutions functioning?
• Does the government maintain territorial control?

The erosion of centralized security authority significantly increases opportunities for organized armed groups to expand their influence.

4. NON-STATE ARMED ACTORS

Modern Middle Eastern conflicts increasingly involve organizations operating outside formal state control.

Examples include:

• political militias
• insurgent organizations
• tribal armed groups
• terrorist organizations
• sectarian defense forces
• criminal organizations possessing military capabilities

The existence of such organizations does not necessarily indicate impending civil war.

However, their presence substantially lowers the barriers to sustained armed conflict should political institutions fail.

5. SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION

Political differences alone rarely produce civil war.

Instead, analysts evaluate whether divisions are becoming sufficiently severe to undermine national cohesion.

Factors include:

• sectarian polarization
• ethnic conflict
• regional rivalries
• ideological extremism
• political radicalization
• population displacement
• refugee pressures

The critical question is not whether divisions exist, but whether existing institutions remain capable of managing them peacefully.

6. EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

Few contemporary civil wars remain purely domestic.

Foreign governments frequently provide:

• military assistance
• intelligence support
• financial aid
• diplomatic backing
• weapons
• proxy forces

Outside intervention often prolongs conflicts that might otherwise have remained localized.

Consequently, every country assessment considers the extent to which external actors possess both the capability and the incentive to influence internal political developments.

ASSESSMENT MATRIX

Each country receives an assessment in every category using a five-level scale.

Rating	Assessment
Very Low	Conditions generally support long-term stability.
Low	Some vulnerabilities exist but remain manageable.
Moderate	Noticeable structural pressures require continued monitoring.
High	Multiple indicators suggest elevated instability.
Very High	Numerous indicators are simultaneously deteriorating, increasing the risk of sustained internal conflict.

This scale measures relative structural vulnerability, not the probability that conflict will begin immediately.

EARLY WARNING INDICATORS

Perhaps the greatest value of intelligence analysis lies in identifying changes before they become crises.

Accordingly, JAFAJ will monitor a series of indicators that historically have preceded significant internal instability.

These include:

Political Indicators

• Collapse of coalition governments
• Suspension of constitutional processes
• Disputed national elections
• Leadership succession crises
• Emergency decrees expanding executive authority

Security Indicators

• Military defections
• Rapid militia recruitment
• Increased political assassinations
• Localized armed clashes
• Loss of government territorial control

Economic Indicators

• Hyperinflation
• Currency collapse
• Food shortages
• Banking instability
• Energy disruptions

Social Indicators

• Mass demonstrations
• Large-scale population displacement
• Sectarian mobilization
• Escalating hate speech
• Collapse of public services

No individual indicator confirms that civil war is imminent.

However, when several of these indicators emerge simultaneously and continue to worsen over time, the probability of organized internal conflict increases substantially. The Fund for Peace’s conflict early-warning methodology likewise emphasizes monitoring clusters of deteriorating indicators rather than relying on a single warning sign.

ANALYTICAL LIMITATIONS

Every intelligence assessment contains uncertainty.

Political crises can accelerate unexpectedly.

Conversely, countries exhibiting numerous structural vulnerabilities may avoid civil conflict through political compromise, effective governance, successful economic reform, or international mediation.

For this reason, the assessments presented in this report should be interpreted as probability estimates based upon currently available information, not deterministic forecasts.

Future developments—including leadership decisions, diplomatic initiatives, economic recovery, or unexpected external events—may significantly alter the trajectory of individual countries.

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

The Middle East currently contains several states exhibiting multiple characteristics commonly associated with elevated conflict risk.

The evidence does not support the conclusion that the region is entering a generalized wave of civil wars.

It does, however, support the assessment that several countries are simultaneously experiencing deteriorating structural conditions that warrant sustained monitoring. International conflict-monitoring organizations similarly emphasize tracking changes in state fragility over time because rising fragility often serves as an early warning of future instability rather than proof that conflict is inevitable.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENT I

IRAN

A STATE UNDER PRESSURE, NOT NECESSARILY A STATE ON THE VERGE OF CIVIL WAR

Overall Risk Assessment: High

Estimated Risk Horizon: 12–24 Months

Intelligence Confidence: Moderate

EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

Iran presents one of the most complex civil war risk profiles in the Middle East.

Unlike failed states such as Yemen or Libya, Iran retains functioning national institutions, centralized security organizations, and a long tradition of state continuity. The government continues to exercise effective control over most of its territory, maintains disciplined military and internal security forces, and possesses extensive intelligence capabilities.

These strengths substantially reduce the likelihood of an abrupt collapse.

At the same time, Iran faces an unusual convergence of strategic pressures.

The country is managing the consequences of military confrontation with Israel and the United States, persistent economic weakness, international sanctions, leadership transition following the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declining public confidence among segments of the population, and continuing tensions involving several ethnic minority regions. Reuters and other analysts describe the succession period as the most significant internal political test faced by the Islamic Republic since 1979.

These pressures do not necessarily point toward civil war.

They do suggest that Iran has entered one of the most politically uncertain periods in its modern history.

THE PARADOX OF IRANIAN STABILITY

Outside observers often underestimate the resilience of the Iranian political system.

The Islamic Republic was deliberately structured to survive crises that might destabilize more centralized governments.

Political authority is distributed across several institutions, including:

• the Office of the Supreme Leader;
• the Assembly of Experts;
• the Guardian Council;
• the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
• the regular armed forces;
• the judiciary;
• the presidency;
• powerful religious foundations.

This institutional redundancy means that the death or removal of one leader—even the Supreme Leader—does not automatically produce governmental collapse.

Indeed, one of the principal conclusions emerging from recent analysis is that Iran’s governing system was specifically designed to withstand such shocks.

For this reason, predictions of imminent regime collapse should be treated cautiously.

History demonstrates that authoritarian governments often prove considerably more resilient than expected.

ECONOMIC PRESSURE

The Iranian economy has experienced prolonged structural stress.

Years of sanctions, inflation, currency depreciation, declining foreign investment, and periodic energy shortages have weakened household purchasing power and reduced public confidence.

Recent military conflict has compounded those pressures.

Damage to infrastructure, increased security expenditures, uncertainty surrounding reconstruction, and continued restrictions on international commerce have placed additional burdens upon an economy that was already under strain. Reuters reports that Iranian authorities have expressed concern that post-war economic hardship could become a catalyst for renewed domestic unrest, prompting an intensified internal security response.

Economic deterioration alone does not produce civil war.

However, it reduces governmental flexibility.

Governments facing severe fiscal constraints often possess fewer resources to subsidize essential goods, maintain employment, modernize infrastructure, or address public grievances.

Over time, economic weakness can amplify political tensions that might otherwise remain manageable.

THE SUCCESSION QUESTION

Leadership succession represents one of the most consequential variables affecting Iran’s long-term stability.

For decades, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei served not only as Iran’s Supreme Leader but also as the central figure balancing relationships among competing political, clerical, military, and security institutions.

Any transition of authority inevitably alters those relationships.

Although constitutional procedures exist for selecting a new Supreme Leader, real-world political transitions seldom proceed entirely according to formal legal processes.

Elite bargaining, institutional influence, military interests, and public expectations all shape succession outcomes.

Recent analyses suggest that Iran’s transition is likely to involve a combination of constitutional mechanisms and informal negotiations among influential political and security actors. The ultimate balance of power between clerical institutions and the IRGC remains one of the most important variables to monitor.

From an intelligence perspective, succession should therefore be viewed not as a single event but as an extended process.

THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD

No assessment of Iranian stability is complete without considering the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Since its creation following the 1979 Revolution, the IRGC has evolved into one of the country’s most influential institutions.

Its responsibilities extend well beyond traditional military functions.

Today, the organization influences:

• internal security;
• intelligence collection;
• strategic missile forces;
• elements of the national economy;
• foreign proxy relationships;
• cyber operations;
• strategic planning.

Because of its institutional depth, the IRGC represents one of the principal stabilizing forces within the current political system.

At the same time, any significant disagreement among senior IRGC leadership regarding succession, economic policy, or national security would represent an important warning indicator.

At present, publicly available information does not demonstrate widespread fragmentation within the organization.

ETHNIC FAULT LINES

Iran is frequently described as a Persian nation.

In reality, it is a multiethnic state.

Its population includes Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, Lurs, Turkmen, and other communities.

Most ethnic communities participate in national political life.

Nevertheless, several peripheral regions have experienced periodic unrest, particularly where longstanding economic grievances, questions of cultural autonomy, or security concerns intersect.

International reporting indicates that authorities have devoted particular attention to Kurdish, Baluchi, and Arab regions during recent periods of domestic tension, reflecting official concern that localized unrest could expand under conditions of broader national instability.

It is important, however, not to overstate these dynamics.

There is currently no persuasive evidence that Iran’s minority populations are uniformly organized around a common separatist agenda.

Rather, localized grievances remain uneven and differ significantly from one region to another.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?

Several developments would materially increase the risk of widespread internal conflict.

These include:

• sustained economic collapse;
• visible fragmentation within the IRGC or senior security services;
• prolonged disputes over political succession;
• simultaneous unrest across multiple provinces;
• coordinated armed activity by several domestic groups;
• loss of governmental control over major urban centers.

Conversely, several developments could reduce the assessed level of risk.

These include:

• economic stabilization;
• sanctions relief;
• successful political consolidation following the leadership transition;
• declining inflation;
• renewed foreign investment;
• improved regional security conditions.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT

Iran should not presently be viewed as a state on the verge of civil war.

Its institutions remain substantially stronger than those found in countries that experienced rapid state collapse during the Arab Spring.

Nevertheless, Iran is entering one of the most politically consequential periods in the history of the Islamic Republic.

The interaction of leadership succession, economic stress, regional military pressures, and domestic political dissatisfaction creates a level of strategic uncertainty not seen for decades.

The principal intelligence question is therefore not whether Iran will experience unrest—periodic unrest is already a recurring feature of Iranian politics.

The more important question is whether multiple sources of instability begin reinforcing one another faster than the state’s institutions can contain them.

At present, JAFAJ assesses that Iran faces a high level of structural instability but a lower probability of imminent nationwide civil war. The country’s institutions remain capable of managing significant internal pressures, although that assessment should be revisited if evidence emerges of elite fragmentation, sustained nationwide unrest, or weakening cohesion within the security apparatus.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENT II

LEBANON

A FRAGILE STATE AT A STRATEGIC CROSSROADS

Overall Risk Assessment: High

Estimated Risk Horizon: 6–24 Months

Intelligence Confidence: Moderate to High

EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

Lebanon presently exhibits one of the highest levels of structural vulnerability in the Middle East.

