CANNABIS AND DRUGS IN MENA

FOLLOW THE ORGANIZATION. FOLLOW THE MONEY. FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE.

TERRORISM REPORT | REGIONAL EXPANSION & PUBLICATION EDITION

Research purpose: To explain the major illicit drug markets operating across the Middle East and North Africa, identify country roles, and determine when — and when not — drug trafficking can be connected to terrorist financing.

PUBLICATION EDITION | 11 OCTOBER 2026 | Public-source analytical feature; not a legal finding or a substitute for country-specific financial investigation.

Research standard: This article distinguishes documented facts, strong corroboration, allegations/designations, and unresolved questions. Drug trafficking is not treated as terrorism merely because armed or terrorist organizations operate in the same geography.

Geographic scope: This feature covers North Africa and the Middle East, with selected South-West Asian supply-chain context where UNODC identifies a direct regional connection. Coverage is evidence-led; it does not imply that every country has an equally documented market or a demonstrated terrorist-financing nexus.

EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

The evidence supports three distinct regional systems—not one unified “MENA drug cartel.” Morocco and North African routes remain central to the cannabis-resin picture; Captagon seizures were concentrated in the Near and Middle East during 2020–2024, with historical production mainly associated with Syria and Lebanon; and methamphetamine is an increasingly important synthetic-drug issue across the Near and Middle East/South-West Asia. These systems may overlap in routes, facilitators or financial infrastructure, but overlap must be demonstrated rather than presumed. [1–3, 10–15]

The strongest terrorism-financing conclusion in the source set is narrow and attributed: U.S. Treasury has publicly described specific Captagon-related actors and alleged financial links involving regime-linked beneficiaries and Hizballah. The broader regional evidence establishes trafficking, seizures, and in some cases armed-group interaction; it does not establish that every market, corridor, country, or drug proceeds stream finances terrorism. [6, 13]

Confidence judgment: High confidence in the broad seizure-based regional patterns reported by UNODC; moderate confidence in selected country-role assessments where sources are historical or partial; low confidence in any country-level terrorist-financing inference that lacks a named actor, mechanism, recipient and transaction-level or equivalent corroboration.

THE BIG PICTURE

Public discussion of drugs in the Middle East and North Africa often focuses on one substance or one country. That framing obscures the region’s distinct, overlapping markets and the different levels of evidence available for each.

MENA has multiple drug markets operating at the same time. Cannabis and hashish remain important. Synthetic stimulants — including Captagon — have created a major regional trafficking market. Methamphetamine is becoming increasingly important in the Near and Middle East. Other drugs move through regional trafficking corridors. Behind those markets are farmers, producers, traffickers, smugglers, criminal organizations, corrupt facilitators, armed groups and, in some cases, terrorist organizations.

The central question for Terrorism Report is therefore not simply: “Are drugs illegal in MENA?” The more important question is: “What happens to the money generated by the illegal drug economy?” [1][2]

WHAT THE 2026 DATA SHOW

UNODC’s 2026 reporting identifies three developments that materially change the regional picture. First, cannabis remains a major illicit drug market, although cannabis resin seizures have declined globally since 2020 and cannabis herb is increasingly replacing resin in many markets. North Africa — particularly Morocco — remained a major center of cannabis-resin seizures in 2024. [3]

Second, the Near and Middle East accounted for 77 percent of global Captagon seizures during 2020–2024, with production historically concentrated mainly in Syria and Lebanon. [1]

Third, methamphetamine seizures have become increasingly important in the Near and Middle East/South-West Asia subregion. UNODC reports that methamphetamine now dominates ATS seizures in the subregion and identifies increases in reported 2025 seizures in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. [2]

These statistics measure reported seizures, not the full size of the illicit market. A seizure increase can reflect more trafficking, stronger enforcement, better detection, or a combination of factors. Terrorism Report therefore treats seizure data as an indicator — not as a direct measure of total production or revenue.

CANNABIS: THE OLD MENA DRUG MARKET

Cannabis has a long history in parts of MENA. Morocco and Lebanon are the most important traditional production cases examined in this report, while trafficking and consumption occur across a much wider geography. Cannabis appears as herb, resin and hashish.

