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JaFaJ

Will Netanyahu’s Actions Doom The Board Of Peace?

JAFAJ STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
August 12, 2026
KEY JUDGMENT
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rejection of the Trump administration’s latest Gaza framework remains the most serious political test yet for the Board of Peace—but it has not stopped the framework from moving forward. Uganda’s parliament has now authorized Uganda’s participation in the proposed International Stabilization Force, providing the Board with its first significant new evidence that the security architecture is moving from diplomatic planning toward implementation.[17]
The central institutional question is therefore clear. The question is no longer simply whether Netanyahu can block the Board’s roadmap. It is whether the Board can maintain its rules, verification system and reciprocal obligations while simultaneously securing Israeli acceptance and assembling the international force required to implement them.
Netanyahu’s insistence that Israel will not withdraw until Hamas is fully disarmed directly challenges the roadmap’s sequencing. The Board’s response will determine whether its framework functions as an independent institution or becomes a political negotiation in which powerful participants can alter the rules.
JAFAJ assesses that Netanyahu is testing the Board—not yet destroying it.
If the Board strengthens verification, clarifies obligations and demonstrates that its rules apply to Israel and Hamas alike, the confrontation could strengthen its legitimacy. If it repeatedly modifies the framework to accommodate political resistance, it could expose the Board as institutionally ambitious but operationally weak.
The immediate dispute remains Gaza. The larger test is whether the Board can enforce a framework while the parties it is supposed to manage disagree with its sequencing.
 
THE NETANYAHU BREAK
Netanyahu’s position is straightforward.
Israel will not accept an arrangement requiring a substantial military withdrawal if Hamas has not been completely disarmed. Associated Press reported that Netanyahu has rejected the U.S.-brokered proposal while maintaining that Israel will not withdraw from the territory it controls until Hamas is fully disarmed. (Associated Press, August 11, 2026.)[1]
Reuters similarly reported that Netanyahu’s government has resisted the proposed sequencing despite the plan’s acceptance in principle by Hamas. (Reuters, August 9, 2026.)[2]
That creates a direct challenge to the Board’s implementation model.
But there is an important distinction.
The Board is not proposing that Israel simply trust Hamas.
Its May implementation report explicitly states that the Roadmap requires complete decommissioning of weapons and dismantling of military and terrorist infrastructure subject to international verification. It further states that Israeli withdrawal would proceed in phases, contingent upon verified progress in decommissioning. (Board of Peace, May 15, 2026.)[3]
The disagreement, therefore, is not fundamentally over the objective. Both sides say Hamas must be disarmed. The dispute is over verification, sequencing and the degree of confidence Israel must place in the international mechanism.
Netanyahu’s rejection has not ended the diplomatic process. [18]  The Board’s Gaza roadmap remains the framework under discussion, while mediators continue efforts to preserve the agreement and address the dispute over sequencing. The central issue is whether Israel’s security requirements can be accommodated through the roadmap’s verification and phased implementation mechanisms without allowing either side to unilaterally rewrite the framework.
The Board is therefore facing a more consequential test than simple Israeli rejection. It must determine whether its verification system can accommodate Israeli security requirements without allowing a powerful participant to rewrite the framework.
Uganda’s parliament has meanwhile approved the potential deployment of Ugandan forces to the proposed International Stabilization Force, giving the Board an important new indication that elements of the security architecture are moving toward implementation.
The question is no longer whether Netanyahu can object. He clearly can. The question is whether the Board can continue building the institution while managing that objection.
 
THE BOARD IS NO LONGER SIMPLY A TRUMP INITIATIVE
This is critical to understanding what happens next.
The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2803 on November 17, 2025, by a vote of 13–0, with China and Russia abstaining. The resolution endorsed the Comprehensive Plan, welcomed the establishment of the Board of Peace as a transitional administration and authorized the creation of a temporary International Stabilization Force. [4]
The resolution also granted the Board an institutional role in coordinating the redevelopment of Gaza and authorized the Board and participating states to establish operational entities under its transitional authority and oversight. [5]
The framework is now beginning to move from institutional authorization toward actual participation. Uganda’s parliament has authorized the deployment of Ugandan troops to the proposed International Stabilization Force, giving Kampala domestic authorization to participate if the multinational force proceeds, while Morocco has also pledged troops. Other countries are participating at different levels, including through planning and medical personnel.
That development matters because an international stabilization force cannot remain a paper institution. It requires governments willing to commit personnel, accept operational responsibilities and place their forces within a defined command structure.
The Board therefore possesses two institutional assets that it did not possess when the initiative was first announced: a United Nations Security Council mandate and an emerging multinational force structure.
The Security Council resolution authorized the International Stabilization Force to operate under a unified command acceptable to the Board and to work with Israel and Egypt. The ISF is charged with helping stabilize Gaza, supporting demilitarization, preventing reconstruction of military and terrorist infrastructure, protecting civilians and supporting vetted Palestinian police. [6]
Netanyahu can reject the current sequencing of the Trump plan, but he cannot unilaterally nullify the broader institutional framework established through the Security Council resolution. He can, however, complicate its implementation by withholding Israeli cooperation on the elements that depend on Israeli participation.
That distinction is central to this story.
The Board is no longer merely a White House initiative seeking Israeli acceptance. It is becoming an internationally authorized mechanism that now has to demonstrate whether it can convert that authorization into an operational reality.
 
THE REAL BATTLE IS OVER VERIFICATION
The most important question is not:
Will Hamas disarm?
The Board’s framework already answers that.
The critical question is:
Who decides whether Hamas has actually disarmed sufficiently to permit the next stage?
The May Board report sets out a roadmap built around monitored and verified implementation. It establishes a transitional Palestinian authority, requires Hamas to cease military, policing and administrative activity, and requires all armed factions to withdraw from governance under the principle of “one authority, one law and one weapon.” (Board of Peace, May 15, 2026.) [7]
The same report states that decommissioning is subject to international verification and that Israeli withdrawal is tied to verified progress. (Board of Peace, May 15, 2026.) [8]
Mladenov subsequently described the mechanism more explicitly to the Security Council. He said the Roadmap is built around reciprocity, with each stage independently verified before the next stage can begin. (United Nations Security Council, May 21, 2026.) [9]
That creates a clear institutional architecture:
SECURITY COMMITMENT
↓
RECIPROCAL ACTION
↓
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION
↓
CERTIFICATION
↓
NEXT STAGE
↓
REPEAT
But the architecture exposes the Board’s central vulnerability:
The system works only if the parties accept who has the authority to certify compliance—and what happens when a party rejects that certification.
That is the real test.
Verification determines whether an obligation has been met.
Authority determines who makes that determination.
Enforcement determines what happens when a party refuses to accept it.
Those three questions now provide the standard against which the Board’s response to Netanyahu should be judged.
NETANYAHU MAY ACTUALLY BE TESTING THE BOARD
There is another interpretation of Netanyahu’s actions.
He may not be attempting to destroy the Board.
He may be testing whether the Board can provide Israel with a security mechanism that is sufficiently reliable to justify Israeli withdrawal.
This is not an irrational Israeli concern.
The entire Board architecture depends upon replacing unilateral military control with an international stabilization system. Resolution 2803 gives the ISF responsibility for helping secure Gaza, supporting demilitarization and preventing the reconstruction of military and terrorist infrastructure. (United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2803.)[10]
From Jerusalem’s perspective, the fundamental question is therefore:
Can the international mechanism prevent Hamas from rebuilding its military capability?
If Israel believes the answer is yes, phased withdrawal becomes more politically and strategically manageable.
If Israel believes the answer is no, Netanyahu has a powerful reason to retain unilateral control.
That is why the ISF may ultimately matter more than the political rhetoric surrounding the 15-point plan.
 
THE INTERNATIONAL STABILIZATION FORCE IS THE PIVOT
The ISF represents the Board’s attempt to create an international security mechanism capable of stabilizing Gaza, supporting demilitarization and civilian protection, and preventing the reconstitution of Hamas and other armed groups.
Resolution 2803 authorizes the force to assist with demilitarization, destroy and prevent the rebuilding of military and terrorist infrastructure, permanently decommission weapons held by non-state armed groups, protect civilians and humanitarian operations, and train and support vetted Palestinian police. (United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2803.)[6]
The Board’s May report said preparations for deployment were well advanced and described the force as operating under unified U.S. command while coordinating closely with Egypt and Israel. But the situation has not yet reached full operational deployment. As of August 12, the International Stabilization Force remains a proposed multinational force whose participating states, command arrangements and deployment remain under development. Uganda’s parliamentary authorization therefore represents progress toward force generation, not evidence that the ISF is already operational.
 
That gives the Board a potentially powerful instrument.
But it also creates the institution’s greatest vulnerability.
Israel must believe the ISF can prevent Hamas from reconstituting itself.
Hamas must believe the ISF is not simply another instrument of Israeli control.
Palestinians must believe the force is facilitating a transition rather than establishing permanent foreign rule.
And troop-contributing states must believe the Board possesses sufficient authority to justify their participation.
That is an extraordinarily difficult balance.
 
WHY NETANYAHU COULD MAKE THE BOARD STRONGER
Netanyahu’s resistance creates an opportunity for the Board to establish its most important institutional principle:
THE RULES APPLY TO EVERYONE.

Hamas cannot evade disarmament.
Israel cannot unilaterally redefine or indefinitely suspend its obligations once the conditions for the applicable stage have been independently verified.
The transitional Palestinian authority cannot operate outside the agreed framework.
The International Stabilization Force cannot operate without defined authority.

The Board’s May report explicitly recognizes that implementation depends on commitments from all parties and that violations by any side could threaten the transition. [13]
That principle is now being tested.
If the Board responds by applying the same verification and reciprocal-obligation standards to every participant, it strengthens its institutional credibility.
If it creates exceptions whenever a powerful participant objects, it weakens that credibility.
Netanyahu’s challenge therefore gives the Board an opportunity to demonstrate the difference between an institution with rules and a diplomatic forum that negotiates those rules whenever circumstances change.
 
THE DANGER OF BENDING THE RULES
The opposite outcome is possible.
Suppose every major objection produces another modification.

Hamas objects → framework changes.
Israel objects → framework changes.
Another government objects → framework changes.

Eventually the Board no longer possesses an independent framework.
It becomes a negotiating forum.
That would be a profound institutional failure.
A peace mechanism cannot be judged solely by its ability to persuade participants to agree.
At some point, it must possess rules that constrain participants.
That is the difference between a diplomatic meeting and an institution.
 
THE RECIPROCITY PROBLEM
Netanyahu’s position cannot be separated from Hamas’s obligations.
The Board’s May report identified Hamas’s refusal to accept verified decommissioning and relinquish coercive control as a principal obstacle to full implementation. [14]
But the Roadmap also recognizes the opposite problem:

Israel wants credible disarmament before accepting substantial withdrawal.
Hamas wants Israeli withdrawal and an end to military pressure before surrendering its remaining military capability.

That creates a classic reciprocity problem.
Neither side wants to make its most consequential concession first.
The Board’s solution is sequencing:
ONE SIDE ACTS.
↓
THE OTHER SIDE ACTS.
↓
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OCCURS.
↓
THE NEXT STAGE BEGINS.
Mladenov described the mechanism to the Security Council as a reciprocal process in which no new stage begins until the obligations of the preceding stage have been verified and certified. [9]
The significance is greater than the Gaza case itself.
The Board is attempting to replace trust with verification and unilateral concessions with reciprocal obligations.
That is potentially the framework’s greatest institutional innovation.
But it will work only if the verification mechanism is sufficiently independent, credible and authoritative to prevent either Israel or Hamas from using disagreement over certification to indefinitely halt the process.
 
NETANYAHU’S DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEM
Netanyahu is also operating under domestic political constraints.
The Associated Press reported August 11 that Netanyahu’s rejection of Trump’s plan comes roughly eleven weeks before Israel’s scheduled October 27, 2026, elections and amid pressure from far-right allies.[19]
That creates a two-front political problem.
Netanyahu must satisfy:
WASHINGTON
and
ISRAEL.
A compromise with Trump that appears to weaken Israel’s ability to prevent another Hamas attack could be politically dangerous.
Consequently, Netanyahu has an incentive to demand a very high standard for international guarantees.
This does not necessarily mean he wants the Board to fail.
It may mean he wants the Board to prove that it can provide security.
 
THREE POSSIBLE BOARD RESPONSES
The Board now has three broad ways to manage the dispute while preserving the underlying roadmap.
OPTION ONE — CONFRONT NETANYAHU
The Board could insist that the framework must be implemented as written.
ADVANTAGE: Establishes institutional authority and demonstrates that the rules apply even when a powerful participant objects.
RISK: Israel could obstruct implementation, leaving the Board with rules but insufficient cooperation to execute them.
 
OPTION TWO — MODIFY THE SEQUENCING
The Board could provide additional Israeli security guarantees or require additional verified Hamas disarmament before specific stages of Israeli withdrawal.
ADVANTAGE: Creates greater political space for Israeli participation.
RISK: Establishes a precedent in which sufficiently powerful participants can alter the framework through political pressure.
 
OPTION THREE — STRENGTHEN VERIFICATION
The Board could preserve the existing framework while strengthening the verification mechanism around the specific conditions that trigger each stage. That would allow Israel to receive independently verified assessments of Hamas’s disarmament and military infrastructure while preserving the roadmap’s reciprocal sequencing. The objective would not be to give Israel unilateral authority to determine compliance, but to create a verification process sufficiently credible that Israel can accept the Board’s certification without surrendering the Board’s independent authority.
ADVANTAGE: Addresses the core Israeli concern while protecting the Board’s institutional credibility.
RISK: Requires intelligence sharing, personnel, funding, political trust and agreement over who has final authority to certify compliance.
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
OPTION THREE IS THE STRONGEST PATH.
The Board should not ask Israel to trust the system.
It should build a system that can be independently tested and verified.
That distinction is critical.
A stronger verification mechanism gives Israel greater security assurance without giving any single participant the power to rewrite the framework.
The Board’s objective should therefore be neither confrontation nor concession. It should be institutionalization.
That is the strongest answer to Netanyahu’s challenge—and the clearest path toward turning the Board from a diplomatic initiative into a functioning international mechanism.
 
THE BOARD’S REAL TEST
The political debate is focused on whether Netanyahu will accept Trump’s 15-point plan.
That is not the institutional question that matters most.
The deeper question is whether the Board can make its framework function when a powerful participant challenges its implementation.
The test has three parts:
VERIFICATION — Can the Board independently determine whether obligations have been fulfilled?
AUTHORITY — Will the parties recognize the Board’s certification as binding for the next stage?
ENFORCEMENT — What happens when a party refuses to comply with a certified decision?
The Board has established a framework for addressing the first question. It now has to demonstrate that it can exercise sufficient authority and develop the operational enforcement capacity required to answer the other two.
That is what will determine whether the Board becomes an institution—or remains a diplomatic mechanism dependent on the consent of the parties it is supposed to manage.
 
JAFAJ ANALYSIS
Netanyahu’s rejection has exposed the central contradiction within the Board of Peace.
The Board is being asked to replace unilateral Israeli military control with an international security mechanism while simultaneously convincing Israel that the mechanism can prevent Hamas from rebuilding its military capability.
Those objectives are not necessarily incompatible. But they require something the Board has not yet fully demonstrated:
institutional authority that can survive disagreement among the parties it is supposed to manage.
The Board’s challenge can therefore be understood through four competing requirements:
ISRAEL NEEDS SECURITY.
HAMAS MUST DISARM.
PALESTINIANS NEED A CREDIBLE PATH TO GOVERNANCE.
THE ISF NEEDS SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO STABILIZE THE TERRITORY.
The Board sits at the center of all four.
That creates the central institutional dilemma. If the Board gives Israel unlimited discretion to determine when its security requirements have been satisfied, the Board’s independent authority is weakened. If it ignores legitimate Israeli security concerns, it may lose the cooperation required to implement the transition.
The solution is not to eliminate disagreement.
It is to institutionalize the process for resolving it.
That means establishing independent verification, clearly defined certification authority, reciprocal obligations and credible consequences for noncompliance.
The Board does not need Netanyahu to agree with every decision.
It needs a system in which disagreement does not automatically stop the system from functioning.
That is the difference between a diplomatic mechanism and an institution.
The current crisis therefore provides the Board with an opportunity to demonstrate something that no resolution or declaration can establish by itself:
that its rules can survive political pressure.
If it can do that, Netanyahu’s resistance becomes a test that strengthens the institution.
If it cannot, the confrontation will reveal that the Board possesses international authorization but insufficient independent authority.
 
CONCLUSION
NETANYAHU MAY HAVE GIVEN THE BOARD ITS MOST IMPORTANT TEST YET
The immediate dispute is over Gaza. The institutional question is much larger.
The larger issue is whether the Board of Peace can convert its international mandate into an operational institution capable of exercising authority, enforcing verified obligations and functioning when a powerful participant rejects its preferred sequencing.
Netanyahu’s rejection does not, by itself, doom the Board. The framework remains operative, discussions with Israel continue, and Uganda’s parliamentary authorization to participate in the proposed International Stabilization Force provides concrete evidence that the international security architecture is moving beyond planning.
But the confrontation has exposed the question the Board ultimately cannot avoid:
Who has the authority to determine when the obligations of the parties have been fulfilled—and what happens when one of them disagrees?
That question cannot be resolved through political compromise alone.
It requires rules, verification, authority and enforcement.
If the Board establishes those mechanisms and applies them consistently, Netanyahu’s resistance could become the event that gives the institution greater credibility.
If the Board repeatedly changes its rules to accommodate political pressure, the opposite will occur.
The Board will have demonstrated that it can negotiate—but not govern.
That is why Netanyahu’s challenge may ultimately be less dangerous to the Board than the Board’s response to it.
JAFAJ BOTTOM LINE:
Netanyahu is not yet destroying the Board of Peace. He is forcing it to prove that it deserves to exist.
 
