Where Are China And Russia?

THE MISSING MEDIATORS IN TODAY’S PEACE TALKS

By JaFaJ Intelligence Desk

 

IN-A-NUTSHELL

If you only have three minutes, here’s what you need to know.

Nearly every major peace negotiation underway today—from Gaza and Lebanon to the Strait of Hormuz and broader U.S.–Iran diplomacy—is being organized by the United States, regional governments such as Qatar, Oman, and Egypt, or European partners. By contrast, China and Russia—despite their status as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and frequent advocates of a multipolar international order—have generally chosen not to lead these negotiations.

This report argues that their relative absence is not diplomatic inactivity but a deliberate strategic choice. Rather than assuming responsibility for organizing and sustaining peace negotiations, Beijing and Moscow appear to favor a model that maximizes geopolitical influence while minimizing the political, financial, military, and diplomatic risks associated with mediation.

The distinction matters.

Leading peace negotiations requires governments to invest years of diplomatic effort, commit financial resources, coordinate humanitarian assistance, support reconstruction, monitor ceasefires, and accept political accountability when agreements fail. Those responsibilities extend far beyond hosting negotiations or issuing public statements.

JaFaJ concludes that the international system may be entering a new era in which influence and leadership are increasingly diverging. Nations can exercise considerable geopolitical influence without accepting responsibility for resolving international conflicts.

That raises a larger strategic question:

Can a truly multipolar world succeed if only a handful of nations remain willing to bear the costs and responsibilities of building peace?

Ultimately, this report argues that the defining measure of twenty-first century leadership may no longer be military strength or economic power alone—it may be a nation’s willingness and ability to organize, finance, and sustain peace after wars begin.

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As wars continue across the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and Asia, one question has become increasingly difficult to ignore: Where are China and Russia?

Nearly every major diplomatic initiative in today’s conflicts—from ceasefire negotiations in Gaza, maritime security discussions involving the Strait of Hormuz, talks concerning Lebanon, hostage negotiations, and even efforts to stabilize Sudan and Yemen—has involved the United States, regional governments, or European partners in one capacity or another. Yet two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, both of whom frequently advocate for a multipolar international order, have largely remained outside the role of principal mediators.

This report concludes that the relative absence of China and Russia from today’s highest-profile peace negotiations is not accidental but reflects a deliberate diplomatic strategy designed to maximize geopolitical influence while minimizing the political, military, and financial burdens traditionally associated with leading international mediation.²

The distinction is important. In the twenty-first century, nations seeking global leadership are increasingly judged not only by their economic strength or military capability, but also by their willingness to organize, sustain, and ultimately assume responsibility for ending international conflicts. The central question explored in this report is whether an emerging gap now exists between the pursuit of great-power influence and the acceptance of great-power responsibility.

JaFaJ Assessment: This report concludes that the principal challenge facing the international system is not a shortage of diplomatic influence, but a shortage of governments willing to assume responsibility for organizing, financing, and sustaining peace. As geopolitical power becomes more widely distributed, leadership in conflict resolution has become increasingly concentrated. Unless more nations develop the institutional capacity and political willingness to lead complex peace negotiations, the gap between global influence and global responsibility is likely to widen.

 

THE QUESTION FEW ARE ASKING

Despite continuous reporting on military operations, humanitarian crises, sanctions, diplomatic statements, and battlefield developments, remarkably little attention has been devoted to a more fundamental strategic question:

Who is actually trying to end these conflicts?

This question has implications far beyond the current conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, or the Strait of Hormuz. It challenges one of the fundamental assumptions of international relations: that nations seeking greater global influence will also assume greater responsibility for resolving international crises. Increasingly, those two roles appear to be diverging.

The ability to wage war and the ability to negotiate peace are not the same strategic capability. Military operations may dominate headlines, but successful peace negotiations require governments willing to assume long-term political responsibility, commit substantial diplomatic resources, and accept accountability when negotiations fail.

Throughout the twentieth century, major powers routinely accepted that responsibility. Negotiations involving Egypt and Israel, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and numerous other international conflicts were supported by governments possessing both the diplomatic influence and the political will to invest significant capital in difficult peace processes.

Today, however, the diplomatic landscape appears markedly different.

The United States continues to participate directly or indirectly in negotiations involving Israel, Lebanon, Hamas, Iran, Ukraine, and maritime security in both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Regional governments—including Qatar, Egypt, Oman, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—have likewise assumed increasingly important mediation responsibilities.³

By comparison, China and Russia have generally chosen to support diplomatic efforts from the sidelines rather than assume primary responsibility for organizing, leading, and sustaining major peace negotiations.

This distinction is important because mediation is fundamentally different from diplomacy.

Governments routinely issue statements supporting peace, encouraging dialogue, or condemning violence. Mediation, however, demands far more than public diplomacy. It requires governments to commit political capital, diplomatic expertise, and often significant national resources to a process whose outcome remains uncertain.

Successful mediators must typically:

• establish secure communications between adversaries;
• dedicate experienced negotiating teams over extended periods;
• provide neutral venues for sensitive discussions;
• develop confidence-building measures;
• draft compromise frameworks;
• coordinate international political and humanitarian support; and
• in many cases, help guarantee implementation after agreements are reached.

