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PA Security Raid On Fuel Tycoon Tareq Al- Natshheh Signals Escalating International Fatah-PA Power Struggle

Editors Note: In our previous newsletter, we published two companion articles for our readers. The first examined the potential for civil conflict across several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The second focused specifically on the growing risk of civil war in Gaza. JaFaJ will continue using this companion-article approach to provide readers with broader regional context alongside focused country analyses. The following article builds upon those earlier assessments and examines subsequent developments relevant to our ongoing coverage of the MENA region.
1. Summary: Palestinian Authority security services conducted coordinated raids targeting fuel stations and offices owned by Hebron businessman Tareq Al-Natsheh. While PA-affiliated media framed the operation as regulatory enforcement, the timing, scale, and units involved point to a political decision made at the highest levels in Ramallah. According to a well-connected Palestinian businessman interviewed by JAFJA — who participated in discussions around the 2019 Bahrain Peace Workshop and engaged directly with senior U.S. officials including then-White House Senior Advisor Jared Kushner — this was not a routine law-enforcement action. It was a calculated move in an intensifying internal struggle between competing Fatah-PA power centers ahead of expected legislative elections. The reported involvement of Palestinian Military Intelligence in the crackdown strongly indicates direct approval from the presidential office. Based on current indicators, this operation marks the opening phase of open infighting among senior Fatah figures and is unlikely to be the last.
2. PA security forces carried out overnight coordinated raids on multiple “Al-Huda” fuel stations in Ramallah, Al-Bireh, Jericho and Beit Ur owned by Tareq Al-Natsheh. Al-Natsheh controls approximately 28 stations across the West Bank and is one of the dominant actors in the sector. Units involved: Preventive Security, Military Intelligence, and Customs Police. Seized: surveillance systems, files, electronic equipment, and fuel stocks. Several employees, including accountants, were detained for questioning then released. PA media reported no arrest warrant had been issued for Al-Natsheh at the time and that he remained in Beit Ur.
3. Al-Natsheh’s offices and facilities sustained extensive damage: furniture destroyed, filing cabinets broken into, personal items including family photos targeted. In a public statement, Al-Natsheh said he instructed supporters to avoid public confrontation to prevent escalation and preserve the “social fabric.”
4. The operation comes amid acute speculation over motive. Two narratives dominate: A. A technical dispute over PA debts to fuel suppliers. B. A political purge tied to internal Fatah alignment ahead of legislative elections. Al-Natsheh is widely understood to maintain close ties to senior Fatah and security figures including Jibril Rajoub and Zakaria Musleh. The timing, just as consultations on electoral lists begin, reinforces the assessment that this is a political signal, not just a financial case.
5. Separately, the Union of Fuel Station Owners reports PA institutions owe suppliers over 70 million shekels. The union warned continued non-payment will force stations to halt fuel to government and security vehicles. Rising fuel prices have worsened liquidity across the sector. The financial dispute is real, but it is being leveraged as cover for political targeting.
6. JAFJA interviewed a prominent Hebron businessman with direct regional political and commercial access. The source attended Bahrain Peace Workshop discussions in 2019 and dealt with senior U.S. officials at the time, including Jared Kushner. Assessment: The raid was ordered for political reasons. The deployment of Military Intelligence confirms senior sign-off from Ramallah. This is the start of a factional confrontation inside Fatah and the PA, and more actions of this type should be expected as succession jockeying accelerates.
7. The Al-Natsheh raids are a political operation disguised as regulatory enforcement. They reflect deepening rivalry inside the PA and Fatah, with Military Intelligence’s role confirming top-level authorization. Expect further targeting of business and security figures aligned with rival camps in the coming weeks.

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Iraq’s New Prime Minister Comes To Washington

The Trump–al-Zaidi Meeting and the Future of Iraq
JAFAJ Intelligence Briefing
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
The first official White House meeting between President Donald Trump and Iraq’s newly appointed Prime Minister, Ali al-Zaidi, represents far more than a ceremonial diplomatic engagement. It marks what may become the beginning of a new strategic chapter in U.S.-Iraq relations, one that seeks to redefine a partnership historically dominated by military operations, counterterrorism, and regional conflict into one increasingly centered on economic development, infrastructure investment, energy cooperation, and institutional reform.¹²
For more than two decades, Iraq has been viewed almost exclusively through the lens of war. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion, sectarian violence, the rise and territorial defeat of the Islamic State (ISIS), the expansion of Iranian influence, and repeated security crises have dominated both media coverage and Western policy discussions. Those challenges remain significant. However, they no longer represent the complete picture. Iraq now stands at an inflection point where economic modernization, government reform, foreign investment, and legislative reconstruction may ultimately prove more consequential than military operations in determining the country’s future.³
The White House meeting reflected this transition. Public remarks by both leaders emphasized investment, reconstruction, oil and natural gas development, infrastructure modernization, electricity generation, and expanding opportunities for American companies operating in Iraq. Security cooperation remained important, particularly regarding ISIS and the future of Iran-backed armed groups, but it was no longer the sole focus of the bilateral relationship. Instead, both governments projected an image of economic partnership designed to produce long-term stability rather than temporary military success.¹²
The meeting also occurred during one of the most strategically sensitive periods in modern Iraqi history. Iraq continues balancing relationships with the United States, Iran, Türkiye, the Gulf States, and an increasingly active China while simultaneously confronting domestic corruption, weak public institutions, unemployment, deteriorating infrastructure, and the continuing challenge of integrating competing armed organizations under the authority of the Iraqi state. These competing pressures make Iraq one of the most politically complex countries in the Middle East.³
For JAFAJ readers, the significance of this meeting extends well beyond diplomacy. The central question is not whether President Trump and Prime Minister al-Zaidi established a productive working relationship. Rather, it is whether Iraq can transform diplomatic momentum into meaningful national reform. That transformation will ultimately depend upon Parliament’s willingness to enact legislation governing foreign investment, banking modernization, energy development, cybersecurity, anti-corruption initiatives, public-private partnerships, and institutional reform. In the final analysis, Iraq’s future will be determined less by speeches delivered in Washington than by laws enacted in Baghdad.
 
KEY JUDGMENTS

Iraq is entering a period in which economic development and institutional modernization may become as strategically important as military security.⁴
The Trump Administration appears to be repositioning the U.S.-Iraq relationship toward investment, energy, reconstruction, and commercial cooperation while maintaining counterterrorism coordination.¹²
Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi inherits an Iraq possessing extraordinary economic potential but constrained by corruption, political fragmentation, infrastructure deficits, and competing regional influences.¹³
Parliament—not diplomacy—will determine whether Iraq’s proposed reforms become permanent national policy through legislation.
Iraq’s legislative agenda deserves to be monitored as a strategic intelligence indicator because it provides one of the earliest measures of the government’s long-term priorities.

 
WHY IRAQ MATTERS
The White House meeting cannot be understood without first understanding Iraq itself. Few nations occupy a more strategically important position in the international system. Iraq sits at the geographic crossroads of the Middle East, bordering Iran, Türkiye, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait while maintaining access to the Persian Gulf. It is simultaneously an energy producer, a transportation corridor, a security buffer, and a political battleground where regional and global powers pursue competing interests.⁵
Iraq also possesses one of the world’s largest proven petroleum reserves, making it a central player within OPEC and an important contributor to global energy markets. Although oil revenues continue to finance the overwhelming majority of government spending, decades of war, sanctions, corruption, and underinvestment have left much of Iraq’s infrastructure in need of reconstruction. Electricity shortages, inadequate water systems, aging transportation networks, and limited private-sector investment continue to constrain long-term economic growth. During his Washington visit, Prime Minister al-Zaidi estimated Iraq’s reconstruction requirements at more than $400 billion, arguing that sustained foreign investment—not simply foreign aid—will be necessary to rebuild the country.⁶
For the United States, Iraq represents far more than an energy partner. American policymakers continue to view Iraq as an essential component of regional stability, particularly in preventing the re-emergence of ISIS, limiting the influence of Iran-backed armed groups, protecting freedom of navigation in the Gulf, and maintaining a favorable balance of power across the Middle East.⁷
Regional governments share many of these interests but approach Iraq from different perspectives. Iran views Iraq as a critical strategic partner because of shared religious, economic, and security ties. Türkiye remains focused on border security and Kurdish militant organizations operating in northern Iraq. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and other Gulf states increasingly view Iraq as both an investment opportunity and an important Arab partner capable of strengthening regional economic integration. China also continues expanding its commercial presence through infrastructure and energy investments, making Iraq an arena of increasing strategic competition among major powers.⁸
 
WHO IS ALI AL-ZAIDI?
Ali al-Zaidi arrived in office under unusual circumstances. Unlike many previous Iraqi prime ministers whose political careers developed through long-established party structures, al-Zaidi entered national politics as a businessman with limited previous political experience. Following months of parliamentary deadlock after Iraq’s elections, he emerged as a compromise candidate capable of attracting support from multiple political factions while also receiving unusually strong encouragement from Washington.⁹
President Trump publicly acknowledged that he had supported al-Zaidi’s candidacy, arguing that Iraq required a leader focused upon economic development rather than political patronage. During their Oval Office meeting, Trump described the two men as having “tremendous chemistry” and predicted that al-Zaidi would become an important regional leader.¹⁰
That comparison is not accidental. Like President Trump, al-Zaidi presents himself as a businessman first and a politician second. His public message emphasizes investment, infrastructure, reconstruction, efficiency, employment, and economic modernization rather than ideology. Whether that approach can succeed within Iraq’s highly fragmented political system remains one of the central questions facing his administration.
His government nevertheless begins with formidable obstacles. Iraq continues confronting entrenched corruption, competing political blocs, weak public institutions, extensive reconstruction needs, and the continuing influence of armed organizations operating alongside formal state security institutions. Any meaningful reform agenda will therefore require not only executive leadership but sustained parliamentary support capable of translating policy proposals into legislation.
For JAFAJ readers, al-Zaidi’s greatest challenge is unlikely to be diplomacy in Washington. It will be governance in Baghdad. His success will ultimately depend upon whether Iraq’s Parliament can enact the legal and regulatory reforms necessary to attract investment, modernize financial institutions, strengthen public administration, and restore confidence in the Iraqi state.
 
THE TRUMP–AL-ZAIDI MEETING: WHAT WAS DISCUSSED?
Although the public images from the Oval Office emphasized diplomacy and personal rapport, the substance of the Trump–al-Zaidi meeting centered on a series of strategic issues that will likely shape U.S.-Iraq relations for years to come. Unlike previous meetings that focused primarily on military operations, this discussion reflected a broader agenda encompassing economic development, energy security, reconstruction, regional stability, and long-term investment.¹¹¹²
FROM A SECURITY PARTNERSHIP TO AN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the meeting was the apparent effort by both governments to redefine the bilateral relationship. For more than two decades, American policy toward Iraq has been dominated by military operations, counterterrorism, intelligence cooperation, and security assistance. While those issues remain important, both leaders publicly emphasized expanding cooperation into commerce, infrastructure, energy, technology, and private investment.¹¹
President Trump repeatedly highlighted opportunities for American companies to participate in Iraq’s reconstruction while encouraging greater commercial engagement between the two countries. Prime Minister al-Zaidi similarly described Iraq as entering a new phase of development that requires international investment rather than prolonged dependence upon foreign assistance. The message from both governments was clear: future relations should increasingly be measured by economic growth rather than military deployments.¹¹¹²
ENERGY REMAINED THE FOUNDATION
Energy dominated much of the strategic discussion.
Iraq possesses enormous petroleum resources but continues facing serious challenges involving electricity generation, natural gas utilization, refining capacity, transmission infrastructure, and domestic energy distribution. American companies possess technical expertise in each of these sectors, making energy cooperation one of the most practical areas for expanding bilateral relations.¹²
Prime Minister al-Zaidi also argued that Iraq deserves greater production flexibility within OPEC to support national reconstruction and long-term economic development. Increased production, however, must be balanced against broader market stability and the collective decisions of OPEC members. The discussion therefore extended beyond oil production itself to encompass Iraq’s broader economic future.¹²
SECURITY COOPERATION CONTINUES
Although economic issues received greater attention than in previous years, security cooperation remains indispensable.
ISIS no longer controls significant territory, but the organization continues maintaining insurgent capabilities in parts of Iraq and neighboring Syria. Intelligence sharing, counterterrorism operations, military training, and border security therefore remain central components of U.S.-Iraq cooperation.¹¹
The meeting also addressed Iraq’s continuing effort to consolidate state authority over armed organizations operating outside direct government control. Prime Minister al-Zaidi reportedly indicated that the Iraqi government intends to strengthen the authority of national institutions while reducing the need for independent armed organizations following the planned transition in the American military mission.¹¹
THE IRAN FACTOR
No discussion of Iraq can ignore Iran.
Although neither government publicly characterized the meeting as an effort to counter Tehran, Iranian influence formed an unavoidable strategic backdrop. Iraq maintains extensive economic, political, religious, and cultural ties with Iran while simultaneously seeking stronger economic and security cooperation with the United States and other Western partners.
This balancing strategy reflects geopolitical necessity rather than political preference. Iraq cannot afford open confrontation with Iran, nor can it ignore the economic and security benefits associated with cooperation with Washington. Prime Minister al-Zaidi’s challenge will therefore be maintaining productive relations with both governments while strengthening Iraq’s own national sovereignty and reducing external dependence.¹¹¹²
 
JAFAJ ANALYSIS
The White House meeting suggests that both governments recognize a fundamental reality: Iraq’s future will not be determined exclusively by military power.
Instead, the next phase of strategic competition will likely focus upon investment, infrastructure, legislation, institutional reform, technology, and economic modernization.
For Washington, a prosperous Iraq represents a more durable security partner than an unstable Iraq dependent upon continuous military assistance.
For Baghdad, attracting foreign capital, modernizing infrastructure, strengthening public institutions, and diversifying the national economy represent essential prerequisites for long-term stability.
The success of that strategy, however, will ultimately depend upon Iraq’s ability to translate diplomatic agreements into enforceable law.
 
LEGISLATIVE IMPLICATIONS: WHERE IRAQ’S FUTURE WILL BE DECIDED
For JAFAJ readers, the most important consequence of the Trump-al-Zaidi meeting may never appear in a White House press release. Instead, its lasting significance will be measured by the legislation introduced, debated, amended, and enacted by Iraq’s Parliament during the coming months.
Diplomatic meetings establish political direction.
Legislation determines whether that direction becomes national policy.
If Prime Minister al-Zaidi intends to modernize Iraq’s economy and strengthen its international partnerships, Parliament will be required to enact a broad package of legislative and regulatory reforms. Without statutory authority, many of the initiatives discussed in Washington will remain political aspirations rather than operational government policy.¹³
Several legislative priorities are already becoming apparent.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT REFORM
One of Iraq’s highest priorities will be strengthening the legal environment governing foreign investment.
International investors consistently seek predictable regulatory systems, transparent commercial law, reliable dispute resolution, enforceable contracts, stable taxation, and protection against arbitrary government action. Although Iraq has made progress, additional legislative modernization will likely be necessary if Baghdad hopes to compete with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and other regional investment destinations.¹⁴
ENERGY LEGISLATION
Energy remains Iraq’s greatest economic asset.
Future legislation may address petroleum production, natural gas development, electricity generation, transmission infrastructure, refinery modernization, renewable energy, pipeline construction, and public-private partnerships designed to attract international capital.
Successful modernization of Iraq’s energy sector would strengthen government revenues while improving domestic electricity reliability and expanding opportunities for international investment.¹⁴
BANKING AND FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION
Iraq’s financial system continues requiring substantial modernization.
Potential legislative reforms include commercial banking, electronic payments, anti-money laundering authorities, financial technology, digital banking, securities regulation, and capital market development.
Modern financial institutions remain essential for attracting foreign investment and supporting long-term economic growth.
ANTI-CORRUPTION
Corruption continues representing one of Iraq’s greatest structural challenges.
Future legislation strengthening procurement transparency, financial disclosure, government auditing, inspector general authorities, judicial independence, and public accountability could significantly improve investor confidence while strengthening public trust in government institutions.
DIGITAL GOVERNMENT
Like many countries throughout the Middle East, Iraq is beginning the transition toward digital government.
Future legislation may include:

cybersecurity;
electronic government services;
digital identity;
artificial intelligence governance;
electronic procurement;
data protection;
digital commerce;
critical infrastructure protection.

These reforms would align Iraq with broader regional modernization efforts while improving government efficiency.
 
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The Trump-al-Zaidi meeting immediately attracted attention throughout the Middle East because Iraq’s future affects virtually every regional government.
Iran will likely continue seeking to preserve its longstanding political and economic influence while monitoring expanding American commercial engagement.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are expected to support greater Iraqi economic stability because stronger commercial integration benefits regional trade while providing an alternative to prolonged geopolitical confrontation.
Türkiye will remain focused upon northern Iraq, border security, energy transportation corridors, and Kurdish militant organizations operating near the frontier.
Israel will closely observe developments affecting Iranian-backed armed organizations and Iraq’s broader regional orientation.
China will likely continue expanding infrastructure and energy investment opportunities consistent with its broader Belt and Road Initiative.
For each government, Iraq represents both an opportunity and a strategic variable.
 
JAFAJ INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
The Trump–al-Zaidi meeting should not be interpreted as a routine diplomatic engagement or viewed solely through the traditional lens of bilateral relations. Rather, it may represent the opening phase of Iraq’s next national transformation—a strategic transition in which economic modernization, institutional reform, and legislative development become as important to national security as military operations and counterterrorism.
For more than two decades, Iraq has occupied a central place within American military strategy. The emerging relationship outlined during the White House meeting suggests that Washington increasingly seeks to redefine that partnership. Success may no longer be measured primarily by troop deployments, kinetic operations, or counterterrorism cooperation, but by measurable progress in private investment, infrastructure modernization, energy development, commercial partnerships, financial reform, and institutional capacity.
Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi appears equally committed to repositioning Iraq from a nation defined by conflict into one defined by economic opportunity. His public emphasis on reconstruction, investment, and modernization suggests an effort to recast Iraq as a regional commercial partner rather than a perpetual security challenge.
Whether those ambitions become reality remains uncertain.
Iraq continues confronting deeply rooted structural obstacles, including systemic corruption, political fragmentation, competing armed organizations, weak public institutions, deteriorating infrastructure, unemployment, demographic pressures, and persistent regional competition among major powers. These conditions cannot be resolved through diplomacy alone, nor can they be overcome by executive action in isolation.

They require legislation.
They require implementation.
They require institutional accountability.
They require sustained political leadership over many years.

For intelligence analysts, the principal indicators of success are now becoming increasingly clear. The most meaningful measures of Iraq’s future will not be found primarily in diplomatic communiqués or presidential statements, but in Parliament’s legislative agenda, the pace of regulatory modernization, the implementation of enacted reforms, and the government’s ability to translate political commitments into measurable institutional change.
JAFAJ therefore assesses with moderate confidence that Iraq’s Parliament—not future diplomatic summits—will become the single most important institution to monitor during the coming legislative session. The laws enacted in Baghdad may ultimately provide a more reliable indicator of Iraq’s strategic trajectory than any speech delivered in Washington.
CONCLUSION
History rarely changes because of a single diplomatic meeting.
More often, history changes because such meetings establish a new strategic direction that is subsequently translated into legislation, institutional reform, sustained political leadership, and measurable national progress.
The Trump–al-Zaidi meeting appears to represent one of those moments.
Whether it ultimately becomes a genuine turning point in U.S.-Iraq relations will depend not upon diplomatic rhetoric, personal chemistry, or symbolic announcements, but upon Iraq’s ability to convert strategic opportunity into enduring national reform. Diplomatic agreements establish intent. Laws establish policy. Institutions determine whether that policy succeeds.
For JAFAJ readers, this changes where strategic attention should be focused.

Continue monitoring the White House.
Continue monitoring regional diplomacy.
Continue monitoring military developments.
But watch Iraq’s Parliament just as carefully.
Watch the legislation governing foreign investment.
Watch energy reform.
Watch banking modernization.
Watch cybersecurity and digital governance.
Watch anti-corruption initiatives.
Watch infrastructure financing.
Watch judicial and regulatory reform.

These measures will provide the earliest and most reliable indicators of whether Iraq is successfully transitioning from a security-dependent state toward a modern, diversified economy capable of attracting sustained international investment, strengthening public institutions, expanding economic opportunity, and exercising greater national sovereignty.
For intelligence professionals, legislation is more than public policy—it is a strategic indicator. Parliamentary agendas reveal priorities. Budget appropriations reveal commitment. Regulatory reforms reveal implementation. Together, they provide one of the clearest windows into a government’s long-term intentions.
The next chapter of Iraq’s future is unlikely to be written first on the battlefield. It will be:

written in committee hearings.
debated on the floor of Parliament.
enacted into law.

Military operations may continue to shape today’s headlines and diplomatic meetings may influence tomorrow’s agenda – But the laws enacted in Baghdad will determine Iraq’s future for decades to come.
That is where JAFAJ will be watching.
 
FOOTNOTES

Associated Press, “Trump Touts ‘Tremendous Chemistry’ with New Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi During White House Visit,” July 14, 2026.
Reuters, “Trump Says U.S. Will Be Doing a Lot of Deals With Iraq, Taking a Lot of Oil Out,” July 14, 2026.
Reuters, “Iraq Needs a Fair Share Within OPEC, Says Prime Minister,” July 14, 2026.
Associated Press, “Trump Touts ‘Tremendous Chemistry’ with New Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi During White House Visit,” July 14, 2026; Reuters, “Iraq Needs a Fair Share Within OPEC, Says Prime Minister,” July 14, 2026.
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: Iraq; Reuters, “Iraq Needs a Fair Share Within OPEC, Says Prime Minister,” July 14, 2026.
Reuters, “Iraq Needs a Fair Share Within OPEC, Says Prime Minister,” July 14, 2026.
Associated Press, “Trump Touts ‘Tremendous Chemistry’ with New Iraqi Prime Minister al-Zaidi During White House Visit,” July 14, 2026.
Reuters, “Trump Says U.S. Will Be Doing a Lot of Deals With Iraq, Taking a Lot of Oil Out,” July 14, 2026; Reuters, “Iraq Needs a Fair Share Within OPEC, Says Prime Minister,” July 14, 2026.
Associated Press, “Trump Touts ‘Tremendous Chemistry’ with New Iraqi Prime Minister al-Zaidi During White House Visit,” July 14, 2026.
Associated Press, “Trump Touts ‘Tremendous Chemistry’ with New Iraqi Prime Minister al-Zaidi During White House Visit,” July 14, 2026
Associated Press, “Trump Touts ‘Tremendous Chemistry’ with New Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi During White House Visit,” July 14, 2026. (AP News).
Reuters, “Iraq Needs a Fair Share Within OPEC, Says Prime Minister,” July 14, 2026; Reuters, “Trump Says U.S. Will Be Doing a Lot of Deals With Iraq,” July 14, 2026.
Associated Press, “Trump Touts ‘Tremendous Chemistry’ with New Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi During White House Visit,” July 14, 2026.
Reuters, “Iraq Needs a Fair Share Within OPEC, Says Prime Minister,” July 14, 2026.

 
SELECTED REFERENCES

Associated Press. “Trump Touts ‘Tremendous Chemistry’ with New Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi During White House Visit.” July 14, 2026.
“Iraq Needs a Fair Share Within OPEC, Says Prime Minister.” July 14, 2026.
“Trump Says U.S. Will Be Doing a Lot of Deals With Iraq.” July 14, 2026.
S. Energy Information Administration. Country Analysis Brief: Iraq.
World Bank. Iraq Overview.
International Monetary Fund. Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia.

 
 

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Is Iran’s Intelligence System Failing Its Leaders?