FOOTNOTES

Associated Press, “In Rejecting Trump’s Gaza Plan, Netanyahu Reprises a Balancing Act He Has Mastered,” August 11, 2026. AP reports Netanyahu’s rejection, his insistence on complete Hamas disarmament and the domestic political pressures surrounding the decision.
Reuters, “Netanyahu Says Trump’s New Gaza Plan Is Unacceptable,” August 9, 2026. Reuters reports Netanyahu’s rejection of the 15-point plan and his insistence that Israel will not withdraw until Hamas is fully disarmed.
Board of Peace, Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza, S/2026/418, May 15, 2026, paras. 9–10. The report describes the 15-point Roadmap, international verification, phased Israeli withdrawal and the role of the International Stabilization Force.
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2803 (2025), S/RES/2803, November 17, 2025. The resolution was adopted 13–0–2 and endorsed the Comprehensive Plan while welcoming the Board of Peace and authorizing an International Stabilization Force.
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2803 (2025), paras. 2–4. The resolution establishes the Board as a transitional administration with international legal personality and places operational entities under its transitional authority and oversight.
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2803 (2025), para. 7. The resolution establishes the ISF mandate, including demilitarization, weapons decommissioning, civilian protection, Palestinian police training and ceasefire monitoring.
Board of Peace, Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025), May 15, 2026, para. 9.
Ibid., para. 10.
Nickolay Mladenov, briefing to the United Nations Security Council, May 21, 2026. Mladenov explained that the Roadmap is based on reciprocity and that no stage begins until the obligations of the previous stage have been independently verified and certified.
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2803 (2025), para. 7.
Ibid.
Board of Peace, Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025), May 15, 2026, para. 38. The report identifies ISF responsibilities including ceasefire monitoring, decommissioning, police training, deconfliction and civilian protection.
Ibid., paras. 11 and 40–42. The Board identifies the Roadmap as the critical mechanism for implementation and calls upon all parties to fulfill their commitments.
Ibid., para. 3. The Board’s May report identified Hamas’s refusal to accept verified decommissioning and relinquish coercive control as the principal obstacle at the close of its reporting period.
Mladenov, briefing to the United Nations Security Council, May 21, 2026.
Associated Press, “In Rejecting Trump’s Gaza Plan, Netanyahu Reprises a Balancing Act He Has Mastered,” August 11, 2026.
Associated Press, “Uganda Approves Sending Troops for International Force in Gaza,” August 6, 2026. AP reports that Uganda’s parliament approved the deployment of Ugandan troops to the proposed International Stabilization Force, marking Uganda’s first public commitment to the mission.
Reuters, “Gaza Board of Peace Official Says Plan Is Still Operative,” August 12, 2026. Reuters reports that the Gaza plan remains active despite Netanyahu’s rejection of an immediate Israeli withdrawal and that discussions with Israel continue around phased implementation and verified commitments.
Chatham House, “Israel’s General Election Will Be No Other,” July 2026. The analysis identifies October 27, 2026, as the scheduled date for Israel’s general election.

REFERENCES

Associated Press. “In Rejecting Trump’s Gaza Plan, Netanyahu Reprises a Balancing Act He Has Mastered.” August 11, 2026.
Mladenov, Nickolay. Briefing to the United Nations Security Council on implementation of Resolution 2803 and the Gaza Roadmap. May 21, 2026. United Nations.
Reuters. “Netanyahu Says Trump’s New Gaza Plan Is Unacceptable.” August 9, 2026.
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2803 (2025): Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict. S/RES/2803. November 17, 2025.
United Nations Security Council. Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza. S/2026/418. May 15, 2026.

 
 
 
 

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China’s Space Diplomacy In MENA:

THE NEW MIDDLE EASTERN BATTLEFIELD: SPACE
JAFAJ | MENA INTELLIGENCE BRIEF | August 9, 20
 
KEY JUDGMENT
China is using space cooperation to build long-term technological relationships across the Middle East and North Africa, creating potential diplomatic influence that can extend well beyond individual satellite or launch projects. A July 2026 study in the Texas National Security Review identified at least fifty China-MENA space-cooperation episodes and concluded that Beijing uses space cooperation as an instrument of diplomacy and influence.1
The strategic significance is not simply that China is selling satellites, providing launch assistance, or participating in lunar exploration. Chinese cooperation can also introduce navigation systems, ground infrastructure, technical standards, training programs, research relationships, and other forms of technological integration that may persist long after an individual project is completed.
MENA governments, however, are not necessarily choosing between Washington and Beijing. Many are pursuing relationships with multiple powers simultaneously to obtain technology, investment, expertise, security partnerships, and greater strategic autonomy. The UAE provides a clear example of a country maintaining a close strategic relationship with the United States while simultaneously expanding selected technological and space relationships with China. 2
The emerging competition is consequently not simply about who launches the next satellite or reaches the Moon first. It is about who helps build the technological infrastructure, standards, expertise, data systems, and institutional relationships that will shape the region’s space economy for the next generation.3
The central strategic question is therefore not whether China will replace the United States in MENA space cooperation. It is whether Chinese technology and institutions become sufficiently embedded in regional space ecosystems that Beijing acquires durable influence without requiring its partners to choose China over Washington.
 
SPACE IS BECOMING DIPLOMACY
For decades, strategic competition in the Middle East centered on energy, military power, bases, shipping routes, weapons, and political alliances. Space is adding a new dimension to that competition because satellite and space-based systems increasingly support functions that extend across civilian, commercial, scientific, and national-security sectors.
Satellite systems now support communications, navigation, agriculture, environmental monitoring, transportation, disaster response, scientific research, economic development, and military capabilities. As a result, space cooperation can create relationships that extend well beyond a single launch or satellite.4
China’s approach reflects this broader reality. Beijing’s space diplomacy is not limited to selling or launching spacecraft. It encompasses agreements, joint missions, technology sharing, infrastructure, training, research cooperation, and other forms of engagement that can connect Chinese institutions and technologies with the emerging space capabilities of partner countries.
The Texas National Security Review study identifies this broader approach as an instrument of statecraft and finds that Beijing has tailored its space relationships toward strategically important regional states, particularly countries with growing technological capabilities and significant geopolitical positions.5
This distinction matters because the strategic value of a space partnership may increase over time. A satellite can create a technical relationship. A ground station can create an infrastructure relationship. Training can create a professional relationship. Shared research can create an institutional relationship. Navigation systems can create a standards and data relationship.6
The satellite may be the visible product.
**The relationship is the strategic asset.**
 
EGYPT, THE UAE, AND IRAN: THREE DIFFERENT MODELS
China’s space diplomacy is particularly instructive when examined through Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran. The three countries demonstrate that Beijing does not use a single model of space engagement. Instead, Chinese space cooperation can serve different national objectives—from building domestic technological capacity, to accelerating advanced capabilities, to providing an alternative source of technology for a strategically constrained partner.7
EGYPT — DEVELOPMENT AND CAPACITY BUILDING
Egypt represents a model centered on national development and the expansion of domestic space capabilities.
Chinese cooperation with Egypt has included satellite development, space technology cooperation, infrastructure, and participation in broader Chinese space-cooperation initiatives. The Texas National Security Review study identifies Egypt as an important MENA space partner and connects Chinese space cooperation with Egypt’s broader efforts to develop domestic space capabilities.8
For Cairo, the attraction is straightforward: Chinese cooperation can help expand domestic technological capacity while Egypt maintains its broader strategic relationship with Washington. Space therefore becomes a mechanism through which Egypt can acquire technology, expertise, and infrastructure without requiring a fundamental realignment of its foreign policy.
Egypt illustrates the development model of Chinese space diplomacy: technological cooperation can strengthen national capabilities while leaving room for broader relationships with other powers.
UAE — ADVANCED CAPABILITY AND STRATEGIC HEDGING
The United Arab Emirates represents a different model.
The UAE has developed a sophisticated domestic space sector while maintaining important strategic and space relationships with the United States. At the same time, the country has pursued selected cooperation with China in technology and space.9
This creates a form of strategic hedging. The UAE does not necessarily need to choose one great power across every technological domain. It can cooperate with Washington through one framework while pursuing selected technological relationships with Beijing through another.
That flexibility is strategically important. It allows the UAE to pursue technological advancement, economic diversification, scientific prestige, and greater strategic autonomy while maintaining important relationships with the United States.
The UAE illustrates the hedging model: space cooperation becomes another instrument through which a technologically ambitious MENA state can diversify its external partnerships without abandoning an established U.S. relationship.
IRAN — STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT AND CONSTRAINT
Iran presents a third model.
China’s relationship with Iran is considerably more politically sensitive because Iranian space capabilities intersect with national-security concerns and the broader strategic competition between Tehran, Washington, and regional U.S. partners.
The Texas National Security Review study finds that China’s cooperation with Iran reflects both opportunities and constraints. Beijing benefits from its relationship with Tehran, but it must also manage its relationships with major Arab partners such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.10
Iran therefore illustrates both the potential and the limits of Chinese space diplomacy.
China can provide Iran with technological cooperation and access that expand Tehran’s space partnerships beyond its existing relationships, giving Beijing an important relationship with a strategically significant state. At the same time, China’s broader regional interests constrain how far Beijing can deepen cooperation with Tehran without affecting its relationships with other MENA governments.
Iran illustrates the strategic-alignment model: Chinese space cooperation can provide an important technological alternative to Western partnerships, but Beijing’s broader regional interests place limits on the relationship.
Taken together, Egypt, the UAE, and Iran demonstrate why China’s MENA space diplomacy should not be viewed as a single geopolitical strategy. China can use space cooperation to support development, facilitate strategic hedging, or strengthen relationships with states that face greater constraints in working with Western powers. The common element is not political alignment.
**It is the creation of durable technological relationships.**
 
 
THE MOON IS NOW PART OF THE COMPETITION
The competition is moving beyond Earth orbit.
China’s International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) is designed as an international framework for scientific research, lunar exploration, infrastructure development, and future utilization of lunar resources. China and Russia established the framework as an international cooperation project and have invited additional countries and organizations to participate.11
MENA participation is already becoming visible.
China’s Chang’e-8 mission, currently planned for around 2029, is expected to carry international payloads from multiple countries and organizations. The China National Space Administration has identified lunar cooperation involving Egypt and Bahrain, among other international partners.12
The significance extends beyond the individual missions.
Participation in lunar programs creates opportunities for scientific research, payload development, technical cooperation, data exchange, and institutional relationships. As lunar activity expands, these relationships could become increasingly relevant to how MENA governments approach future lunar technology, research partnerships, and infrastructure.13
The strategic implication is a JAFAJ assessment: early participation could give governments greater experience and institutional familiarity as lunar activity develops.
This creates another dimension of strategic competition.
A MENA country does not necessarily have to choose between China and the United States across its entire space program. It can cooperate with Washington through one space framework while cooperating with Beijing through another.
That behavior is increasingly important to understanding the regional space environment. MENA governments may view participation in multiple space ecosystems not as a contradiction, but as a way to maximize technological access, investment, expertise, and strategic options.
The result is a space environment that differs significantly from a simple Cold War-style bloc competition. The emerging contest is less about forcing countries into exclusive camps and more about establishing relationships that remain valuable as the region’s space capabilities—and eventually its lunar capabilities—expand.
 
 
ARTEMIS VS. ILRS — BUT NOT NECESSARILY “EITHER/OR”
The United States has developed its own international framework for lunar exploration through the Artemis Accords.
The Accords establish nonbinding principles for peaceful, transparent, sustainable civil-space cooperation and emphasize interoperability, scientific-data sharing, registration of space objects, deconfliction, and responsible use of space.14
Several MENA countries have joined the U.S.-led framework, including the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.15
China and Russia, meanwhile, are developing the International Lunar Research Station and recruiting international partners.16
At first glance, the two frameworks appear to represent competing great-power approaches to international lunar cooperation:
ARTEMIS = U.S.-LED LUNAR COOPERATION FRAMEWORK
ILRS = CHINA/RUSSIA-LED LUNAR COOPERATION FRAMEWORK
But the behavior of MENA governments is more complicated.
Many governments are pursuing relationships with multiple technological ecosystems simultaneously. Participation in one framework does not necessarily require withdrawal from another.
That is not necessarily indecision.
It may be strategic hedging.
This approach can allow MENA governments to maximize access to technology, investment, expertise, scientific cooperation, prestige, and strategic options while reducing reliance on any single external power.
But strategic hedging creates an important second question:
Can a country maintain political flexibility if its underlying technology becomes increasingly tied to one external ecosystem?
That question leads to one of the less visible dimensions of China’s space diplomacy.
 
 
THE HIDDEN ISSUE: TECHNOLOGICAL EMBEDDEDNESS
Space cooperation can create long-term technological relationships that extend beyond the original project.
Once a country integrates a particular navigation system, establishes compatible ground infrastructure, trains personnel around a particular technology, or develops domestic systems around foreign platforms, changing suppliers or technical systems can become increasingly expensive and difficult.
The Texas National Security Review study identifies China’s BeiDou navigation system as an important example. Chinese cooperation involving navigation systems and related infrastructure can embed Chinese technology, standards, expertise, and operating practices into partner countries.17
The strategic significance is that the relationship can survive the original project.
The first satellite may be the beginning.
The ground station may be the beginning.
The training program may be the beginning.
The navigation system may be the beginning.
Over time, individual projects can form an interconnected technological relationship involving infrastructure, personnel, standards, data, maintenance, and future procurement.18
The strategic question is therefore not simply who supplies the hardware.
It is who becomes embedded in the system.
That distinction matters because technological relationships can influence future procurement decisions, technical standards, maintenance requirements, training pipelines, data access, and subsequent infrastructure investments.
A country can therefore maintain diplomatic relationships with multiple powers while becoming more technologically integrated with one particular ecosystem.
Space diplomacy can therefore create durable influence without requiring a formal alliance. As Chinese technology, standards, expertise, and infrastructure become more deeply embedded in partner countries, those relationships may become increasingly difficult to unwind without significant technical, financial, or institutional costs.
 
 
Produce next:
WHY THIS MATTERS TO THE UNITED STATES
The United States retains enormous advantages in space technology, scientific institutions, commercial space capabilities, launch services, and international partnerships. But technological superiority does not automatically produce diplomatic influence.
Beijing can offer a package that combines technology, infrastructure, training, and broader diplomatic relationships.19
For governments seeking to expand their technological capabilities, that combination can be attractive even when those governments maintain close security relationships with Washington.
The United States therefore faces a problem that cannot be solved simply by asking MENA governments to choose America over China.
They may not want to choose.
They want options.
The strategic challenge for Washington is consequently not merely preventing China from gaining access to MENA space programs. It is ensuring that U.S. partnerships remain sufficiently practical, accessible, and competitive that regional governments continue to see American cooperation as valuable across the full space ecosystem.
That ecosystem extends from scientific research and commercial services to lunar exploration, navigation, data, infrastructure, education, and workforce development.
The distinction is important.
The United States can retain technological superiority while losing influence in individual technological ecosystems if competing partnerships become easier to access, faster to implement, or more deeply embedded in regional institutions.20
The competition is therefore partly about technology.
But it is also about availability, accessibility, standards, infrastructure, expertise, and relationships.
For Washington, the objective should not necessarily be to prevent MENA governments from cooperating with China. It should be to ensure that cooperation with the United States remains sufficiently valuable, accessible, and competitive that regional governments continue to view the American space ecosystem as an important partner in their technological development.
THE MENA SPACE ECONOMY
The strategic competition also intersects directly with economic diversification.
MENA governments increasingly view space as part of national economic development rather than simply a matter of national prestige. Space capabilities are becoming connected to artificial intelligence, telecommunications, defense, navigation, climate monitoring, agriculture, logistics, scientific research, education, and commercial investment.21
This changes the strategic calculation.
A country developing a domestic space sector is not simply purchasing satellites. It is building an industrial and technological ecosystem.
That ecosystem requires engineers and technical specialists, universities and research institutions, laboratories, launch access, ground stations, data systems, software, financing, international partnerships, and regulatory institutions.
Each of those requirements creates an opportunity for outside powers to participate in—and potentially become embedded within—the development process.
China’s space diplomacy is particularly relevant because Beijing can engage across multiple layers of that ecosystem. Cooperation can extend beyond spacecraft to infrastructure, technical training, navigation, research, data, and institutional relationships.22
The strategic significance is therefore broader than the number of satellites a country operates.
The more important question is whether MENA states develop the domestic capacity to design, operate, maintain, and eventually produce space technologies themselves—and which external partners become embedded in that development process.
The region is therefore moving beyond simply purchasing space technology. Several MENA states are seeking to develop domestic capabilities in space technology, data, services, and related industrial activities. That transition makes the region’s emerging space economy an important arena for long-term technological competition.23
The Middle East is not simply becoming a customer for space technology. It is increasingly seeking to become a producer of it.
 
 
THE BIGGER QUESTION: WHO SETS THE STANDARDS?
The most important question is not whether China will “win” the Middle Eastern space race.
That framing is too simplistic.
The more consequential question is:
Who will have the greatest influence over the technological standards, infrastructure, partnerships, and institutional relationships that shape the region’s space economy over the next twenty-five years?
That contest is already underway.
China is building relationships through satellites, navigation, lunar science, infrastructure, training, and international cooperation. The United States brings the Artemis Accords, major commercial space capabilities, extensive scientific institutions, and long-standing security relationships with many MENA governments.24
The result is not a single contest between two powers. It is an increasingly competitive ecosystem in which MENA governments can draw on multiple external partners for different purposes.
One relationship may provide security cooperation. Another may provide technology. Another may provide investment. Another may provide scientific expertise or access to specialized infrastructure.
This creates both complexity and opportunity.
For MENA governments, maintaining multiple technological relationships can reduce reliance on any single external power and increase their ability to negotiate for technology, investment, expertise, and access.
But the same strategy creates an important long-term question:
Which external technologies, standards, infrastructure, and institutions become embedded deeply enough that they shape future choices?
That is why the competition over MENA space is not simply a contest for contracts or missions.
It is a contest to shape the technological architecture of the region’s emerging space economy.
From a JAFAJ perspective, strategic autonomy increasingly means not simply having multiple partners, but retaining meaningful technological choices among them.
 
 
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
China’s space diplomacy in MENA should not be understood simply as a competition to sell satellites or secure individual space contracts.
It is better understood as a long-term effort to establish technological, institutional, and infrastructure relationships that can generate diplomatic influence over time.25
The evidence indicates that China has developed important space relationships with strategically significant countries such as Egypt, the UAE, and Iran while simultaneously expanding cooperation with other MENA states.26
The United States retains major advantages in advanced technology, commercial space capabilities, scientific institutions, launch capabilities, and security relationships.
China, however, does not need to replace the United States to gain strategic value.
Beijing can gain influence simply by becoming one of the region’s indispensable technological partners.
That is the critical point.
A MENA government does not have to choose China over the United States for China to gain influence. If Chinese technology becomes embedded in satellites, navigation systems, ground infrastructure, training programs, research institutions, data systems, or lunar projects, Beijing can establish a durable position even while the same governments continue cooperating with Washington.27
The strategic competition is therefore less about securing exclusive allegiance than about establishing durable technological embeddedness.
JAFAJ will monitor five indicators of whether Chinese space cooperation is becoming strategically embedded across MENA:

TECHNOLOGICAL EMBEDDEDNESS — Whether MENA governments increase their integration of Chinese navigation, satellite, ground, communications, or data systems into domestic space infrastructure.
LUNAR PARTICIPATION — Whether MENA participation in the ILRS, Chang’e missions, and related Chinese lunar initiatives expands in the number of participating countries, missions, payloads, or institutional partnerships.43
U.S. ENGAGEMENT — Whether Washington expands practical space cooperation—including technology, research, commercial services, workforce development, and lunar cooperation—rather than relying primarily on diplomatic frameworks.44
DUAL PARTICIPATION — Whether MENA governments increasingly participate in both U.S.-led and China-led space initiatives, indicating that regional states are maintaining multiple technological relationships rather than moving toward exclusive alignment.
INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY — Whether MENA states move from purchasing space technology toward developing domestic capabilities in satellite manufacturing, data services, software, infrastructure, research, and related space industries.

