The US president claims Iran and other Middle Eastern countries asked Washington to hold off on any attack as the "perimeters" of a deal had been …
... continue reading.Trump says he is cancelling strikes on Iran subject to deal being made 'rapidly' – BBC Read More »
History Has Always Produced Assassins. But What Happens When Governments Begin Legitimizing Political Murder?
By the JAFAJ Editorial Board
“Civilizations are not judged by how they behave during peace. They are judged by the rules they refuse to abandon during conflict.”
History is often remembered by the wars it fought, the treaties it signed, and the empires it built. Yet some of civilization’s greatest turning points began not with armies on the battlefield, but with the death of a single individual. Assassinations have redirected history, reshaped governments, and altered the destiny of nations. They remind us that one act of political violence can echo across generations.
On the Ides of March in 44 B.C., Julius Caesar entered the Roman Senate believing he would debate the future of the Republic. Instead, he was surrounded by men he considered allies and stabbed to death. The Roman Republic died with him.
Three centuries later, King Philip II of Macedon was assassinated during a royal celebration. His death unexpectedly elevated his twenty-year-old son, Alexander, to the throne. History would remember him as Alexander the Great, whose conquests transformed the ancient world and reshaped civilizations across three continents.
More than a thousand years later, Archbishop Thomas Becket was murdered inside Canterbury Cathedral after a bitter struggle with King Henry II over the limits of royal authority. Whether intended or not, words spoken at the highest levels of power inspired an act whose consequences reverberated throughout medieval Europe.
In 1610, King Henry IV of France was assassinated by a religious extremist, depriving Europe of one of its most influential statesmen at a pivotal moment in history.
From ancient Rome to medieval England, from the monarchies of Europe to the birth of modern democracies, history repeatedly demonstrates that the assassination of a single leader can redirect the course of civilization. Wars have begun, peace agreements have collapsed, governments have fallen, and entire political systems have been transformed because one individual was removed from history at precisely the wrong moment. Political assassination has never been merely the death of a person. More often than not, it has marked the beginning of a new chapter for nations—and sometimes for the world.
Nearly nineteen centuries after Caesar, Abraham Lincoln was murdered only days after preserving the Union, leaving a fractured nation to confront Reconstruction without the leader who had held it together.
In Sarajevo, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand ignited the chain reaction that became the First World War.
John F. Kennedy’s assassination altered the trajectory of American politics.
Yitzhak Rabin’s murder dealt a devastating blow to hopes for peace in the Middle East.
Shinzo Abe’s assassination forced Japan to confront the vulnerability of even one of the world’s safest democracies.
History remembers these events because they changed nations.
History remembers something else as well.
They were almost universally regarded as tragedies—not as acceptable instruments of statecraft.
No civilized nation celebrated Lincoln’s murder as legitimate diplomacy.
No democracy concluded that killing John F. Kennedy represented a valid political argument.
No responsible government openly declared that assassination should become a recognized tool of foreign policy.
For centuries—even among bitter enemies—there remained an unspoken understanding that some boundaries should never be crossed.
That understanding now appears to be under increasing pressure.
The Difference Between Terrorism and State Legitimization
For more than two thousand years, one principle quietly survived despite wars, revolutions, terrorism, and ideological conflict. Political murder occurred. Governments were accused of orchestrating it. Intelligence services were suspected of covert operations. Proxy organizations carried out attacks.
Yet governments almost always denied involvement.
That denial mattered.
It reflected an understanding that openly advocating the assassination of a foreign leader violated one of the unwritten rules upon which international relations depended. Even when governments secretly crossed those lines, they rarely claimed doing so as legitimate policy.
The distinction between terrorism and violence publicly encouraged—or even debated—by institutions connected to a government is therefore more than legal.
It is civilizational.
One reflects the actions of criminals or extremists.
The other risks eroding the norms that restrain governments themselves.
Recent reports concerning Iran deserve attention because they describe something different: public rhetoric directed at a foreign leader, reported legislative discussions concerning rewards for killing that leader, and reported state-affiliated messaging extending threats to members of that leader’s family.
Whether these reports ultimately reflect official policy, proposals that never become law, or propaganda rather than operational intent, they raise a larger question than any single country.
What happens when ideas once considered beyond the boundaries of civilized conduct begin entering mainstream political discourse?
The Last Boundary
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of these reports is not that a political leader was threatened.
Presidents, prime ministers, kings, and generals have always understood that public service carries extraordinary personal risk.
The deeper concern is the apparent expansion of threats to family members.
Children do not vote.
They do not write legislation.
They do not command armies.
They do not negotiate treaties.
They do not decide questions of war and peace.
Their only connection to politics is the family into which they happened to be born.
For generations, civilized societies instinctively recognized that simple truth.
Families remained among the last places where political conflict was expected to stop.
Not because treaties required it.
Because civilization did.
If We Allow This to Continue…What’s Next?
This is the question every democracy should be asking.
Not whether one supports Donald Trump.
Not whether one opposes Iran.
Not whether today’s geopolitical disputes are justified.
Those debates will continue.
The larger question is whether the rules themselves are beginning to disappear.
If publicly encouraging violence against one foreign president becomes politically acceptable…
What prevents similar rhetoric against another?
If today’s target is a president…
Who becomes tomorrow’s target?
A prime minister?
A cabinet minister?
A Supreme Court justice?
A diplomat?
A scientist?
A journalist?
A business leader?
A spouse?
A child?
History demonstrates that dangerous precedents rarely remain confined to their original target.
They expand.
First the exception.
Then the justification.
Eventually the norm.
Civilizations seldom abandon their principles in a single dramatic moment.
They lose them one compromise at a time.
What Should Democracies Do?
The response cannot depend upon ideology or nationality.
If one government publicly encourages violence against foreign leaders, the international response should be the same regardless of who the intended victim may be.
Democracies should reaffirm a simple principle: publicly advocating or rewarding violence against foreign leaders—or against their families—falls outside accepted international conduct.
Diplomatic protests, targeted sanctions against responsible individuals, enhanced intelligence cooperation, and renewed international commitments to protecting the families of public officials should all remain available policy tools where appropriate under domestic and international law.
The issue is not simply protecting one leader.
It is protecting the rules that protect every leader.
JAFAJ Editorial
Ultimately, this debate is not about Donald Trump.
Nor is it solely about Iran.
It is about whether the international community still believes that some lines should never be crossed.
Political assassination has existed for more than two thousand years.
Civilized societies never eliminated it.
They condemned it.
They isolated those who practiced it.
Most importantly, they refused to normalize it.
If that restraint weakens—if governments, legislatures, or state-affiliated institutions begin publicly legitimizing violence against foreign leaders or extending threats to their families—the consequences will extend far beyond any single administration or nation.
History teaches that civilizations rarely collapse because they suddenly abandon their principles.
They decline when behavior that once shocked the conscience slowly becomes familiar.
Every generation inherits boundaries it did not create.
Every generation must decide whether those boundaries remain worth defending.
History will not remember the moment those boundaries disappeared.
It will remember what happened after they did.
And that is the question every nation should be asking itself today:
If we allow this to continue…what comes next?
Legitimizing Political Murder: When Does It Stop? Read More »
JAFAJ Strategic Intelligence Report
Middle East | Defense | Artificial Intelligence | Technology Transfer | U.S. Foreign Policy
KEY JUDGMENTS
The United States has initiated one of the most consequential strategic realignments in Gulf technology policy since the Abraham Accords by easing export restrictions on advanced dual-use technologies to the United Arab Emirates.
The policy is expected to accelerate Emirati development of artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, advanced semiconductor applications, cybersecurity, robotics, satellite technologies, and indigenous drone manufacturing.
Rather than representing a simple export regulation change, the decision signals Washington’s willingness to integrate the UAE more deeply into the Western defense-industrial ecosystem while reducing long-term dependence on Chinese technology.
The move will likely trigger competitive responses from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and Iran, each of which views advanced technology as central to future military and economic power.
The decision may ultimately prove more strategically significant than any single fighter aircraft sale because it strengthens the industrial foundation upon which future military capabilities will be built.
THE STORY BEHIND THE HEADLINE
Major geopolitical shifts are not always announced with presidential speeches or dramatic treaty signings.
Sometimes they arrive as a technical amendment to export regulations.
That appears to be precisely what has happened with the U.S. decision to place the United Arab Emirates into one of America’s most trusted export-control categories, granting Emirati companies significantly easier access to a wide range of advanced dual-use technologies.
To most observers, the announcement generated little attention.
Within defense and intelligence circles, however, it has the potential to become one of the defining strategic developments of 2026.
Washington is no longer simply selling weapons to the UAE.
It is helping build the technological infrastructure that will allow the Emirates to design, manufacture, improve, and export sophisticated defense systems for decades to come.
This represents a profound shift in American policy.
A NEW STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
For decades, U.S.-UAE military cooperation centered primarily on procurement.
The Emirates purchased American aircraft.
American missiles.
American sensors.
American logistics.
American training.
The relationship largely resembled that of supplier and customer.
Today’s strategy is fundamentally different.
Washington increasingly sees Abu Dhabi not merely as a buyer, but as a long-term technology partner capable of producing advanced systems alongside American industry.
The distinction matters.
Countries that manufacture technology wield influence very differently from countries that merely purchase it.
Manufacturing creates permanent industrial capacity.
Engineering talent.
Research institutions.
Artificial intelligence laboratories.
Export markets.
Jobs.
Strategic independence.
The United States appears willing to help cultivate each of those sectors inside the UAE.
THE RACE FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Artificial intelligence is rapidly replacing oil as one of the Middle East’s most strategically valuable resources.
Governments throughout the Gulf have invested billions of dollars attempting to become regional AI leaders.
The UAE entered the competition earlier than most.
It established one of the world’s first ministries dedicated to artificial intelligence.
It invested heavily in research universities.
It attracted global technology firms.
It created sovereign wealth fund investments targeting AI infrastructure.
Today’s export changes accelerate those ambitions.
Access to advanced processors, specialized computing hardware, machine-learning software, and associated technical knowledge may dramatically shorten development timelines for Emirati defense companies.
Unlike previous generations of military modernization—which required purchasing finished equipment—future military advantage increasingly depends upon the ability to continually improve AI algorithms.
That favors nations with strong domestic technology ecosystems.
THE DRONE REVOLUTION
The Middle East has become one of the world’s primary laboratories for unmanned warfare.
Conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, the Red Sea, and elsewhere have demonstrated that inexpensive autonomous systems can alter battlefields once dominated by billion-dollar aircraft.
The UAE has taken notice.
Companies within the Emirati defense sector have spent years investing in:
Loitering munitions
Autonomous surveillance systems
AI-enabled targeting
Swarming drone technologies
Maritime autonomous vehicles
Border security systems
Easier access to American technologies does not merely improve today’s products.
It may dramatically improve tomorrow’s research and development pipeline.
The difference between importing drones and designing next-generation autonomous systems represents a strategic leap.
Washington appears increasingly comfortable helping the UAE make that transition.
THE CHINA CALCULATION
Perhaps the most significant element of the policy is not what Washington gains.
It is what Washington hopes to prevent.
For years, American policymakers worried that close technological cooperation with the UAE risked exposing sensitive technologies to China.
Huawei telecommunications infrastructure.
Chinese artificial intelligence partnerships.
Joint commercial ventures.
Technology-sharing agreements.
These relationships complicated numerous American defense discussions.
The latest export decision suggests a strategic reassessment.
Rather than restricting access indefinitely, Washington appears to have concluded that deeper engagement offers a better path toward keeping Gulf partners within the Western technology ecosystem.
This reflects a broader global trend.
The United States increasingly recognizes that trusted allies cannot be expected to modernize exclusively with American technology if Washington remains unwilling to share it.
If America does not become the preferred technology partner, Beijing almost certainly will.
A QUIET INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
The public often measures military power by counting fighter aircraft, aircraft carriers, or missile inventories.
Defense planners increasingly measure something else.
Industrial capacity.
Who designs the chips?
Who develops the software?
Who trains the AI?
Who manufactures autonomous systems?
Who controls the supply chain?
Those questions increasingly determine long-term military strength.
The latest export changes directly address those issues.
They improve access to precisely the technologies that underpin future weapons development.
That makes the announcement far more important than it initially appears.
REGIONAL REACTIONS
Saudi Arabia
Riyadh is unlikely to ignore the decision.
Under Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia seeks to localize at least half of its defense spending while expanding domestic aerospace, AI, and advanced manufacturing capabilities.
Expect Saudi officials to seek similar export treatment from Washington while accelerating investments in indigenous defense firms.
Israel
Israel retains its qualitative military edge and remains the Middle East’s most advanced technology power.
However, Israeli planners will closely monitor how rapidly Emirati capabilities expand.
The most likely outcome is greater cooperation rather than competition, particularly in cybersecurity, missile defense, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems enabled by the Abraham Accords.
Iran
Tehran will almost certainly portray the announcement as further evidence that Washington intends to strengthen Gulf military capabilities against Iranian influence.