An Assessment of Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence, and Strategic Decision-Making
Publication Date: July 15, 2026
Classification: Open-Source Intelligence Assessment (OSINT)
JAFAJ SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Iran’s intelligence community occupies a central position in the Islamic Republic’s national security strategy. Unlike many states that rely primarily on conventional military power to advance national interests, Iran has long depended upon intelligence operations, proxy organizations, covert action, cyber capabilities, and strategic influence campaigns to compensate for conventional military limitations. Intelligence is not merely a supporting function within the Iranian system; it is one of the principal instruments through which the state seeks to preserve regime stability, deter foreign adversaries, influence regional politics, and project power beyond its borders.
Measured solely by its ability to collect information, Iran’s intelligence services remain capable organizations. Over the past two decades, Tehran has demonstrated competence in cyber espionage, regional human intelligence (HUMINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and the cultivation of proxy networks throughout the Middle East. These capabilities have enabled Iran to monitor regional developments, evade sanctions, support allied organizations, and influence conflicts extending from Lebanon and Syria to Iraq and Yemen.¹
Yet intelligence collection represents only one stage of a much broader intelligence process.
Modern intelligence organizations exist not merely to acquire information but to transform information into actionable knowledge that informs strategic decision-making. This process requires successful collection, analysis, dissemination, policy integration, operational security, and continuous counterintelligence. Failure at any stage may produce strategic surprise, operational setbacks, or political miscalculation.
This assessment examines whether recent events indicate that Iran’s intelligence system is experiencing such failures.
The evidence presented in this report does not support the conclusion that Iranian intelligence organizations are fundamentally incapable of collecting information. Instead, publicly observable events suggest a more nuanced picture. Iran continues to demonstrate considerable intelligence capabilities in several domains while simultaneously experiencing repeated operational setbacks that raise legitimate questions regarding analytical performance, institutional coordination, counterintelligence, and strategic decision-making.
Repeated Israeli intelligence operations inside Iran, targeted killings of senior military leaders and nuclear scientists, sabotage of strategic facilities, cyber intrusions, and apparent foreign penetration of sensitive government institutions have exposed vulnerabilities that cannot easily be dismissed as isolated incidents. Although each operation may have unique circumstances, their cumulative effect suggests systemic weaknesses deserving careful examination.
This report therefore evaluates Iran’s intelligence performance not by ideology or political preference, but by measurable operational outcomes. Intelligence organizations ultimately succeed or fail according to their ability to provide accurate warning, protect national secrets, deny adversaries access to sensitive information, and enable informed national decision-making.
Whether Iran is meeting those objectives remains the central question addressed throughout this assessment.
KEY JUDGMENTS
Based upon publicly available information, this assessment reaches the following principal judgments.
First, Iran continues to maintain a capable and sophisticated intelligence apparatus possessing significant strengths in regional intelligence collection, cyber operations, proxy-enabled human intelligence, and open-source intelligence exploitation. Public evidence does not support characterizing Iranian intelligence services as ineffective institutions.²
Second, repeated operational successes achieved by foreign intelligence services against Iranian targets suggest significant weaknesses exist within Iran’s counterintelligence and security architecture. The persistence of these operations over multiple years indicates structural rather than isolated vulnerabilities.
Third, available evidence suggests that intelligence collection and strategic decision-making should be evaluated separately. An intelligence service may correctly identify an adversary’s capabilities while political leadership misjudges intentions, timing, or willingness to act. Public information is insufficient to determine precisely where failures occur within the Iranian decision-making process.
Fourth, the available evidence supports a moderate-to-high confidence assessment that counterintelligence presently represents one of Iran’s most significant institutional vulnerabilities. Foreign intelligence services appear to have repeatedly obtained highly sensitive operational information concerning Iranian military leadership, strategic facilities, and national security programs.
Fifth, the evidence does not support broad conclusions regarding the overall effectiveness of Iran’s intelligence organizations. Certain intelligence disciplines—including cyber operations and regional proxy intelligence—continue to demonstrate meaningful capability despite observable weaknesses elsewhere.
INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENCE LEVELS
Professional intelligence assessments distinguish carefully between observable facts, analytical judgments, and speculation. Throughout this report, confidence levels reflect the quantity, quality, consistency, and independence of available evidence.
High Confidence indicates multiple independent sources consistently support a conclusion and alternative explanations appear substantially less likely.
Moderate Confidence indicates available evidence generally supports the assessment, although competing interpretations remain plausible or significant information gaps exist.
Low Confidence indicates the available evidence is limited, contradictory, or insufficient to support firm analytical conclusions.
Because this report relies exclusively upon publicly available information, no conclusion should be interpreted as possessing the certainty associated with classified intelligence reporting.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
This report is an open-source intelligence assessment.
It relies upon publicly available government publications, official statements, judicial records, congressional testimony, cybersecurity advisories, reports issued by international organizations, academic research, reputable investigative journalism, think-tank analyses, and observable operational outcomes.
The assessment does not rely upon classified information.
Accordingly, the report does not attempt to reconstruct Iranian intelligence reporting or internal deliberations. Instead, it evaluates measurable outcomes and institutional performance based upon evidence available within the public domain.
Observable operational success and failure remain among the most useful indicators available when evaluating intelligence organizations from outside government.
Repeated strategic surprise, successful foreign penetration, compromised operational security, and ineffective counterintelligence frequently reveal institutional characteristics even when internal reporting remains inaccessible.
Conversely, successful intelligence operations, effective cyber campaigns, resilient proxy networks, and sophisticated regional influence activities demonstrate institutional strengths that should not be overlooked.
Throughout this assessment, care has been taken to distinguish documented events from analytical interpretation.
CHAPTER ONE
UNDERSTANDING IRAN’S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Iran possesses one of the largest and most complex intelligence architectures in the Middle East.
Rather than concentrating intelligence authority within a single civilian organization, the Islamic Republic has developed a multilayered intelligence structure composed of civilian agencies, military organizations, law-enforcement entities, religious institutions, cyber organizations, and specialized security services. While this structure provides redundancy and broad collection capabilities, it also creates overlapping jurisdictions, bureaucratic competition, and potential challenges in coordinating intelligence assessments across multiple institutions.
At the center of the civilian intelligence system is the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS). Established in 1984 following the consolidation of the Islamic Republic, MOIS serves as Iran’s principal civilian intelligence organization. Its responsibilities include domestic security, foreign intelligence collection, counterespionage, counterterrorism, protection of state institutions, and monitoring activities considered threats to national security.³
Parallel to MOIS is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO). Unlike MOIS, which functions as a government ministry, the IRGC Intelligence Organization operates within the Revolutionary Guard structure and maintains particularly close relationships with Iran’s political and military leadership. Over the past two decades, the IRGC-IO has expanded significantly in both influence and operational capability, becoming one of the country’s most powerful intelligence organizations.
The existence of parallel intelligence organizations is neither unusual nor inherently problematic. Numerous countries—including the United States—maintain multiple intelligence agencies with specialized missions.
The challenge arises when institutional competition begins to outweigh institutional cooperation.
Public reporting has periodically suggested rivalry between elements of Iran’s civilian intelligence services and the Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence organizations. Such competition may encourage innovation and redundancy, but it can also complicate intelligence sharing, delay dissemination, or produce competing analytical assessments reaching senior policymakers.
In addition to MOIS and the IRGC Intelligence Organization, numerous other entities contribute to Iran’s intelligence ecosystem.
The IRGC Quds Force collects foreign operational intelligence supporting overseas activities and relationships with allied organizations throughout the Middle East. Iranian military intelligence organizations provide battlefield assessments and operational planning. The Law Enforcement Command maintains domestic intelligence responsibilities relating to public security, organized crime, and internal stability. Cyber organizations affiliated with both MOIS and the IRGC conduct espionage, influence operations, network reconnaissance, and defensive cyber activities.⁴
This layered intelligence structure reflects Iran’s broader national security philosophy.
Rather than relying exclusively upon conventional military superiority, Tehran integrates intelligence, diplomacy, cyber operations, proxy organizations, economic pressure, and information campaigns into a unified strategy designed to offset conventional disadvantages and create strategic depth throughout the region.
Viewed from this perspective, intelligence is not merely an adjunct to military power.
It is one of the primary instruments through which the Islamic Republic seeks to achieve national objectives.
That institutional importance makes recent operational setbacks particularly significant. If intelligence occupies such a central role within Iran’s national security strategy, repeated failures affecting intelligence performance have implications extending well beyond individual operations. They raise broader questions concerning organizational effectiveness, analytical rigor, strategic warning, and the ability of senior leadership to make informed national security decisions.
These questions form the foundation for the remainder of this assessment.
JAFAJ ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT – CHAPTER ONE
Key Findings

Iran maintains one of the Middle East’s most extensive intelligence systems.
The country possesses multiple capable intelligence organizations with distinct but overlapping missions.
Intelligence remains central to Iranian national security doctrine.
Institutional complexity creates opportunities for both specialization and bureaucratic friction.
Public evidence indicates meaningful intelligence capabilities coexist with observable operational vulnerabilities.

Confidence Level
High Confidence
Strategic Implications
Understanding Iran’s intelligence performance requires evaluating the entire intelligence cycle rather than focusing exclusively on individual operational successes or failures. Institutional strengths in collection do not necessarily translate into effective strategic decision-making or successful counterintelligence.
RUNNING CHICAGO-STYLE FOOTNOTES

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, various editions.
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, annual editions; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Iran Military Power.
Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, official organizational history and statutory authorities; see also academic studies of the post-1979 Iranian intelligence system.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; U.S. Congressional Research Service, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Sanctions, various editions.

 
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CHAPTER TWO
THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE: WHERE SUCCESS OR FAILURE IS DETERMINED
Intelligence organizations are often judged by their most visible successes and failures. Assassinations, sabotage operations, cyber intrusions, espionage arrests, and covert actions receive widespread media attention and frequently shape public perceptions regarding the effectiveness of intelligence services. Professional intelligence organizations, however, evaluate performance differently.
An intelligence service is only as effective as its ability to move information through the entire intelligence cycle. Collection alone is insufficient. Information must be transformed into reliable intelligence, communicated to decision-makers in a timely manner, protected from compromise, and ultimately incorporated into policy decisions. Weakness at any stage of this cycle can undermine otherwise successful collection efforts.
For analytical purposes, the intelligence cycle may be divided into six principal stages:

Planning and Direction
Collection
Processing and Exploitation
Analysis and Production
Dissemination
Decision and Operational Response

Although presented sequentially, these functions operate simultaneously and continuously.
Planning and Direction
The intelligence process begins with national leadership identifying strategic priorities. Intelligence organizations cannot effectively collect information unless policymakers clearly define the questions requiring answers.
For Iran, these priorities have remained relatively consistent for decades. Principal intelligence requirements include monitoring Israeli military capabilities, assessing United States force posture in the Middle East, protecting the regime from internal and external threats, evaluating regional political developments, monitoring sanctions enforcement, supporting proxy organizations, and preserving the security of strategic military and nuclear programs.¹
There is little public evidence suggesting Iran has failed to identify its principal intelligence priorities. On the contrary, Tehran has consistently devoted substantial institutional resources toward these objectives.
Accordingly, there is little basis for concluding that the planning phase represents the principal weakness within Iran’s intelligence system.
JAFAJ Assessment: Moderate Confidence
Collection
Iran possesses diversified intelligence collection capabilities.
Its Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS), Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO), Quds Force, cyber organizations, military intelligence services, diplomatic reporting, proxy organizations, and open-source analysts collectively generate substantial quantities of intelligence.
Iran has demonstrated competence in several collection disciplines.
Regional proxy organizations have provided battlefield reporting throughout Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories. Cyber organizations have conducted espionage campaigns targeting governments, research institutions, universities, and private industry. Public reporting further indicates extensive exploitation of commercially available satellite imagery, maritime tracking systems, procurement databases, and social media platforms.
The growth of publicly available information has fundamentally altered intelligence work. Much strategic insight no longer requires clandestine collection. Open-source intelligence increasingly supplements—or in some cases replaces—traditional espionage.
Iran has invested heavily in these capabilities.
While individual collection failures undoubtedly occur, available evidence suggests Iranian intelligence organizations remain capable collectors of regional political and military information.
JAFAJ Assessment: High Confidence
Processing and Exploitation
Raw information rarely possesses immediate intelligence value.
Collected information must be translated, authenticated, organized, prioritized, correlated with existing reporting, and prepared for analytical review.
Little reliable public information exists concerning Iran’s internal processing procedures.
Accordingly, no firm conclusions should be drawn regarding this stage of the intelligence cycle.
Nevertheless, the sophistication demonstrated by Iranian cyber campaigns and regional intelligence activities suggests competent technical processing capabilities in many operational areas.
Whether all relevant information reaches the appropriate analytical organizations remains unknown.
JAFAJ Assessment: Low Confidence
Analysis and Production
Intelligence analysis represents the point at which information becomes judgment.
Professional analysts compare independent sources, identify inconsistencies, evaluate competing explanations, assess probability, and communicate uncertainty to policymakers. Their responsibility is not to predict the future with certainty but to reduce uncertainty sufficiently to improve decision-making.
History demonstrates that intelligence failures frequently originate during analysis rather than collection.
Israeli intelligence underestimated Arab intentions in 1973 despite substantial warning information. American intelligence struggled to integrate dispersed reporting before the September 11 attacks. Numerous governments have overestimated or underestimated adversaries because analysts accepted prevailing assumptions rather than testing alternative hypotheses.
Whether Iran faces similar analytical challenges cannot be determined directly from public information.
However, observable operational outcomes suggest that some strategic developments may not have been fully anticipated or adequately incorporated into national decision-making.
Possible explanations include analytical bias, fragmented reporting, institutional rivalry, delayed dissemination, or policymaker rejection of unwelcome conclusions.
These explanations are not mutually exclusive.
JAFAJ Assessment: Moderate Confidence
Dissemination
Intelligence possesses value only when it reaches decision-makers in time to influence policy.
Professional intelligence organizations therefore emphasize concise reporting, clear warning language, and rapid communication during crises.
Public information provides little insight into dissemination procedures within Iran’s national security structure.
However, Iran’s multiple intelligence organizations create the possibility that competing assessments may reach senior officials through separate channels.
Parallel reporting can strengthen analysis by presenting alternative viewpoints.
It can also complicate decision-making if competing organizations provide inconsistent assessments without effective coordination.
Whether such dynamics influence Iranian national security decisions remains uncertain.
JAFAJ Assessment: Low Confidence
Decision and Operational Response
The final stage of the intelligence cycle lies beyond the intelligence community itself.
Political leaders—not intelligence officers—determine national policy.
An intelligence service may accurately identify an emerging threat while political leadership elects not to act.
Conversely, policymakers may demand action despite incomplete or uncertain intelligence.
This distinction is frequently overlooked in public discussions of intelligence failure.
Without access to Iranian internal deliberations, analysts cannot determine whether recent operational setbacks resulted primarily from inadequate intelligence, flawed analysis, delayed dissemination, political decisions, or some combination of these factors.
Observable outcomes indicate that adversaries have repeatedly achieved operational success against sensitive Iranian targets.
Public evidence alone does not establish precisely why.
That distinction is essential to maintaining analytical integrity.
CHAPTER THREE
WHERE THE SYSTEM APPEARS TO BE BREAKING DOWN
Evaluating intelligence performance requires examining patterns rather than isolated events.
Individual intelligence failures occur within every nation.
Repeated failures affecting similar targets, however, may indicate institutional weaknesses requiring closer examination.
Based upon publicly available information, four areas warrant particular attention.
Counterintelligence
Counterintelligence is responsible for detecting hostile intelligence activity, protecting classified information, identifying insider threats, securing communications, and preventing foreign penetration of sensitive institutions.
Numerous publicly reported Israeli operations suggest that Iranian counterintelligence has faced sustained challenges over an extended period. These include reported penetrations of sensitive facilities, targeted operations against senior officials and scientists, and access to highly sensitive operational information.²
Although each operation has unique circumstances, their cumulative pattern raises legitimate questions regarding institutional resilience.
JAFAJ Assessment: Moderate-to-High Confidence
Operational Security
Operational security depends upon limiting access to sensitive information, controlling communications, compartmentalizing planning, and reducing opportunities for adversary surveillance.
Successful precision operations often require detailed knowledge of schedules, facilities, communications, and movement patterns.
Repeated operations of this nature suggest operational security procedures should be evaluated carefully.
This conclusion does not establish widespread institutional compromise.
It does suggest opportunities for adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities.
JAFAJ Assessment: Moderate Confidence
Strategic Warning
One of the principal responsibilities of every intelligence organization is providing strategic warning before crises develop.
Strategic warning does not require predicting every event.
It requires identifying increasing probability, recognizing changing adversary behavior, and communicating elevated risk to policymakers.
Public reporting concerning several recent regional crises suggests warning indicators existed before major military operations.
Whether those indicators were fully recognized, accurately interpreted, or acted upon by Iranian leadership cannot presently be determined from open sources.
JAFAJ Assessment: Low-to-Moderate Confidence
Institutional Coordination
Iran’s intelligence system benefits from multiple specialized organizations.
That same diversity creates coordination challenges.
Competing institutional cultures, overlapping responsibilities, and parallel reporting channels may complicate integrated national assessments.
Comparable challenges have affected intelligence communities throughout the world, including democratic and authoritarian governments alike.
The existence of multiple agencies should therefore be viewed as a potential organizational risk rather than evidence of institutional dysfunction.
JAFAJ Assessment: Moderate Confidence
CHAPTER FOUR
PATTERN OF OPERATIONAL OUTCOMES
Rather than evaluating individual incidents in isolation, intelligence professionals frequently examine long-term operational patterns.
Several observable trends emerge from publicly available reporting over the past decade.
First, Iranian intelligence organizations have continued demonstrating meaningful regional collection capabilities through cyber operations, proxy relationships, and diplomatic reporting.
Second, foreign intelligence services—particularly Israel—have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to conduct sophisticated operations affecting Iranian strategic interests.
Third, Iranian security institutions have responded by increasing internal security measures, restructuring elements of their national security apparatus, and emphasizing counterintelligence improvements.
These developments do not establish that Iran’s intelligence community is ineffective.
They do suggest that Iranian intelligence organizations operate in an increasingly competitive environment where capable adversaries have achieved notable operational successes.
For policymakers, the central analytical question is therefore not whether Iranian intelligence can collect information.
The more important question is whether institutional reforms can strengthen the integration of collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and strategic decision-making sufficiently to reduce future operational vulnerabilities.
JAFAJ ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT – CHAPTERS TWO THROUGH FOUR
Key Findings

Public evidence suggests Iran retains capable intelligence collection organizations.
Observable operational outcomes point to greater challenges in counterintelligence, operational security, and strategic warning than in collection itself.
Public information is insufficient to assign responsibility for individual operational failures to any single stage of the intelligence cycle.
The distinction between intelligence performance and political decision-making remains critical when evaluating national security outcomes.

Confidence Level
Moderate Confidence
Strategic Implications
Future intelligence competition involving Iran is likely to focus less on expanding collection capabilities and more on strengthening institutional resilience against sophisticated foreign intelligence operations.
RUNNING CHICAGO-STYLE FOOTNOTES (CONTINUED)

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, various editions; Congressional Research Service, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Sanctions.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reports on Iran’s nuclear program; analyses by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Atlantic Council, and other research institutions concerning Israeli-Iranian intelligence competition; publicly reported accounts of operations targeting Iranian nuclear infrastructure and senior officials.

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CHAPTER FIVE
IRAN’S INTELLIGENCE ON THE UNITED STATES
A LONG-TERM STRATEGIC COLLECTION EFFORT
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States has remained Iran’s highest-priority global intelligence target. Successive Iranian governments have viewed American military power, economic influence, diplomatic alliances, and sanctions policy as the principal external factors shaping Iran’s national security environment. As a result, Iranian intelligence organizations have devoted substantial resources to understanding U.S. capabilities, intentions, and decision-making.
Unlike the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, the intelligence contest between Washington and Tehran has generally been asymmetrical. The United States possesses significantly greater intelligence resources, technical collection systems, satellite constellations, and global surveillance capabilities. Iran has therefore attempted to compensate through regional human intelligence networks, cyber espionage, open-source intelligence, proxy organizations, diplomatic reporting, and influence operations.
This asymmetrical approach reflects necessity rather than preference.
Unable to match American technical collection capabilities directly, Iran has emphasized collection methods that are comparatively inexpensive, adaptable, and difficult to attribute. Over the past twenty years, cyber operations have become one of Tehran’s most important intelligence tools, allowing Iranian intelligence services to obtain political, military, scientific, and commercial information without relying exclusively upon traditional espionage.
COLLECTION PRIORITIES
Open-source reporting consistently indicates that Iranian intelligence organizations devote significant attention to several categories of U.S. intelligence.
The first priority involves American military capabilities and force posture throughout the Middle East.
Iran closely monitors U.S. naval operations in the Persian Gulf, aircraft carrier deployments, bomber rotations, regional air bases, missile defense systems, logistics hubs, and military exercises. Because Iran’s defense doctrine relies heavily upon deterrence through missiles, drones, maritime disruption, and proxy organizations, understanding American military readiness is essential to Iranian planning.⁷
A second priority concerns U.S. political decision-making.
Iranian analysts monitor presidential statements, congressional hearings, defense authorization legislation, sanctions policy, election outcomes, cabinet appointments, and public debate regarding the Middle East. Unlike authoritarian systems where strategic decisions may remain highly centralized, the American political process generates extensive publicly available information. Congressional testimony, budget documents, committee hearings, think-tank publications, court filings, and investigative journalism collectively provide foreign intelligence services with significant insight into policy development.
Consequently, Iranian intelligence collection against the United States increasingly emphasizes exploitation of publicly available information rather than reliance solely upon clandestine espionage.
A third intelligence priority involves sanctions enforcement.
Economic sanctions remain one of the most consequential instruments of American policy toward Iran. Intelligence organizations therefore monitor financial regulations, shipping enforcement, export controls, energy markets, international banking restrictions, and multinational compliance efforts. These assessments assist Iranian policymakers in identifying vulnerabilities within sanctions regimes and developing methods to reduce their economic impact.
CYBER COLLECTION
Perhaps no area better illustrates Iran’s intelligence evolution than cyber operations.
Over the past two decades, U.S. government agencies have attributed numerous cyber espionage campaigns to Iranian state-sponsored or state-aligned actors. Public advisories issued jointly by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) describe persistent Iranian efforts targeting government agencies, defense contractors, research institutions, universities, healthcare organizations, and private industry.⁸
These campaigns have generally emphasized intelligence collection rather than large-scale destructive attacks.
Objectives have reportedly included credential theft, network reconnaissance, collection of proprietary research, monitoring of dissident organizations, and long-term access to strategic information systems.
Iran’s cyber organizations have demonstrated adaptability by combining technical intrusion techniques with social engineering, phishing operations, and exploitation of publicly available information.
Although Iran’s cyber capabilities generally remain below those attributed to Russia, China, and the United States, they nevertheless represent one of the country’s most effective intelligence instruments.
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
Human intelligence remains considerably more difficult.
Recruiting individuals with legitimate access to sensitive U.S. national security information presents significant operational challenges. American counterintelligence organizations devote extensive resources to detecting foreign recruitment efforts, monitoring espionage activity, and protecting classified information.
Publicly reported criminal prosecutions illustrate continuing Iranian efforts to collect information through human sources, influence operations, and surveillance directed at dissidents, journalists, former government officials, and individuals perceived as hostile to the Islamic Republic. Federal authorities have disrupted multiple alleged Iranian operations over the past decade, demonstrating both Tehran’s continued interest in human intelligence and the effectiveness of American counterintelligence in identifying certain activities.⁹
Open-source evidence does not support the conclusion that Iran has achieved sustained penetration of the highest levels of the United States national security establishment comparable to historic Soviet or contemporary Chinese espionage operations.
This distinction is important.
Iran demonstrates persistence in human intelligence operations without necessarily demonstrating equivalent strategic success.
ANALYTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES
Collecting information differs fundamentally from understanding it.
One of the most challenging tasks facing any foreign intelligence organization is interpreting American political decision-making.
The United States operates through a constitutional system involving multiple branches of government, competing political parties, independent courts, state governments, and an active media environment. Policies frequently emerge from negotiation and compromise rather than centralized planning.
For foreign analysts accustomed to more hierarchical political systems, predicting American decisions may prove considerably more difficult than identifying American capabilities.
Several regional crises suggest Iranian policymakers have occasionally underestimated Washington’s willingness to employ military force under specific circumstances while overestimating the restraining influence of domestic political debate.
Whether these represent intelligence failures, analytical misjudgments, or political decisions remains impossible to determine from public information.
The distinction nevertheless illustrates one of intelligence analysis’s central challenges:
Knowing what an adversary can do does not necessarily reveal what an adversary will do.
JAFAJ ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT – CHAPTER FIVE
Key Findings

Iran maintains an extensive long-term intelligence collection effort directed toward the United States.
Cyber operations, open-source intelligence, regional reporting, and sanctions monitoring represent major institutional strengths.
Public evidence demonstrates persistent intelligence collection efforts but provides limited evidence of major strategic penetration of the U.S. national security establishment.
Understanding American political decision-making appears substantially more difficult than monitoring American military capabilities.