These indicators provide a way to distinguish temporary cooperation from deeper technological integration.
The strategic question for the next decade is therefore not simply:
Who gets to the Moon first?
It is:
Who helps build the technological infrastructure of the countries that will operate there?
That may ultimately prove to be the more consequential competition.
 
 
FOOTNOTES

R. Lincoln Hines, Lawrence Rubin, and Dayana Alagirova, “Choosing Orbits: China’s Space Diplomacy in the Middle East,” *Texas National Security Review* 9, no. 3 (Summer 2026): 28–47, https://doi.org/10.1353/tns.00039.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
China National Space Administration, “International Lunar Research Station,” April 25, 2024.
China National Space Administration, “China to Launch Chang’e-8 Lunar Mission around 2029, Collaborating with Int’l Partners,” April 24, 2025.
China National Space Administration, “International Lunar Research Station.”; China National Space Administration, “China to Launch Chang’e-8 Lunar Mission around 2029, Collaborating with Int’l Partners.”
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Artemis Accords,” updated November 20, 2025.
Ibid.
China National Space Administration, “International Lunar Research Station.”
Hines et al., “Choosing Orbits.”
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Hines et al., “Choosing Orbits.”; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Artemis Accords.”
Hines et al., “Choosing Orbits.”
Ibid.
Ibid.

 
REFERENCES

China National Space Administration. “China to Launch Chang’e-8 Lunar Mission around 2029, Collaborating with Int’l Partners.” April 24, 2025.
 “International Lunar Research Station.” April 25, 2024.
Hines, R. Lincoln, Lawrence Rubin, and Dayana Alagirova. “Choosing Orbits: China’s Space Diplomacy in the Middle East.” *Texas National Security Review* 9, no. 3 (Summer 2026): 28–47. https://doi.org/10.1353/tns.00039.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. “Artemis Accords.” Updated November 20, 2025.

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A New Middle Eastern Security Architecture: Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan Form A New Defense Alignment

 SAUDI ARABIA, TÜRKİYE AND PAKISTAN FORM A NEW DEFENSE ALIGNMENT
JAFAJ | MENA INTELLIGENCE BRIEF | August 9, 2026
 
KEY JUDGMENT
Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan have created a new trilateral defense framework that could become an important component of the Middle East’s emerging security architecture. The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed in Makkah on August 7, establishes that an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack against all three and calls for expanded defense cooperation.¹
The agreement does not yet establish a NATO-style operational alliance. Its specific military obligations, command arrangements, and procedures for responding to an attack remain unclear. Turkish officials have described the agreement as defensive and have emphasized that it is not directed against a specific country.²
Nevertheless, the strategic significance is considerable. The agreement links Saudi Arabia’s economic and political weight, Türkiye’s large conventional military and defense-industrial base, and Pakistan’s extensive military relationship with Riyadh and strategic capabilities. It also formalizes a security relationship that had been developing through bilateral defense cooperation.
The larger strategic question is whether the agreement will remain a mechanism for deterrence and political signaling or become the foundation for a broader regional security structure.
For JAFAJ, the more important development may be what the agreement reveals about the changing Middle Eastern security environment: regional powers are increasingly building overlapping security relationships rather than relying exclusively on a single external guarantor.
THE AGREEMENT
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement was signed by Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Its central provision is straightforward: an armed attack against one signatory will be regarded as an attack against all three.³
The agreement represents a significant expansion of an existing Saudi-Pakistani defense relationship and adds Türkiye to a formal collective-defense framework.
The practical obligations, however, remain less clear.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has said that assistance under the agreement could include intelligence sharing, logistical support, or the deployment of military forces depending on the circumstances. Turkish officials have also described the arrangement as defensive rather than directed against a named adversary.⁴
That distinction matters.
The agreement should therefore not yet be described as an operational military alliance equivalent to NATO. Its significance will ultimately depend on whether the three governments translate the political commitment into military planning, intelligence coordination, exercises, interoperability, and defined procedures for responding to an attack.
The agreement is consequently best understood as a collective-defense framework whose strategic meaning remains to be demonstrated through implementation.
WHY NOW?
The timing is significant.
The Middle East has experienced a period of extraordinary military instability, including direct confrontation involving Iran, attacks affecting Gulf security, disruption to energy infrastructure and maritime routes, and continuing uncertainty over the future regional balance.
The four-country R4 framework—Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye—had already been developing a mechanism for regional consultation before the defense agreement was signed. At their June 21 meeting in Cairo, the four foreign ministers reaffirmed the importance of continued consultation and coordination on peace, security, stability, and prosperity and specifically emphasized Gulf and Levant security.⁵
The Makkah agreement therefore did not emerge in isolation.
It represents the security component of a broader pattern of regional coordination.
For Saudi Arabia, the security consequences of regional instability are particularly important. The kingdom’s economic transformation depends on energy exports, international investment, infrastructure development, tourism, transportation, and regional connectivity.
Riyadh therefore has an interest in expanding its security options rather than depending exclusively on any single external guarantor.
That does not mean Saudi Arabia is abandoning Washington.
The more likely interpretation is strategic diversification.
Regional governments increasingly appear to be asking a different question:
How many security relationships do we need when the next regional crisis arrives?
That is fundamentally different from choosing between the United States and another great power.
SAUDI ARABIA: DIVERSIFYING THE SECURITY UMBRELLA
For Riyadh, the agreement provides another layer of strategic depth.
Saudi Arabia maintains an extensive defense relationship with the United States. At the same time, it has developed increasingly significant defense relationships with Türkiye and Pakistan.
The Saudi-Pakistani relationship is particularly important because the two countries signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement in September 2025. That agreement stated that aggression against either country would be considered aggression against both and was intended to strengthen joint deterrence.⁶
The relationship subsequently moved beyond political declarations.
In April 2026, Saudi Arabia announced that a Pakistani military force, including fighter and support aircraft, had arrived at a Saudi air base under the bilateral strategic defense agreement. Riyadh said the deployment was intended to strengthen joint military coordination and operational readiness.⁷
The trilateral agreement therefore builds upon an existing military relationship rather than creating one from nothing.
Adding Türkiye changes the equation.
Türkiye brings a major conventional military capability, a large defense industry, NATO interoperability, and experience in the development and export of unmanned systems and other military technologies.
Saudi Arabia has already pursued Turkish defense-industrial cooperation. In 2023, Saudi and Turkish defense companies signed agreements and memoranda aimed at localizing drone production and components in Saudi Arabia.⁸
The strategic combination is therefore notable:
Saudi capital and strategic geography + Turkish defense technology and military capacity + Pakistani military expertise and long-standing Gulf ties.
If those capabilities become more closely integrated, the arrangement could develop into a meaningful regional security platform.
TÜRKIYE: FROM NATO MEMBER TO REGIONAL SECURITY POWER
Türkiye’s participation may be the most strategically interesting element of the agreement.
Ankara remains a NATO member and continues to operate within the Western alliance system. At the same time, Türkiye has expanded its independent regional influence across the Middle East and beyond.
The Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish framework gives Ankara another mechanism through which it can exercise regional security influence without abandoning its NATO relationship.
That is important because the emerging Middle Eastern security system does not appear to be developing around a simple choice between Washington and an alternative bloc.
Instead, Türkiye is increasingly operating across several security networks simultaneously.
Türkiye can be:
A NATO member.
A defense supplier.
A regional military power.
A partner to Saudi Arabia.
A partner to Pakistan.
And potentially a participant in a broader regional security architecture.
That flexibility gives Ankara considerable strategic leverage.
The Türkiye-Pakistan relationship already includes commitments to expand defense and security cooperation, joint research and development, information sharing, and defense-industrial cooperation.⁹
The new trilateral framework therefore connects two existing defense relationships with Saudi Arabia into a single political-security structure.
PAKISTAN: THE STRATEGIC WILDCARD
Pakistan brings a different capability to the arrangement.
Islamabad has maintained a longstanding defense relationship with Saudi Arabia, including military cooperation and deployments. The 2025 Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement further institutionalized that relationship.¹⁰
Pakistan also possesses a substantial conventional military establishment and is the only nuclear-armed state among the three signatories.
That nuclear dimension requires caution.
The agreement should not be characterized as automatically extending a Pakistani nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia. The publicly available information does not establish such an arrangement.
Pakistan’s strategic value to the agreement is broader:

military manpower;
operational experience;
air power;
training;
defense cooperation;
intelligence relationships; and
the strategic weight associated with being a nuclear-armed state.

The combination gives the trilateral arrangement a level of strategic depth that would not exist with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye alone.
It also expands Pakistan’s role in Middle Eastern security beyond its traditional bilateral relationship with Riyadh.
THE IRAN QUESTION
The agreement’s relationship with Iran may be the most closely watched issue.
The three governments have emphasized that the pact is defensive and does not identify a specific adversary. Turkish officials have specifically rejected the idea that the agreement was designed against Iran.¹¹
That position matters.
Saudi Arabia has pursued diplomatic engagement with Tehran. Pakistan maintains its own diplomatic relationship with Iran. Türkiye has extensive economic, political, and geographic interests in maintaining a workable relationship with its neighbor.
The three countries therefore have reasons to avoid formally defining Iran as the enemy.
At the same time, all three have direct interests in deterring military threats in their surrounding regions.
The agreement consequently creates an unusual strategic balance:
It can strengthen deterrence without formally naming the state that might be most affected by that deterrence.
That ambiguity may actually make the arrangement more useful.
It allows Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan to strengthen collective security while preserving diplomatic flexibility toward Tehran.
THE ISRAEL QUESTION
Israel presents another complication.
The three governments have different relationships with Israel, but all three operate within a regional environment heavily affected by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israel’s military relationships with neighboring states.
Türkiye has been particularly critical of Israeli military operations. Saudi Arabia has emphasized Palestinian statehood and regional stability. Pakistan does not recognize Israel.
The defense agreement therefore creates a regional security grouping in which Israel is not formally identified as an adversary but cannot be separated from the strategic environment in which the agreement was created.
That distinction will matter.
If the agreement remains focused on territorial defense, deterrence, and regional stability, it could contribute to a more balanced security environment.
If it becomes associated with a broader confrontation involving Israel, Iran, or both, its strategic character could change significantly.
For now, the evidence supports a more cautious interpretation.
The agreement is a security framework, not yet a regional war coalition.
THE UNITED STATES: REPLACEMENT OR SUPPLEMENT?
The most important question for Washington may be whether the agreement represents a challenge to the American security system or an effort by regional partners to supplement it.
Current evidence points more strongly toward the second interpretation.
Saudi Arabia maintains its defense relationship with the United States.
Türkiye remains a NATO member.
Pakistan maintains extensive relationships with Washington.
None of the three governments has announced that the new arrangement replaces its existing security relationships.
Instead, the emerging model appears to be:
U.S. security relationship + regional security partnerships + bilateral defense agreements + strategic autonomy.
That model could become a defining characteristic of the next Middle Eastern security architecture.
Regional governments may no longer want a single security guarantor.
They may want multiple overlapping guarantees.
This is particularly important for the United States.
Washington has historically provided much of the external military capacity underpinning Gulf security. But regional governments are increasingly demonstrating that they can build additional relationships with other capable military powers.
The result does not necessarily reduce American influence.
It does, however, reduce American exclusivity.
That is a significant strategic distinction.
THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPANSION
The agreement could become considerably more important if additional countries join.
Egypt is the most obvious potential candidate.
Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye already participate in the R4 consultation mechanism. At their June 21 meeting, the four governments reaffirmed their commitment to continued coordination on regional peace, security, stability, and prosperity.¹²
Following the new defense agreement, Turkish officials indicated that Egypt could become a future participant.¹³
Egypt’s participation would materially change the strategic weight of the framework.
A security structure connecting:
Saudi Arabia + Türkiye + Pakistan + Egypt
would bring together four of the region’s most consequential military and political states.
That would move the arrangement beyond a trilateral defense pact toward something closer to a regional security concert.
But expansion is not guaranteed.
Egypt would have to evaluate the military obligations, political risks, relationships with other Arab states, and potential consequences for its relations with the United States and Israel.
The same considerations would apply to any additional member.
The first test of the agreement may therefore be whether it can expand without becoming politically exclusive.
THE BIGGER SHIFT: REGIONAL STATES ARE BUILDING THEIR OWN OPTIONS
The most important strategic development may not be the agreement itself.
It may be the reason the agreement became possible.
Middle Eastern governments increasingly appear to be moving toward strategic diversification.
They are not necessarily abandoning the United States.
They are not necessarily aligning with China.
They are not necessarily forming an anti-Israel bloc.
They are building options.
That distinction is critical.
A state with several defense relationships can negotiate from a stronger position than a state dependent upon one external security provider.
The emerging model could therefore look less like the Cold War and more like a network of overlapping security partnerships.
Saudi Arabia can work with Washington.
Türkiye can remain inside NATO.
Pakistan can maintain relationships with Western and Asian powers.
And all three can simultaneously build a regional defense mechanism.
That is not necessarily strategic inconsistency.
It is strategic hedging.
The same pattern can be seen beyond defense.
MENA governments increasingly seek multiple relationships for technology, investment, infrastructure, trade, energy, and security.
The objective is not necessarily to choose one great power.
The objective is to preserve options.
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST
The agreement could affect the regional balance in at least five ways.

GREATER REGIONAL DETERRENCE

If the agreement becomes operational, an adversary contemplating an attack on one member would have to consider the potential response of all three.
That could raise the cost of military action.

GREATER SAUDI STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

Riyadh gains another security relationship without necessarily abandoning its existing U.S. partnership.
That strengthens Saudi Arabia’s negotiating position.

GREATER TURKISH INFLUENCE

Türkiye gains another institutional mechanism for projecting military and diplomatic influence into the Gulf.

A LARGER ROLE FOR PAKISTAN

Pakistan gains a formal role in a Middle Eastern security arrangement involving two major regional powers.

A MORE COMPLEX ROLE FOR WASHINGTON

The United States remains central to the regional security system, but the system is becoming more diversified.
Washington may increasingly have to operate as one critical partner within a broader network rather than the sole external security provider.
THE LIMITS OF THE AGREEMENT
The agreement should not be overstated.
A mutual-defense declaration does not automatically create an effective military alliance.
The real test will be implementation.
The three governments must still determine how intelligence will be shared, how military forces would coordinate, what constitutes an armed attack, how decisions would be made, and what military assistance each country would actually provide.
They must also reconcile different strategic priorities.
Saudi Arabia’s primary concerns are centered on Gulf security, Iran, energy infrastructure, and economic transformation.
Türkiye has interests extending across the Middle East, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and NATO.
Pakistan’s primary security concerns remain concentrated in South Asia, particularly India and Afghanistan.
These differences do not make the agreement meaningless.
They do mean that political unity will be easier to achieve than military integration.
That distinction should guide how the agreement is evaluated.
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement should not yet be described as a new “Islamic NATO.”
That characterization goes beyond the available evidence.
The agreement’s practical military obligations remain insufficiently defined, and the three governments have emphasized its defensive character.¹⁴
But dismissing the agreement as symbolic would also be a mistake.
It creates a formal defense relationship among three strategically important states and builds upon defense relationships that were already becoming increasingly institutionalized.
More importantly, it reflects a broader regional trend:
Middle Eastern states are increasingly seeking the ability to provide for their own security through multiple overlapping partnerships rather than relying exclusively on a single external power.
For Saudi Arabia, the arrangement provides additional strategic depth.
For Türkiye, it creates another avenue for regional leadership while preserving its NATO position.
For Pakistan, it expands its strategic role beyond South Asia and reinforces its longstanding security relationship with the Gulf.
For the United States, it represents both a challenge and an opportunity.
The challenge is that Washington can no longer assume that regional partners will rely primarily on American security guarantees.
The opportunity is that a stronger regional security architecture could eventually reduce the burden on the United States if regional states develop greater capacity to deter threats and respond collectively.
The decisive question will therefore not be whether the Makkah agreement replaces the American security system.
It is whether the Middle East is beginning to build a security system in which the United States remains essential—but is no longer indispensable to every part of it.
JAFAJ WILL WATCH FIVE INDICATORS

EXPANSION — Whether Egypt or other regional states join the framework.
MILITARY INTEGRATION — Whether the three countries conduct joint exercises, establish integrated planning mechanisms, or expand intelligence and air-defense cooperation.
SAUDI DEFENSE DIVERSIFICATION — Whether Riyadh increasingly combines U.S., Turkish, Pakistani, and other defense capabilities.
IRAN — Whether the agreement remains formally defensive or evolves into an explicit deterrence mechanism against Tehran.
U.S. ROLE — Whether Washington adapts by strengthening regional partnerships or attempts to preserve a predominantly U.S.-centered security architecture.

The strategic question for JAFAJ is therefore not simply whether Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan have created a new alliance.
It is whether they have taken the first institutional step toward a Middle Eastern security architecture increasingly designed—and increasingly defended—by the region itself.
FOOTNOTES

Reuters, “Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan Pledge Mutual Defence as Middle East Turmoil Escalates,” August 7, 2026.
Reuters, “Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Defence Pact Technically Same as NATO’s Article 5, Turkish Minister Says,” August 8, 2026; Associated Press, “Pakistan Says New Defense Pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey Is ‘Purely Defensive’ and Open to Others,” August 8, 2026.
Reuters, “Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan Pledge Mutual Defence.”
Reuters, “Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Defence Pact Technically Same as NATO’s Article 5.”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, “Joint Statement of the R4 Following the Fourth Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Türkiye, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” June 21, 2026.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, “Joint Statement on the State Visit of the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif, to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” September 17, 2025.
Saudi Press Agency, “Ministry of Defense: Pakistani Military Force Arrives in Saudi Arabia Under Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement,” April 11, 2026.
Saudi Press Agency, “Saudi and Turkish Companies Ink Agreement and Two MoUs to Localize Drone Industry,” August 7, 2023.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, “Joint Declaration of the 7th Session of Pakistan-Türkiye High Level Strategic Cooperation Council: ‘Further Deepening, Diversifying, and Institutionalizing the Strategic Partnership,’” 2025.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, “Joint Statement on the State Visit of the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif, to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” September 17, 2025.
Reuters, “Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Defence Pact Technically Same as NATO’s Article 5.”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, “Joint Statement of the R4,” June 21, 2026.
Associated Press, “Pakistan Says New Defense Pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey Is ‘Purely Defensive’ and Open to Others,” August 8, 2026; Arab News, “Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Says Expects Egypt to Join Defense Pact with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,” August 8, 2026.
Reuters, “Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan Pledge Mutual Defence”; Associated Press, “Pakistan Says New Defense Pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey Is ‘Purely Defensive’ and Open to Others.”