UNODC’s 2026 data show that cannabis remains the world’s most widely produced, trafficked and consumed illicit drug. Cannabis-resin seizures remain concentrated in Western and Central Europe, North Africa and the Near and Middle East/South-West Asia. [3]

MOROCCO

Morocco is one of the region’s most important cannabis cases. The Rif has historically been associated with cultivation, and Moroccan cannabis resin has entered international trafficking networks. UNODC reports that in 2024 cannabis-resin seizures in North Africa overtook those reported in Western and Central Europe, largely reflecting increased seizures in Morocco and declines in several European countries. [3]

The analytical caution is important: seizure volume does not equal production volume, and production does not establish who ultimately receives the proceeds. The appropriate research question is therefore not simply “How much cannabis does Morocco produce?” but “Which actors control cultivation, processing, movement, wholesale distribution and proceeds?”

LEBANON

Lebanon provides a second major cannabis case study. The Bekaa Valley has long been associated with cannabis cultivation and hashish production. The illicit cannabis economy intersects with agricultural communities, criminal networks and non-state actors. The existence of those overlapping actors does not by itself establish terrorist financing.

As of the FATF statement dated 19 June 2026, Lebanon remained under increased monitoring and was asked to address specified AML/CFT deficiencies, including risk assessment, asset recovery and terrorist-financing investigations. This is evidence about the country’s AML/CFT action plan; it is not, by itself, evidence that proceeds from Lebanon’s cannabis trade finance a terrorist organization. [7]

CANNABIS AND THE TERRORISM QUESTION

It is tempting to say: “Cannabis is illegal. Terrorists need money. Therefore cannabis funds terrorism.” That is not sufficient evidence.

The actual financial chain must be demonstrated:

• CANNABIS PRODUCTION
• TRAFFICKING
• REVENUE
• CRIMINAL NETWORK
• TRANSFER OR TAXATION
• ARMED/TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
• TERRORIST FINANCING

Each step requires evidence. If the evidence stops at the criminal network, the analysis should stop there. A farmer, smuggler, criminal syndicate, corrupt official, armed group and terrorist organization can occupy different positions in the same supply chain. Terrorism Report should identify those relationships separately rather than labeling an entire drug market “terrorist.”

DRUGS ARE BIGGER THAN CANNABIS

Cannabis is only one part of the MENA drug economy. The region has experienced extensive trafficking in amphetamine-type stimulants, particularly Captagon, while methamphetamine is becoming more significant.

THE CAPTAGON MARKET

UNODC reports that the Near and Middle East accounted for 77 percent of global Captagon seizures during 2020–2024. Production was mainly associated with Syria and Lebanon. [1]

UNODC’s 2025 reporting describes Syria as the dominant historical origin of Captagon in the regional market before the December 2024 political transition. The transition disrupted known production infrastructure, but it does not establish that all production ended. The scale, location and continuity of any post-transition manufacturing remain uncertain and should be treated as an open intelligence question, not a settled finding. [4]

The disruption did not immediately eliminate trafficking. UNODC documented large seizures in Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia after the Syrian disruption, including consignments ranging from 500,000 to 5 million tablets. The evidence does not establish whether those shipments came from stockpiles, relocated production or newly resumed manufacturing. [5]

SYRIA

Syria is the central production case in the Captagon story. UNODC reports that most Captagon originated in Syria for the decade before the December 2024 transition, while subsequent disruption has created uncertainty about production geography. [4]

U.S. Treasury has separately documented sanctions against individuals involved in Captagon production and trafficking that Treasury said benefited the former Assad regime and its allies, including Hizballah. That is a government sanctions finding, not a criminal conviction, and Terrorism Report should label it accordingly. [6]

The research conclusion is stronger when narrowly stated: there is documented evidence connecting parts of the Syrian Captagon economy to regime-linked actors and, in U.S. government findings, to Hizballah. There is not sufficient evidence to characterize every Syrian drug trafficker or every Syrian drug shipment as terrorist-controlled.

IRAQ

Iraq has become one of the most important trafficking-corridor cases in the region. UNODC describes Iraq as a potential increasingly important node linking drug-trafficking ecosystems spanning Southwest Asia, Africa and Europe. It identifies northern, central and southern internal corridors and notes the relevance of cross-border armed groups and transborder economic interests. [5]

UNODC reported that Captagon seizures in Iraq increased almost 3,380 percent from 2019 to 2023 and that Iraq seized more than 4.1 tons of Captagon tablets during 2023. The cited UNODC study covers the 2019–2023 period; this report therefore does not append a separate 2024 total without a directly matching, independently checked source. [5]

This establishes Iraq as a major trafficking and enforcement case. It does not, by itself, establish that a terrorist organization controls the Iraqi drug market.