Confidence Level
Moderate-to-High Confidence
Strategic Implications
Iran is likely to continue emphasizing cyber espionage, open-source exploitation, sanctions intelligence, and regional military monitoring while seeking opportunities to expand human intelligence capabilities against U.S. interests.
CHAPTER SIX
IRAN’S INTELLIGENCE ON ISRAEL
THE PRIMARY STRATEGIC ADVERSARY
No foreign intelligence target receives greater sustained attention from the Islamic Republic than the State of Israel.
For more than four decades, Tehran has regarded Israel not merely as a regional competitor but as a principal strategic adversary. Consequently, Iranian intelligence organizations devote substantial resources toward understanding Israeli military capabilities, intelligence organizations, political leadership, technological development, missile defense systems, cyber capabilities, and strategic planning.
The intelligence contest between Iran and Israel differs fundamentally from Iran’s competition with the United States.
Whereas geography limits direct operational interaction with Washington, Iran and Israel engage in an ongoing regional intelligence competition characterized by proxy conflict, cyber operations, covert action, strategic influence campaigns, and persistent surveillance.
This competition has become one of the most sophisticated intelligence rivalries in the modern Middle East.
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PRIORITIES
Iranian collection priorities concerning Israel appear relatively consistent.
Primary objectives include monitoring the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the Israeli Air Force, missile defense systems, intelligence organizations, nuclear policy, cyber capabilities, energy infrastructure, and political decision-making.
Collection efforts also extend to Israeli regional diplomacy, normalization agreements, military cooperation with neighboring states, and technological innovation relevant to future military capabilities.
Iran benefits from several advantages in regional intelligence collection.
Relationships with Hezbollah, Palestinian armed organizations, Iraqi militias, and other regional partners provide access to localized reporting that supplements traditional intelligence collection. These relationships enable Tehran to receive battlefield observations, political reporting, and operational assessments from multiple theaters simultaneously.
Proxy reporting, however, possesses inherent limitations.
Information obtained through allied organizations may reflect local perspectives, organizational interests, or incomplete situational awareness. Professional intelligence analysis therefore requires independent verification whenever possible.
THE INTELLIGENCE COMPETITION
Evaluating intelligence organizations requires examining both offensive and defensive performance.
Iran has achieved notable intelligence successes over the past several decades.
Its regional proxy architecture has demonstrated resilience. Iranian intelligence has successfully supported long-term relationships across multiple countries, monitored Israeli regional activities, and developed extensive understanding of Israel’s military doctrine.
Nevertheless, publicly observable operational outcomes increasingly suggest that Israel currently holds the strategic advantage in the bilateral intelligence competition.
Numerous publicly reported operations—including the removal of Iran’s nuclear archive in 2018, repeated sabotage of nuclear facilities, targeted killings of senior nuclear scientists, precision strikes against military leadership, and reported intelligence penetration of sensitive institutions—demonstrate exceptionally detailed knowledge of Iranian security procedures and strategic infrastructure.¹⁰
Such operations generally require years of preparation.
They depend upon careful intelligence collection, operational security, technical surveillance, logistical planning, and often some degree of human access to sensitive information.
Individual operations do not necessarily establish systemic institutional weakness.
Repeated operations over an extended period, however, warrant closer analytical attention.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AS A CENTRAL CHALLENGE
Counterintelligence represents the defensive dimension of intelligence work.
Its mission is straightforward but exceptionally demanding: identify hostile intelligence services, protect classified information, detect insider threats, prevent recruitment, secure communications, and deny adversaries access to sensitive institutions.
Available public evidence suggests this may be the area presenting Iran’s greatest institutional challenge.
Repeated successful foreign intelligence operations indicate that Israeli intelligence has, at various times, acquired detailed information concerning Iranian facilities, leadership movements, scientific programs, and security procedures.
The existence of such information does not necessarily imply widespread institutional penetration.
It may result from a combination of technical surveillance, cyber collection, human intelligence, operational security weaknesses, or independent intelligence sources.
Professional analysis therefore favors caution.
Rather than concluding that Iranian institutions have been comprehensively penetrated, the available evidence supports the narrower conclusion that foreign intelligence services have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to obtain highly valuable operational intelligence concerning sensitive Iranian activities.
That conclusion is both analytically defensible and supported by observable outcomes.
WHO HOLDS THE ADVANTAGE?
The intelligence competition between Iran and Israel remains dynamic.
Iran continues demonstrating capable intelligence collection through regional networks, cyber activities, and long-term strategic analysis.
Israel continues demonstrating exceptional effectiveness in covert action, strategic intelligence, counterproliferation operations, and operational execution.
Both intelligence communities remain highly capable.
The principal distinction emerging from publicly available evidence concerns operational outcomes.
Recent years have produced more observable Israeli intelligence successes affecting Iranian strategic interests than corresponding publicly confirmed Iranian successes affecting Israeli strategic infrastructure.
Whether this trend continues will depend upon future organizational adaptation, technological innovation, and counterintelligence reform within both countries.
JAFAJ ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT – CHAPTER SIX
Key Findings

Israel remains Iran’s highest-priority foreign intelligence target.
Iran possesses substantial regional intelligence collection capabilities directed toward Israeli military and political activities.
Public evidence indicates Israel has achieved notable operational success against sensitive Iranian targets.
Counterintelligence and operational security appear to represent continuing challenges for Iran.
The intelligence competition remains active and continues to evolve.

Confidence Level
Moderate-to-High Confidence
Strategic Implications
The Israeli-Iranian intelligence contest will likely remain one of the defining strategic competitions in the Middle East. Future developments in cyber operations, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and technical surveillance are likely to influence this balance as much as traditional espionage.
RUNNING CHICAGO-STYLE FOOTNOTES (CONTINUED)

U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA), joint cybersecurity advisories concerning Iranian state-sponsored cyber actors, various editions.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, public counterintelligence press releases concerning Iranian intelligence activities in the United States; U.S. Department of Justice, criminal indictments and related public filings involving alleged Iranian intelligence operations.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reports on Iran’s nuclear program; David E. Sanger and Ronen Bergman, reporting on Israeli intelligence operations; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), analyses of Israeli-Iranian strategic competition; Atlantic Council, assessments of Israeli intelligence and special operations; and other publicly available reporting regarding the 2018 seizure of Iran’s nuclear archive and subsequent covert actions.

 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
IRAN’S INTELLIGENCE ON THE ARAB STATES
THE REGIONAL PRIORITY
While the United States and Israel occupy the highest levels of Iran’s strategic intelligence priorities, the Arab states collectively represent Tehran’s most immediate operational intelligence challenge. Geography, economics, sectarian politics, military competition, and regional diplomacy require Iranian intelligence organizations to maintain continuous awareness of developments throughout the Arabian Peninsula and the broader Middle East.
Iran’s intelligence priorities vary considerably among Arab states. Countries sharing maritime borders with Iran or hosting significant American military forces receive particularly close scrutiny. Likewise, states participating in regional security coalitions, normalization agreements with Israel, or multinational sanctions enforcement remain high-priority intelligence targets.
Unlike the Cold War model of intelligence collection directed primarily at military forces, Iran’s regional intelligence strategy integrates political, military, economic, religious, and social reporting into a comprehensive assessment of regional stability.
THE GULF STATES
The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman—receive sustained Iranian intelligence attention.
Collection priorities include:

Military modernization programs.
Air and missile defense capabilities.
Naval deployments in the Persian Gulf.
Defense cooperation with the United States and European allies.
Energy production and export infrastructure.
Internal political stability.
Economic diversification initiatives.
Intelligence cooperation with Israel.

Iran also closely monitors foreign military basing agreements throughout the Gulf. American, British, and French military installations provide strategic reach into the region and therefore constitute significant intelligence targets.
Open-source information, commercial satellite imagery, maritime tracking systems, and publicly available procurement records substantially supplement traditional intelligence collection.
SAUDI ARABIA
Saudi Arabia occupies a unique position within Iranian intelligence planning.
As the region’s largest Arab economy, custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites, and one of Iran’s principal geopolitical competitors, Saudi Arabia represents both a strategic rival and an indispensable regional actor.
Iranian intelligence collection reportedly focuses upon several areas:

Saudi defense modernization.
Air force readiness.
Missile defense systems.
Energy infrastructure.
Internal succession dynamics.
Counterterrorism cooperation.
Relations with Washington.
Expanding regional diplomacy.

The restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 reduced tensions but did not eliminate intelligence competition.
Professional intelligence organizations routinely continue collecting against states with which diplomatic relations exist.
Diplomacy rarely replaces intelligence collection.
Rather, successful diplomacy often increases the demand for accurate intelligence.
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
The United Arab Emirates presents a different intelligence challenge.
As a regional financial center, transportation hub, and increasingly sophisticated technological economy, the UAE occupies an important position within sanctions enforcement, international finance, logistics, and advanced technology.
Iranian intelligence therefore possesses strong incentives to understand Emirati banking regulations, export controls, maritime activity, and relationships with Western governments.
The UAE’s expanding defense cooperation with both the United States and Israel further elevates its intelligence importance.
IRAQ, SYRIA, AND LEBANON
Iran possesses substantially greater intelligence access within Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon than elsewhere in the Arab world.
Decades of political relationships, military cooperation, intelligence partnerships, and proxy organizations provide Tehran with significant regional situational awareness.
These relationships have produced one of Iran’s principal strategic advantages.
Information acquired through allied organizations frequently supplements official intelligence reporting, providing Iranian decision-makers with detailed operational awareness unavailable through technical collection alone.
Nevertheless, proxy reporting introduces analytical challenges.
Organizations naturally interpret events through their own operational priorities.
Consequently, independent verification remains essential before incorporating such reporting into national strategic assessments.
THE LIMITS OF REGIONAL COLLECTION
Despite extensive regional networks, Iran faces significant constraints.
Arab governments continue strengthening domestic security services, expanding cyber defenses, increasing intelligence cooperation with Western partners, and improving counterintelligence capabilities.
Regional normalization efforts, changing alliances, and technological advances further complicate intelligence collection.
Consequently, Tehran must continually adapt its regional intelligence architecture to an increasingly dynamic security environment.
JAFAJ ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT – CHAPTER SEVEN
Key Findings

The Arab states collectively represent Iran’s most immediate regional intelligence priority.
Gulf military capabilities, energy infrastructure, and foreign military presence remain primary intelligence targets.
Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon continue providing Iran with significant regional intelligence access.
Improved regional counterintelligence is increasing the difficulty of intelligence collection.

Confidence Level
High Confidence
Strategic Implications
Iran’s regional intelligence posture will remain essential to its national security strategy regardless of broader diplomatic developments.
CHAPTER EIGHT
IRAN’S INTELLIGENCE ON EUROPE
A DIFFERENT INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT
Europe presents a fundamentally different intelligence environment than either the Middle East or the United States.
Rather than preparing primarily for military confrontation, Iranian intelligence organizations concentrate on diplomacy, sanctions policy, export controls, financial regulation, technology acquisition, and political developments affecting European Union policy.
European governments collectively play an important role in negotiations concerning Iran’s nuclear program, economic sanctions, aviation, banking, shipping, and advanced technology.
Consequently, Tehran devotes considerable analytical resources toward understanding European political dynamics.
COLLECTION OBJECTIVES
Iranian intelligence priorities throughout Europe generally include:

European Union sanctions policy.
Export-control enforcement.
Nuclear negotiations.
Financial regulation.
Scientific research.
Technology acquisition.
Iranian diaspora communities.
Political developments affecting Middle East policy.

Because Europe possesses relatively open political systems, extensive public records, and active media organizations, open-source intelligence provides substantial strategic value.
Many policy debates occur publicly long before formal governmental decisions are reached.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES
European intelligence and law enforcement agencies have publicly reported investigations involving alleged Iranian intelligence activities over many years.
These investigations illustrate both continuing Iranian collection efforts and increasingly coordinated European counterintelligence responses.
European intelligence cooperation through NATO partners and bilateral arrangements has strengthened information sharing regarding foreign intelligence threats.
Consequently, Iranian intelligence operations within Europe face a progressively more challenging operating environment than existed several decades ago.
JAFAJ ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT – CHAPTER EIGHT
Key Findings

Europe represents an important political and economic intelligence target.
Intelligence priorities emphasize diplomacy, sanctions, finance, and technology.
European counterintelligence cooperation has increased operational risk for foreign intelligence services.
Open-source intelligence remains particularly valuable within democratic political systems.

Confidence Level
Moderate-to-High Confidence
CHAPTER NINE
IRAN’S INTELLIGENCE ON RUSSIA
Relations between Iran and Russia illustrate one of intelligence’s enduring realities:
Friendly governments continue collecting intelligence against one another.
Shared interests reduce uncertainty but never eliminate national intelligence requirements.
Iran therefore continues evaluating Russian military technology, defense cooperation, regional diplomacy, sanctions policy, energy markets, and broader strategic objectives.
Russian intelligence organizations undoubtedly conduct similar assessments regarding Iran.
The relationship is characterized less by trust than by pragmatic strategic cooperation.
Iran’s principal intelligence objective is understanding the degree to which Russian policies align—or diverge—from Iranian regional interests.
Military cooperation, defense technology transfers, aviation, energy, and regional security all require continuous intelligence assessment.
JAFAJ ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT – CHAPTER NINE
Key Findings

Intelligence collection continues despite expanding bilateral cooperation.
Strategic uncertainty requires continuous assessment.
Defense cooperation increases the importance of political intelligence.

Confidence Level
Moderate Confidence
CHAPTER TEN
IRAN’S INTELLIGENCE ON CHINA
China has become one of Iran’s most significant long-term strategic relationships.
The 25-year cooperation framework, expanding trade, infrastructure investment, energy cooperation, and diplomatic coordination have increased China’s importance within Iranian strategic planning.
Accordingly, Iranian intelligence organizations devote increasing attention toward Chinese foreign policy, technology development, financial institutions, maritime strategy, and economic priorities.
Unlike intelligence collection directed toward adversaries, Iranian intelligence concerning China emphasizes strategic forecasting, economic analysis, and technology assessment rather than military contingency planning.
Nevertheless, intelligence collection remains necessary.
States cooperate because interests overlap—not because national interests become identical.
Future changes in Chinese economic policy, relations with Western governments, or Middle Eastern strategy could substantially affect Iranian national interests.
Consequently, Tehran requires continuous intelligence concerning Beijing’s evolving strategic priorities.
LOOKING EAST
Iran’s broader strategic orientation toward Asia has increased the importance of economic intelligence.
Monitoring supply chains, semiconductor policy, artificial intelligence, telecommunications, shipping routes, rare earth minerals, and advanced manufacturing now occupies a larger role within Iranian intelligence planning than during previous decades.
This reflects a broader international trend.
Economic intelligence increasingly rivals traditional military intelligence in strategic importance.
JAFAJ ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT – CHAPTER TEN
Key Findings

China represents Iran’s most important long-term economic intelligence partner.
Collection priorities emphasize economic forecasting, technology, trade, and strategic policy.
Military intelligence plays a smaller role than political and economic analysis.
Intelligence cooperation does not eliminate national intelligence requirements.

Confidence Level
Moderate Confidence
RUNNING CHICAGO-STYLE FOOTNOTES (CONTINUED)

U.S. Congressional Research Service, Iran and the Arab Gulf States; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance.
Gulf Cooperation Council public communiqués; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military expenditure databases and regional security analyses.
European Union External Action Service, public sanctions documentation and policy statements concerning Iran; Europol, European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (relevant counterintelligence context).
Congressional Research Service, Russia-Iran Relations; International Crisis Group, analyses of Russian-Iranian strategic cooperation.
Congressional Research Service, China-Iran Relations; analyses published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Atlantic Council, and other research institutions concerning Chinese-Iranian economic and strategic cooperation.

END OF BATCH 4 — CONTINUES IN BATCH 5
 
 
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ns, and clandestine operations. Less visible—but equally important—is counterintelligence, the discipline responsible for protecting a nation’s secrets while identifying and neutralizing foreign intelligence activities.
In many respects, counterintelligence represents the ultimate measure of an intelligence organization’s institutional maturity.
Successful espionage demonstrates the ability to acquire information.
Successful counterintelligence demonstrates the ability to deny that same opportunity to adversaries.
For the Islamic Republic of Iran, this distinction has become increasingly important.
During the past two decades, numerous publicly reported operations have demonstrated the ability of foreign intelligence services—particularly Israel, but also other state actors—to obtain sensitive information concerning Iranian military programs, nuclear facilities, scientific research, leadership movements, procurement networks, and strategic planning.¹⁶
No intelligence service prevents every penetration.
The question for analysts is not whether foreign intelligence occasionally succeeds, but whether repeated operational outcomes reveal broader institutional patterns.
UNDERSTANDING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Counterintelligence encompasses considerably more than identifying spies.
Modern counterintelligence seeks to:

Detect foreign intelligence officers.
Prevent recruitment of government officials.
Protect classified information.
Secure communications.
Identify cyber intrusions.
Monitor insider threats.
Protect research institutions.
Secure military procurement.
Prevent technological compromise.
Conduct deception operations against hostile intelligence services.

Consequently, counterintelligence extends across nearly every government institution.
Weaknesses in any single component may create opportunities for adversaries.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE THREAT
Traditional espionage relied heavily upon clandestine meetings, dead drops, photographic surveillance, and recruited human sources.
Contemporary intelligence competition is considerably more complex.
Foreign intelligence services now combine:

Human intelligence.
Cyber intrusion.
Artificial intelligence-assisted analysis.
Commercial satellite imagery.
Social media exploitation.
Financial intelligence.
Telecommunications metadata.
Commercial data brokers.
Supply-chain analysis.
Open-source intelligence.

The integration of these disciplines enables intelligence organizations to construct highly detailed operational pictures without relying exclusively upon traditional espionage.
Consequently, protecting national secrets has become substantially more difficult.
PUBLICLY OBSERVABLE TRENDS
Public reporting during the past decade reveals several recurring themes regarding Iran’s counterintelligence environment.
First, sensitive military and scientific programs have repeatedly become the focus of sophisticated foreign intelligence operations.
Second, adversaries have demonstrated detailed knowledge regarding Iranian organizational structure, facility locations, procurement networks, and leadership activities.
Third, Iranian authorities have repeatedly announced arrests of individuals accused of espionage or collaboration with foreign intelligence services.
These announcements illustrate an important analytical point.
Frequent espionage arrests may indicate effective counterintelligence.
They may also indicate extensive foreign intelligence activity.
Without access to underlying evidence, public reporting rarely permits definitive conclusions.
Professional intelligence analysis therefore emphasizes observable operational outcomes rather than official claims alone.
STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES
Several structural characteristics may complicate Iranian counterintelligence.
The existence of multiple intelligence organizations creates opportunities for specialization while simultaneously increasing coordination requirements.
Expanding cyber dependence enlarges the number of potential attack surfaces available to foreign intelligence services.
Scientific modernization, international trade, higher education, foreign travel, and global communications likewise increase opportunities for intelligence collection.
These developments are not unique to Iran.
Every technologically advanced society confronts similar counterintelligence challenges.
The principal question is whether institutions adapt rapidly enough to changing threats.
THE COST OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FAILURE
Counterintelligence failures produce consequences extending far beyond the immediate operational loss.
Compromised programs require redesign.
Scientific research may be delayed.
Military planning must be revised.
Trust within organizations declines.
Resources are redirected from strategic initiatives toward internal investigations.
Perhaps most importantly, adversaries gain confidence.
Repeated operational success encourages increasingly ambitious intelligence activities.
Consequently, counterintelligence failures frequently produce cumulative strategic effects rather than isolated tactical losses.
JAFAJ ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT – CHAPTER ELEVEN
Key Findings

Counterintelligence is central to evaluating institutional resilience.
Publicly observable operational outcomes suggest this remains one of Iran’s most significant security challenges.
Technological change has substantially increased counterintelligence complexity.
Institutional adaptation will likely determine future operational resilience.

Confidence Level
Moderate-to-High Confidence
Strategic Implications
Future intelligence competition involving Iran will depend as much upon defensive institutional resilience as offensive intelligence collection.
CHAPTER TWELVE
CYBER INTELLIGENCE: THE NEW FRONTIER
THE DIGITAL BATTLEFIELD
Few developments have transformed intelligence work more profoundly than cyberspace.
Information that once required years of human intelligence collection may now be obtained through network intrusion, malicious software, credential theft, or exploitation of vulnerable digital infrastructure.
Iran recognized this transformation relatively early.
Following major cyber incidents affecting Iranian infrastructure—including the discovery of the Stuxnet malware targeting Iranian nuclear facilities—Tehran significantly expanded investments in cyber security, cyber intelligence, and cyber operations.¹⁷
Cyber capability now represents an integral component of Iranian national security strategy.
OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS
Public reporting attributes numerous cyber espionage campaigns to Iranian state-sponsored or state-aligned organizations.
Although attribution within cyberspace remains inherently difficult, U.S. government agencies and cybersecurity firms have repeatedly described Iranian cyber actors targeting:

Government agencies.
Defense contractors.
Universities.
Healthcare systems.
Critical infrastructure.
Energy companies.
Telecommunications.
Financial institutions.

Most publicly documented campaigns emphasize intelligence collection rather than physical destruction.
Strategic information often possesses greater long-term value than immediate disruption.
DEFENSIVE CYBER CAPABILITIES
Cyber defense presents an equally significant challenge.
Protecting national infrastructure requires securing government networks, military systems, industrial control systems, research institutions, and private-sector partners simultaneously.
The rapid expansion of artificial intelligence, cloud computing, autonomous systems, and Internet-connected devices continues increasing the complexity of national cyber defense.
No nation has achieved complete cybersecurity.
Consequently, cyber defense remains an ongoing process rather than a permanent achievement.
THE ROLE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Artificial intelligence is transforming intelligence analysis.
Large datasets previously requiring months of human review may now be processed within minutes.
Pattern recognition, anomaly detection, language translation, image analysis, financial tracking, and social media monitoring increasingly rely upon AI-assisted analytical tools.
Iran has demonstrated growing interest in integrating artificial intelligence into both civilian and national security applications.
Whether Iranian intelligence organizations successfully integrate AI into future intelligence operations may significantly influence their long-term effectiveness.
THE FUTURE CYBER ENVIRONMENT
The future intelligence contest will likely depend less upon traditional espionage alone and increasingly upon integration across multiple disciplines.
Cyber intelligence, satellite imagery, commercial databases, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and autonomous systems are rapidly reshaping intelligence work.
Success will depend not merely upon acquiring technology but upon integrating technology into coherent intelligence processes.
JAFAJ ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT – CHAPTER TWELVE
Key Findings

Cyber intelligence has become one of Iran’s principal intelligence strengths.
Cyber espionage complements traditional intelligence collection.
Defensive cybersecurity remains an evolving challenge.
Artificial intelligence will increasingly shape intelligence competition.

Confidence Level
High Confidence
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES
WHEN INTELLIGENCE IS NOT THE PROBLEM
Perhaps the most misunderstood aspect of intelligence work is the assumption that intelligence organizations control national decisions.
They do not.
Their responsibility is to inform policymakers—not replace them.
Consequently, evaluating national security outcomes requires distinguishing between intelligence performance and political decision-making.
An intelligence service may accurately identify an emerging threat.
Political leadership may nevertheless reject, delay, reinterpret, or ignore that assessment.
History provides numerous examples.
The United States before Pearl Harbor.
Israel before the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
Several governments before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
In each instance, intelligence collection, analytical judgment, and political decision-making interacted in different ways.
INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
Every intelligence organization develops institutional assumptions.
These assumptions assist analysts by simplifying complex environments.
They may also create blind spots.
Confirmation bias, organizational inertia, bureaucratic rivalry, excessive compartmentalization, and political pressure represent recurring challenges across intelligence communities worldwide.
Iran is unlikely to be immune.
Whether such dynamics have influenced recent operational outcomes cannot be conclusively determined through public evidence alone.
Nevertheless, these factors merit consideration when evaluating institutional performance.
THE CHALLENGE OF ADAPTATION
The intelligence profession rewards adaptation.
Adversaries continuously modify collection techniques, cyber capabilities, recruitment strategies, communications technologies, and deception methods.
Organizations unable to adapt eventually become predictable.
Those capable of continuous innovation generally retain operational advantage.
Recent organizational reforms reportedly undertaken within elements of Iran’s national security establishment suggest recognition that adaptation remains necessary.
The effectiveness of those reforms will become evident only over time.
LESSONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
This assessment identifies several broader lessons extending beyond Iran.
First, intelligence collection alone rarely determines strategic success.
Second, counterintelligence deserves equal attention.
Third, technological superiority cannot substitute for analytical rigor.
Fourth, institutional learning often determines long-term effectiveness more than individual operational victories.
These observations apply broadly across intelligence organizations regardless of national affiliation.
JAFAJ ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT – CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Key Findings

Political decision-making should be distinguished from intelligence performance.
Institutional culture significantly influences analytical outcomes.
Adaptation remains essential to long-term intelligence effectiveness.
Organizational learning may ultimately prove more important than technological capability.

Confidence Level
Moderate Confidence
RUNNING CHICAGO-STYLE FOOTNOTES (CONTINUED)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reports concerning Iran’s nuclear program; analyses by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Atlantic Council, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and other research organizations examining Israeli-Iranian intelligence competition and counterintelligence challenges.
Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon (New York: Crown, 2014); Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), joint cybersecurity advisories concerning Iranian cyber activity; U.S. Cyber Command public statements where applicable.

=====================
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE AND THE FUTURE OF IRAN’S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
THE CHALLENGE OF ADAPTATION
Throughout modern history, intelligence organizations have been judged not by the absence of failure but by their ability to learn from it. Every major intelligence service has experienced significant setbacks, including strategic surprise, compromised operations, analytical errors, and counterintelligence failures. What distinguishes effective organizations is the speed and effectiveness with which they identify shortcomings, implement reforms, and adapt to changing threats.
From an open-source perspective, Iran appears to recognize that its intelligence environment has become more demanding. Public reporting indicates continued investment in cyber capabilities, internal security, intelligence coordination, and technological modernization.¹⁸ Such efforts are consistent with the broader international trend of governments seeking to improve resilience against increasingly sophisticated intelligence threats.
Whether these efforts will produce measurable improvements cannot yet be determined. Organizational reform is inherently difficult. Intelligence institutions often balance competing priorities, including operational effectiveness, information security, bureaucratic coordination, and political accountability. Reforms that strengthen one area may introduce new challenges elsewhere.
THE EVOLVING INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT
The intelligence profession continues to change at a rapid pace.
Artificial intelligence, commercial satellite imagery, encrypted communications, cyber operations, publicly available data, and advanced analytics have transformed the way governments collect and interpret information. Capabilities once available only to major powers are increasingly accessible to smaller states and even non-state actors.
This transformation has reduced the distinction between traditional espionage and data analysis.
Modern intelligence organizations must integrate information from multiple disciplines, including:

Human intelligence (HUMINT)
Signals intelligence (SIGINT)
Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT)
Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
Cyber intelligence
Financial intelligence
Commercial data sources

Success increasingly depends upon integrating these disciplines into coherent assessments rather than relying on any single collection method.
INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING
Institutional learning is among the most difficult aspects of intelligence work.
Meaningful reform requires organizations to identify errors honestly, evaluate competing explanations, and modify procedures without overreacting to individual events. Excessive focus on a single failure can create new vulnerabilities elsewhere, while insufficient attention to recurring problems may allow institutional weaknesses to persist.
This dynamic is not unique to Iran. Comparable challenges have been documented in intelligence communities across democratic and authoritarian systems alike.
Accordingly, open-source analysis should avoid viewing intelligence performance through a binary framework of “success” or “failure.” Intelligence organizations typically demonstrate strengths in some disciplines while facing challenges in others. Institutional performance is therefore best understood as a continuum rather than an absolute condition.
THE VALUE OF OPEN-SOURCE ANALYSIS
Open-source intelligence has become an increasingly important tool for researchers, policymakers, journalists, and scholars.
Publicly available information allows independent analysts to identify trends, compare institutional development, and evaluate observable outcomes. However, open-source analysis also has inherent limitations.
Analysts outside government rarely have access to classified reporting, internal deliberations, operational planning, or intelligence priorities. As a result, conclusions should be framed with appropriate caution and accompanied by explicit confidence assessments.
The purpose of this report has therefore been to examine observable patterns rather than claim insight into classified decision-making.
JAFAJ ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT – CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Key Findings

Intelligence organizations must continually adapt to technological and geopolitical change.
Organizational resilience depends upon continuous learning and institutional reform.
Open-source intelligence provides valuable insights but cannot fully reveal internal decision-making.
Analytical confidence should remain proportional to the available evidence.