Iran’s response may include expanded drone production, increased technology transfers to proxy organizations, and deeper cooperation with Russia and China on military technology.
Turkey
Turkey has already emerged as one of the world’s leading drone exporters.
A rapidly modernizing Emirati defense sector introduces a potential long-term commercial competitor across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.
China
Perhaps no nation will analyze the decision more carefully than China.
Beijing has invested heavily in becoming the Gulf’s preferred technology partner.
Washington’s policy change represents a direct challenge to that strategy.
THE CONGRESSIONAL DIMENSION
The decision is unlikely to escape congressional attention.
Members of Congress will almost certainly examine:
Technology security safeguards.
End-user monitoring.
Protection against unauthorized technology transfers.
Compliance with export-control regulations.
The impact on Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME).
Risks associated with sensitive AI technologies.
Future hearings could determine whether the current policy becomes the foundation for broader Gulf technology cooperation or remains limited in scope.
WHAT TO WATCH
Over the next 24 months, JaFaJ will monitor several indicators that will reveal whether this policy marks a lasting strategic shift:
New U.S.-UAE joint ventures in AI and autonomous systems.
Increased venture-capital investment in Emirati defense technology startups.
Expansion of EDGE Group’s international export portfolio.
Additional U.S. export-control reforms benefiting trusted Gulf partners.
Regional responses from Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, and Iran.
Congressional efforts to tighten—or further liberalize—technology-transfer rules.
Evidence that Chinese technology providers are losing market share within the UAE.
JAFAJ STRATEGIC OUTLOOK
History suggests that great-power competition is often decided long before conflicts begin. The decisive advantage belongs to the nation—or coalition—that builds the strongest innovation ecosystem, attracts the best engineering talent, and controls the technologies that define the next generation of warfare.
The U.S. decision to ease technology exports to the United Arab Emirates is best understood through that lens.
This is not simply an administrative adjustment to export regulations. It is a strategic investment in a partner that Washington increasingly views as a pillar of regional stability, a hub for advanced manufacturing, and a counterweight to expanding Chinese technological influence.
If implemented successfully, the policy could help transform the UAE from one of the world’s most sophisticated defense importers into one of its leading defense technology exporters.
That evolution would reshape regional security, influence global arms markets, and strengthen the Western-aligned technology ecosystem across the Middle East.
For JaFaJ readers, the significance is clear: the competition for the Middle East is no longer defined solely by military deployments or diplomatic agreements. It is increasingly a contest over artificial intelligence, semiconductors, autonomous systems, and the industrial capacity to innovate faster than strategic rivals.
The next balance of power may be written not on the battlefield, but in research laboratories, semiconductor fabrication facilities, and AI development centers.
JAFAJ Strategic Intelligence Assessment
July 29, 2026
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The passing of Senator Lindsey Graham marks the end of one of the most influential congressional voices on Middle East policy in a generation. For more than two decades, Graham served as an advocate for the U.S.-Israel alliance, a strong supporter of Arab-Israeli normalization, and a trusted interlocutor among American, Israeli, and Gulf leaders. His funeral, attended by President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, underscored the breadth of his international relationships and his influence beyond Capitol Hill.
Yet Graham’s death raises a broader strategic question:
Who now becomes the principal political champion of the Abraham Accords?
JAFAJ assesses that this is the wrong question.
The more consequential issue is not who replaces Senator Graham, but whether the Abraham Accords have matured beyond requiring a single American political champion. JAFAJ assesses with high confidence that they have. The strategic incentives driving normalization—shared concerns over Iranian regional ambitions, expanding economic integration, technological cooperation, and collective security—are now rooted more deeply in the national interests of participating governments than in the influence of any individual policymaker.
Consequently, leadership of the Accords is expected to become progressively more decentralized, shifting from individual political advocates toward an institutional network of governments, military establishments, intelligence services, financial institutions, and private-sector partnerships whose shared interests make the normalization process substantially more resilient than during its initial phase.
ANALYTICAL CONFIDENCE
Unless otherwise noted, JAFAJ’s principal judgments in this assessment are made with moderate to high confidence.
Confidence levels reflect the quality of available information, the consistency of observable regional developments, historical patterns of state behavior, and the degree to which multiple independent indicators support a given assessment. High confidence does not imply certainty; rather, it reflects a judgment that available evidence strongly supports the conclusion while recognizing that unforeseen political, military, or diplomatic developments could alter future outcomes.
Specific forecasts involving future leadership decisions, Saudi normalization, and regional political dynamics necessarily carry greater uncertainty than assessments regarding established institutional trends.
KEY JUDGMENTS
JAFAJ assesses with high confidence that Senator Lindsey Graham’s passing will not materially alter the long-term trajectory of the Abraham Accords. The strategic drivers supporting normalization have become increasingly institutional and are no longer dependent upon a single American political leader.
JAFAJ assesses that the center of gravity for Arab-Israeli normalization is shifting from Washington toward regional capitals, particularly Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi, and eventually Riyadh, where national interests increasingly drive policy decisions.
JAFAJ assesses with moderate confidence that Saudi Arabia remains the decisive strategic variable. Formal Saudi participation would fundamentally reshape the Middle East’s political, economic, and security architecture while encouraging additional Muslim-majority states to consider normalization.
JAFAJ assesses with high confidence that Iran will continue efforts to impede normalization efforts through proxy organizations, cyber operations, diplomatic pressure, and information campaigns as regional security cooperation deepens.
The future success of the Abraham Accords will be measured less by additional signing ceremonies than by the depth of practical integration in intelligence sharing, missile defense, trade, critical infrastructure, technology, and investment.
THE END OF A CONGRESSIONAL ERA
Senator Lindsey Graham occupied a role in American foreign policy that extended well beyond the traditional responsibilities of a legislator. While formal diplomacy remained the responsibility of the executive branch, Graham became one of Washington’s most effective unofficial strategic intermediaries, maintaining trusted relationships with presidents, Israeli leaders, Gulf monarchies, senior military officials, and congressional leadership.
This unique network allowed Graham to reinforce American policy through personal diplomacy. His influence frequently derived not from statutory authority, but from credibility, access, and the confidence he enjoyed among regional decision-makers. In an era when political polarization increasingly complicated bipartisan foreign policy, Graham remained one of the few members of Congress capable of communicating directly with multiple centers of power while retaining influence across successive presidential administrations.
From an intelligence perspective, Graham’s strategic value rested in his ability to reduce political friction between governments pursuing common security objectives. He helped translate executive policy into sustained congressional support while simultaneously providing regional partners with confidence that American commitments extended beyond changes in presidential administrations.
His passing therefore represents more than the loss of an experienced senator.
It marks the disappearance of one of the last American policymakers whose influence depended as much upon enduring personal relationships as formal institutional authority.
Whether another individual can replicate that role is uncertain.
Whether that role is still necessary is the central question examined in this assessment.
THE ABRAHAM ACCORDS HAVE MOVED BEYOND THEIR FOUNDERS
The Abraham Accords no longer depend on any single American political figure.
Since their signing in 2020, normalization has expanded beyond symbolic diplomatic recognition into practical cooperation. Intelligence sharing, defense coordination, investment, energy development, cybersecurity, tourism, artificial intelligence, and technology partnerships have become central components of regional engagement.
These developments have created vested interests among participating governments, private industry, and security institutions. As a result, the Accords have become increasingly resilient to changes in political leadership.
The fundamental strategic logic that produced the Accords remains largely unchanged:
concern over Iran’s regional ambitions,
economic diversification across Gulf economies,
technological cooperation with Israel,
enhanced regional security,
and continued American engagement in the Middle East.
These drivers continue to exist regardless of congressional turnover.
WHY THIS MATTERS
The evolution of the Abraham Accords carries implications well beyond Arab-Israeli relations.
For the United States, successful normalization represents an opportunity to transition from direct regional management toward a security model in which capable regional partners assume greater responsibility for collective defense, intelligence cooperation, maritime security, critical infrastructure protection, and economic resilience. Such a transition has the potential to reduce demands on American military resources while preserving U.S. strategic influence in one of the world’s most consequential regions.
Conversely, failure of the normalization process would likely reinforce longstanding regional rivalries, expand opportunities for Iranian influence, complicate efforts to counter violent extremist organizations, and increase the probability that future crises require more direct American diplomatic or military involvement.
Accordingly, the future of the Abraham Accords should be viewed not simply as a regional diplomatic initiative, but as a significant indicator of whether the Middle East is moving toward a more self-sustaining security architecture or returning to a pattern of recurring instability that places greater demands upon the United States and its allies.
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
The death of Senator Lindsey Graham is significant not because it creates a vacancy in the United States Senate, but because it marks the passing of one of the last American policymakers who exercised influence through personal diplomacy as much as legislative authority.
For more than two decades, Graham occupied a unique position within American foreign policy. He maintained direct relationships with presidents, Israeli prime ministers, Gulf monarchs, senior military commanders, and congressional leadership. In many respects, he functioned as an unofficial strategic intermediary—someone capable of carrying messages, building consensus, and reinforcing U.S. commitments outside formal diplomatic channels.
The more important strategic question, however, is not who replaces Lindsey Graham.
It is whether the center of gravity in Middle East diplomacy has permanently shifted away from Washington.
When the Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, American leadership was indispensable. Today, the political, economic, and security incentives supporting normalization increasingly originate within the region itself. Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and potentially Saudi Arabia now possess independent national interests that encourage continued cooperation regardless of which party controls Congress or who occupies individual Senate seats.
If that assessment is correct, then Graham’s passing represents something larger than the loss of a respected senator. It marks the symbolic conclusion of an era in which American political leadership served as the principal engine of Arab-Israeli normalization. The next phase will be driven less by Washington and more by the strategic calculations of Jerusalem, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Cairo, and Amman.
That evolution may ultimately prove to be the Abraham Accords’ greatest achievement. Diplomatic agreements become durable not when they are protected by political personalities, but when participating nations conclude that cooperation advances their national interests more effectively than confrontation.
The first phase of the Accords demonstrated that diplomatic normalization between Israel and Arab states was politically possible. The second phase will determine whether normalization evolves into a permanent regional security architecture capable of surviving changes in governments, elections, military crises, and leadership transitions.
This distinction is significant.
The strategic value of the Abraham Accords no longer rests primarily on diplomatic recognition. It now rests on integrated missile defense, intelligence cooperation, cybersecurity partnerships, joint military planning, infrastructure investment, artificial intelligence, water security, energy development, and expanding commercial ties. As these relationships deepen, the political cost of reversing normalization increases substantially for participating governments.
Iran’s Strategic Dilemma
For Tehran, the Abraham Accords represent more than a diplomatic setback; they threaten a core element of Iran’s long-term regional strategy.
For decades, Iranian policy has benefited from a fragmented Middle East in which Arab governments viewed Israel primarily as a political adversary rather than a strategic partner. That division complicated regional security cooperation, limited intelligence sharing, and reduced the likelihood of a coordinated response to Iranian military activities or proxy operations.
The Abraham Accords gradually reverse those conditions.
As normalization expands, regional governments gain stronger incentives to coordinate intelligence, integrate missile-defense capabilities, improve maritime security, protect critical infrastructure, and develop common approaches to emerging cyber threats. Each additional layer of institutional cooperation increases the strategic cost to Iran of coercive diplomacy and proxy warfare.
Consequently, Tehran’s objective extends beyond preventing additional normalization agreements. Iran has a broader interest in preventing the emergence of a durable regional security architecture capable of coordinating political, military, economic, and intelligence activities among Israel, Gulf states, and the United States.
From an intelligence perspective, this distinction is important.
Iran is likely to oppose not only new diplomatic agreements but also the quieter expansion of joint military planning, intelligence cooperation, infrastructure investment, technology partnerships, and integrated defense systems that collectively give the Abraham Accords their long-term strategic value.
Hamas faces a parallel dilemma.
The organization’s political legitimacy has long rested upon the assumption that widespread Arab acceptance of Israel would remain impossible until the Palestinian issue was resolved. Every additional normalization initiative weakens that narrative while shifting regional priorities toward economic development, technological cooperation, and collective security. Consequently, Hamas retains a strong incentive to disrupt normalization through violence, political agitation, or actions intended to trigger broader regional confrontation.
Jordan and Egypt occupy a different strategic position. Both governments have longstanding peace agreements with Israel and are likely to continue serving as stabilizing actors. Neither is expected to lead expansion of the Abraham Accords, but both have significant interests in preventing regional escalation, preserving economic stability, and maintaining close security cooperation with the United States and Israel. Their continued participation lends institutional credibility to the broader normalization process.
The decisive variable remains Saudi Arabia.
No country possesses greater potential to reshape the strategic balance of the Middle East. Saudi accession to the Abraham Accords would extend normalization beyond bilateral diplomacy into the political and religious center of the Arab world. Such a development would likely encourage additional Muslim-majority nations to reconsider their own relationships with Israel while accelerating regional investment, transportation, technology, and defense integration. Although substantial political obstacles remain—including security guarantees, Palestinian governance, and regional stability—the strategic incentives for eventual Saudi participation continue to grow.