These responsibilities expose mediators to considerable political risk. When negotiations fail—as they often do—the governments leading the process are frequently criticized by all parties involved.

For that reason, mediation represents far more than diplomacy. It is an assumption of international responsibility.

 

THE COST OF PEACE

Bringing nations to the negotiating table is often portrayed as the culmination of diplomacy. In reality, it is usually the beginning of a far more demanding and politically hazardous process.

Unlike military victories, peace negotiations rarely produce immediate political rewards. When negotiations fail—as they frequently do—the mediator is often criticized by every participant. Each side accuses the intermediary of insufficient pressure, excessive concessions, political favoritism, or an inability to enforce agreements. Success, by contrast, is seldom attributed to a single government. The political benefits are typically shared among numerous participants, while the principal mediator assumes the greatest responsibility for sustaining the agreement.

For these reasons, mediation represents one of the most resource-intensive responsibilities of international leadership.

Effective mediation requires far more than diplomatic skill. It demands:

• established diplomatic credibility;
• reliable intelligence capabilities;
• military, economic, or political leverage over the negotiating parties;
• the ability to mobilize humanitarian and financial assistance;
• sustained political engagement over months or even years; and
• a willingness to remain committed long after international attention has shifted elsewhere.

Hosting negotiations is only one phase of the process.

Successful peace agreements frequently require international monitoring mechanisms, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction funding, sanctions relief, prisoner exchanges, border verification, economic assistance, and, in some cases, long-term security guarantees. These responsibilities often continue for years after a formal agreement has been signed.

Without such commitments, negotiated settlements frequently prove temporary, allowing conflicts to re-emerge once external diplomatic pressure subsides.

This reality helps explain why many governments publicly support diplomacy while remaining reluctant to assume primary responsibility for leading it. Encouraging negotiations carries relatively little political risk. Leading them requires governments to invest significant diplomatic resources, accept long-term obligations, and ultimately bear responsibility when peace proves difficult to sustain.

These realities also help explain why some major powers may deliberately choose to support peace initiatives without leading them. Encouraging negotiations allows governments to project diplomatic influence while avoiding the substantial political, financial, and long-term obligations that accompany successful mediation. The distinction between supporting diplomacy and leading diplomacy lies at the heart of this report.

 

CHINA’S MODEL OF GLOBAL INFLUENCE

During the past two decades, China has transformed itself into one of the world’s most influential economic powers. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, expanded trade relationships, infrastructure investment, technology partnerships, and energy cooperation, Beijing has significantly increased its political and economic presence throughout the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.⁴

Yet China’s expanding global influence has not been accompanied by a corresponding expansion of international security leadership.

Unlike the United States, whose global influence has traditionally combined economic, military, and diplomatic engagement, China has generally emphasized economic integration while exercising considerably greater caution in assuming responsibility for resolving complex international conflicts.

This distinction is central to understanding Beijing’s broader strategic approach.

China’s principal interests in the Middle East remain largely economic and geopolitical. They include:

• securing reliable energy supplies;
• protecting critical maritime trade routes;
• expanding commercial investment opportunities;
• maintaining regional stability conducive to economic growth; and
• preventing disruptions to global supply chains.

Achieving these objectives does not necessarily require China to become the principal architect of regional peace negotiations.

On the contrary, assuming responsibility for mediating active conflicts could expose Beijing to political risks that provide relatively little strategic return. Failed negotiations, renewed hostilities, humanitarian crises, or collapsed ceasefires could damage China’s carefully cultivated relationships with multiple regional governments while creating expectations for long-term diplomatic, economic, or even security commitments.

The 2023 Saudi Arabia-Iran normalization agreement demonstrated that China possesses both the diplomatic capability and the international credibility to facilitate meaningful negotiations under favorable circumstances.⁵ That agreement represented an important diplomatic achievement and signaled Beijing’s growing confidence as a global actor.

However, normalizing diplomatic relations between two sovereign governments differs fundamentally from mediating active wars involving multiple armed organizations, humanitarian emergencies, territorial disputes, and deeply rooted political grievances.

The latter requires more than diplomatic influence. It demands sustained political engagement, continued mediation after agreements are signed, and, in many cases, the willingness to provide economic assistance, security assurances, or long-term diplomatic oversight.

To date, Beijing has generally avoided assuming those responsibilities.

Instead, China has pursued a strategy that supports negotiations, encourages regional stability, and expands its diplomatic influence while avoiding primary responsibility for enforcing or sustaining negotiated outcomes.

From Beijing’s perspective, this approach offers considerable advantages. It preserves productive relationships with competing regional actors, minimizes political exposure if negotiations collapse, and allows China to expand its international influence without assuming the full burdens traditionally associated with great-power leadership.

Whether this represents prudent statecraft or a deliberate limitation on China’s global leadership ambitions remains one of the defining questions confronting international diplomacy in the twenty-first century.

China’s preference for economic engagement over security leadership explains only part of the broader strategic picture. To understand why today’s most significant peace negotiations continue to be led by the United States and regional governments, it is equally important to examine Russia’s evolving diplomatic posture—and, more importantly, the strategic logic increasingly shared by both Moscow and Beijing.