Confidence Level
High Confidence
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
CONCLUSIONS
This assessment began with a central question:
Is Iran’s intelligence system failing its leaders?
Based solely on publicly available information, the evidence does not support a simple yes-or-no answer.
Instead, it points to a more nuanced conclusion.
Iran maintains an extensive intelligence community with demonstrated capabilities in regional collection, cyber operations, open-source intelligence, and strategic analysis. These capabilities have enabled Tehran to monitor regional developments, support foreign policy objectives, and maintain awareness of issues affecting its national security.
At the same time, publicly reported operational outcomes indicate that Iran has experienced significant security setbacks over an extended period. These events have prompted continued discussion among researchers regarding institutional resilience, counterintelligence, and organizational adaptation.
Because this report relies exclusively on open-source information, it cannot determine the internal causes of individual successes or failures. Nor can it reliably distinguish between shortcomings in intelligence collection, analytical assessment, organizational coordination, or political decision-making.
That limitation is important.
Responsible intelligence analysis requires acknowledging uncertainty where uncertainty exists.
The principal contribution of this report is therefore not a definitive judgment regarding Iran’s intelligence services, but a structured framework for evaluating intelligence performance through observable evidence, institutional analysis, and appropriate confidence assessments.
Future developments—including organizational reforms, technological modernization, and changes in the regional security environment—will provide additional opportunities to evaluate how Iran’s intelligence community continues to evolve.
FINAL JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
The available open-source evidence supports the following overall conclusions:

Iran possesses a capable and multifaceted intelligence community.
Intelligence performance should be evaluated across the entire intelligence cycle rather than through isolated events.
Public reporting indicates both notable institutional strengths and significant challenges.
Open-source evidence alone is insufficient to support categorical judgments regarding the overall effectiveness of Iran’s intelligence organizations.
Continued observation, rigorous sourcing, and careful distinction between fact and analytical judgment remain essential for future assessments.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Various editions.
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Iran Military Power. Various editions.
Congressional Research Service. Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Sanctions. Various editions.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance. Annual editions.
International Atomic Energy Agency. Reports on Iran’s Nuclear Programme. Various editions.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and National Security Agency. Joint Cybersecurity Advisories concerning Iranian State-Sponsored Cyber Activity. Various editions.
Kim Zetter. Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon. New York: Crown, 2014.
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Reports on Middle East security, cyber operations, and regional strategic competition.
Atlantic Council. Reports on Middle East security and intelligence affairs.
International Crisis Group. Reports on Iran and regional security dynamics.
RUNNING CHICAGO-STYLE FOOTNOTES (CONTINUED)

Congressional Research Service, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Sanctions; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, annual editions.

=====================
APPENDIX A
CONSOLIDATED FOOTNOTES

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, various editions.
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, annual editions; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Iran Military Power, various editions.
Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic of Iran (MOIS), official organizational history and statutory authorities; see also scholarly studies of the post-1979 Iranian intelligence system.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Sanctions, various editions.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, various editions; Congressional Research Service (CRS), Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Sanctions, various editions.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reports concerning Iran’s nuclear program; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), analyses of Israeli-Iranian strategic competition; Atlantic Council, reports concerning Israeli intelligence operations and regional security; additional publicly available reporting regarding operations targeting Iranian nuclear infrastructure and senior officials.
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Iran Military Power; Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, various editions.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); National Security Agency (NSA), joint cybersecurity advisories concerning Iranian state-sponsored cyber actors, various editions.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), public counterintelligence press releases concerning Iranian intelligence activities in the United States; U.S. Department of Justice, criminal indictments and related public filings involving alleged Iranian intelligence operations.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reports on Iran’s nuclear program; David E. Sanger and Ronen Bergman, reporting on Israeli intelligence operations; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), analyses of Israeli-Iranian strategic competition; Atlantic Council, assessments of Israeli intelligence and special operations; and publicly available reporting regarding the 2018 seizure of Iran’s nuclear archive and subsequent covert actions.
U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Iran and the Arab Gulf States; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, annual editions.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), official communiqués and public statements; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military expenditure databases and regional security analyses.
European Union External Action Service (EEAS), public sanctions documentation and policy statements concerning Iran; Europol, European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), relevant editions.
Congressional Research Service (CRS), reports concerning Russia-Iran relations; International Crisis Group, analyses of Russian-Iranian strategic cooperation.
Congressional Research Service (CRS), reports concerning China-Iran relations; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Atlantic Council, and additional research institutions examining Chinese-Iranian economic and strategic cooperation.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reports concerning Iran’s nuclear program; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Atlantic Council; Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and other research organizations examining Israeli-Iranian intelligence competition and counterintelligence developments.
Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon (New York: Crown Publishers, 2014); Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), joint cybersecurity advisories concerning Iranian cyber activity; U.S. Cyber Command public statem  ents, where applicable.
Congressional Research Service (CRS), Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Sanctions, various editions; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, annual editions.

 

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Jordan: Acquittal Of Former Partnership And Salvation Party Leader Highlights Continued Government Accommodation Of The Muslim Brotherhood

 

The acquittal of Salem Al-Falahat should be viewed in the broader political context of the Jordanian government’s continued accommodation of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although Al-Falahat is himself associated with the Brotherhood, he attempted to establish a separate political vehicle to compete with the Brotherhood’s established political leadership from within the same ideological camp.
An East Bank Jordanian widely regarded as loyal to the government, Al-Falahat founded the Partnership and Salvation Party in an effort to challenge the Brotherhood’s dominant political organization. Instead of rewarding a figure considered close to the state, the Jordanian government moved against his party, ultimately dissolving it through the courts and prosecuting him on forgery allegations. The authorities, however, failed to secure a conviction, and he has now been acquitted in a country where the judicial system remains tightly controlled by the government.
On 12 July 2026, Jordan’s Court of Cassation upheld an earlier Court of Appeal ruling acquitting Salem Al-Falahat, the Secretary General of the dissolved Partnership and Salvation Party, of forgery charges. The case stemmed from complaints filed by individuals who denied signing party membership forms that allegedly bore their signatures.
The case illustrates that the Jordanian government continues to support the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood organization while suppressing competing Islamist movements that attempt to challenge it from within. The partnership between the Hashemite regime and the Muslim Brotherhood remains close and continues to serve the interests of both sides.
It is also worth noting that the Jordanian government continues to authorize the Brotherhood’s current political vehicle, the Nation (Ummah) Party, formerly known as the Islamic Action Front Party, despite repeated American demands to dismantle and designate the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan as a terrorist organization.
President Donald Trump designated the Muslim Brotherhood branches in Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt as terrorist organizations in November 2025. Jordan responded by banning the already defunct Muslim Brotherhood Society, while leaving untouched the Brotherhood Association, which remains operational, and the Islamic Action Front—now operating as the Nation (Ummah) Party—which continues to function legally as the Brotherhood’s political arm.
The continued legal status of the Nation (Ummah) Party is particularly significant given that Jordan has outlawed or severely restricted most other political parties. The government’s willingness to preserve the Brotherhood’s political infrastructure while acting against rival Islamist initiatives demonstrates that the relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Muslim Brotherhood remains strong despite public claims to the contrary.

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Israeli Authorities Closely Monitor Palestinian Businessman Suspected Of Laundering Money For Hamas

 

Israeli authorities are closely monitoring a Palestinian businessman Moataz Hani Ghaleb Zaloum in Bethlehem, West Bank, over suspicions that he is laundering money for the terrorist group Hamas.
Mr. Zaloum has been a small-time businessman in Bethlehem, the Karla’s region. A native of Hebron in the southern West Bank, he owned a toy store with only moderate business traffic. He was suffering from substantial debts and financial problems which, according to information known to the security agencies, had also caused serious family problems with both of his wives.
Nonetheless, during the past three months in particular, Mr. Zaloum has suddenly been able to fully stock his store, invest in real estate, and appears to have access to a very large amount of cash, all of which remains entirely unexplained.
The greatest concern is that Mr. Zaloum is suspected of maintaining substantial ties to Hamas. Two of his relatives are known to be closely associated with the terrorist organization.
Following Hamas’s defeat and the significant loss of its power in Gaza, the terrorist group, which continues to receive funding from Qatar and other sources of income, is known to have distributed substantial amounts of its funds to money launderers and business figures, including individuals in the West Bank and Amman, Jordan.
The sudden appearance of previously unremarkable businessmen with unexplained wealth in the West Bank has reinforced assessments that Hamas cash is now circulating throughout the Palestinian territories.
For now, Mr. Zaloum remains under extremely close and highly confidential surveillance by the Israeli authorities, along with all individuals conducting business dealings with him.

 

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When States Fracture: State Fragility And Civil War Risk

Prepared by: JAFAJ Intelligence Division
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Middle East is entering a period of strategic uncertainty unlike any since the aftermath of the Arab Spring.
Over the past two decades, the region has experienced interstate wars, terrorist insurgencies, revolutions, and proxy conflicts. Today, however, another pattern is emerging. In several countries, the principal threat to national stability no longer originates from foreign invasion but from internal political fragmentation, weakened state institutions, economic deterioration, and increasingly powerful non-state armed groups.
This Intelligence Estimate examines the probability that one or more Middle Eastern states could experience significant internal armed conflict over the next twenty-four months. Rather than predicting that civil wars are inevitable, this report evaluates structural conditions that historically have preceded civil conflict and assesses where those conditions are converging.
Three countries stand out as presenting the greatest potential for renewed or expanded internal conflict: Iran, Lebanon, and Syria. Each faces a unique combination of political uncertainty, economic stress, competing centers of power, and external interference. Other states—including Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories—also remain vulnerable, though the nature and likelihood of conflict vary considerably.
Current evidence does not support the conclusion that a region-wide wave of civil wars is imminent. However, several independent assessments have identified rising instability in Lebanon and persistent fragmentation in Syria, while Iran faces an uncertain political transition following recent leadership changes and military confrontation. These developments warrant close observation over the coming months.
This report concludes that the greatest danger is not a simultaneous collapse across the region, but rather the emergence of one major internal conflict capable of producing cascading political, humanitarian, and security consequences for neighboring states.
KEY JUDGMENTS
Key Judgment 1
The Middle East is entering a period in which internal instability is becoming a greater strategic concern than conventional interstate warfare.
While external military conflict remains possible, many governments now face more immediate challenges from declining public confidence, weakened institutions, armed political movements, and deteriorating economic conditions.
Key Judgment 2
Lebanon currently exhibits one of the region’s highest risks of internal political violence.
Growing disputes over Hezbollah’s future, debates surrounding state sovereignty, continued Israeli military pressure, and deep sectarian divisions have created conditions that many analysts believe could evolve into broader internal conflict if political compromise fails. Recent reporting by the Council on Foreign Relations and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data similarly identifies Lebanon as one of the region’s principal conflict flashpoints.
Key Judgment 3
Syria remains politically fragmented despite reductions in nationwide fighting.
The decline in large-scale combat should not be interpreted as the restoration of a fully consolidated state. Competing armed groups, foreign military deployments, economic weakness, and unresolved governance questions continue to limit long-term stability. Several analysts caution that Syria has not entered a new civil war, but that its recovery remains fragile.
Key Judgment 4
Iran faces a period of elevated political uncertainty.
Recent military conflict, economic pressure, sanctions, and questions surrounding national leadership have increased uncertainty regarding Iran’s internal political trajectory. These factors do not necessarily indicate imminent civil war, but they increase the importance of monitoring succession dynamics, elite cohesion, regional unrest, and public dissatisfaction.
Key Judgment 5
Civil wars rarely begin with one defining event.
Historical experience demonstrates that internal armed conflicts generally emerge after prolonged institutional weakening combined with one or more triggering events, including contested elections, economic collapse, military defections, leadership succession disputes, or major security incidents.
INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENCE
This report relies upon open-source government publications, international organizations, academic research, conflict-monitoring databases, and reporting from established news organizations.
The judgments contained herein represent analytical assessments rather than predictions.
Confidence levels are defined as follows:
High Confidence — Supported by multiple independent sources with consistent reporting.
Moderate Confidence — Supported by credible reporting, although future developments remain uncertain.
Low Confidence — Based upon limited information or rapidly evolving events.
Unless otherwise stated, the principal assessments contained in this report are made with moderate confidence.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
This Intelligence Estimate evaluates the structural conditions associated with civil conflict across the contemporary Middle East. It does not attempt to forecast the precise timing of political crises, military confrontations, or regime change. Instead, it identifies conditions historically associated with increased internal instability and assesses their presence within selected countries.
For the purposes of this report, the term civil war refers to sustained organized armed conflict occurring primarily within the borders of a sovereign state and involving governmental forces and one or more organized domestic armed actors.
The assessment examines six principal indicators:

Government legitimacy.
Economic stability.
Political succession and leadership continuity.
Strength and influence of non-state armed groups.
Sectarian, ethnic, or ideological polarization.
Foreign intervention and proxy competition.

No single indicator is sufficient to predict civil war. Rather, the interaction of multiple indicators over time provides a more reliable basis for assessing conflict risk.
 
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
WHY CIVIL WARS BEGIN
Civil wars rarely begin as civil wars.
More often, they emerge from a gradual deterioration of political, economic, and security conditions that weakens the state’s ability to manage competing interests peacefully. This deterioration can take years or even decades before a single triggering event transforms chronic instability into organized armed conflict.
Contrary to popular perception, most civil wars do not originate solely from ideological disputes, ethnic differences, or religious divisions. Such differences exist in many societies that never experience large-scale internal violence. Modern conflict research instead suggests that civil wars are more likely when political grievances intersect with weak state institutions, declining government legitimacy, economic distress, and opportunities for organized armed groups to mobilize.
For intelligence analysts, this distinction is important.
The question is not whether a society contains political, ethnic, or religious divisions. Nearly every nation does.
The more important question is whether the institutions responsible for managing those divisions continue to function effectively.
When governments lose the ability—or the public confidence necessary—to resolve disputes through political processes, competing groups increasingly seek alternative means of protecting their interests. In some cases, those alternatives remain peaceful. In others, they evolve into organized violence.
THE FRAGILITY CASCADE
Historical experience suggests that internal conflicts generally develop through a recognizable progression rather than through sudden collapse.
Although every conflict follows its own path, many begin with a series of reinforcing failures:

Economic deterioration reduces public confidence.
Political polarization erodes consensus.
Government legitimacy declines.
Security institutions become increasingly politicized.
Armed non-state actors expand their influence.
Foreign powers support competing domestic factions.
A triggering event accelerates existing tensions into violence.

None of these conditions alone produces civil war.
Together, however, they can overwhelm the institutions designed to maintain political order.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development describes fragility as a multidimensional condition encompassing political, security, economic, societal, environmental, and human factors rather than a single measurable characteristic. Importantly, the OECD notes that fragility and conflict are related but distinct: many fragile states do not experience war, while fragility nonetheless reduces a state’s ability to absorb shocks without violence.
STATE LEGITIMACY AS A STRATEGIC VARIABLE
One of the strongest indicators of long-term stability is not military strength but political legitimacy.
Governments generally maintain authority through a combination of law, public confidence, institutional effectiveness, and coercive capability.
When confidence in political institutions declines, governments often become increasingly dependent upon coercion.
While coercion may restore short-term order, excessive reliance upon force can further weaken legitimacy if significant portions of the population conclude that political participation no longer offers meaningful influence.
This creates a dangerous feedback loop:
Reduced legitimacy encourages greater coercion.
Greater coercion further reduces legitimacy.
Eventually, portions of the population may conclude that violence offers greater political leverage than peaceful participation.
Research examining state fragility has consistently found that governance quality—particularly when weaker than expected for a country’s level of development—is associated with a higher subsequent risk of civil conflict.
THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ARMED ACTORS
Few contemporary civil wars begin with the spontaneous creation of armed movements.
Instead, many countries already possess organizations capable of conducting sustained military operations independent of central government control.
These may include:

political militias;
sectarian organizations;
tribal armed groups;
insurgent movements;
terrorist organizations;
criminal networks with military capabilities.

The existence of such organizations does not guarantee civil conflict.
However, they significantly reduce the time required for political disputes to become armed confrontations because organizational structures, weapons, leadership, financing, and recruitment networks may already exist.
Throughout the contemporary Middle East, the continued presence of heavily armed non-state actors remains one of the region’s defining security characteristics.
FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND PROXY DYNAMICS
Modern civil wars rarely remain purely domestic.
External governments frequently intervene to protect allies, expand regional influence, counter perceived threats, or prevent hostile actors from gaining power.
As a result, internal conflicts increasingly become proxy conflicts involving multiple regional and international powers.
The Syrian conflict demonstrated how rapidly domestic unrest can evolve into an internationalized war involving neighboring states, regional competitors, and global military powers.
The OECD has similarly observed that internationalized civil wars have become increasingly common, particularly in regions characterized by weak governance, transnational armed movements, and strategic competition among outside powers.
For the Middle East, foreign intervention should therefore be viewed not simply as a consequence of civil war, but as a factor capable of extending conflicts, increasing their intensity, and complicating negotiated settlements.
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
The principal lesson from comparative conflict research is straightforward.
Civil wars are rarely the product of a single grievance or isolated political crisis.
Instead, they emerge when multiple structural vulnerabilities accumulate faster than governments can resolve them.
For JAFAJ’s purposes, this report evaluates each country through the same analytical framework rather than attempting to predict a single triggering event.
The objective is not to determine whether civil war will occur.
The objective is to assess where the underlying conditions associated with internal armed conflict are becoming more pronounced, how rapidly they are evolving, and what indicators would suggest either escalation or stabilization.
 
REGIONAL RISK FRAMEWORK
HOW JAFAJ ASSESSES THE RISK OF CIVIL WAR
Intelligence analysis is not prediction.
Its purpose is to identify developing trends, assess their significance, and estimate the probability that those trends will produce specific outcomes. In the case of civil conflict, analysts are not attempting to predict the exact day a government may collapse or when the first shots will be fired. Rather, they seek to determine whether the underlying conditions that have historically preceded civil wars are becoming stronger or weaker over time.
Accordingly, this report employs a structured analytical framework designed to evaluate relative—not absolute—risk across the Middle East.
This framework recognizes two fundamental realities.
First, no single factor causes civil war.
Second, civil wars almost always emerge from the interaction of multiple political, economic, security, and social pressures rather than from a single crisis. Numerous early-warning models developed by governments, research institutions, and international organizations similarly rely upon combinations of structural indicators rather than isolated variables.
THE JAFAJ CIVIL WAR RISK MODEL
This report evaluates each country across six principal categories.

GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY

Governments derive authority from more than military strength.
Legitimacy reflects whether citizens believe political institutions possess the legal and moral authority to govern.
Indicators include:

public confidence
corruption
electoral credibility
judicial independence
effectiveness of government services
ability to peacefully resolve political disputes

As legitimacy declines, governments often rely increasingly upon coercive measures to maintain authority, creating additional political tension.

ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

Economic conditions rarely create civil wars by themselves.
They can, however, magnify existing political grievances.
Analysts therefore examine:

inflation
unemployment
currency stability
public debt
government revenues
energy dependence
food security
youth employment

History demonstrates that prolonged economic deterioration often weakens public confidence while simultaneously reducing a government’s ability to provide services and maintain political stability.

SECURITY APPARATUS

One defining characteristic of stable states is the government’s ability to exercise effective control over the legitimate use of force.
Questions considered include:

Does the government control the national military?
Are security services politically divided?
Do regional commanders operate independently?
Are military defections increasing?
Are police institutions functioning?
Does the government maintain territorial control?

The erosion of centralized security authority significantly increases opportunities for organized armed groups to expand their influence.

NON-STATE ARMED ACTORS

Modern Middle Eastern conflicts increasingly involve organizations operating outside formal state control.
Examples include:

political militias
insurgent organizations
tribal armed groups
terrorist organizations
sectarian defense forces
criminal organizations possessing military capabilities

The existence of such organizations does not necessarily indicate impending civil war.
However, their presence substantially lowers the barriers to sustained armed conflict should political institutions fail.

SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION

Political differences alone rarely produce civil war.
Instead, analysts evaluate whether divisions are becoming sufficiently severe to undermine national cohesion.
Factors include:

sectarian polarization
ethnic conflict
regional rivalries
ideological extremism
political radicalization
population displacement
refugee pressures

The critical question is not whether divisions exist, but whether existing institutions remain capable of managing them peacefully.

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

Few contemporary civil wars remain purely domestic.
Foreign governments frequently provide:

military assistance
intelligence support
financial aid
diplomatic backing
weapons
proxy forces

Outside intervention often prolongs conflicts that might otherwise have remained localized.
Consequently, every country assessment considers the extent to which external actors possess both the capability and the incentive to influence internal political developments.
ASSESSMENT MATRIX
Each country receives an assessment in every category using a five-level scale.

Rating
Assessment

Very Low
Conditions generally support long-term stability.

Low
Some vulnerabilities exist but remain manageable.

Moderate
Noticeable structural pressures require continued monitoring.

High
Multiple indicators suggest elevated instability.

Very High
Numerous indicators are simultaneously deteriorating, increasing the risk of sustained internal conflict.

This scale measures relative structural vulnerability, not the probability that conflict will begin immediately.
EARLY WARNING INDICATORS
Perhaps the greatest value of intelligence analysis lies in identifying changes before they become crises.
Accordingly, JAFAJ will monitor a series of indicators that historically have preceded significant internal instability.
These include:
Political Indicators

Collapse of coalition governments
Suspension of constitutional processes
Disputed national elections
Leadership succession crises
Emergency decrees expanding executive authority

Security Indicators

Military defections
Rapid militia recruitment
Increased political assassinations
Localized armed clashes
Loss of government territorial control

Economic Indicators

Hyperinflation
Currency collapse
Food shortages
Banking instability
Energy disruptions

Social Indicators

Mass demonstrations
Large-scale population displacement
Sectarian mobilization
Escalating hate speech
Collapse of public services

No individual indicator confirms that civil war is imminent.
However, when several of these indicators emerge simultaneously and continue to worsen over time, the probability of organized internal conflict increases substantially. The Fund for Peace’s conflict early-warning methodology likewise emphasizes monitoring clusters of deteriorating indicators rather than relying on a single warning sign.
ANALYTICAL LIMITATIONS
Every intelligence assessment contains uncertainty.
Political crises can accelerate unexpectedly.
Conversely, countries exhibiting numerous structural vulnerabilities may avoid civil conflict through political compromise, effective governance, successful economic reform, or international mediation.
For this reason, the assessments presented in this report should be interpreted as probability estimates based upon currently available information, not deterministic forecasts.
Future developments—including leadership decisions, diplomatic initiatives, economic recovery, or unexpected external events—may significantly alter the trajectory of individual countries.
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
The Middle East currently contains several states exhibiting multiple characteristics commonly associated with elevated conflict risk.
The evidence does not support the conclusion that the region is entering a generalized wave of civil wars.
It does, however, support the assessment that several countries are simultaneously experiencing deteriorating structural conditions that warrant sustained monitoring. International conflict-monitoring organizations similarly emphasize tracking changes in state fragility over time because rising fragility often serves as an early warning of future instability rather than proof that conflict is inevitable.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT I
IRAN
A STATE UNDER PRESSURE, NOT NECESSARILY A STATE ON THE VERGE OF CIVIL WAR
Overall Risk Assessment: High
Estimated Risk Horizon: 12–24 Months
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Iran presents one of the most complex civil war risk profiles in the Middle East.
Unlike failed states such as Yemen or Libya, Iran retains functioning national institutions, centralized security organizations, and a long tradition of state continuity. The government continues to exercise effective control over most of its territory, maintains disciplined military and internal security forces, and possesses extensive intelligence capabilities.
These strengths substantially reduce the likelihood of an abrupt collapse.
At the same time, Iran faces an unusual convergence of strategic pressures.
The country is managing the consequences of military confrontation with Israel and the United States, persistent economic weakness, international sanctions, leadership transition following the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declining public confidence among segments of the population, and continuing tensions involving several ethnic minority regions. Reuters and other analysts describe the succession period as the most significant internal political test faced by the Islamic Republic since 1979.
These pressures do not necessarily point toward civil war.
They do suggest that Iran has entered one of the most politically uncertain periods in its modern history.
THE PARADOX OF IRANIAN STABILITY
Outside observers often underestimate the resilience of the Iranian political system.
The Islamic Republic was deliberately structured to survive crises that might destabilize more centralized governments.
Political authority is distributed across several institutions, including:

the Office of the Supreme Leader;
the Assembly of Experts;
the Guardian Council;
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
the regular armed forces;
the judiciary;
the presidency;
powerful religious foundations.