The United Arab Emirates is expected to remain the practical engine of the Accords. Abu Dhabi has consistently demonstrated that normalization can produce measurable economic and technological benefits while maintaining pragmatic relations with multiple regional actors. The UAE model increasingly serves as a template for other governments evaluating the long-term advantages of normalization.
Taken together, these developments suggest that leadership of the Abraham Accords is becoming increasingly decentralized. Rather than relying on a single American political champion, the initiative is evolving into a network of governments, defense establishments, intelligence services, financial institutions, and private-sector partnerships that collectively possess far greater resilience than any individual political figure.
JAFAJ Assessment
History may ultimately conclude that Lindsey Graham’s greatest contribution to the Abraham Accords was not his advocacy for their creation, but his role in helping move them beyond the point where they depended upon him. Successful geopolitical initiatives become enduring not because their architects remain in office, but because participating nations conclude that cooperation serves their national interests better than confrontation.
The Abraham Accords appear to be approaching that threshold. If this assessment proves correct, Graham’s passing will mark the end of an important chapter in Middle East diplomacy—not the end of the story, but the beginning of a new phase in which the success of normalization will be measured not by political speeches or signing ceremonies, but by the strength of the strategic institutions that emerge in their wake.
WHO IS MOST LIKELY TO PICK UP THE LEAD?
The search for a single successor to Senator Lindsey Graham may overstate the importance of individual leadership.
JAFAJ assesses that the future of the Abraham Accords will depend less upon identifying another congressional champion than upon the ability of multiple institutions to sustain strategic momentum simultaneously. The White House will continue shaping executive policy, Congress will provide legislative oversight and political support, regional governments will determine the pace of normalization, defense establishments will deepen military cooperation, and private-sector investment will reinforce the economic incentives that make normalization increasingly durable.
Accordingly, leadership of the Abraham Accords is expected to become increasingly distributed rather than concentrated.
Instead of asking who replaces Lindsey Graham, policymakers should ask which leaders are best positioned to advance specific components of the normalization agenda. The following individuals are therefore assessed as the most influential contributors to the Accords’ next phase—not as Graham’s successors, but as leaders whose respective institutions collectively shape the future of regional normalization.
President Donald Trump
If any individual assumes Graham’s role as the public face of normalization, it will almost certainly be President Trump.
The Abraham Accords remain one of the signature foreign-policy achievements of his administration, and current diplomatic efforts suggest the White House continues to view expansion of the Accords as a strategic priority. Trump’s direct relationships with Gulf leaders, combined with his close ties to Prime Minister Netanyahu, give him unmatched leverage in shaping the next phase of regional diplomacy.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio
The day-to-day diplomatic effort is likely to fall increasingly to Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
Rubio combines strong congressional foreign-policy credentials with longstanding support for Israel and an emphasis on countering Iranian influence. As Secretary of State, he is positioned to translate presidential objectives into sustained diplomatic engagement with regional partners.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
No leader has invested more political capital in expanding regional normalization than Netanyahu.
Israel views additional normalization agreements not simply as diplomatic victories but as components of a broader regional security architecture. Netanyahu is therefore expected to remain one of the strongest advocates for expanding the Accords, particularly with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
Saudi Arabia remains the strategic prize.
If Riyadh ultimately joins the Abraham Accords, it would fundamentally alter the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Although normalization remains tied to broader regional security considerations and Palestinian issues, Saudi participation would likely encourage additional Arab and Muslim-majority nations to follow.
For that reason, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman may ultimately become the most influential regional figure in determining the Accords’ future.
CAN CONGRESS PRODUCE ANOTHER GRAHAM?
Perhaps not another Lindsey Graham—but Congress is unlikely to leave the position vacant.
Graham’s greatest strength was not simply his voting record. He combined foreign-policy expertise, personal relationships with world leaders, credibility within the national security community, and direct access to multiple presidential administrations. Those qualities are difficult to replicate in a single individual.
Instead, JAFAJ assesses that responsibility will likely be shared among several senior lawmakers.
Senator Tom Cotton (Arkansas)
Tom Cotton is perhaps the most likely successor from a national security perspective.
A former Army officer with extensive experience on defense and intelligence issues, Cotton has consistently supported Israel, advocated a hard line against Iran, and maintained strong credibility within Republican foreign-policy circles. While he lacks Graham’s decades-long diplomatic relationships, he possesses many of the strategic credentials necessary to become one of Congress’s leading voices on Middle East security.
Senator Ted Cruz (Texas)
Ted Cruz has become one of the Senate’s most outspoken defenders of Israel and has repeatedly supported expanding Arab-Israeli normalization.
His influence extends beyond legislation through his visibility in conservative media and his ability to mobilize political support among Republican voters. Cruz is likely to continue championing policies that strengthen the Abraham Accords and counter Iranian regional influence.
Senator Jim Risch (Idaho)
As Chairman (or senior Republican leader, depending on Senate organization) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jim Risch may ultimately exercise the greatest institutional influence.
Unlike Graham, Risch generally operates with less public visibility, but his committee position gives him substantial authority over foreign-policy legislation, diplomatic oversight, and confirmation of senior State Department officials. His influence may prove more procedural than political, yet no less significant.
JAFAJ Assessment
Rather than producing another Lindsey Graham, Congress is more likely to divide his responsibilities among multiple senators—one providing strategic vision, another public advocacy, and another institutional leadership. The result may actually produce a more durable congressional foundation for the Abraham Accords.
STRATEGIC BENEFICIARIES AND LOSERS
Major geopolitical developments rarely produce equal outcomes. The continuing evolution of the Abraham Accords is expected to redistribute political influence, economic opportunity, and regional security advantages across the Middle East. As leadership transitions following Senator Graham’s passing, JAFAJ assesses that the following actors are positioned to gain—or lose—the most over the next five years.
Strategic Beneficiaries
Israel
Israel remains the principal long-term beneficiary of expanding normalization. Every additional Arab partner reduces Israel’s diplomatic isolation while increasing regional intelligence cooperation, missile defense integration, trade, tourism, and investment. Most importantly, normalization allows Israel to shift greater strategic attention from regional legitimacy toward confronting shared security threats.
Saudi Arabia
If Riyadh ultimately joins the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia could emerge as the political center of a new regional security framework. Participation would expand access to Israeli technology, strengthen defense cooperation with the United States, attract additional foreign investment, and reinforce the Kingdom’s role as a leading Arab power.
United Arab Emirates
The UAE has already demonstrated that normalization can generate measurable economic returns. As additional nations consider participation, Abu Dhabi is well positioned to become the financial, technological, and logistical hub connecting Israel with the broader Gulf region.
The United States
Although leadership may become increasingly regional, the United States remains the indispensable external security guarantor. A broader normalization network reduces the long-term burden on U.S. forces by encouraging regional partners to assume greater responsibility for collective security while preserving American strategic influence.
Strategic Losers
Iran
Iran faces the greatest strategic challenge.
The Abraham Accords steadily weaken Tehran’s long-standing objective of preventing cooperation between Israel and Arab governments. Every new security partnership reduces Iran’s ability to isolate Israel diplomatically while increasing the possibility of coordinated regional responses to Iranian military or proxy activities.
Hamas
Hamas derives much of its political legitimacy from opposition to normalization. As additional Arab governments deepen cooperation with Israel, Hamas risks increasing political isolation unless it can successfully reframe the regional debate or disrupt normalization through renewed conflict.
Hezbollah
A stronger regional security architecture—particularly one emphasizing intelligence sharing and integrated air and missile defense—would reduce Hezbollah’s operational freedom and complicate Iran’s ability to project influence through Lebanese territory.
Extremist Organizations
Militant organizations that depend upon perpetual regional instability are likely to encounter greater intelligence cooperation, improved border security, enhanced financial monitoring, and broader diplomatic coordination among participating states.
JAFAJ Net Assessment
The strategic balance is gradually shifting away from ideological confrontation and toward pragmatic cooperation based on shared national interests. The principal beneficiaries are governments seeking stability, investment, technological development, and collective security. The principal losers are those whose political influence depends upon sustaining regional conflict and preventing Arab-Israeli cooperation.
STRATEGIC OUTLOOK
The Middle East is entering a transition from conflict management to strategic competition.
Military operations will remain important, but the principal contest over the next decade may center on diplomacy, economic integration, technological cooperation, and regional security alliances.
Israel
Israel will almost certainly continue making expansion of the Abraham Accords one of its highest foreign-policy priorities.
Jerusalem is expected to deepen defense cooperation with existing partners, expand intelligence sharing, pursue additional regional infrastructure projects, and continue encouraging Saudi participation. Israeli leaders increasingly view normalization as a long-term national security strategy rather than simply a diplomatic achievement.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia remains the decisive strategic prize.
Should Riyadh formally recognize Israel, the geopolitical balance of the Middle East would shift dramatically. Such a decision would likely encourage additional Muslim-majority nations to consider normalization while accelerating regional investment, technology partnerships, aviation links, and energy cooperation.
United Arab Emirates
The UAE will likely continue serving as the Accords’ economic engine.
Abu Dhabi is expected to expand investment partnerships with Israel while carefully maintaining working economic relations with Iran. This balanced approach reflects the UAE’s broader strategy of maximizing regional stability without becoming overly dependent on any single alliance.
Jordan
Jordan is expected to remain one of the region’s most cautious partners.
Amman’s security relationship with Israel remains essential, yet domestic political sensitivities surrounding the Palestinian issue will likely limit the government’s willingness to embrace highly visible normalization initiatives. Jordan will probably continue emphasizing regional stability, border security, water cooperation, and intelligence coordination while avoiding steps that could inflame internal opposition.
Egypt
Egypt is likely to continue serving as a diplomatic mediator.
Cairo maintains long-standing peace with Israel and remains indispensable in negotiations involving Gaza, border security, and ceasefire arrangements. Egypt’s role as an intermediary between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Arab governments is expected to grow as regional diplomacy becomes increasingly complex.
Hamas
Hamas faces perhaps its most uncertain strategic environment since taking control of Gaza.
Military losses, international isolation, and growing pressure from Arab governments could significantly reduce its political influence. To remain relevant, Hamas may seek to disrupt normalization through renewed violence, propaganda campaigns, or efforts to provoke broader regional crises. The organization understands that every new normalization agreement weakens its long-standing narrative that Israel cannot be accepted within the Arab world.
Iran
Iran remains the Abraham Accords’ principal strategic opponent.
Tehran views normalization as an effort to build an informal regional coalition designed to contain Iranian influence. Consequently, Iran is expected to continue employing proxy organizations, cyber capabilities, diplomatic pressure, and asymmetric operations to discourage additional Arab participation.
Iran’s broader objective is unlikely to change: preventing the emergence of a unified regional security architecture aligned with the United States and Israel.
Syria
The trajectory of Syria will depend largely on the durability of its current political transition and the extent of external influence.
If the new government consolidates authority, Damascus may prioritize reconstruction, sanctions relief, and regional reintegration over confrontation with Israel. However, unresolved territorial disputes, Iranian influence, and internal security challenges could continue to complicate any movement toward broader regional normalization. Syria is therefore more likely to remain an observer than an active participant in the Abraham Accords over the near term.
Turkey
Turkey is expected to continue balancing strategic competition with pragmatic engagement.
Ankara will likely maintain support for the Palestinian cause while preserving economic ties with Israel and seeking to expand its regional influence. Turkish policy will probably remain transactional, adjusting to changes in regional security and domestic political priorities rather than aligning fully with or against the Abraham Accords.
MONITORING INDICATORS
Intelligence assessments should be judged not only by the logic of their conclusions but also by whether observable developments support or contradict those judgments. JAFAJ identifies the following indicators as the most important measures of whether the Abraham Accords continue to gain strategic momentum over the next five years.
Indicator 1 — Saudi Arabia’s Diplomatic Position
The single most significant indicator will be Riyadh’s willingness to expand formal or informal cooperation with Israel. Progress in security coordination, civil aviation, commercial investment, technology partnerships, or public diplomatic engagement would suggest that normalization continues moving forward despite political obstacles.
Indicator 2 — Regional Defense Integration
Increasing cooperation in missile defense, intelligence sharing, cybersecurity, naval security, and joint military planning would demonstrate that the Abraham Accords are evolving beyond diplomacy into a functional regional security architecture.
Indicator 3 — Economic Integration
Growth in bilateral trade, cross-border investment, transportation links, tourism, energy projects, artificial intelligence partnerships, and digital infrastructure will provide measurable evidence that participating governments view normalization as a long-term strategic investment rather than a temporary political initiative.
Indicator 4 — Iranian Response
Changes in Iranian proxy activity, cyber operations, political messaging, and diplomatic initiatives should be closely monitored. An increase in efforts to disrupt regional cooperation would suggest that Tehran views continued normalization as a growing strategic threat.
Indicator 5 — Congressional Engagement
The degree to which Congress continues supporting security cooperation, defense assistance, and normalization initiatives following Senator Graham’s passing will provide an important measure of whether bipartisan institutional support remains durable.
