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For nearly half a century, every American president—from Jimmy Carter to Donald Trump—has confronted the same strategic dilemma: How do you contain Iran’s regional ambitions without becoming trapped in another major Middle East war? Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution transformed Iran from a close American ally into one of Washington’s principal geopolitical adversaries, successive administrations have pursued remarkably similar strategic objectives despite significant differences in political philosophy and foreign policy doctrine.¹
Administrations have changed. Political parties have alternated in power. Strategies have evolved from diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions to covert operations, military deterrence, coalition-building, cyber operations, and direct military strikes. Yet the underlying objective has remained consistent: **limit Iran’s ability to project power, protect American interests and allies, prevent nuclear proliferation, and avoid a large-scale conventional war in the Middle East.**²
The methods have changed far more than the mission. Every administration has adjusted its tactical approach in response to changing regional circumstances—from the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf Wars to the Global War on Terror, the rise of Iranian-backed proxy organizations, and renewed competition among major powers. Each president inherited a strategic environment shaped largely by the decisions of previous administrations while confronting new crises that required adapting, rather than abandoning, the broader policy of containment.³
The cumulative cost of that strategy has been substantial. Over nearly five decades, the United States has invested hundreds of billions—and likely well over one trillion—dollars in military deployments, intelligence operations, sanctions enforcement, missile defense systems, maritime security, coalition operations, and regional partnerships. Thousands of American service members have lost their lives in conflicts directly or indirectly connected to Iran’s expanding regional influence, while countless others have served in one of the longest continuous security commitments in modern American history.⁴
 
President Jimmy Carter (1977–1981): Isolation Begins
The modern U.S. strategy of containing Iran began with the collapse of one of America’s closest Middle Eastern alliances. The 1979 Islamic Revolution overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, replacing a pro-Western monarchy with the Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The revolution fundamentally altered the strategic balance in the Persian Gulf, transforming Iran from a regional partner into one of Washington’s principal geopolitical adversaries. President Jimmy Carter responded by suspending military cooperation, freezing Iranian assets held in the United States, imposing economic sanctions, and ultimately severing diplomatic relations after Iranian militants seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979.⁵
The ensuing hostage crisis became one of the defining foreign policy challenges of Carter’s presidency. Fifty-two American diplomats and citizens were held captive for 444 days while repeated diplomatic negotiations failed to secure their release. As international pressure mounted, Carter authorized Operation Eagle Claw, a complex joint military rescue mission launched on April 24, 1980. Mechanical failures, severe weather, and operational complications forced the mission’s cancellation at a remote desert staging site known as Desert One. During the withdrawal, a collision between an RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter and a U.S. Air Force EC-130 transport aircraft killed eight American servicemen and destroyed both aircraft. The failed operation exposed significant shortcomings in U.S. joint special operations capabilities and directly influenced the later creation of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and improvements in interservice coordination.⁶
At the same time, Carter fundamentally reshaped American strategic doctrine in the Middle East. In his January 1980 State of the Union Address, he announced what became known as the Carter Doctrine, declaring that any attempt by an outside power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and would be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. Although originally intended to deter Soviet expansion following the invasion of Afghanistan, the doctrine became the foundation for four decades of sustained American military engagement in the Gulf and provided the strategic framework within which future administrations would confront Iran.⁷
Human Cost: Eight American servicemen lost their lives during Operation Eagle Claw, while fifty-two U.S. diplomats and citizens endured 444 days of captivity under harsh conditions before their release on January 20, 1981. The hostage crisis profoundly affected American public confidence and permanently altered U.S.-Iranian relations.⁸
Financial Cost: The immediate costs of sanctions enforcement, military mobilization, and Operation Eagle Claw were modest when compared to later decades. However, Carter’s response initiated a long-term American commitment to defending the Persian Gulf that would ultimately require hundreds of billions of dollars in military infrastructure, naval deployments, regional partnerships, and forward force posture over the next four decades.⁹
 
President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989): Military Containment and the Rise of Proxy Conflict
President Ronald Reagan inherited the Iran hostage crisis on his first day in office, but his administration quickly shifted from crisis management to long-term strategic containment. Reagan viewed Iran as both a sponsor of international terrorism and a destabilizing force in the Persian Gulf. His administration expanded intelligence operations, strengthened military partnerships with Gulf allies, increased the U.S. naval presence in the region, and sought to protect the free flow of oil through one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.¹⁰
The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) dominated Reagan’s Middle East policy. Although officially neutral, the United States increasingly tilted toward Iraq as Iranian forces gained battlefield momentum. At the same time, Iran expanded its use of proxy organizations—including Hezbollah in Lebanon—to advance its regional objectives while maintaining plausible deniability. The October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 American service members, demonstrated the growing effectiveness of Iranian-backed proxy warfare and profoundly influenced future American military planning. Intelligence assessments later concluded that Hezbollah carried out the attack with significant support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).¹¹
As attacks against commercial shipping intensified during the so-called “Tanker War,” the Reagan Administration launched Operation Earnest Will in 1987, reflagging and escorting Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Persian Gulf under U.S. protection. The operation marked one of the largest naval convoy missions since World War II and significantly increased the American military footprint in the Gulf. The mission culminated in Operation Praying Mantis on April 18, 1988, after the guided missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian naval mine. During the one-day operation, U.S. naval forces destroyed Iranian oil platforms used for military purposes, sank or severely damaged several Iranian warships, and established overwhelming American naval superiority in the region. It remains the largest surface naval engagement fought by the United States since World War II.¹²
Despite Reagan’s public commitment to isolating Tehran, his administration became embroiled in one of the most controversial foreign policy scandals of the Cold War. Between 1985 and 1986, senior administration officials secretly authorized the sale of American weapons to Iran in hopes of securing the release of U.S. hostages held in Lebanon while using the proceeds to fund the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. The Iran-Contra Affair exposed deep contradictions within U.S. policy toward Iran, damaged the administration’s credibility, and generated years of congressional investigations. Although the scandal did not fundamentally alter the broader strategy of containment, it illustrated the complex and often conflicting priorities confronting American policymakers in the Middle East.¹³
Human Cost: The Beirut Marine Barracks bombing claimed the lives of 241 American service members, while additional casualties occurred during naval operations in the Persian Gulf, including injuries sustained during Iranian mining attacks. Beyond direct casualties, the growing threat posed by Iranian-backed terrorist organizations forced a permanent reassessment of U.S. force protection and counterterrorism doctrine.¹⁴
Financial Cost: Operations Earnest Will and Praying Mantis, expanded intelligence activities, increased naval deployments, and enhanced military cooperation with Gulf allies required billions of dollars in defense expenditures. More importantly, these operations institutionalized a sustained American naval presence in the Persian Gulf that has continued—with varying intensity—for nearly four decades.¹⁵
 
President George H. W. Bush (1989–1993): Building a Regional Security Architecture
President George H. W. Bush inherited a Middle East transformed by the final stages of the Iran-Iraq War and the gradual decline of Soviet influence. Rather than pursuing major new initiatives toward Iran, Bush focused on preserving regional stability through coalition-building, military deterrence, and strategic partnerships with America’s Gulf allies. His administration adopted what officials described as a policy of “goodwill begets goodwill,” signaling a willingness to improve relations with Tehran if Iran moderated its support for terrorism, released Western hostages held through proxy organizations, and demonstrated greater regional restraint. Those conditions were never fully met, and the broader policy of containment remained intact.¹⁶
The defining event of Bush’s presidency was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Although Iran officially condemned Saddam Hussein’s aggression and remained largely neutral during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, American policymakers remained deeply concerned that Tehran might exploit the conflict to expand its regional influence. The successful U.S.-led coalition not only liberated Kuwait but also established a permanent American military infrastructure throughout the Persian Gulf, including expanded bases, logistics hubs, and defense agreements with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. While directed primarily at deterring Iraq, this new security architecture also strengthened America’s long-term ability to contain Iran.¹⁷
Following the Gulf War, the Bush Administration maintained comprehensive economic sanctions against Iran while expanding intelligence cooperation with regional partners. American officials increasingly viewed Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Palestinian militant organizations, and other proxy groups as the principal long-term threat to regional stability. Rather than relying solely on military power, Bush emphasized diplomatic coalition-building and multinational security arrangements that could deter Iranian aggression without requiring direct confrontation. This approach established the framework that subsequent administrations would continue to refine throughout the 1990s and beyond.¹⁸
Bush also oversaw significant improvements in America’s military posture following lessons learned from Operation Eagle Claw and the Iran-Iraq War. Joint command structures, rapid deployment capabilities, integrated air defense systems, and pre-positioned equipment became central components of U.S. planning for future contingencies in the Gulf. These investments reflected a growing consensus that the United States would require a sustained forward presence to protect global energy markets and reassure regional allies against both Iraqi and Iranian threats.¹⁹
Human Cost: Compared with both the Reagan and George W. Bush administrations, relatively few American casualties were directly attributable to Iran during Bush’s presidency. Nevertheless, thousands of U.S. military personnel remained deployed throughout the Gulf, operating in an increasingly complex security environment where Iranian capabilities and intentions continued to shape American force posture.²⁰
Financial Cost: Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm represented one of the largest military mobilizations since Vietnam. Although coalition contributions offset a significant portion of combat expenses, the long-term costs of maintaining permanent bases, expanding naval operations, pre-positioning equipment, and strengthening regional defense partnerships required billions of dollars annually. Much of this infrastructure would become the foundation for every subsequent American military operation involving Iran or the broader Middle East.²¹
 