REFERENCES

Associated Press. “Pakistan Says New Defense Pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey Is ‘Purely Defensive’ and Open to Others.” August 8, 2026.
Arab News. “Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Says Expects Egypt to Join Defense Pact with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia.” August 8, 2026.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan. “Joint Declaration of the 7th Session of Pakistan-Türkiye High Level Strategic Cooperation Council: ‘Further Deepening, Diversifying, and Institutionalizing the Strategic Partnership.’” 2025.
———. “Joint Statement on the State Visit of the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif, to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” September 17, 2025.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye. “Joint Statement of the R4 Following the Fourth Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Türkiye, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” June 21, 2026.
“Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan Pledge Mutual Defence as Middle East Turmoil Escalates.” August 7, 2026.
———. “Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Defence Pact Technically Same as NATO’s Article 5, Turkish Minister Says.” August 8, 2026.
Saudi Press Agency. “Ministry of Defense: Pakistani Military Force Arrives in Saudi Arabia Under Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement.” April 11, 2026.
———. “Saudi and Turkish Companies Ink Agreement and Two MoUs to Localize Drone Industry.” August 7, 2023.

 

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Africa Enters The Postwar Gaza Equation: Uganda’s Gaza Decision

UGANDA’S GAZA DECISION: AFRICA MOVES TOWARD THE SECURITY TABLE
JAFAJ | MENA INTELLIGENCE BRIEF | August 9, 2026
KEY JUDGMENT
Uganda’s parliamentary approval of a potential deployment of Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) personnel to Gaza represents more than another foreign military commitment. Together with Morocco’s participation, it marks the beginning of an African operational role within the emerging International Stabilization Force and creates the possibility of a broader African role in postwar Gaza.
The larger strategic question is whether Uganda and Morocco will remain limited national contingents or become the foundation for wider African contributions of military, police, medical, engineering, and other stabilization capabilities. The answer will depend on the ISF’s mandate, command structure, rules of engagement, and ability to connect security operations with governance and reconstruction.
Uganda may be one of the countries positioned to help answer that question.
 
THE DECISION
On August 6, Uganda’s Parliament approved a government motion supporting the deployment of a UPDF contingent to Gaza as part of the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF). The motion was introduced by Defense and Veterans Affairs Minister Kiryowa Kiwanuka under Uganda’s constitutional and statutory requirements governing the deployment of troops outside the country. 1
The vote authorized the government to proceed with the remaining legal and operational requirements for Uganda’s participation; it did not itself deploy Ugandan forces to Gaza. The decision followed discussions between Ugandan military officials and representatives of the United States and the ISF during July. According to the UPDF, President Yoweri Museveni was prepared to deploy a contingent subject to the required legal and operational arrangements. Parliament subsequently directed the Defense Minister to proceed with the remaining requirements for an agreement governing the deployment. 1
Uganda’s decision comes as the International Stabilization Force moves from planning toward implementation. A May 2026 report to the United Nations Security Council stated that preparations for deployment were well advanced, that the ISF was operating under unified U.S. command, that a mission support site had been identified, and that efforts were underway to generate and deploy participating forces. 5 Israel’s security cabinet subsequently approved the legal framework allowing the ISF to enter Gaza, removing a key legal obstacle to an initial international presence on the ground. 6
Taken together, these developments indicate that the ISF is moving from diplomatic planning toward the operational phase. Uganda’s parliamentary action should therefore be understood as one component of a broader process that still requires final agreements, force generation, command arrangements, and deployment decisions.
The proposed mission is tied to the broader Gaza transition architecture established under U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, which welcomed the establishment of the Board of Peace and called for international contributions of personnel, equipment and financial resources. 2,3
FROM AUTHORIZATION TO DEPLOYMENT
Uganda’s parliamentary vote does not complete the deployment process. The next step is to translate political authorization into an operational agreement defining Uganda’s contribution, command relationships, rules of engagement, logistics, force protection, and the conditions governing deployment. The timing and final composition of Uganda’s contingent remain to be established. 1
Uganda’s specific responsibilities will depend on that agreement and the ISF’s final operational structure. The contingent will operate within an assigned role under the force’s overall command and according to the responsibilities established for its personnel.
For Uganda, the critical question is therefore no longer simply whether it will participate, but what role it will perform within the force and what operational responsibilities that role will entail.
 
WHY UGANDA?
Uganda is not entering the discussion as an inexperienced military actor.
The UPDF has extensive experience in multinational operations, including missions in Somalia, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and United Nations peacekeeping operations. Ugandan officials cited this experience directly when presenting the Gaza deployment to Parliament. 1
Uganda also maintains specialized peace-support training infrastructure. UPDF officials told Parliament that Ugandan personnel receive international peace-support training at the International Peace Support Operations Training Center in Singo. 1
That experience gives Kampala a potentially important advantage in Gaza. The mission will require personnel capable of operating in a multinational environment where military security must be coordinated with civilian protection, humanitarian requirements, political considerations, and other international actors.
The Gaza mission, however, will present challenges substantially different from conventional peacekeeping. Uganda will operate as one component of a multinational force rather than as an independent security actor. Its effectiveness will therefore depend not only on its own military capabilities, but also on interoperability with other contributing countries, a unified command structure, common rules of engagement, and coordination with Israeli, Palestinian, humanitarian, and civilian authorities.
A stabilization force could be required to operate simultaneously alongside:

Israeli security forces;
• Palestinian security personnel;
• international military contingents;
• humanitarian organizations;
• civilian administrators;
• reconstruction organizations; and
• an emerging Palestinian governing structure.

In that environment, coordination, rules of engagement, political neutrality, and the ability to operate alongside multiple civilian and military actors may be as important as troop numbers. The final command arrangement will therefore be critical. A capable multinational force can still fail if participating contingents operate under conflicting political instructions, unclear rules of engagement, or competing chains of command. For Uganda, the command structure will determine not only how its personnel operate, but also how responsibility is assigned when military, humanitarian, Israeli, Palestinian, and civilian authorities have competing priorities.
These command arrangements will matter because Uganda’s contribution will ultimately be judged not simply by its ability to perform assigned security tasks, but by how effectively those tasks support the broader transition from conflict to stabilization.
 
FROM WARFIGHTING TO STABILIZATION
Uganda’s Defense Minister emphasized that the proposed UPDF role would include monitoring compliance, supervising security arrangements, supporting demobilization, and helping prevent renewed conflict. The government also stated that Ugandan forces would remain neutral, comply with international humanitarian law, and operate under defined rules of engagement. 1
That language reveals the broader challenge facing the stabilization mission—but Uganda’s contingent will be responsible only for the functions assigned to it within the ISF’s overall mandate.
Gaza does not simply need soldiers. It needs a security environment in which soldiers can eventually become less necessary.
That distinction is critical. A conventional military operation generally measures success through territory controlled, threats eliminated, or missions completed. A stabilization mission must measure success differently. In Gaza, the relevant question will be whether the ISF can establish sufficient security for civilian life, humanitarian operations, institutional recovery, and reconstruction to proceed while creating the conditions for armed groups to be demobilized and legitimate governance to be restored.
The progression is straightforward:

SECURITY RESTORED
INSTITUTIONS FUNCTIONING
CIVILIANS PROTECTED
ARMED GROUPS DEMOBILIZED
GOVERNANCE TRANSFERRED
INTERNATIONAL FORCES REDUCED

The progression defines the mission’s ultimate test: whether security can be transferred from an international force to functioning local institutions.
 
AFRICA’S ROLE MAY BE BIGGER THAN TROOPS
Together, Morocco and Uganda could give the emerging stabilization force a meaningful African dimension if their participation develops into a broader African contribution. Their importance is not simply numerical. Morocco is expected to provide military officers, police, gendarmerie personnel, and a military field hospital, while Uganda brings extensive experience in multinational peace-support operations. Their participation therefore suggests that an African contribution could extend beyond conventional troop deployments to include policing, medical support, logistics, and other specialized stabilization capabilities. 1,4
The participation of Morocco and Uganda could mark the beginning of a broader African contribution to the postwar Gaza framework rather than a series of isolated deployments. If the stabilization architecture expands, additional African governments could be asked to provide military, police, medical, engineering, humanitarian, or administrative capabilities. The immediate question is what would cause those governments to participate.
A broader contribution is more likely if the ISF demonstrates a clear mandate, defined command structure, credible rules of engagement, and a manageable division of responsibilities among participating states. If those conditions are established, Morocco and Uganda could provide a foundation for recruiting additional African capabilities. If they are not, African participation may remain limited to a small number of national contingents.
That possibility matters because African governments have developed substantial experience contributing personnel and specialized capabilities to peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilization, particularly through missions on the African continent. Gaza could create a different model: African states contributing security and stabilization capacity to a major international mission outside Africa.
If that model proves operationally effective, the implications could extend well beyond Gaza. Countries such as Uganda could gain greater credibility as providers of international security and stabilization capacity, while Gaza could become a test case for whether African states can translate their peace-support experience into a broader role in international security and reconstruction missions.
 
THE POLITICAL CALCULATION
For Kampala, the Gaza deployment carries both diplomatic opportunity and political risk. Uganda’s government has presented the deployment as consistent with the country’s established role in international peace operations and its broader contribution to regional and international security. 1
At the same time, the decision places Uganda in a more complicated diplomatic position. Kampala is both a long-standing participant in African peace and security operations and a government engaged directly with the United States on the proposed Gaza stabilization mission. 1
The risk is straightforward: Uganda could become associated with a highly controversial international mission in one of the world’s most politically polarized conflicts. The conduct of the mission, its rules of engagement, and its relationship with Israeli and Palestinian authorities could directly affect Uganda’s international standing.
The opportunity is more strategic. If Uganda successfully contributes to the mission, Kampala could demonstrate that an African state is capable of providing meaningful security and stabilization capacity beyond the African continent. That could enhance Uganda’s credibility as a provider of international peace and security—not simply as a participant in African operations, but as a government capable of contributing to complex multinational stabilization efforts.
For Kampala, the diplomatic payoff will depend on three factors: whether the mission is viewed as genuinely multinational, whether Ugandan forces operate consistently with their stated neutrality and international humanitarian obligations, and whether the deployment contributes to a credible transition toward Palestinian-led governance.
 
THE BIGGER QUESTION: WHO BUILDS THE PEACE?
The military component is only one part of the Gaza transition.
The White House’s framework assigns the Board of Peace a broader role involving governance, reconstruction, international resources, and accountability. 2 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 establishes the broader international framework for the Gaza transition and authorizes the International Stabilization Force to provide security support for implementation of the plan. 3
That creates a three-part challenge:
SECURITY — Who provides the security necessary to keep the peace?
GOVERNANCE — Who administers Gaza while Palestinian-led governing institutions are established?
RECONSTRUCTION — Who finances, manages, and oversees the physical and economic recovery?
The operational test will be whether the international force can connect these three functions rather than treat them as separate missions. Security must support governance; governance must enable reconstruction; and reconstruction must produce visible improvements in civilian life. The failure of any one element could undermine the others and extend the international security presence indefinitely.
The existence of an international force does not by itself resolve these challenges. The mission will still have to establish clear command relationships, rules of engagement, coordination with Israeli and Palestinian authorities, mechanisms for civilian protection, financing arrangements, and a credible transition from international security forces to Palestinian-led governance. These factors will determine whether the ISF becomes a temporary stabilizing force or an open-ended international security presence.
Uganda’s decision addresses the security question, but security cannot be separated from governance or reconstruction. Without security, reconstruction cannot proceed. Without functioning governance, security cannot be sustained. And without visible economic and humanitarian recovery, political stability will remain fragile. Financing is therefore not simply a reconstruction issue; it is a core component of the stabilization strategy.
The ultimate test of the Gaza framework will be whether the international community can solve all three problems simultaneously—and sustain the commitment long enough for Gaza to move from stabilization to self-government.
 
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
Uganda’s parliamentary vote should not be viewed simply as an African country volunteering troops for an international mission. It is an early indication that the emerging Gaza stabilization architecture is beginning to translate diplomatic commitments into operational participation—and that African states may become an important part of that process.
If Uganda proceeds, its contribution could provide three important benefits:

Operational capacity for the International Stabilization Force.
An African dimension to an international mission that otherwise could be dominated by Western and Middle Eastern participants.
A potential foundation for broader African participation in Gaza stabilization, reconstruction, and post-conflict governance.

But the strategic significance of Uganda’s decision will ultimately depend on what happens after authorization. The critical questions are whether the ISF can establish effective command and rules of engagement, protect civilians, coordinate with Israeli and Palestinian authorities, support humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, and create the conditions for a credible transition to Palestinian-led governance.
The most important development may therefore not be the number of Ugandan troops eventually deployed. It may be whether Uganda and Morocco become the beginning of a meaningful African operational role in building the postwar Middle East—and whether that role expands beyond two national contingents.
For JAFAJ, four indicators will be particularly important:

The final composition of the ISF.
The command and rules-of-engagement structure governing participating forces.
The scope of African participation beyond Morocco and Uganda.
Measurable progress in governance and reconstruction alongside the international security presence.

The strategic question is therefore no longer simply whether African states will participate. It is whether Uganda and Morocco can help establish a durable African role in the security, stabilization, and reconstruction of postwar Gaza—and whether the international force can ultimately make itself less necessary.
 
 
FOOTNOTES

Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces, “Parliament Backs UPDF Deployment to Gaza as Part of International Stabilisation Force,” August 7, 2026.
The White House, “Statement on President Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict,” January 16, 2026.
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2803 (2025), November 17, 2025.
 Reuters, “Morocco Signs Agreement to Join Gaza International Force, State Media Say,” July 15, 2026.
United Nations, Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza, S/2026/418, May 15, 2026.
Reuters, “Israel to Allow International Force into Gaza, Israeli Official Says,” July 26, 2026.

REFERENCES

“Israel to Allow International Force into Gaza, Israeli Official Says.” July 26, 2026.
“Morocco Signs Agreement to Join Gaza International Force, State Media Say.” July 15, 2026.
Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces. “Parliament Backs UPDF Deployment to Gaza as Part of International Stabilisation Force.” August 7, 2026.
United Nations. Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza. S/2026/418. May 15, 2026.
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2803 (2025). November 17, 2025.
White House. “Statement on President Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict.” January 16, 2026.

 
 
 
 

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Uganda Becomes First African Nation To Publicly Commit Troops To Gaza Stabilization Force

KEY JUDGMENTS

Uganda has become the first African nation to publicly approve the deployment of troops to the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF) for Gaza, marking a significant transition from ceasefire negotiations toward planning for post-conflict implementation. Parliamentary approval was granted on August 6, although deployment remains contingent upon additional legal and operational agreements.¹
The decision represents Uganda’s first official public commitment to participate in the U.S.-backed multinational stabilization force envisioned for post-war Gaza. Until now, Uganda had been identified by Israeli officials as a potential contributor, but Kampala had not publicly confirmed its participation.²
Uganda’s approval signals that international planning is beginning to shift beyond diplomacy toward the practical requirements of securing, governing, and stabilizing Gaza after active military operations conclude.
Uganda’s participation may also mark the beginning of a broader strategic partnership with the United States, positioning Kampala as an increasingly important security and diplomatic partner in the Middle East while strengthening its international profile.

ANALYSIS
For months, international attention has focused on ceasefire negotiations, hostage releases, humanitarian assistance, and political agreements. Comparatively little attention has been devoted to the equally important question of who will secure and stabilize Gaza once the fighting ends.
Uganda’s parliamentary approval provides one of the clearest indications to date that governments are beginning to prepare for that next phase. The proposed International Stabilization Force is expected to operate in areas of Gaza outside direct Israeli control following implementation of the broader peace framework. Although political, diplomatic, and security conditions must still be satisfied before deployment, Uganda’s decision moves the discussion from theoretical planning toward operational preparation.¹
The announcement also reinforces a broader trend identified throughout recent JaFaJ reporting: modern peace processes increasingly require governments willing to assume responsibilities that extend well beyond diplomacy. Negotiating agreements is only the first stage of conflict resolution. Lasting peace depends upon security, governance, humanitarian coordination, reconstruction, and sustained international commitment.
Uganda brings substantial operational experience to this mission. The Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) has participated in major peacekeeping and stabilization operations in Somalia, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, providing experience directly applicable to complex post-conflict environments.
Beyond Gaza, Uganda’s decision may represent the beginning of a broader strategic relationship between Presidents Yoweri Museveni and Donald Trump. By becoming one of the first governments to publicly commit forces to the proposed stabilization mission, Uganda has positioned itself as a key implementation partner within the emerging post-war security framework. If the mission proves successful, cooperation could expand beyond military operations into regional security, diplomacy, intelligence sharing, trade, and economic engagement. While any future changes to U.S. sanctions, tariffs, or other bilateral policies would require separate political and legal decisions, Uganda’s willingness to assume responsibility in one of the world’s most challenging stabilization missions could strengthen its long-term relationship with Washington and elevate its diplomatic influence internationally.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
Uganda’s announcement raises several important strategic questions that will shape the next phase of the Gaza peace process:

Which additional nations will formally commit forces to the International Stabilization Force?
What command structure and rules of engagement will govern multinational operations?
Under what legal authority will participating forces operate?
How and when will security responsibilities transition from Israeli forces to the multinational mission?
What governments and international institutions will finance long-term stabilization and reconstruction?
Could Uganda’s participation serve as a catalyst for broader U.S.-Uganda strategic cooperation extending beyond Gaza?

The answers to these questions may ultimately prove as important as the ceasefire negotiations themselves, determining not only whether peace can be achieved, but whether it can be sustained.
THE JaFaJ ASSESSMENT
Uganda’s parliamentary approval should be viewed as more than a military announcement. It represents one of the first concrete indicators that the international community is beginning to transition from negotiating peace to implementing it.
The decision also highlights an emerging reality of twenty-first century conflict resolution: nations that contribute to post-conflict security and stabilization often gain diplomatic influence extending far beyond the battlefield. If Uganda’s participation marks the beginning of closer strategic cooperation with the United States, it could influence future regional security initiatives, diplomatic engagement, and broader bilateral relations.
History demonstrates that ending wars is only the beginning. Lasting peace depends upon governments willing to provide security, support reconstruction, and sustain political commitments long after the fighting ends. Uganda’s decision suggests that the implementation phase of the Gaza peace process may now be underway.
Sources

Reuters, Uganda clears way for deployment of troops to Gaza under Trump plan, August 6, 2026.
Reuters, Israeli security cabinet approves letting international force enter Gaza areas beyond Israeli control, July 26, 2026.

 

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Who Pays For Peace?