Indicator 6 — Expansion of Participation
Formal participation by additional Arab or Muslim-majority states—or significant movement toward such participation—would represent one of the strongest indicators that the Abraham Accords have become a durable feature of the regional political landscape rather than a temporary diplomatic achievement.
JAFAJ Intelligence Assessment
If these indicators continue to trend positively over the next five years, the Abraham Accords will likely be remembered not simply as a diplomatic breakthrough, but as the foundation of a new Middle Eastern security and economic order. Conversely, sustained deterioration across multiple indicators would suggest that normalization remains vulnerable to political change, regional conflict, or renewed great-power competition.
ALTERNATIVE ASSESSMENTS
While JAFAJ assesses that the Abraham Accords are becoming increasingly institutionalized, alternative outcomes remain plausible.
One competing assessment argues that the Accords remain heavily dependent upon sustained American political leadership. Under this view, changes in U.S. foreign policy, shifting congressional priorities, prolonged regional conflict, or renewed disagreement over the Palestinian issue could significantly slow or even reverse the pace of normalization.
A second assessment suggests that normalization may continue economically while stalling politically. Governments could expand trade, investment, technology partnerships, and security cooperation without pursuing additional formal diplomatic recognition, resulting in a less visible—but still meaningful—evolution of the Accords.
JAFAJ considers both outcomes possible.
However, current evidence favors the assessment that institutional cooperation is expanding more rapidly than political rhetoric. Growing defense coordination, intelligence sharing, infrastructure investment, and commercial integration suggest that normalization increasingly rests upon enduring strategic interests rather than temporary political alignment.
Consequently, JAFAJ assesses that the long-term trajectory of the Abraham Accords remains positive, although the pace of expansion will likely vary according to regional security conditions and domestic political developments.
JAFAJ STRATEGIC FORECAST (2026–2031)
JAFAJ assesses that the defining challenge of the next five years is no longer achieving normalization, but consolidating it.
The strategic objective has shifted from negotiating diplomatic recognition to building durable institutions capable of sustaining defense cooperation, intelligence integration, economic development, technological innovation, and regional security regardless of future political leadership or changes in government.
Over the next five years, the defining indicators will not be the number of signing ceremonies but the depth of cooperation in missile defense, intelligence sharing, cybersecurity, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, energy, trade, and transportation.
Lindsey Graham’s passing closes an important chapter in the Accords’ political history. The more consequential question is no longer who replaces Lindsey Graham, but whether the strategic interests binding Israel, the Gulf states, and the United States have become strong enough to make the Abraham Accords effectively irreversible.
JAFAJ FINAL ASSESSMENT
The death of Senator Lindsey Graham closes an important chapter in the history of the Abraham Accords, but it is unlikely to alter their long-term trajectory. The strategic forces that produced normalization in 2020 are stronger today than they were at the time of the Accords’ signing. Shared concerns over Iranian regional ambitions, expanding economic integration, technological cooperation, and evolving regional security requirements continue to reinforce incentives for cooperation among participating states.
The more significant development is the changing nature of leadership itself.
During the first phase of the Abraham Accords, American political leadership provided the diplomatic momentum necessary to overcome decades of mistrust. The next phase is expected to be driven increasingly by regional governments pursuing their own national interests. As the practical benefits of cooperation expand—from missile defense and intelligence sharing to trade, investment, artificial intelligence, and critical infrastructure—the Accords become progressively more resistant to changes in political leadership in Washington or elsewhere.
For that reason, Senator Graham’s passing should not be viewed as a test of whether another American politician can assume his role. The more important test is whether the institutions created during the first phase of normalization have matured sufficiently to sustain strategic cooperation without relying upon a single political champion.
JAFAJ assesses with high confidence that they have.
This judgment does not imply that future setbacks are unlikely. Armed conflict, domestic political change, leadership transitions, shifts in U.S. policy, or renewed great-power competition could all slow or complicate the pace of normalization. Nevertheless, the underlying incentives encouraging cooperation among Israel, several Arab governments, and the United States appear stronger than the political forces seeking to reverse them.
History rarely identifies the precise moment when a diplomatic initiative becomes permanent. More often, that transformation is recognized only in retrospect, after institutions prove capable of surviving wars, elections, and changes in leadership.
JAFAJ assesses that the Abraham Accords are approaching that threshold.
If this assessment proves correct, Lindsey Graham’s enduring legacy will not be that he championed the Abraham Accords. It will be that he helped advance them to the point where their future depended less on individual leadership than on the strategic interests of the nations themselves.
The defining question for the next decade is therefore no longer whether the Abraham Accords will survive.
It is whether they will become the foundation upon which a new Middle Eastern security order is built.
This article is an analytical assessment. Forecasts and judgments represent JAFAJ’s strategic analysis based on current diplomatic developments, public statements, and observable regional trends, rather than predictions of future events.
Lindsey Grahams Passing: who Will Carry the Abraham Accords Forward Now? Read More »
Automation vs. Autonomy: The Race to Define the Next Generation of Battlefield Drones – when machines start making decisions
JAFAJ Strategic Intelligence Report
Artificial Intelligence | Defense Technology | Autonomous Weapons | Military Innovation | Future Warfare
KEY JUDGMENTS
The next revolution in military drones will not be driven by faster aircraft or larger payloads, but by the degree of decision-making delegated to machines.
Defense industries worldwide are moving from automated drone systems—where humans remain in control—to increasingly autonomous systems capable of identifying, prioritizing, and engaging targets with minimal human intervention.
The distinction between automation and autonomy will become one of the most consequential defense policy debates of the coming decade, affecting military doctrine, international law, ethics, and battlefield effectiveness.
Nations that successfully integrate artificial intelligence, secure communications, resilient electronic warfare protection, and human oversight will gain significant operational advantages.
The United States, China, Israel, Turkey, Russia, and several European nations are competing to establish technological leadership in autonomous combat systems, creating an emerging AI arms race that extends beyond traditional weapons development.
Imagine an armed reconnaissance drone flying over hostile territory when enemy electronic warfare suddenly severs its communications with headquarters.
Until recently, the mission would have ended there. The aircraft would either return to base or remain frozen, waiting for instructions that might never arrive.
Tomorrow’s battlefield may look very different.
Instead of waiting, the drone could continue its mission independently. It could navigate around threats, identify hostile vehicles, distinguish military targets from civilian objects, prioritize emerging threats, coordinate with nearby unmanned aircraft, and recommend—or even execute—a strike before communications are restored.
That possibility lies at the center of one of the most consequential military debates of the twenty-first century.
Who should make the final decision?
A human commander…
or the machine itself?
THE NEXT WAR MAY BE DECIDED BY A SINGLE QUESTION
Who makes the final decision?
For decades, military planners measured battlefield superiority by counting tanks, aircraft, missiles, and soldiers.
Today, an equally important question is emerging:
Will humans continue to control battlefield drones, or will artificial intelligence increasingly make combat decisions on its own?
The answer could reshape military doctrine as profoundly as the invention of radar, jet aircraft, or precision-guided weapons.
The debate is no longer theoretical.
Artificial intelligence has advanced to the point where many of the technologies needed for autonomous combat already exist.
The remaining question is not whether autonomy is technically possible—it is how much autonomy governments are willing to permit.
AUTOMATION AND AUTONOMY ARE NOT THE SAME
The terms are often used interchangeably, but they describe fundamentally different concepts.
An automated drone follows predefined instructions.
It can maintain altitude, navigate waypoints, avoid obstacles, or return to base after completing a mission.
The human operator still makes the critical decisions, including whether to authorize the use of force.
An autonomous drone goes significantly further.
Using artificial intelligence, machine learning, sensor fusion, and advanced algorithms, it can evaluate its environment, identify potential threats, prioritize objectives, adapt to changing conditions, and—in some configurations—select and engage targets without requiring real-time human approval.
The distinction is subtle but profound.
Automation assists human operators.
Autonomy can replace portions of human decision-making.
That shift has enormous implications for military operations.
WHY MILITARIES WANT GREATER AUTONOMY
Modern battlefields generate more information than any human staff can process. Military commanders are increasingly confronting a problem of cognitive overload rather than firepower. Modern conflicts generate millions of data points every hour—from satellites, drones, radar systems, cyber networks, electronic intelligence platforms, and ground sensors. No command staff, regardless of its size or experience, can evaluate that volume of information quickly enough to exploit fleeting battlefield opportunities. Artificial intelligence is therefore evolving from a technological advantage into an operational necessity.
Satellites, drones, aircraft, radar systems, electronic intelligence platforms, cyber networks, and ground sensors produce enormous volumes of data every second.
Artificial intelligence offers a solution.
Instead of requiring human operators to analyze every signal manually, AI can:
Detect threats within milliseconds.
Correlate information from multiple sensors.
Recommend courses of action.
Allocate drones across multiple objectives.
Adapt missions as battlefield conditions evolve.
Continue operations when communications are disrupted.
In highly contested environments, where electronic warfare may interrupt communications with remote operators, greater autonomy also improves operational resilience.
A drone that can continue its mission after losing contact with headquarters may prove significantly more effective than one awaiting instructions that never arrive.
THE LESSONS OF UKRAINE
The war in Ukraine has become the world’s largest laboratory for drone warfare.
Thousands of unmanned aerial systems now perform reconnaissance, artillery spotting, logistics, electronic warfare, precision strikes, and battlefield surveillance every day.
The conflict has demonstrated both the strengths and limitations of current drone technology.
Operators frequently lose communications because of electronic jamming.
GPS signals are routinely disrupted.
Drone control links are attacked.
Artificial intelligence increasingly fills these gaps by enabling aircraft to navigate, identify objects, avoid obstacles, and continue missions despite degraded communications.
The result is an accelerating demand for higher levels of autonomy.
Perhaps the most important lesson emerging from Ukraine is that electronic warfare can often neutralize sophisticated weapons without destroying them. A drone that loses its communications link is frequently as ineffective as one that has been shot down. This reality is reshaping military procurement priorities. Instead of simply building larger fleets of unmanned aircraft, defense planners are increasingly demanding systems capable of navigating, adapting, and completing missions independently when communications are degraded or denied.
Every operational lesson learned in Ukraine is influencing defense procurement worldwide.
THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE SWARMS
One of the most significant advances in autonomous systems is the development of drone swarms.
Rather than controlling dozens of aircraft individually, future operators may supervise hundreds of autonomous drones working together.
Each drone shares information with the others.
If one aircraft is destroyed, the remaining members of the swarm automatically redistribute tasks.
Targets are identified collectively.
Flight paths change dynamically.
Electronic attacks are coordinated automatically.
The swarm behaves less like individual aircraft and more like a single distributed intelligence.
This concept dramatically increases operational flexibility while overwhelming traditional air-defense systems.
Several nations are already conducting experiments involving autonomous swarm technologies.
THE HUMAN FACTOR REMAINS CRITICAL
Despite rapid advances, most military organizations continue to insist that humans retain ultimate responsibility for decisions involving lethal force.
The principle is often described as “human in the loop.”
Other concepts include:
Human on the loop – AI performs most functions while humans supervise and intervene when necessary.
Human out of the loop – Fully autonomous systems operate without direct human involvement once activated.
Most Western militaries currently favor maintaining meaningful human control over lethal decisions.
However, technological capabilities continue advancing faster than international regulations.
The gap between what machines can do and what governments permit them to do continues to narrow.
THE ELECTRONIC WARFARE CHALLENGE
Autonomous drones must survive in one of the most hostile environments ever created.
Future battlefields will feature:
GPS denial.
Communications jamming.
Cyberattacks.
Radar deception.
Electronic spoofing.
Directed-energy weapons.
Artificial intelligence designed to deceive opposing AI.
Success will depend upon systems capable of operating independently while recognizing attempts to manipulate their sensors or decision-making algorithms.
This makes electronic warfare protection just as important as artificial intelligence itself.
THE GLOBAL COMPETITION
The competition to develop autonomous military systems is no longer simply a race to build better drones. It is increasingly a contest to dominate the technologies that will define future military power, including artificial intelligence, advanced sensors, secure communications, electronic warfare, edge computing, and resilient software architectures. Nations that successfully integrate these capabilities into coherent operational systems are likely to gain disproportionate military advantages over competitors that continue relying primarily on traditional platforms.
United States
The Pentagon is investing heavily in collaborative combat aircraft, autonomous wingmen, AI-assisted targeting, and large-scale drone initiatives intended to offset growing military competition with China.
China
China has made autonomous systems a national strategic priority, combining advances in artificial intelligence, commercial drone manufacturing, and military modernization into an integrated development strategy.
Israel
Israel continues to lead in battlefield drone innovation, integrating artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, intelligence collection, and precision strike capabilities into highly sophisticated operational systems.
Turkey
Turkey’s defense industry has transformed the global drone market by combining affordability with increasingly advanced autonomous features, making its systems attractive to nations seeking cost-effective alternatives.
Russia
Operational experience in Ukraine is driving Russian investments in autonomous navigation, loitering munitions, and AI-assisted target recognition despite continuing challenges posed by sanctions and supply-chain constraints.
THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL BATTLE
The technological debate is rapidly becoming a legal one.
International organizations, human rights groups, and many governments are calling for new rules governing lethal autonomous weapons systems.
Key questions include:
Who bears responsibility if an autonomous weapon makes a fatal error?
How should AI distinguish civilians from combatants in complex urban environments?
Can machines comply with the principles of proportionality and distinction under international humanitarian law?
Should fully autonomous lethal weapons be prohibited altogether?
No global consensus currently exists.
The outcome of this debate will extend far beyond the battlefield. Decisions made today about military artificial intelligence are likely to influence civilian robotics, autonomous transportation, emergency response systems, commercial aviation, cybersecurity standards, and the legal frameworks governing machine decision-making. As military AI becomes more sophisticated, many of its underlying technologies are expected to migrate into the commercial economy, making today’s defense policies tomorrow’s public policy challenges.
As a result, technological development continues to outpace international regulation.
WHAT TO WATCH
JaFaJ analysts will monitor several developments over the next five years:
Deployment of AI-enabled collaborative combat aircraft.
Operational use of fully autonomous drone swarms.
International negotiations on autonomous weapons regulations.
Integration of AI with electronic warfare systems.
Advances in edge computing that allow drones to process data without relying on remote cloud infrastructure.
Commercial AI breakthroughs that rapidly migrate into military applications.
Regional adoption of autonomous systems across the Middle East.
JAFAJ STRATEGIC OUTLOOK
The future of battlefield drones will not be determined by airframe design alone. It will be defined by intelligence—specifically, how much intelligence is embedded within the aircraft itself and how much authority commanders are willing to delegate to algorithms.
Automation improves efficiency by helping human operators perform existing tasks more effectively.
Autonomy changes the nature of warfare by enabling machines to perceive, decide, adapt, and act with unprecedented speed.
The strategic advantages are obvious: faster decision cycles, reduced communications dependence, greater survivability, and the ability to manage increasingly complex operations.
The strategic risks are equally significant: unintended escalation, algorithmic error, cyber manipulation, and unresolved questions of accountability.
For defense planners, the central challenge is no longer whether autonomous systems will become part of future warfare—they already are.
The real question is where governments choose to draw the line between human judgment and machine decision-making.
For JaFaJ readers, one conclusion stands above all others: the future balance of military power will increasingly be determined not by the number of drones a nation possesses, but by the intelligence embedded within them and the judgment governing their use. History remembers the invention of gunpowder, aircraft, radar, and nuclear weapons because each fundamentally changed the character of warfare. Artificial intelligence may represent the next transformation. The nations that succeed will not necessarily be those that build the largest autonomous fleets, but those that most effectively combine artificial intelligence, resilient electronic warfare protection, trusted human oversight, and adaptable military doctrine into a coherent system of decision advantage.
JAFAJ Strategic Intelligence Report
Defense Intelligence | Electronic Warfare | Israel | Military Technology | Middle East Security
KEY JUDGMENTS
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) has unveiled Ellyon, a next-generation electronic attack and intelligence-gathering platform that signals a significant advancement in Israel’s electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.
Ellyon reflects a broader transformation in modern warfare, where dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum is becoming as decisive as control of the air, land, sea, cyber, and space domains.
The platform is designed not only to detect and monitor hostile electronic emissions but also to actively shape the battlefield by disrupting enemy communications, sensors, radar systems, and command networks.
Israel’s continued investment in advanced EW technologies is likely to reinforce its qualitative military edge (QME) while prompting regional adversaries—including Iran and Hezbollah—to accelerate investments in counter-electronic warfare capabilities.
The introduction of Ellyon underscores an emerging global defense trend: future conflicts may be won by disabling an adversary’s ability to communicate and detect threats rather than by destroying physical assets alone.
A WAR CAN NOW BE LOST BEFORE THE FIRST SHOT IS FIRED
For centuries, military victory has been measured by visible destruction. Armies counted enemy tanks destroyed, aircraft shot down, ships sunk, and territory captured. Even the precision-guided revolution of the late twentieth century remained centered on kinetic effects—the physical destruction of military targets.
That assumption is rapidly becoming outdated.
The next generation of warfare may be decided before the first missile is launched or the first bomb is dropped. Instead of destroying an opponent’s forces outright, militaries are increasingly seeking to blind, confuse, isolate, and disrupt them by attacking the invisible networks upon which modern combat depends.
Communications, radar systems, satellite navigation, electronic sensors, data links, and command networks now form the nervous system of every modern military. If those systems can be disrupted, manipulated, or denied, an opposing force may lose much of its combat effectiveness without suffering catastrophic physical losses.
Israel Aerospace Industries’ unveiling of Ellyon, a next-generation electronic attack and intelligence platform developed by Elta Systems, should therefore be viewed as far more than a new defense product. It is one of the clearest public indicators yet that military competition is entering a new era—one in which control of the electromagnetic spectrum may prove as decisive as control of the air, sea, land, cyber, or space domains.
THE INVISIBLE BATTLEFIELD
Every modern military operates inside an invisible environment that most people never see.
Fighter aircraft exchange encrypted data with airborne command centers. Missile-defense batteries receive targeting information from distant radar sites. Naval vessels coordinate through secure communications networks. Drones rely on satellite navigation and digital control links. Ground forces depend on wireless command systems to synchronize operations across rapidly changing battlefields.
Collectively, these electronic signals form the nervous system of modern warfare.
For decades, military planners concentrated on destroying enemy forces by attacking the platforms themselves—aircraft, tanks, missile launchers, ships, and command headquarters. Today, an increasing number of defense strategists are asking a different question:
Why destroy the platform if you can disable the network that allows it to fight?
A fighter aircraft that cannot receive targeting data becomes far less effective. A missile battery denied radar information becomes little more than expensive hardware. A drone that loses its navigation link may never reach its target. An army unable to communicate quickly can lose the initiative long before suffering significant casualties.
This shift represents one of the most important changes in military doctrine since the introduction of precision-guided weapons.
The objective is no longer simply to destroy an adversary’s combat power. Increasingly, it is to deny that adversary the ability to detect, communicate, coordinate, and make decisions. Victory may depend less on who possesses the largest arsenal than on who can see first, understand first, disrupt first, and act first.
Platforms such as Ellyon are designed for precisely this environment. Rather than serving solely as electronic intelligence collectors, they are becoming active participants in shaping the battlefield—detecting hostile emissions, identifying vulnerabilities, disrupting communications, deceiving sensors, and preserving the freedom of action of friendly forces before conventional combat begins.
THE FIRST GLOBAL ELECTROMAGNETIC ARMS RACE
Military revolutions rarely announce themselves. They emerge gradually as conflicts fought in different regions begin revealing the same underlying lesson.
That pattern is now becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.
In Ukraine, electronic warfare has evolved into a daily contest for control of drones, satellite navigation, communications, and battlefield awareness. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have repeatedly adapted their tactics as each side developed new methods of jamming, deception, and signal exploitation. The result has been a continuous cycle of innovation in which electronic superiority often determines whether precision weapons reach their targets at all.
In the Middle East, Israel has demonstrated an equally sophisticated reliance on electronic intelligence and spectrum dominance during operations against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iranian-backed organizations. While many operational details remain classified, publicly available evidence suggests that electronic surveillance, signals intelligence, cyber capabilities, and precision targeting have become increasingly integrated into Israeli military operations.
Across the Indo-Pacific, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the United States are investing heavily in electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, sensor fusion, and resilient command-and-control networks. NATO members are likewise accelerating investments in electromagnetic spectrum operations after observing the lessons emerging from Ukraine.
Although these conflicts differ in geography, politics, and military objectives, they point toward the same strategic conclusion.
The defining military competition of the next decade may not be the race to field more tanks, aircraft, or missiles. It may instead be the race to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum—the invisible battlespace through which modern militaries communicate, navigate, detect, coordinate, and fight.
Viewed through that broader strategic lens, Ellyon is more than another Israeli defense system. It is a visible manifestation of a military transformation that is already underway.
FROM ELECTRONIC WARFARE TO DECISION WARFARE
For most of military history, commanders sought to make better decisions than their adversaries. Superior intelligence, experienced leadership, and faster communications often determined victory as much as numerical strength.
Artificial intelligence is beginning to transform that equation.
Modern electronic warfare systems no longer serve merely as passive collectors of information. They are rapidly evolving into decision-support platforms capable of processing enormous volumes of electronic activity in seconds, identifying hostile emitters, recognizing previously unseen patterns, prioritizing threats, recommending countermeasures, and in some circumstances initiating electronic responses before a human operator could complete the same analysis.
The strategic advantage lies not simply in possessing more information, but in converting information into operational decisions faster than an adversary can react.
Military theorists have long emphasized that success depends upon completing the observe–orient–decide–act (OODA) cycle more rapidly than an opponent. Artificial intelligence now offers the possibility of compressing that cycle from minutes to seconds—and eventually from seconds to fractions of a second.
Although Israel Aerospace Industries has disclosed relatively little about Ellyon’s internal architecture, the platform reflects broader trends across advanced military research. Electronic intelligence, artificial intelligence, autonomous processing, and electronic attack are increasingly converging into integrated systems designed not only to understand the battlespace, but to shape it continuously in real time.
The significance of this evolution extends well beyond electronic warfare. Future military competition may increasingly reward the nation that can make accurate decisions first rather than the nation that simply possesses the largest inventory of weapons.
WHY ISRAEL IS LEADING THE ELECTROMAGNETIC REVOLUTION
Israel’s investment in electronic warfare is not simply the product of technological innovation—it is the logical consequence of decades of strategic necessity.
Unlike many larger military powers, Israel has long operated under the assumption that it cannot rely on numerical superiority during a prolonged regional conflict. Potential adversaries often possess larger populations, greater strategic depth, and, collectively, larger inventories of missiles, rockets, and conventional military equipment.
That reality has encouraged Israeli defense planners to pursue a different form of military advantage.
Rather than attempting to match adversaries platform for platform, Israel has consistently invested in technologies that increase the effectiveness of every aircraft, every missile-defense battery, every intelligence asset, and every military unit operating on the battlefield.
This philosophy has produced world-class expertise in electronic intelligence (ELINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), cyber operations, precision targeting, intelligence fusion, autonomous systems, and integrated air-defense networks. These capabilities are not independent disciplines. Increasingly, they operate as components of a single decision-making ecosystem in which sensors, communications, artificial intelligence, and electronic attack continuously reinforce one another.
Viewed in that context, Ellyon is not an isolated technological achievement. It is the latest expression of a long-standing Israeli doctrine: offset quantitative disadvantages through intelligence superiority, technological innovation, and faster operational decision-making.
As warfare becomes increasingly networked, that doctrine may prove relevant far beyond the Middle East. Militaries around the world are beginning to recognize that future combat effectiveness may depend less on fielding larger forces than on enabling smaller forces to see more clearly, communicate more securely, and act more quickly than their adversaries.
WHO RESPONDS NEXT?
Military innovations rarely remain one-sided for long. Every significant advance generates a countermeasure, and every countermeasure begins a new cycle of competition. JAFAJ assesses with high confidence that Ellyon’s introduction will accelerate an already expanding regional race for electromagnetic superiority rather than establish a permanent Israeli advantage.
The question is no longer whether neighboring states will respond. The question is how quickly—and in what ways.
Iran
Iran is likely to view Ellyon as further evidence that future conflicts with Israel will depend as much on electromagnetic resilience as on missile inventories. Tehran is expected to accelerate investment in hardened communications, passive detection systems, electronic deception, artificial intelligence, frequency-agile networks, and redundant command-and-control architectures designed to survive sustained electronic attack.
Rather than attempting to match Israel platform for platform, Iran will likely seek to complicate Israeli targeting by making its military networks more difficult to detect, identify, and disrupt.
Hezbollah
Hezbollah’s operational effectiveness increasingly depends upon reliable communications, precision targeting, and coordination among dispersed missile units. Any capability that threatens those networks reduces Hezbollah’s ability to synchronize large-scale operations.
Future adaptations may include greater use of fiber-optic communications, decentralized command structures, shorter electronic transmission times, and increased operational autonomy for field commanders in order to reduce exposure to Israeli electronic intelligence.
Syria
Although Syria’s conventional military capabilities remain limited, its territory continues to serve as a critical transit corridor for Iranian personnel, weapons, and logistical support.
Enhanced Israeli electronic attack capabilities could further complicate efforts to protect these supply routes by increasing Israel’s ability to detect, monitor, and disrupt military activity before kinetic strikes become necessary.
Turkey
Turkey has emerged as one of the world’s fastest-growing producers of drones, electronic warfare systems, and defense electronics.
An increasingly sophisticated Israeli electronic warfare capability is likely to intensify regional competition in artificial intelligence, spectrum operations, autonomous systems, and electronic attack technologies. Rather than focusing exclusively on traditional weapons, both countries may increasingly compete in the software-defined battlespace.