President Bill Clinton (1993–2001): Institutionalizing Dual Containment
President Bill Clinton transformed the policy of containing Iran from a largely military strategy into a comprehensive diplomatic and economic campaign. Recognizing that both Iraq and Iran posed significant threats to American interests and regional stability, the Clinton Administration formally adopted the doctrine of Dual Containment, abandoning the traditional balance-of-power approach that had previously relied on one regional rival to offset the other. Instead, the United States sought to isolate both governments simultaneously through economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, intelligence operations, and strengthened security partnerships with America’s Gulf allies.²²
The administration significantly expanded the use of economic sanctions as a principal instrument of national security. In 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Orders 12957 and 12959, prohibiting virtually all American trade and investment with Iran. Congress reinforced these measures the following year by passing the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996, authorizing sanctions against foreign companies investing substantially in Iran’s petroleum sector. The legislation reflected a growing bipartisan consensus that limiting Iran’s energy revenues would constrain its ability to finance terrorism, develop advanced weapons programs, and expand its regional influence.²³
Throughout the 1990s, American intelligence agencies also increased their focus on Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. U.S. officials concluded that Tehran had adopted proxy warfare as a cost-effective means of challenging American interests while avoiding direct military confrontation. The 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia, which killed nineteen U.S. Air Force personnel and wounded hundreds more, reinforced concerns regarding Iran’s growing operational reach. Subsequent investigations by U.S. authorities concluded that members of Saudi Hezbollah carried out the attack with support from elements of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, although Tehran has consistently denied responsibility.²⁴
Clinton also sought limited diplomatic engagement when opportunities emerged. The election of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami in 1997 generated cautious optimism regarding improved bilateral relations. Khatami’s calls for a “Dialogue Among Civilizations” prompted modest cultural exchanges and limited diplomatic contacts. Nevertheless, fundamental disagreements over Iran’s support for terrorist organizations, missile development, and suspected nuclear activities prevented any meaningful normalization of relations. Containment remained the cornerstone of American policy despite occasional diplomatic openings.²⁵
By the end of Clinton’s second term, the United States had constructed an increasingly sophisticated system of financial sanctions, intelligence cooperation, counterterrorism coordination, missile defense planning, and military partnerships that would become the foundation for future administrations. The policy of containing Iran had evolved beyond military deterrence into an integrated strategy employing nearly every instrument of American national power.²⁶
Human Cost: Direct American combat casualties attributable to Iran remained relatively limited during the Clinton years compared with earlier and later administrations. However, the Khobar Towers bombing claimed nineteen American lives and underscored the continuing threat posed by Iranian-backed proxy organizations. Thousands of U.S. military personnel remained deployed throughout the Persian Gulf to enforce regional security and deter both Iraqi and Iranian aggression.²⁷
Financial Cost: Maintaining Dual Containment required billions of dollars annually for sanctions enforcement, intelligence collection, naval patrols, air operations, missile defense initiatives, and forward military deployments. Although these expenditures were considerably lower than the costs of major conventional wars, they represented a sustained long-term investment in a permanent American security presence throughout the Middle East.²⁸
 
President George W. Bush (2001–2009): Containment in the Age of the Global War on Terror
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 fundamentally reshaped American foreign policy and transformed the strategic context in which the United States confronted Iran. Although Iran initially provided limited cooperation against the Taliban during the opening stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, the relationship deteriorated rapidly as President George W. Bush expanded the Global War on Terror. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush identified Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil,” arguing that the Islamic Republic supported terrorism, pursued weapons of mass destruction, and threatened both regional stability and American national security.²⁹
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 dramatically altered the balance of power in the Middle East. While the removal of Saddam Hussein eliminated one of Iran’s principal regional adversaries, it also created opportunities for Tehran to expand its political, military, and intelligence influence inside Iraq. Iran cultivated close relationships with Shi’a political parties, supported numerous militia organizations, and supplied increasingly sophisticated weapons—including explosively formed penetrators (EFPs)—to insurgent groups responsible for attacks against coalition forces. As the Iraqi insurgency intensified, American commanders concluded that Iranian support for proxy organizations had become one of the most significant challenges confronting U.S. operations.³⁰
The Bush Administration responded by expanding intelligence collection, strengthening regional missile defense initiatives, increasing sanctions targeting Iranian financial institutions, and enhancing security cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Naval deployments in the Persian Gulf increased substantially as the United States sought to deter Iranian interference with international shipping and reassure regional allies concerned about Tehran’s growing influence following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The administration also pursued international diplomatic efforts through the United Nations Security Council to pressure Iran over its advancing nuclear enrichment program, resulting in multiple rounds of multilateral sanctions beginning in 2006.³¹
American concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions became a defining feature of Bush’s second term. Intelligence agencies assessed that Iran possessed the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons if it chose to do so, although the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate concluded with “high confidence” that Tehran had halted its structured nuclear weapons program in 2003 while continuing uranium enrichment and other activities that preserved its future options. This assessment reinforced the administration’s dual-track strategy of maintaining diplomatic pressure while preserving the credible threat of military action should Iran move toward acquiring a nuclear weapon.³²
By the conclusion of Bush’s presidency, the policy of containing Iran had expanded beyond traditional military deterrence to include counterinsurgency operations, financial warfare, multinational sanctions, intelligence campaigns, cyber capabilities, and missile defense. Iran had emerged not merely as a regional competitor but as a central strategic challenge influencing nearly every aspect of American policy in the Middle East.³³
Human Cost: The Iraq War claimed the lives of more than 4,400 American service members and wounded more than 32,000 others. While responsibility for the conflict extended far beyond Iran, senior U.S. military officials concluded that Iranian-backed militias contributed significantly to coalition casualties through the use of advanced roadside bombs, rockets, and other sophisticated weaponry supplied by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force. The broader human cost also included hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilian deaths, widespread displacement, and years of regional instability.³⁴
Financial Cost: The Iraq War became one of the most expensive military operations in American history. Direct congressional appropriations exceeded $800 billion during the Bush Administration, while long-term estimates—including veterans’ care, interest on borrowed funds, and future obligations—have exceeded $2 trillion according to multiple independent studies. In addition, billions of dollars were spent annually on naval deployments, intelligence operations, sanctions enforcement, missile defense, and regional security initiatives designed specifically to contain Iran’s expanding influence.³⁵
 
President Barack Obama (2009–2017): Diplomacy Backed by Deterrence
President Barack Obama entered office determined to test whether sustained diplomacy could reduce tensions with Iran while preserving America’s long-standing strategy of regional containment. Unlike his predecessor, Obama emphasized engagement alongside pressure, arguing that diplomatic negotiations, combined with economic sanctions and credible military deterrence, offered the best opportunity to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon without initiating another major conflict in the Middle East. Although the administration’s methods differed significantly from previous approaches, its strategic objectives remained largely unchanged: limit Iran’s regional influence, prevent nuclear proliferation, protect U.S. allies, and maintain stability throughout the Persian Gulf.³⁶
The administration significantly expanded international economic pressure during its first term. Working closely with the European Union, the United Nations Security Council, and other international partners, the United States implemented some of the most comprehensive financial sanctions ever imposed on Iran. These measures targeted Iran’s banking sector, oil exports, shipping industry, and access to the international financial system. By 2013, sanctions had sharply reduced Iranian oil exports, contributed to severe inflation, weakened the Iranian currency, and placed substantial pressure on Tehran’s economy, creating conditions favorable for renewed diplomatic negotiations.³⁷
Those negotiations culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed on July 14, 2015, by Iran and the P5+1 nations (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), with the European Union serving as coordinator. Under the agreement, Iran accepted strict limitations on uranium enrichment, reduced its stockpile of enriched uranium, dismantled thousands of centrifuges, redesigned the Arak heavy-water reactor, and agreed to an extensive inspection regime administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In exchange, the United States, European Union, and United Nations agreed to suspend or remove specified nuclear-related sanctions. Supporters viewed the agreement as the most significant nuclear nonproliferation achievement in decades, while critics argued that it temporarily delayed—rather than permanently eliminated—Iran’s pathway to a nuclear weapon and failed to address Tehran’s ballistic missile program, regional proxy activities, or sponsorship of terrorist organizations.³⁸
Despite the emphasis on diplomacy, the Obama Administration maintained a robust American military presence throughout the Middle East. U.S. naval forces continued regular operations in the Persian Gulf, missile defense cooperation with Gulf allies expanded, and intelligence operations targeting Iranian activities remained active. Following the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, American forces returned to combat operations in Iraq under Operation Inherent Resolve. Although both the United States and Iran opposed ISIS, they coordinated only indirectly through the Iraqi government, while continuing to compete for political influence throughout the region. Simultaneously, the administration responded to repeated incidents involving Iranian naval harassment of U.S. vessels operating in international waters, underscoring that diplomatic engagement had not eliminated military tensions.³⁹
The administration also intensified the use of cyber capabilities against Iran. Building upon programs initiated during the George W. Bush Administration, the United States reportedly participated in cyber operations—including the Stuxnet malware campaign—that disrupted Iran’s uranium enrichment infrastructure. These operations represented a new dimension of containment, demonstrating how cyber warfare could complement sanctions, diplomacy, intelligence, and conventional military deterrence without escalating into open conflict.⁴⁰
By the conclusion of Obama’s presidency, the United States had demonstrated that diplomacy and containment were not mutually exclusive. While the JCPOA temporarily reduced concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program, fundamental disagreements over ballistic missiles, regional proxy warfare, human rights, and terrorism remained unresolved. The broader strategy of containing Iranian influence endured, even as the tools employed became more sophisticated and increasingly multilateral.⁴¹
Human Cost: Compared with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan during the previous administration, American casualties directly associated with Iran declined substantially. Nevertheless, U.S. service members continued to deploy throughout the Middle East in support of counterterrorism operations, regional deterrence, maritime security, and coalition missions against ISIS. American personnel also faced recurring risks from Iranian-backed militia groups operating in Iraq and Syria, although large-scale direct confrontations remained relatively limited during this period.⁴²
Financial Cost: The Obama Administration continued to spend tens of billions of dollars annually maintaining military forces throughout the Middle East, supporting naval operations in the Persian Gulf, funding missile defense systems, conducting intelligence and cyber operations, enforcing sanctions, and leading coalition operations against ISIS. While the JCPOA reduced the likelihood of immediate military conflict over Iran’s nuclear program, it did not substantially reduce the long-term costs of America’s regional security commitments.⁴³
 