Although China and Russia differ substantially in their geopolitical objectives, military capabilities, and economic priorities, both governments have largely adopted a similar approach to international conflict resolution. Rather than assuming primary responsibility for organizing and sustaining major peace negotiations, they have generally sought to maximize diplomatic influence while minimizing the long-term political, military, and financial obligations associated with international mediation.⁶

This convergence is significant because mediation is not simply another instrument of foreign policy. It is one of the most demanding responsibilities of international leadership. Governments willing to lead peace negotiations must not only bring adversaries to the negotiating table, but also accept responsibility for sustaining agreements long after the negotiations themselves have ended.

Although China’s strategic priorities differ substantially from Russia’s, both governments appear to have reached a similar conclusion regarding international mediation. Rather than routinely serving as principal architects of peace negotiations, each has generally favored an approach that preserves diplomatic influence while limiting long-term political, financial, and security commitments. The reasons differ; the outcome is strikingly similar.

 

RUSSIA: A GLOBAL POWER FACING STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS

For much of the post-Cold War era, Russia positioned itself as an indispensable diplomatic and security actor throughout the Middle East. Long-standing political and military relationships with Syria, Iran, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria, combined with its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, ensured that Moscow remained an influential participant in virtually every major regional security discussion.

On paper, these advantages would appear to place Russia in an ideal position to organize, host, or lead major international peace negotiations.

The reality, however, has been markedly different.

Rather than assuming leadership of comprehensive negotiations concerning Gaza, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, or maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz, Moscow has generally supported diplomatic initiatives led by other governments while advancing its own interests through bilateral diplomacy, multilateral forums, and the United Nations.⁷

This evolution reflects more than a simple shift in diplomatic priorities. It also reflects the strategic reality that every major power operates with finite political, military, economic, and diplomatic resources.

Since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has devoted extraordinary national resources to sustaining military operations, managing the effects of international sanctions, preserving domestic economic stability, maintaining strategic partnerships outside the Western alliance, and responding to an increasingly complex European security environment.

These demands inevitably constrain diplomatic capacity.

Experienced negotiators are limited in number.

Senior political leaders must constantly prioritize competing international crises.

Military planners, intelligence agencies, and foreign ministries cannot simultaneously devote unlimited attention to every conflict.

Launching and sustaining a major peace initiative in the Middle East while prosecuting Europe’s largest armed conflict since the Second World War would require an extraordinary commitment of diplomatic and political capital.

Russia’s relative absence from many of today’s highest-profile mediation efforts should therefore not automatically be interpreted as diplomatic disengagement. Rather, it reflects a broader strategic calculation regarding where Moscow believes its limited diplomatic resources can produce the greatest geopolitical return.

Whether that calculation represents prudent strategic prioritization or a missed opportunity to demonstrate global leadership remains an open question.

Russia’s strategic constraints illustrate only one of the challenges confronting potential mediators. Even governments possessing substantial diplomatic influence and geopolitical reach must also be viewed by the negotiating parties as sufficiently credible to facilitate meaningful compromise. Diplomatic capacity alone is not enough; successful mediation also depends upon trust, perceived balance, and political legitimacy.

 

THE CHALLENGE OF PERCEIVED NEUTRALITY

Diplomatic influence alone is insufficient to make a successful mediator.

Equally important is credibility.

Peace negotiations succeed only when opposing parties believe that the mediator can provide a process they perceive as fair, balanced, and capable of producing meaningful results. Absolute neutrality is rarely achievable in international politics. Every major power possesses strategic alliances, economic interests, military relationships, or historical commitments that inevitably shape how its diplomacy is viewed.

For that reason, the central question is not whether a mediator is completely neutral. Rather, it is whether the negotiating parties believe the mediator possesses sufficient credibility, influence, and political independence to facilitate meaningful compromise despite those relationships.

This challenge confronts every major power.

The United States is frequently criticized because of its long-standing strategic partnerships with Israel and several Gulf states.

Russia’s close military and political relationships with Syria and Iran similarly influence how many governments evaluate Moscow’s ability to serve as an impartial intermediary.

China’s expanding economic investments and growing commercial influence throughout the Middle East likewise shape regional perceptions of Beijing’s diplomatic priorities.

None of these relationships automatically disqualify a nation from serving as a mediator. They do, however, influence how negotiating parties assess both the mediator’s intentions and its ability to balance competing interests.

As a result, many contemporary conflicts have increasingly relied upon regional governments whose relationships with the parties are viewed as more balanced or politically acceptable.

Countries such as Qatar, Oman, Egypt, and Türkiye often possess a unique combination of regional credibility, established communication channels, and practical understanding of local political dynamics that larger global powers may struggle to replicate.

The growing reliance upon these regional intermediaries reflects an important evolution in modern diplomacy. International mediation is no longer determined solely by military strength or economic influence. Increasingly, it depends upon political credibility, regional legitimacy, and the confidence of the negotiating parties themselves.

 

THE RISE OF REGIONAL MEDIATORS

One of the most significant—and frequently overlooked—developments in international diplomacy has been the emergence of regional powers as indispensable brokers of peace.