Unlike Iran, where strong national institutions continue to provide a significant degree of political resilience, Lebanon’s political system has experienced years of institutional weakening, economic collapse, and competing claims regarding the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

The principal question facing Lebanon is no longer whether political divisions exist.

Those divisions have existed for decades.

The more consequential question is whether the Lebanese state can successfully reassert sovereign authority over security policy without provoking large-scale internal confrontation.

That challenge has become considerably more difficult following the recent Israel-Hezbollah conflict, renewed international pressure to disarm Hezbollah, and widening political disagreement over Lebanon’s future security architecture. Recent reporting indicates that proposed security arrangements linking Israeli withdrawal to Hezbollah’s disarmament have intensified domestic political divisions and renewed public discussion of the possibility of civil conflict.

JAFAJ assesses that Lebanon faces a high probability of continued political instability and an elevated risk of localized armed confrontation. A return to a nationwide civil war comparable to the 1975–1990 conflict remains a lower-probability outcome but cannot be dismissed if multiple destabilizing factors converge.

THE LEGACY OF AN UNFINISHED PEACE

Lebanon’s civil war officially ended with the 1989 Taif Agreement.

The fighting stopped.

Many of the underlying political issues did not.

The post-war political system was designed around sectarian power-sharing intended to prevent domination by any single community. While that arrangement reduced large-scale violence, it also institutionalized political fragmentation.

Rather than producing a strong central government, Lebanon developed a system in which political authority is distributed among numerous competing parties, religious communities, and regional interests.

This structure has often produced political paralysis during periods of national crisis.

Successive economic shocks, government resignations, the Beirut port explosion, regional conflicts, and prolonged financial instability have further eroded public confidence in state institutions.

Consequently, Lebanon enters the current period of regional instability with fewer institutional reserves than many neighboring states.

HEZBOLLAH AND THE QUESTION OF STATE AUTHORITY

No issue is more central to Lebanon’s future than Hezbollah’s military status.

For Hezbollah and many within Lebanon’s Shi’a community, the organization remains an essential deterrent against external threats and a legitimate component of the country’s national defense.

For many other Lebanese political parties, Hezbollah’s independent military capability represents a fundamental challenge to state sovereignty.

This disagreement is not simply ideological.

It concerns one of the most basic characteristics of statehood:

Who possesses the legitimate authority to employ organized military force?

Recent diplomatic initiatives have brought that question into sharper focus.

International proposals conditioning Israeli withdrawal upon Hezbollah’s disarmament have placed the Lebanese government in an exceptionally difficult position.

Accepting such conditions risks confrontation with Hezbollah.

Rejecting them risks prolonged external military pressure and continued political isolation.

This dilemma has no easy solution.

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

Lebanon’s political crisis cannot be separated from its economic condition.

Years of financial instability have fundamentally altered the relationship between citizens and the state.

Among the continuing challenges are:

• banking sector instability;
• declining purchasing power;
• infrastructure deterioration;
• public debt;
• limited government revenues;
• emigration of skilled professionals;
• persistent unemployment.

Economic hardship does not inevitably produce civil conflict.

It does, however, reduce the government’s ability to provide public services, finance reconstruction, maintain infrastructure, and address political grievances.

Over time, these pressures weaken institutional legitimacy.

When economic frustration overlaps with political polarization and security competition, overall national resilience declines.

SECTARIAN POLITICS

Lebanon’s political system remains organized largely around confessional representation.

This structure has historically allowed diverse religious communities to participate in governance.

It has also reinforced political identities that often coincide with sectarian affiliation.

Periods of external conflict therefore tend to deepen domestic political divisions.

Recent fighting between Israel and Hezbollah has produced markedly different political reactions across Lebanese society.

Some communities view Hezbollah as the country’s principal line of defense.

Others argue that its independent military decisions expose Lebanon to unnecessary regional wars.

Neither perspective exists in isolation.

Both influence national political decision-making.

As these competing narratives become increasingly polarized, the possibility of political compromise becomes more difficult.

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Despite these challenges, Lebanon retains several important stabilizing factors.

The Lebanese Armed Forces continue to enjoy broader national legitimacy than most political institutions.

Unlike the militia-dominated environment of the mid-1970s, there remains widespread public recognition that renewed nationwide civil war would produce catastrophic consequences for every community.

Many political leaders therefore possess strong incentives to avoid direct military confrontation.

This factor should not be underestimated.

Historical memory itself can function as a stabilizing influence.

Reuters reporting from April 2026 noted that former combatants, journalists, and civic leaders repeatedly warned against repeating the mistakes of the 1975–1990 conflict, even as they acknowledged that current sectarian tensions increasingly resemble those that preceded the earlier war.

POTENTIAL TRIGGERS

Several developments could substantially increase Lebanon’s risk profile.

These include:

• attempts to forcibly disarm Hezbollah;
• collapse of national political negotiations;
• prolonged Israeli military occupation of disputed territory;
• major sectarian violence in Beirut;
• assassination of senior political figures;
• fragmentation within the Lebanese Armed Forces;
• severe deterioration of humanitarian conditions.

Conversely, several developments would likely reduce the probability of internal armed conflict.

These include:

• successful political dialogue regarding national defense policy;
• sustained international economic assistance;
• gradual implementation of security reforms;
• negotiated de-escalation between Israel and Hezbollah;
• strengthening of state institutions.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT

Lebanon today is not simply confronting a security crisis.

It is confronting a sovereignty crisis.

The central issue is whether the Lebanese state can consolidate political authority over national defense while preserving domestic political consensus.

History demonstrates that states facing competing centers of armed authority often encounter prolonged instability rather than immediate collapse.

Lebanon’s institutions remain functional.

Its armed forces remain intact.

Its political leadership continues to pursue negotiated solutions.

These factors weigh against predictions of imminent nationwide civil war.

Nevertheless, Lebanon currently exhibits one of the region’s highest concentrations of structural risk factors.

The interaction of economic weakness, unresolved sectarian divisions, competing claims to military authority, external military pressure, and fragile political institutions creates conditions that warrant continued close monitoring.

JAFAJ therefore assesses that Lebanon’s greatest near-term danger is not an immediate return to full-scale civil war but a series of localized confrontations that could progressively undermine state authority if left unresolved. Should such confrontations spread across multiple sectarian or geographic lines, the risk assessment would require upward revision.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENT III

SYRIA

AN UNFINISHED CIVIL WAR OR A FRAGILE TRANSITION?

Overall Risk Assessment: High

Estimated Risk Horizon: 12–36 Months

Intelligence Confidence: High

EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

Syria presents a fundamentally different analytical problem than either Iran or Lebanon.

The principal question is not whether Syria could enter a civil war.

Rather, it is whether Syria has genuinely emerged from one.

Although the collapse of the Assad government fundamentally altered Syria’s political landscape, the country remains divided by competing military organizations, unresolved sectarian grievances, foreign intervention, economic devastation, and incomplete national integration. The current transitional government has achieved important political gains, but it has not yet consolidated authority across the entire country.

For intelligence purposes, Syria should therefore be viewed as a fragile post-conflict state, not a fully stabilized one.

The probability of a return to nationwide fighting remains lower than during the height of the Syrian Civil War. However, the probability of recurring localized armed conflict remains significant.

THE FALL OF THE ASSAD GOVERNMENT DID NOT END SYRIA’S CHALLENGES

The removal of Bashar al-Assad ended one phase of Syria’s modern history.

It did not automatically resolve the conditions that produced fourteen years of war.

The transitional government inherited a country characterized by:

• damaged infrastructure;
• millions of displaced citizens;
• competing regional authorities;
• extensive humanitarian needs;
• weakened state institutions;
• unresolved sectarian grievances;
• continuing foreign military involvement.

The challenge facing Damascus is therefore not simply governing Syria.

It is rebuilding the legitimacy of the Syrian state itself.

CSIS has described the transition as a limited window of opportunity in which political inclusion, institutional reform, and international support will largely determine whether Syria moves toward durable stability or renewed fragmentation.

THE FRAGMENTED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Despite the establishment of a transitional government, Syria does not yet possess a fully unified national security structure.

Several armed actors continue to exercise influence in different parts of the country.

These include:

• Syrian government security forces;
• Kurdish-led security organizations in the northeast;
• local tribal formations;
• Druze self-defense groups;
• remnants of extremist organizations, including the Islamic State;
• various locally organized armed groups.

This fragmentation complicates efforts to establish a single national monopoly on the use of force.

While several integration initiatives are underway, negotiations concerning command authority, local governance, and security responsibilities remain incomplete. Analysts continue to identify integration of Kurdish-led forces into national institutions as one of the transition’s most difficult unresolved issues.

SECTARIAN TRUST REMAINS THE CENTRAL CHALLENGE

Military victories alone do not produce political reconciliation.

One of the transitional government’s greatest challenges is rebuilding trust among communities that experienced years of violence.

Recent violence involving Druze, Alawite, and Bedouin communities demonstrates that sectarian tensions remain capable of producing significant localized conflict.

The violence in Sweida Province, as well as earlier attacks in Syria’s coastal regions, illustrates that local grievances continue to threaten broader national reconciliation. UN officials report that implementation of the government’s stabilization plan for Sweida has stalled, with kidnappings, community mistrust, and political divisions continuing nearly a year after major sectarian violence.

Similarly, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has concluded that both state and non-state actors continue to commit serious abuses against religious minorities, raising continuing concerns regarding rule of law and minority protection.

These developments do not necessarily indicate the beginning of another nationwide civil war.

They do indicate that reconciliation remains incomplete.

THE KURDISH QUESTION

The future relationship between Damascus and Kurdish-administered regions represents another major variable.

For more than a decade, northeastern Syria developed political and military institutions largely independent of Damascus.

The long-term success of Syria’s transition depends in part upon whether those institutions can be integrated into a unified Syrian state while preserving acceptable levels of local autonomy.

Failure to reach durable political arrangements could generate renewed military confrontation.

Successful integration, by contrast, would remove one of Syria’s most important long-term security risks.

This issue should therefore be viewed as a strategic indicator rather than merely a regional political dispute. CSIS has identified Kurdish integration as one of the defining tests of Syria’s post-Assad transition.

FOREIGN POWERS REMAIN DEEPLY INVOLVED

Unlike many civil wars, Syria’s conflict has never been exclusively domestic.

Regional and international actors continue to shape the country’s security environment.

Their interests differ considerably.

Some seek border security.

Others seek influence.

Others seek to prevent extremist resurgence.

Israel continues to conduct military operations when it perceives emerging security threats.

Turkey remains focused on Kurdish armed organizations operating near its southern border.

The United States continues to influence developments through diplomacy and its evolving regional posture.

These overlapping interests complicate Syria’s transition because domestic political decisions frequently produce regional security consequences.

The continued presence of multiple external actors substantially increases the complexity of conflict management.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?