President Donald Trump (2017–2021): Maximum Pressure and Renewed Confrontation
President Donald Trump entered office determined to reverse what he viewed as the shortcomings of the Obama Administration’s Iran policy. Arguing that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile program, regional proxy network, support for terrorist organizations, and sunset provisions governing nuclear restrictions, Trump adopted a strategy of “Maximum Pressure.” Rather than seeking to modify the nuclear agreement, the administration sought to compel Iran to negotiate a broader settlement by combining comprehensive economic sanctions with credible military deterrence and diplomatic isolation.⁴⁴
On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA and ordered the reimposition of all previously suspended American sanctions. The administration subsequently expanded restrictions targeting Iran’s banking system, petroleum exports, shipping industry, construction sector, and access to international financial markets. The Department of the Treasury designated hundreds of Iranian individuals, companies, financial institutions, and government entities under various sanctions authorities, while secondary sanctions discouraged foreign businesses from maintaining commercial relationships with Tehran. The resulting economic pressure contributed to a sharp decline in Iranian oil exports, significant currency depreciation, and one of the country’s deepest economic contractions since the Iran-Iraq War.⁴⁵
The administration also intensified efforts to isolate Iran diplomatically and militarily. In April 2019, the United States designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), marking the first time Washington had applied the designation to an official branch of another nation’s armed forces. The decision reflected the administration’s assessment that the IRGC functioned not only as Iran’s principal military institution but also as the primary coordinator of Tehran’s regional proxy network, including Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and numerous militia organizations operating in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.⁴⁶
Tensions escalated dramatically throughout 2019 following attacks on commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, the downing of an American RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance drone by Iranian forces, and missile and drone strikes against Saudi Arabian oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais. Although the United States attributed the attacks to Iran, the administration deliberately avoided launching a large-scale military response, instead increasing sanctions, deploying additional forces to the Gulf, and strengthening regional missile defense capabilities. Trump’s restraint demonstrated that the administration’s objective remained deterrence rather than regime change or prolonged conventional war.⁴⁷
The defining moment of Trump’s Iran policy occurred on January 3, 2020, when an American MQ-9 Reaper drone strike near Baghdad International Airport killed Major General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force, along with Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. The administration justified the operation as an act of self-defense intended to prevent imminent attacks against American personnel. Iran responded several days later by launching ballistic missiles against Al Asad Air Base and other facilities housing U.S. forces in Iraq. Although no American personnel were killed in the attack, more than one hundred service members were later diagnosed with traumatic brain injuries, illustrating both the risks of escalation and the restraint exercised by both governments in avoiding a broader regional war.⁴⁸
Despite heightened tensions, the administration continued to strengthen strategic partnerships with America’s regional allies. The signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 normalized diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Although framed primarily as a regional peace initiative, the agreements also strengthened a growing coalition of countries sharing concerns regarding Iran’s expanding regional influence and ballistic missile capabilities.⁴⁹
By the conclusion of Trump’s first term, the policy of containing Iran had shifted decisively away from negotiated accommodation and toward coercive diplomacy backed by overwhelming economic pressure and selective military force. Yet despite unprecedented sanctions and the elimination of one of Iran’s most senior military leaders, the administration did not fundamentally alter Tehran’s regional behavior, demonstrating both the strengths and limitations of economic coercion as an instrument of national strategy.⁵⁰
Human Cost: Compared with the Iraq War years, direct American combat fatalities attributable to Iranian actions remained relatively limited. Nevertheless, repeated attacks by Iranian-backed militia organizations injured numerous American personnel, while the January 2020 Iranian missile strike against Al Asad Air Base resulted in more than one hundred diagnosed traumatic brain injuries among U.S. service members. Regional instability also continued to produce significant humanitarian consequences throughout Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon.⁵¹
Financial Cost: The Maximum Pressure campaign required billions of dollars in sanctions enforcement, intelligence operations, naval deployments, missile defense initiatives, and expanded military readiness throughout the Middle East. Although considerably less expensive than sustained ground combat operations, these expenditures reflected the continuing financial burden of maintaining a credible deterrent against Iran while supporting regional allies and protecting international maritime commerce.⁵²
 
President Joe Biden (2021–2025): Deterrence Amid Regional Escalation
President Joe Biden entered office pledging to restore diplomacy as the primary instrument of American policy toward Iran. His administration initially sought to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), arguing that a negotiated agreement remained the most effective means of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Early indirect negotiations in Vienna, conducted through European intermediaries, attempted to bring both Washington and Tehran back into compliance with the agreement. Despite months of negotiations, however, disagreements over sanctions relief, verification mechanisms, Iran’s expanding nuclear program, and broader geopolitical developments ultimately prevented a return to the accord. By 2023, the administration had largely shifted from diplomatic engagement back toward a strategy centered on deterrence, sanctions enforcement, and regional security cooperation.⁵³
The strategic environment changed dramatically following Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. Although the United States did not conclude that Iran directly planned the attack, American intelligence agencies assessed that Tehran had long provided Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other regional proxy organizations with financial support, weapons, training, and intelligence assistance. The conflict rapidly expanded beyond Gaza as Iranian-backed militias launched repeated attacks against American military installations in Iraq and Syria, while the Houthi movement in Yemen began targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. These developments transformed the administration’s Iran policy from one focused primarily on nuclear diplomacy into one centered on regional deterrence and force protection.⁵⁴
In response, President Biden ordered a substantial increase in American military deployments throughout the Middle East. The United States deployed multiple aircraft carrier strike groups, strategic bombers, air defense systems, and additional fighter aircraft to reassure regional allies and deter further escalation. U.S. Central Command also conducted repeated precision strikes against facilities used by Iranian-backed militia organizations in Iraq and Syria following attacks that killed and wounded American personnel. The administration consistently emphasized that these operations were intended to deter future attacks while avoiding a broader regional war with Iran itself.⁵⁵
The administration also led multinational efforts to protect one of the world’s most important maritime trade routes. Beginning in late 2023, Houthi attacks against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea disrupted global shipping, increased insurance costs, and threatened international commerce. In response, the United States established Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational maritime security initiative designed to defend commercial shipping against missile and drone attacks. American and coalition naval forces subsequently conducted repeated defensive operations and precision strikes against Houthi missile launch sites, radar systems, weapons storage facilities, and command-and-control infrastructure in Yemen. These operations represented one of the largest sustained naval security missions in the region since the Tanker War of the 1980s.⁵⁶
One of the most significant escalatory events occurred on January 28, 2024, when an Iranian-backed militia conducted a drone attack against Tower 22, a U.S. logistics facility located in northeastern Jordan near the Syrian border. Three American Army Reserve soldiers were killed, and more than forty service members were injured. The attack marked the first combat deaths of U.S. personnel resulting directly from Iranian-backed militia operations since the beginning of the Gaza conflict and prompted a series of coordinated American airstrikes against militia facilities in Iraq and Syria. The administration emphasized that the strikes were directed at proxy organizations rather than Iran itself, reflecting its continuing effort to impose costs without triggering direct interstate conflict.⁵⁷
Meanwhile, Iran continued expanding its nuclear capabilities beyond the limitations established under the JCPOA. Reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency documented increased uranium enrichment, expanded centrifuge operations, and reduced international monitoring access following the collapse of the nuclear agreement. Although American officials continued to state that diplomacy remained preferable, the administration increasingly relied on sanctions, military deterrence, intelligence cooperation, and regional coalition-building to prevent further escalation. By the end of Biden’s presidency, American policy had effectively returned to a modernized version of long-standing containment—one relying on integrated military, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and multinational tools rather than a single dominant strategy.⁵⁸
Human Cost: During the Biden Administration, repeated attacks by Iranian-backed militias injured dozens of American service members across Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. The January 2024 attack on Tower 22 killed three U.S. Army Reserve soldiers and marked the deadliest attack on American forces in the region in several years. Beyond direct casualties, thousands of U.S. military personnel remained deployed throughout the Middle East under increasingly hazardous conditions as regional conflicts expanded following October 2023.⁵⁹
Financial Cost: The United States committed billions of dollars annually to sustaining regional military operations, reinforcing air and missile defense systems, expanding naval deployments, protecting international shipping lanes, supporting Israel’s defense, conducting retaliatory strikes against Iranian-backed militia organizations, and maintaining intelligence and surveillance operations across the Middle East. These expenditures demonstrated that, despite the absence of another major ground war, the financial costs of containing Iran continued to grow as proxy conflicts spread across multiple theaters.⁶⁰
 
President Donald Trump (2025–Present): Direct Strategic Deterrence
President Donald Trump returned to office in January 2025 facing a Middle East fundamentally different from the one he had left four years earlier. Iran’s nuclear program had advanced significantly beyond the limitations once imposed by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), regional proxy conflicts had intensified following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, and Tehran’s strategic partnership with Russia and expanding ties with China had elevated Iran’s importance within broader great-power competition. Unlike previous administrations that alternated between diplomacy and coercion, Trump’s second administration adopted a strategy centered on direct strategic deterrence—using overwhelming military capability, economic pressure, and explicit demonstrations of American resolve to prevent Iran from altering the regional balance of power.⁶¹
The administration maintained comprehensive economic sanctions while accelerating efforts to isolate Iran diplomatically and financially. The Department of the Treasury expanded sanctions targeting Iranian financial institutions, shipping networks, oil exports, procurement organizations, and companies supporting Iran’s missile and drone industries. Simultaneously, Washington strengthened security cooperation with Israel and key Arab partners while expanding integrated regional air and missile defense initiatives designed to counter Iran’s growing arsenal of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems.⁶²
Military deterrence became increasingly visible throughout 2025. American naval forces maintained a continuous presence in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and eastern Mediterranean, while long-range bombers, carrier strike groups, and additional fighter aircraft rotated through the region. The administration consistently emphasized that these deployments were intended to deter Iranian aggression, reassure allies, preserve freedom of navigation, and prevent the emergence of conditions that could lead to a broader regional war. At the same time, U.S. intelligence agencies expanded surveillance and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, missile production facilities, and proxy organizations operating throughout Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.⁶³
The defining feature of the administration’s Iran policy became its willingness to employ limited but decisive military force against strategically important targets. During Operation Midnight Hammer, American B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, supported by submarine-launched cruise missiles and other precision strike assets, attacked key elements of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including facilities associated with uranium enrichment and nuclear research. The administration stated that the operation was narrowly focused on degrading Iran’s nuclear capabilities rather than pursuing regime change or initiating a prolonged military campaign. Officials described the strikes as a demonstration that the United States would act decisively if diplomatic and economic measures failed to prevent Iran from approaching a nuclear weapons capability.⁶⁴
Although the operation represented one of the most significant direct American military actions against Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the administration deliberately sought to limit escalation. Following the strikes, American officials publicly reiterated that the United States remained prepared to defend its interests while expressing no intention to occupy Iranian territory or engage in a long-term ground war. Iran’s response remained comparatively restrained, allowing both governments to avoid a broader conventional conflict while preserving their respective deterrent postures. The episode demonstrated how the American strategy of containment had evolved from indirect competition through proxies into occasional direct military intervention designed to impose strategic costs without crossing the threshold into full-scale war.⁶⁵
Trump’s second administration therefore represented the culmination of nearly five decades of evolving containment policy. Earlier presidents relied primarily on sanctions, diplomacy, coalition-building, proxy competition, or limited military operations. By contrast, the 2025 strategy integrated every major instrument of national power—economic sanctions, intelligence operations, cyber capabilities, regional alliances, missile defense, maritime security, and precision conventional strikes—into a single doctrine intended to deter Iran through overwhelming capability and demonstrated willingness to act. Whether this approach ultimately produces long-term regional stability remains an open question, but it reflects the most direct application of American military power against Iran in the post-revolutionary era.⁶⁶
Human Cost: Direct American combat casualties associated with operations against Iran have remained relatively limited during the administration. Nevertheless, thousands of American military personnel continue to serve throughout the Middle East under heightened force-protection conditions, while the persistent threat posed by Iranian missiles, drones, proxy organizations, and maritime harassment continues to place U.S. forces at significant operational risk. Civilian populations throughout the region also remain vulnerable to escalation resulting from any direct confrontation between Iran, Israel, and the United States.⁶⁷
Financial Cost: Initial estimates indicate that Operation Midnight Hammer and associated force deployments required tens of billions of dollars in operational expenditures, precision-guided munitions, strategic bomber operations, intelligence collection, logistics, missile defense, and regional force reinforcement. More broadly, sustaining America’s military posture across the Middle East continues to require annual expenditures measured in the tens of billions of dollars, underscoring that nearly five decades after the Iranian Revolution, the financial burden of containment remains substantial and ongoing.⁶⁸
 