Only a generation ago, negotiations involving major international conflicts were expected to be organized and led by global powers such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, or France. Today, however, countries including Qatar, Oman, Egypt, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates increasingly occupy the center of the diplomatic process.⁸

This transformation reflects more than a redistribution of diplomatic responsibilities. It reflects a growing recognition that regional governments often possess advantages that even the world’s most powerful nations cannot easily replicate.

Each has cultivated unique diplomatic capabilities.

Qatar has established communication channels with governments and non-state organizations that frequently refuse direct contact with one another.

Oman has earned an international reputation for discreet diplomacy and confidential negotiations, particularly involving Iran and Western governments.

Egypt remains indispensable to negotiations involving Gaza because of its geographic position, border responsibilities, intelligence cooperation, and decades of political engagement with both Israeli and Palestinian leaders.

Türkiye continues balancing complex relationships with NATO allies, Russia, Ukraine, and multiple Middle Eastern governments, allowing Ankara to maintain dialogue across geopolitical divisions that many other capitals cannot bridge.

Saudi Arabia has significantly expanded its diplomatic profile through regional normalization initiatives, multilateral diplomacy, and broader engagement on Middle Eastern security issues.

The effectiveness of these governments derives from more than geography.

Regional mediators understand the political culture, historical grievances, religious dynamics, and security concerns that shape negotiations. They have cultivated personal relationships with regional leaders over decades and frequently share linguistic, cultural, economic, or historical ties that facilitate dialogue during periods of crisis.

Most importantly, they have a direct stake in the outcome.

JaFaJ describes this emerging model as Regional Peace Leadership—a diplomatic framework in which neighboring states assume primary responsibility for facilitating negotiations because they possess the geographic proximity, political relationships, cultural understanding, and strategic incentives necessary to sustain long-term peace. Rather than replacing global powers, regional peace leaders increasingly serve as indispensable partners in resolving conflicts that directly affect their own security and prosperity.

Unlike distant powers separated by oceans, regional governments experience the consequences of instability immediately. Refugee flows, disrupted trade, terrorism, maritime insecurity, energy market volatility, and economic uncertainty all affect their national security and domestic prosperity.

That proximity often enhances both their diplomatic credibility and their urgency.

For China and Russia, supporting these regional mediators while remaining outside the center of negotiations may therefore represent a calculated strategic choice. By allowing regional governments to assume the political risks associated with mediation, Beijing and Moscow preserve their diplomatic relationships, limit their long-term obligations, and retain the flexibility to influence events without becoming directly responsible for the success—or failure—of the peace process.

 

THE HIGH COST OF LEADING PEACE TALKS

Hosting international peace negotiations is often portrayed as a diplomatic triumph. In reality, it is frequently one of the most demanding, politically risky, and least rewarding responsibilities a government can undertake.

The signing of a ceasefire or peace agreement is not the end of the diplomatic process. More often, it marks the beginning of an even longer period of implementation, verification, monitoring, and crisis management.⁹

When negotiations fail—as many inevitably do—the government that led the process frequently becomes the target of criticism from every participant. Each side may accuse the mediator of applying insufficient pressure, demanding excessive concessions, displaying political favoritism, or failing to enforce agreed-upon commitments. Success, by contrast, is rarely attributed to a single nation. The political benefits are typically shared among multiple governments and international organizations, while the principal mediator assumes disproportionate responsibility when agreements begin to unravel.

The responsibilities associated with peace implementation are substantial.

Effective mediation often requires governments to:

• monitor ceasefire compliance;
• verify prisoner exchanges;
• coordinate humanitarian assistance;
• mobilize international reconstruction funding;
• facilitate economic recovery;
• provide long-term diplomatic engagement; and
• in some cases, support security guarantees designed to prevent renewed hostilities.

These obligations may continue for months, years, or even decades after negotiators leave the conference table.

For that reason, governments considering whether to lead a peace process must weigh far more than diplomatic prestige. They must assess the long-term financial costs, political liabilities, military commitments, and strategic risks associated with assuming ownership of an uncertain and often fragile peace.

This helps explain why relatively few nations actively seek to become principal mediators in the world’s most dangerous conflicts. Encouraging negotiations is comparatively inexpensive. Leading them requires governments to accept enduring responsibilities, uncertain outcomes, and the very real possibility that they will ultimately be held accountable for events beyond their control.

In international diplomacy, the greatest burden is often not negotiating peace—it is sustaining it.

 

THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF REMAINING ONE STEP REMOVED

The cumulative evidence presented thus far suggests that China and Russia are not disengaged from international diplomacy. Rather, both appear to have adopted a strategy that allows them to influence major peace initiatives without assuming primary responsibility for their success or failure.

From a strategic perspective, this approach offers several important advantages.

First, it preserves diplomatic flexibility.

Governments that do not lead negotiations retain greater freedom to criticize proposals, suggest alternative approaches, adjust their positions as political circumstances evolve, or support competing initiatives without becoming personally invested in a single diplomatic outcome. They influence the process without becoming responsible for the process itself.

Second, it protects long-term bilateral relationships.

China simultaneously maintains important economic partnerships with Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and numerous other governments throughout the Middle East. Russia likewise balances strategic relationships with multiple regional actors whose interests frequently conflict.