Several developments would increase Syria’s risk profile.

These include:

• collapse of negotiations with Kurdish authorities;
• expansion of sectarian violence into multiple provinces;
• fragmentation within national security institutions;
• significant resurgence of the Islamic State;
• widespread failure of transitional governance;
• major foreign military escalation.

Conversely, several developments would improve the outlook.

These include:

• successful integration of regional security forces;
• effective protection of minority communities;
• restoration of public services;
• constitutional progress;
• sustained international reconstruction assistance;
• continued reductions in sectarian violence.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT

Syria should not be viewed as a country that has fully emerged from conflict.

Neither should it be viewed as a country inevitably returning to nationwide civil war.

The evidence presently supports a more nuanced conclusion.

The transitional government has made measurable progress toward reestablishing national authority.

At the same time, that authority remains uneven, particularly in regions where sectarian distrust, competing armed organizations, and unresolved governance disputes persist. International observers continue to characterize Syria’s transition as fragile rather than consolidated.

JAFAJ therefore assesses that Syria’s greatest strategic risk is not the immediate return of a nationwide civil war, but the persistence of multiple localized conflicts that gradually erode confidence in the transitional government.

If those localized conflicts become interconnected—linking sectarian violence, governance failures, Kurdish disputes, extremist activity, and external intervention—the probability of a broader internal conflict would increase significantly.

At present, however, the available evidence supports the assessment that Syria remains a fragile state in transition rather than a state experiencing a renewed nationwide civil war.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENT IV

IRAQ

BETWEEN STABILITY AND FRAGMENTATION

Overall Risk Assessment: Moderate

Estimated Risk Horizon: 12–24 Months

Intelligence Confidence: Moderate to High

EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

Iraq occupies a unique position within the Middle East’s evolving security environment.

Unlike Syria or Yemen, Iraq is not presently engaged in a nationwide civil war.

Unlike Iran, its principal vulnerabilities are not centered on national leadership succession.

Instead, Iraq’s greatest strategic challenge is balancing competing centers of political and military authority while preventing regional conflicts from reigniting domestic instability.

Over the past decade, Iraq has achieved measurable progress.

The territorial defeat of the Islamic State, improvements in government institutions, increasing public confidence in national security forces, and gradual economic recovery have all strengthened the Iraqi state.

Yet many of the structural conditions that contributed to earlier conflict remain unresolved.

Political competition among Shi’a factions, unresolved relations with the Kurdistan Region, the continued influence of armed groups operating outside direct government control, and competing Iranian and American interests continue to place significant pressure on Iraqi institutions. The Council on Foreign Relations continues to classify Iraq as a country facing persistent political instability because of these unresolved structural challenges.

JAFAJ assesses that Iraq is more resilient today than at any point since the defeat of ISIS, but that resilience remains conditional upon continued political compromise and successful efforts to strengthen the state’s monopoly over the use of force.

A COUNTRY THAT HAS LEARNED FROM CIVIL WAR

Modern Iraq has experienced nearly every form of armed conflict.

It has endured dictatorship, foreign invasion, sectarian violence, insurgency, terrorism, and civil war.

Those experiences continue to influence political decision-making.

Unlike the period preceding the 2006–2008 sectarian conflict, there is now broad recognition across much of Iraq’s political leadership that renewed internal war would threaten the survival of the modern Iraqi state itself.

This historical memory serves as an important stabilizing factor.

Political leaders who fiercely disagree on policy often share one common objective:

Avoiding another nationwide civil war.

That objective has contributed to a political culture that generally favors negotiation over direct military confrontation among major political actors.

THE POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES

Perhaps no issue better illustrates Iraq’s strategic dilemma than the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

Originally formed to combat ISIS, the PMF evolved into a diverse collection of organizations with varying political loyalties, institutional relationships, and military capabilities.

Some components operate closely alongside the Iraqi state.

Others maintain stronger political or operational relationships with Iran.

This diversity complicates government efforts to establish unified command over all armed organizations.

The central question is not whether Iraq possesses capable security institutions.

It does.

The question is whether every major armed organization ultimately answers to those institutions.

Recent reporting suggests that Baghdad has increased efforts to consolidate state authority over armed groups while simultaneously attempting to avoid direct confrontation with powerful militia organizations. Several factions have publicly indicated a willingness to discuss integration or disarmament, although implementation remains uncertain.

IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES

Few countries illustrate regional strategic competition more clearly than Iraq.

The United States remains an important security and economic partner.

Iran maintains extensive historical, religious, political, and economic relationships with many Iraqi actors.

Baghdad therefore faces a persistent balancing act.

Any major shift toward one side risks political backlash from the other.

This balancing strategy has become more difficult following the recent regional conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States.

According to Reuters reporting, U.S. pressure on Baghdad to restrict militia financing and reassert state authority has increased significantly, while Iran has reportedly adapted by developing smaller proxy structures intended to preserve its regional influence.

This external competition represents one of Iraq’s most important long-term strategic risks.

THE KURDISTAN REGION

Relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government remain considerably more stable than during earlier periods of confrontation.

Nevertheless, important disputes continue regarding:

• energy policy;
• revenue sharing;
• constitutional authority;
• security coordination;
• administrative jurisdiction.

These disagreements have generally remained political rather than military.

That distinction is significant.

As long as both sides continue resolving disputes through negotiation rather than force, this issue is unlikely to become the principal driver of nationwide instability.

However, prolonged political deadlock combined with broader regional conflict could alter that assessment.

ECONOMIC STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES

Compared with several neighboring states, Iraq benefits from substantial natural resources.

Oil revenues continue to provide the financial foundation of the Iraqi government.

That strength, however, also creates vulnerability.

Heavy dependence upon petroleum revenues exposes Iraq to fluctuations in global energy markets and disruptions caused by regional conflict.

Recent attacks affecting energy infrastructure demonstrated how quickly external conflict can produce domestic economic consequences.

The Associated Press reported that attacks on oil infrastructure and export disruptions during the regional conflict threatened government revenues, electricity generation, and public-sector salaries—highlighting the connection between regional security and domestic stability.

Diversifying the Iraqi economy therefore remains both an economic and a national security priority.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?

Several developments would increase Iraq’s overall risk profile.

These include:

• fragmentation among major Shi’a political factions;
• large-scale militia resistance to state authority;
• renewed sectarian mobilization;
• major deterioration in Baghdad–Erbil relations;
• severe economic disruption resulting from prolonged regional conflict;
• resurgence of ISIS or comparable extremist organizations.

Conversely, several developments would reduce the assessed level of risk.

These include:

• successful security sector reform;
• peaceful integration of armed organizations into state institutions;
• continued economic diversification;
• strengthened cooperation between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government;
• reduced regional competition between Iran and the United States.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT

Iraq should not presently be viewed as a country moving toward imminent civil war.

Its political institutions remain stronger than during previous periods of national crisis.

The Iraqi Security Forces have demonstrated increasing professionalism.

The overwhelming majority of political leaders recognize the catastrophic consequences of renewed nationwide conflict.

These are important stabilizing factors.

Nevertheless, Iraq’s stability remains closely linked to developments beyond its borders.

Continued competition between regional powers, the unresolved future of armed factions operating outside full state control, and the country’s dependence on oil revenues create structural vulnerabilities that require continued monitoring.

JAFAJ therefore assesses that Iraq’s greatest strategic risk is not internal political collapse but gradual erosion of state authority should external regional conflicts increasingly intersect with unresolved domestic political disputes.

At present, Iraq’s trajectory points toward managed instability rather than renewed civil war, provided that political leaders continue strengthening national institutions while limiting the influence of competing armed actors.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENT V

YEMEN

A CIVIL WAR THAT NEVER TRULY ENDED

Overall Risk Assessment: Very High

Estimated Risk Horizon: Immediate–24 Months

Intelligence Confidence: High

EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

Unlike the other countries examined in this report, Yemen should not be assessed according to the likelihood of entering civil war.

Yemen is already experiencing one.

The more relevant intelligence question is whether the conflict is entering a new and potentially more dangerous phase.

Over the past decade, Yemen has evolved from a conflict between the internationally recognized government and the Houthi movement into a far more complex struggle involving competing governments, separatist movements, tribal organizations, terrorist groups, regional powers, and foreign military intervention.

Recent fighting among factions previously aligned against the Houthis demonstrates that the conflict is no longer defined solely by a two-sided war. Instead, it has become a multi-dimensional contest over the future political structure of Yemen itself. Reuters and the Associated Press report that renewed fighting between Saudi-backed government forces and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) has fractured the anti-Houthi coalition and significantly increased the risk of prolonged instability.

JAFAJ assesses that Yemen currently presents the highest level of sustained internal conflict risk in the Middle East and is likely to remain unstable regardless of the outcome of any single military campaign.

FROM CIVIL WAR TO STATE FRAGMENTATION

The conflict that began in 2014 has evolved substantially.

Initially centered on the Houthi seizure of Sana’a and the collapse of the internationally recognized government, the conflict now encompasses multiple overlapping struggles.

Today, Yemen contains competing political and military authorities with differing visions of the country’s future.

Among the principal actors are:

• the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah);
• the internationally recognized government;
• the Presidential Leadership Council;
• the Southern Transitional Council;
• tribal security organizations;
• National Resistance Forces;
• extremist organizations, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

These organizations do not merely disagree over policy.

Many disagree over whether Yemen should remain a single state.

This distinction fundamentally changes the nature of the conflict.

THE SOUTHERN QUESTION

One of the most important developments during the past several years has been the growing strength of southern separatism.

The Southern Transitional Council seeks restoration of an independent South Yemen.

Its objectives differ significantly from those of the internationally recognized government.

Although both oppose Houthi control of northern Yemen, they increasingly disagree regarding the future political map of the country.

The January 2026 fighting between Saudi-backed government forces and UAE-supported STC units demonstrated that anti-Houthi cooperation cannot be assumed.

Instead, competing strategic objectives now divide former coalition partners.

From an intelligence perspective, this represents one of Yemen’s most important structural changes.

THE HOUTHI FACTOR

The Houthis remain Yemen’s single most powerful organized military actor.

They continue to exercise control over the capital, Sana’a, and much of northern Yemen, governing areas that contain a majority of the country’s population. They also retain significant missile, drone, and command capabilities developed during years of conflict.

This level of territorial control provides organizational advantages that distinguish the Houthis from many insurgent movements.

At the same time, their continued military posture ensures that any negotiated political settlement must account for their role.

No realistic long-term settlement can ignore the military and political realities on the ground.

REGIONAL COMPETITION

Yemen’s conflict remains deeply internationalized.

Saudi Arabia continues to view developments in Yemen through the lens of border security and regional balance.

The United Arab Emirates has pursued a different strategy, emphasizing influence through southern partners and maritime security.