Forty-Seven Years of Containment
From Jimmy Carter to Donald Trump, every American president has inherited the same strategic problem: how to prevent Iran from dominating the Middle East without committing the United States to another large-scale regional war. Administrations have disagreed over tactics, political rhetoric, and diplomatic priorities, yet the fundamental objective has remained remarkably consistent. Whether through economic sanctions, military deterrence, diplomatic engagement, intelligence operations, cyber warfare, coalition-building, or precision military strikes, every administration has sought to limit Iran’s ability to project power while preserving regional stability and protecting American interests.⁶⁹
The historical record demonstrates that containment has been a strategy of continuity rather than revolution. Carter established the framework following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Reagan expanded military deterrence while confronting the emergence of Iranian proxy warfare. George H. W. Bush institutionalized a permanent Gulf security architecture after Operation Desert Storm. Clinton formalized Dual Containment through economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. George W. Bush integrated Iran policy into the Global War on Terror. Obama pursued diplomacy through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action while maintaining robust military deterrence. Trump’s first administration shifted toward Maximum Pressure, Biden returned to deterrence amid expanding regional conflict, and Trump’s second administration embraced direct strategic deterrence through precision military operations against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Although the instruments changed, the strategic objective did not.⁷⁰
The cumulative costs of this policy have been extraordinary. Over nearly five decades, the United States has committed well in excess of one trillion dollars to military deployments, naval operations, intelligence collection, missile defense, coalition-building, sanctions enforcement, force protection, counterterrorism operations, and regional security partnerships associated directly or indirectly with containing Iran. These expenditures extend far beyond combat operations, encompassing the long-term costs of maintaining one of the largest sustained American military commitments outside Europe since the Second World War.⁷¹
The human costs have been equally significant. Thousands of American service members have lost their lives in conflicts shaped by Iran’s expanding regional influence, while many thousands more have been wounded in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and throughout the Persian Gulf. Iranian-backed proxy organizations—including Hezbollah, Iraqi militia groups, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis—have repeatedly targeted American personnel and allies, forcing successive administrations to balance military retaliation with the broader objective of preventing uncontrolled regional escalation. Beyond American casualties, millions of civilians throughout the Middle East have experienced displacement, economic hardship, and prolonged instability resulting from conflicts in which Iran has been either a direct participant or a principal external supporter.⁷²
Containment has nevertheless achieved several important strategic objectives. Since 1979, the United States has successfully prevented Iran from establishing military dominance over the Persian Gulf, preserved freedom of navigation through critical maritime chokepoints, maintained the security of key regional allies, and delayed or constrained aspects of Iran’s nuclear program through a combination of sanctions, diplomacy, intelligence operations, and military pressure. At the same time, containment has not eliminated Iran’s influence. Tehran has continued to expand its regional proxy network, improve its missile capabilities, strengthen strategic relationships with Russia and China, and demonstrate increasing sophistication in cyber operations, unmanned systems, and asymmetric warfare.⁷³
This mixed record raises a central strategic question that remains unresolved after nearly half a century: Has containment succeeded because it prevented a catastrophic regional war, or has it merely managed an enduring conflict whose financial and human costs continue to accumulate? The answer depends largely upon how success is defined. If success means preventing a direct conventional war between the United States and Iran while preserving the regional balance of power, containment has largely achieved its objective. If success requires ending Iran’s sponsorship of proxy organizations, eliminating its nuclear ambitions, or fundamentally changing the character of the Islamic Republic, the evidence is considerably less conclusive.⁷⁴
The history of American policy toward Iran is therefore not the story of nine different strategies. It is the story of one enduring strategy, continuously adapted by nine presidents confronting different crises, changing geopolitical realities, and evolving threats. Future administrations will almost certainly continue to debate the appropriate balance between diplomacy, economic pressure, military deterrence, and direct action. Yet unless the strategic environment changes fundamentally, the United States is likely to remain committed to the same central objective that has guided American policy since 1979: **containing Iran while avoiding a wider Middle East war.**⁷⁵
 
Footnotes

David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 3–18; Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1–12.
Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy, CRS Report R44017 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated periodically); U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations With Iran, Fact Sheet.
Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 23–47; David Crist, The Twilight War, 19–41.
Brown University, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project (Providence, RI: Brown University); Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress.

David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 43–69; Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 33–58; James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 238–289.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operation Eagle Claw: The Rescue of American Hostages in Iran (Washington, DC: Department of Defense); Air Force Historical Support Division, “Operation Eagle Claw,” U.S. Air Force Historical Studies Office; Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 563–612.
Jimmy Carter, The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress, January 23, 1980 (Washington, DC: The White House); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, rev. ed., 2005), 357–360; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah, 617–623; Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 289–305; U.S. Department of State, The Hostage Crisis in Iran.
Congressional Research Service, The Carter Doctrine and U.S. Military Commitments in the Persian Gulf; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 65–83.

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, National Security Decision Directives relating to the Persian Gulf; David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 71–118; Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 84–118.
U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act (Washington, DC, 1983); National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission Report), 48–52; Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 21–39.
Naval History and Heritage Command, Operation Earnest Will; Naval History and Heritage Command, Operation Praying Mantis; Crist, The Twilight War, 233–269; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 503–540.
Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993); Malcolm Byrne, ed., The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New York: The New Press, 1993); Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991).
Department of Defense, Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act; Levitt, Hezbollah, 21–39; National Counterterrorism Center, Hezbollah Profile.
Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Naval History and Heritage Command, Operation Earnest Will.

George H. W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 31, 1990; George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, National Security Directive 26: U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf (October 2, 1989); Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 119–143.
U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992); Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 17–642; Congressional Research Service, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy.
Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Military Forces in Transition (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 1999), 3–26; Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 189–212.
Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson, A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994); Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
Congressional Budget Office, The Costs of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1992); Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project.

Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 3, no. 1 (1999); Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 144–176; Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy.
Executive Order No. 12957, “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources,” March 15, 1995; Executive Order No. 12959, “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran,” May 6, 1995; Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996); U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), History of Sanctions Against Iran.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khobar Towers Investigation; U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C. 2006); Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 89–113; Congressional Research Service, Iran’s Support for Terrorism.
Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006), 91–118; Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 166–176; U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999.
Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Military Forces in Transition (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; National Security Council, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (1998).
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khobar Towers Investigation; Department of Defense, Report to Congress on the Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad; Levitt, Hezbollah, 89–113.
Congressional Budget Office, Long-Term Implications of U.S. Military Operations in the Persian Gulf; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project.

George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 2002; The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, September 2002); Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 285–318.
U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (various reports, 2005–2008); General David H. Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, September 2007; Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012), 177–284.
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008); Congressional Research Service, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Iran Sanctions Program.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate: Iran—Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (Washington, DC, November 2007); International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (2003–2008); Congressional Research Service, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status.
Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 247–291; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy.
Department of Defense, Operation Iraqi Freedom Casualty Status; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; General David H. Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq; Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame, 385–471.
Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook (2008); Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Linda J. Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008); Congressional Research Service, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11.

Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt, June 4, 2009; The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC, May 2010); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Iran Sanctions; Congressional Research Service, Iran Sanctions; International Monetary Fund, Islamic Republic of Iran: Selected Issues (Washington, DC, 2014).
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Vienna, July 14, 2015; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015–2016); U.S. Department of State, Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; Congressional Research Service, The Iran Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA): Status and Issues for Congress.
Department of Defense, Operation Inherent Resolve Lead Inspector General Reports; U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Maritime Security Operations in the Arabian Gulf; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 181–248; Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (New York: Crown Publishers, 2014); Congressional Research Service, Cyber Operations in International Law.
Ray Takeyh, The Last Shah: America, Iran, and the Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021), concluding analysis; Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iran and the Changing Balance of Power in the Gulf.
Department of Defense, Operation Inherent Resolve Reports; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
Congressional Budget Office, Long-Term Implications of U.S. Overseas Military Operations; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Department of Defense, Annual Budget Justification Materials.

Donald J. Trump, Remarks on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, The White House, May 8, 2018; The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, December 2017); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Iran Sanctions Program; Congressional Research Service, Iran Sanctions; International Monetary Fund, Islamic Republic of Iran: 2019 Article IV Consultation (Washington, DC, 2020).
U.S. Department of State, Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, April 8, 2019; Congressional Research Service, The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): Background and U.S. Designation; Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Posture Statement (2020); Congressional Research Service, Attacks on Oil Tankers in the Persian Gulf; International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report (2019).
Department of Defense, Statement by the Department of Defense on the Death of Qasem Soleimani, January 3, 2020; U.S. Central Command, Iranian Ballistic Missile Attack on Al Asad Air Base; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions; Department of Defense Inspector General, Operation Inherent Resolve Quarterly Reports (2020).
The White House, The Abraham Accords Declaration, September 15, 2020; U.S. Department of State, The Abraham Accords; Congressional Research Service, The Abraham Accords: Background and U.S. Policy.
Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Maximum Pressure and Its Limits; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2021.
Department of Defense Inspector General, Operation Inherent Resolve Quarterly Reports (2020); Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; U.S. Central Command, Posture Statement (2020).
Congressional Budget Office, Defense Budget Overview (2020); Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project.

Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2021); Congressional Research Service, The Iran Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA): Status and Issues for Congress; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran (2021–2023).
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (2024); Congressional Research Service, Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2023.
U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM Posture Statements (2023–2024); Department of Defense, Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on U.S. Force Posture in the Middle East; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
U.S. Department of Defense, Operation Prosperity Guardian Fact Sheet (2023); U.S. Central Command, Red Sea Maritime Security Operations; Congressional Research Service, Red Sea Shipping Disruptions and U.S. Military Operations.
Department of Defense, Statement on the Attack on Tower 22, January 28, 2024; U.S. Central Command, U.S. Strikes Against Iranian-Backed Militia Targets, February 2024; Congressional Research Service, Recent Attacks on U.S. Forces in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran (2024); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iran’s Nuclear Program and Regional Strategy.
Department of Defense, Casualty Information and Force Protection Updates (2023–2024); Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; U.S. Central Command, Posture Statements (2024).
Congressional Budget Office, Defense Budget Overview (2024); Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Department of Defense, Annual Budget Justification Materials (2024).

The White House, National Security Presidential Directives (2025); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy (updated 2025); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Iran Sanctions Program (2025); Congressional Research Service, Iran Sanctions; U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review.
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Posture Statement (2025); Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress (2025); Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
U.S. Department of Defense, Operation Midnight Hammer Briefing (2025); The White House, Remarks by President Donald J. Trump Following U.S. Military Operations Against Iranian Nuclear Facilities (2025); International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran (2025).
Congressional Research Service, U.S.-Iran Military Confrontation: Issues for Congress (2025); Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Assessing the Strategic Impact of Operation Midnight Hammer (2025); Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Iran Update (2025).
Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy (2025); Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and the Gulf Military Balance (Center for Strategic and International Studies); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025.
Department of Defense, Force Protection Condition Reports (2025); U.S. Central Command, Regional Security Assessment (2025); Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project.
Congressional Budget Office, Defense Budget Outlook (2025); Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress; Department of Defense, Annual Budget Justification Materials (2025).

John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War and After, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 357–388; Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy (updated 2025).
Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004); David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (New York: Penguin Press, 2012); Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; Congressional Budget Office, The Budgetary Effects of U.S. Military Operations Since 2001; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues for Congress.
Department of Defense, Operation Iraqi Freedom Casualty Reports; Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Costs of War Project; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism (various years); Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran (various reports); Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iran and the Changing Balance of Power in the Gulf; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025.
Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and the Gulf Military Balance (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 383–388.
The White House, National Security Strategy (various administrations); Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy; National Defense Strategy reports (various administrations).

Understanding the Politics Behind One of the Middle East’s Greatest Misconceptions
JAFAJ Intelligence Analysis
July 19, 2026
KEY JUDGMENTS

The principal strategic divide in today’s Middle East is driven by geopolitical competition and national interests rather than religion alone.¹
Although the Sunni–Shia divide remains politically significant, governments consistently place security, economic stability, and regional influence above sectarian solidarity.¹²
Many Arab governments increasingly view Iran as a regional competitor whose expanding influence challenges existing balances of power.²³
Alliances throughout the Middle East are pragmatic and issue-specific, with governments frequently cooperating on some issues while competing on others.³⁴
Understanding these dynamics is essential for accurately interpreting current conflicts and anticipating future regional alignments.¹²⁴

 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
To many outside observers, the politics of the Middle East appear deceptively straightforward. Because the overwhelming majority of the region’s population is Muslim, it is often assumed that Muslim-majority governments naturally share common political objectives and will unite when confronted by external challenges. Current events demonstrate otherwise. The modern Middle East is characterized not by religious unity, but by a complex web of competing national interests, historical rivalries, economic priorities, security concerns, and regional ambitions.¹²
JAFAJ assesses that the defining strategic competition in today’s Middle East is not a struggle between Islam and the West, nor can it be adequately explained by the centuries-old Sunni–Shia divide. Rather, it is a contest among sovereign governments seeking to preserve their own security, expand their regional influence, strengthen their economies, and shape the future political order of one of the world’s most strategically important regions. Religion frequently provides governments with political legitimacy and influences public messaging, but it is national interest—not theology—that consistently drives foreign policy decisions.¹³
Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Tehran has pursued an ambitious strategy designed to expand its regional influence through diplomacy, military modernization, strategic partnerships, and long-term relationships with governments and allied organizations operating throughout Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. These efforts have transformed Iran into one of the Middle East’s most influential regional powers while simultaneously placing it in sustained strategic competition with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and numerous other governments that possess their own competing visions for regional leadership and security.²⁴
This strategic competition explains why Muslim-majority nations frequently support opposing sides during the same regional crisis despite sharing a common faith. Governments routinely cooperate on trade while competing on security matters, maintain diplomatic relations while opposing one another’s military objectives, and pursue independent foreign policies designed to advance domestic priorities rather than ideological or sectarian solidarity. As a result, regional alliances remain fluid, pragmatic, and subject to continuous adjustment as political and security conditions evolve.¹²³
Understanding these realities is essential for interpreting today’s headlines. Oversimplified narratives portraying the Middle East as divided exclusively along religious lines fail to explain the strategic behavior of governments across the region. The principal forces shaping contemporary Middle Eastern politics remain sovereignty, national security, economic resilience, energy security, military deterrence, and the pursuit of regional influence. Those realities—not religion alone—will continue to define regional alliances long after the current conflicts have subsided.¹²⁴
 
A STRUGGLE FOR REGIONAL LEADERSHIP
At the center of today’s Middle East lies a strategic competition that extends far beyond religion. While sectarian identity continues to influence political rhetoric and public opinion, the region’s principal governments are engaged in a broader contest over who will shape the Middle East’s future political, economic, and security architecture.¹ Rather than acting solely as representatives of religious communities, regional leaders increasingly pursue policies designed to strengthen national power, preserve regime stability, secure economic prosperity, and expand diplomatic influence throughout the Islamic world.²
For nearly five decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has sought to position itself as one of the region’s dominant strategic powers. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Tehran adopted a foreign policy that combines ideological messaging with long-term geopolitical objectives. Iranian leaders have consistently portrayed their government as a defender of regional resistance against foreign intervention, while simultaneously investing in military modernization, missile capabilities, intelligence operations, and strategic relationships with governments and allied organizations across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.³ These policies have significantly expanded Iran’s regional influence while also increasing concerns among neighboring governments regarding Tehran’s long-term strategic ambitions.⁴
Saudi Arabia represents the principal alternative vision for regional leadership. As the custodian of Islam’s two holiest cities and the Arab world’s largest economy, Riyadh has traditionally viewed regional stability, secure energy markets, and the preservation of sovereign governments as essential components of Middle Eastern security. Although Saudi-Iranian relations have experienced periods of diplomatic engagement and limited rapprochement, Saudi leaders continue to regard unchecked Iranian influence as a potential challenge to Gulf security and the broader regional balance of power.² ⁵
Turkey has likewise pursued an increasingly independent regional strategy. Ankara has expanded its diplomatic, military, and economic presence throughout the eastern Mediterranean, the Levant, the Caucasus, and North Africa while seeking greater influence over regional political developments. Egypt continues to view itself as one of the Arab world’s principal political and military powers, while Jordan remains focused upon border security, regional stability, and maintaining close strategic relationships with both Western and Arab partners. The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman each pursue distinct foreign policies designed to maximize national interests while preserving strategic flexibility in an increasingly competitive regional environment.² ⁵
These differing visions of regional order have produced a geopolitical environment in which cooperation and competition frequently exist simultaneously. Governments that cooperate on trade, energy production, maritime security, or counterterrorism may strongly disagree over proxy conflicts, military intervention, or regional influence. Diplomatic relations therefore should not be interpreted as indicators of strategic alignment. Instead, they often reflect the practical necessity of maintaining communication while managing competing national interests.¹ ³
Consequently, describing the Middle East as divided into fixed political or religious blocs oversimplifies a far more dynamic reality. The region functions as a constantly evolving balance-of-power system in which governments routinely reassess alliances according to changing political, military, and economic conditions. Alliances form, dissolve, and evolve not because religious identities change, but because national interests change. Understanding that principle is essential for interpreting nearly every major diplomatic and military development occurring throughout the region today.¹ ² ⁴
 
ARAB VERSUS PERSIAN: CIVILIZATIONAL IDENTITY MATTERS
Religion represents only one dimension of identity in the Middle East. Equally important are history, language, ethnicity, culture, and the enduring influence of civilization. While many outside observers view the region primarily through the lens of Islam, governments throughout the Middle East frequently view themselves first as nation-states with distinct historical identities and strategic interests.¹
This distinction is particularly important when examining Iran’s relationships with its Arab neighbors. Although Iran is an overwhelmingly Muslim nation, it is also overwhelmingly Persian. Persian civilization predates the emergence of Islam by more than a millennium, and modern Iran continues to view itself as the heir to one of the world’s oldest continuous civilizations. Persian language, literature, national traditions, and historical memory remain central components of Iranian identity and continue to influence the country’s worldview and foreign policy.²
By contrast, most governments surrounding Iran identify politically and culturally with the Arab world. Shared Arabic language, centuries of cultural interaction, and institutions such as the Arab League reinforce a collective Arab political identity that frequently shapes regional diplomacy independent of religion. While Arab governments differ significantly in their domestic political systems and foreign policy priorities, many continue to emphasize Arab sovereignty, territorial integrity, and regional stability as central components of their national interests.³
These differing civilizational perspectives have important geopolitical consequences. Iranian policymakers frequently frame Tehran’s regional role through the broader concept of the Islamic Ummah while simultaneously emphasizing Iran’s revolutionary ideology and strategic independence. Many Arab governments, however, approach regional affairs through the framework of state sovereignty, Arab political leadership, and the preservation of existing regional institutions. These differing strategic perspectives often produce competing visions for the future political order of the Middle East, even when governments share religious traditions.¹ ³
The distinction between Arab and Persian identity should not be interpreted as evidence of inevitable conflict. History demonstrates that cooperation between Arab governments and Iran is both possible and, at times, mutually beneficial. Trade, energy development, maritime security, counterterrorism, and regional diplomacy have repeatedly brought Tehran together with neighboring governments despite broader political disagreements. Likewise, periods of tension have often been followed by renewed diplomatic engagement as governments reassess their strategic priorities.⁴
Nevertheless, historical memory continues to shape modern decision-making. Arab governments frequently view expanding Iranian influence through the lens of regional power politics rather than religious solidarity. Concerns over military influence, proxy organizations, ballistic missile development, maritime security, and political interference often outweigh shared Islamic identity when leaders evaluate Iranian policy. From Tehran’s perspective, many of these same activities are viewed as necessary components of national defense, strategic deterrence, and regional influence. The result is a continuing competition in which both sides frequently believe they are acting defensively while simultaneously perceiving the other as pursuing expansionist objectives.² ⁵
Understanding this distinction is essential for accurately interpreting regional events. The strategic competition unfolding across the Middle East is not fundamentally a conflict between Arabs and Persians, nor is it solely a conflict between Sunni and Shia Islam. It is a contest among sovereign states possessing different histories, identities, security concerns, and visions for regional leadership. Those competing identities help explain why governments that share a common religion often pursue dramatically different foreign policies and frequently align with different partners during periods of regional crisis.¹ ² ³
 