Assuming responsibility for mediating negotiations inevitably creates winners and losers. Any perception that a mediator has favored one party over another can damage carefully cultivated political, economic, or security relationships that have taken years to develop.

By remaining one step removed from formal negotiations, both governments preserve greater freedom to maintain productive relationships with all parties regardless of the outcome.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, indirect diplomacy significantly reduces political risk.

When negotiations collapse—as they often do—public criticism generally focuses on the governments that organized the talks, drafted the agreements, and assumed responsibility for implementing them. Governments operating from the background retain the ability to support diplomacy, offer alternative proposals, or criticize unsuccessful initiatives without assuming ownership of the outcome.

This strategy allows Beijing and Moscow to expand their diplomatic influence while limiting the long-term political, financial, and strategic obligations traditionally associated with international mediation.

Whether this represents prudent statecraft or calculated restraint is ultimately a matter of perspective.

What is less debatable is that influence without responsibility carries fewer costs than leadership with accountability.

That distinction lies at the heart of this report.

For nations seeking global influence, remaining one step removed may be an effective strategy.

For nations seeking global leadership, however, history has generally demanded something more.

 

THE EMERGING MODEL OF “LOW-RISK DIPLOMACY”

Taken collectively, the evidence examined throughout this report suggests that China and Russia are not withdrawing from international diplomacy. Rather, they appear to be refining a strategic approach that may best be described as “low-risk diplomacy.”

Under this model, governments seek to maximize geopolitical influence while minimizing the long-term political, military, economic, and financial obligations traditionally associated with conflict resolution and international peacebuilding.¹⁰ Rather than serving as the principal architects of peace negotiations, they position themselves to influence diplomatic outcomes while allowing other governments to assume the burdens—and liabilities—of leadership.

This strategy offers several strategic advantages.

It enables governments to publicly advocate peace without becoming politically accountable when negotiations fail. It preserves relationships with competing regional actors by avoiding the appearance of favoritism toward any one party. It reduces exposure to the enormous financial commitments that frequently accompany post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, security guarantees, and long-term peace implementation. Finally, it allows governments to evaluate, criticize, or support diplomatic initiatives without assuming responsibility for producing an alternative.

From the perspective of national strategy, this approach is both logical and understandable.

Every government seeks to maximize strategic influence while limiting unnecessary political risk. Measured solely in terms of national interest, low-risk diplomacy may therefore represent an efficient allocation of diplomatic resources.

The question addressed in this report, however, is not whether this strategy serves national interests.

The question is whether it satisfies the broader responsibilities traditionally associated with great-power leadership.

Leadership has never been measured solely by economic strength, military capability, technological innovation, or diplomatic rhetoric. Throughout modern history, great powers have also been judged by their willingness to assume responsibility for managing international crises, organizing complex negotiations, and investing the political capital necessary to sustain peace after conflicts have ended.

Deterring conflict is an important measure of power.

Ending conflict has historically been an even greater measure of leadership.

If low-risk diplomacy becomes the preferred model for emerging global powers, the international community must confront an important question:

Who, then, will accept the risks of leading the world’s most difficult peace negotiations?

 

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INFLUENCE AND LEADERSHIP

One of the central conclusions emerging from this analysis is that influence and leadership are not synonymous.

A nation may possess extraordinary economic strength, military capability, technological innovation, diplomatic access, or political influence without assuming the responsibilities traditionally associated with international leadership.

Influence enables governments to shape events.

Leadership requires governments to accept responsibility for their outcome.

That distinction is more than semantic.

It lies at the heart of how the international system has historically functioned.

Throughout modern history, the governments that have exercised the greatest international leadership have generally been those willing to assume the political, financial, and diplomatic burdens of resolving conflicts—not merely commenting upon them.

The United States provides one example. Despite significant policy successes, notable failures, and frequent international criticism, successive American administrations repeatedly invested political capital in difficult negotiations, including Camp David, Madrid, Dayton, Wye River, and numerous other diplomatic initiatives.¹¹ These negotiations did not always produce lasting peace, nor did they always achieve their stated objectives. They nevertheless demonstrated a willingness to accept responsibility for attempting to resolve some of the world’s most dangerous conflicts.

Other nations have demonstrated similar leadership.

Norway quietly facilitated the Oslo peace process.

Ireland played an important supporting role in the negotiations that ultimately produced the Good Friday Agreement.

For generations, Switzerland has provided trusted neutral ground for sensitive diplomatic negotiations involving governments that refused direct dialogue elsewhere.

Although these countries differ significantly in military power, economic size, and geopolitical influence, they share one important characteristic: each accepted responsibility for moving negotiations forward when success was uncertain and failure carried political risk. Their examples demonstrate that diplomatic leadership is determined less by national size than by a willingness to invest political capital in building peace.

Rather, they illustrate a broader principle.

Leadership is ultimately measured not by the ability to influence international events from a distance, but by the willingness to accept responsibility for bringing adversaries together, sustaining negotiations through periods of failure, and remaining engaged after agreements have been signed.

Influence may shape international affairs.

Leadership accepts accountability for them.

That distinction represents the defining difference between exercising power and exercising responsibility.