JORDAN

Jordan is a major border and interception case in the Captagon system. UNODC reports large seizures in Jordan following the Syrian disruption, demonstrating that established routes and trafficking networks remained active after major production facilities were dismantled. [5]

Jordan should therefore be analyzed as a strategic transit/interdiction jurisdiction rather than automatically classified as a production center. FATF’s 2025 follow-up found Jordan compliant or largely compliant on many technical AML/CFT requirements, including terrorist-financing and targeted-financial-sanctions measures. [8]

SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF

The Arabian Peninsula has been the principal destination market for Captagon. UNODC notes that Saudi Arabia accounted for approximately 67 percent of regional Captagon tablets seized between 2012 and 2021, although the absence of comprehensive official aggregated Saudi reporting since 2022 complicates current trend analysis. [4]

UNODC’s 2026 data identify Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates among countries reporting indications of increased methamphetamine seizures in 2025. These are reported seizure trends, not direct measures of consumption, market value or terrorist-financing activity. [2]

These countries therefore matter primarily as destination, interdiction and financial-market jurisdictions. Presence in a destination market does not establish that local institutions or governments are participants in trafficking.

LIBYA

Libya deserves more attention than it usually receives. UNODC’s 2024 Libya reporting describes the country as a key link in transit routes involving cannabis resin, cocaine, synthetic drugs and pharmaceuticals across North Africa, the Sahel, Europe and the Middle East. UNODC also describes increasingly active trafficking networks linking suppliers from Latin America, West Africa and the Levant. [9]

UNODC’s 2025 drug-market analysis also identified continued Captagon trafficking to Libya and emerging signs of use there. [4]

Libya therefore belongs in Terrorism Report’s regional map as a trafficking and transit case. A separate investigation is needed before attributing specific drug revenue to a particular armed or terrorist organization.

EGYPT

Egypt is relevant as a large North African population and transit market and as one of the countries appearing in UNODC’s regional Captagon analysis. UNODC reports continued Captagon trafficking to Egypt and identifies the possibility that the market may diversify geographically following disruption of Syrian production. [4]

The evidence available for this article does not justify labeling Egypt a major Captagon production center or asserting terrorist financing from Egyptian drug markets. Egypt should therefore remain a monitored market in the country database rather than an overclaimed terrorism-financing case.

ALGERIA AND TUNISIA

Algeria and Tunisia are important North African jurisdictions because cannabis-resin trafficking routes have historically crossed the western and central Maghreb. Earlier UNODC research documented movement of Moroccan resin through North African routes, including flows toward Libya and Egypt and land routes involving Algeria and Tunisia. [10]

For the present report, however, the evidence is stronger for regional trafficking relevance than for a direct terrorism-financing connection. Terrorism Report should not infer such a connection from geography alone.

IRAN AND SOUTH-WEST ASIA

Iran is increasingly important to the regional synthetic-drug picture because UNODC identifies it as a major location for methamphetamine seizures originating in Afghanistan. UNODC’s 2026 data indicate that methamphetamine originating in Southwest Asia may be making inroads into the Near and Middle East as Captagon production was disrupted. [2]

Iran should therefore be treated as an upstream production, transit and regional-market variable in the MENA drug map. The drug-trafficking evidence should not be converted automatically into a terrorism-financing finding.

 

 