Iran has maintained relationships with the Houthis.

These overlapping interests complicate every diplomatic initiative.

Political agreements acceptable to one regional actor may be viewed as strategically unacceptable by another.

Consequently, Yemen illustrates one of the defining characteristics of modern civil wars:

Domestic political conflicts increasingly become arenas for regional competition.

THE HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION

Years of conflict have severely weakened Yemen’s state institutions.

Large portions of the population continue to experience:

• food insecurity;
• limited access to healthcare;
• damaged infrastructure;
• interrupted education;
• displacement;
• reduced economic opportunity.

These humanitarian conditions are not merely consequences of conflict.

They also influence future stability.

Communities experiencing prolonged economic hardship become increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by armed organizations, criminal networks, and extremist groups.

Accordingly, humanitarian recovery should be viewed as a national security issue as well as a humanitarian imperative.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?

Several developments would increase Yemen’s already elevated risk profile.

These include:

• complete collapse of the Presidential Leadership Council;
• formal declaration of an independent South Yemen;
• major Saudi-Houthi military confrontation;
• renewed expansion of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula;
• widespread breakdown of humanitarian assistance.

Several developments would reduce the overall risk assessment.

These include:

• durable ceasefire agreements among major factions;
• negotiated political arrangements between northern and southern authorities;
• sustained humanitarian recovery;
• improved regional diplomacy between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran;
• gradual reconstruction of national institutions.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT

Yemen differs fundamentally from every other country examined in this report.

The principal intelligence question is not whether civil war will occur.

It already has.

Instead, analysts must assess whether Yemen is moving toward:

• national reunification;
• formal partition;
• prolonged frozen conflict;
• or continued multi-sided warfare.

At present, the available evidence suggests that continued fragmentation remains the most likely near-term outcome. Although diplomatic initiatives continue, multiple armed organizations retain independent command structures and incompatible political objectives.

From a regional perspective, Yemen’s importance extends beyond its borders.

Its location along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, proximity to the Red Sea, and relationship to Gulf security ensure that instability within Yemen will continue influencing regional trade, maritime security, and broader Middle Eastern geopolitics.

JAFAJ therefore assesses that Yemen represents the Middle East’s most entrenched civil conflict and is likely to remain one of the region’s principal sources of long-term instability unless a comprehensive political settlement addresses not only the Houthi-government conflict but also the competing visions for Yemen’s future state structure.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENT VI

LIBYA

A DIVIDED STATE SEEKING REUNIFICATION

Overall Risk Assessment: Moderate–High

Estimated Risk Horizon: 12–36 Months

Intelligence Confidence: Moderate to High

EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

Libya represents one of the Middle East and North Africa’s most unusual security cases.

Unlike Yemen, where large-scale civil war continues, Libya has experienced a significant reduction in nationwide fighting since the 2020 ceasefire.

Yet peace should not be confused with stability.

The country remains politically divided between rival governments, competing military institutions, and separate centers of political legitimacy. Although large-scale combat has declined, Libya has yet to resolve the underlying constitutional, political, and institutional disputes that originally fueled its civil war. The United Nations continues to describe Libya’s political process as improving but fragile, warning that the current opportunity for national reconciliation could narrow without sustained progress.

JAFAJ assesses that Libya is not presently on the verge of renewed nationwide civil war, but remains vulnerable to renewed armed confrontation if political negotiations collapse or rival authorities again seek to resolve disputes through military means.

FROM CIVIL WAR TO POLITICAL STALEMATE

The 2020 ceasefire fundamentally altered Libya’s security environment.

Major offensive operations largely ceased.

National institutions, however, remained divided.

Today Libya continues to operate under competing political authorities.

In the west, the internationally recognized Government of National Unity exercises authority from Tripoli.

In the east, rival political institutions supported by the Libyan National Army maintain effective control over much of eastern and southern Libya.

This division has created what analysts often describe as a frozen political conflict rather than a resolved national settlement.

The absence of large-scale warfare therefore reflects deterrence and political equilibrium more than comprehensive reconciliation. The Council on Foreign Relations continues to classify Libya as a country experiencing persistent instability because rival governments remain deadlocked over elections, constitutional arrangements, and national governance.

TWO GOVERNMENTS—ONE STATE

The central challenge confronting Libya is legitimacy.

Both rival political systems claim national authority.

Both maintain administrative institutions.

Both possess security organizations.

Neither exercises uncontested sovereignty across the entire country.

As a result, Libya continues to experience parallel governance in areas such as:

• national budgeting;
• internal security;
• military command;
• public administration;
• border management;
• energy policy.

This institutional duplication complicates virtually every effort to rebuild unified national government.

Political compromise therefore remains the decisive strategic variable.

OIL: LIBYA’S GREATEST ASSET AND GREATEST VULNERABILITY

Libya possesses Africa’s largest proven oil reserves.

Oil exports provide the overwhelming majority of government revenue.

Consequently, disputes regarding oil production, export terminals, revenue distribution, and the Central Bank have repeatedly become political flashpoints.

Unlike many countries where economic disagreements remain primarily financial, disputes over Libya’s energy sector directly influence political legitimacy and military power.

Control of oil revenues affects:

• government salaries;
• military financing;
• reconstruction;
• infrastructure investment;
• regional political influence.

Recent diplomatic initiatives have attempted to separate oil production from political disputes.

Progress has been uneven.

The adoption of a unified national budget represented an important institutional achievement, but broader disagreements over political authority remain unresolved. The Financial Times and Reuters report that outside mediators view shared management of Libya’s energy resources as essential to any lasting political settlement.

THE MILITARY BALANCE

One of Libya’s principal stabilizing factors is the current military balance.

Neither major political bloc appears capable of achieving a decisive nationwide military victory at acceptable cost.

This strategic reality has encouraged negotiation over renewed offensive operations.

At the same time, the existence of separate military command structures means that localized incidents retain the potential to escalate unexpectedly.

The continued absence of a unified national military therefore represents both a stabilizing and destabilizing factor.

It discourages offensive campaigns.

It also prevents the emergence of a single national security authority.

INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

Libya remains heavily influenced by external diplomacy.

The United Nations continues facilitating political negotiations.

Regional governments remain engaged.

Several international actors view Libyan stability as strategically important because of:

• Mediterranean security;
• migration;
• energy exports;
• counterterrorism;
• regional economic development.

Recent reporting indicates that Pakistan, with encouragement from the United States and several regional governments, has begun facilitating discussions between Libya’s eastern and western political authorities regarding a proposed thirty-six-month national reunification process. While negotiations remain preliminary, they represent one of the most significant diplomatic initiatives since the 2020 ceasefire.

Whether this initiative succeeds remains uncertain.

Its existence nevertheless suggests that major international actors increasingly view political reunification as achievable rather than unattainable.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?

Several developments would increase Libya’s risk profile.

These include:

• collapse of reunification negotiations;
• renewed competition over oil infrastructure;
• failure to implement national elections;
• fragmentation within either major governing coalition;
• significant foreign military intervention;
• prolonged constitutional deadlock.

Conversely, several developments would improve Libya’s long-term outlook.

These include:

• successful formation of unified national institutions;
• implementation of credible national elections;
• consolidation of military command structures;
• equitable distribution of oil revenues;
• continued reductions in political violence;
• successful constitutional reform.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT

Libya today differs significantly from the country that experienced full-scale civil war following 2011.

Violence has declined.

Institutions have strengthened in some areas.

Political dialogue has resumed.

These developments should not be overlooked.

Nevertheless, Libya has not yet completed the transition from ceasefire to durable peace.

Its institutions remain divided.

Its constitutional future remains unsettled.

Its political legitimacy remains contested.

JAFAJ therefore assesses that Libya’s greatest strategic risk is not an immediate return to nationwide civil war, but the gradual erosion of the current political equilibrium if reunification efforts fail.

Unlike Syria, where conflict remains deeply embedded in local security structures, or Lebanon, where competing armed authority defines the central political challenge, Libya’s future depends primarily upon whether competing governments can transform a military stalemate into a unified political settlement.

At present, the evidence suggests that Libya is moving cautiously toward political reconciliation rather than toward renewed nationwide civil war. That trajectory, however, remains reversible and dependent upon continued domestic compromise and sustained international mediation.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENT VII

THE STABLE STATES

WHY SOME COUNTRIES ARE UNLIKELY TO EXPERIENCE CIVIL WAR

Countries Assessed:

Jordan

Saudi Arabia

United Arab Emirates

Qatar

Oman

Bahrain

Kuwait

Overall Regional Risk: Low to Moderate

Intelligence Confidence: High

EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

An assessment of civil war risk in the Middle East would be incomplete if it focused exclusively on countries experiencing instability.

Several regional governments continue to demonstrate a high degree of political resilience despite operating within one of the world’s most volatile security environments.

Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait differ significantly in their political systems, economic structures, and foreign policy priorities. Yet they share several characteristics that reduce the probability of large-scale internal armed conflict.

These characteristics include relatively effective state institutions, centralized security organizations, comparatively high levels of government capacity, and the ability to provide essential public services. While each country faces important domestic and regional challenges, none currently exhibits the combination of structural conditions typically associated with a high probability of civil war. The World Bank and the Fund for Peace continue to rank these states well above the region’s fragile or conflict-affected countries in measures of governance and institutional capacity.

JORDAN

A BUFFER STATE UNDER CONTINUOUS PRESSURE

Jordan occupies one of the most strategically exposed positions in the Middle East.

It borders Israel, the West Bank, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

It has absorbed successive refugee crises while maintaining internal political stability.

Jordan continues to face economic pressures, water shortages, unemployment, and periodic demonstrations.

Nevertheless, several important stabilizing factors remain present.

These include:

• professional security institutions;
• broad international support;
• functioning government institutions;
• continuity within the Hashemite monarchy;
• limited sectarian polarization.

Jordan’s principal security risks originate from regional spillover rather than domestic armed opposition.

Accordingly, JAFAJ assesses Jordan’s civil war risk as Low.

SAUDI ARABIA

STRONG STATE CAPACITY REDUCES INTERNAL RISK

Saudi Arabia has undergone substantial political and economic transformation during the past decade.

Large-scale economic reforms, institutional modernization, expanded investment, and centralization of political authority have strengthened the state’s governing capacity.

The Kingdom continues to face:

• regional security threats;
• missile and drone attacks;
• economic diversification challenges;
• succession questions over the long term.

However, the government maintains:

• effective security institutions;
• centralized command authority;
• substantial financial resources;
• strong territorial control.

No organized domestic armed movement presently possesses the capability to challenge the state’s authority nationwide.

JAFAJ therefore assesses Saudi Arabia’s civil war risk as Low.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

The UAE remains among the region’s most politically stable states.