If more major powers choose to exercise influence without assuming responsibility, the burden of international mediation will continue falling on a relatively small group of nations. Governments such as the United States, Qatar, Oman, Egypt, and other regional partners may increasingly find themselves organizing negotiations, financing implementation, coordinating humanitarian assistance, and sustaining fragile agreements while other influential states remain largely in supporting roles.

Over time, this imbalance could reduce the international community’s overall capacity to resolve conflicts. Peace negotiations require experienced mediators, financial resources, political commitment, and long-term engagement. If too few nations are willing to provide those capabilities, future conflicts may become more difficult to end—even when broad international support exists for diplomacy.

The central question, therefore, is not whether China and Russia should mediate every conflict. Rather, it is whether the international system can sustain an expanding number of complex crises if the responsibility for building peace continues to be concentrated among only a handful of governments.

This distinction leads to a broader strategic question. If leadership is measured by the willingness to organize and sustain peace, then the emergence of a multipolar world should logically produce a corresponding expansion in diplomatic leadership. Whether that transition is actually occurring—or whether responsibility remains concentrated among a small number of governments—is one of the defining questions explored in this report.

 

CAN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD FUNCTION WITHOUT MULTIPLE MEDIATORS?

The broader implications of this analysis extend well beyond the foreign policies of China and Russia. They raise a more fundamental question about the future of the international system itself.

Supporters of a multipolar world frequently argue that global governance should no longer depend primarily upon a single dominant power. That argument has considerable merit. A more balanced international order could distribute diplomatic responsibilities more broadly, reduce dependence upon any one nation, encourage greater regional participation, and create additional pathways for conflict resolution.

Yet multipolarity is not merely about distributing influence.

It must also distribute responsibility.

If multiple nations seek greater authority within international institutions and greater influence over global affairs, they must also be prepared to assume a proportional share of the diplomatic burdens that accompany international leadership. Otherwise, the responsibility for organizing negotiations, managing crises, financing reconstruction, and sustaining fragile peace agreements will continue to fall upon the same limited group of governments.

The current international environment illustrates this challenge.

Across Gaza, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, Ukraine, the Red Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz, negotiations continue to rely heavily upon a familiar collection of actors: the United States, the United Nations, Qatar, Egypt, Oman, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and selected European governments.¹² China participates. Russia participates. Both contribute diplomatically through bilateral engagement, multilateral institutions, and the United Nations.

Participation, however, should not be confused with leadership.

Leadership is measured not simply by attendance at negotiations, but by the willingness to organize them, sustain them through periods of failure, mobilize international support, and accept responsibility for implementing agreements once they are reached.

That distinction will become increasingly important as geopolitical competition accelerates.

A genuinely multipolar international order cannot be sustained solely by multiple centers of power. It must also develop multiple centers of diplomatic leadership capable of assuming the difficult responsibilities of conflict prevention, mediation, and post-conflict peacebuilding.

Otherwise, the world risks creating a system in which power is widely distributed, but responsibility remains concentrated in the hands of only a few nations.

 

JaFaJ ANALYSIS

The central question examined in this report is not whether China or Russia should assume a larger role in international diplomacy. Every sovereign nation has both the right and the obligation to pursue policies that advance its own national interests.

The more consequential question is whether the architecture of the international system is quietly changing in ways that few policymakers have yet recognized.

For nearly eight decades following the Second World War, international leadership was measured largely by a nation’s ability to project military power, build alliances, influence international institutions, and shape the global economy. Those indicators remain important, but they may no longer be sufficient.

A new measure of geopolitical influence may be emerging.

Several factors are driving this evolution. Contemporary conflicts increasingly involve multiple state and non-state actors, prolonged humanitarian crises, complex economic interdependence, cyber operations, and global media scrutiny. Military victories alone rarely produce durable political settlements. As a result, governments capable of coordinating diplomacy, reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and long-term implementation are becoming increasingly important to international stability.

Increasingly, nations are being judged not only by their capacity to wage war, but by their willingness—and ability—to end it.

This represents a profound shift in how strategic leadership may be evaluated during the twenty-first century.

The defining geopolitical competition of the next generation may not be over territory, ideology, or even economic output. It may instead revolve around which nations possess the diplomatic institutions, political credibility, economic capacity, and strategic patience necessary to manage an increasingly unstable international system.

As conflicts become more complex, peace itself is becoming a strategic resource.

Governments capable of organizing negotiations, coordinating multinational coalitions, mobilizing humanitarian assistance, financing reconstruction, and sustaining fragile agreements will accumulate a form of geopolitical influence that cannot be measured by gross domestic product, military expenditures, or technological innovation alone.

Diplomatic leadership is becoming a strategic capability in its own right.

This evolution has important implications for every major power.

If China and Russia continue pursuing a model of influence without ownership, they may preserve strategic flexibility while avoiding many of the political and financial costs associated with international mediation.

The tradeoff, however, is that they may also surrender one of the most powerful instruments of long-term geopolitical influence: the ability to define the political architecture that emerges after conflict.

History demonstrates that nations rarely shape the peace they do not help negotiate.

Those that organize negotiations frequently influence ceasefire mechanisms, reconstruction priorities, regional security arrangements, humanitarian frameworks, economic recovery, and the institutions that govern the post-conflict order. In many respects, the diplomatic table determines the geopolitical map that follows.