MENA COUNTRY DRUG-MARKET MATRIX

COUNTRY	PRIMARY ROLE	KEY DRUGS / MARKETS	EVIDENCE LEVEL	TERRORISM-FINANCING FINDING	SOURCE BASIS
Morocco	Production / export	Cannabis resin	DOCUMENTED	No blanket terrorism-financing finding established	[3, 10]
Lebanon	Production / trafficking / finance-risk environment	Cannabis, hashish, Captagon	DOCUMENTED / MIXED	Specific links require actor-by-actor proof	[1, 4, 7]
Syria	Historical industrial production / trafficking	Captagon	DOCUMENTED	U.S. sanctions identify regime-linked and allied beneficiaries	[1, 4, 6]
Iraq	Transit / trafficking node / destination	Captagon, methamphetamine	DOCUMENTED	Drug-market role does not establish terrorist control	[2, 5]
Jordan	Transit / border interception	Captagon, methamphetamine	DOCUMENTED	No blanket terrorist-financing conclusion	[2, 5, 8]
Saudi Arabia	Major destination / interdiction	Captagon, methamphetamine	DOCUMENTED	Destination-market status is not financing evidence	[2, 4]
UAE	Destination / transit / financial jurisdiction	Methamphetamine and other drugs	DOCUMENTED / DEVELOPING	Requires transaction-specific evidence	[2, 11, 15]
Bahrain	Destination / interdiction	Methamphetamine	DEVELOPING	No finding established in this article	[2]
Kuwait	Destination / interdiction	Methamphetamine, ATS	DEVELOPING	No finding established in this article	[2]
Oman	Transit / destination	Methamphetamine, other drugs	DEVELOPING	No finding established in this article	[2]
Libya	Transit / trafficking hub	Cannabis resin, cocaine, synthetic drugs, pharmaceuticals, Captagon	DOCUMENTED	Armed-group connection requires separate proof	[9, 12, 13]
Egypt	Destination / transit / emerging Captagon market	Captagon, cannabis and other drugs	DOCUMENTED / DEVELOPING	No direct terrorism-financing conclusion	[4, 10]
Algeria	Transit / regional market	Cannabis resin and other drugs	DOCUMENTED	No direct terrorism-financing conclusion	[10, 14]
Tunisia	Transit / regional market	Cannabis resin and other drugs	DOCUMENTED	No direct terrorism-financing conclusion	[10, 14]
Iran	Upstream / transit / regional market	Methamphetamine and other drugs	DOCUMENTED	Drug role does not itself establish terrorist financing	[2, 11, 15]
Yemen	Transit / conflict-affected market	Methamphetamine and other drugs	DEVELOPING	Requires actor-specific evidence	[2]
Türkiye	Cross-regional transit / destination variable	Methamphetamine and other drugs	MONITORING CONTEXT	Route evidence does not establish control or terrorist financing	[11, 15]
Afghanistan	Upstream supply-chain context; outside core MENA scope	Methamphetamine; opiates	DOCUMENTED SUPPLY CONTEXT	Origin findings are substance- and dataset-specific; no blanket financing conclusion	[11, 15]
Israel	Not classified in this edition	Country-specific profile not developed	INSUFFICIENT COVERAGE	No categorical drug-market or terrorist-financing finding assigned	Source gap; see [2, 11]
Palestinian territories	Not classified in this edition	Country-specific profile not developed	INSUFFICIENT COVERAGE	No categorical drug-market or terrorist-financing finding assigned	Source gap; see [2, 11]

Matrix note: ‘Documented’ refers only to the specific market-role proposition supported by the cited source; it is not a finding that drug proceeds finance terrorism. ‘Developing’ and ‘insufficient coverage’ describe this article’s public-source evidence, not a definitive judgment about the underlying market.

NORTH AFRICA: CONNECTED MARKETS, DIFFERENT ROLES

North Africa should not be treated as a single drug market. Morocco is the best-established cannabis-resin production case in this report; Algeria and Tunisia are relevant to cross-border movement and domestic seizure patterns; Egypt is a destination and transit market; and Libya has an increasingly documented role as a multi-commodity transit hub. These roles overlap, but they are not interchangeable. Evidence that a shipment crosses a country does not establish that the country produced it, that a local armed group controlled it, or that proceeds financed terrorism. [3, 9–10, 12, 14]

LIBYA: TRANSIT, CONFLICT ECONOMIES AND FINANCIAL RISK

UNODC’s January 2026 publication on drug-trafficking dynamics in Libya and North Africa examines trends from 2020 through 2024. It describes Libya as an expanding transit hub, with cocaine moving toward the Middle East and Europe and synthetic drugs reaching North Africa and other subregions. UNODC reported that the combined estimated street value of recorded cocaine seizures in Libya during 2024 was USD 3.7 million to USD 7.8 million. This is an estimate for seized cocaine, not a measure of the total market or net proceeds. [12]

LIBYA: ARMED ACTORS AND THE EVIDENCE THRESHOLD

The same UNODC analysis describes the illicit drug economy as one of several reported revenue sources through which influential criminal, armed or other groups may gain leverage in parts of Libya, including through direct trafficking or taxation. This supports treating the interaction between trafficking and conflict economies as a serious investigative line. It does not justify attributing all Libyan drug proceeds to a single faction, nor does an armed-group connection automatically establish a legally defined terrorist-financing offence. Investigators still need actor-specific evidence, a revenue mechanism and proof of the recipient or benefit. [13]