The Missing Budget in International Relations
JaFaJ STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
 
IN-A-NUTSHELL
If you only have three minutes, here’s the central argument.
Governments spend trillions of dollars every year preparing for war, yet comparatively little preparing for what comes after the fighting stops. Nations maintain standing armies, intelligence agencies, cyber commands, logistics networks, and military reserve forces because they understand that preparation is less expensive than crisis. But when conflicts end, the international community often discovers it has no comparable system for financing, organizing, or implementing peace.
JaFaJ argues that this is one of the most overlooked weaknesses in modern national security policy.
Peace is not simply a humanitarian aspiration. It is a strategic capability and an economic investment. Successful diplomacy restores trade, lowers insurance costs, attracts investment, accelerates reconstruction, reduces refugee flows, and strengthens long-term regional stability. Yet governments rarely budget for mediation, peace implementation, or post-conflict recovery with the same discipline they apply to military preparedness.
This paper introduces several new strategic concepts—including the Peace Deficit, Peace Return on Investment (PROI), and Strategic Peace Capital—to encourage governments to measure peace readiness with the same rigor they measure military readiness. It also proposes a six-pillar JaFaJ Peace Architecture designed to institutionalize diplomacy, reconstruction, mediation, and peace implementation before crises occur rather than after they erupt.
The central question is straightforward:
If governments budget for every stage of war, why do so few budget for peace?
JaFaJ concludes that the defining strategic competition of the twenty-first century may not simply be over military superiority or economic dominance. It may be over which nations possess the institutions, financial capacity, diplomatic readiness, and political vision to transform military victories into lasting peace. Governments that prepare only to fight wars may win battles. Governments that prepare to build peace may shape the international order that follows.
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Every year, governments invest trillions of dollars preparing for war. They finance advanced weapons systems, intelligence networks, cyber defense, logistics, force readiness, and military modernization because they understand a fundamental principle of national security: preparation is less expensive than crisis. Yet when wars end, that principle is often abandoned. The international community routinely discovers that it has invested comparatively little in the institutions, personnel, financing, and planning required to secure and sustain the peace.¹
This contradiction represents one of the least recognized vulnerabilities in modern international affairs. Nations meticulously measure military readiness, but few systematically evaluate peace readiness. Standing armed forces are funded years in advance, while mediation teams, reconstruction financing, humanitarian coordination, governance planning, and post-conflict recovery mechanisms are frequently assembled only after violence has erupted.²
JaFaJ argues that this reactive approach is neither strategically sound nor economically efficient. Delayed investments in peacebuilding increase reconstruction costs, prolong humanitarian crises, discourage private investment, disrupt international trade, delay economic recovery, and heighten the risk that fragile ceasefires will collapse into renewed conflict. In economic terms, the world repeatedly pays a premium for preparing too late.
This paper advances a broader proposition. Peace should no longer be viewed solely as a diplomatic aspiration or humanitarian objective. It should be recognized as a strategic national security investment—one that generates measurable political, economic, and security returns for both the countries emerging from conflict and the international community that depends upon global stability.
For generations, governments have built sophisticated institutions to prepare for war.
JaFaJ believes the twenty-first century demands an equally disciplined commitment to preparing for peace.
 
THE MOST EXPENSIVE GOVERNMENT PROGRAM THAT DOESN’T EXIST
Every responsible government accepts a fundamental principle of national security:
Preparation costs less than crisis.
That principle explains why nations invest heavily in standing armed forces, intelligence agencies, cybersecurity, strategic stockpiles, logistics networks, military education, and long-term procurement programs. These capabilities are financed years—often decades—in advance because governments understand that responding after a crisis begins is almost always more expensive than preparing before one occurs.
Yet when armed conflicts end, that same principle is frequently abandoned.
Governments that meticulously plan for war often discover they have made comparatively little investment in preparing for peace.
Few maintain permanent mediation teams.
Few establish dedicated reconstruction funds.
Few budget for transitional justice, post-conflict governance, economic stabilization, humanitarian coordination, or the long-term diplomatic engagement required to transform fragile ceasefires into durable political settlements. Instead, these capabilities are often assembled only after violence has erupted, relying upon emergency appropriations, donor conferences, multilateral appeals, and ad hoc diplomatic initiatives created under intense political pressure.³
The consequences are both predictable and expensive.
Delays in organizing peace implementation prolong humanitarian crises, discourage private investment, slow the restoration of trade, increase reconstruction costs, weaken public confidence, and raise the likelihood that unresolved disputes will reignite into renewed conflict.
From a public finance perspective, this represents a remarkable contradiction.
Governments routinely budget for every stage of war—from deterrence and mobilization to combat operations and veterans’ care—but comparatively few budget systematically for the equally demanding process of securing the peace.
The international community has institutionalized the business of war.
It has yet to institutionalize the business of peace.
That distinction may represent one of the most significant—and costly—gaps in modern national security planning.
 
 
THE ECONOMICS OF PEACE
Peace is most often described as a humanitarian objective or a diplomatic achievement.
It should also be understood as an economic asset.
Wars destroy infrastructure, interrupt trade, displace labor, increase sovereign borrowing, elevate insurance costs, disrupt energy markets, discourage investment, and weaken public institutions. By contrast, durable peace reverses those dynamics. It restores confidence, reduces uncertainty, lowers transaction costs, and creates the conditions necessary for long-term economic growth.⁴
Every successful ceasefire generates measurable economic value.
Reopened shipping lanes reduce transportation costs and improve the reliability of global supply chains.
Secure borders facilitate trade, tourism, and cross-border investment.
Functioning ports restore commercial activity and government revenue.
Returning refugees expand the labor force, increase consumer demand, and reduce the long-term financial burden of humanitarian assistance.
The reconstruction of schools, hospitals, transportation networks, courts, utilities, and communications infrastructure creates employment while laying the foundation for sustained economic development.
The economic benefits extend well beyond the countries directly emerging from conflict.
Stable regions strengthen international supply chains, improve global energy security, reduce maritime insurance premiums, encourage foreign direct investment, stabilize financial markets, and lower the fiscal demands placed upon international humanitarian organizations. The dividends of peace are therefore shared not only by former adversaries, but by trading partners, investors, insurers, and consumers around the world.
Despite these measurable returns, governments rarely evaluate peacebuilding as they would any other strategic investment.
Infrastructure projects are assessed by expected economic growth.
Education is measured by improvements in human capital.
Scientific research is justified by innovation and productivity.
National defense is funded to deter future threats.
Peacebuilding, however, is seldom evaluated according to its long-term economic return.
This represents a significant gap in modern public policy.
JaFaJ argues that diplomacy should no longer be viewed solely as an instrument of foreign policy.
It should also be recognized as economic infrastructure—an investment that generates measurable returns through expanded trade, lower risk, increased investment, stronger institutions, and greater international stability.
The twenty-first century will not simply reward governments capable of financing war.
It will increasingly reward those capable of financing peace.
 
THE PEACE DEFICIT
Governments routinely measure fiscal deficits, trade imbalances, infrastructure shortfalls, housing shortages, labor market gaps, and investment needs because these indicators help policymakers identify risks before they become national crises.
Curiously, no comparable measure exists for one of the most consequential challenges confronting the international community:
The capacity to build and sustain peace.
JaFaJ describes this gap as the Peace Deficit.
JaFaJ Definition — Peace Deficit
The difference between the diplomatic, financial, institutional, legal, and human resources required to prevent, negotiate, implement, and sustain durable peace, and the resources governments actually commit before conflict occurs.
Unlike military weakness, peace deficits are rarely visible during periods of stability. They accumulate quietly over years as governments underinvest in diplomacy, mediation, reconstruction planning, conflict prevention, peace implementation, and the institutions responsible for transforming ceasefires into lasting political settlements.
The consequences become apparent only after violence erupts.
Governments suddenly discover shortages of experienced mediators, reconstruction specialists, humanitarian coordinators, legal experts, financial resources, governance capacity, and implementation mechanisms precisely when those capabilities are needed most.
By then, the opportunity for inexpensive prevention has largely disappeared.
History repeatedly demonstrates that rebuilding fractured societies costs far more than preserving stable ones. Every delayed investment in diplomacy increases the financial, political, and human costs of recovery. Every underfunded peace process raises the likelihood that fragile settlements will collapse into renewed conflict.
Like deferred maintenance on critical infrastructure, peace deficits compound over time.
Ignoring them does not eliminate the liability.
It simply increases the eventual cost of repayment.
JaFaJ believes governments should begin measuring peace deficits with the same discipline applied to fiscal sustainability, infrastructure resilience, and military readiness.
Because what is not measured is rarely managed.
And what is not managed eventually becomes a crisis.
 
THE RETURN ON DIPLOMACY
Governments routinely evaluate public investments according to their expected return.
Transportation infrastructure is justified by increased commerce and economic productivity.
Education is funded because it develops human capital and expands long-term economic opportunity.
Scientific research drives innovation, competitiveness, and technological advancement.
National defense is financed to deter aggression and reduce future security risks.
Every major public expenditure is expected to produce measurable strategic, economic, or societal benefits.
Diplomacy should be evaluated according to the same standard.
Successful mediation is not simply a political achievement.
It is an investment capable of generating substantial economic, financial, and strategic returns.
A peace initiative costing tens—or even hundreds—of millions of dollars may prevent conflicts that would otherwise consume tens of billions in military operations, humanitarian assistance, refugee support, infrastructure reconstruction, disrupted trade, higher insurance costs, and prolonged peacekeeping commitments.⁴
The financial implications extend well beyond the immediate parties to a conflict.
Every successful negotiation reduces uncertainty within international markets.
It restores investor confidence.
It strengthens supply chains.
It stabilizes energy markets.
It lowers transportation and maritime insurance costs.
It encourages foreign direct investment.
It accelerates economic recovery while reducing the long-term fiscal burden placed upon governments and international organizations.
From a public finance perspective, these are measurable returns.
Yet governments rarely calculate them.
JaFaJ proposes that diplomacy should be evaluated using a framework comparable to other forms of strategic public investment.
Accordingly, this report introduces the concept of Peace Return on Investment (PROI).
JaFaJ Definition — Peace Return on Investment (PROI)
The long-term economic, political, and security value generated by investments in conflict prevention, mediation, peace implementation, and post-conflict stabilization relative to the financial and diplomatic resources committed.
Under such a framework, governments would evaluate diplomacy not solely by whether negotiations succeed or fail, but by the broader value created through wars avoided, trade restored, infrastructure preserved, refugee movements reduced, investor confidence strengthened, reconstruction costs contained, and regional stability sustained.
The implications extend far beyond foreign policy.
If governments can calculate the return on infrastructure, education, scientific research, and defense spending, they should also be able to evaluate the return generated by successful diplomacy.
Because in the twenty-first century, one of the most valuable investments a nation can make may not be another weapons system.
It may be preventing the next war from occurring.
 
THE JaFaJ PEACE ARCHITECTURE
A Framework for Twenty-First Century Peace Readiness
For more than a century, governments have invested systematically in the institutions required to deter war, project military power, and defend national interests. Standing armies, intelligence services, logistics networks, reserve forces, and defense industries are now considered essential components of national security.
No comparable architecture exists for building peace.
Instead, mediation teams are assembled after crises erupt, reconstruction financing is sought after infrastructure has been destroyed, and diplomatic coalitions are often created only after violence has escalated beyond political control.
JaFaJ believes this reactive model is no longer sustainable.
If peace is essential to national security, economic stability, and international prosperity, then governments should prepare for peace with the same discipline, permanence, and institutional commitment that they devote to preparing for war.
Accordingly, JaFaJ proposes the development of a comprehensive Peace Readiness Architecture built upon six strategic pillars.
 
PILLAR I — NATIONAL PEACE BUDGETS
Governments should establish dedicated annual appropriations supporting conflict prevention, mediation, peace implementation, transitional governance, reconstruction planning, and post-conflict stabilization.
Preparing for peace should become a permanent budgetary responsibility rather than an emergency expenditure approved only after violence has erupted.
 
PILLAR II — DIPLOMATIC READINESS ASSESSMENTS
Military readiness is measured continuously.
Diplomatic readiness should be measured with equal discipline.
Governments should publish annual assessments evaluating their ability to organize negotiations, deploy experienced mediation teams, sustain long-term diplomatic engagement, coordinate coalition partners, and implement complex peace agreements.
What is not measured is rarely managed.
 
PILLAR III — NATIONAL MEDIATION CORPS
Every nation maintains trained military professionals prepared to respond rapidly during national emergencies.
Governments should develop comparable civilian capabilities.
Permanent National Mediation Corps should integrate diplomats, economists, intelligence analysts, constitutional lawyers, humanitarian specialists, military planners, development experts, financial professionals, and regional specialists capable of immediate deployment during emerging international crises.
Peace should never depend upon assembling expertise after conflict has already begun.
 
PILLAR IV — RECONSTRUCTION RESERVE FUNDS
History demonstrates that the period immediately following a ceasefire often determines whether peace succeeds or fails.
Governments and international institutions should establish standing reconstruction reserve funds capable of immediate activation following negotiated settlements.
Rapid investments in infrastructure, governance, justice systems, education, healthcare, and economic recovery frequently cost far less than managing renewed violence after fragile agreements collapse.
 
PILLAR V — COALITION MEDIATION FRAMEWORKS
Twenty-first century conflicts are increasingly too complex for any single government to resolve alone.
Future peace negotiations should rely upon permanent multinational mediation frameworks that combine:

regional legitimacy;
diplomatic credibility;
economic capacity;
security expertise;
legal authority;
humanitarian capability; and
long-term implementation resources.

The future of peace diplomacy belongs not to individual mediators, but to integrated diplomatic coalitions.
 
PILLAR VI — INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACCOUNTABILITY
Governments routinely publish defense budgets, military expenditures, foreign assistance programs, and development spending.
Comparable transparency should exist for peace.
JaFaJ recommends annual public reporting measuring national investments in conflict prevention, mediation, reconstruction, peace implementation, and long-term stabilization alongside traditional national security expenditures.
Nations should be evaluated not only by what they spend preparing for war, but also by what they invest in preventing it.
 
FROM REACTIVE DIPLOMACY TO STRATEGIC PEACE READINESS
Collectively, these six pillars represent more than individual policy recommendations.
They form the foundation of a broader strategic proposition.
The international community has spent generations institutionalizing the business of war.
The twenty-first century should be remembered for institutionalizing the business of peace.
Military superiority will remain an essential component of national security.
Economic competitiveness will continue shaping geopolitical influence.
But the nations that invest systematically in diplomacy, mediation, reconstruction, and peace implementation will possess a strategic capability that many governments have yet to recognize.
The next generation of global leadership may ultimately be defined not by who can wage war most effectively, but by who is best prepared to build a durable peace when the fighting ends.
 
A NEW MEASURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY
For more than a century, governments have measured national security through familiar indicators: the size of their armed forces, the sophistication of their weapons, the resilience of their economies, the strength of their alliances, and their capacity to deter aggression.
These measures remain indispensable.
They are no longer sufficient.
The defining national security challenge of the twenty-first century may not be determining who can wage war most effectively, but who can prevent conflict from becoming permanent.
Military victories can remove immediate threats.
They cannot, by themselves, rebuild institutions, restore public trust, revive economies, return displaced populations, or transform ceasefires into durable political settlements.
Those responsibilities belong to diplomacy.
They require governments that are prepared not only to fight, but also to finance, organize, negotiate, implement, and sustain the peace that follows.
JaFaJ argues that this capacity constitutes a distinct form of strategic power.
This report defines that capability as Strategic Peace Capital.
JaFaJ Definition — Strategic Peace Capital
The institutional capacity, diplomatic credibility, financial preparedness, international partnerships, and operational experience that enable a nation to prevent conflict, negotiate durable settlements, implement peace agreements, and sustain long-term political stability.
Unlike military power, Strategic Peace Capital cannot be acquired quickly during a crisis.
It is accumulated over years through sustained investments in diplomacy, mediation, reconstruction planning, peace implementation, international partnerships, and the institutions that transform negotiated agreements into lasting stability.
Nations that consistently develop Strategic Peace Capital acquire advantages that extend well beyond traditional measures of national power.
They become trusted conveners during international crises.
They attract diplomatic partnerships.
They influence the design of post-conflict institutions.
They shape reconstruction priorities.
They strengthen international confidence.
And they help write the political architecture that emerges after war.
Military power may determine who prevails on the battlefield.
Economic power may determine who finances recovery.
Strategic Peace Capital may determine who shapes the international order that follows.
That distinction carries profound implications for governments, legislatures, finance ministries, defense planners, and international institutions alike.
If nations routinely budget for deterrence, mobilization, military readiness, veterans’ care, and post-war recovery, should they not also budget systematically for conflict prevention, mediation, reconstruction, and peace implementation?
JaFaJ believes the next evolution in national security policy is not simply stronger defense.
It is balanced preparedness—a national strategy that recognizes security depends upon two complementary capabilities:
The ability to prevail in war.
The ability to build peace.
The governments that master both will not simply respond to the international order.
They will help define it.
 
JaFaJ STRATEGIC QUESTIONS
Questions That Should Shape the Next Generation of National Security Policy
Every generation of policymakers inherits assumptions that eventually require reexamination.
For much of the twentieth century, governments asked how to deter wars, how to win wars, and how to defend against wars.
The twenty-first century demands a different set of questions.
JaFaJ believes the international community has devoted extraordinary intellectual, political, and financial resources to understanding the economics of war, while giving comparatively little attention to the economics of peace.
If that imbalance continues, governments may discover they have perfected the ability to manage conflict while neglecting the institutions required to end it.
Accordingly, JaFaJ offers the following strategic questions—not as conclusions, but as invitations for policymakers, legislators, economists, military planners, diplomats, and international organizations to reconsider the architecture of modern national security.
Should governments publish annual Peace Budgets alongside defense budgets, allowing taxpayers and legislatures to evaluate investments in conflict prevention, mediation, reconstruction, and long-term stability with the same transparency applied to military spending?
Should ministries of finance calculate the economic return on diplomacy in the same manner they evaluate investments in transportation infrastructure, public health, scientific research, and national defense?
Should every major nation maintain a permanent National Mediation Corps—trained, funded, and prepared for rapid deployment—just as they maintain military reserve forces prepared for national emergencies?
Should international organizations establish measurable standards for Peace Readiness, enabling governments to assess whether they possess the institutional capacity to negotiate, implement, and sustain durable peace agreements before crises emerge?
Should national security strategies include measurable indicators for conflict prevention, diplomatic readiness, reconstruction capacity, and peace implementation alongside traditional assessments of military capability and deterrence?
Should governments begin measuring Strategic Peace Capital with the same discipline used to evaluate military readiness, economic resilience, technological competitiveness, and alliance strength?
Should peace implementation become a permanent national security function rather than an improvised international response assembled after violence has already occurred?
Most importantly, have governments spent the past century preparing to win wars while failing to prepare adequately to win the peace?
That final question may prove to be the most important.
History demonstrates that military victories do not automatically produce political stability.
Conflicts may end on the battlefield, but lasting peace is built through institutions, investment, diplomacy, governance, and sustained political commitment.
JaFaJ believes the next generation of global leadership will be judged not only by the strength of a nation’s armed forces, the size of its economy, or the sophistication of its technology.
It will also be judged by whether it possesses the vision, institutions, financial commitment, and political will to transform military success into enduring peace.
The twenty-first century may ultimately reward those governments that become not only the world’s strongest defenders—
but also its most effective builders of peace.
 