Gulf States
For the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and other regional partners, Ellyon reinforces the growing importance of integrated air defense, electronic resilience, and intelligence sharing.
Rather than viewing electronic warfare as a specialized military capability, Gulf defense planners are increasingly likely to treat it as a foundational element of national security planning alongside missile defense, cyber security, and space-based surveillance.
THE END OF THE KINETIC ERA?
For more than a century, military power has largely been measured through tangible assets—how many fighter aircraft, tanks, warships, missiles, or artillery systems a nation could deploy.
Those metrics are becoming increasingly incomplete.
The defining military advantage of the coming decades may not lie in possessing more weapons, but in ensuring those weapons can continue to operate while denying an adversary the same ability.
A fifth-generation fighter that cannot communicate securely is significantly less effective than its design specifications suggest. A precision-guided missile that loses satellite navigation may never reach its intended target. A sophisticated integrated air-defense network deprived of reliable sensor data becomes increasingly vulnerable to deception and electronic attack.
In each case, the platform itself remains physically intact. Yet its combat value can be dramatically reduced.
This represents a fundamental shift in military thinking.
Historically, victory required physically destroying an opponent’s military capability. Increasingly, future conflicts may reward forces capable of disrupting, delaying, deceiving, or degrading an adversary’s ability to make effective decisions while preserving their own operational freedom.
Military planners increasingly describe this as decision superiority—the ability to observe, understand, decide, and act faster than an opponent.
Electronic warfare, cyber operations, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and resilient communications are rapidly converging to make that objective achievable on an unprecedented scale.
Viewed through that lens, Ellyon is not simply another electronic warfare platform.
It is an investment in preserving decision superiority across every domain of modern conflict.
INDICATORS TO MONITOR
The following developments will help determine whether the assessment presented in this report is unfolding as expected. JAFAJ will continue monitoring these indicators over the next 12 to 24 months.
Indicator 1: Operational Employment
The first confirmed combat use of Ellyon by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will provide the clearest evidence that the platform has transitioned from development into operational doctrine. Particular attention should be paid to operations in which adversary communications, radar systems, or unmanned platforms experience unexplained degradation prior to kinetic strikes.
Indicator 2: Export Authorization
Approval to export Ellyon—or derivative technologies—to trusted partners would indicate Israeli confidence in the platform’s maturity while signaling a broader shift toward allied electromagnetic interoperability. Export restrictions, by contrast, may suggest the system remains strategically sensitive.
Indicator 3: Regional Countermeasures
Increased investment by Iran, Hezbollah, Turkey, or Gulf states in hardened communications, passive sensors, spectrum-management technologies, electronic deception, or distributed command-and-control networks would reinforce the assessment that regional militaries increasingly view electromagnetic resilience as a strategic necessity.
Indicator 4: AI Integration
Public evidence that artificial intelligence is assuming a larger role in electronic attack, spectrum management, target prioritization, or electronic intelligence analysis would suggest that military competition is evolving beyond traditional electronic warfare toward AI-enabled decision warfare.
Indicator 5: Doctrinal Change
Future military exercises, procurement strategies, and defense white papers that elevate electromagnetic spectrum operations alongside cyber, space, and conventional combat would indicate that electronic warfare is becoming a core operational discipline rather than a specialized supporting capability.
Indicator 6: Adversary Adaptation
Observable changes in adversary communications procedures—including greater reliance on fiber-optic networks, burst transmissions, decentralized command structures, or autonomous systems—would provide indirect evidence that Israeli electronic warfare capabilities are influencing regional military planning.
Alternative Assessment
Some analysts argue that electronic warfare will remain a supporting capability rather than the decisive factor in future conflicts, noting that conventional firepower, logistics, and industrial capacity continue to determine the outcome of prolonged wars.
JAFAJ assesses that this view underestimates the accelerating integration of artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, cyber operations, and autonomous systems. Rather than replacing conventional military power, these capabilities increasingly determine whether that power can be employed effectively.
JAFAJ STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
JAFAJ assesses with high confidence that military competition is entering a transitional period in which control of the electromagnetic spectrum will become increasingly decisive in determining operational success.
The implications extend well beyond Israel.
Electronic warfare, cyber operations, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and resilient communications are rapidly converging into a single decision-making ecosystem. Nations that successfully integrate these capabilities will increasingly possess the ability to detect threats earlier, process information faster, disrupt adversary decision cycles, and preserve freedom of action before large-scale kinetic combat begins.
This transition does not eliminate the importance of conventional military power. Armored forces, airpower, naval capabilities, precision weapons, logistics, and industrial capacity will remain fundamental components of national defense.
However, their effectiveness will increasingly depend upon the resilience of the electronic networks that connect them.
JAFAJ further assesses with moderate confidence that regional competitors—including Iran, Hezbollah, Turkey, and several Gulf states—will accelerate investments in electronic resilience, artificial intelligence, distributed command-and-control systems, passive sensing technologies, and spectrum operations over the next decade.
This competition is unlikely to remain confined to the Middle East.
The strategic lessons emerging from Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East increasingly point toward the same conclusion: future military advantage will belong not simply to the nation possessing the largest arsenal, but to the nation capable of making accurate operational decisions faster than its adversaries while denying them the ability to do the same.
From that perspective, Ellyon should not be viewed merely as another Israeli defense platform.
It represents a visible indicator of a much broader transformation in military affairs that is already reshaping defense planning around the world.
Future historians may ultimately conclude that the defining military revolution of the 2020s was not the proliferation of drones, precision-guided weapons, or autonomous systems alone.
It was the emergence of decision warfare—a battlespace in which information, artificial intelligence, and electromagnetic dominance increasingly determine victory before the first conventional engagement begins.
For that reason, JAFAJ assesses that Ellyon is significant not because it changes today’s battlefield, but because it provides one of the clearest public indications of what tomorrow’s battlefield is likely to become.
ALTERNATIVE ASSESSMENT
Some defense analysts argue that electronic warfare will remain an enabling capability rather than the decisive factor in future conflicts. They note that wars continue to be won through industrial capacity, logistics, manpower, and conventional firepower, and caution against overstating the impact of any single technological development.
JAFAJ assesses that this perspective understates the accelerating convergence of artificial intelligence, cyber operations, autonomous systems, electronic warfare, and resilient communications. While conventional military power will remain indispensable, the effectiveness of that power will increasingly depend upon the ability to preserve decision superiority while disrupting an adversary’s command, control, communications, and sensing capabilities.
Israel Unveils Ellyon: The Electromagnetic Warfare Revolution Has Begun Read More »
… Hezbollah weapons cache, Israeli media reports said. Israel's public broadcaster said that this is the first time since the start of the pilot …
... continue reading.Lebanese Army reportedly finds Hezbollah arms in pilot zone – Naharnet Read More »
Israel will allow a multinational security force to enter Gaza as proposed under U.S. President Donald Trump's ceasefire plan for the enclave, …
... continue reading.Israel to allow international force into Gaza, Israeli official says | Reuters Read More »
Part I: The Problem Is No Longer Uranium—It Is Trust
A JaFaJ Opinion Piece
Introduction
For more than two decades, Iran’s nuclear program has remained one of the international community’s most persistent diplomatic challenges. Governments have changed, sanctions have been imposed and lifted, military threats have intensified, covert operations have occurred, and multiple rounds of negotiations have produced both breakthroughs and setbacks. Despite these efforts, no lasting political settlement has emerged.¹
Much of the public discussion continues to focus on uranium enrichment percentages, centrifuge production, sanctions, and inspections. Those issues remain important. However, they are no longer the principal obstacle to an agreement.
The central obstacle today is trust.
Washington questions whether Tehran will honor long-term commitments. Tehran questions whether any agreement negotiated with one American administration will survive the next presidential election. European governments seek to preserve nuclear restraints while preventing another regional conflict. Gulf Arab states increasingly evaluate Iran’s nuclear activities alongside missile development, proxy organizations, maritime security, and regional influence.²
This article argues that future negotiations should no longer be built upon expectations of trust. They should instead be designed around verification, transparency, reciprocity, and incremental implementation.
Trust should become the result of successful diplomacy—not its prerequisite.
The Historical Record
Iran ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970 and entered into a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1974.³ Those agreements established Iran’s legal obligation to permit international safeguards intended to verify that nuclear materials remained dedicated to peaceful purposes.
International concern intensified after 2002 when previously undeclared Iranian nuclear activities became public. Subsequent IAEA investigations concluded that Iran had failed to declare certain nuclear activities required under its safeguards agreement. Those findings ultimately resulted in referral to the United Nations Security Council and a series of Security Council resolutions requiring Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and cooperate fully with IAEA investigations.⁴
Diplomatic negotiations eventually produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015 between Iran, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. Under the agreement, Iran accepted significant restrictions on uranium enrichment, centrifuge deployment, heavy-water reactor development, and stockpile limits in exchange for sanctions relief and expanded international monitoring. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 incorporated the agreement into the international legal framework governing Iran’s nuclear program.⁵
The agreement substantially reduced immediate proliferation concerns and was widely regarded as creating the most extensive nuclear verification regime ever negotiated with Iran.⁶
The diplomatic environment changed dramatically in May 2018 when the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions. Iran subsequently exceeded several of the agreement’s nuclear limitations, including restrictions involving uranium enrichment levels, stockpile quantities, and advanced centrifuge deployment. Since then, the relationship has largely evolved through reciprocal escalation rather than reciprocal compliance.⁷
The Collapse of Trust
Diplomatic negotiations usually require compromise.
Successful diplomacy requires something different.
It requires each government to believe that concessions made today will still have value tomorrow.
That confidence has largely disappeared.
From the American perspective, repeated disputes regarding safeguards implementation, enrichment activities, and transparency have reinforced longstanding concerns regarding Iranian compliance with international obligations.⁸
From the Iranian perspective, the American withdrawal from the JCPOA demonstrated that negotiated agreements may be reversed through domestic political decisions regardless of previous implementation.
Both governments therefore approach negotiations with fundamentally different assumptions.
Washington asks:
Can Iran be trusted to comply?
Tehran asks:
Can the United States be trusted to keep its promises?
Neither question has produced an answer acceptable to both governments.
Negotiating the Wrong Problem
One of the most persistent weaknesses in previous diplomatic efforts has been the attempt to negotiate every major dispute simultaneously.
Negotiators have attempted to resolve:
nuclear enrichment;
sanctions relief;
ballistic missile development;
proxy organizations;
regional military activities;
maritime security;
prisoner exchanges;
financial restrictions; and
broader regional normalization.
This approach creates extraordinary political complexity.
Every additional issue introduces another opportunity for negotiations to collapse.
Instead of seeking one comprehensive settlement, negotiators should pursue parallel agreements with independent verification mechanisms.
Nuclear verification should remain a nuclear negotiation.
Regional security should become a regional security negotiation.
Economic sanctions should become an economic negotiation.
Prisoner exchanges should remain humanitarian negotiations.
Progress in one area should encourage progress elsewhere—but failure in one track should not automatically destroy every other agreement.
Verification Instead of Trust
History demonstrates that successful arms-control agreements rarely depend upon mutual friendship.
They depend upon inspection.
Verification allows governments to cooperate despite profound political disagreements.
The International Atomic Energy Agency exists for precisely this purpose.
Its safeguards system was designed to verify compliance through inspections, declarations, technical monitoring, and material accountancy—not political assurances.⁹
Future negotiations should therefore focus less on obtaining rhetorical commitments and more on strengthening practical verification mechanisms acceptable to all participating governments.
Trust is earned.
Verification is measured.
Diplomacy should be built upon measurements.
The Real Question
For years, diplomats have debated how much uranium Iran may enrich.
That remains an important technical question.
It is not the most important political question.
The more significant question is this:
Can governments design an agreement capable of surviving changes in leadership, domestic politics, regional crises, and international pressure?
If the answer is no, then even the most technically sophisticated agreement will ultimately fail.
If the answer is yes, then negotiations no longer depend upon trust.
They depend upon institutions.
That distinction should become the foundation of the next generation of diplomacy.
Iran’s Greatest Strategic Miscalculation
History is filled with examples of nations that unintentionally strengthened the very coalitions they hoped to weaken. One of the central arguments of this article is that Iran risks making the same mistake.
For decades, Iranian policymakers have viewed their nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and regional network of allied armed groups as essential components of national security. Iranian officials have consistently argued that these capabilities are defensive measures intended to deter foreign intervention and preserve national sovereignty.¹
Many of Iran’s neighbors, however, interpret the same activities very differently.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel increasingly assess Iran’s military posture as a regional challenge extending beyond the nuclear issue alone. Missile development, support for armed non-state actors, attacks on maritime commerce, and expanding enrichment capabilities are often viewed collectively rather than as isolated policies.²
Whether those perceptions are entirely accurate is almost secondary.
In international politics, perception often shapes policy as much as reality.
The Security Dilemma
Political scientists have long described this phenomenon as the security dilemma.
A government strengthens its military because it believes it is improving its own security.
Neighboring governments interpret those same actions as preparation for aggression.