This raises an even broader strategic question.

If the United States gradually reduces its willingness to lead international negotiations while China and Russia remain reluctant to assume those responsibilities, who fills the vacuum?

Will regional powers such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa gradually assume larger diplomatic roles?

Will new multilateral institutions emerge to coordinate peace negotiations?

Or will the international community enter an era in which conflicts become longer, settlements become more fragile, and no nation consistently accepts responsibility for managing the peace?

The answer to those questions may define international politics more profoundly than the outcome of any single conflict now dominating today’s headlines.

The future balance of power may ultimately be determined not by which nation wins the next war, but by which nation becomes indispensable in building the peace that follows.

 

CONCLUSION

The question posed at the beginning of this report remains both timely and increasingly consequential:

Why are China and Russia not leading more of today’s peace negotiations?

The evidence suggests that neither nation has retreated from international diplomacy. Rather, both appear to have adopted a deliberate strategy that emphasizes selective engagement, regional intermediaries, and limited exposure to the political, military, and financial risks associated with leading high-profile peace initiatives.¹³

From the perspective of national strategy, this approach is understandable.

From the perspective of international leadership, however, it leaves an increasingly important vacuum.

History offers a simple but often overlooked lesson:

Peace does not organize itself.

Someone must persuade adversaries to meet when they refuse to speak.

Someone must draft the first proposal that neither side initially accepts.

Someone must monitor ceasefires after the headlines disappear.

Someone must coordinate humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, prisoner exchanges, border verification, and the countless technical details that transform signed agreements into lasting peace.

These responsibilities rarely produce political popularity.

They rarely generate immediate strategic rewards.

Yet without them, diplomacy remains aspiration rather than achievement.

The central lesson is that peace is not a spontaneous outcome of diplomacy; it is the product of sustained political investment. Governments that possess the institutions, personnel, financial resources, and strategic patience to implement agreements will increasingly shape the international order long after military operations have ended. In the twenty-first century, the ability to build peace may become as strategically significant as the ability to wage war.

The international system is now entering a period unlike any since the end of the Second World War.

Power is becoming more widely distributed.

Economic influence is becoming increasingly multipolar.

Regional powers are assuming greater geopolitical significance.

Yet responsibility for building peace remains concentrated among a remarkably small number of governments.

JaFaJ identifies this as the Responsibility Gap: geopolitical influence is becoming increasingly distributed among major powers, while responsibility for organizing, financing, implementing, and sustaining peace remains concentrated among relatively few nations. Closing this gap may become one of the defining diplomatic challenges of the twenty-first century.

That imbalance may prove unsustainable.

Perhaps the most important question is not whether China and Russia should lead more negotiations.

It is whether the world has outgrown the assumption that any single nation should bear primary responsibility for maintaining international peace.

The next generation of diplomacy may not belong to a single superpower.

It may belong to coalitions of mediators—regional powers with local credibility, global powers with diplomatic and economic leverage, neutral states capable of hosting negotiations, international organizations that provide legitimacy, and private humanitarian institutions that sustain implementation.

Such a model would distribute not only influence, but responsibility.

It would recognize that twenty-first-century conflicts are too complex for any single nation to resolve alone.

If that evolution does not occur, the consequences could be profound.

The world may continue producing more regional powers, more military capability, more economic competition, and more geopolitical influence—while simultaneously producing fewer governments willing to assume responsibility for negotiating peace.

That would represent a dangerous paradox.

The international community would possess more power than at any point in modern history, yet fewer nations prepared to use that power to end wars.

Ultimately, history has rarely judged nations solely by the wars they won.

It has judged them by the peace they built.

The defining geopolitical question of the next generation may therefore be neither who becomes the next superpower nor who possesses the world’s largest economy or military.

It may simply be this:

When the next global crisis erupts, which nation—or coalition of nations—will step forward, accept responsibility, and lead the world toward peace?

Because in the final analysis, influence may shape history, but leadership accepts responsibility for writing its next chapter.

 

JaFaJ STRATEGIC INSIGHTS

A FRAMEWORK FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PEACE DIPLOMACY

Based upon the evidence presented in this report, JaFaJ offers the following strategic observations and policy recommendations for governments seeking to strengthen the international system.

1. REDEFINE GREAT-POWER LEADERSHIP

The international community should broaden its definition of great-power status. Military capability, economic strength, technological innovation, and diplomatic influence remain essential measures of national power, but they are no longer sufficient. Nations seeking global leadership should also be evaluated by their willingness to organize peace negotiations, sustain diplomatic engagement, finance post-conflict reconstruction, and remain committed until durable political settlements are achieved.

JaFaJ Recommendation: Future assessments of global influence should include a nation’s measurable contributions to conflict prevention, mediation, peace implementation, and post-conflict stabilization.

 

2. ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION RESPONSIBILITY INDEX (IMRI)

Military spending, economic output, and development assistance are measured through internationally recognized indicators.

No comparable system exists to measure a nation’s contribution to international peace diplomacy.