IRAN’S STRATEGY: PROJECTING POWER WITHOUT DIRECT WAR
Unlike many regional powers, Iran has spent decades developing a national security strategy that relies on far more than conventional military strength. While Tehran continues to invest in its army, navy, air force, missile forces, and expanding drone capabilities, Iranian military doctrine places equal emphasis on deterrence through strategic depth, asymmetric warfare, intelligence operations, and long-term partnerships with governments and allied non-state organizations throughout the Middle East.¹ ²
From Tehran’s perspective, this strategy reflects both historical experience and geographic reality. Iranian leaders frequently point to the devastating Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), repeated threats of military intervention, international sanctions, and the substantial American military presence surrounding Iran as evidence that national security cannot rely solely upon defending Iranian territory. Instead, Iran has adopted a forward-defense doctrine designed to discourage potential adversaries by extending its strategic influence well beyond its borders.³
Rather than projecting military power primarily through overseas bases or large expeditionary forces, Iran has cultivated long-term relationships with governments, political movements, and armed organizations operating across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories. These relationships provide Tehran with multiple avenues through which it can influence regional events while simultaneously increasing the strategic costs facing any nation considering direct military action against Iran.¹ ⁴
Supporters of Iranian policy frequently describe this network as an effective deterrence strategy. From their perspective, maintaining relationships with regional partners strengthens Iran’s national security, creates strategic depth beyond its borders, and reduces the likelihood that future conflicts will be fought exclusively on Iranian soil. Iranian officials have consistently argued that deterrence is achieved not merely through military capability, but by convincing potential adversaries that military action would generate significant regional consequences.² ⁵
Many neighboring governments interpret the same strategy very differently. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, Israel, and several Gulf Cooperation Council members argue that Iranian support for armed organizations allows Tehran to influence political developments inside sovereign states while contributing to regional instability and prolonging proxy conflicts. These governments contend that the expansion of Iranian influence has increased tensions throughout the Middle East and complicated diplomatic efforts to resolve ongoing regional disputes.¹ ⁶
This difference in perspective lies at the heart of today’s geopolitical competition. Actions that Iranian officials characterize as legitimate defensive measures are frequently viewed by neighboring governments as offensive efforts to expand Iranian regional influence. Conversely, military cooperation among Gulf states, normalization agreements with Israel, and expanded American security partnerships are often viewed by Tehran as attempts to strategically encircle Iran. As a result, both sides increasingly perceive their own policies as defensive while viewing the actions of their rivals as aggressive.³ ⁶
The strategic consequences extend far beyond bilateral relations. Because many of these competing interests are advanced through local partners rather than direct confrontation between national militaries, regional crises increasingly develop into proxy conflicts involving multiple governments with overlapping interests. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and, at various times, Gaza have all become arenas in which larger regional rivalries are expressed through local political and military actors rather than conventional interstate warfare.² ⁴
JAFAJ assesses that this indirect approach to competition will remain one of the defining characteristics of Middle Eastern security for the foreseeable future. Conventional military conflict between major regional powers carries enormous political, economic, and human costs. Consequently, governments are likely to continue pursuing influence through diplomacy, economic leverage, intelligence activities, cyber capabilities, strategic partnerships, and proxy relationships rather than risking full-scale conventional war. Understanding this doctrine of indirect competition is essential to understanding nearly every major security crisis unfolding across the Middle East today.¹ ² ³
 
NATIONAL INTERESTS OUTWEIGH RELIGIOUS SOLIDARITY
One of the most persistent misconceptions in international affairs is the belief that governments conduct foreign policy primarily on the basis of religion, ideology, or historical friendship. While these factors often influence political rhetoric and public diplomacy, they rarely determine national strategy. Throughout history, states have consistently pursued policies designed to maximize their own security, economic prosperity, political stability, and long-term strategic interests.¹
The Middle East is no exception. Although religion remains an important component of national identity, governments throughout the region continuously evaluate a far broader range of strategic considerations before making foreign policy decisions. Territorial integrity, military readiness, maritime security, energy infrastructure, economic development, foreign investment, trade relationships, domestic political stability, and diplomatic flexibility frequently outweigh sectarian identity when leaders determine how to respond to regional crises.²
This reality explains why governments sharing the same religion often adopt dramatically different foreign policies. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for example, have periodically disagreed over regional security priorities despite their shared Arab identity and Sunni-majority populations. Likewise, Oman has traditionally pursued a policy of neutrality and diplomatic mediation, maintaining productive relationships with Iran while simultaneously preserving close ties with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf Cooperation Council members.³
Iraq presents perhaps the clearest example of competing national interests overriding simple religious explanations. Although Iraq possesses a Shia-majority population and maintains extensive political, religious, and economic ties with Iran, successive Iraqi governments have also sought to preserve close relationships with the United States, neighboring Arab governments, Turkey, and the broader international community. Baghdad’s foreign policy has therefore reflected an ongoing effort to balance competing strategic relationships rather than align exclusively with any single regional power.⁴
Pakistan illustrates a similar strategic balancing act. Sharing a border with Iran while simultaneously maintaining longstanding defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia and close security relationships with Western governments, Islamabad has consistently attempted to avoid becoming fully aligned with either side of regional rivalries. Instead, Pakistani leaders have generally pursued policies intended to preserve regional stability while protecting Pakistan’s own national security interests and economic development.⁵
Even governments that publicly criticize Iranian regional activities frequently continue diplomatic engagement with Tehran. Economic necessity, shared maritime boundaries, energy markets, border security, counterterrorism cooperation, and regional trade all encourage governments to maintain channels of communication despite significant political disagreements. Diplomatic engagement should therefore not be interpreted as political endorsement, just as public criticism does not necessarily eliminate opportunities for future cooperation.¹ ⁶
The same principle applies beyond the Middle East. Throughout modern international relations, governments routinely cooperate with strategic competitors on selected issues while simultaneously opposing them in other areas. The United States and China, for example, maintain extensive commercial relationships despite growing strategic competition. India continues to purchase military equipment from multiple international partners while pursuing an increasingly independent foreign policy. European governments cooperate closely within NATO while occasionally disagreeing over trade, energy policy, and regional security. These examples illustrate that strategic competition and diplomatic cooperation are not mutually exclusive but frequently occur simultaneously.⁷
JAFAJ assesses that this principle remains essential for understanding contemporary Middle Eastern politics. Governments do not select allies on the basis of religion alone. They evaluate every major foreign policy decision according to whether it enhances national security, strengthens economic resilience, protects political stability, and advances long-term strategic interests. Religious identity remains influential, but it operates within a broader framework dominated by calculations of national advantage. Those realities explain why alliances across the Middle East remain flexible, why governments frequently shift diplomatic positions as circumstances change, and why regional politics continue to defy simplistic religious explanations.¹ ²
 
WHO SUPPORTS IRAN—AND TO WHAT DEGREE?
One of the most common misconceptions surrounding Middle Eastern geopolitics is the belief that the region is divided into two clearly defined camps: nations that support Iran and nations that oppose it. JAFAJ assesses that this framework oversimplifies a far more complex strategic reality. Very few governments align completely with Tehran across every issue, and even fewer oppose Iranian interests in every circumstance. Instead, most states maintain relationships that vary according to security concerns, economic interests, domestic politics, geography, and changing regional conditions.¹
Rather than existing as rigid alliances, Iran’s regional relationships should be viewed as a spectrum. At one end are governments that maintain extensive political, military, and economic cooperation with Tehran. In the middle are states that pursue pragmatic diplomatic engagement while simultaneously opposing certain aspects of Iranian regional policy. At the opposite end are governments that increasingly view Iranian strategic ambitions as inconsistent with their own national security objectives. Between these positions lies considerable diplomatic flexibility, allowing governments to adjust policy as regional circumstances evolve.²
 
STRONG STATE PARTNERS
Iraq
Iraq maintains perhaps the most complicated relationship with Iran anywhere in the Middle East. Geography, religion, commerce, and decades of political interaction have created deep connections between the two countries. Since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, Iran has significantly expanded its influence within Iraq through political relationships, economic investment, religious institutions, and security cooperation with various Iraqi organizations.³
Despite these close ties, Iraq cannot accurately be described as an Iranian client state. Baghdad continues to maintain important strategic relationships with the United States, neighboring Arab governments, Turkey, the European Union, and numerous international organizations. Iraqi leaders have consistently sought to avoid becoming the central battlefield in the broader competition between Iran and its regional rivals. As a result, Iraqi foreign policy remains one of strategic balancing rather than exclusive alignment with Tehran.⁴
Syria
For decades, Syria represented Iran’s closest Arab state partner. Long before the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Damascus and Tehran maintained extensive political, military, and intelligence cooperation based upon shared regional interests. During Syria’s civil conflict, Iranian military, financial, and logistical support became a critical component of the Assad government’s survival strategy, further strengthening the bilateral relationship.⁵
Although Syria’s domestic political landscape continues to evolve, decades of institutional cooperation have produced enduring security relationships that are likely to influence both governments well into the future. Even as Damascus seeks broader diplomatic engagement with Arab governments, Iran remains an important strategic partner within Syria’s long-term security calculations.⁶
 