They respond by strengthening their own militaries.
The original government then interprets those responses as new threats requiring even greater military capabilities.
Neither side necessarily desires war.
Both become less secure.³
The Middle East increasingly exhibits many characteristics of this cycle.
A New Nuclear Era
One of the least discussed consequences of Iran’s nuclear program may be its effect on neighboring states.
Several governments across the Middle East have expanded or announced civilian nuclear energy programs during the past decade. Although each government cites domestic electricity demand, economic diversification, desalination requirements, or long-term energy planning, regional security considerations inevitably influence strategic planning.⁴
Saudi Arabia has repeatedly stated its intention to develop a civilian nuclear industry and has publicly indicated that if Iran were to obtain a nuclear weapon, Riyadh would consider its own strategic options.⁵
The United Arab Emirates operates the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant under one of the region’s most comprehensive civilian nuclear regulatory frameworks. Egypt continues construction of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant with Russian assistance. Türkiye is developing the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. Each project has distinct economic and energy objectives, yet together they represent a significant expansion of nuclear expertise across the region.⁶
None of these programs should automatically be viewed as military in nature.
Nevertheless, they demonstrate that nuclear technology is becoming increasingly common throughout the Middle East.
The Unintended Consequence
Iran’s leaders have consistently argued that their nuclear activities are peaceful and fully consistent with their rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Yet strategic outcomes are determined not only by intentions but also by how those intentions are interpreted by others.
If neighboring governments conclude that Iran’s long-term trajectory increases regional uncertainty, they are likely to invest more heavily in missile defense, intelligence cooperation, advanced conventional weapons, cybersecurity, and civilian nuclear infrastructure.
Ironically, policies intended to enhance Iran’s security may encourage a broader regional military modernization effort.
This is not necessarily because neighboring governments seek confrontation.
It is because governments routinely prepare for capabilities rather than intentions.
Toward a Middle East Security Architecture
The Middle East is witnessing unprecedented levels of security cooperation among governments that historically maintained only limited formal relationships.
The Abraham Accords demonstrated that political alignments once considered unlikely can become possible when governments identify common strategic interests. Since their signing in 2020, cooperation among Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and the United States has expanded into areas including trade, technology, intelligence, air defense, and maritime security.⁷
Although no formal “Middle East NATO” currently exists, regional defense cooperation has become significantly more integrated than it was a decade ago.
Joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, missile defense discussions, and maritime coordination increasingly reflect common concerns regarding regional stability.⁸
Should these trends continue, Iran may ultimately find itself confronting not isolated bilateral relationships but a more interconnected regional security network.
Why This Matters for Negotiations
Diplomacy succeeds when governments believe that negotiated outcomes will improve their security more effectively than continued confrontation.
If Iranian decision-makers conclude that present policies are accelerating regional military cooperation, expanding civilian nuclear capabilities among neighboring states, and encouraging deeper security integration with outside powers, negotiations may become more attractive—not because of coercion, but because of strategic self-interest.
The objective should not be to force Iran into negotiations through humiliation.
The objective should be to demonstrate that a negotiated settlement offers greater long-term security than an indefinite cycle of escalation.
That is a fundamentally different diplomatic message.
Preliminary Conclusion
Iran’s greatest strategic challenge may not be sanctions.
It may not be uranium enrichment.
It may not even be military pressure.
Its greatest strategic challenge may be that policies designed to strengthen national security are encouraging neighboring governments to become more closely aligned with one another.
History suggests that regional security competitions often produce outcomes that none of the participants originally intended.
The challenge for future diplomacy is to interrupt that cycle before it becomes permanent.
Stop Negotiating Everything at Once
One of the principal weaknesses of previous negotiations has been the assumption that every disagreement between Iran and the international community must be resolved within a single comprehensive agreement.
That approach has repeatedly proven vulnerable to failure.
Nuclear enrichment, ballistic missiles, sanctions relief, regional proxy organizations, maritime security, cyber operations, prisoner exchanges, and humanitarian concerns have often been treated as one interconnected package. A breakdown on one issue has frequently jeopardized progress on every other issue.¹⁸
Large diplomatic agreements are politically attractive because they promise sweeping solutions. In practice, however, they create numerous opportunities for negotiations to collapse. Every additional issue adds another political constituency, another domestic debate, and another point of potential disagreement.
Future negotiations should instead follow a modular approach.
Separate the Tracks
Rather than pursuing one comprehensive agreement, negotiators should establish several independent negotiating tracks.
Track One: Nuclear Issues
This track should focus exclusively on uranium enrichment, centrifuge deployment, safeguards implementation, inspections, stockpile limitations, and technical verification. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should remain the primary technical authority responsible for monitoring compliance.¹⁹
Track Two: Regional Security
Regional military issues—including maritime security, deconfliction mechanisms, missile transparency, and crisis communications—should be negotiated separately by regional governments with appropriate international participation.
Track Three: Humanitarian Issues
Prisoner exchanges, missing persons, humanitarian access, disaster cooperation, and medical coordination should remain insulated from political disputes whenever possible.
Track Four: Economic Measures
Sanctions relief should be negotiated independently using clearly defined benchmarks that are transparent, measurable, and reversible.
Progress on one track should encourage cooperation on the others without making success in every area dependent upon complete agreement elsewhere.
Replace Political Promises with Technical Verification
Diplomatic history demonstrates that verification mechanisms generally outlast political assurances.
Governments change.
Legislatures change.
Political priorities change.
Verification systems remain.
Future agreements should therefore rely upon objective measurements rather than subjective confidence.
Verification mechanisms may include:
expanded IAEA inspections;
continuous monitoring technologies;
agreed reporting schedules;
reciprocal compliance reviews;
independent dispute-resolution procedures; and
automatic technical consultations following alleged violations.
Such mechanisms reduce uncertainty while allowing governments to cooperate without requiring complete political trust.²⁰
Reciprocity Must Be Immediate
Another recurring weakness in previous negotiations has been the perception that one side must act first while the other side promises future action.
This sequencing creates political risk for every participant.
Future agreements should instead emphasize simultaneous implementation.
For example:
verified technical compliance should trigger immediate, predefined sanctions relief;
verified sanctions relief should trigger immediate reciprocal technical implementation;
verified violations should trigger proportional, predefined responses rather than automatic collapse of the entire agreement.
Negotiations should become predictable.
Predictability reduces political risk.
Give Diplomacy Room to Succeed
Public negotiations frequently become political theater.
Statements intended for domestic audiences often complicate discussions taking place behind closed doors.
Governments should therefore distinguish between public diplomacy and operational diplomacy.
Public officials should clearly explain objectives to their citizens while allowing professional negotiators sufficient flexibility to explore practical solutions.
History demonstrates that many successful international agreements required extensive confidential diplomacy before public announcements were possible.²¹
Confidential discussions should not replace democratic accountability.
They should facilitate it.
The Role of Regional Governments
Regional governments must become participants rather than spectators.
No long-term agreement involving Iran can succeed if neighboring states conclude that their own security concerns have been ignored.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Iraq, Türkiye, Jordan, Egypt, and other regional governments each possess distinct security interests.
Those interests deserve structured consultation rather than informal observation.
Inclusive diplomacy is more likely to produce durable agreements than negotiations conducted solely among global powers.
A Different Definition of Success
Success should not be defined as producing a perfect agreement.
Success should be defined as reducing the probability of future conflict.
A durable agreement that lowers regional tensions by twenty percent may ultimately prove more valuable than an ambitious agreement that promises complete normalization but collapses within a few years.
Diplomacy is rarely perfect.
Its purpose is to make conflict less likely.
That objective remains achievable.
Looking Ahead
The next stage of diplomacy requires a fundamental shift in thinking.
Negotiators should stop asking how to restore the past.
Instead, they should ask how to build a framework capable of surviving future political changes.
The objective is not simply another agreement with Iran.
The objective is the creation of institutions, verification mechanisms, and regional relationships capable of sustaining peace even during periods of political disagreement.
That should become the measure of diplomatic success.
The European Union
The European Union has historically served as one of the principal diplomatic bridges between Iran and the United States. European diplomacy helped facilitate negotiations that ultimately produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, and the EU has continued to coordinate discussions following the deterioration of the agreement.²²
The European Union should continue emphasizing diplomacy while improving transparency regarding sanctions, compliance benchmarks, and dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Future negotiations should avoid ambiguity.
Every obligation should have a corresponding benchmark.
Every benchmark should have a measurable standard.
Every standard should have a clearly defined consequence.
Diplomacy functions best when expectations are understood before disagreements emerge.
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom remains one of Europe’s most experienced diplomatic actors in Middle Eastern affairs.
London should continue supporting multilateral negotiations while expanding efforts aimed at maritime security in the Persian Gulf, intelligence cooperation against illicit weapons trafficking, and coordinated sanctions enforcement where appropriate.²³
At the same time, British diplomacy should continue encouraging dialogue between regional governments whose communications remain limited or intermittent.
Diplomatic engagement and deterrence should reinforce—not replace—one another.
France
France has traditionally combined strong support for nuclear non-proliferation with an independent diplomatic approach toward Middle Eastern security.
Paris should continue encouraging negotiations that strengthen verification rather than merely extending political commitments.
France also possesses considerable expertise in civilian nuclear regulation.
That experience could prove valuable if future regional agreements include expanded civilian nuclear cooperation accompanied by strengthened international safeguards.
Germany
Germany has consistently emphasized diplomacy, economic engagement, and international institutions as mechanisms for reducing conflict.
Berlin should continue supporting negotiated settlements while expanding technical cooperation involving export controls, nuclear security, industrial safeguards, and scientific exchanges consistent with international law.
Economic relationships often create additional incentives for political stability.
Those opportunities should not be ignored.
China
China occupies a unique position.
Unlike many Western governments, Beijing maintains extensive economic relationships with Iran while simultaneously expanding strategic partnerships throughout the Gulf region.
China demonstrated its growing diplomatic influence by facilitating the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023.²⁴
Future negotiations should encourage Beijing to use that influence in support of regional stability, transparency, and continued diplomatic engagement.
China’s long-term economic interests depend upon secure energy supplies and regional stability.
Those interests align with preventing military escalation.
Russia
Russia remains an important participant in discussions involving Iran’s nuclear program through both the JCPOA framework and its longstanding nuclear cooperation with Tehran.
Although geopolitical tensions between Russia and many Western governments have increased substantially in recent years, Moscow continues to possess technical expertise and diplomatic relationships that remain relevant to future negotiations.²⁵
Where practical, cooperation on nuclear verification should remain separated from broader geopolitical disputes.
Preventing nuclear proliferation remains a shared international interest regardless of disagreements elsewhere.
India
India has traditionally maintained productive relationships with both Iran and the Gulf Arab states.
Its investments in the Chabahar Port project demonstrate India’s interest in regional connectivity while preserving strategic autonomy in foreign policy.²⁶
New Delhi could contribute by encouraging economic cooperation, infrastructure development, and commercial integration that increase the long-term costs of regional conflict.
Economic interdependence does not eliminate political disagreements.
It frequently reduces incentives for war.
The United Nations
The United Nations remains the only international organization with universal legitimacy to convene governments representing competing regional interests.
Future negotiations should utilize existing UN institutions whenever possible while avoiding unnecessary duplication of international mechanisms already in place.
The Security Council should continue supporting non-proliferation objectives.
Specialized agencies should continue strengthening technical cooperation.
The Secretary-General should remain available to facilitate dialogue when requested by the participating governments.
The United Nations cannot create peace.
It can provide institutions through which governments pursue it.
The International Atomic Energy Agency
No institution is more important to future nuclear negotiations than the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The IAEA’s credibility depends upon political independence, technical competence, and consistent application of international safeguards.
Future agreements should strengthen—not weaken—the Agency’s ability to verify compliance.
Governments may disagree politically.
Scientific measurements should remain objective.
Confidence in verification depends upon confidence in the institution performing the verification.
Maintaining the IAEA’s technical independence should therefore become one of the highest priorities in any future agreement.²⁷
The Path Forward
The international community should abandon the search for a single diplomatic breakthrough capable of resolving every disagreement simultaneously.
Instead, governments should pursue continuous diplomacy supported by permanent institutions.
Negotiations should become routine rather than extraordinary.
Communication should continue even during periods of heightened tension.
Verification should replace speculation.
Transparency should replace ambiguity.
Incremental progress should replace unrealistic expectations.
The objective is not to eliminate every disagreement.
The objective is to reduce the probability that disagreement becomes war.
That goal remains achievable.
What Should Never Happen Again
The history of negotiations with Iran demonstrates that diplomatic failures rarely occur because governments stop talking.
They occur because governments stop believing.
When confidence disappears, every military exercise becomes a threat.
Every intelligence report becomes evidence of bad faith.
Every political speech becomes another reason to delay negotiations.
Future diplomacy must avoid repeating several recurring mistakes.