This institutional redundancy means that the death or removal of one leader—even the Supreme Leader—does not automatically produce governmental collapse.
Indeed, one of the principal conclusions emerging from recent analysis is that Iran’s governing system was specifically designed to withstand such shocks.
For this reason, predictions of imminent regime collapse should be treated cautiously.
History demonstrates that authoritarian governments often prove considerably more resilient than expected.
ECONOMIC PRESSURE
The Iranian economy has experienced prolonged structural stress.
Years of sanctions, inflation, currency depreciation, declining foreign investment, and periodic energy shortages have weakened household purchasing power and reduced public confidence.
Recent military conflict has compounded those pressures.
Damage to infrastructure, increased security expenditures, uncertainty surrounding reconstruction, and continued restrictions on international commerce have placed additional burdens upon an economy that was already under strain. Reuters reports that Iranian authorities have expressed concern that post-war economic hardship could become a catalyst for renewed domestic unrest, prompting an intensified internal security response.
Economic deterioration alone does not produce civil war.
However, it reduces governmental flexibility.
Governments facing severe fiscal constraints often possess fewer resources to subsidize essential goods, maintain employment, modernize infrastructure, or address public grievances.
Over time, economic weakness can amplify political tensions that might otherwise remain manageable.
THE SUCCESSION QUESTION
Leadership succession represents one of the most consequential variables affecting Iran’s long-term stability.
For decades, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei served not only as Iran’s Supreme Leader but also as the central figure balancing relationships among competing political, clerical, military, and security institutions.
Any transition of authority inevitably alters those relationships.
Although constitutional procedures exist for selecting a new Supreme Leader, real-world political transitions seldom proceed entirely according to formal legal processes.
Elite bargaining, institutional influence, military interests, and public expectations all shape succession outcomes.
Recent analyses suggest that Iran’s transition is likely to involve a combination of constitutional mechanisms and informal negotiations among influential political and security actors. The ultimate balance of power between clerical institutions and the IRGC remains one of the most important variables to monitor.
From an intelligence perspective, succession should therefore be viewed not as a single event but as an extended process.
THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
No assessment of Iranian stability is complete without considering the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Since its creation following the 1979 Revolution, the IRGC has evolved into one of the country’s most influential institutions.
Its responsibilities extend well beyond traditional military functions.
Today, the organization influences:

internal security;
intelligence collection;
strategic missile forces;
elements of the national economy;
foreign proxy relationships;
cyber operations;
strategic planning.

Because of its institutional depth, the IRGC represents one of the principal stabilizing forces within the current political system.
At the same time, any significant disagreement among senior IRGC leadership regarding succession, economic policy, or national security would represent an important warning indicator.
At present, publicly available information does not demonstrate widespread fragmentation within the organization.
ETHNIC FAULT LINES
Iran is frequently described as a Persian nation.
In reality, it is a multiethnic state.
Its population includes Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, Lurs, Turkmen, and other communities.
Most ethnic communities participate in national political life.
Nevertheless, several peripheral regions have experienced periodic unrest, particularly where longstanding economic grievances, questions of cultural autonomy, or security concerns intersect.
International reporting indicates that authorities have devoted particular attention to Kurdish, Baluchi, and Arab regions during recent periods of domestic tension, reflecting official concern that localized unrest could expand under conditions of broader national instability.
It is important, however, not to overstate these dynamics.
There is currently no persuasive evidence that Iran’s minority populations are uniformly organized around a common separatist agenda.
Rather, localized grievances remain uneven and differ significantly from one region to another.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?
Several developments would materially increase the risk of widespread internal conflict.
These include:

sustained economic collapse;
visible fragmentation within the IRGC or senior security services;
prolonged disputes over political succession;
simultaneous unrest across multiple provinces;
coordinated armed activity by several domestic groups;
loss of governmental control over major urban centers.

Conversely, several developments could reduce the assessed level of risk.
These include:

economic stabilization;
sanctions relief;
successful political consolidation following the leadership transition;
declining inflation;
renewed foreign investment;
improved regional security conditions.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
Iran should not presently be viewed as a state on the verge of civil war.
Its institutions remain substantially stronger than those found in countries that experienced rapid state collapse during the Arab Spring.
Nevertheless, Iran is entering one of the most politically consequential periods in the history of the Islamic Republic.
The interaction of leadership succession, economic stress, regional military pressures, and domestic political dissatisfaction creates a level of strategic uncertainty not seen for decades.
The principal intelligence question is therefore not whether Iran will experience unrest—periodic unrest is already a recurring feature of Iranian politics.
The more important question is whether multiple sources of instability begin reinforcing one another faster than the state’s institutions can contain them.
At present, JAFAJ assesses that Iran faces a high level of structural instability but a lower probability of imminent nationwide civil war. The country’s institutions remain capable of managing significant internal pressures, although that assessment should be revisited if evidence emerges of elite fragmentation, sustained nationwide unrest, or weakening cohesion within the security apparatus.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT II
LEBANON
A FRAGILE STATE AT A STRATEGIC CROSSROADS
Overall Risk Assessment: High
Estimated Risk Horizon: 6–24 Months
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate to High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Lebanon presently exhibits one of the highest levels of structural vulnerability in the Middle East.
Unlike Iran, where strong national institutions continue to provide a significant degree of political resilience, Lebanon’s political system has experienced years of institutional weakening, economic collapse, and competing claims regarding the state’s monopoly on the use of force.
The principal question facing Lebanon is no longer whether political divisions exist.
Those divisions have existed for decades.
The more consequential question is whether the Lebanese state can successfully reassert sovereign authority over security policy without provoking large-scale internal confrontation.
That challenge has become considerably more difficult following the recent Israel-Hezbollah conflict, renewed international pressure to disarm Hezbollah, and widening political disagreement over Lebanon’s future security architecture. Recent reporting indicates that proposed security arrangements linking Israeli withdrawal to Hezbollah’s disarmament have intensified domestic political divisions and renewed public discussion of the possibility of civil conflict.
JAFAJ assesses that Lebanon faces a high probability of continued political instability and an elevated risk of localized armed confrontation. A return to a nationwide civil war comparable to the 1975–1990 conflict remains a lower-probability outcome but cannot be dismissed if multiple destabilizing factors converge.
THE LEGACY OF AN UNFINISHED PEACE
Lebanon’s civil war officially ended with the 1989 Taif Agreement.
The fighting stopped.
Many of the underlying political issues did not.
The post-war political system was designed around sectarian power-sharing intended to prevent domination by any single community. While that arrangement reduced large-scale violence, it also institutionalized political fragmentation.
Rather than producing a strong central government, Lebanon developed a system in which political authority is distributed among numerous competing parties, religious communities, and regional interests.
This structure has often produced political paralysis during periods of national crisis.
Successive economic shocks, government resignations, the Beirut port explosion, regional conflicts, and prolonged financial instability have further eroded public confidence in state institutions.
Consequently, Lebanon enters the current period of regional instability with fewer institutional reserves than many neighboring states.
HEZBOLLAH AND THE QUESTION OF STATE AUTHORITY
No issue is more central to Lebanon’s future than Hezbollah’s military status.
For Hezbollah and many within Lebanon’s Shi’a community, the organization remains an essential deterrent against external threats and a legitimate component of the country’s national defense.
For many other Lebanese political parties, Hezbollah’s independent military capability represents a fundamental challenge to state sovereignty.
This disagreement is not simply ideological.
It concerns one of the most basic characteristics of statehood:
Who possesses the legitimate authority to employ organized military force?
Recent diplomatic initiatives have brought that question into sharper focus.
International proposals conditioning Israeli withdrawal upon Hezbollah’s disarmament have placed the Lebanese government in an exceptionally difficult position.
Accepting such conditions risks confrontation with Hezbollah.
Rejecting them risks prolonged external military pressure and continued political isolation.
This dilemma has no easy solution.
THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION
Lebanon’s political crisis cannot be separated from its economic condition.
Years of financial instability have fundamentally altered the relationship between citizens and the state.
Among the continuing challenges are:

banking sector instability;
declining purchasing power;
infrastructure deterioration;
public debt;
limited government revenues;
emigration of skilled professionals;
persistent unemployment.

Economic hardship does not inevitably produce civil conflict.
It does, however, reduce the government’s ability to provide public services, finance reconstruction, maintain infrastructure, and address political grievances.
Over time, these pressures weaken institutional legitimacy.
When economic frustration overlaps with political polarization and security competition, overall national resilience declines.
SECTARIAN POLITICS
Lebanon’s political system remains organized largely around confessional representation.
This structure has historically allowed diverse religious communities to participate in governance.
It has also reinforced political identities that often coincide with sectarian affiliation.
Periods of external conflict therefore tend to deepen domestic political divisions.
Recent fighting between Israel and Hezbollah has produced markedly different political reactions across Lebanese society.
Some communities view Hezbollah as the country’s principal line of defense.
Others argue that its independent military decisions expose Lebanon to unnecessary regional wars.
Neither perspective exists in isolation.
Both influence national political decision-making.
As these competing narratives become increasingly polarized, the possibility of political compromise becomes more difficult.
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Despite these challenges, Lebanon retains several important stabilizing factors.
The Lebanese Armed Forces continue to enjoy broader national legitimacy than most political institutions.
Unlike the militia-dominated environment of the mid-1970s, there remains widespread public recognition that renewed nationwide civil war would produce catastrophic consequences for every community.
Many political leaders therefore possess strong incentives to avoid direct military confrontation.
This factor should not be underestimated.
Historical memory itself can function as a stabilizing influence.
Reuters reporting from April 2026 noted that former combatants, journalists, and civic leaders repeatedly warned against repeating the mistakes of the 1975–1990 conflict, even as they acknowledged that current sectarian tensions increasingly resemble those that preceded the earlier war.
POTENTIAL TRIGGERS
Several developments could substantially increase Lebanon’s risk profile.
These include:

attempts to forcibly disarm Hezbollah;
collapse of national political negotiations;
prolonged Israeli military occupation of disputed territory;
major sectarian violence in Beirut;
assassination of senior political figures;
fragmentation within the Lebanese Armed Forces;
severe deterioration of humanitarian conditions.

Conversely, several developments would likely reduce the probability of internal armed conflict.
These include:

successful political dialogue regarding national defense policy;
sustained international economic assistance;
gradual implementation of security reforms;
negotiated de-escalation between Israel and Hezbollah;
strengthening of state institutions.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
Lebanon today is not simply confronting a security crisis.
It is confronting a sovereignty crisis.
The central issue is whether the Lebanese state can consolidate political authority over national defense while preserving domestic political consensus.
History demonstrates that states facing competing centers of armed authority often encounter prolonged instability rather than immediate collapse.
Lebanon’s institutions remain functional.
Its armed forces remain intact.
Its political leadership continues to pursue negotiated solutions.
These factors weigh against predictions of imminent nationwide civil war.
Nevertheless, Lebanon currently exhibits one of the region’s highest concentrations of structural risk factors.
The interaction of economic weakness, unresolved sectarian divisions, competing claims to military authority, external military pressure, and fragile political institutions creates conditions that warrant continued close monitoring.
JAFAJ therefore assesses that Lebanon’s greatest near-term danger is not an immediate return to full-scale civil war but a series of localized confrontations that could progressively undermine state authority if left unresolved. Should such confrontations spread across multiple sectarian or geographic lines, the risk assessment would require upward revision.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT III
SYRIA
AN UNFINISHED CIVIL WAR OR A FRAGILE TRANSITION?
Overall Risk Assessment: High
Estimated Risk Horizon: 12–36 Months
Intelligence Confidence: High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Syria presents a fundamentally different analytical problem than either Iran or Lebanon.
The principal question is not whether Syria could enter a civil war.
Rather, it is whether Syria has genuinely emerged from one.
Although the collapse of the Assad government fundamentally altered Syria’s political landscape, the country remains divided by competing military organizations, unresolved sectarian grievances, foreign intervention, economic devastation, and incomplete national integration. The current transitional government has achieved important political gains, but it has not yet consolidated authority across the entire country.
For intelligence purposes, Syria should therefore be viewed as a fragile post-conflict state, not a fully stabilized one.
The probability of a return to nationwide fighting remains lower than during the height of the Syrian Civil War. However, the probability of recurring localized armed conflict remains significant.
THE FALL OF THE ASSAD GOVERNMENT DID NOT END SYRIA’S CHALLENGES
The removal of Bashar al-Assad ended one phase of Syria’s modern history.
It did not automatically resolve the conditions that produced fourteen years of war.
The transitional government inherited a country characterized by:

damaged infrastructure;
millions of displaced citizens;
competing regional authorities;
extensive humanitarian needs;
weakened state institutions;
unresolved sectarian grievances;
continuing foreign military involvement.

The challenge facing Damascus is therefore not simply governing Syria.
It is rebuilding the legitimacy of the Syrian state itself.
CSIS has described the transition as a limited window of opportunity in which political inclusion, institutional reform, and international support will largely determine whether Syria moves toward durable stability or renewed fragmentation.
THE FRAGMENTED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Despite the establishment of a transitional government, Syria does not yet possess a fully unified national security structure.
Several armed actors continue to exercise influence in different parts of the country.
These include:

Syrian government security forces;
Kurdish-led security organizations in the northeast;
local tribal formations;
Druze self-defense groups;
remnants of extremist organizations, including the Islamic State;
various locally organized armed groups.

This fragmentation complicates efforts to establish a single national monopoly on the use of force.
While several integration initiatives are underway, negotiations concerning command authority, local governance, and security responsibilities remain incomplete. Analysts continue to identify integration of Kurdish-led forces into national institutions as one of the transition’s most difficult unresolved issues.
SECTARIAN TRUST REMAINS THE CENTRAL CHALLENGE
Military victories alone do not produce political reconciliation.
One of the transitional government’s greatest challenges is rebuilding trust among communities that experienced years of violence.
Recent violence involving Druze, Alawite, and Bedouin communities demonstrates that sectarian tensions remain capable of producing significant localized conflict.
The violence in Sweida Province, as well as earlier attacks in Syria’s coastal regions, illustrates that local grievances continue to threaten broader national reconciliation. UN officials report that implementation of the government’s stabilization plan for Sweida has stalled, with kidnappings, community mistrust, and political divisions continuing nearly a year after major sectarian violence.
Similarly, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has concluded that both state and non-state actors continue to commit serious abuses against religious minorities, raising continuing concerns regarding rule of law and minority protection.
These developments do not necessarily indicate the beginning of another nationwide civil war.
They do indicate that reconciliation remains incomplete.
THE KURDISH QUESTION
The future relationship between Damascus and Kurdish-administered regions represents another major variable.
For more than a decade, northeastern Syria developed political and military institutions largely independent of Damascus.
The long-term success of Syria’s transition depends in part upon whether those institutions can be integrated into a unified Syrian state while preserving acceptable levels of local autonomy.
Failure to reach durable political arrangements could generate renewed military confrontation.
Successful integration, by contrast, would remove one of Syria’s most important long-term security risks.
This issue should therefore be viewed as a strategic indicator rather than merely a regional political dispute. CSIS has identified Kurdish integration as one of the defining tests of Syria’s post-Assad transition.
FOREIGN POWERS REMAIN DEEPLY INVOLVED
Unlike many civil wars, Syria’s conflict has never been exclusively domestic.
Regional and international actors continue to shape the country’s security environment.
Their interests differ considerably.
Some seek border security.
Others seek influence.
Others seek to prevent extremist resurgence.
Israel continues to conduct military operations when it perceives emerging security threats.
Turkey remains focused on Kurdish armed organizations operating near its southern border.
The United States continues to influence developments through diplomacy and its evolving regional posture.
These overlapping interests complicate Syria’s transition because domestic political decisions frequently produce regional security consequences.
The continued presence of multiple external actors substantially increases the complexity of conflict management.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?
Several developments would increase Syria’s risk profile.
These include:

collapse of negotiations with Kurdish authorities;
expansion of sectarian violence into multiple provinces;
fragmentation within national security institutions;
significant resurgence of the Islamic State;
widespread failure of transitional governance;
major foreign military escalation.

Conversely, several developments would improve the outlook.
These include:

successful integration of regional security forces;
effective protection of minority communities;
restoration of public services;
constitutional progress;
sustained international reconstruction assistance;
continued reductions in sectarian violence.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
Syria should not be viewed as a country that has fully emerged from conflict.
Neither should it be viewed as a country inevitably returning to nationwide civil war.
The evidence presently supports a more nuanced conclusion.
The transitional government has made measurable progress toward reestablishing national authority.
At the same time, that authority remains uneven, particularly in regions where sectarian distrust, competing armed organizations, and unresolved governance disputes persist. International observers continue to characterize Syria’s transition as fragile rather than consolidated.
JAFAJ therefore assesses that Syria’s greatest strategic risk is not the immediate return of a nationwide civil war, but the persistence of multiple localized conflicts that gradually erode confidence in the transitional government.
If those localized conflicts become interconnected—linking sectarian violence, governance failures, Kurdish disputes, extremist activity, and external intervention—the probability of a broader internal conflict would increase significantly.
At present, however, the available evidence supports the assessment that Syria remains a fragile state in transition rather than a state experiencing a renewed nationwide civil war.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT IV
IRAQ
BETWEEN STABILITY AND FRAGMENTATION
Overall Risk Assessment: Moderate
Estimated Risk Horizon: 12–24 Months
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate to High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Iraq occupies a unique position within the Middle East’s evolving security environment.
Unlike Syria or Yemen, Iraq is not presently engaged in a nationwide civil war.
Unlike Iran, its principal vulnerabilities are not centered on national leadership succession.
Instead, Iraq’s greatest strategic challenge is balancing competing centers of political and military authority while preventing regional conflicts from reigniting domestic instability.
Over the past decade, Iraq has achieved measurable progress.
The territorial defeat of the Islamic State, improvements in government institutions, increasing public confidence in national security forces, and gradual economic recovery have all strengthened the Iraqi state.
Yet many of the structural conditions that contributed to earlier conflict remain unresolved.
Political competition among Shi’a factions, unresolved relations with the Kurdistan Region, the continued influence of armed groups operating outside direct government control, and competing Iranian and American interests continue to place significant pressure on Iraqi institutions. The Council on Foreign Relations continues to classify Iraq as a country facing persistent political instability because of these unresolved structural challenges.
JAFAJ assesses that Iraq is more resilient today than at any point since the defeat of ISIS, but that resilience remains conditional upon continued political compromise and successful efforts to strengthen the state’s monopoly over the use of force.
A COUNTRY THAT HAS LEARNED FROM CIVIL WAR
Modern Iraq has experienced nearly every form of armed conflict.
It has endured dictatorship, foreign invasion, sectarian violence, insurgency, terrorism, and civil war.
Those experiences continue to influence political decision-making.
Unlike the period preceding the 2006–2008 sectarian conflict, there is now broad recognition across much of Iraq’s political leadership that renewed internal war would threaten the survival of the modern Iraqi state itself.
This historical memory serves as an important stabilizing factor.
Political leaders who fiercely disagree on policy often share one common objective:
Avoiding another nationwide civil war.
That objective has contributed to a political culture that generally favors negotiation over direct military confrontation among major political actors.
THE POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES
Perhaps no issue better illustrates Iraq’s strategic dilemma than the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
Originally formed to combat ISIS, the PMF evolved into a diverse collection of organizations with varying political loyalties, institutional relationships, and military capabilities.
Some components operate closely alongside the Iraqi state.
Others maintain stronger political or operational relationships with Iran.
This diversity complicates government efforts to establish unified command over all armed organizations.
The central question is not whether Iraq possesses capable security institutions.
It does.
The question is whether every major armed organization ultimately answers to those institutions.
Recent reporting suggests that Baghdad has increased efforts to consolidate state authority over armed groups while simultaneously attempting to avoid direct confrontation with powerful militia organizations. Several factions have publicly indicated a willingness to discuss integration or disarmament, although implementation remains uncertain.
IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES
Few countries illustrate regional strategic competition more clearly than Iraq.
The United States remains an important security and economic partner.
Iran maintains extensive historical, religious, political, and economic relationships with many Iraqi actors.
Baghdad therefore faces a persistent balancing act.
Any major shift toward one side risks political backlash from the other.
This balancing strategy has become more difficult following the recent regional conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States.
According to Reuters reporting, U.S. pressure on Baghdad to restrict militia financing and reassert state authority has increased significantly, while Iran has reportedly adapted by developing smaller proxy structures intended to preserve its regional influence.
This external competition represents one of Iraq’s most important long-term strategic risks.
THE KURDISTAN REGION
Relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government remain considerably more stable than during earlier periods of confrontation.
Nevertheless, important disputes continue regarding:

energy policy;
revenue sharing;
constitutional authority;
security coordination;
administrative jurisdiction.

These disagreements have generally remained political rather than military.
That distinction is significant.
As long as both sides continue resolving disputes through negotiation rather than force, this issue is unlikely to become the principal driver of nationwide instability.
However, prolonged political deadlock combined with broader regional conflict could alter that assessment.
ECONOMIC STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES
Compared with several neighboring states, Iraq benefits from substantial natural resources.
Oil revenues continue to provide the financial foundation of the Iraqi government.
That strength, however, also creates vulnerability.
Heavy dependence upon petroleum revenues exposes Iraq to fluctuations in global energy markets and disruptions caused by regional conflict.
Recent attacks affecting energy infrastructure demonstrated how quickly external conflict can produce domestic economic consequences.
The Associated Press reported that attacks on oil infrastructure and export disruptions during the regional conflict threatened government revenues, electricity generation, and public-sector salaries—highlighting the connection between regional security and domestic stability.
Diversifying the Iraqi economy therefore remains both an economic and a national security priority.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?
Several developments would increase Iraq’s overall risk profile.
These include:

fragmentation among major Shi’a political factions;
large-scale militia resistance to state authority;
renewed sectarian mobilization;
major deterioration in Baghdad–Erbil relations;
severe economic disruption resulting from prolonged regional conflict;
resurgence of ISIS or comparable extremist organizations.

Conversely, several developments would reduce the assessed level of risk.
These include:

successful security sector reform;
peaceful integration of armed organizations into state institutions;
continued economic diversification;
strengthened cooperation between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government;
reduced regional competition between Iran and the United States.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
Iraq should not presently be viewed as a country moving toward imminent civil war.
Its political institutions remain stronger than during previous periods of national crisis.
The Iraqi Security Forces have demonstrated increasing professionalism.
The overwhelming majority of political leaders recognize the catastrophic consequences of renewed nationwide conflict.
These are important stabilizing factors.
Nevertheless, Iraq’s stability remains closely linked to developments beyond its borders.
Continued competition between regional powers, the unresolved future of armed factions operating outside full state control, and the country’s dependence on oil revenues create structural vulnerabilities that require continued monitoring.
JAFAJ therefore assesses that Iraq’s greatest strategic risk is not internal political collapse but gradual erosion of state authority should external regional conflicts increasingly intersect with unresolved domestic political disputes.
At present, Iraq’s trajectory points toward managed instability rather than renewed civil war, provided that political leaders continue strengthening national institutions while limiting the influence of competing armed actors.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT V
YEMEN
A CIVIL WAR THAT NEVER TRULY ENDED
Overall Risk Assessment: Very High
Estimated Risk Horizon: Immediate–24 Months
Intelligence Confidence: High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Unlike the other countries examined in this report, Yemen should not be assessed according to the likelihood of entering civil war.
Yemen is already experiencing one.
The more relevant intelligence question is whether the conflict is entering a new and potentially more dangerous phase.
Over the past decade, Yemen has evolved from a conflict between the internationally recognized government and the Houthi movement into a far more complex struggle involving competing governments, separatist movements, tribal organizations, terrorist groups, regional powers, and foreign military intervention.
Recent fighting among factions previously aligned against the Houthis demonstrates that the conflict is no longer defined solely by a two-sided war. Instead, it has become a multi-dimensional contest over the future political structure of Yemen itself. Reuters and the Associated Press report that renewed fighting between Saudi-backed government forces and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) has fractured the anti-Houthi coalition and significantly increased the risk of prolonged instability.
JAFAJ assesses that Yemen currently presents the highest level of sustained internal conflict risk in the Middle East and is likely to remain unstable regardless of the outcome of any single military campaign.
FROM CIVIL WAR TO STATE FRAGMENTATION
The conflict that began in 2014 has evolved substantially.
Initially centered on the Houthi seizure of Sana’a and the collapse of the internationally recognized government, the conflict now encompasses multiple overlapping struggles.
Today, Yemen contains competing political and military authorities with differing visions of the country’s future.
Among the principal actors are:

the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah);
the internationally recognized government;
the Presidential Leadership Council;
the Southern Transitional Council;
tribal security organizations;
National Resistance Forces;
extremist organizations, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

These organizations do not merely disagree over policy.
Many disagree over whether Yemen should remain a single state.
This distinction fundamentally changes the nature of the conflict.
THE SOUTHERN QUESTION
One of the most important developments during the past several years has been the growing strength of southern separatism.
The Southern Transitional Council seeks restoration of an independent South Yemen.
Its objectives differ significantly from those of the internationally recognized government.
Although both oppose Houthi control of northern Yemen, they increasingly disagree regarding the future political map of the country.
The January 2026 fighting between Saudi-backed government forces and UAE-supported STC units demonstrated that anti-Houthi cooperation cannot be assumed.
Instead, competing strategic objectives now divide former coalition partners.
From an intelligence perspective, this represents one of Yemen’s most important structural changes.
THE HOUTHI FACTOR
The Houthis remain Yemen’s single most powerful organized military actor.
They continue to exercise control over the capital, Sana’a, and much of northern Yemen, governing areas that contain a majority of the country’s population. They also retain significant missile, drone, and command capabilities developed during years of conflict.
This level of territorial control provides organizational advantages that distinguish the Houthis from many insurgent movements.
At the same time, their continued military posture ensures that any negotiated political settlement must account for their role.
No realistic long-term settlement can ignore the military and political realities on the ground.
REGIONAL COMPETITION
Yemen’s conflict remains deeply internationalized.
Saudi Arabia continues to view developments in Yemen through the lens of border security and regional balance.
The United Arab Emirates has pursued a different strategy, emphasizing influence through southern partners and maritime security.
Iran has maintained relationships with the Houthis.
These overlapping interests complicate every diplomatic initiative.
Political agreements acceptable to one regional actor may be viewed as strategically unacceptable by another.
Consequently, Yemen illustrates one of the defining characteristics of modern civil wars:
Domestic political conflicts increasingly become arenas for regional competition.
THE HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION
Years of conflict have severely weakened Yemen’s state institutions.
Large portions of the population continue to experience:

food insecurity;
limited access to healthcare;
damaged infrastructure;
interrupted education;
displacement;
reduced economic opportunity.