COUNTRIES MAINTAINING WORKING RELATIONS
Qatar
Qatar has traditionally pursued one of the Middle East’s most independent foreign policies. While remaining a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council and maintaining close security cooperation with the United States, Doha has also preserved diplomatic and economic relations with Tehran. Shared development of the South Pars/North Field natural gas reserve—the world’s largest natural gas field—creates powerful economic incentives for continued cooperation despite broader regional disagreements.⁷
Rather than serving as an Iranian ally, Qatar has frequently positioned itself as a diplomatic intermediary capable of maintaining communication with multiple regional actors simultaneously. This flexibility has enhanced Doha’s regional influence while allowing it to preserve productive relationships across competing political blocs.⁸
Oman
For decades, Oman has cultivated a reputation as one of the Middle East’s most respected diplomatic mediators. Muscat has consistently maintained productive relationships with Iran while simultaneously preserving close partnerships with Saudi Arabia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Gulf governments. Rather than choosing sides in regional disputes, Omani leaders have frequently sought to reduce tensions through quiet diplomacy and confidential negotiations.⁹
Oman’s strategic value lies not in military alignment but in diplomatic credibility. Numerous regional negotiations involving Iran and Western governments have relied upon Oman’s neutral position, making Muscat one of the region’s most influential behind-the-scenes diplomatic actors.¹⁰
Pakistan
Pakistan demonstrates how strategic relationships often resist simple political labels. Sharing a lengthy border with Iran while maintaining extensive military cooperation with Saudi Arabia and long-standing security partnerships with Western governments, Islamabad has consistently attempted to balance competing regional interests without fully aligning itself with any single power.¹¹
Pakistani policymakers generally seek stable relations with Tehran while simultaneously honoring defense commitments with Gulf partners and preserving access to Western military and economic assistance. This multidirectional approach reflects Pakistan’s broader national security strategy rather than ideological preference for any one regional actor.¹²
 
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
Iran possesses a relatively small number of close state partners, a larger group of pragmatic diplomatic relationships, and an even broader network of governments willing to cooperate selectively on issues of mutual interest. Most regional governments neither fully embrace nor fully reject Tehran. Instead, they continually adjust their relationships according to changing security conditions, economic opportunities, domestic political considerations, and evolving regional threats.
Understanding this spectrum of relationships is essential for interpreting Middle Eastern diplomacy. The region is not divided into fixed camps. It is characterized by overlapping partnerships, shifting priorities, and governments that consistently place national interests above ideological or sectarian alignment.¹ ²
 
IRAN’S MOST IMPORTANT PARTNERS ARE NOT STATES
Perhaps the most misunderstood aspect of Iran’s regional strategy is that many of its most influential partners are not sovereign governments. Although Iran maintains diplomatic relationships with numerous states, much of its regional influence has historically been exercised through long-standing relationships with non-state political and armed organizations operating throughout the Middle East.¹
This strategy differs significantly from the traditional alliance systems employed by most nation-states. Rather than relying exclusively on formal defense treaties or permanent overseas military bases, Tehran has cultivated networks of organizations capable of advancing Iranian strategic interests while simultaneously increasing the political and military costs facing potential adversaries.²
Among the best-known of these organizations is Hezbollah in Lebanon. Established during the early 1980s, Hezbollah has evolved from a local militia into one of Lebanon’s most influential political and military organizations. Its military capabilities, political representation, and extensive social service infrastructure have made it a central component of Lebanon’s domestic political landscape while also serving as one of Iran’s closest regional partners.³
Iran has likewise maintained extensive relationships with numerous Iraqi militia organizations that emerged following the 2003 invasion of Iraq and later participated in military operations against the Islamic State. While these organizations differ considerably in ideology, leadership, and political influence, several have maintained close military, financial, or ideological relationships with Tehran. Their participation within Iraq’s broader security structure has significantly expanded Iran’s political influence inside its western neighbor.⁴
In Yemen, Iran has developed relationships with the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah), a political and military organization that has become one of the principal actors in Yemen’s prolonged civil conflict. Although analysts continue to debate the precise scope of Iranian support, most governments in the region assess that Tehran has provided varying degrees of political backing, military assistance, and technical expertise that have enhanced Houthi capabilities over time.⁵
Iran has also maintained relationships with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and, at various times, Hamas. These relationships have not always been consistent or free of political disagreement. Hamas, for example, has periodically distanced itself from Tehran over regional issues—particularly regarding Syria—while later rebuilding portions of the relationship as strategic interests evolved. These fluctuations illustrate an important reality: even Iran’s closest non-state partners pursue their own interests and are not simply instruments of Iranian foreign policy.⁶
Collectively, these organizations are frequently described by analysts as part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” From Tehran’s perspective, this network serves as a forward-defense system intended to deter military threats, expand strategic depth, and strengthen regional deterrence. Iranian officials have consistently argued that supporting allied organizations contributes to national security by reducing the likelihood that conflicts will occur solely within Iranian territory.⁷
Many neighboring governments reach very different conclusions. Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and several Western governments contend that Iranian support for armed organizations undermines state sovereignty, fuels proxy warfare, prolongs regional instability, and complicates diplomatic efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts. These governments frequently argue that Iran’s regional influence extends beyond traditional diplomacy into the internal political affairs of neighboring states.⁸
These competing interpretations help explain why Iran’s network of regional partners remains one of the Middle East’s most controversial strategic issues. Supporters view these relationships as a legitimate deterrence strategy designed to protect Iranian national security. Critics view the same relationships as mechanisms through which Tehran projects influence beyond its borders while avoiding the costs and risks associated with direct military confrontation.⁹
JAFAJ assesses that both perspectives are essential for understanding the region. Policymakers who examine only one interpretation risk misunderstanding the strategic calculations driving regional decision-making. Whether viewed as deterrence, power projection, or a combination of both, Iran’s network of non-state partners has become one of the defining characteristics of contemporary Middle Eastern security and will likely remain a central factor shaping regional stability for years to come.¹⁰
 
WHY DO THESE RELATIONSHIPS EXIST?
Although each relationship is unique, several common strategic factors help explain why governments and non-state organizations continue to cooperate with Iran despite increasing regional tensions.
Shared Security Interests
Several governments and organizations view Iran as an important counterweight to competing regional powers. Where national security concerns overlap, cooperation often becomes a practical strategic choice rather than an ideological commitment.¹¹
Economic Cooperation
Energy infrastructure, cross-border trade, transportation corridors, investment opportunities, and shared natural resources encourage continued engagement with Tehran even among governments that disagree with certain Iranian regional policies. Economic interdependence frequently survives periods of political tension because mutual commercial interests remain significant.¹²
Strategic Independence
Many governments seek to avoid dependence upon any single regional or global power. Maintaining productive diplomatic relations with Iran provides additional flexibility, reduces strategic vulnerability, and strengthens negotiating positions with competing international partners.¹³
Domestic Political Considerations
In several countries, political parties, religious institutions, and armed organizations maintain longstanding historical, ideological, or cultural ties with Iran. These domestic relationships often influence foreign policy and help sustain bilateral cooperation even during periods of heightened regional tension.¹⁴
 
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
The relationships surrounding Iran cannot be explained through religion alone. Security, economics, geography, domestic politics, and strategic necessity all shape the decisions of governments and organizations throughout the Middle East. While ideology influences public rhetoric, national interest remains the principal force determining the durability of regional partnerships.
Understanding these motivations provides a more accurate picture of the Middle East than simplistic narratives portraying governments as permanently aligned for or against Tehran. The region continues to function as a dynamic strategic environment in which cooperation, competition, and diplomacy evolve continuously in response to changing political realities.¹⁵
 
THE STRATEGIC REALITY
One of the greatest analytical mistakes made by outside observers is assuming that the Middle East is divided into two permanent camps: nations that support Iran and nations that oppose it. JAFAJ assesses that this framework fails to capture the region’s strategic complexity. Middle Eastern governments rarely maintain absolute positions. Instead, they continually adjust policy in response to changing political circumstances, economic conditions, military developments, domestic pressures, and international events.¹
The modern Middle East is better understood as a dynamic balance-of-power system than as a collection of rigid alliances. Governments frequently cooperate with one another in one area while competing vigorously in another. A nation may oppose Iranian influence in Syria while simultaneously maintaining extensive trade with Tehran. Another government may criticize Iranian military activities while preserving diplomatic relations and cooperating on maritime security or energy development. These overlapping relationships often appear contradictory to outside observers but represent standard practice in international politics.²
Economic considerations remain among the most powerful influences on regional decision-making. Energy exports, shipping lanes, financial investment, cross-border commerce, and access to international markets all encourage governments to preserve working relationships even during periods of political tension. Severing diplomatic ties or economic cooperation often imposes substantial costs on both parties, creating incentives for continued engagement despite significant strategic disagreements.³
Security considerations are equally important. Governments throughout the Middle East must simultaneously prepare for conventional military threats, terrorism, cyber operations, ballistic missile proliferation, maritime security challenges, and domestic political instability. As a result, policymakers often seek to reduce the number of active adversaries they face at any given time. Diplomatic engagement therefore becomes a practical security tool rather than an indication of political agreement.⁴
This pragmatic approach explains why many governments publicly advocate restraint during regional crises while privately strengthening military readiness and expanding security cooperation with international partners. Diplomatic statements intended for public audiences frequently differ from private strategic planning conducted by national security officials. Understanding this distinction is essential for accurately interpreting official government statements during periods of heightened regional tension.⁵
The same flexibility extends beyond the Middle East. Throughout history, governments have routinely balanced cooperation with competition. During the Cold War, numerous nations maintained commercial relationships across ideological divides. Today, major powers continue to trade, negotiate, and cooperate on selected issues despite strategic rivalry in other areas. Middle Eastern governments operate according to the same principles of statecraft that have guided international relations for centuries.⁶
Perhaps the most important conclusion is that regional politics remain fluid rather than permanent. Alliances evolve as leadership changes, security threats emerge, economic priorities shift, and diplomatic opportunities arise. Governments that compete today may cooperate tomorrow if strategic circumstances change. Likewise, longstanding partners may gradually drift apart as their national interests diverge. Stability in the Middle East therefore depends not upon permanent friendships but upon the continuous management of competing interests.⁷
For policymakers, investors, journalists, and citizens attempting to understand regional events, this distinction is critical. Headlines often focus upon military confrontation, diplomatic disputes, or ideological rhetoric, yet those events frequently represent only one element of a much broader strategic calculation. Governments rarely make decisions for a single reason. Instead, every major foreign policy decision reflects the interaction of political, economic, military, diplomatic, and domestic considerations that collectively determine national strategy.⁸
 