First, negotiations should never become hostage to domestic political calendars. Election cycles, coalition politics, and changes in government should not automatically invalidate years of diplomatic progress. Stable institutions—not temporary political majorities—should provide continuity.²⁸
Second, governments should avoid public ultimatums whenever possible. While public statements can reassure domestic audiences, diplomacy often succeeds only when negotiators retain sufficient flexibility to explore compromise privately. The most durable international agreements have frequently been preceded by extensive confidential negotiations.²⁹
Third, negotiations should avoid “all-or-nothing” diplomacy. International agreements should be designed so that limited disagreements do not automatically destroy years of successful implementation. Arms-control history demonstrates that dispute-resolution mechanisms often preserve agreements during periods of political crisis.³⁰
Build Institutions, Not Headlines
Diplomatic success should not be measured by the signing ceremony.
It should be measured by whether the agreement still functions ten years later.
Too often, governments focus on negotiating documents while neglecting the institutions necessary to implement them.
Future agreements should establish permanent organizations responsible for:
technical verification;
scientific cooperation;
maritime communications;
military deconfliction;
sanctions review;
humanitarian coordination;
emergency consultation;
dispute resolution.
Institutions survive political disagreements.
Personal relationships rarely do.
The objective should therefore be to institutionalize diplomacy rather than personalize it.
The Role of Economic Integration
History demonstrates that nations engaged in substantial economic cooperation generally possess stronger incentives to avoid military conflict.
Economic interdependence is not a guarantee of peace.
It does, however, increase the political and financial costs of confrontation.
Future diplomacy should therefore encourage:
regional infrastructure projects;
energy cooperation where appropriate;
transportation connectivity;
environmental initiatives;
scientific research partnerships;
public health cooperation;
educational exchanges.
These initiatives should complement—not replace—security negotiations.
Peace is strengthened when governments develop multiple reasons to cooperate.
The Human Dimension
Diplomatic negotiations often focus upon governments.
Peace ultimately belongs to people.
Millions of Iranians, Israelis, Saudis, Emiratis, Jordanians, Iraqis, Egyptians, Turks, Europeans, and Americans share remarkably similar aspirations.
They seek security.
Economic opportunity.
Educational advancement.
Stable families.
Predictable futures.
These common interests rarely dominate diplomatic discussions.
They should.
Expanding academic exchanges, scientific collaboration, cultural programs, disaster-response cooperation, and medical partnerships cannot resolve strategic disagreements by themselves.
They can, however, reduce mutual misunderstanding.
Long-term peace depends not only upon agreements signed by governments but also upon relationships developed among societies.
Leadership Matters
Diplomatic breakthroughs rarely occur because governments suddenly become friends.
They occur because leaders conclude that continued confrontation no longer serves their national interests.
Effective leadership requires recognizing when previous strategies have reached diminishing returns.
Every government represented in future negotiations will need to make politically difficult decisions.
Iran.
The United States.
Israel.
Saudi Arabia.
European governments.
Regional partners.
No agreement can succeed if compromise is viewed as weakness.
Compromise is often the practical expression of strategic confidence.
Strong governments negotiate because they possess choices.
Weak governments negotiate because they possess none.
Recognizing that distinction changes the political narrative surrounding diplomacy.
The Strategic Choice
The Middle East now faces two competing futures.
One path continues the familiar cycle of sanctions, military escalation, proxy conflict, cyber operations, missile development, intelligence competition, and periodic crises.
The other path accepts that strategic competition will continue while creating institutions capable of preventing competition from becoming war.
Neither future promises perfection.
One offers greater stability.
History will judge today’s leaders not by the speeches they deliver but by the institutions they leave behind.
Final Thoughts
The question confronting policymakers is not whether Iran should negotiate.
The question is whether every government involved can design a negotiating framework capable of surviving disagreement.
Trust alone cannot accomplish that objective.
Verification can.
Institutions can.
Transparency can.
Predictability can.
Diplomacy succeeds when governments no longer depend upon optimism.
It succeeds when they construct systems capable of functioning despite political differences.
That is the central lesson of the past two decades.
It should become the foundation for the next two.
Conclusion
Bringing Iran back to the negotiating table will require more than sanctions, incentives, or military deterrence.
It will require a different philosophy of diplomacy.
One that accepts political disagreement as permanent.
One that measures compliance rather than intentions.
One that rewards verified progress instead of rhetorical promises.
One that recognizes regional security cannot be achieved by any nation acting alone.
Negotiations without trust are possible.
Negotiations without verification are not.
The challenge before the international community is therefore not to create perfect trust.
It is to create durable institutions capable of preserving peace despite imperfect trust.
That objective remains difficult.
It is also achievable.
Footnotes
Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, Congressional Research Service Report R40094 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated August 7, 2025).
Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program; Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program and UN Sanctions Reimposition, Congressional Research Service In Focus IF11583 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 9, 2026).
Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program, discussing Iran’s ratification of the NPT in 1970 and conclusion of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1974.
Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program, sections on IAEA safeguards, Board of Governors findings, and United Nations Security Council actions.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015); summarized in Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program.
Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program, discussion of JCPOA verification and monitoring provisions.
Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program; Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program and UN Sanctions Reimposition.
Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program, discussion of IAEA safeguards compliance and subsequent Board of Governors findings.
Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program, section describing the purpose and scope of the IAEA safeguards system.
Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, Congressional Research Service Report R40094 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated August 7, 2025).
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025 (London: IISS, 2025).
Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214.
International Atomic Energy Agency, Power Reactor Information System (PRIS); World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in the United Arab Emirates,” “Nuclear Power in Egypt,” and “Nuclear Power in Türkiye.”
Remarks by Saudi officials on nuclear policy summarized in Congressional Research Service reporting and public statements regarding regional nuclear competition.
World Nuclear Association, country profiles for the UAE, Egypt, and Türkiye; IAEA PRIS reactor database.
The Abraham Accords Declaration, September 15, 2020; U.S. Department of State, The Abraham Accords.
U.S. Central Command, public releases on regional integrated air and missile defense cooperation and multinational military exercises.
Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, Congressional Research Service Report R40094 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated August 7, 2025).
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency).
International Atomic Energy Agency, The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Reference Series (Vienna: IAEA).
George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993); Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
European External Action Service, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), official background materials and statements on EU coordination of negotiations.
UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, UK Policy Toward Iran and official statements regarding Gulf maritime security.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Trilateral Statement by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the People’s Republic of China,” March 10, 2023.
Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, Congressional Research Service Report R40094 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated August 7, 2025).
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, official materials concerning the Chabahar Port Project and India-Iran economic cooperation.
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Overview; IAEA Statute; and official safeguards documentation describing the Agency’s verification responsibilities.
Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, Congressional Research Service Report R40094 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated August 7, 2025).
George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993); Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961); Steven E. Miller and Scott D. Sagan, eds., Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence, 4th ed. (Boston: Pearson, 2012).
United Nations Charter, Preamble and Chapters I–VI; United Nations, Our Common Agenda (New York: United Nations, 2021).
International Atomic Energy Agency, The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966 and 1968), IAEA Safeguards Series; Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, CRS Report R40094.
Without Tricks: A Realistic Strategy for Bringing Iran Back to the Negotiating Table Read More »
JAFAJ – NEW GENERATION OF LEADERS SERIES
EXECUTIVE PROFILE
Name: Khalil al-Hayya
Born: November 5, 1960
Birthplace: Gaza City, Gaza Strip (then under Egyptian administration)
Nationality: Palestinian
Education:
B.A., Islamic University of Gaza
M.A. in Hadith Studies, University of Jordan
Ph.D., University of the Holy Quran and Islamic Sciences (Sudan) (Wikipedia)
Current Position:
Overall Leader (Head of the Political Bureau) of Hamas, elected July 2026 after an internal leadership process to succeed Yahya Sinwar. (Reuters)
BACKGROUND
Khalil al-Hayya has been part of Hamas since its founding during the First Intifada in 1987. Unlike many Hamas commanders who built their reputations on battlefield operations, al-Hayya rose through the organization’s political and administrative ranks, eventually becoming one of its principal strategists, diplomats, and negotiators.
Over nearly four decades, he has served as:
Member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (since 2006)
Senior member of Hamas’s Political Bureau
Deputy to Yahya Sinwar
Chief Hamas negotiator in ceasefire and hostage discussions
Hamas representative to Egypt, Qatar, Iran, and Turkey
Overall leader of Hamas beginning in July 2026. (Reuters)
LEADERSHIP STYLE
Unlike Yahya Sinwar, whose reputation centered on direct operational leadership inside Gaza, al-Hayya is generally viewed as a political strategist and negotiator.
His influence comes from:
coalition building
diplomacy
organizational management
negotiations
strategic planning
Rather than commanding military operations in the field, he has historically coordinated Hamas’s political leadership while maintaining close relationships with regional governments and external sponsors. Reuters describes him as Hamas’s top negotiator and one of its most influential political figures. (Reuters)
IDEOLOGY
Al-Hayya has consistently described Hamas as both a political movement and an armed resistance organization.
His public positions generally include:
rejection of permanent Israeli control over Palestinian territories;
support for maintaining Hamas’s armed wing;
continued relations with Iran and other regional allies; and
participation in ceasefire negotiations without publicly committing Hamas to permanent disarmament. (Reuters)
He has also stated that Hamas could accept a Palestinian state within the pre-1967 borders under certain conditions while continuing to characterize armed resistance as legitimate. His statements over time have reflected tactical flexibility in negotiations but continuity in core political objectives. (Wikipedia)
KNOWN PUBLIC QUOTES
The following quotations have been widely reported and attributed to Khalil al-Hayya:
On the October 7, 2023 attack
“We succeeded in putting the Palestinian issue back on the table, and now no one in the region is experiencing calm.” (Wikipedia)
On Hamas’s strategic priorities
“Our goal is not to run Gaza and bring it water and electricity.” (Wikipedia)
On Palestinian statehood
Hamas would agree to a long-term ceasefire and transform into a political party if an independent Palestinian state were established on the 1967 borders, according to public remarks reported in 2024. (Wikipedia)
On the October 7 attack
Reuters and other reporting note that al-Hayya has publicly defended the October 7 attack and has described it as central to Hamas’s broader strategy. (Reuters)
ORGANIZATION UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP
Because Hamas is both a political movement and an armed organization, no verified official personnel figures exist. Estimates vary among governments and research organizations.
Estimated armed strength
Before the 2023–2026 war:
approximately 30,000–40,000 fighters
Current estimates following the war:
approximately 20,000–40,000 remaining fighters, although losses are disputed and Hamas does not publish official numbers. (Facebook)
These figures refer primarily to the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing.
Civil administration
Prior to the current conflict, Hamas governed roughly 2.3 million residents of the Gaza Strip through ministries, police, courts, education, and municipal institutions.
As of mid-2026, governance is fragmented because large portions of Gaza remain contested or under Israeli military control. Reuters and other reporting indicate Hamas continues to exercise influence in areas where its administrative structures remain functional, though the extent of effective control has diminished since the war began. (Reuters)
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
There is no audited public budget for Hamas.
Instead, analysts estimate resources from multiple streams, including external state support, donations, taxation, investments, and commercial holdings.
Open-source estimates include:
Historical annual operating budgets ranging from tens of millions of dollars before Hamas governed Gaza.
Iranian support reported at times as up to approximately US$300 million annually, although funding levels have fluctuated significantly over time.
A broader investment portfolio estimated by some analyses at US$500 million to US$1 billion in assets and business holdings across several countries before recent sanctions and wartime losses. These figures are estimates and are not independently audited. (Wikipedia)
Because of wartime disruption, sanctions, and opaque finances, current annual expenditures and available resources cannot be stated with confidence.
STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE
Khalil al-Hayya now occupies one of the most consequential positions in Middle Eastern politics.
His decisions may influence:
ceasefire negotiations;
hostage-release discussions;
relations with Iran;
Hamas’s military posture;
Gaza’s future governance; and
regional diplomacy involving Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Israel, the United States, and other Arab states. (Reuters)
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
Al-Hayya represents institutional continuity rather than ideological transformation. His career has been rooted in Hamas’s political leadership, negotiation efforts, and external relations rather than tactical military command. His elevation suggests that Hamas intends to preserve its organizational structure while adapting to the strategic realities created by the 2023–2026 Gaza war.
From a policy perspective, his leadership indicates that future negotiations are likely to involve an experienced political strategist with longstanding regional relationships, even as the organization faces significant military, financial, and governance pressures. (Reuters)
Footnotes
Reuters. “Hamas Names Khalil Al-Hayya as New Overall Leader.” July 20, 2026. (Reuters)
Reuters. “Who Is Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas’s Chief Negotiator?” October 2025. (Reuters)
Al Jazeera. “Who Is Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas’s Newly Elected Political Chief?” July 20, 2026. (Al Jazeera)
Reuters. “Hamas Names Khalil Al-Hayya as New Overall Leader.” July 20, 2026. (Reuters)
Open-source financial analyses summarized in public references on Hamas financing and Iranian support. Figures are estimates and should not be treated as audited financial statements. (Wikipedia)
... continue reading.
A New Generation Of Leaders: Profiling Khalil Al-Hayya Read More »