FOOTNOTES

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Trends in World Military Expenditure, latest annual report; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance (London: Routledge, latest edition).
United Nations, Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund Strategy; United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, official reports on sustaining peace.
United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Guidance for Mediation; World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018).
World Bank, Pathways for Peace; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), reports on the economic impact of conflict and peacebuilding; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), publications on post-conflict recovery and economic resilience.

 

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Where Are China And Russia?

THE MISSING MEDIATORS IN TODAY’S PEACE TALKS
By JaFaJ Intelligence Desk
 
IN-A-NUTSHELL
If you only have three minutes, here’s what you need to know.
Nearly every major peace negotiation underway today—from Gaza and Lebanon to the Strait of Hormuz and broader U.S.–Iran diplomacy—is being organized by the United States, regional governments such as Qatar, Oman, and Egypt, or European partners. By contrast, China and Russia—despite their status as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and frequent advocates of a multipolar international order—have generally chosen not to lead these negotiations.
This report argues that their relative absence is not diplomatic inactivity but a deliberate strategic choice. Rather than assuming responsibility for organizing and sustaining peace negotiations, Beijing and Moscow appear to favor a model that maximizes geopolitical influence while minimizing the political, financial, military, and diplomatic risks associated with mediation.
The distinction matters.
Leading peace negotiations requires governments to invest years of diplomatic effort, commit financial resources, coordinate humanitarian assistance, support reconstruction, monitor ceasefires, and accept political accountability when agreements fail. Those responsibilities extend far beyond hosting negotiations or issuing public statements.
JaFaJ concludes that the international system may be entering a new era in which influence and leadership are increasingly diverging. Nations can exercise considerable geopolitical influence without accepting responsibility for resolving international conflicts.
That raises a larger strategic question:
Can a truly multipolar world succeed if only a handful of nations remain willing to bear the costs and responsibilities of building peace?
Ultimately, this report argues that the defining measure of twenty-first century leadership may no longer be military strength or economic power alone—it may be a nation’s willingness and ability to organize, finance, and sustain peace after wars begin.
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As wars continue across the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and Asia, one question has become increasingly difficult to ignore: Where are China and Russia?
Nearly every major diplomatic initiative in today’s conflicts—from ceasefire negotiations in Gaza, maritime security discussions involving the Strait of Hormuz, talks concerning Lebanon, hostage negotiations, and even efforts to stabilize Sudan and Yemen—has involved the United States, regional governments, or European partners in one capacity or another. Yet two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, both of whom frequently advocate for a multipolar international order, have largely remained outside the role of principal mediators.
This report concludes that the relative absence of China and Russia from today’s highest-profile peace negotiations is not accidental but reflects a deliberate diplomatic strategy designed to maximize geopolitical influence while minimizing the political, military, and financial burdens traditionally associated with leading international mediation.²
The distinction is important. In the twenty-first century, nations seeking global leadership are increasingly judged not only by their economic strength or military capability, but also by their willingness to organize, sustain, and ultimately assume responsibility for ending international conflicts. The central question explored in this report is whether an emerging gap now exists between the pursuit of great-power influence and the acceptance of great-power responsibility.
JaFaJ Assessment: This report concludes that the principal challenge facing the international system is not a shortage of diplomatic influence, but a shortage of governments willing to assume responsibility for organizing, financing, and sustaining peace. As geopolitical power becomes more widely distributed, leadership in conflict resolution has become increasingly concentrated. Unless more nations develop the institutional capacity and political willingness to lead complex peace negotiations, the gap between global influence and global responsibility is likely to widen.
 
THE QUESTION FEW ARE ASKING
Despite continuous reporting on military operations, humanitarian crises, sanctions, diplomatic statements, and battlefield developments, remarkably little attention has been devoted to a more fundamental strategic question:
Who is actually trying to end these conflicts?
This question has implications far beyond the current conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, or the Strait of Hormuz. It challenges one of the fundamental assumptions of international relations: that nations seeking greater global influence will also assume greater responsibility for resolving international crises. Increasingly, those two roles appear to be diverging.
The ability to wage war and the ability to negotiate peace are not the same strategic capability. Military operations may dominate headlines, but successful peace negotiations require governments willing to assume long-term political responsibility, commit substantial diplomatic resources, and accept accountability when negotiations fail.
Throughout the twentieth century, major powers routinely accepted that responsibility. Negotiations involving Egypt and Israel, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and numerous other international conflicts were supported by governments possessing both the diplomatic influence and the political will to invest significant capital in difficult peace processes.
Today, however, the diplomatic landscape appears markedly different.
The United States continues to participate directly or indirectly in negotiations involving Israel, Lebanon, Hamas, Iran, Ukraine, and maritime security in both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Regional governments—including Qatar, Egypt, Oman, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—have likewise assumed increasingly important mediation responsibilities.³
By comparison, China and Russia have generally chosen to support diplomatic efforts from the sidelines rather than assume primary responsibility for organizing, leading, and sustaining major peace negotiations.
This distinction is important because mediation is fundamentally different from diplomacy.
Governments routinely issue statements supporting peace, encouraging dialogue, or condemning violence. Mediation, however, demands far more than public diplomacy. It requires governments to commit political capital, diplomatic expertise, and often significant national resources to a process whose outcome remains uncertain.
Successful mediators must typically:

establish secure communications between adversaries;
dedicate experienced negotiating teams over extended periods;
provide neutral venues for sensitive discussions;
develop confidence-building measures;
draft compromise frameworks;
coordinate international political and humanitarian support; and
in many cases, help guarantee implementation after agreements are reached.

These responsibilities expose mediators to considerable political risk. When negotiations fail—as they often do—the governments leading the process are frequently criticized by all parties involved.
For that reason, mediation represents far more than diplomacy. It is an assumption of international responsibility.
 
THE COST OF PEACE
Bringing nations to the negotiating table is often portrayed as the culmination of diplomacy. In reality, it is usually the beginning of a far more demanding and politically hazardous process.
Unlike military victories, peace negotiations rarely produce immediate political rewards. When negotiations fail—as they frequently do—the mediator is often criticized by every participant. Each side accuses the intermediary of insufficient pressure, excessive concessions, political favoritism, or an inability to enforce agreements. Success, by contrast, is seldom attributed to a single government. The political benefits are typically shared among numerous participants, while the principal mediator assumes the greatest responsibility for sustaining the agreement.
For these reasons, mediation represents one of the most resource-intensive responsibilities of international leadership.
Effective mediation requires far more than diplomatic skill. It demands:

established diplomatic credibility;
reliable intelligence capabilities;
military, economic, or political leverage over the negotiating parties;
the ability to mobilize humanitarian and financial assistance;
sustained political engagement over months or even years; and
a willingness to remain committed long after international attention has shifted elsewhere.

Hosting negotiations is only one phase of the process.
Successful peace agreements frequently require international monitoring mechanisms, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction funding, sanctions relief, prisoner exchanges, border verification, economic assistance, and, in some cases, long-term security guarantees. These responsibilities often continue for years after a formal agreement has been signed.
Without such commitments, negotiated settlements frequently prove temporary, allowing conflicts to re-emerge once external diplomatic pressure subsides.
This reality helps explain why many governments publicly support diplomacy while remaining reluctant to assume primary responsibility for leading it. Encouraging negotiations carries relatively little political risk. Leading them requires governments to invest significant diplomatic resources, accept long-term obligations, and ultimately bear responsibility when peace proves difficult to sustain.
These realities also help explain why some major powers may deliberately choose to support peace initiatives without leading them. Encouraging negotiations allows governments to project diplomatic influence while avoiding the substantial political, financial, and long-term obligations that accompany successful mediation. The distinction between supporting diplomacy and leading diplomacy lies at the heart of this report.
 
CHINA’S MODEL OF GLOBAL INFLUENCE
During the past two decades, China has transformed itself into one of the world’s most influential economic powers. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, expanded trade relationships, infrastructure investment, technology partnerships, and energy cooperation, Beijing has significantly increased its political and economic presence throughout the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.⁴
Yet China’s expanding global influence has not been accompanied by a corresponding expansion of international security leadership.
Unlike the United States, whose global influence has traditionally combined economic, military, and diplomatic engagement, China has generally emphasized economic integration while exercising considerably greater caution in assuming responsibility for resolving complex international conflicts.
This distinction is central to understanding Beijing’s broader strategic approach.
China’s principal interests in the Middle East remain largely economic and geopolitical. They include:

securing reliable energy supplies;
protecting critical maritime trade routes;
expanding commercial investment opportunities;
maintaining regional stability conducive to economic growth; and
preventing disruptions to global supply chains.

Achieving these objectives does not necessarily require China to become the principal architect of regional peace negotiations.
On the contrary, assuming responsibility for mediating active conflicts could expose Beijing to political risks that provide relatively little strategic return. Failed negotiations, renewed hostilities, humanitarian crises, or collapsed ceasefires could damage China’s carefully cultivated relationships with multiple regional governments while creating expectations for long-term diplomatic, economic, or even security commitments.
The 2023 Saudi Arabia-Iran normalization agreement demonstrated that China possesses both the diplomatic capability and the international credibility to facilitate meaningful negotiations under favorable circumstances.⁵ That agreement represented an important diplomatic achievement and signaled Beijing’s growing confidence as a global actor.
However, normalizing diplomatic relations between two sovereign governments differs fundamentally from mediating active wars involving multiple armed organizations, humanitarian emergencies, territorial disputes, and deeply rooted political grievances.
The latter requires more than diplomatic influence. It demands sustained political engagement, continued mediation after agreements are signed, and, in many cases, the willingness to provide economic assistance, security assurances, or long-term diplomatic oversight.
To date, Beijing has generally avoided assuming those responsibilities.
Instead, China has pursued a strategy that supports negotiations, encourages regional stability, and expands its diplomatic influence while avoiding primary responsibility for enforcing or sustaining negotiated outcomes.
From Beijing’s perspective, this approach offers considerable advantages. It preserves productive relationships with competing regional actors, minimizes political exposure if negotiations collapse, and allows China to expand its international influence without assuming the full burdens traditionally associated with great-power leadership.
Whether this represents prudent statecraft or a deliberate limitation on China’s global leadership ambitions remains one of the defining questions confronting international diplomacy in the twenty-first century.
China’s preference for economic engagement over security leadership explains only part of the broader strategic picture. To understand why today’s most significant peace negotiations continue to be led by the United States and regional governments, it is equally important to examine Russia’s evolving diplomatic posture—and, more importantly, the strategic logic increasingly shared by both Moscow and Beijing.
Although China and Russia differ substantially in their geopolitical objectives, military capabilities, and economic priorities, both governments have largely adopted a similar approach to international conflict resolution. Rather than assuming primary responsibility for organizing and sustaining major peace negotiations, they have generally sought to maximize diplomatic influence while minimizing the long-term political, military, and financial obligations associated with international mediation.⁶
This convergence is significant because mediation is not simply another instrument of foreign policy. It is one of the most demanding responsibilities of international leadership. Governments willing to lead peace negotiations must not only bring adversaries to the negotiating table, but also accept responsibility for sustaining agreements long after the negotiations themselves have ended.
Although China’s strategic priorities differ substantially from Russia’s, both governments appear to have reached a similar conclusion regarding international mediation. Rather than routinely serving as principal architects of peace negotiations, each has generally favored an approach that preserves diplomatic influence while limiting long-term political, financial, and security commitments. The reasons differ; the outcome is strikingly similar.
 
RUSSIA: A GLOBAL POWER FACING STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS
For much of the post-Cold War era, Russia positioned itself as an indispensable diplomatic and security actor throughout the Middle East. Long-standing political and military relationships with Syria, Iran, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria, combined with its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, ensured that Moscow remained an influential participant in virtually every major regional security discussion.
On paper, these advantages would appear to place Russia in an ideal position to organize, host, or lead major international peace negotiations.
The reality, however, has been markedly different.
Rather than assuming leadership of comprehensive negotiations concerning Gaza, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, or maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz, Moscow has generally supported diplomatic initiatives led by other governments while advancing its own interests through bilateral diplomacy, multilateral forums, and the United Nations.⁷
This evolution reflects more than a simple shift in diplomatic priorities. It also reflects the strategic reality that every major power operates with finite political, military, economic, and diplomatic resources.
Since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has devoted extraordinary national resources to sustaining military operations, managing the effects of international sanctions, preserving domestic economic stability, maintaining strategic partnerships outside the Western alliance, and responding to an increasingly complex European security environment.
These demands inevitably constrain diplomatic capacity.
Experienced negotiators are limited in number.
Senior political leaders must constantly prioritize competing international crises.
Military planners, intelligence agencies, and foreign ministries cannot simultaneously devote unlimited attention to every conflict.
Launching and sustaining a major peace initiative in the Middle East while prosecuting Europe’s largest armed conflict since the Second World War would require an extraordinary commitment of diplomatic and political capital.
Russia’s relative absence from many of today’s highest-profile mediation efforts should therefore not automatically be interpreted as diplomatic disengagement. Rather, it reflects a broader strategic calculation regarding where Moscow believes its limited diplomatic resources can produce the greatest geopolitical return.
Whether that calculation represents prudent strategic prioritization or a missed opportunity to demonstrate global leadership remains an open question.
Russia’s strategic constraints illustrate only one of the challenges confronting potential mediators. Even governments possessing substantial diplomatic influence and geopolitical reach must also be viewed by the negotiating parties as sufficiently credible to facilitate meaningful compromise. Diplomatic capacity alone is not enough; successful mediation also depends upon trust, perceived balance, and political legitimacy.
 
THE CHALLENGE OF PERCEIVED NEUTRALITY
Diplomatic influence alone is insufficient to make a successful mediator.
Equally important is credibility.
Peace negotiations succeed only when opposing parties believe that the mediator can provide a process they perceive as fair, balanced, and capable of producing meaningful results. Absolute neutrality is rarely achievable in international politics. Every major power possesses strategic alliances, economic interests, military relationships, or historical commitments that inevitably shape how its diplomacy is viewed.
For that reason, the central question is not whether a mediator is completely neutral. Rather, it is whether the negotiating parties believe the mediator possesses sufficient credibility, influence, and political independence to facilitate meaningful compromise despite those relationships.
This challenge confronts every major power.
The United States is frequently criticized because of its long-standing strategic partnerships with Israel and several Gulf states.
Russia’s close military and political relationships with Syria and Iran similarly influence how many governments evaluate Moscow’s ability to serve as an impartial intermediary.
China’s expanding economic investments and growing commercial influence throughout the Middle East likewise shape regional perceptions of Beijing’s diplomatic priorities.
None of these relationships automatically disqualify a nation from serving as a mediator. They do, however, influence how negotiating parties assess both the mediator’s intentions and its ability to balance competing interests.
As a result, many contemporary conflicts have increasingly relied upon regional governments whose relationships with the parties are viewed as more balanced or politically acceptable.
Countries such as Qatar, Oman, Egypt, and Türkiye often possess a unique combination of regional credibility, established communication channels, and practical understanding of local political dynamics that larger global powers may struggle to replicate.
The growing reliance upon these regional intermediaries reflects an important evolution in modern diplomacy. International mediation is no longer determined solely by military strength or economic influence. Increasingly, it depends upon political credibility, regional legitimacy, and the confidence of the negotiating parties themselves.
 
THE RISE OF REGIONAL MEDIATORS
One of the most significant—and frequently overlooked—developments in international diplomacy has been the emergence of regional powers as indispensable brokers of peace.
Only a generation ago, negotiations involving major international conflicts were expected to be organized and led by global powers such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, or France. Today, however, countries including Qatar, Oman, Egypt, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates increasingly occupy the center of the diplomatic process.⁸
This transformation reflects more than a redistribution of diplomatic responsibilities. It reflects a growing recognition that regional governments often possess advantages that even the world’s most powerful nations cannot easily replicate.
Each has cultivated unique diplomatic capabilities.
Qatar has established communication channels with governments and non-state organizations that frequently refuse direct contact with one another.
Oman has earned an international reputation for discreet diplomacy and confidential negotiations, particularly involving Iran and Western governments.
Egypt remains indispensable to negotiations involving Gaza because of its geographic position, border responsibilities, intelligence cooperation, and decades of political engagement with both Israeli and Palestinian leaders.
Türkiye continues balancing complex relationships with NATO allies, Russia, Ukraine, and multiple Middle Eastern governments, allowing Ankara to maintain dialogue across geopolitical divisions that many other capitals cannot bridge.
Saudi Arabia has significantly expanded its diplomatic profile through regional normalization initiatives, multilateral diplomacy, and broader engagement on Middle Eastern security issues.
The effectiveness of these governments derives from more than geography.
Regional mediators understand the political culture, historical grievances, religious dynamics, and security concerns that shape negotiations. They have cultivated personal relationships with regional leaders over decades and frequently share linguistic, cultural, economic, or historical ties that facilitate dialogue during periods of crisis.
Most importantly, they have a direct stake in the outcome.
JaFaJ describes this emerging model as Regional Peace Leadership—a diplomatic framework in which neighboring states assume primary responsibility for facilitating negotiations because they possess the geographic proximity, political relationships, cultural understanding, and strategic incentives necessary to sustain long-term peace. Rather than replacing global powers, regional peace leaders increasingly serve as indispensable partners in resolving conflicts that directly affect their own security and prosperity.
Unlike distant powers separated by oceans, regional governments experience the consequences of instability immediately. Refugee flows, disrupted trade, terrorism, maritime insecurity, energy market volatility, and economic uncertainty all affect their national security and domestic prosperity.
That proximity often enhances both their diplomatic credibility and their urgency.
For China and Russia, supporting these regional mediators while remaining outside the center of negotiations may therefore represent a calculated strategic choice. By allowing regional governments to assume the political risks associated with mediation, Beijing and Moscow preserve their diplomatic relationships, limit their long-term obligations, and retain the flexibility to influence events without becoming directly responsible for the success—or failure—of the peace process.
 