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE CURRENT CONFLICT
The ongoing confrontation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States illustrates these broader strategic realities. Although governments throughout the Muslim world have expressed concern regarding the possibility of wider regional conflict, their responses have varied considerably according to their individual national interests rather than religious affiliation alone.¹
Several governments have publicly called for restraint while simultaneously strengthening domestic security measures, protecting critical infrastructure, increasing military readiness, and coordinating closely with international partners. Others have emphasized diplomatic mediation, fearing that a broader regional war would threaten energy exports, disrupt global shipping, damage tourism, undermine economic growth, and increase domestic political instability.²
Even governments highly critical of Israeli military operations have often stopped short of endorsing direct Iranian military action. Likewise, governments maintaining cooperative relations with the United States have frequently urged restraint rather than escalation. These differing responses illustrate the central conclusion of this report: national strategy—not religious solidarity—continues to drive regional decision-making.³
JAFAJ assesses that future crises are likely to follow a similar pattern. Governments will continue evaluating events through the lens of national security, economic resilience, political stability, and strategic advantage. Public statements may emphasize solidarity, diplomacy, or humanitarian concerns, but the policies ultimately adopted will continue to reflect each government’s assessment of its own national interests.⁴
 
CONCLUSION
The question posed at the beginning of this report—Why are so many Muslim nations aligned against Iran?—cannot be answered by religion alone. While sectarian differences between Sunni and Shia Islam remain politically significant, they represent only one element within a much broader strategic landscape. JAFAJ assesses that national interests, regional security, economic priorities, historical rivalries, and geopolitical competition collectively provide a far more accurate explanation for the policies adopted by governments throughout the Middle East.¹
Contrary to popular perception, the Muslim world is not united either in support of or opposition to Iran. Instead, it is characterized by a complex network of partnerships, rivalries, and pragmatic relationships that continue to evolve as regional circumstances change. Governments cooperate where interests overlap, compete where interests diverge, and frequently pursue both strategies simultaneously. The resulting diplomatic landscape is considerably more nuanced than the simplified narratives often presented in political debate or media reporting.²
Iran has successfully developed a regional strategy centered on strategic depth, deterrence, and long-term relationships with both governments and influential non-state organizations. Supporters argue that these relationships provide necessary protection against external threats and strengthen regional deterrence. Critics contend that they expand Iranian influence beyond its borders, undermine state sovereignty, and contribute to prolonged proxy conflicts. Both interpretations shape how governments formulate policy toward Tehran, and both influence the broader regional balance of power.³
Likewise, many Arab governments have increasingly strengthened security cooperation among themselves and with outside partners, including the United States and, in some cases, Israel. These relationships should not be interpreted solely through the lens of ideology or religion. Rather, they reflect shared concerns regarding regional stability, missile proliferation, maritime security, terrorism, economic resilience, and the protection of critical national infrastructure.⁴
Perhaps the most enduring lesson is that international politics rarely operates according to permanent friendships or permanent enemies. States continuously reassess their strategic environment and modify policy as circumstances evolve. Changes in political leadership, military capability, economic conditions, technological development, or regional conflict can alter diplomatic relationships that once appeared fixed. Consequently, today’s adversaries may become tomorrow’s negotiating partners, while today’s allies may discover important areas of disagreement.⁵
For analysts, journalists, policymakers, and citizens alike, understanding these dynamics is essential. Interpreting Middle Eastern affairs primarily through religious identity risks overlooking the strategic calculations that ultimately drive government decision-making. Successful analysis requires consideration of geography, history, economics, military capability, domestic politics, alliance structures, energy security, and diplomacy alongside religious and cultural influences. Only by integrating these factors can observers accurately assess regional developments and anticipate future policy decisions.⁶
Looking ahead, JAFAJ assesses that competition between Iran and many of its regional neighbors will likely persist, although its form may continue to evolve. Direct conventional warfare remains costly and unpredictable, making diplomacy, economic pressure, intelligence operations, cyber capabilities, strategic partnerships, and proxy competition more likely instruments of statecraft. Periods of confrontation will almost certainly alternate with periods of negotiation, reflecting the continuing effort by regional governments to balance security, prosperity, and political stability.⁷
Ultimately, the central finding of this report is straightforward: the Middle East is not divided primarily by religion—it is shaped by national interest. Governments may invoke religious language, historical identity, or ideological principles in public discourse, but the policies they ultimately adopt are overwhelmingly determined by calculations of security, economic advantage, political survival, and strategic opportunity. Appreciating that distinction is fundamental to understanding not only Iran’s relationships with its neighbors, but the future trajectory of the Middle East itself.⁸
 
JAFAJ INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
Confidence Level: High
JAFAJ assesses with high confidence that the principal factor driving the policies of most Muslim-majority governments toward Iran is national interest rather than religious solidarity. Historical rivalries, security concerns, economic interdependence, and geopolitical competition consistently outweigh sectarian affiliation in shaping regional decision-making.
Key Intelligence Judgments

Regional alliances remain fluid and should not be viewed as permanent.
Iran will continue relying upon strategic partnerships and indirect influence to enhance deterrence and expand regional leverage.
Arab governments are expected to deepen security cooperation while preserving selective diplomatic engagement with Tehran where national interests require.
Proxy competition, cyber operations, economic pressure, and diplomacy will remain more likely than sustained conventional interstate warfare.
Future regional stability will depend less upon religious reconciliation than upon the successful management of competing national interests.

Readers should therefore approach future developments in the Middle East with an understanding that governments are likely to continue making decisions based on pragmatic strategic calculations rather than ideological alignment alone.
 
Footnotes

Council on Foreign Relations, The Sunni-Shia Divide.
United States Institute of Peace, Iran’s Regional Strategy and Proxy Networks.
Baker Institute for Public Policy, Gulf States and Iran: Misunderstandings and Regional Security.
Reuters, “Pakistan Weighs Regional Security Risks Amid Iran Conflict,” July 2026.

Religion Unplugged. Islam’s Sunni-Shia Divide: Why It Matters Today.

Council on Foreign Relations. The Arab League and Regional Politics.
Encyclopaedia Iranica. Persian Identity and Iranian Civilization.
Brookings Institution. Identity, Nationalism, and Power Politics in the Middle East.

United States Institute of Peace. Iran’s Regional Strategy and Proxy Networks.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2026.
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Iran’s Missile and Drone Strategy.
Congressional Research Service. Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies.
Reuters. “Regional Security Developments Following the Iran-Israel Crisis,” 2026.
Atlantic Council. Iran’s Network of Regional Partners and Strategic Deterrence.

Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
Council on Foreign Relations. The Sunni-Shia Divide.
Baker Institute for Public Policy. Gulf States and Iran: Misunderstandings and Regional Security.
Congressional Research Service. Iraq: Politics, Governance, and U.S. Policy.
Reuters. “Pakistan Weighs Regional Security Risks Amid Iran Conflict.” July 2026.
United States Institute of Peace. Iran’s Regional Strategy and Proxy Networks.
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Cornell University Press, 1987).

Council on Foreign Relations. The Sunni-Shia Divide.
Baker Institute for Public Policy. Gulf States and Iran: Misunderstandings and Regional Security.
Congressional Research Service. Iraq: Politics, Governance, and U.S. Policy.
United States Institute of Peace. Iran’s Regional Strategy and Proxy Networks.
International Crisis Group. Syria, Iran, and Regional Security.
Reuters. “Regional Diplomacy and Syria,” 2026.
U.S. Energy Information Administration. Qatar Country Analysis Brief.
Reuters. “Qatar Maintains Regional Diplomatic Balance,” 2026.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Oman’s Regional Mediation.
Middle East Institute. Oman as a Diplomatic Intermediary.
Reuters. “Pakistan Weighs Regional Security Risks Amid Iran Conflict.” July 2026.
Congressional Research Service. Pakistan: Political and Security Issues.

United States Institute of Peace. Iran’s Regional Strategy and Proxy Networks.
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Iran and Its Regional Network.
Congressional Research Service. Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress.
Congressional Research Service. Iraq: Politics, Governance, and U.S. Policy.
International Crisis Group. Yemen’s Houthi Movement and Regional Security.
Council on Foreign Relations. Iran’s Regional Influence and Proxy Organizations.
Atlantic Council. The Axis of Resistance: Strategy and Structure.
Reuters. “Regional Security Developments Following the Iran-Israel Crisis,” 2026.
Baker Institute for Public Policy. Gulf States and Iran: Misunderstandings and Regional Security.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2026.
World Bank. Middle East Trade and Regional Economic Integration.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Strategic Autonomy in the Middle East.
Brookings Institution. Political Movements and Regional Alliances in the Middle East.
Stephen M. Walt. The Origins of Alliances. Cornell University Press, 1987.

Stephen M. Walt. The Origins of Alliances. Cornell University Press, 1987.
Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
Baker Institute for Public Policy. Gulf States and Iran: Misunderstandings and Regional Security.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2026.
Reuters. “Regional Security Developments Following the Iran-Israel Crisis,” 2026.
Council on Foreign Relations. The Sunni-Shia Divide.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Strategic Competition in the Middle East.
Brookings Institution. Middle East Geopolitics and Regional Power Competition.

 
Selected Bibliography

Baker Institute for Public Policy. Gulf States and Iran: Misunderstandings and Regional Security.
Brookings Institution. Middle East Geopolitics and Regional Power Competition.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Strategic Competition in the Middle East.
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Iran and Its Regional Network.
Congressional Research Service. Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress.
Congressional Research Service. Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies.
Congressional Research Service. Iraq: Politics, Governance, and U.S. Policy.
Council on Foreign Relations. The Sunni-Shia Divide.
Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
International Crisis Group. Syria, Iran, and Regional Security.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2026.
Reuters. Various reports on Middle East regional security and diplomacy, 2026.
Stephen M. Walt. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987.
United States Institute of Peace. Iran’s Regional Strategy and Proxy Networks.
World Bank. Middle East Trade and Regional Economic Integration.