Strong economic performance, diversified international relationships, highly capable security institutions, and relatively effective governance contribute to national resilience.

Potential risks include:

• regional military escalation;
• cyber attacks;
• economic disruption;
• terrorism.

None presently suggests a meaningful probability of internal armed conflict.

Assessment: Very Low

QATAR

Qatar maintains one of the highest standards of living in the Middle East.

Political continuity, strong financial reserves, and active diplomacy contribute significantly to national stability.

Although regional tensions occasionally affect Qatari foreign policy, they have not translated into meaningful domestic instability.

Assessment: Very Low

OMAN

Oman has historically pursued a policy of neutrality and regional mediation.

Political succession following the death of Sultan Qaboos demonstrated institutional continuity rather than instability.

Economic diversification remains an important long-term challenge.

Nevertheless, Oman continues to exhibit:

• high institutional legitimacy;
• limited political violence;
• effective governance.

Assessment: Very Low

BAHRAIN

Bahrain presents a more complex picture.

Historical sectarian tensions continue to influence domestic politics.

The government maintains strong security institutions and receives substantial regional support, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Gulf Cooperation Council partners.

While localized unrest remains possible, the probability of nationwide civil war remains Low.

KUWAIT

Kuwait possesses one of the Gulf’s most developed parliamentary systems.

Political disagreements frequently occur between elected representatives and the executive branch.

Importantly, these disagreements have remained political rather than military.

Strong institutions and economic resources continue supporting national stability.

Assessment: Very Low

COMMON STABILIZING FACTORS

Several characteristics distinguish these countries from those examined earlier.

They generally possess:

• functioning national institutions;
• unified military command structures;
• comparatively strong economies or fiscal reserves;
• limited territorial fragmentation;
• effective internal security organizations;
• broad control over the legitimate use of force;
• relatively high administrative capacity.

These factors substantially reduce the likelihood that political disputes will evolve into sustained armed conflict.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THIS ASSESSMENT?

Although current risks remain comparatively low, analysts should continue monitoring:

• severe economic shocks;
• prolonged succession disputes;
• significant erosion of government legitimacy;
• emergence of organized armed opposition;
• large-scale refugee spillover;
• regional wars producing domestic political polarization.

At present, however, none of these countries exhibits multiple deteriorating indicators comparable to those observed in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, or Yemen.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT

One of the most important findings of this Intelligence Estimate is that geography alone does not determine conflict risk.

Several states located in one of the world’s most unstable regions continue to demonstrate remarkable political resilience.

This reinforces an important analytical conclusion:

Civil wars are not an inevitable consequence of regional instability.

Rather, they emerge when structural weaknesses accumulate beyond the capacity of political institutions to manage them peacefully.

The Gulf monarchies and Jordan illustrate the opposite dynamic. Despite operating in an exceptionally challenging security environment, they continue to benefit from strong state institutions, centralized security structures, and governing systems capable of absorbing political shocks without widespread armed conflict.

SPECIAL ASSESSMENT

THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

GOVERNANCE, FRAGMENTATION, AND THE RISK OF INTERNAL CONFLICT

Overall Risk Assessment: Moderate–High

Estimated Risk Horizon: 6–24 Months

Intelligence Confidence: Moderate

EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

The Palestinian Territories present one of the most analytically complex security environments in the Middle East.

Unlike the sovereign states examined elsewhere in this report, the Palestinian political system is divided geographically, institutionally, and politically between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

Accordingly, the principal intelligence question is not whether Palestine could experience a conventional civil war comparable to those in Syria or Yemen.

Rather, the question is whether political fragmentation, competing claims of legitimacy, and unresolved security arrangements could produce sustained armed confrontation among Palestinian actors themselves.

Recent developments have altered that assessment.

Hamas’ announcement that it would dissolve its de facto civilian government in Gaza and transfer administrative authority to a technocratic committee represents the most significant change in Palestinian governance since Hamas seized Gaza in 2007. However, Hamas has not committed to surrendering its weapons or relinquishing all security authority, leaving the future distribution of power uncertain.

JAFAJ assesses that the greatest near-term risk is not an organized Hamas–Fatah civil war, but prolonged political fragmentation in which competing governing authorities, security organizations, and external actors prevent the emergence of a unified Palestinian political system.

THE LEGACY OF 2007

The political division between Gaza and the West Bank did not begin with the current conflict.

It began nearly two decades earlier.

Following Hamas’ electoral victory and subsequent fighting with Fatah, Palestinian governance effectively split into two separate administrations.

Since then:

• Hamas has governed Gaza.
• The Palestinian Authority has administered much of the West Bank.
• Separate security institutions developed.
• Separate bureaucracies emerged.
• Political reconciliation repeatedly failed.

This institutional separation created two distinct political systems operating under different leadership, different security structures, and different governing priorities.

The current ceasefire and reconstruction process therefore confronts not only the physical destruction of Gaza but also nearly twenty years of political separation.

A NEW POLITICAL MOMENT

Hamas’ decision to dissolve its civilian governing authority is politically significant.

If implemented, it would end nearly two decades of direct Hamas administration over civilian ministries and transfer day-to-day governance to a technocratic body created under the post-war framework. Hamas has described the move as part of the reconstruction process, while the Board of Peace has stated that it will judge the transition by “actions, not promises.” Israeli officials have argued that meaningful change also requires Hamas to relinquish its armed capabilities.

This distinction is critical.

Civil administration and military authority are not the same.

Even if civilian governance changes, unresolved questions remain regarding:

• policing;
• internal security;
• weapons control;
• intelligence functions;
• border security;
• command over armed formations.

Until these issues are resolved, competing centers of authority are likely to persist.

THE HAMAS–FATAH RELATIONSHIP

For many years, discussions of Palestinian internal politics focused on the rivalry between Hamas and Fatah.

While that rivalry remains important, it may no longer represent the principal source of future instability.

Both organizations now confront a different strategic challenge:

Whether a unified Palestinian governing structure can emerge after years of institutional separation.

That challenge involves far more than political reconciliation.

It requires integration of:

• civil administrations;
• financial systems;
• judicial institutions;
• security organizations;
• local governance;
• reconstruction authorities.

History demonstrates that institutional integration is often more difficult than political agreement.

THE SECURITY QUESTION

The future of Palestinian security institutions remains the most uncertain variable.

No political transition can be considered complete while competing armed organizations maintain separate chains of command.

The current framework leaves several major questions unanswered.

Among them:

• Who controls internal policing?
• Who secures border crossings?
• Who commands armed personnel?
• What becomes of Hamas’ military wing?
• What role, if any, will the Palestinian Authority’s security institutions play in Gaza?
• What responsibilities will international organizations assume?

Until these questions are resolved, governance arrangements will remain incomplete.

The United Nations has similarly argued that Gaza’s recovery must ultimately support reunification of Gaza and the West Bank under a single legitimate Palestinian governing authority.

THE RECONSTRUCTION CHALLENGE

Political stability cannot be separated from reconstruction.

Years of conflict have devastated housing, public infrastructure, healthcare, education, and the economy.

Reconstruction therefore represents more than humanitarian recovery.

It is also a test of governance.

Whichever institutions successfully deliver:

• public services;
• reconstruction;
• employment;
• security;
• humanitarian assistance;

are likely to gain political legitimacy.

Failure to deliver those services could produce renewed political competition among Palestinian factions.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?

Several developments would increase the risk of internal Palestinian conflict.

These include:

• collapse of the governance transition;
• competing claims of authority between rival Palestinian institutions;
• disputes regarding weapons and security control;
• failure of reconstruction;
• assassination of senior political leaders;
• emergence of additional armed factions.

Conversely, several developments would reduce the assessed level of risk.

These include:

• successful implementation of the technocratic administration;
• agreement regarding unified security structures;
• sustained reconstruction;
• expanded cooperation between Gaza and West Bank institutions;
• internationally supported political reforms;
• continued reductions in armed violence.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT

The Palestinian Territories should not presently be assessed as moving toward a conventional civil war resembling those experienced by Syria or Yemen.

Instead, they face a different strategic challenge.

The central issue is political integration.

The recent decision by Hamas to dissolve its civilian governing authority creates an opportunity for institutional restructuring.

Whether that opportunity succeeds will depend less upon announcements than upon implementation.

The decisive question is not who governs Gaza’s ministries.

The decisive question is who ultimately exercises legitimate authority over governance, security, reconstruction, and the use of force across the Palestinian Territories.

JAFAJ therefore assesses that the greatest threat to Palestinian stability is prolonged political fragmentation rather than immediate civil war. If competing institutions become entrenched, reconstruction stalls, or rival security organizations begin operating independently of a unified political framework, the risk of sustained internal armed confrontation would increase. Conversely, successful institutional integration under a broadly accepted governing structure would significantly reduce that risk over time.

CHAPTER VIII

REGIONAL CONTAGION

HOW ONE CIVIL WAR COULD IGNITE ANOTHER

Regional Assessment: Moderate Risk of Cascading Instability

Estimated Time Horizon: 6–36 Months

Intelligence Confidence: Moderate to High

EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

Civil wars seldom remain domestic affairs.

In today’s Middle East, political instability spreads across borders through refugee movements, economic disruption, ideological mobilization, weapons trafficking, proxy organizations, and foreign military intervention.

The region’s geographic proximity, interconnected political movements, and competing regional powers mean that instability in one country can rapidly influence security conditions elsewhere.

This dynamic is not theoretical.

The Syrian Civil War reshaped regional politics by generating one of the largest refugee crises in modern history, altering the security policies of neighboring states, facilitating the expansion of extremist organizations, and drawing multiple regional and international militaries into the conflict. Similar spillover effects have been documented in conflicts involving Iraq, Yemen, and Libya.¹

The principal intelligence question is therefore no longer:

Could one country experience civil war?

The more important question becomes:

What happens to the region if it does?

THE CASCADE MODEL

JAFAJ assesses that regional instability generally expands through five interconnected pathways.

Rather than occurring sequentially, these pathways often reinforce one another.

Political Crisis

│

▼

Internal Violence

│

▼

Population Displacement

│

▼

Regional Political Pressure

│

▼

Foreign Intervention

│

▼

Expanded Regional Instability

Each stage increases the probability that neighboring states will experience secondary security challenges.

PATHWAY ONE

REFUGEE MOVEMENTS

Large-scale population displacement is among the earliest indicators that internal conflict is expanding beyond national borders.

Neighboring governments often experience immediate pressure upon:

• healthcare systems;
• housing;
• employment;
• education;
• public finances;
• border security.

Jordan, Lebanon, Türkiye, and Iraq all experienced substantial demographic and economic effects following the Syrian conflict.

Future conflicts involving Iran or Lebanon could generate similar regional pressures, although the scale would depend upon the duration and intensity of violence.