THE HIGH COST OF LEADING PEACE TALKS
Hosting international peace negotiations is often portrayed as a diplomatic triumph. In reality, it is frequently one of the most demanding, politically risky, and least rewarding responsibilities a government can undertake.
The signing of a ceasefire or peace agreement is not the end of the diplomatic process. More often, it marks the beginning of an even longer period of implementation, verification, monitoring, and crisis management.⁹
When negotiations fail—as many inevitably do—the government that led the process frequently becomes the target of criticism from every participant. Each side may accuse the mediator of applying insufficient pressure, demanding excessive concessions, displaying political favoritism, or failing to enforce agreed-upon commitments. Success, by contrast, is rarely attributed to a single nation. The political benefits are typically shared among multiple governments and international organizations, while the principal mediator assumes disproportionate responsibility when agreements begin to unravel.
The responsibilities associated with peace implementation are substantial.
Effective mediation often requires governments to:

monitor ceasefire compliance;
verify prisoner exchanges;
coordinate humanitarian assistance;
mobilize international reconstruction funding;
facilitate economic recovery;
provide long-term diplomatic engagement; and
in some cases, support security guarantees designed to prevent renewed hostilities.

These obligations may continue for months, years, or even decades after negotiators leave the conference table.
For that reason, governments considering whether to lead a peace process must weigh far more than diplomatic prestige. They must assess the long-term financial costs, political liabilities, military commitments, and strategic risks associated with assuming ownership of an uncertain and often fragile peace.
This helps explain why relatively few nations actively seek to become principal mediators in the world’s most dangerous conflicts. Encouraging negotiations is comparatively inexpensive. Leading them requires governments to accept enduring responsibilities, uncertain outcomes, and the very real possibility that they will ultimately be held accountable for events beyond their control.
In international diplomacy, the greatest burden is often not negotiating peace—it is sustaining it.
 
THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF REMAINING ONE STEP REMOVED
The cumulative evidence presented thus far suggests that China and Russia are not disengaged from international diplomacy. Rather, both appear to have adopted a strategy that allows them to influence major peace initiatives without assuming primary responsibility for their success or failure.
From a strategic perspective, this approach offers several important advantages.
First, it preserves diplomatic flexibility.
Governments that do not lead negotiations retain greater freedom to criticize proposals, suggest alternative approaches, adjust their positions as political circumstances evolve, or support competing initiatives without becoming personally invested in a single diplomatic outcome. They influence the process without becoming responsible for the process itself.
Second, it protects long-term bilateral relationships.
China simultaneously maintains important economic partnerships with Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and numerous other governments throughout the Middle East. Russia likewise balances strategic relationships with multiple regional actors whose interests frequently conflict.
Assuming responsibility for mediating negotiations inevitably creates winners and losers. Any perception that a mediator has favored one party over another can damage carefully cultivated political, economic, or security relationships that have taken years to develop.
By remaining one step removed from formal negotiations, both governments preserve greater freedom to maintain productive relationships with all parties regardless of the outcome.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, indirect diplomacy significantly reduces political risk.
When negotiations collapse—as they often do—public criticism generally focuses on the governments that organized the talks, drafted the agreements, and assumed responsibility for implementing them. Governments operating from the background retain the ability to support diplomacy, offer alternative proposals, or criticize unsuccessful initiatives without assuming ownership of the outcome.
This strategy allows Beijing and Moscow to expand their diplomatic influence while limiting the long-term political, financial, and strategic obligations traditionally associated with international mediation.
Whether this represents prudent statecraft or calculated restraint is ultimately a matter of perspective.
What is less debatable is that influence without responsibility carries fewer costs than leadership with accountability.
That distinction lies at the heart of this report.
For nations seeking global influence, remaining one step removed may be an effective strategy.
For nations seeking global leadership, however, history has generally demanded something more.
 
THE EMERGING MODEL OF “LOW-RISK DIPLOMACY”
Taken collectively, the evidence examined throughout this report suggests that China and Russia are not withdrawing from international diplomacy. Rather, they appear to be refining a strategic approach that may best be described as “low-risk diplomacy.”
Under this model, governments seek to maximize geopolitical influence while minimizing the long-term political, military, economic, and financial obligations traditionally associated with conflict resolution and international peacebuilding.¹⁰ Rather than serving as the principal architects of peace negotiations, they position themselves to influence diplomatic outcomes while allowing other governments to assume the burdens—and liabilities—of leadership.
This strategy offers several strategic advantages.
It enables governments to publicly advocate peace without becoming politically accountable when negotiations fail. It preserves relationships with competing regional actors by avoiding the appearance of favoritism toward any one party. It reduces exposure to the enormous financial commitments that frequently accompany post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, security guarantees, and long-term peace implementation. Finally, it allows governments to evaluate, criticize, or support diplomatic initiatives without assuming responsibility for producing an alternative.
From the perspective of national strategy, this approach is both logical and understandable.
Every government seeks to maximize strategic influence while limiting unnecessary political risk. Measured solely in terms of national interest, low-risk diplomacy may therefore represent an efficient allocation of diplomatic resources.
The question addressed in this report, however, is not whether this strategy serves national interests.
The question is whether it satisfies the broader responsibilities traditionally associated with great-power leadership.
Leadership has never been measured solely by economic strength, military capability, technological innovation, or diplomatic rhetoric. Throughout modern history, great powers have also been judged by their willingness to assume responsibility for managing international crises, organizing complex negotiations, and investing the political capital necessary to sustain peace after conflicts have ended.
Deterring conflict is an important measure of power.
Ending conflict has historically been an even greater measure of leadership.
If low-risk diplomacy becomes the preferred model for emerging global powers, the international community must confront an important question:
Who, then, will accept the risks of leading the world’s most difficult peace negotiations?
 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INFLUENCE AND LEADERSHIP
One of the central conclusions emerging from this analysis is that influence and leadership are not synonymous.
A nation may possess extraordinary economic strength, military capability, technological innovation, diplomatic access, or political influence without assuming the responsibilities traditionally associated with international leadership.
Influence enables governments to shape events.
Leadership requires governments to accept responsibility for their outcome.
That distinction is more than semantic.
It lies at the heart of how the international system has historically functioned.
Throughout modern history, the governments that have exercised the greatest international leadership have generally been those willing to assume the political, financial, and diplomatic burdens of resolving conflicts—not merely commenting upon them.
The United States provides one example. Despite significant policy successes, notable failures, and frequent international criticism, successive American administrations repeatedly invested political capital in difficult negotiations, including Camp David, Madrid, Dayton, Wye River, and numerous other diplomatic initiatives.¹¹ These negotiations did not always produce lasting peace, nor did they always achieve their stated objectives. They nevertheless demonstrated a willingness to accept responsibility for attempting to resolve some of the world’s most dangerous conflicts.
Other nations have demonstrated similar leadership.
Norway quietly facilitated the Oslo peace process.
Ireland played an important supporting role in the negotiations that ultimately produced the Good Friday Agreement.
For generations, Switzerland has provided trusted neutral ground for sensitive diplomatic negotiations involving governments that refused direct dialogue elsewhere.
Although these countries differ significantly in military power, economic size, and geopolitical influence, they share one important characteristic: each accepted responsibility for moving negotiations forward when success was uncertain and failure carried political risk. Their examples demonstrate that diplomatic leadership is determined less by national size than by a willingness to invest political capital in building peace.
Rather, they illustrate a broader principle.
Leadership is ultimately measured not by the ability to influence international events from a distance, but by the willingness to accept responsibility for bringing adversaries together, sustaining negotiations through periods of failure, and remaining engaged after agreements have been signed.
Influence may shape international affairs.
Leadership accepts accountability for them.
That distinction represents the defining difference between exercising power and exercising responsibility.
If more major powers choose to exercise influence without assuming responsibility, the burden of international mediation will continue falling on a relatively small group of nations. Governments such as the United States, Qatar, Oman, Egypt, and other regional partners may increasingly find themselves organizing negotiations, financing implementation, coordinating humanitarian assistance, and sustaining fragile agreements while other influential states remain largely in supporting roles.
Over time, this imbalance could reduce the international community’s overall capacity to resolve conflicts. Peace negotiations require experienced mediators, financial resources, political commitment, and long-term engagement. If too few nations are willing to provide those capabilities, future conflicts may become more difficult to end—even when broad international support exists for diplomacy.
The central question, therefore, is not whether China and Russia should mediate every conflict. Rather, it is whether the international system can sustain an expanding number of complex crises if the responsibility for building peace continues to be concentrated among only a handful of governments.
This distinction leads to a broader strategic question. If leadership is measured by the willingness to organize and sustain peace, then the emergence of a multipolar world should logically produce a corresponding expansion in diplomatic leadership. Whether that transition is actually occurring—or whether responsibility remains concentrated among a small number of governments—is one of the defining questions explored in this report.
 
CAN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD FUNCTION WITHOUT MULTIPLE MEDIATORS?
The broader implications of this analysis extend well beyond the foreign policies of China and Russia. They raise a more fundamental question about the future of the international system itself.
Supporters of a multipolar world frequently argue that global governance should no longer depend primarily upon a single dominant power. That argument has considerable merit. A more balanced international order could distribute diplomatic responsibilities more broadly, reduce dependence upon any one nation, encourage greater regional participation, and create additional pathways for conflict resolution.
Yet multipolarity is not merely about distributing influence.
It must also distribute responsibility.
If multiple nations seek greater authority within international institutions and greater influence over global affairs, they must also be prepared to assume a proportional share of the diplomatic burdens that accompany international leadership. Otherwise, the responsibility for organizing negotiations, managing crises, financing reconstruction, and sustaining fragile peace agreements will continue to fall upon the same limited group of governments.
The current international environment illustrates this challenge.
Across Gaza, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, Ukraine, the Red Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz, negotiations continue to rely heavily upon a familiar collection of actors: the United States, the United Nations, Qatar, Egypt, Oman, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and selected European governments.¹² China participates. Russia participates. Both contribute diplomatically through bilateral engagement, multilateral institutions, and the United Nations.
Participation, however, should not be confused with leadership.
Leadership is measured not simply by attendance at negotiations, but by the willingness to organize them, sustain them through periods of failure, mobilize international support, and accept responsibility for implementing agreements once they are reached.
That distinction will become increasingly important as geopolitical competition accelerates.
A genuinely multipolar international order cannot be sustained solely by multiple centers of power. It must also develop multiple centers of diplomatic leadership capable of assuming the difficult responsibilities of conflict prevention, mediation, and post-conflict peacebuilding.
Otherwise, the world risks creating a system in which power is widely distributed, but responsibility remains concentrated in the hands of only a few nations.
 
JaFaJ ANALYSIS
The central question examined in this report is not whether China or Russia should assume a larger role in international diplomacy. Every sovereign nation has both the right and the obligation to pursue policies that advance its own national interests.
The more consequential question is whether the architecture of the international system is quietly changing in ways that few policymakers have yet recognized.
For nearly eight decades following the Second World War, international leadership was measured largely by a nation’s ability to project military power, build alliances, influence international institutions, and shape the global economy. Those indicators remain important, but they may no longer be sufficient.
A new measure of geopolitical influence may be emerging.
Several factors are driving this evolution. Contemporary conflicts increasingly involve multiple state and non-state actors, prolonged humanitarian crises, complex economic interdependence, cyber operations, and global media scrutiny. Military victories alone rarely produce durable political settlements. As a result, governments capable of coordinating diplomacy, reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and long-term implementation are becoming increasingly important to international stability.
Increasingly, nations are being judged not only by their capacity to wage war, but by their willingness—and ability—to end it.
This represents a profound shift in how strategic leadership may be evaluated during the twenty-first century.
The defining geopolitical competition of the next generation may not be over territory, ideology, or even economic output. It may instead revolve around which nations possess the diplomatic institutions, political credibility, economic capacity, and strategic patience necessary to manage an increasingly unstable international system.
As conflicts become more complex, peace itself is becoming a strategic resource.
Governments capable of organizing negotiations, coordinating multinational coalitions, mobilizing humanitarian assistance, financing reconstruction, and sustaining fragile agreements will accumulate a form of geopolitical influence that cannot be measured by gross domestic product, military expenditures, or technological innovation alone.
Diplomatic leadership is becoming a strategic capability in its own right.
This evolution has important implications for every major power.
If China and Russia continue pursuing a model of influence without ownership, they may preserve strategic flexibility while avoiding many of the political and financial costs associated with international mediation.
The tradeoff, however, is that they may also surrender one of the most powerful instruments of long-term geopolitical influence: the ability to define the political architecture that emerges after conflict.
History demonstrates that nations rarely shape the peace they do not help negotiate.
Those that organize negotiations frequently influence ceasefire mechanisms, reconstruction priorities, regional security arrangements, humanitarian frameworks, economic recovery, and the institutions that govern the post-conflict order. In many respects, the diplomatic table determines the geopolitical map that follows.
This raises an even broader strategic question.
If the United States gradually reduces its willingness to lead international negotiations while China and Russia remain reluctant to assume those responsibilities, who fills the vacuum?
Will regional powers such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa gradually assume larger diplomatic roles?
Will new multilateral institutions emerge to coordinate peace negotiations?
Or will the international community enter an era in which conflicts become longer, settlements become more fragile, and no nation consistently accepts responsibility for managing the peace?
The answer to those questions may define international politics more profoundly than the outcome of any single conflict now dominating today’s headlines.
The future balance of power may ultimately be determined not by which nation wins the next war, but by which nation becomes indispensable in building the peace that follows.
 
CONCLUSION
The question posed at the beginning of this report remains both timely and increasingly consequential:
Why are China and Russia not leading more of today’s peace negotiations?
The evidence suggests that neither nation has retreated from international diplomacy. Rather, both appear to have adopted a deliberate strategy that emphasizes selective engagement, regional intermediaries, and limited exposure to the political, military, and financial risks associated with leading high-profile peace initiatives.¹³
From the perspective of national strategy, this approach is understandable.
From the perspective of international leadership, however, it leaves an increasingly important vacuum.
History offers a simple but often overlooked lesson:
Peace does not organize itself.
Someone must persuade adversaries to meet when they refuse to speak.
Someone must draft the first proposal that neither side initially accepts.
Someone must monitor ceasefires after the headlines disappear.
Someone must coordinate humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, prisoner exchanges, border verification, and the countless technical details that transform signed agreements into lasting peace.
These responsibilities rarely produce political popularity.
They rarely generate immediate strategic rewards.
Yet without them, diplomacy remains aspiration rather than achievement.
The central lesson is that peace is not a spontaneous outcome of diplomacy; it is the product of sustained political investment. Governments that possess the institutions, personnel, financial resources, and strategic patience to implement agreements will increasingly shape the international order long after military operations have ended. In the twenty-first century, the ability to build peace may become as strategically significant as the ability to wage war.
The international system is now entering a period unlike any since the end of the Second World War.
Power is becoming more widely distributed.
Economic influence is becoming increasingly multipolar.
Regional powers are assuming greater geopolitical significance.
Yet responsibility for building peace remains concentrated among a remarkably small number of governments.
JaFaJ identifies this as the Responsibility Gap: geopolitical influence is becoming increasingly distributed among major powers, while responsibility for organizing, financing, implementing, and sustaining peace remains concentrated among relatively few nations. Closing this gap may become one of the defining diplomatic challenges of the twenty-first century.
That imbalance may prove unsustainable.
Perhaps the most important question is not whether China and Russia should lead more negotiations.
It is whether the world has outgrown the assumption that any single nation should bear primary responsibility for maintaining international peace.
The next generation of diplomacy may not belong to a single superpower.
It may belong to coalitions of mediators—regional powers with local credibility, global powers with diplomatic and economic leverage, neutral states capable of hosting negotiations, international organizations that provide legitimacy, and private humanitarian institutions that sustain implementation.
Such a model would distribute not only influence, but responsibility.
It would recognize that twenty-first-century conflicts are too complex for any single nation to resolve alone.
If that evolution does not occur, the consequences could be profound.
The world may continue producing more regional powers, more military capability, more economic competition, and more geopolitical influence—while simultaneously producing fewer governments willing to assume responsibility for negotiating peace.
That would represent a dangerous paradox.
The international community would possess more power than at any point in modern history, yet fewer nations prepared to use that power to end wars.
Ultimately, history has rarely judged nations solely by the wars they won.
It has judged them by the peace they built.
The defining geopolitical question of the next generation may therefore be neither who becomes the next superpower nor who possesses the world’s largest economy or military.
It may simply be this:
When the next global crisis erupts, which nation—or coalition of nations—will step forward, accept responsibility, and lead the world toward peace?
Because in the final analysis, influence may shape history, but leadership accepts responsibility for writing its next chapter.
 
JaFaJ STRATEGIC INSIGHTS
A FRAMEWORK FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PEACE DIPLOMACY
Based upon the evidence presented in this report, JaFaJ offers the following strategic observations and policy recommendations for governments seeking to strengthen the international system.

REDEFINE GREAT-POWER LEADERSHIP

The international community should broaden its definition of great-power status. Military capability, economic strength, technological innovation, and diplomatic influence remain essential measures of national power, but they are no longer sufficient. Nations seeking global leadership should also be evaluated by their willingness to organize peace negotiations, sustain diplomatic engagement, finance post-conflict reconstruction, and remain committed until durable political settlements are achieved.
JaFaJ Recommendation: Future assessments of global influence should include a nation’s measurable contributions to conflict prevention, mediation, peace implementation, and post-conflict stabilization.
 

ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION RESPONSIBILITY INDEX (IMRI)

Military spending, economic output, and development assistance are measured through internationally recognized indicators.
No comparable system exists to measure a nation’s contribution to international peace diplomacy.
JaFaJ Recommendation: The international community should establish an International Mediation Responsibility Index (IMRI) that evaluates nations according to objective criteria, including:

peace negotiations hosted;
ceasefires facilitated;
humanitarian corridors negotiated;
reconstruction initiatives coordinated;
peace agreements successfully implemented;
and long-term diplomatic engagement following conflict.

An initial IMRI methodology could assign weighted scores across several categories, including mediation leadership, implementation success, reconstruction support, humanitarian coordination, diplomatic capacity, and sustained post-conflict engagement. Like other international indices, the methodology should be transparent, repeatable, and updated annually to enable meaningful comparisons over time.
Governments should be measured not only by the wars they influence, but by the peace they help build.
 

CREATE PERMANENT MULTINATIONAL MEDIATION COALITIONS

Modern conflicts are increasingly too complex for any single nation to manage alone.
Rather than relying upon one dominant mediator, future negotiations should be organized through permanent multinational mediation coalitions combining:

regional powers with local credibility;
global powers with political and economic leverage;
neutral states capable of hosting negotiations;
international organizations providing legal legitimacy; and
humanitarian institutions responsible for implementation and recovery.

JaFaJ Recommendation: Peace diplomacy should evolve from a single-mediator model toward a coalition-based model that distributes both authority and responsibility.
 

TREAT DIPLOMATIC CAPACITY AS A STRATEGIC ASSET

Most governments invest heavily in military readiness.
Far fewer invest systematically in negotiation expertise.
Yet diplomacy often determines the political outcome after military operations conclude.
JaFaJ Recommendation: Governments should establish permanent national mediation corps composed of experienced diplomats, regional specialists, legal experts, economists, humanitarian planners, intelligence professionals, and conflict-resolution specialists capable of rapid deployment during emerging international crises.
 