JaFaJ Recommendation: The international community should establish an International Mediation Responsibility Index (IMRI) that evaluates nations according to objective criteria, including:

• peace negotiations hosted;
• ceasefires facilitated;
• humanitarian corridors negotiated;
• reconstruction initiatives coordinated;
• peace agreements successfully implemented;
• and long-term diplomatic engagement following conflict.

An initial IMRI methodology could assign weighted scores across several categories, including mediation leadership, implementation success, reconstruction support, humanitarian coordination, diplomatic capacity, and sustained post-conflict engagement. Like other international indices, the methodology should be transparent, repeatable, and updated annually to enable meaningful comparisons over time.

Governments should be measured not only by the wars they influence, but by the peace they help build.

 

3. CREATE PERMANENT MULTINATIONAL MEDIATION COALITIONS

Modern conflicts are increasingly too complex for any single nation to manage alone.

Rather than relying upon one dominant mediator, future negotiations should be organized through permanent multinational mediation coalitions combining:

• regional powers with local credibility;
• global powers with political and economic leverage;
• neutral states capable of hosting negotiations;
• international organizations providing legal legitimacy; and
• humanitarian institutions responsible for implementation and recovery.

JaFaJ Recommendation: Peace diplomacy should evolve from a single-mediator model toward a coalition-based model that distributes both authority and responsibility.

 

4. TREAT DIPLOMATIC CAPACITY AS A STRATEGIC ASSET

Most governments invest heavily in military readiness.

Far fewer invest systematically in negotiation expertise.

Yet diplomacy often determines the political outcome after military operations conclude.

JaFaJ Recommendation: Governments should establish permanent national mediation corps composed of experienced diplomats, regional specialists, legal experts, economists, humanitarian planners, intelligence professionals, and conflict-resolution specialists capable of rapid deployment during emerging international crises.

 

5. REWARD THE BUILDERS OF PEACE

International prestige continues to be heavily influenced by military capability and economic performance.

Comparable recognition is rarely afforded to governments that consistently prevent wars or successfully negotiate peace.

JaFaJ Recommendation: International institutions should create formal recognition systems rewarding governments that demonstrate sustained excellence in conflict prevention, mediation, and post-conflict reconstruction. Diplomatic leadership should become a measurable component of international prestige.

 

6. PREPARE FOR THE NEXT ERA OF GEOPOLITICS

The defining geopolitical competition of the twenty-first century may not be determined solely by military superiority or economic dominance.

It may instead be determined by which governments become indispensable to the management of international crises.

Nations capable of consistently organizing negotiations, building international coalitions, coordinating reconstruction, and sustaining fragile peace agreements will shape the political architecture of the post-conflict world.

JaFaJ Assessment: The governments that write the peace agreements of the future are likely to exercise greater long-term influence than those that simply win the wars of the present.

 

THE JaFaJ DOCTRINE

This report concludes with a broader proposition.

For more than a century, geopolitical power has largely been measured by a nation’s ability to deter conflict or prevail in war.

JaFaJ believes the next generation of international leadership will be measured differently.

The defining strategic capability of the twenty-first century will not simply be the ability to project power. It will be the ability to organize peace.

The nations that consistently convene negotiations, bridge political divides, coordinate international coalitions, and transform ceasefires into durable settlements will increasingly shape the global order.

Military victories determine who wins battles.

Diplomatic leadership determines who writes history.

 

FOOTNOTES

1. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V, Security Council; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, official statements on multipolarity and global governance.
2. Reuters, “Can China Restrain Iran? Gulf States Test Beijing’s Influence,” July 30, 2026.
3. Reuters, “U.S.-Facilitated Israel-Lebanon Talks Have Begun,” August 4, 2026; Associated Press, reporting on Gulf mediation efforts and regional diplomacy, August 2026.
4. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, The Belt and Road Initiative: A Key Pillar of the Global Community of Shared Future; World Bank, Belt and Road overview.
5. Associated Press, “China Brokers Restoration of Saudi-Iran Relations,” March 2023; Reuters, coverage of the Saudi-Iran agreement.

1. Reuters, reporting on Russian and Chinese diplomatic engagement and international mediation strategies during Middle East conflicts, 2025–2026.
2. United Nations Security Council meeting records on the Middle East, 2025–2026; Reuters, coverage of Russian diplomatic activity concerning Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran.
3. Associated Press; Reuters; International Crisis Group, reporting on mediation efforts by Qatar, Oman, Egypt, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates during 2025–2026.
4. United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation (New York: United Nations, 2012); United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, mediation guidance and implementation frameworks.

1. United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Guidance for Effective Mediation (New York: United Nations, 2012); International Crisis Group, reports on contemporary mediation practices and state diplomacy.
2. Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Camp David Accords; U.S. Department of State, The Dayton Peace Accords; George Washington University National Security Archive, Madrid Peace Conference; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, historical documentation on the Oslo Process.
3. Reuters and Associated Press, coverage of mediation efforts involving Gaza, Lebanon, the Red Sea, Sudan, Yemen, Ukraine, and the Strait of Hormuz, 2025–2026; United Nations Security Council meeting records.
4. Council on Foreign Relations, analyses of Chinese and Russian foreign policy; Reuters, reporting on Chinese Middle East diplomacy and Russian diplomatic engagement, 2025–2026.