These humanitarian conditions are not merely consequences of conflict.
They also influence future stability.
Communities experiencing prolonged economic hardship become increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by armed organizations, criminal networks, and extremist groups.
Accordingly, humanitarian recovery should be viewed as a national security issue as well as a humanitarian imperative.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?
Several developments would increase Yemen’s already elevated risk profile.
These include:

complete collapse of the Presidential Leadership Council;
formal declaration of an independent South Yemen;
major Saudi-Houthi military confrontation;
renewed expansion of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula;
widespread breakdown of humanitarian assistance.

Several developments would reduce the overall risk assessment.
These include:

durable ceasefire agreements among major factions;
negotiated political arrangements between northern and southern authorities;
sustained humanitarian recovery;
improved regional diplomacy between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran;
gradual reconstruction of national institutions.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
Yemen differs fundamentally from every other country examined in this report.
The principal intelligence question is not whether civil war will occur.
It already has.
Instead, analysts must assess whether Yemen is moving toward:

national reunification;
formal partition;
prolonged frozen conflict;
or continued multi-sided warfare.

At present, the available evidence suggests that continued fragmentation remains the most likely near-term outcome. Although diplomatic initiatives continue, multiple armed organizations retain independent command structures and incompatible political objectives.
From a regional perspective, Yemen’s importance extends beyond its borders.
Its location along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, proximity to the Red Sea, and relationship to Gulf security ensure that instability within Yemen will continue influencing regional trade, maritime security, and broader Middle Eastern geopolitics.
JAFAJ therefore assesses that Yemen represents the Middle East’s most entrenched civil conflict and is likely to remain one of the region’s principal sources of long-term instability unless a comprehensive political settlement addresses not only the Houthi-government conflict but also the competing visions for Yemen’s future state structure.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT VI
LIBYA
A DIVIDED STATE SEEKING REUNIFICATION
Overall Risk Assessment: Moderate–High
Estimated Risk Horizon: 12–36 Months
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate to High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Libya represents one of the Middle East and North Africa’s most unusual security cases.
Unlike Yemen, where large-scale civil war continues, Libya has experienced a significant reduction in nationwide fighting since the 2020 ceasefire.
Yet peace should not be confused with stability.
The country remains politically divided between rival governments, competing military institutions, and separate centers of political legitimacy. Although large-scale combat has declined, Libya has yet to resolve the underlying constitutional, political, and institutional disputes that originally fueled its civil war. The United Nations continues to describe Libya’s political process as improving but fragile, warning that the current opportunity for national reconciliation could narrow without sustained progress.
JAFAJ assesses that Libya is not presently on the verge of renewed nationwide civil war, but remains vulnerable to renewed armed confrontation if political negotiations collapse or rival authorities again seek to resolve disputes through military means.
FROM CIVIL WAR TO POLITICAL STALEMATE
The 2020 ceasefire fundamentally altered Libya’s security environment.
Major offensive operations largely ceased.
National institutions, however, remained divided.
Today Libya continues to operate under competing political authorities.
In the west, the internationally recognized Government of National Unity exercises authority from Tripoli.
In the east, rival political institutions supported by the Libyan National Army maintain effective control over much of eastern and southern Libya.
This division has created what analysts often describe as a frozen political conflict rather than a resolved national settlement.
The absence of large-scale warfare therefore reflects deterrence and political equilibrium more than comprehensive reconciliation. The Council on Foreign Relations continues to classify Libya as a country experiencing persistent instability because rival governments remain deadlocked over elections, constitutional arrangements, and national governance.
TWO GOVERNMENTS—ONE STATE
The central challenge confronting Libya is legitimacy.
Both rival political systems claim national authority.
Both maintain administrative institutions.
Both possess security organizations.
Neither exercises uncontested sovereignty across the entire country.
As a result, Libya continues to experience parallel governance in areas such as:

national budgeting;
internal security;
military command;
public administration;
border management;
energy policy.

This institutional duplication complicates virtually every effort to rebuild unified national government.
Political compromise therefore remains the decisive strategic variable.
OIL: LIBYA’S GREATEST ASSET AND GREATEST VULNERABILITY
Libya possesses Africa’s largest proven oil reserves.
Oil exports provide the overwhelming majority of government revenue.
Consequently, disputes regarding oil production, export terminals, revenue distribution, and the Central Bank have repeatedly become political flashpoints.
Unlike many countries where economic disagreements remain primarily financial, disputes over Libya’s energy sector directly influence political legitimacy and military power.
Control of oil revenues affects:

government salaries;
military financing;
reconstruction;
infrastructure investment;
regional political influence.

Recent diplomatic initiatives have attempted to separate oil production from political disputes.
Progress has been uneven.
The adoption of a unified national budget represented an important institutional achievement, but broader disagreements over political authority remain unresolved. The Financial Times and Reuters report that outside mediators view shared management of Libya’s energy resources as essential to any lasting political settlement.
THE MILITARY BALANCE
One of Libya’s principal stabilizing factors is the current military balance.
Neither major political bloc appears capable of achieving a decisive nationwide military victory at acceptable cost.
This strategic reality has encouraged negotiation over renewed offensive operations.
At the same time, the existence of separate military command structures means that localized incidents retain the potential to escalate unexpectedly.
The continued absence of a unified national military therefore represents both a stabilizing and destabilizing factor.
It discourages offensive campaigns.
It also prevents the emergence of a single national security authority.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION
Libya remains heavily influenced by external diplomacy.
The United Nations continues facilitating political negotiations.
Regional governments remain engaged.
Several international actors view Libyan stability as strategically important because of:

Mediterranean security;
migration;
energy exports;
counterterrorism;
regional economic development.

Recent reporting indicates that Pakistan, with encouragement from the United States and several regional governments, has begun facilitating discussions between Libya’s eastern and western political authorities regarding a proposed thirty-six-month national reunification process. While negotiations remain preliminary, they represent one of the most significant diplomatic initiatives since the 2020 ceasefire.
Whether this initiative succeeds remains uncertain.
Its existence nevertheless suggests that major international actors increasingly view political reunification as achievable rather than unattainable.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?
Several developments would increase Libya’s risk profile.
These include:

collapse of reunification negotiations;
renewed competition over oil infrastructure;
failure to implement national elections;
fragmentation within either major governing coalition;
significant foreign military intervention;
prolonged constitutional deadlock.

Conversely, several developments would improve Libya’s long-term outlook.
These include:

successful formation of unified national institutions;
implementation of credible national elections;
consolidation of military command structures;
equitable distribution of oil revenues;
continued reductions in political violence;
successful constitutional reform.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
Libya today differs significantly from the country that experienced full-scale civil war following 2011.
Violence has declined.
Institutions have strengthened in some areas.
Political dialogue has resumed.
These developments should not be overlooked.
Nevertheless, Libya has not yet completed the transition from ceasefire to durable peace.
Its institutions remain divided.
Its constitutional future remains unsettled.
Its political legitimacy remains contested.
JAFAJ therefore assesses that Libya’s greatest strategic risk is not an immediate return to nationwide civil war, but the gradual erosion of the current political equilibrium if reunification efforts fail.
Unlike Syria, where conflict remains deeply embedded in local security structures, or Lebanon, where competing armed authority defines the central political challenge, Libya’s future depends primarily upon whether competing governments can transform a military stalemate into a unified political settlement.
At present, the evidence suggests that Libya is moving cautiously toward political reconciliation rather than toward renewed nationwide civil war. That trajectory, however, remains reversible and dependent upon continued domestic compromise and sustained international mediation.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT VII
THE STABLE STATES
WHY SOME COUNTRIES ARE UNLIKELY TO EXPERIENCE CIVIL WAR
Countries Assessed:
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates
Qatar
Oman
Bahrain
Kuwait
Overall Regional Risk: Low to Moderate
Intelligence Confidence: High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
An assessment of civil war risk in the Middle East would be incomplete if it focused exclusively on countries experiencing instability.
Several regional governments continue to demonstrate a high degree of political resilience despite operating within one of the world’s most volatile security environments.
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait differ significantly in their political systems, economic structures, and foreign policy priorities. Yet they share several characteristics that reduce the probability of large-scale internal armed conflict.
These characteristics include relatively effective state institutions, centralized security organizations, comparatively high levels of government capacity, and the ability to provide essential public services. While each country faces important domestic and regional challenges, none currently exhibits the combination of structural conditions typically associated with a high probability of civil war. The World Bank and the Fund for Peace continue to rank these states well above the region’s fragile or conflict-affected countries in measures of governance and institutional capacity.
JORDAN
A BUFFER STATE UNDER CONTINUOUS PRESSURE
Jordan occupies one of the most strategically exposed positions in the Middle East.
It borders Israel, the West Bank, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.
It has absorbed successive refugee crises while maintaining internal political stability.
Jordan continues to face economic pressures, water shortages, unemployment, and periodic demonstrations.
Nevertheless, several important stabilizing factors remain present.
These include:

professional security institutions;
broad international support;
functioning government institutions;
continuity within the Hashemite monarchy;
limited sectarian polarization.

Jordan’s principal security risks originate from regional spillover rather than domestic armed opposition.
Accordingly, JAFAJ assesses Jordan’s civil war risk as Low.
SAUDI ARABIA
STRONG STATE CAPACITY REDUCES INTERNAL RISK
Saudi Arabia has undergone substantial political and economic transformation during the past decade.
Large-scale economic reforms, institutional modernization, expanded investment, and centralization of political authority have strengthened the state’s governing capacity.
The Kingdom continues to face:

regional security threats;
missile and drone attacks;
economic diversification challenges;
succession questions over the long term.

However, the government maintains:

effective security institutions;
centralized command authority;
substantial financial resources;
strong territorial control.

No organized domestic armed movement presently possesses the capability to challenge the state’s authority nationwide.
JAFAJ therefore assesses Saudi Arabia’s civil war risk as Low.
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
The UAE remains among the region’s most politically stable states.
Strong economic performance, diversified international relationships, highly capable security institutions, and relatively effective governance contribute to national resilience.
Potential risks include:

regional military escalation;
cyber attacks;
economic disruption;
terrorism.

None presently suggests a meaningful probability of internal armed conflict.
Assessment: Very Low
QATAR
Qatar maintains one of the highest standards of living in the Middle East.
Political continuity, strong financial reserves, and active diplomacy contribute significantly to national stability.
Although regional tensions occasionally affect Qatari foreign policy, they have not translated into meaningful domestic instability.
Assessment: Very Low
OMAN
Oman has historically pursued a policy of neutrality and regional mediation.
Political succession following the death of Sultan Qaboos demonstrated institutional continuity rather than instability.
Economic diversification remains an important long-term challenge.
Nevertheless, Oman continues to exhibit:

high institutional legitimacy;
limited political violence;
effective governance.

Assessment: Very Low
BAHRAIN
Bahrain presents a more complex picture.
Historical sectarian tensions continue to influence domestic politics.
The government maintains strong security institutions and receives substantial regional support, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Gulf Cooperation Council partners.
While localized unrest remains possible, the probability of nationwide civil war remains Low.
KUWAIT
Kuwait possesses one of the Gulf’s most developed parliamentary systems.
Political disagreements frequently occur between elected representatives and the executive branch.
Importantly, these disagreements have remained political rather than military.
Strong institutions and economic resources continue supporting national stability.
Assessment: Very Low
COMMON STABILIZING FACTORS
Several characteristics distinguish these countries from those examined earlier.
They generally possess:

functioning national institutions;
unified military command structures;
comparatively strong economies or fiscal reserves;
limited territorial fragmentation;
effective internal security organizations;
broad control over the legitimate use of force;
relatively high administrative capacity.

These factors substantially reduce the likelihood that political disputes will evolve into sustained armed conflict.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THIS ASSESSMENT?
Although current risks remain comparatively low, analysts should continue monitoring:

severe economic shocks;
prolonged succession disputes;
significant erosion of government legitimacy;
emergence of organized armed opposition;
large-scale refugee spillover;
regional wars producing domestic political polarization.

At present, however, none of these countries exhibits multiple deteriorating indicators comparable to those observed in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, or Yemen.
JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
One of the most important findings of this Intelligence Estimate is that geography alone does not determine conflict risk.
Several states located in one of the world’s most unstable regions continue to demonstrate remarkable political resilience.
This reinforces an important analytical conclusion:
Civil wars are not an inevitable consequence of regional instability.
Rather, they emerge when structural weaknesses accumulate beyond the capacity of political institutions to manage them peacefully.
The Gulf monarchies and Jordan illustrate the opposite dynamic. Despite operating in an exceptionally challenging security environment, they continue to benefit from strong state institutions, centralized security structures, and governing systems capable of absorbing political shocks without widespread armed conflict.
SPECIAL ASSESSMENT
THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
GOVERNANCE, FRAGMENTATION, AND THE RISK OF INTERNAL CONFLICT
Overall Risk Assessment: Moderate–High
Estimated Risk Horizon: 6–24 Months
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
The Palestinian Territories present one of the most analytically complex security environments in the Middle East.
Unlike the sovereign states examined elsewhere in this report, the Palestinian political system is divided geographically, institutionally, and politically between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
Accordingly, the principal intelligence question is not whether Palestine could experience a conventional civil war comparable to those in Syria or Yemen.
Rather, the question is whether political fragmentation, competing claims of legitimacy, and unresolved security arrangements could produce sustained armed confrontation among Palestinian actors themselves.
Recent developments have altered that assessment.
Hamas’ announcement that it would dissolve its de facto civilian government in Gaza and transfer administrative authority to a technocratic committee represents the most significant change in Palestinian governance since Hamas seized Gaza in 2007. However, Hamas has not committed to surrendering its weapons or relinquishing all security authority, leaving the future distribution of power uncertain.
JAFAJ assesses that the greatest near-term risk is not an organized Hamas–Fatah civil war, but prolonged political fragmentation in which competing governing authorities, security organizations, and external actors prevent the emergence of a unified Palestinian political system.
THE LEGACY OF 2007
The political division between Gaza and the West Bank did not begin with the current conflict.
It began nearly two decades earlier.
Following Hamas’ electoral victory and subsequent fighting with Fatah, Palestinian governance effectively split into two separate administrations.
Since then:

Hamas has governed Gaza.
The Palestinian Authority has administered much of the West Bank.
Separate security institutions developed.
Separate bureaucracies emerged.
Political reconciliation repeatedly failed.

This institutional separation created two distinct political systems operating under different leadership, different security structures, and different governing priorities.
The current ceasefire and reconstruction process therefore confronts not only the physical destruction of Gaza but also nearly twenty years of political separation.
A NEW POLITICAL MOMENT
Hamas’ decision to dissolve its civilian governing authority is politically significant.
If implemented, it would end nearly two decades of direct Hamas administration over civilian ministries and transfer day-to-day governance to a technocratic body created under the post-war framework. Hamas has described the move as part of the reconstruction process, while the Board of Peace has stated that it will judge the transition by “actions, not promises.” Israeli officials have argued that meaningful change also requires Hamas to relinquish its armed capabilities.
This distinction is critical.
Civil administration and military authority are not the same.
Even if civilian governance changes, unresolved questions remain regarding:

policing;
internal security;
weapons control;
intelligence functions;
border security;
command over armed formations.

Until these issues are resolved, competing centers of authority are likely to persist.
THE HAMAS–FATAH RELATIONSHIP
For many years, discussions of Palestinian internal politics focused on the rivalry between Hamas and Fatah.
While that rivalry remains important, it may no longer represent the principal source of future instability.
Both organizations now confront a different strategic challenge:
Whether a unified Palestinian governing structure can emerge after years of institutional separation.
That challenge involves far more than political reconciliation.
It requires integration of:

civil administrations;
financial systems;
judicial institutions;
security organizations;
local governance;
reconstruction authorities.

History demonstrates that institutional integration is often more difficult than political agreement.
THE SECURITY QUESTION
The future of Palestinian security institutions remains the most uncertain variable.
No political transition can be considered complete while competing armed organizations maintain separate chains of command.
The current framework leaves several major questions unanswered.
Among them:

Who controls internal policing?
Who secures border crossings?
Who commands armed personnel?
What becomes of Hamas’ military wing?
What role, if any, will the Palestinian Authority’s security institutions play in Gaza?
What responsibilities will international organizations assume?

Until these questions are resolved, governance arrangements will remain incomplete.
The United Nations has similarly argued that Gaza’s recovery must ultimately support reunification of Gaza and the West Bank under a single legitimate Palestinian governing authority.
THE RECONSTRUCTION CHALLENGE
Political stability cannot be separated from reconstruction.
Years of conflict have devastated housing, public infrastructure, healthcare, education, and the economy.
Reconstruction therefore represents more than humanitarian recovery.
It is also a test of governance.
Whichever institutions successfully deliver:

public services;
reconstruction;
employment;
security;
humanitarian assistance;

are likely to gain political legitimacy.
Failure to deliver those services could produce renewed political competition among Palestinian factions.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?
Several developments would increase the risk of internal Palestinian conflict.
These include:

collapse of the governance transition;
competing claims of authority between rival Palestinian institutions;
disputes regarding weapons and security control;
failure of reconstruction;
assassination of senior political leaders;
emergence of additional armed factions.

Conversely, several developments would reduce the assessed level of risk.
These include:

successful implementation of the technocratic administration;
agreement regarding unified security structures;
sustained reconstruction;
expanded cooperation between Gaza and West Bank institutions;
internationally supported political reforms;
continued reductions in armed violence.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
The Palestinian Territories should not presently be assessed as moving toward a conventional civil war resembling those experienced by Syria or Yemen.
Instead, they face a different strategic challenge.
The central issue is political integration.
The recent decision by Hamas to dissolve its civilian governing authority creates an opportunity for institutional restructuring.
Whether that opportunity succeeds will depend less upon announcements than upon implementation.
The decisive question is not who governs Gaza’s ministries.
The decisive question is who ultimately exercises legitimate authority over governance, security, reconstruction, and the use of force across the Palestinian Territories.
JAFAJ therefore assesses that the greatest threat to Palestinian stability is prolonged political fragmentation rather than immediate civil war. If competing institutions become entrenched, reconstruction stalls, or rival security organizations begin operating independently of a unified political framework, the risk of sustained internal armed confrontation would increase. Conversely, successful institutional integration under a broadly accepted governing structure would significantly reduce that risk over time.
CHAPTER VIII
REGIONAL CONTAGION
HOW ONE CIVIL WAR COULD IGNITE ANOTHER
Regional Assessment: Moderate Risk of Cascading Instability
Estimated Time Horizon: 6–36 Months
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate to High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Civil wars seldom remain domestic affairs.
In today’s Middle East, political instability spreads across borders through refugee movements, economic disruption, ideological mobilization, weapons trafficking, proxy organizations, and foreign military intervention.
The region’s geographic proximity, interconnected political movements, and competing regional powers mean that instability in one country can rapidly influence security conditions elsewhere.
This dynamic is not theoretical.
The Syrian Civil War reshaped regional politics by generating one of the largest refugee crises in modern history, altering the security policies of neighboring states, facilitating the expansion of extremist organizations, and drawing multiple regional and international militaries into the conflict. Similar spillover effects have been documented in conflicts involving Iraq, Yemen, and Libya.¹
The principal intelligence question is therefore no longer:
Could one country experience civil war?
The more important question becomes:
What happens to the region if it does?
THE CASCADE MODEL
JAFAJ assesses that regional instability generally expands through five interconnected pathways.
Rather than occurring sequentially, these pathways often reinforce one another.
Political Crisis
│
▼
Internal Violence
│
▼
Population Displacement
│
▼
Regional Political Pressure
│
▼
Foreign Intervention
│
▼
Expanded Regional Instability
Each stage increases the probability that neighboring states will experience secondary security challenges.
PATHWAY ONE
REFUGEE MOVEMENTS
Large-scale population displacement is among the earliest indicators that internal conflict is expanding beyond national borders.
Neighboring governments often experience immediate pressure upon:

healthcare systems;
housing;
employment;
education;
public finances;
border security.

Jordan, Lebanon, Türkiye, and Iraq all experienced substantial demographic and economic effects following the Syrian conflict.
Future conflicts involving Iran or Lebanon could generate similar regional pressures, although the scale would depend upon the duration and intensity of violence.
Refugee movements are humanitarian events.
They also become strategic events.
PATHWAY TWO
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
Civil wars rarely contain weapons.
As state authority weakens, military equipment often disperses beyond government control.
Weapons may flow through:

smuggling networks;
tribal relationships;
criminal organizations;
proxy groups;
terrorist organizations.

The Libyan conflict demonstrated how unsecured weapons stockpiles influenced conflicts throughout North Africa and the Sahel.
Similarly, instability in one state may substantially increase military capabilities available to non-state actors elsewhere.
PATHWAY THREE
IDEOLOGICAL MOBILIZATION
Modern communications accelerate political mobilization.
Events occurring inside one country frequently inspire demonstrations, recruitment, fundraising, or political activism elsewhere.
Religious, ethnic, ideological, and nationalist movements increasingly operate across national boundaries.
Consequently, civil conflicts often produce:

increased political polarization;
expanded recruitment;
online propaganda;
financial support networks;
foreign volunteers.

While digital mobilization does not automatically translate into armed conflict, it can strengthen organizations capable of exploiting periods of political instability.
PATHWAY FOUR
PROXY ESCALATION
Regional powers rarely remain neutral when neighboring governments begin to weaken.
Instead, they often perceive opportunities—or threats—that encourage intervention.
Support may include:

intelligence;
financing;
weapons;
military advisors;
diplomatic recognition;
cyber operations;
economic assistance.

History demonstrates that such intervention frequently prolongs conflicts while increasing their complexity.
Domestic political disputes therefore become regional strategic competitions.
PATHWAY FIVE
ECONOMIC SHOCK
Regional conflicts affect far more than security.
They disrupt:

trade;
tourism;
energy markets;
shipping;
investment;
financial confidence.

The Red Sea crisis demonstrated how localized military activity could rapidly influence international shipping costs and insurance markets.
Likewise, instability affecting the Strait of Hormuz would possess immediate global economic implications.
Economic disruption often produces political consequences in neighboring countries, creating additional instability.
THE CIVIL WAR NETWORK
The following diagram illustrates JAFAJ’s assessment of likely regional spillover pathways.
Syria
↙  ↓  ↘
Lebanon Iraq Türkiye
 
Iran ↔ Iraq ↔ Syria
 
Lebanon ↔ Israel
 
Yemen ↔ Saudi Arabia ↔ Gulf States
 
Libya ↔ Egypt ↔ Tunisia ↔ Sahel
 
Gaza ↔ Israel ↔ Jordan
This should not be interpreted as predicting conflict.
Rather, it illustrates where instability is most likely to produce secondary effects.
WHICH COUNTRY MATTERS MOST?
From a regional perspective, not every conflict carries equal strategic weight.
JAFAJ assesses the following potential regional impacts.

Country
Regional Spillover Potential

Iran
Very High

Syria
Very High

Lebanon
High

Iraq
High

Yemen
Moderate–High

Libya
Moderate

Palestinian Territories
Moderate

Iran ranks highest because of:

geographic location;
population size;
regional proxy relationships;
energy infrastructure;
Strait of Hormuz;
influence extending into Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

A major internal crisis in Iran would likely produce broader regional consequences than instability in any other country assessed in this report.
EARLY WARNING INDICATORS OF REGIONAL CONTAGION
JAFAJ recommends monitoring the following indicators.
Political

Collapse of regional diplomatic negotiations.
Simultaneous emergencies in multiple neighboring states.
Expansion of emergency powers.

Military

Cross-border artillery or missile exchanges.
Mobilization of proxy organizations.
Increased foreign military deployments.
Expansion of border security operations.

Humanitarian

Refugee flows exceeding national response capacity.
Rapid displacement across multiple borders.
Breakdown of humanitarian corridors.