REWARD THE BUILDERS OF PEACE

International prestige continues to be heavily influenced by military capability and economic performance.
Comparable recognition is rarely afforded to governments that consistently prevent wars or successfully negotiate peace.
JaFaJ Recommendation: International institutions should create formal recognition systems rewarding governments that demonstrate sustained excellence in conflict prevention, mediation, and post-conflict reconstruction. Diplomatic leadership should become a measurable component of international prestige.
 

PREPARE FOR THE NEXT ERA OF GEOPOLITICS

The defining geopolitical competition of the twenty-first century may not be determined solely by military superiority or economic dominance.
It may instead be determined by which governments become indispensable to the management of international crises.
Nations capable of consistently organizing negotiations, building international coalitions, coordinating reconstruction, and sustaining fragile peace agreements will shape the political architecture of the post-conflict world.
JaFaJ Assessment: The governments that write the peace agreements of the future are likely to exercise greater long-term influence than those that simply win the wars of the present.
 
THE JaFaJ DOCTRINE
This report concludes with a broader proposition.
For more than a century, geopolitical power has largely been measured by a nation’s ability to deter conflict or prevail in war.
JaFaJ believes the next generation of international leadership will be measured differently.
The defining strategic capability of the twenty-first century will not simply be the ability to project power. It will be the ability to organize peace.
The nations that consistently convene negotiations, bridge political divides, coordinate international coalitions, and transform ceasefires into durable settlements will increasingly shape the global order.
Military victories determine who wins battles.
Diplomatic leadership determines who writes history.
 
FOOTNOTES

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V, Security Council; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, official statements on multipolarity and global governance.
Reuters, “Can China Restrain Iran? Gulf States Test Beijing’s Influence,” July 30, 2026.
Reuters, “U.S.-Facilitated Israel-Lebanon Talks Have Begun,” August 4, 2026; Associated Press, reporting on Gulf mediation efforts and regional diplomacy, August 2026.
The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, The Belt and Road Initiative: A Key Pillar of the Global Community of Shared Future; World Bank, Belt and Road overview.
Associated Press, “China Brokers Restoration of Saudi-Iran Relations,” March 2023; Reuters, coverage of the Saudi-Iran agreement.

Reuters, reporting on Russian and Chinese diplomatic engagement and international mediation strategies during Middle East conflicts, 2025–2026.
United Nations Security Council meeting records on the Middle East, 2025–2026; Reuters, coverage of Russian diplomatic activity concerning Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran.
Associated Press; Reuters; International Crisis Group, reporting on mediation efforts by Qatar, Oman, Egypt, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates during 2025–2026.
United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation (New York: United Nations, 2012); United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, mediation guidance and implementation frameworks.

United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Guidance for Effective Mediation (New York: United Nations, 2012); International Crisis Group, reports on contemporary mediation practices and state diplomacy.
Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Camp David Accords; U.S. Department of State, The Dayton Peace Accords; George Washington University National Security Archive, Madrid Peace Conference; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, historical documentation on the Oslo Process.
Reuters and Associated Press, coverage of mediation efforts involving Gaza, Lebanon, the Red Sea, Sudan, Yemen, Ukraine, and the Strait of Hormuz, 2025–2026; United Nations Security Council meeting records.
Council on Foreign Relations, analyses of Chinese and Russian foreign policy; Reuters, reporting on Chinese Middle East diplomacy and Russian diplomatic engagement, 2025–2026.

 
 

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Israel Can No Longer Rule Out War with Egypt, Growing More Alarmed by Cairo’s Military Alliance with China

Israel Can No Longer Rule Out War with Egypt, Growing More Alarmed by Cairo’s Military Alliance with China

A Washington source has confirmed to JAFAJ that Israel can no longer rule out the possibility of a war with Egypt within the next few years. According to the source, Israeli officials have already shared their concerns extensively with the Trump administration.
According to the source, the Israelis have taken note of Egypt’s increasingly hostile posture, which has intensified since the outbreak of the Gaza war following Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attacks against Israeli villages. Israeli officials suspect that Egypt either failed to adequately monitor the smuggling of weapons into Gaza across its border with the Strip or, even worse, that certain Egyptian military officers deliberately benefited from the weapons-smuggling operation through corruption.
The well-connected source, who has worked in close proximity to the Israeli establishment for decades, added that the issue causing the greatest concern to both Israel and the United States is the rapidly expanding military alliance between Egypt and China. He said this relationship has included increasingly extensive military cooperation, highlighted by the large-scale joint Chinese-Egyptian military maneuvers conducted in Egypt during 2025, at the height of the Gaza war, which Israeli officials interpreted as a deliberate show of force and a strategic warning directed at Israel.
The source added that Israel now increasingly views the Egyptian military establishment as a hostile strategic threat because of its growing military relationship with China and Cairo’s increasing economic dependence on Beijing rather than its traditional Western allies. He further stated that senior Israeli military commanders have repeatedly raised concerns with their American counterparts at U.S. Central Command regarding what they describe as the gradual expansion of Egyptian military deployments into areas of the Sinai Peninsula that were designated as off-limits to permanent Egyptian military forces under the Camp David Accords, which have remained in force for nearly five decades.
Comment.Military cooperation between Egypt and China began to expand significantly after President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power and has evolved into what many observers now describe as an increasingly close strategic military partnership. The relationship reached a new level in 2025 with the first-ever joint Egypt-China air exercise, “Eagles of Civilization 2025,”conducted between April 19 and May 4. China deployed J-10C multirole fighters, KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft, YY-20 aerial refueling tankers, helicopters, and supporting personnel to Egypt. The exercise included air combat operations, aerial refueling, combined command and planning, combat search-and-rescue missions, and joint air support operations. Beyond the exercises, Cairo has expanded consultations with Beijing on military technology, aerospace cooperation, air defense systems, and defense industrial cooperation, while reportedly introducing the Chinese HQ-9B long-range air defense system into service. Israeli officials are understood to view this growing military relationship as one of the most significant strategic shifts in the regional balance of power in recent years.
Comment.Egypt remains one of Israel’s most significant regional partners, making the deterioration in the relationship particularly concerning. Egypt’s increasingly hostile diplomatic posture, combined with its expanding military alliance with China, has raised serious concerns within the Israeli security establishment. While both Cairo and Beijing may understand that a direct war with Israel would likely be devastating for Egypt and could rapidly expand into a much wider regional conflict, the increasingly reckless behavior exhibited by elements of the Egyptian military in recent years has heightened the risk of dangerous miscalculation. In particular, the decision to conduct large-scale joint military exercises with China near Israel’s borders, together with the unprecedented military buildup in the Sinai Peninsula—including deployments in areas that the Camp David Accords designated as off-limits to permanent Egyptian military forces—has reinforced Israeli concerns that Egypt is playing with fire. If such miscalculations continue, the consequences could extend far beyond Egypt and Israel, potentially igniting a conflict that engulfs the entire region.

 

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UAE Considers Major Air Force Overhaul Amid Iranian Threat: Israel Supports UAE’s Rights

Israeli Government Minister: We Support UAE’s Right to Defend Its Skies
1.An American industrial source has shared with JAFAJ that the United Arab Emirates is considering an entire overhaul of its Air Force, which would include obtaining new equipment, adopting new operational concepts, and revising its military tactics.
2.The source confirmed that the United Arab Emirates has been consulting the U.S. Department of Defense for input and technical expertise on how to cope with the Iranian aerial threat that has emerged since the launch of the ongoing U.S. confrontation with Iran.
3.Also confirmed to JAFAJ by an American military contractor who resides and operates in the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi’s objective is to acquire weapons that enhance both its air defense and its offensive capabilities. According to the contractor, the UAE is seeking to obtain American-made kamikaze drones, specifically the FLM-136 Low-cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS), a one-way attack drone designed to destroy itself upon striking its target. The system is commonly referred to as a kamikaze drone or suicide drone. Abu Dhabi is also looking to expand its inventory of smart bombs of all types, including the 2,000-pound class of precision-guided bombs that can be carried by the UAE’s F-16 Block 60 fighter aircraft.
4.The military contractor, who has worked with both the U.S. Department of Defense in Washington and the UAE government, said that Abu Dhabi also wants to obtain a larger inventory of ground-to-air defense missiles and would like to localize the THAAD missile defense system and further develop it with both American and Israeli expertise.
5.THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) is one of the United States’ most advanced missile defense systems. It is designed to intercept and destroy short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during the final stage of their flight using hit-to-kill technology rather than explosive warheads. Israel also operates THAAD as part of its layered missile defense network alongside Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and the Arrow systems, providing additional protection against long-range ballistic missile threats.
6.The source, who is well connected to the UAE Air Force, said the capabilities of the Emirati Air Force are already quite significant, with its advanced F-16 fleet, substantial stockpile of smart bombs, and radar-guided missiles. Nonetheless, he said Iran’s use of large numbers of kamikaze drones has created serious concern throughout the country. He added that the UAE is now shopping for far more destructive firepower, including additional surface-to-surface missiles, because Abu Dhabi is increasingly concluding that offense is the best defense.
7.He explained that it is his understanding that the Trump administration is very pleased with and impressed by the United Arab Emirates’ resilience and commitment during the confrontation with Iran and would therefore support future American weapons sales to Abu Dhabi.
8.The source also said that Abu Dhabi remains keen to obtain the F-35 fighter aircraft. While the issue is not currently on the table, he believes it is very likely that, in the aftermath of this war, the UAE will have earned the right to acquire America’s most sophisticated fighter jet.
9.On this subject, JAFAJ also spoke with a member of the Israeli government who spoke on condition of anonymity. He said that, personally, he would not oppose a U.S. sale of the F-35 to the United Arab Emirates. However, he emphasized that such a decision would ultimately require consensus within the Israeli Cabinet and the approval of the Israeli Prime Minister. He added that the United Arab Emirates is regarded as one of the most trusted mutual partners of both Israel and the United States, adding that Israel supports the UAE’s right to defend its skies.
 

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The Regions New Centers Of Power

WHO WILL SHAPE THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE DECADE AHEAD?
By JaFaJ Intelligence

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For much of the twentieth century, power in the Middle East was measured using familiar metrics: the size of an army, the quantity of oil beneath the ground, or the strategic importance of a country’s geography. Those indicators remain important, but they no longer provide a complete picture of regional influence. The Middle East is entering an era in which technological innovation, economic diversification, artificial intelligence, logistics, diplomacy, legislative capacity, and scientific research increasingly determine which governments shape regional events.¹
The wars in Gaza, the Red Sea, Syria, Yemen, and the continuing strategic competition involving Iran have reinforced an important lesson. Military power remains essential, but it is no longer sufficient. Governments capable of integrating military capability with advanced technology, resilient institutions, diversified economies, and international partnerships possess a growing strategic advantage.²
This assessment introduces the JaFaJ Middle East Power Index (MEPI), an analytical framework designed to evaluate comprehensive national influence rather than a single dimension of state power. Instead of asking which nation possesses the largest military or the highest gross domestic product, MEPI asks a broader question:
Which countries possess the greatest ability to influence the political, economic, technological, and security environment of the Middle East during the coming decade?
 
THE NINE PILLARS OF MODERN POWER
The traditional concept of national power has expanded significantly during the past two decades. Contemporary governments compete simultaneously across multiple domains that reinforce one another.
Military capability remains the foundation of national security and deterrence. However, sustained military effectiveness increasingly depends upon advanced research, industrial production, intelligence integration, cybersecurity, and technological innovation. The International Institute for Strategic Studies notes that modern military competitiveness increasingly reflects the ability to integrate these capabilities rather than simply field large standing forces.³
Economic strength likewise extends beyond national income. Diversified economies with robust financial systems, advanced manufacturing, resilient supply chains, and strong investment climates provide governments with greater flexibility during crises while supporting long-term modernization. The International Monetary Fund has repeatedly emphasized that economic diversification remains a central strategic objective for many Middle Eastern states as they prepare for an evolving global economy.⁴
Diplomatic influence has become an increasingly important instrument of national power. Countries capable of mediating disputes, building regional coalitions, and maintaining constructive relationships with competing global powers often exercise influence disproportionate to their geographic size. Qatar’s mediation efforts, Saudi Arabia’s expanding diplomatic role, and the United Arab Emirates’ growing international partnerships illustrate this trend.⁵
Technology has emerged as another decisive factor. Artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, biotechnology, semiconductor research, and digital infrastructure increasingly influence military capability, industrial productivity, healthcare, finance, and education. Governments investing consistently in scientific research today are likely to possess greater strategic flexibility tomorrow.⁶
The final dimensions include energy, maritime logistics, and legislative capacity. Energy continues to shape international markets, while ports, transportation networks, and logistics hubs increasingly determine economic competitiveness. At the same time, governments are using legislation, industrial policy, investment regulation, and technology governance as strategic tools that influence innovation, foreign investment, and national resilience.⁷
 
THE 2026 JAFAJ MIDDLE EAST POWER RANKINGS

Israel

Israel ranks first because it demonstrates sustained strength across nearly every category evaluated by MEPI. The country combines advanced military capabilities, world-leading innovation, cybersecurity, biotechnology, artificial intelligence research, and a diversified knowledge-based economy. Despite limited natural resources and a relatively small population, Israel consistently converts scientific research into military capability and commercial success. This integration of universities, private industry, government institutions, and defense research creates one of the region’s most comprehensive strategic ecosystems.⁸

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia occupies the second position because of its ambitious transformation under Vision 2030. Long recognized as an energy superpower, the Kingdom is investing heavily in logistics, tourism, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, infrastructure, renewable energy, and scientific research. Combined with its leadership within OPEC and growing diplomatic engagement, Saudi Arabia’s modernization program represents one of the region’s most significant strategic developments.⁹

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates continues to demonstrate that strategic influence is not determined by population alone. Dubai and Abu Dhabi have developed into global centers for logistics, aviation, finance, technology, and investment. Government support for artificial intelligence, renewable energy, commercial space activities, and advanced digital infrastructure has positioned the UAE as one of the Middle East’s leading innovation hubs.¹⁰

Türkiye

Türkiye maintains influence through its diversified industrial economy, expanding indigenous defense industry, strategic geography, and active foreign policy. Ankara’s position at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East enhances its importance in regional trade, energy transit, and security affairs. Its growing defense manufacturing sector further strengthens long-term strategic autonomy.¹¹

Iran

Despite years of international sanctions, Iran remains one of the region’s principal strategic actors. Indigenous missile production, unmanned aerial systems, regional security partnerships, and asymmetric military doctrine continue to provide Tehran with significant influence. Economic constraints remain substantial, but Iran demonstrates that military and geopolitical influence are not determined solely by economic performance.¹²

Egypt

Egypt’s strategic importance derives from a combination of geography, population, military capability, and control of the Suez Canal. As one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, the canal remains central to global commerce. Egypt also continues to play an important diplomatic role within both the Arab world and Africa.¹³

Qatar

Qatar has developed influence disproportionate to its size through liquefied natural gas exports, sovereign wealth investments, and diplomacy. The country’s repeated role as an intermediary in regional negotiations demonstrates how financial resources and diplomatic credibility can amplify national influence beyond traditional military measures.¹⁴
8–10. Jordan, Oman, and Kuwait
Jordan, Oman, and Kuwait complete the top ten. Each contributes to regional stability through different strengths. Jordan maintains close security partnerships and institutional stability. Oman has cultivated a long-standing reputation for neutrality and mediation. Kuwait continues to exercise financial influence through sovereign investment while maintaining an important role within the Gulf Cooperation Council.¹⁵
 
FIVE TRENDS THAT WILL DEFINE THE NEXT DECADE
The rankings reveal several broader trends reshaping the Middle East.
First, technology is becoming as important as energy. Countries investing heavily in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, biotechnology, and advanced manufacturing are positioning themselves for long-term strategic advantage.
Second, the Gulf states are becoming comprehensive powers. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are no longer relying exclusively on petroleum exports. Both are investing aggressively in logistics, scientific research, tourism, finance, and digital infrastructure.
Third, diplomacy has become a strategic capability. Mediation, coalition building, and international partnerships increasingly determine regional influence. Small states can now shape major geopolitical developments through diplomacy rather than military force alone.
Fourth, maritime security remains central to regional stability. The Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Suez Canal continue to influence global trade, energy markets, and military planning. Governments capable of protecting these routes—or disrupting them—possess considerable strategic leverage.¹⁶
Finally, institutions matter. Countries with effective governance, transparent regulation, and long-term national planning consistently outperform states relying primarily on natural resources or military power. Institutional resilience increasingly determines whether governments can convert national wealth into enduring strategic influence.
 
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
The Middle East is undergoing a structural transformation.
Military power remains indispensable, but it is no longer the sole determinant of regional leadership. The countries most likely to shape the region during the coming decade will be those capable of integrating defense capability with technological innovation, scientific research, diversified economies, effective governance, and sustained diplomatic engagement.
The inaugural JaFaJ Middle East Power Index suggests that the balance of regional influence is becoming broader, more technologically driven, and increasingly institutional. Oil wealth alone will not determine tomorrow’s leaders. Neither will military power in isolation.
Instead, the decisive question is whether governments can convert today’s resources into tomorrow’s capabilities.
The map of the Middle East has not changed.
The map of influence has.
 
FOOTNOTES

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2026 (London: Routledge for IISS, 2026).
IISS, The Military Balance 2026; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2026 (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2026).
IISS, The Military Balance 2026.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia (Washington, DC: IMF, 2026).
International Crisis Group, Middle East and North Africa Reports; IMF, Regional Economic Outlook.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD AI Policy Observatory; World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Global Innovation Index.
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime Transport.
IISS, The Military Balance 2026; WIPO, Global Innovation Index.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030; IMF, Regional Economic Outlook.
World Bank, Connecting to Compete: Logistics Performance Index; OECD AI Policy publications.
IISS, The Military Balance 2026; SIPRI, Yearbook 2026.
IISS, The Military Balance 2026; IMF country assessments for Iran.
World Bank, World Development Indicators; Suez Canal Authority annual reports.
IMF, Regional Economic Outlook; QatarEnergy publications.
World Bank governance indicators; GCC official publications.
UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport; International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2025.

 
REFERENCES

International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2026. London: Routledge for IISS, 2026.
International Monetary Fund. Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia. Washington, DC: IMF, 2026.
International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook 2025. Paris: IEA, 2025.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD AI Policy Observatory. Paris: OECD.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Main Science and Technology Indicators. Paris: OECD.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SIPRI Yearbook 2026. Stockholm: SIPRI, 2026.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Review of Maritime Transport. Geneva: UNCTAD.
World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Intellectual Property Organization. Global Innovation Index. Geneva: WIPO.

 

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