Refugee movements are humanitarian events.

They also become strategic events.

PATHWAY TWO

WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

Civil wars rarely contain weapons.

As state authority weakens, military equipment often disperses beyond government control.

Weapons may flow through:

• smuggling networks;
• tribal relationships;
• criminal organizations;
• proxy groups;
• terrorist organizations.

The Libyan conflict demonstrated how unsecured weapons stockpiles influenced conflicts throughout North Africa and the Sahel.

Similarly, instability in one state may substantially increase military capabilities available to non-state actors elsewhere.

PATHWAY THREE

IDEOLOGICAL MOBILIZATION

Modern communications accelerate political mobilization.

Events occurring inside one country frequently inspire demonstrations, recruitment, fundraising, or political activism elsewhere.

Religious, ethnic, ideological, and nationalist movements increasingly operate across national boundaries.

Consequently, civil conflicts often produce:

• increased political polarization;
• expanded recruitment;
• online propaganda;
• financial support networks;
• foreign volunteers.

While digital mobilization does not automatically translate into armed conflict, it can strengthen organizations capable of exploiting periods of political instability.

PATHWAY FOUR

PROXY ESCALATION

Regional powers rarely remain neutral when neighboring governments begin to weaken.

Instead, they often perceive opportunities—or threats—that encourage intervention.

Support may include:

• intelligence;
• financing;
• weapons;
• military advisors;
• diplomatic recognition;
• cyber operations;
• economic assistance.

History demonstrates that such intervention frequently prolongs conflicts while increasing their complexity.

Domestic political disputes therefore become regional strategic competitions.

PATHWAY FIVE

ECONOMIC SHOCK

Regional conflicts affect far more than security.

They disrupt:

• trade;
• tourism;
• energy markets;
• shipping;
• investment;
• financial confidence.

The Red Sea crisis demonstrated how localized military activity could rapidly influence international shipping costs and insurance markets.

Likewise, instability affecting the Strait of Hormuz would possess immediate global economic implications.

Economic disruption often produces political consequences in neighboring countries, creating additional instability.

THE CIVIL WAR NETWORK

The following diagram illustrates JAFAJ’s assessment of likely regional spillover pathways.

Syria

↙  ↓  ↘

Lebanon Iraq Türkiye

 

Iran ↔ Iraq ↔ Syria

 

Lebanon ↔ Israel

 

Yemen ↔ Saudi Arabia ↔ Gulf States

 

Libya ↔ Egypt ↔ Tunisia ↔ Sahel

 

Gaza ↔ Israel ↔ Jordan

This should not be interpreted as predicting conflict.

Rather, it illustrates where instability is most likely to produce secondary effects.

WHICH COUNTRY MATTERS MOST?

From a regional perspective, not every conflict carries equal strategic weight.

JAFAJ assesses the following potential regional impacts.

Country	Regional Spillover Potential
Iran	Very High
Syria	Very High
Lebanon	High
Iraq	High
Yemen	Moderate–High
Libya	Moderate
Palestinian Territories	Moderate

Iran ranks highest because of:

• geographic location;
• population size;
• regional proxy relationships;
• energy infrastructure;
• Strait of Hormuz;
• influence extending into Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

A major internal crisis in Iran would likely produce broader regional consequences than instability in any other country assessed in this report.

EARLY WARNING INDICATORS OF REGIONAL CONTAGION

JAFAJ recommends monitoring the following indicators.

Political

• Collapse of regional diplomatic negotiations.
• Simultaneous emergencies in multiple neighboring states.
• Expansion of emergency powers.

Military

• Cross-border artillery or missile exchanges.
• Mobilization of proxy organizations.
• Increased foreign military deployments.
• Expansion of border security operations.

Humanitarian

• Refugee flows exceeding national response capacity.
• Rapid displacement across multiple borders.
• Breakdown of humanitarian corridors.

Economic

• Closure of strategic maritime routes.
• Major disruption of oil exports.
• Banking instability.
• Severe food inflation.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT

The greatest strategic danger facing the Middle East may not be a single civil war.

It may be the interaction of several smaller crises occurring simultaneously.

History demonstrates that regional conflicts rarely develop in isolation.

Instead, they evolve through a combination of domestic political failures, external intervention, humanitarian displacement, economic disruption, and competing geopolitical interests.

At present, JAFAJ does not assess that the Middle East is on the threshold of a region-wide cascade of civil wars.

However, several states are simultaneously experiencing elevated structural pressures.

Should one of the region’s major states—particularly Iran, Lebanon, or Syria—experience significant internal deterioration, the probability of broader regional instability would increase substantially through refugee movements, proxy mobilization, economic disruption, and foreign intervention.

Accordingly, policymakers should monitor interactions among conflicts, not merely the trajectory of individual countries.

CHAPTER IX

STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR MONTHS

Forecast Period: July 2026 – July 2028

Intelligence Confidence: Moderate

EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

The Middle East is unlikely to experience a simultaneous collapse of multiple governments over the next twenty-four months.

The available evidence instead suggests a more complex and uneven trajectory.

Several states are expected to remain relatively stable despite operating within a volatile regional environment. Others will likely continue experiencing persistent political fragmentation without descending into full-scale civil war. A smaller number face elevated structural pressures that could, under specific circumstances, develop into sustained internal armed conflict.

Accordingly, JAFAJ assesses that the region’s principal security challenge over the next two years will not be a single catastrophic event.

Rather, it will be the accumulation of multiple interconnected crises that collectively increase regional instability.

MOST LIKELY SCENARIO

Managed Instability

Estimated Probability: 60–70%

Under this scenario:

• Iran experiences periodic domestic unrest but retains institutional cohesion.
• Lebanon continues political deadlock while avoiding nationwide civil war.
• Syria remains fragmented but avoids renewed nationwide conflict.
• Iraq continues gradual institutional strengthening despite periodic security incidents.
• Yemen remains divided with intermittent military operations.
• Libya advances slowly toward political reunification while experiencing occasional localized violence.
• The Palestinian Territories continue political transition with uneven implementation.

This scenario does not represent peace.

It represents governments successfully preventing structural pressures from developing into nationwide armed conflict.

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ONE

Regional Escalation

Estimated Probability: 20–30%

This scenario develops if one major crisis produces cascading regional effects.

Possible triggers include:

• political fragmentation in Iran;
• collapse of Lebanese state institutions;
• major deterioration in Syria’s political transition;
• direct confrontation among regional powers;
• widespread proxy mobilization.

Under this scenario:

• refugee flows increase substantially;
• regional military deployments expand;
• proxy organizations become more active;
• economic disruption accelerates;
• humanitarian demands increase significantly.

Regional instability would likely persist for several years.

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO TWO

Regional Stabilization

Estimated Probability: 10–20%

Although less likely, several positive developments could improve regional stability.

These include:

• successful reconstruction initiatives;
• durable ceasefire agreements;
• economic recovery;
• strengthened state institutions;
• expanded regional diplomacy;
• improved relations among major regional powers.

This scenario requires sustained political compromise across multiple countries simultaneously.

While difficult, it should not be dismissed.

History demonstrates that prolonged conflict can eventually create incentives for political settlement.

THE COUNTRIES MOST LIKELY TO CHANGE

Not every country is equally likely to experience significant change during the forecast period.

JAFAJ assesses the following.

Country	Probability of Significant Political Change	Direction of Risk
Iran	High	Increasing
Lebanon	High	Increasing
Syria	Moderate	Stable to Increasing
Iraq	Moderate	Stable
Yemen	High	Stable (Continuing Conflict)
Libya	Moderate	Improving
Palestinian Territories	High	Uncertain
Jordan	Low	Stable
Saudi Arabia	Low	Stable
UAE	Very Low	Stable

These estimates reflect the probability of meaningful political or security developments, not the probability of civil war.

THE THREE VARIABLES THAT MATTER MOST

Among dozens of observable indicators, JAFAJ identifies three variables that will likely determine the region’s trajectory over the next twenty-four months.

1. STATE CAPACITY

Governments that maintain functioning institutions, unified security services, and the ability to deliver basic public services are significantly more likely to withstand political shocks.

Institutional resilience remains the single greatest predictor of long-term stability.

2. EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

Regional conflicts become substantially more dangerous when outside powers increase military, financial, or political involvement.

The degree of external intervention will heavily influence whether localized crises remain contained or expand.

3. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

Military capability alone rarely ensures long-term stability.

Governments retaining sufficient political legitimacy are generally better positioned to manage periods of economic hardship, leadership transition, and security crises without widespread violence.

WHAT POLICYMAKERS SHOULD WATCH

JAFAJ recommends prioritizing the following indicators during the forecast period.

Strategic Indicators

• Leadership transitions.
• Constitutional crises.
• Fragmentation within national armed forces.
• Growth of organized militias.
• Breakdown of ceasefire agreements.

Economic Indicators

• Currency instability.
• Severe inflation.
• Food insecurity.
• Public-sector salary disruptions.
• Energy infrastructure attacks.

Security Indicators

• Cross-border military operations.
• Increased proxy activity.
• Political assassinations.
• Expansion of terrorist organizations.
• Loss of territorial control by national governments.

Changes across multiple categories simultaneously would warrant reassessment of regional risk.

FINAL ANALYTIC JUDGMENT

The central finding of this Intelligence Estimate is straightforward.

The Middle East is not entering a period in which civil war is inevitable.

It is entering a period in which several countries are simultaneously experiencing structural pressures historically associated with elevated risks of internal conflict.

Those pressures differ in origin and intensity.

Iran faces uncertainty associated with leadership transition, economic strain, and regional confrontation.

Lebanon confronts unresolved questions of sovereignty and competing military authority.

Syria continues the difficult transition from prolonged civil war toward national reconstruction.

Iraq seeks to strengthen state institutions while balancing powerful domestic and external actors.

Yemen remains trapped in an entrenched multi-sided conflict.

Libya continues the slow process of political reunification after years of division.

The Palestinian Territories face the challenge of transforming political transition into durable institutional governance.

At the same time, Jordan and the Gulf states demonstrate that regional instability does not inevitably produce state failure. Strong institutions, effective governance, and unified security structures continue to provide substantial protection against large-scale internal conflict.

The report’s most important conclusion is therefore not that civil wars are imminent.

It is that institutional resilience—not military power alone—will determine which states successfully navigate the next decade of regional uncertainty.

CHAPTER X

STRATEGIC WARNING

THE COST OF MISREADING CIVIL WAR

Classification: Unclassified

Purpose: Strategic Warning for Policymakers

Intelligence Confidence: Moderate–High

THE CENTRAL WARNING

The greatest danger confronting policymakers is not that civil wars are unpredictable.

It is that they are frequently recognized only after they have become irreversible.