Economic

Closure of strategic maritime routes.
Major disruption of oil exports.
Banking instability.
Severe food inflation.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
The greatest strategic danger facing the Middle East may not be a single civil war.
It may be the interaction of several smaller crises occurring simultaneously.
History demonstrates that regional conflicts rarely develop in isolation.
Instead, they evolve through a combination of domestic political failures, external intervention, humanitarian displacement, economic disruption, and competing geopolitical interests.
At present, JAFAJ does not assess that the Middle East is on the threshold of a region-wide cascade of civil wars.
However, several states are simultaneously experiencing elevated structural pressures.
Should one of the region’s major states—particularly Iran, Lebanon, or Syria—experience significant internal deterioration, the probability of broader regional instability would increase substantially through refugee movements, proxy mobilization, economic disruption, and foreign intervention.
Accordingly, policymakers should monitor interactions among conflicts, not merely the trajectory of individual countries.
CHAPTER IX
STRATEGIC OUTLOOK
THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR MONTHS
Forecast Period: July 2026 – July 2028
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
The Middle East is unlikely to experience a simultaneous collapse of multiple governments over the next twenty-four months.
The available evidence instead suggests a more complex and uneven trajectory.
Several states are expected to remain relatively stable despite operating within a volatile regional environment. Others will likely continue experiencing persistent political fragmentation without descending into full-scale civil war. A smaller number face elevated structural pressures that could, under specific circumstances, develop into sustained internal armed conflict.
Accordingly, JAFAJ assesses that the region’s principal security challenge over the next two years will not be a single catastrophic event.
Rather, it will be the accumulation of multiple interconnected crises that collectively increase regional instability.
MOST LIKELY SCENARIO
Managed Instability
Estimated Probability: 60–70%
Under this scenario:

Iran experiences periodic domestic unrest but retains institutional cohesion.
Lebanon continues political deadlock while avoiding nationwide civil war.
Syria remains fragmented but avoids renewed nationwide conflict.
Iraq continues gradual institutional strengthening despite periodic security incidents.
Yemen remains divided with intermittent military operations.
Libya advances slowly toward political reunification while experiencing occasional localized violence.
The Palestinian Territories continue political transition with uneven implementation.

This scenario does not represent peace.
It represents governments successfully preventing structural pressures from developing into nationwide armed conflict.
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ONE
Regional Escalation
Estimated Probability: 20–30%
This scenario develops if one major crisis produces cascading regional effects.
Possible triggers include:

political fragmentation in Iran;
collapse of Lebanese state institutions;
major deterioration in Syria’s political transition;
direct confrontation among regional powers;
widespread proxy mobilization.

Under this scenario:

refugee flows increase substantially;
regional military deployments expand;
proxy organizations become more active;
economic disruption accelerates;
humanitarian demands increase significantly.

Regional instability would likely persist for several years.
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO TWO
Regional Stabilization
Estimated Probability: 10–20%
Although less likely, several positive developments could improve regional stability.
These include:

successful reconstruction initiatives;
durable ceasefire agreements;
economic recovery;
strengthened state institutions;
expanded regional diplomacy;
improved relations among major regional powers.

This scenario requires sustained political compromise across multiple countries simultaneously.
While difficult, it should not be dismissed.
History demonstrates that prolonged conflict can eventually create incentives for political settlement.
THE COUNTRIES MOST LIKELY TO CHANGE
Not every country is equally likely to experience significant change during the forecast period.
JAFAJ assesses the following.

Country
Probability of Significant Political Change
Direction of Risk

Iran
High
Increasing

Lebanon
High
Increasing

Syria
Moderate
Stable to Increasing

Iraq
Moderate
Stable

Yemen
High
Stable (Continuing Conflict)

Libya
Moderate
Improving

Palestinian Territories
High
Uncertain

Jordan
Low
Stable

Saudi Arabia
Low
Stable

UAE
Very Low
Stable

These estimates reflect the probability of meaningful political or security developments, not the probability of civil war.
THE THREE VARIABLES THAT MATTER MOST
Among dozens of observable indicators, JAFAJ identifies three variables that will likely determine the region’s trajectory over the next twenty-four months.

STATE CAPACITY

Governments that maintain functioning institutions, unified security services, and the ability to deliver basic public services are significantly more likely to withstand political shocks.
Institutional resilience remains the single greatest predictor of long-term stability.

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

Regional conflicts become substantially more dangerous when outside powers increase military, financial, or political involvement.
The degree of external intervention will heavily influence whether localized crises remain contained or expand.

POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

Military capability alone rarely ensures long-term stability.
Governments retaining sufficient political legitimacy are generally better positioned to manage periods of economic hardship, leadership transition, and security crises without widespread violence.
WHAT POLICYMAKERS SHOULD WATCH
JAFAJ recommends prioritizing the following indicators during the forecast period.
Strategic Indicators

Leadership transitions.
Constitutional crises.
Fragmentation within national armed forces.
Growth of organized militias.
Breakdown of ceasefire agreements.

Economic Indicators

Currency instability.
Severe inflation.
Food insecurity.
Public-sector salary disruptions.
Energy infrastructure attacks.

Security Indicators

Cross-border military operations.
Increased proxy activity.
Political assassinations.
Expansion of terrorist organizations.
Loss of territorial control by national governments.

Changes across multiple categories simultaneously would warrant reassessment of regional risk.
FINAL ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
The central finding of this Intelligence Estimate is straightforward.
The Middle East is not entering a period in which civil war is inevitable.
It is entering a period in which several countries are simultaneously experiencing structural pressures historically associated with elevated risks of internal conflict.
Those pressures differ in origin and intensity.
Iran faces uncertainty associated with leadership transition, economic strain, and regional confrontation.
Lebanon confronts unresolved questions of sovereignty and competing military authority.
Syria continues the difficult transition from prolonged civil war toward national reconstruction.
Iraq seeks to strengthen state institutions while balancing powerful domestic and external actors.
Yemen remains trapped in an entrenched multi-sided conflict.
Libya continues the slow process of political reunification after years of division.
The Palestinian Territories face the challenge of transforming political transition into durable institutional governance.
At the same time, Jordan and the Gulf states demonstrate that regional instability does not inevitably produce state failure. Strong institutions, effective governance, and unified security structures continue to provide substantial protection against large-scale internal conflict.
The report’s most important conclusion is therefore not that civil wars are imminent.
It is that institutional resilience—not military power alone—will determine which states successfully navigate the next decade of regional uncertainty.
CHAPTER X
STRATEGIC WARNING
THE COST OF MISREADING CIVIL WAR
Classification: Unclassified
Purpose: Strategic Warning for Policymakers
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate–High
THE CENTRAL WARNING
The greatest danger confronting policymakers is not that civil wars are unpredictable.
It is that they are frequently recognized only after they have become irreversible.
History demonstrates that governments, international organizations, financial markets, and even intelligence services often underestimate the cumulative effects of institutional decline. Individual warning signs may appear manageable in isolation. Considered together, however, they can indicate that a state’s political resilience is deteriorating more rapidly than generally understood.
Civil wars rarely begin with a declaration.
They begin with institutions that gradually lose their ability to manage political competition peacefully.
THE WARNING SIGNS
JAFAJ assesses that governments should pay particular attention when multiple warning indicators emerge simultaneously.
Among the most significant are:

declining confidence in national institutions;
prolonged political paralysis;
deterioration of economic conditions;
expansion of armed organizations operating outside government authority;
increasing political violence;
widespread public distrust of constitutional processes;
growing foreign involvement in domestic political affairs.

No single indicator demonstrates that civil war is imminent.
The convergence of several indicators over time is considerably more significant than any one event.
THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME
One of the consistent findings of comparative conflict research is that governments generally possess more opportunities to prevent civil war before organized violence becomes widespread.
Political compromise, institutional reform, economic stabilization, constitutional adaptation, and effective governance tend to be most successful during periods of political tension—not after armed conflict has become entrenched.
Once competing groups conclude that military force offers greater political advantage than negotiation, opportunities for peaceful resolution decline rapidly.
Time therefore represents one of the most important strategic variables.
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
Outside governments frequently influence the trajectory of internal conflicts.
Diplomatic engagement, humanitarian assistance, economic support, and conflict mediation may strengthen political resilience.
Conversely, military intervention, proxy competition, sanctions without diplomatic pathways, or unconditional support for competing factions may unintentionally prolong instability.
International policy should therefore focus not only on ending active conflicts but also on strengthening the institutions capable of preventing future conflicts.
A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
The Middle East should not be viewed as a region uniformly moving toward instability.
Several states continue demonstrating considerable institutional resilience despite operating within a difficult strategic environment.
Others remain engaged in complex transitions that could produce either greater stability or renewed violence.
The distinction matters.
Successful policy depends upon recognizing differences among countries rather than treating regional instability as a single phenomenon.
THE JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
Based upon the evidence examined throughout this Intelligence Estimate, JAFAJ reaches five principal conclusions.
First, institutional strength remains the single most important determinant of whether political crises evolve into civil wars.
Second, civil wars increasingly develop within regional systems rather than remaining confined inside national borders.
Third, governments confronting simultaneous political, economic, and security crises face substantially greater long-term risks than governments experiencing isolated challenges.
Fourth, the interaction of regional conflicts may ultimately prove more destabilizing than any single conflict.
Finally, the coming twenty-four months are likely to be defined not by one decisive regional event but by a series of interconnected political developments whose cumulative effects will shape the Middle East’s strategic landscape.
FINAL JUDGMENT
This Intelligence Estimate does not conclude that the Middle East is entering a new era of widespread civil wars.
It does conclude that several countries are simultaneously experiencing structural pressures that deserve sustained attention from policymakers, researchers, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector.
The central lesson is clear.
Civil wars are rarely unavoidable.
Neither are they random.
They emerge when institutional resilience erodes faster than political systems can adapt.
Understanding that process remains the best opportunity to prevent future conflicts rather than merely responding to them.
JAFAJ KEY TAKEAWAYS

Finding
Assessment

Region-wide civil war
Unlikely

Localized internal conflicts
Likely

Iran
Highest strategic uncertainty

Lebanon
Highest risk of renewed internal political violence

Syria
Fragile transition requiring sustained monitoring

Iraq
Improving but structurally vulnerable

Yemen
Continuing multi-sided civil conflict

Libya
Gradual political improvement with persistent risks

Palestinian Territories
Political fragmentation remains the principal concern

Gulf States
Generally stable

ABOUT JAFAJ INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
JAFAJ Intelligence Estimates are strategic assessments prepared using structured analytical methods, comparative conflict analysis, and publicly available information from governmental, international, academic, and professional research sources.
These reports do not predict future events with certainty. Rather, they evaluate observable trends, assess structural conditions, and identify developments that may alter the probability of future outcomes.
The purpose of a JAFAJ Intelligence Estimate is to support informed decision-making by presenting balanced analysis, clearly stated assumptions, and transparent judgments regarding issues affecting regional and international security.
CHAPTER XI
ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES
WHAT COULD CHANGE THIS ASSESSMENT?
Purpose: Challenge Key Assumptions
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Intelligence analysis is inherently probabilistic.
The judgments presented throughout this report represent the authors’ best assessment based upon currently available information. They should not be interpreted as predictions or certainties.
Future political decisions, economic developments, diplomatic initiatives, or unforeseen events may significantly alter the trajectory of individual states.
This chapter examines alternative scenarios that could invalidate or substantially modify the preceding assessments.
ALTERNATIVE OUTCOME ONE
REGIONAL STABILIZATION
The principal conclusion of this report is that several Middle Eastern states face elevated structural risks.
This assessment would require downward revision if several developments occurred simultaneously.
These include:

sustained regional diplomatic engagement;
successful economic reforms;
improved government legitimacy;
integration of non-state armed organizations into state institutions;
constitutional reforms accepted across political factions;
substantial reductions in sectarian violence.

Should these developments occur across several countries, regional stability would likely improve considerably.
ALTERNATIVE OUTCOME TWO
RAPID ESCALATION
The report also concludes that widespread regional civil war is not the most likely outcome.
That assessment could change if several destabilizing events occurred in rapid succession.
Examples include:

leadership crisis in Iran accompanied by elite fragmentation;
collapse of Lebanon’s political institutions;
renewed nationwide fighting in Syria;
major regional war involving multiple states;
severe global economic recession affecting Middle Eastern governments;
widespread disruption of maritime trade through the Strait of Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb.

A convergence of these events could produce regional instability beyond the levels assessed in this estimate.
ALTERNATIVE OUTCOME THREE
INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION
History demonstrates that governments frequently adapt more effectively than outside observers expect.
Political systems under pressure may respond through:

constitutional reform;
coalition governments;
decentralization;
economic restructuring;
negotiated security arrangements;
expanded international cooperation.

Several countries assessed as high risk today could therefore experience greater stability if institutions successfully adapt to changing political conditions.
Institutional resilience should not be underestimated.
BLACK SWAN EVENTS
Some developments cannot reasonably be forecast with precision but could fundamentally alter the regional outlook.
Examples include:

unexpected leadership transitions;
major natural disasters;
large-scale cyber attacks affecting national infrastructure;
significant technological disruption;
unforeseen breakthroughs in regional diplomacy;
emergence of new transnational security threats.

Although low in probability, such events could require immediate reassessment.
THE LIMITS OF FORECASTING
This report focuses on structural indicators because they generally evolve more slowly than political events.
Nevertheless, structural analysis has limitations.
Governments sometimes collapse despite apparently strong institutions.
Others survive despite severe economic or political crises.
Political leadership, public attitudes, external intervention, and chance all influence outcomes in ways that cannot be measured with complete precision.
Accordingly, this report should be viewed as a framework for continued assessment rather than a final judgment.
THE IMPORTANCE OF REASSESSMENT
Conflict risk is dynamic.
Therefore, the conclusions presented here should be reviewed whenever significant developments occur, including:

changes in national leadership;
major constitutional reforms;
widespread political violence;
sustained economic shocks;
regional military escalation;
peace agreements;
major changes in foreign military involvement.

Regular reassessment is essential to maintaining analytical accuracy.
FINAL ANALYTIC OBSERVATION
Perhaps the most important conclusion of this Intelligence Estimate is methodological rather than political.
Civil wars should not be viewed as isolated national events.
They are the product of interacting political, economic, social, and security systems operating over time.
Understanding those interactions improves the ability of governments, researchers, humanitarian organizations, and private institutions to recognize emerging risks before they become irreversible crises.
Future developments may confirm, refine, or contradict the judgments presented in this report.
That possibility is not a weakness of intelligence analysis.
It is an essential characteristic of it.
APPENDIX A
JAFAJ MIDDLE EAST CIVIL WAR RISK INDEX (MECWRI)
Methodology and Comparative Assessment
PURPOSE
The JAFAJ Middle East Civil War Risk Index (MECWRI) provides a standardized framework for comparing structural indicators associated with internal armed conflict across Middle Eastern states.
Unlike event-based reporting, the Index is designed to measure structural vulnerability rather than current headlines.
It does not predict that civil war will occur.
Instead, it estimates the degree to which observable political, economic, security, and social conditions resemble those historically associated with elevated risks of sustained internal conflict.
Accordingly, the Index should be interpreted as a decision-support tool rather than a forecasting instrument.
ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES
The MECWRI is built upon six principles.
First, civil wars emerge through interacting structural pressures rather than isolated events.
Second, no single indicator adequately predicts internal armed conflict.
Third, institutional resilience generally provides stronger protection against civil conflict than military capability alone.
Fourth, conflict risk changes over time and therefore requires periodic reassessment.
Fifth, regional dynamics influence domestic stability.
Sixth, professional intelligence analysis should distinguish between probability and certainty.
ASSESSMENT CATEGORIES
Each country is evaluated across six major categories.

Category
Weight

Government Legitimacy
20%

Economic Resilience
15%

Security Institutions
20%

Non-State Armed Actors
20%

Social Fragmentation
15%

External Intervention
10%

Total
100%

Government legitimacy and security institutions receive the highest weighting because comparative conflict research consistently identifies them as among the strongest determinants of state resilience.
SCORING SCALE
Each category receives a numerical assessment.

Score
Assessment

1
Very Low Risk

2
Low Risk

3
Moderate Risk

4
High Risk

5
Very High Risk

Weighted scores are combined to produce the overall Civil War Risk Index.
OVERALL RISK SCALE

Final Score
Risk Assessment

1.0–1.9
Very Low

2.0–2.4
Low

2.5–3.2
Moderate

3.3–4.0
High

4.1–5.0
Very High

2026 JAFAJ CIVIL WAR RISK INDEX

Country
Gov.
Econ.
Security
Armed Groups
Social
External
Overall

Iran
4
4
2
3
4
4
3.55

Lebanon
4
5
4
5
5
4
4.45

Syria
4
5
5
5
5
5
4.80

Iraq
3
3
3
4
3
4
3.35

Yemen
5
5
5
5
4
5
4.90

Libya
4
3
4
4
3
4
3.75

Palestinian Territories
4
4
4
5
4
4
4.15

Jordan
2
3
2
1
2
3
2.10

Saudi Arabia
2
2
1
1
2
3
1.75

UAE
1
1
1
1
1
2
1.10

Qatar
1
1
1
1
1
2
1.10

Oman
1
2
1
1
1
2
1.25

Bahrain
2
2
2
2
3
2
2.15

Kuwait
2
2
2
1
2
2
1.90

REGIONAL OBSERVATIONS
Several trends emerge from the 2026 assessment.
Very High Risk

Yemen
Syria
Palestinian Territories

These areas continue experiencing either active armed conflict or institutional fragmentation severe enough to present sustained risks of organized internal violence.
High Risk

Lebanon
Libya
Iran
Iraq

Although differing considerably in political structure, these countries share multiple structural vulnerabilities requiring continued monitoring.
Low to Very Low Risk

Jordan
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Qatar
Oman
Bahrain
Kuwait

These states currently possess comparatively stronger institutions, more unified security structures, or greater economic capacity to absorb political shocks.
TREND ANALYSIS
The Index measures both current conditions and direction of change.

Trend
Meaning

▲
Deteriorating

►
Stable

▼
Improving

Country
Trend

Iran
▲

Lebanon
▲

Syria
►

Iraq
►

Yemen
►

Libya
▼

Palestinian Territories
▲

Jordan
►

Saudi Arabia
►

UAE
►

Qatar
►

Oman
►

Bahrain
►

Kuwait
►

INTELLIGENCE LIMITATIONS
The MECWRI is not intended to predict the precise timing of political crises or civil wars.
Instead, it provides a structured method for comparing structural vulnerabilities across countries.
Unexpected political decisions, economic reforms, external intervention, leadership changes, or diplomatic breakthroughs may rapidly alter individual country assessments.
Accordingly, JAFAJ recommends updating the Index at least quarterly and immediately following major regional developments.
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
The Middle East does not presently exhibit evidence of a region-wide movement toward simultaneous civil wars.
It does, however, contain several countries experiencing elevated structural pressures that warrant sustained monitoring.
The 2026 MECWRI identifies Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, Iran, Libya, and Iraq as requiring the highest levels of analytical attention because of the interaction of institutional weakness, armed non-state actors, economic stress, and external intervention.
Conversely, the Gulf monarchies and Jordan continue to demonstrate comparatively strong institutional resilience despite operating in one of the world’s most challenging strategic environments.
The Index therefore reinforces the central conclusion of this Intelligence Estimate:
Civil wars are not random events. They emerge when multiple structural pressures overwhelm a state’s capacity to manage political competition peacefully.
 
FOOTNOTES

Council on Foreign Relations, Conflicts to Watch in 2026, identifying Lebanon and Syria among the most significant regional conflict risks.
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, “Is Civil Unrest Poised to Escalate in Lebanon?” documenting increasing political tensions and evaluating scenarios under which civil conflict could emerge.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The War with Iran Threatens Syria’s Recovery,” discussing the continuing fragility of Syria’s political transition.
Council on Foreign Relations, “Syria’s Surge in Violence Does Not Signal a New Civil War—for Now,” March 2025.
Associated Press, reporting on political divisions in Lebanon surrounding Hezbollah’s future and concerns regarding renewed internal conflict.
Reuters, “As Internal Divisions Simmer, Lebanese See Echoes of Civil War,” April 22, 2026.
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003).
World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, discussing the interaction of institutions, governance, and conflict risk.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, States of Fragility 2018, Chapter 1.
James D. Fearon, “State Fragility, Governance Indicators, and the Risk of Civil Conflict,” Revue d’économie du développement 19, no. 4 (2011).
James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004).
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Conflict and Fragility.”
Rick Barton et al., Early Warning? A Review of Conflict Prediction Models and Systems, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2008.
The Fund for Peace, “Early Warning and Response.”
International Monetary Fund, Political Fragility: Coups d’État and Their Drivers, Working Paper No. 24/34 (2024).
The Fund for Peace, “Data for Peace” and the Fragile States Index methodology.
The Fund for Peace, “Country Risk and Fragility Data.”
Barton et al., Early Warning?, discussing the use of multi-indicator conflict prediction systems.
The Fund for Peace, “Early Warning and Response.”
The Fund for Peace, “Data for Peace.”
Reuters, “Khamenei Killing Shatters Iran’s Order, Triggers High-Stakes Succession Race,” March 1, 2026.
Reuters, “Fearing Economic Collapse After War, Iran Cracks Down on Dissent,” March 30, 2026.
Council on Foreign Relations, After Khamenei: Planning for Iran’s Leadership Transition.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Iran Analysis, Research, & Events, July 2026.
Reuters, “With War Likely Over, Iranian Rulers Must Face Demands of Angry, Embittered Population,” June 2026.
Associated Press, “How a Push to Disarm Hezbollah Is Deepening Divisions in Lebanon and Raising Fears of Civil War,” July 9, 2026.
Reuters, “War Between Hezbollah and Israel Deepens Fractures in Lebanon,” March 27, 2026.
Reuters, “As Internal Divisions Simmer, Lebanese See Echoes of Civil War,” April 22, 2026.
Reuters, “Lebanon’s South Takes a Breath as Families Return to Shattered Homes and Lives,” July 6, 2026.
Associated Press, “How a Push to Disarm Hezbollah Is Deepening Divisions in Lebanon and Raising Fears of Civil War,” July 9, 2026.
Council on Foreign Relations, *Conflict in Syria*.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Syria’s Promise and Challenges One Year After Assad’s Fall*.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, *How Syria Can Succeed in Integrating the Kurds*.
Reuters, “Syria Has Made No Progress on Sweida Reintegration Plan, UN Says,” June 22, 2026.
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, *Religious Freedom and Rule of Law in Syria*.
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, *Country Update: Syria*.
Council on Foreign Relations, *Syria’s Surge in Violence Does Not Signal a New Civil War—For Now*.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The United States Withdraws from Syria: State of Play*.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The War with Iran Threatens Syria’s Recovery*.
Reuters, “Syria Has Made No Progress on Sweida Reintegration Plan, UN Says,” June 22, 2026.
Council on Foreign Relations, *Instability in Iraq*.
Chatham House, *Can Iraq’s New Prime Minister Finally Rein In Its Armed Factions?*.
Reuters, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Set Up Covert Iraqi Cells to Attack Gulf Neighbors,” June 19, 2026.
The Wall Street Journal, “Iraq Agrees to U.S. Demands to Halt Dollar Flows to Iran-Backed Militias,” July 2026.
Associated Press, “Iraq Is Caught in the Crossfire of the Iran War,” April 2026.
Chatham House, *Can Iraq’s New Prime Minister Finally Rein In Its Armed Factions?.
Reuters, reporting on covert IRGC-linked cells in Iraq and regional proxy dynamics.
Associated Press, reporting on attacks affecting Iraq’s oil infrastructure and government finances during the regional conflict.
Council on Foreign Relations, *Instability in Iraq*.
JAFAJ analytical assessment based on the preceding sources and comparative conflict analysis.
Reuters, “Who Is Fighting in Yemen?” January 2, 2026.
Reuters, “Saudi-Backed Yemen Government Says It Retakes Eastern City from Separatists,” January 3, 2026.
Associated Press, “Escalation in Yemen Threatens to Reignite Civil War and Create Wider Tensions in Gulf Region.”
Reuters, “Who Is Fighting in Yemen?” describing the principal armed factions and their territorial control.
Reuters, “Saudi-Backed Yemen Government Says It Retakes Eastern City from Separatists,” discussing the growing divide between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over Yemen.
Associated Press, “Escalation in Yemen Threatens to Reignite Civil War,” analyzing the strategic implications of renewed fighting among anti-Houthi factions.
Reuters, “Who Is Fighting in Yemen?” overview of the Houthi movement, the Presidential Leadership Council, the Southern Transitional Council, and associated armed organizations.
JAFAJ analytical assessment based on the preceding sources and comparative conflict analysis.
United Nations, Libya’s Political Process Regains Momentum, but Window for Action Is Narrowing, June 18, 2026.
Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker: Instability in Libya, updated June 2026.
Security Council Report, Libya Monthly Forecast, June 2026.
Reuters, “Pakistan Mediating Libya Unity Push as Rival Camps Seek Deal,” July 6, 2026.
Financial Times, “Trump Adviser Pushes Power-Sharing Plan for Oil-Rich Libya,” June 2026.
United Nations Support Mission in Libya briefing to the UN Security Council, June 18, 2026.
Reuters, “Pakistan Mediating Libya Unity Push as Rival Camps Seek Deal,” discussing the proposed Government of National Consensus and transitional framework.
JAFAJ analytical assessment based on the preceding sources and comparative conflict analysis.
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2026.
The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2026.
International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, 2026.
Gulf Cooperation Council, official communiqués on regional security cooperation.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2026.
World Bank governance indicators for Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman.
The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2026 comparative regional rankings.
JAFAJ comparative analysis using standardized risk indicators developed for this report.
Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Presses for Progress on Stalled Peace Plan,” July 6, 2026.
Associated Press, “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a UN-Backed Committee,” July 6, 2026.
Financial Times, “Hamas Says It Will Dissolve Gaza Civilian Governing Arm,” July 6, 2026.
United Nations, Security Council Briefing, “Recovery in Gaza Must Advance the Reunification of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank Under a Single, Legitimate, Sovereign Palestinian Government,” May 21, 2026.
JAFAJ analytical assessment based on the preceding sources and comparative conflict analysis.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends reports on forced displacement resulting from conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen.
International Organization for Migration, regional displacement assessments.
World Bank, The Mobility of Displaced Syrians and regional economic impact studies.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, research on regional proxy conflicts and Middle East security.
International Crisis Group, analyses of regional conflict spillover.
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), regional conflict monitoring and event analysis.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, humanitarian situation reports.
JAFAJ analytical assessment based on comparative conflict research and the sources cited throughout this report.
JAFAJ strategic assessment derived from the comparative analysis presented in Chapters I–IX and supported by the cited government publications, international organizations, academic research, and conflict-monitoring sources used throughout this Intelligence Estimate.
JAFAJ concluding assessment synthesizing the analytical findings presented throughout this Intelligence Estimate.
JAFAJ methodological assessment based on structured analytic techniques, comparative conflict research, and the evidence presented throughout this Intelligence Estimate.

 
 

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When States Fracture: State Fragility And Civil War Risk Read More »

Preventing Civil War In Gaza

CAN THE BOARD OF PEACE SUCCEED?
JAFAJ SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
Publication Date: July 12, 2026
Prepared By: JAFAJ Intelligence Division
Estimated Reading Time: 18 Minutes
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The future of Gaza will be determined by more than ceasefires, reconstruction funding, or political agreements.
It will be determined by whether a legitimate governing authority can emerge before political fragmentation evolves into sustained internal conflict.
The recent decision by Hamas to dissolve its de facto civilian government and support the transfer of administrative authority to a Palestinian technocratic committee operating under the supervision of the Board of Peace represents the most significant proposed change in Gaza’s governance structure since Hamas assumed control in 2007. While the announcement creates an opportunity for institutional transition, it does not by itself resolve the fundamental issues of security, political legitimacy, reconstruction, or the future of armed organizations.
This report does not attempt to determine whether peace between Israel and Hamas will endure.
Instead, it addresses a narrower—and arguably more important—question:
Can the Board of Peace reduce the conditions that historically lead to civil war within Gaza?
Based upon the analytical framework established in JAFAJ’s State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East, this assessment concludes that Gaza presently exhibits several structural conditions commonly associated with elevated risks of internal conflict. These include fragmented political authority, severe economic disruption, weakened governmental institutions, competing claims of legitimacy, extensive physical destruction, and continuing external military pressure. At the same time, the proposed governance transition offers an opportunity to strengthen civilian institutions before those structural pressures evolve into sustained internal violence.
The Board of Peace should therefore be judged not by its political symbolism, but by its ability to strengthen civilian governance before institutional fragility evolves into organized internal violence. If it succeeds, the likelihood that future political disputes are resolved through force rather than functioning institutions will decline.
KEY JUDGMENTS
KEY JUDGMENT 1
The greatest immediate threat to Gaza is not necessarily renewed civil war, but continued political fragmentation.
If multiple institutions claim governing authority while security responsibilities remain divided, the probability of future internal confrontation will increase substantially.
KEY JUDGMENT 2
The Board of Peace is positioned to influence governance, not geopolitics. Its greatest potential contribution lies in strengthening civilian institutions, coordinating humanitarian assistance, and supporting reconstruction. Its ability to shape military organizations, border security, or regional diplomacy remains limited.
KEY JUDGMENT 3
Restoring public confidence in civilian government is likely to prove more important over the long term than announcing new governing structures.
Political legitimacy is earned through effective administration rather than institutional design alone.
KEY JUDGMENT 4
Civil wars rarely begin because governments fail to make political announcements.
They begin because governments fail to establish effective institutions capable of peacefully managing political competition.
KEY JUDGMENT 5
If the Board of Peace succeeds in restoring governance, coordinating reconstruction, and creating broadly accepted civilian institutions, it can significantly reduce the structural conditions associated with internal armed conflict.
It cannot, by itself, eliminate every source of instability.
INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENCE
This assessment is based upon publicly available reporting, official statements, comparative conflict research, and JAFAJ’s previously published analytical framework concerning civil war risk in the Middle East.
Judgments contained herein represent analytical assessments rather than predictions.
Confidence levels are defined as follows:
High Confidence – Multiple independent sources support the assessment with relatively little disagreement.
Moderate Confidence – Available evidence generally supports the assessment, although important uncertainties remain.
Low Confidence – Limited information or rapidly changing conditions reduce confidence in the assessment.
Unless otherwise noted, the principal judgments contained in this report are made with moderate confidence because implementation of the proposed governance transition remains incomplete.
INTRODUCTION
WHY THIS QUESTION MATTERS
Post-conflict transitions present some of the highest risks of institutional failure. While ceasefires may reduce violence and reconstruction can address immediate humanitarian needs, neither automatically produces stable governance. The period immediately following major conflict often determines whether political competition shifts toward functioning civilian institutions or returns to organized violence.
Gaza now enters that transitional phase. The proposed transfer of civilian authority from Hamas to a Palestinian technocratic committee operating under the Board of Peace creates an opportunity to strengthen civilian governance. It also introduces significant risks if competing claims of political authority, unresolved security arrangements, and weak institutions prevent the emergence of a legitimate governing structure.
The proposed transfer of civilian authority from Hamas to a technocratic governing committee offers an opportunity to establish a new model of governance. It also presents significant risks if expectations exceed institutional capacity or if competing centers of authority remain unresolved. Hamas has announced the dissolution of its civilian governing structure, but it has also indicated that ministries will continue functioning and that security responsibilities in areas under its control will remain in place pending further implementation. Israeli officials have argued that meaningful political transition also requires resolution of the question of armed authority.
Accordingly, this report does not evaluate the Board of Peace as a diplomatic initiative.
It evaluates the Board as an institution designed to reduce the structural conditions historically associated with civil conflict.
The central analytical question is therefore straightforward:
Can improved governance reduce the probability of future internal armed conflict in Gaza?
The answer depends less upon political declarations than upon whether civilian institutions can establish legitimacy, deliver essential public services, coordinate reconstruction, and create sufficient public confidence to manage political competition without violence.
The following chapters examine whether those conditions are achievable, identify the principal obstacles to success, and assess the extent to which the Board of Peace can realistically influence the outcome.
 
DOES GAZA EXHIBIT THE CONDITIONS FOR CIVIL WAR?
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
The central premise of this report is that civil wars do not begin spontaneously.
They emerge when political institutions lose the ability to manage competing interests peacefully and when rival groups conclude that force offers a greater opportunity than negotiation.
Applying the analytical framework developed in JAFAJ’s State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East leads to an important conclusion:
Gaza currently exhibits many—but not all—of the structural conditions historically associated with elevated risks of internal armed conflict.
This finding should not be interpreted as a prediction that a Palestinian civil war is inevitable.
Rather, it indicates that the institutional environment in Gaza is sufficiently fragile that failure to establish effective governance could allow political competition to evolve into organized violence. The proposed transition to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), overseen by the Board of Peace, creates an opportunity to reverse that trajectory, but only if authority is translated from political agreements into functioning institutions.
THE LESSON OF 2007
Gaza has already experienced one internal Palestinian conflict.
In 2007, tensions between Hamas and Fatah escalated into several days of intense fighting that ended with Hamas assuming control of the Gaza Strip while the Palestinian Authority retained authority in much of the West Bank.
The political consequences of that conflict continue to shape Gaza today.
For nearly two decades, Palestinians have operated under separate governing systems, separate security institutions, and different political leaderships.
This institutional division has become normalized.
Reunifying these systems will require considerably more than administrative restructuring.
It will require rebuilding political trust between institutions that have developed independently for almost twenty years.
Any assessment of future civil conflict must therefore recognize that Gaza’s greatest challenge is not simply reconstruction.
It is political reintegration.
FRACTURED POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
Stable governments generally derive legitimacy from some combination of constitutional authority, public confidence, effective administration, and the ability to deliver essential services.
Gaza presently faces challenges in each of these areas.
Years of armed conflict have weakened public administration.
Large portions of the territory remain physically devastated.
Millions of civilians continue depending upon humanitarian assistance.
Political authority itself is undergoing transition.
Although Hamas has announced the dissolution of its civilian governing body, the transition remains incomplete. Hamas has stated that ministries and civil servants will remain in place while it continues to oversee security and policing in areas under its control pending further implementation of the post-war plan.
This creates a period in which questions of authority may become as important as authority itself.
COMPETING CENTERS OF POWER
One of the strongest indicators of future instability is the existence of multiple organizations capable of exercising governmental authority.
In Gaza, several overlapping centers of influence either currently exist or may emerge during the transition.
These include:

the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG);
Hamas’ remaining political leadership;
Hamas’ military structures;
local municipal authorities;
clan and family leadership networks;
international humanitarian organizations;
external actors participating in reconstruction.

Each performs a different function.
The challenge is ensuring that these functions complement rather than compete with one another.
If civilians become uncertain regarding who governs, who provides services, who controls policing, or who resolves disputes, institutional legitimacy may weaken before the new governing structure has an opportunity to mature.
THE SECURITY QUESTION
The most difficult issue confronting any post-conflict government is usually not reconstruction.
It is security.
Roads can be rebuilt.
Schools can reopen.
Electricity can be restored.
Establishing one legitimate authority over the use of force is considerably more difficult.
The current transition does not fully resolve this question.
Public reporting indicates that Hamas has agreed to dissolve its civilian administration but has not agreed to disarm or relinquish all security responsibilities. Israeli officials have argued that any meaningful political transition must include changes in the security environment, while the Board of Peace has emphasized that it will evaluate progress based on implementation rather than declarations.
Accordingly, the greatest uncertainty confronting Gaza is not administrative.
It is institutional.
Until questions concerning policing, public security, and armed authority are resolved, the potential for competing centers of power will remain.
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Economic collapse does not automatically produce civil war.
It does, however, increase political pressure on governments already struggling to establish legitimacy.
Gaza enters the reconstruction period with extraordinary economic challenges.
Among them are:

extensive destruction of housing;
damaged public infrastructure;
interrupted education;
weakened healthcare systems;
extremely high unemployment;
dependence upon external assistance;
widespread displacement.

These conditions increase the importance of effective governance.
Governments unable to deliver visible improvements in daily life frequently experience declining public confidence.
Conversely, successful reconstruction often strengthens political legitimacy more rapidly than constitutional reform alone.
For the Board of Peace, reconstruction is therefore more than an engineering project.
It is a governance strategy.
THE ROLE OF LOCAL CLANS
International reporting often focuses on governments, political parties, and armed organizations.
Less attention is paid to Gaza’s long-established family and clan networks.
Historically, these networks have played an important role in:

dispute resolution;
community organization;
humanitarian assistance;
local leadership.

During periods when formal institutions weaken, informal institutions frequently become more influential.
This presents both opportunities and risks.
Properly integrated, respected local leaders can strengthen community confidence in new governing institutions.
Ignored or marginalized, they may become alternative sources of political authority.
Successful governance therefore requires engagement beyond formal political institutions.
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
Using JAFAJ’s six structural indicators of civil conflict produces a mixed assessment.

Indicator
Assessment

Government Legitimacy
High Risk

Economic Conditions
Very High Risk

Security Integration
High Risk

Armed Organizations
Very High Risk

Social Fragmentation
Moderate Risk

External Influence
Very High Risk

This assessment does not conclude that civil war is imminent.
It does conclude that Gaza presently exhibits sufficient structural vulnerabilities that failure to establish credible governance could substantially increase future risks.
Conversely, rapid improvements in governance, reconstruction, public services, and institutional legitimacy could reduce those risks over time.
The significance of the Board of Peace therefore lies not in whether it governs Gaza permanently.
Its importance lies in whether it can strengthen civilian institutions before structural fragility evolves into organized internal violence.
CAN THE BOARD OF PEACE PREVENT CIVIL WAR?
FROM POLITICAL AGREEMENT TO FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
The Board of Peace cannot prevent civil war through diplomacy alone.
Its success or failure will ultimately be determined by whether it can help create institutions that are viewed as legitimate, effective, and broadly representative by the population of Gaza.
This distinction is critical.
Civil wars are rarely prevented because political leaders sign agreements.
They are prevented because populations conclude that political institutions provide a more effective means of resolving disputes than violence.
Accordingly, the Board of Peace should not be evaluated by the number of meetings it convenes, statements it issues, or agreements it negotiates.
It should be evaluated by a single question:
Does it increase the capacity of civilian government to peacefully manage political competition?
If the answer becomes yes, the probability of internal armed conflict declines.
If the answer remains no, the risk of future instability will remain elevated regardless of reconstruction funding or diplomatic progress.
WHAT THE BOARD OF PEACE CAN DO
One of the most common analytical errors in post-conflict assessments is assigning institutions responsibilities they were never designed to perform.
The Board of Peace is not intended to become Gaza’s permanent government.
Rather, it is designed to facilitate a political transition by supporting Palestinian civilian institutions until they are capable of governing independently. Current planning envisions the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) exercising day-to-day civil administration, supported by an International Stabilization Force (ISF) and a newly trained police service in designated areas.
If implemented successfully, the Board can make meaningful contributions in several areas.
These include:

coordinating humanitarian assistance;
supporting reconstruction planning;
assisting the establishment of civilian ministries;
facilitating international financial assistance;
strengthening administrative capacity;
supporting development of accountable public institutions.

These functions are not politically insignificant.
They represent the practical foundations upon which governmental legitimacy is built.
WHAT THE BOARD OF PEACE CANNOT DO
The Board’s limitations are equally important.
It cannot independently resolve the principal strategic disputes that continue to define Gaza’s security environment.
Among the issues largely beyond its direct authority are:

Hamas’ military capabilities;
Israeli military operations;
long-term border arrangements;
regional diplomacy;
external state sponsorship of armed groups;
final political status negotiations.

These issues require decisions by sovereign governments and political organizations.
The Board may facilitate discussions.
It cannot impose political settlements.
These limitations do not diminish the Board’s strategic importance. Rather, they define the scope of its influence. This assessment therefore evaluates the Board according to the responsibilities it is designed to perform—strengthening civilian governance, supporting institutional development, and reducing the structural conditions associated with internal conflict.
THE THREE PILLARS OF SUCCESS
Based upon comparative post-conflict governance research and JAFAJ’s civil war framework, three conditions will largely determine whether the Board contributes to long-term stability.
Pillar One: Legitimacy
Governments derive authority from public confidence as much as from legal authority.
Citizens are more likely to support institutions that consistently provide:

healthcare;
education;
utilities;
public safety;
transparent administration;
equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance.

Visible improvements in daily life may strengthen legitimacy more effectively than constitutional declarations.
Pillar Two: Administrative Capacity
Good governance requires functioning institutions.
The NCAG and supporting ministries must demonstrate the ability to:

process aid efficiently;
manage public finances;
supervise reconstruction;
coordinate municipal services;
resolve administrative disputes.

Institutional competence creates confidence.
Administrative failure undermines it.
Pillar Three: Security Integration
The most difficult challenge remains security.
History demonstrates that durable post-conflict governance generally depends upon one widely recognized principle:
The legitimate use of force should ultimately be exercised through accountable public institutions.
Whether Gaza can gradually move toward that objective remains uncertain.
Current planning envisions locally recruited police operating alongside the International Stabilization Force within pilot humanitarian zones, but broader security arrangements remain unresolved.
THE JAFAJ GOVERNANCE MATRIX
The Board’s influence varies considerably across different sectors.

Governance Function
Expected Board Influence

Humanitarian Coordination
High

Reconstruction Planning
High

Civil Administration
High

Ministry Development
High

Budget Coordination
Moderate

Police Development
Moderate

Judicial Reform
Moderate

Elections
Low–Moderate

Hamas Military Wing
Low

Israeli Security Policy
Very Low

Regional Diplomacy
Very Low

This assessment illustrates an important analytical conclusion.
The Board’s greatest strength lies in governance.
Its greatest limitations lie in security and geopolitics.
HOW SUCCESS SHOULD BE MEASURED
Success should not be measured by political symbolism.
Instead, JAFAJ recommends monitoring measurable indicators.
Within twelve months, analysts should ask:

Are ministries functioning?
Are salaries being paid?
Is humanitarian aid reaching intended recipients?
Has reconstruction begun at scale?
Are police performing routine public safety functions?
Are civilians increasingly relying upon public institutions rather than informal power structures?

Positive answers would indicate improving institutional resilience.
Negative answers would suggest increasing structural vulnerability.
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
The Board of Peace represents an opportunity—not a guarantee.
Its comparative advantage lies in strengthening civilian governance during a period when Gaza faces exceptional institutional weakness.
If governance improves more rapidly than political fragmentation, the Board may substantially reduce the structural conditions associated with civil conflict.
If governance fails to improve—or if competing institutions emerge with overlapping claims to authority—the transition itself could become another source of instability.
Current reporting suggests that implementation remains in its earliest stages. The planned pilot humanitarian zone is intended to demonstrate whether Palestinian technocratic governance, supported by international security arrangements, can function in practice before broader expansion is attempted. Participation is expected to be voluntary, with administration carried out by the NCAG and support from the ISF.
Accordingly, JAFAJ assesses that the Board of Peace has the potential to reduce the probability of internal armed conflict, but only if it succeeds in transforming political commitments into functioning institutions capable of earning and maintaining public legitimacy.
INTELLIGENCE OUTLOOK
CAN THE BOARD OF PEACE SUCCEED?
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
The Board of Peace enters Gaza at a decisive moment.
The military phase of the conflict has largely given way to a political and institutional phase in which the principal challenge is no longer defeating an adversary, but establishing a functioning system of civilian governance.
History suggests that this transition is often the most difficult stage of post-conflict recovery.
Many societies have successfully ended major combat only to experience renewed instability because governing institutions failed to develop quickly enough to replace wartime political structures.
For Gaza, the challenge is particularly acute.
The territory must simultaneously rebuild infrastructure, restore essential public services, establish legitimate civilian authority, coordinate international assistance, and manage unresolved security issues.
These objectives are mutually reinforcing.
Failure in one area is likely to affect progress in the others.
Consequently, the Board of Peace should not be judged solely by reconstruction projects or humanitarian deliveries.
Its long-term success will depend upon whether those activities strengthen durable Palestinian governing institutions capable of functioning after international involvement declines. Current planning envisions the pilot humanitarian zone as the first step in testing whether Palestinian technocratic governance can operate effectively with multinational support before broader implementation.
MOST LIKELY SCENARIO
MANAGED TRANSITION
Estimated Probability: 55–65 Percent
Under this scenario:

The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) gradually establishes civilian authority within designated areas.
Reconstruction expands incrementally.
Humanitarian conditions improve unevenly.
Hamas’ political role diminishes within civilian administration but questions surrounding its military structure remain unresolved.
Israeli military operations continue on a limited basis against perceived security threats.
The Board of Peace expands its administrative role through demonstrated performance rather than formal political agreements.

This scenario does not produce comprehensive peace.
It does produce sufficient institutional stability to reduce the likelihood of widespread internal Palestinian violence.
BEST-CASE SCENARIO
SUCCESSFUL INSTITUTIONAL CONSOLIDATION
Estimated Probability: 20–25 Percent
The Board of Peace successfully facilitates:

functioning civilian ministries;
transparent financial administration;
effective humanitarian coordination;
expanding reconstruction;
growing public confidence;
professional civilian policing;
broader international investment.

In this scenario, Palestinian institutions gradually become the primary source of political legitimacy.
Competing centers of authority decline in importance because functioning government increasingly meets public expectations.
While broader regional political disputes remain unresolved, internal governance becomes progressively more stable.
WORST-CASE SCENARIO
RETURN TO POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION
Estimated Probability: 15–20 Percent
The greatest long-term danger is not immediate civil war.
It is institutional failure.
This scenario develops if:

competing governing authorities emerge;
reconstruction stalls;
humanitarian assistance becomes politicized;
public confidence declines;
armed organizations increasingly substitute for civilian institutions;
external political actors pursue competing governance models.

Under these conditions, localized confrontations could gradually evolve into sustained internal conflict.
Importantly, such a development would likely occur over months rather than days.
Civil wars generally emerge through institutional deterioration rather than sudden political collapse.
EARLY WARNING INDICATORS
JAFAJ recommends continuous monitoring of the following indicators during the next twelve months.
Positive Indicators

NCAG operating inside Gaza.
Expansion of functioning ministries.
Regular delivery of public services.
Increased reconstruction activity.
Successful operation of the pilot humanitarian zone.
Growing public participation in civilian institutions.
Expanded international financial commitments.

Negative Indicators

Parallel governing authorities.
Competing police or security organizations.
Political assassinations.
Armed clashes among Palestinian factions.
Suspension of reconstruction projects.
Diversion of humanitarian assistance.
Declining public confidence in civilian governance.

The appearance of several negative indicators simultaneously would warrant reassessment of the Board’s overall prospects.
THE JAFAJ STABILITY MATRIX

Category
Current Assessment
Trend

Civil Governance
Moderate
▲ Improving Potential

Humanitarian Coordination
Moderate
▲ Improving

Reconstruction Capacity
Low
► Stable

Public Legitimacy
Low
▲ Conditional

Security Integration
Low
► Uncertain

International Support
High
▲ Improving

Overall Stabilization Capacity
Moderate
▲

Analytic Note: The Board’s greatest opportunity lies in improving governance and reconstruction. Its greatest vulnerability lies in unresolved questions concerning security authority and political legitimacy.
FINAL JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
The central question posed by this report is straightforward:
Can the Board of Peace stop a civil war in Gaza?
The available evidence suggests a qualified answer.
The Board of Peace cannot prevent civil war by itself.
It does not control all armed organizations.
It cannot independently determine Israeli security policy.
It cannot resolve every regional political dispute.
Those responsibilities lie beyond its institutional authority.
However, the Board can influence one factor that comparative conflict research consistently identifies as decisive:
The strength of civilian governance.
If the Board succeeds in helping establish legitimate Palestinian institutions that deliver public services, coordinate reconstruction, administer humanitarian assistance, and earn public confidence, it can substantially reduce the structural conditions associated with internal armed conflict.
Conversely, if governance remains fragmented, reconstruction falters, and competing authorities continue exercising overlapping political and security responsibilities, the risk of future instability will remain elevated regardless of diplomatic agreements.
JAFAJ assesses that the long-term stability of Gaza will depend less on diplomatic agreements than on the strength and legitimacy of the civilian institutions that emerge during the current transition. The Board of Peace cannot determine every outcome, but it can influence whether political competition is increasingly managed through governance rather than violence.
The success or failure of this transition will therefore be measured not by political declarations, but by whether durable institutions emerge before structural fragility hardens into renewed internal conflict. That is the central finding of this assessment.
 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt’,” July 6, 2026.
Associated Press, “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a UN-Backed Committee,” July 6, 2026.
Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt’,” describing the proposed transfer of civilian authority while Hamas retains security influence.
Associated Press, reporting on the role of the technocratic committee and the Board of Peace in the proposed governance transition.
JAFAJ Intelligence Division, State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East (2026–2028), analytical framework on structural indicators of civil conflict (internal reference).
Reuters, reporting that Hamas stated ministries would continue operating during the transition while security arrangements remained unresolved.
Associated Press, reporting that the transition leaves unresolved questions concerning disarmament and security authority.
JAFAJ comparative assessment derived from the Middle East Civil War Risk framework (internal analytical reference).
Reuters, statements by the Board of Peace emphasizing that implementation would be judged by actions rather than announcements.
JAFAJ analytical judgment based on the sources cited above and comparative post-conflict governance research.

 

JAFAJ Intelligence Division, State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East (2026–2028), methodology chapter on structural indicators of civil conflict.
Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt’,” July 6, 2026, reporting that Hamas agreed to dissolve its civilian government while ministries and personnel would remain in place during the transition.
Reuters, “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza,” July 8, 2026, discussing the role of the NCAG and the Board of Peace in post-war governance planning.
Reuters, July 6, 2026, noting that Hamas stated it would continue overseeing security and policing in areas remaining under its control during implementation of the agreement.
Reuters, July 8, 2026, reporting that the Board of Peace would evaluate implementation based on “actions, not promises.”
Reuters, July 6, 2026, describing the establishment of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) as the proposed civilian governing authority.
JAFAJ comparative conflict analysis based on the Civil War Risk framework.
Reuters, July 8, 2026, discussing the proposed humanitarian zone and the planned role of a new police force under the transition framework.
JAFAJ assessment derived from comparative post-conflict governance literature and the evidence cited in this report.
JAFAJ analytical judgment synthesizing the structural indicators evaluated in this chapter
Reuters, “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza, Official Says,” July 8, 2026.
Associated Press, “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a UN-Backed Committee,” July 6, 2026.
Reuters, describing the proposed role of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) in exercising civilian authority.
Reuters, reporting that the pilot humanitarian zone would include a newly recruited police force supported by the International Stabilization Force.
Reuters, noting that participation in the pilot zone would be voluntary and administered by the NCAG with ISF support.
Associated Press, reporting that Hamas’ announcement did not resolve questions concerning weapons or long-term security authority.
Reuters, reporting that the Board of Peace stated its assessment would be based on “actions, not promises.”
JAFAJ Intelligence Division, State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East (2026–2028), governance and institutional resilience framework.
JAFAJ comparative assessment based on post-conflict governance literature and the evidence cited in this report.
JAFAJ analytical judgment synthesizing the governance, legitimacy, and security findings presented in this chapter.

 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Board of Peace. Official statements and planning materials released June–July 2026.
“Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt.’” July 6, 2026.
“Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza, Official Says.” July 8, 2026.
Associated Press. “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a UN-Backed Committee.” July 6, 2026.
JAFAJ Intelligence Division. State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East (2026–2028). Internal analytical reference.

 

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