History demonstrates that governments, international organizations, financial markets, and even intelligence services often underestimate the cumulative effects of institutional decline. Individual warning signs may appear manageable in isolation. Considered together, however, they can indicate that a state’s political resilience is deteriorating more rapidly than generally understood.

Civil wars rarely begin with a declaration.

They begin with institutions that gradually lose their ability to manage political competition peacefully.

THE WARNING SIGNS

JAFAJ assesses that governments should pay particular attention when multiple warning indicators emerge simultaneously.

Among the most significant are:

• declining confidence in national institutions;
• prolonged political paralysis;
• deterioration of economic conditions;
• expansion of armed organizations operating outside government authority;
• increasing political violence;
• widespread public distrust of constitutional processes;
• growing foreign involvement in domestic political affairs.

No single indicator demonstrates that civil war is imminent.

The convergence of several indicators over time is considerably more significant than any one event.

THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME

One of the consistent findings of comparative conflict research is that governments generally possess more opportunities to prevent civil war before organized violence becomes widespread.

Political compromise, institutional reform, economic stabilization, constitutional adaptation, and effective governance tend to be most successful during periods of political tension—not after armed conflict has become entrenched.

Once competing groups conclude that military force offers greater political advantage than negotiation, opportunities for peaceful resolution decline rapidly.

Time therefore represents one of the most important strategic variables.

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

Outside governments frequently influence the trajectory of internal conflicts.

Diplomatic engagement, humanitarian assistance, economic support, and conflict mediation may strengthen political resilience.

Conversely, military intervention, proxy competition, sanctions without diplomatic pathways, or unconditional support for competing factions may unintentionally prolong instability.

International policy should therefore focus not only on ending active conflicts but also on strengthening the institutions capable of preventing future conflicts.

A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The Middle East should not be viewed as a region uniformly moving toward instability.

Several states continue demonstrating considerable institutional resilience despite operating within a difficult strategic environment.

Others remain engaged in complex transitions that could produce either greater stability or renewed violence.

The distinction matters.

Successful policy depends upon recognizing differences among countries rather than treating regional instability as a single phenomenon.

THE JAFAJ ASSESSMENT

Based upon the evidence examined throughout this Intelligence Estimate, JAFAJ reaches five principal conclusions.

First, institutional strength remains the single most important determinant of whether political crises evolve into civil wars.

Second, civil wars increasingly develop within regional systems rather than remaining confined inside national borders.

Third, governments confronting simultaneous political, economic, and security crises face substantially greater long-term risks than governments experiencing isolated challenges.

Fourth, the interaction of regional conflicts may ultimately prove more destabilizing than any single conflict.

Finally, the coming twenty-four months are likely to be defined not by one decisive regional event but by a series of interconnected political developments whose cumulative effects will shape the Middle East’s strategic landscape.

FINAL JUDGMENT

This Intelligence Estimate does not conclude that the Middle East is entering a new era of widespread civil wars.

It does conclude that several countries are simultaneously experiencing structural pressures that deserve sustained attention from policymakers, researchers, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector.

The central lesson is clear.

Civil wars are rarely unavoidable.

Neither are they random.

They emerge when institutional resilience erodes faster than political systems can adapt.

Understanding that process remains the best opportunity to prevent future conflicts rather than merely responding to them.

JAFAJ KEY TAKEAWAYS

Finding	Assessment
Region-wide civil war	Unlikely
Localized internal conflicts	Likely
Iran	Highest strategic uncertainty
Lebanon	Highest risk of renewed internal political violence
Syria	Fragile transition requiring sustained monitoring
Iraq	Improving but structurally vulnerable
Yemen	Continuing multi-sided civil conflict
Libya	Gradual political improvement with persistent risks
Palestinian Territories	Political fragmentation remains the principal concern
Gulf States	Generally stable

ABOUT JAFAJ INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

JAFAJ Intelligence Estimates are strategic assessments prepared using structured analytical methods, comparative conflict analysis, and publicly available information from governmental, international, academic, and professional research sources.

These reports do not predict future events with certainty. Rather, they evaluate observable trends, assess structural conditions, and identify developments that may alter the probability of future outcomes.

The purpose of a JAFAJ Intelligence Estimate is to support informed decision-making by presenting balanced analysis, clearly stated assumptions, and transparent judgments regarding issues affecting regional and international security.

CHAPTER XI

ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES

WHAT COULD CHANGE THIS ASSESSMENT?

Purpose: Challenge Key Assumptions

Intelligence Confidence: Moderate

EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

Intelligence analysis is inherently probabilistic.

The judgments presented throughout this report represent the authors’ best assessment based upon currently available information. They should not be interpreted as predictions or certainties.

Future political decisions, economic developments, diplomatic initiatives, or unforeseen events may significantly alter the trajectory of individual states.

This chapter examines alternative scenarios that could invalidate or substantially modify the preceding assessments.

ALTERNATIVE OUTCOME ONE

REGIONAL STABILIZATION

The principal conclusion of this report is that several Middle Eastern states face elevated structural risks.

This assessment would require downward revision if several developments occurred simultaneously.

These include:

• sustained regional diplomatic engagement;
• successful economic reforms;
• improved government legitimacy;
• integration of non-state armed organizations into state institutions;
• constitutional reforms accepted across political factions;
• substantial reductions in sectarian violence.

Should these developments occur across several countries, regional stability would likely improve considerably.

ALTERNATIVE OUTCOME TWO

RAPID ESCALATION

The report also concludes that widespread regional civil war is not the most likely outcome.

That assessment could change if several destabilizing events occurred in rapid succession.

Examples include:

• leadership crisis in Iran accompanied by elite fragmentation;
• collapse of Lebanon’s political institutions;
• renewed nationwide fighting in Syria;
• major regional war involving multiple states;
• severe global economic recession affecting Middle Eastern governments;
• widespread disruption of maritime trade through the Strait of Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb.

A convergence of these events could produce regional instability beyond the levels assessed in this estimate.

ALTERNATIVE OUTCOME THREE

INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION

History demonstrates that governments frequently adapt more effectively than outside observers expect.

Political systems under pressure may respond through:

• constitutional reform;
• coalition governments;
• decentralization;
• economic restructuring;
• negotiated security arrangements;
• expanded international cooperation.

Several countries assessed as high risk today could therefore experience greater stability if institutions successfully adapt to changing political conditions.

Institutional resilience should not be underestimated.

BLACK SWAN EVENTS

Some developments cannot reasonably be forecast with precision but could fundamentally alter the regional outlook.

Examples include:

• unexpected leadership transitions;
• major natural disasters;
• large-scale cyber attacks affecting national infrastructure;
• significant technological disruption;
• unforeseen breakthroughs in regional diplomacy;
• emergence of new transnational security threats.

Although low in probability, such events could require immediate reassessment.

THE LIMITS OF FORECASTING

This report focuses on structural indicators because they generally evolve more slowly than political events.

Nevertheless, structural analysis has limitations.

Governments sometimes collapse despite apparently strong institutions.

Others survive despite severe economic or political crises.

Political leadership, public attitudes, external intervention, and chance all influence outcomes in ways that cannot be measured with complete precision.

Accordingly, this report should be viewed as a framework for continued assessment rather than a final judgment.

THE IMPORTANCE OF REASSESSMENT

Conflict risk is dynamic.

Therefore, the conclusions presented here should be reviewed whenever significant developments occur, including:

• changes in national leadership;
• major constitutional reforms;
• widespread political violence;
• sustained economic shocks;
• regional military escalation;
• peace agreements;
• major changes in foreign military involvement.

Regular reassessment is essential to maintaining analytical accuracy.

FINAL ANALYTIC OBSERVATION

Perhaps the most important conclusion of this Intelligence Estimate is methodological rather than political.

Civil wars should not be viewed as isolated national events.

They are the product of interacting political, economic, social, and security systems operating over time.

Understanding those interactions improves the ability of governments, researchers, humanitarian organizations, and private institutions to recognize emerging risks before they become irreversible crises.

Future developments may confirm, refine, or contradict the judgments presented in this report.

That possibility is not a weakness of intelligence analysis.

It is an essential characteristic of it.

APPENDIX A

JAFAJ MIDDLE EAST CIVIL WAR RISK INDEX (MECWRI)

Methodology and Comparative Assessment

PURPOSE

The JAFAJ Middle East Civil War Risk Index (MECWRI) provides a standardized framework for comparing structural indicators associated with internal armed conflict across Middle Eastern states.

Unlike event-based reporting, the Index is designed to measure structural vulnerability rather than current headlines.

It does not predict that civil war will occur.

Instead, it estimates the degree to which observable political, economic, security, and social conditions resemble those historically associated with elevated risks of sustained internal conflict.

Accordingly, the Index should be interpreted as a decision-support tool rather than a forecasting instrument.

ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES

The MECWRI is built upon six principles.

First, civil wars emerge through interacting structural pressures rather than isolated events.

Second, no single indicator adequately predicts internal armed conflict.

Third, institutional resilience generally provides stronger protection against civil conflict than military capability alone.

Fourth, conflict risk changes over time and therefore requires periodic reassessment.

Fifth, regional dynamics influence domestic stability.

Sixth, professional intelligence analysis should distinguish between probability and certainty.

ASSESSMENT CATEGORIES

Each country is evaluated across six major categories.

Category	Weight
Government Legitimacy	20%
Economic Resilience	15%
Security Institutions	20%
Non-State Armed Actors	20%
Social Fragmentation	15%
External Intervention	10%
Total	100%

Government legitimacy and security institutions receive the highest weighting because comparative conflict research consistently identifies them as among the strongest determinants of state resilience.

SCORING SCALE

Each category receives a numerical assessment.

Score	Assessment
1	Very Low Risk
2	Low Risk
3	Moderate Risk
4	High Risk
5	Very High Risk

Weighted scores are combined to produce the overall Civil War Risk Index.

OVERALL RISK SCALE

Final Score	Risk Assessment
1.0–1.9	Very Low
2.0–2.4	Low
2.5–3.2	Moderate
3.3–4.0	High
4.1–5.0	Very High

2026 JAFAJ CIVIL WAR RISK INDEX

Country	Gov.	Econ.	Security	Armed Groups	Social	External	Overall
Iran	4	4	2	3	4	4	3.55
Lebanon	4	5	4	5	5	4	4.45
Syria	4	5	5	5	5	5	4.80
Iraq	3	3	3	4	3	4	3.35
Yemen	5	5	5	5	4	5	4.90
Libya	4	3	4	4	3	4	3.75
Palestinian Territories	4	4	4	5	4	4	4.15
Jordan	2	3	2	1	2	3	2.10
Saudi Arabia	2	2	1	1	2	3	1.75
UAE	1	1	1	1	1	2	1.10
Qatar	1	1	1	1	1	2	1.10
Oman	1	2	1	1	1	2	1.25
Bahrain	2	2	2	2	3	2	2.15
Kuwait	2	2	2	1	2	2	1.90

REGIONAL OBSERVATIONS

Several trends emerge from the 2026 assessment.

Very High Risk

• Yemen
• Syria
• Palestinian Territories

These areas continue experiencing either active armed conflict or institutional fragmentation severe enough to present sustained risks of organized internal violence.

High Risk

• Lebanon
• Libya
• Iran
• Iraq

Although differing considerably in political structure, these countries share multiple structural vulnerabilities requiring continued monitoring.

Low to Very Low Risk

• Jordan
• Saudi Arabia
• UAE
• Qatar
• Oman
• Bahrain
• Kuwait

These states currently possess comparatively stronger institutions, more unified security structures, or greater economic capacity to absorb political shocks.

TREND ANALYSIS

The Index measures both current conditions and direction of change.

Trend	Meaning
▲	Deteriorating
►	Stable
▼	Improving
Country			Trend
Iran			▲
Lebanon			▲
Syria			►
Iraq			►
Yemen			►
Libya			▼
Palestinian Territories			▲
Jordan			►
Saudi Arabia			►
UAE			►
Qatar			►
Oman			►
Bahrain			►
Kuwait			►

INTELLIGENCE LIMITATIONS

The MECWRI is not intended to predict the precise timing of political crises or civil wars.

Instead, it provides a structured method for comparing structural vulnerabilities across countries.

Unexpected political decisions, economic reforms, external intervention, leadership changes, or diplomatic breakthroughs may rapidly alter individual country assessments.

Accordingly, JAFAJ recommends updating the Index at least quarterly and immediately following major regional developments.

JAFAJ ASSESSMENT

The Middle East does not presently exhibit evidence of a region-wide movement toward simultaneous civil wars.

It does, however, contain several countries experiencing elevated structural pressures that warrant sustained monitoring.

The 2026 MECWRI identifies Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, Iran, Libya, and Iraq as requiring the highest levels of analytical attention because of the interaction of institutional weakness, armed non-state actors, economic stress, and external intervention.

Conversely, the Gulf monarchies and Jordan continue to demonstrate comparatively strong institutional resilience despite operating in one of the world’s most challenging strategic environments.

The Index therefore reinforces the central conclusion of this Intelligence Estimate:

Civil wars are not random events. They emerge when multiple structural pressures overwhelm a state’s capacity to manage political competition peacefully.

 

FOOTNOTES

1. Council on Foreign Relations, Conflicts to Watch in 2026, identifying Lebanon and Syria among the most significant regional conflict risks.
2. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, “Is Civil Unrest Poised to Escalate in Lebanon?” documenting increasing political tensions and evaluating scenarios under which civil conflict could emerge.
3. Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The War with Iran Threatens Syria’s Recovery,” discussing the continuing fragility of Syria’s political transition.
4. Council on Foreign Relations, “Syria’s Surge in Violence Does Not Signal a New Civil War—for Now,” March 2025.
5. Associated Press, reporting on political divisions in Lebanon surrounding Hezbollah’s future and concerns regarding renewed internal conflict.
6. Reuters, “As Internal Divisions Simmer, Lebanese See Echoes of Civil War,” April 22, 2026.
7. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003).
8. World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, discussing the interaction of institutions, governance, and conflict risk.
9. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, States of Fragility 2018, Chapter 1.
10. James D. Fearon, “State Fragility, Governance Indicators, and the Risk of Civil Conflict,” Revue d’économie du développement 19, no. 4 (2011).
11. James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004).
12. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Conflict and Fragility.”
13. Rick Barton et al., Early Warning? A Review of Conflict Prediction Models and Systems, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2008.
14. The Fund for Peace, “Early Warning and Response.”
15. International Monetary Fund, Political Fragility: Coups d’État and Their Drivers, Working Paper No. 24/34 (2024).
16. The Fund for Peace, “Data for Peace” and the Fragile States Index methodology.
17. The Fund for Peace, “Country Risk and Fragility Data.”
18. Barton et al., Early Warning?, discussing the use of multi-indicator conflict prediction systems.
19. The Fund for Peace, “Early Warning and Response.”
20. The Fund for Peace, “Data for Peace.”
21. Reuters, “Khamenei Killing Shatters Iran’s Order, Triggers High-Stakes Succession Race,” March 1, 2026.
22. Reuters, “Fearing Economic Collapse After War, Iran Cracks Down on Dissent,” March 30, 2026.
23. Council on Foreign Relations, After Khamenei: Planning for Iran’s Leadership Transition.
24. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Iran Analysis, Research, & Events, July 2026.
25. Reuters, “With War Likely Over, Iranian Rulers Must Face Demands of Angry, Embittered Population,” June 2026.
26. Associated Press, “How a Push to Disarm Hezbollah Is Deepening Divisions in Lebanon and Raising Fears of Civil War,” July 9, 2026.
27. Reuters, “War Between Hezbollah and Israel Deepens Fractures in Lebanon,” March 27, 2026.
28. Reuters, “As Internal Divisions Simmer, Lebanese See Echoes of Civil War,” April 22, 2026.
29. Reuters, “Lebanon’s South Takes a Breath as Families Return to Shattered Homes and Lives,” July 6, 2026.
30. Associated Press, “How a Push to Disarm Hezbollah Is Deepening Divisions in Lebanon and Raising Fears of Civil War,” July 9, 2026.
31. Council on Foreign Relations, *Conflict in Syria*.
32. Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Syria’s Promise and Challenges One Year After Assad’s Fall*.
33. Center for Strategic and International Studies, *How Syria Can Succeed in Integrating the Kurds*.
34. Reuters, “Syria Has Made No Progress on Sweida Reintegration Plan, UN Says,” June 22, 2026.
35. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, *Religious Freedom and Rule of Law in Syria*.
36. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, *Country Update: Syria*.
37. Council on Foreign Relations, *Syria’s Surge in Violence Does Not Signal a New Civil War—For Now*.
38. Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The United States Withdraws from Syria: State of Play*.
39. Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The War with Iran Threatens Syria’s Recovery*.
40. Reuters, “Syria Has Made No Progress on Sweida Reintegration Plan, UN Says,” June 22, 2026.
41. Council on Foreign Relations, *Instability in Iraq*.
42. Chatham House, *Can Iraq’s New Prime Minister Finally Rein In Its Armed Factions?*.
43. Reuters, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Set Up Covert Iraqi Cells to Attack Gulf Neighbors,” June 19, 2026.
44. The Wall Street Journal, “Iraq Agrees to U.S. Demands to Halt Dollar Flows to Iran-Backed Militias,” July 2026.
45. Associated Press, “Iraq Is Caught in the Crossfire of the Iran War,” April 2026.
46. Chatham House, *Can Iraq’s New Prime Minister Finally Rein In Its Armed Factions?.
47. Reuters, reporting on covert IRGC-linked cells in Iraq and regional proxy dynamics.
48. Associated Press, reporting on attacks affecting Iraq’s oil infrastructure and government finances during the regional conflict.
49. Council on Foreign Relations, *Instability in Iraq*.
50. JAFAJ analytical assessment based on the preceding sources and comparative conflict analysis.
51. Reuters, “Who Is Fighting in Yemen?” January 2, 2026.
52. Reuters, “Saudi-Backed Yemen Government Says It Retakes Eastern City from Separatists,” January 3, 2026.
53. Associated Press, “Escalation in Yemen Threatens to Reignite Civil War and Create Wider Tensions in Gulf Region.”
54. Reuters, “Who Is Fighting in Yemen?” describing the principal armed factions and their territorial control.
55. Reuters, “Saudi-Backed Yemen Government Says It Retakes Eastern City from Separatists,” discussing the growing divide between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over Yemen.
56. Associated Press, “Escalation in Yemen Threatens to Reignite Civil War,” analyzing the strategic implications of renewed fighting among anti-Houthi factions.
57. Reuters, “Who Is Fighting in Yemen?” overview of the Houthi movement, the Presidential Leadership Council, the Southern Transitional Council, and associated armed organizations.
58. JAFAJ analytical assessment based on the preceding sources and comparative conflict analysis.
59. United Nations, Libya’s Political Process Regains Momentum, but Window for Action Is Narrowing, June 18, 2026.
60. Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker: Instability in Libya, updated June 2026.
61. Security Council Report, Libya Monthly Forecast, June 2026.
62. Reuters, “Pakistan Mediating Libya Unity Push as Rival Camps Seek Deal,” July 6, 2026.
63. Financial Times, “Trump Adviser Pushes Power-Sharing Plan for Oil-Rich Libya,” June 2026.
64. United Nations Support Mission in Libya briefing to the UN Security Council, June 18, 2026.
65. Reuters, “Pakistan Mediating Libya Unity Push as Rival Camps Seek Deal,” discussing the proposed Government of National Consensus and transitional framework.
66. JAFAJ analytical assessment based on the preceding sources and comparative conflict analysis.
67. World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2026.
68. The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2026.
69. International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, 2026.
70. Gulf Cooperation Council, official communiqués on regional security cooperation.
71. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2026.
72. World Bank governance indicators for Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman.
73. The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2026 comparative regional rankings.
74. JAFAJ comparative analysis using standardized risk indicators developed for this report.
75. Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Presses for Progress on Stalled Peace Plan,” July 6, 2026.
76. Associated Press, “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a UN-Backed Committee,” July 6, 2026.
77. Financial Times, “Hamas Says It Will Dissolve Gaza Civilian Governing Arm,” July 6, 2026.
78. United Nations, Security Council Briefing, “Recovery in Gaza Must Advance the Reunification of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank Under a Single, Legitimate, Sovereign Palestinian Government,” May 21, 2026.
79. JAFAJ analytical assessment based on the preceding sources and comparative conflict analysis.
80. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends reports on forced displacement resulting from conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen.
81. International Organization for Migration, regional displacement assessments.
82. World Bank, The Mobility of Displaced Syrians and regional economic impact studies.
83. Center for Strategic and International Studies, research on regional proxy conflicts and Middle East security.
84. International Crisis Group, analyses of regional conflict spillover.
85. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), regional conflict monitoring and event analysis.
86. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, humanitarian situation reports.
87. JAFAJ analytical assessment based on comparative conflict research and the sources cited throughout this report.
88. JAFAJ strategic assessment derived from the comparative analysis presented in Chapters I–IX and supported by the cited government publications, international organizations, academic research, and conflict-monitoring sources used throughout this Intelligence Estimate.
89. JAFAJ concluding assessment synthesizing the analytical findings presented throughout this Intelligence Estimate.
90. JAFAJ methodological assessment based on structured analytic techniques, comparative conflict research, and the evidence presented throughout this Intelligence Estimate.