ALGERIA AND TUNISIA: ROUTES ARE NOT FINANCING FINDINGS

Algeria and Tunisia belong in the regional picture because North African drug flows cross borders and national seizure data can reveal changing routes. UNODC material on North African cocaine trafficking has documented seizures in Tunisian ports and at Tunis airport, including shipments reportedly destined for Algeria or Libya. Such examples demonstrate movement and enforcement activity, not the scale of the whole market. The reporting periods in older seizure examples must remain visible; they should not be presented as current 2026 trends. [14]

EGYPT: A LARGE MARKET WITH SPECIFIC EVIDENCE GAPS

Egypt is relevant as a destination and transit jurisdiction in reporting on Captagon and other drugs. The evidence summarized here does not establish Egypt as a principal Captagon production center or demonstrate that Egyptian drug-market proceeds finance a terrorist organization. The report therefore treats Egypt as a monitored market and avoids converting geography, seizure reports or the presence of extremist groups in the wider region into a financing conclusion. A stronger country assessment would require current, substance-specific seizure series, court records, financial investigations and clearly attributed official findings. [4]

TÜRKIYE AND SOUTH-WEST ASIA: CROSS-REGIONAL SUPPLY

UNODC’s 2026 reporting says much of the methamphetamine seized in South-West Asia is reported to originate in Afghanistan, with Iran a major seizure location; some shipments have moved onward to other destinations, including South-East Europe, notably Türkiye. UNODC also reports that methamphetamine may be making inroads into the Near and Middle East as Captagon production was curtailed following the December 2024 change of government in Syria. These findings indicate possible market substitution and route adaptation, not proof that the same organizations control both markets. [2, 11]

Türkiye should be analyzed as a cross-regional transit and destination variable when supported by the specific dataset being used, not automatically grouped with MENA countries or treated as evidence of a single unified trafficking network. Afghanistan and Iran are relevant upstream variables for methamphetamine and other drug flows, but their inclusion here is supply-chain context rather than a claim that they are part of every definition of MENA.

YEMEN AND THE GULF: MONITORING WITHOUT OVERCLAIMING

UNODC’s 2026 partial seizure data point to likely increases in reported methamphetamine seizures in Yemen and several Gulf states during 2025, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The data are partial and seizure-based. They support heightened monitoring of trafficking and enforcement trends, but do not independently establish rising consumption, market value, local production or terrorist financing. [2]

Yemen’s conflict-affected setting creates a legitimate reason to examine possible overlaps among trafficking, informal taxation, armed actors and illicit finance. However, the country’s security conditions are not a substitute for transaction-level evidence. Any conclusion should identify the specific group, commodity, time period, revenue stream and documented benefit. The same standard applies to Gulf destination markets: seizures or destination-market demand do not implicate governments, financial institutions or entire communities.

ISRAEL, PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES AND THIN PUBLIC DATA

Public-source evidence reviewed for this edition does not support a comparable, fully developed country profile for every jurisdiction in the wider MENA region. Israel and the Palestinian territories are therefore not assigned a categorical drug-market or terrorist-financing finding in the matrix. This is a limitation of the present source base, not a claim that trafficking is absent. Future editions should add country-specific official seizure statistics, judicial records, financial-intelligence reporting and independently corroborated investigations before assigning a role or evidence label.

REGIONAL COMPARISON: WHAT CAN BE SAID WITH CONFIDENCE

The strongest supported regional conclusions are narrower than a single ‘MENA drug cartel’ narrative. First, cannabis resin remains especially relevant to Morocco and North African routes. Second, Captagon seizures were heavily concentrated in the Near and Middle East during 2020–2024, with historical production mainly associated with Syria and Lebanon. Third, Libya’s role as a multi-commodity transit hub merits greater attention. Fourth, UNODC reports an emerging methamphetamine shift affecting the Near and Middle East, with South-West Asian supply connections. Fifth, proving terrorist financing requires a separate layer of evidence beyond production, trafficking or armed-group presence. [1–4, 9, 12–14]

THE EMERGING SYNTHETIC-DRUG SYSTEM

The most important new analytical issue may be the shift from a predominantly Captagon-centered story toward a more diversified synthetic-drug market. UNODC’s 2026 data state that methamphetamine seizures now dominate ATS seizures in the Near and Middle East/South-West Asia subregion. The agency identifies likely increases in methamphetamine seizures in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the UAE and Yemen in 2025. [2]

This matters because trafficking networks can adapt. When one commodity becomes harder to manufacture or move, demand, routes, suppliers and criminal organizations can shift toward another commodity. That does not mean every new methamphetamine shipment is a continuation of the Captagon network. It means the network should be tested rather than assumed.

FOLLOW THE MONEY

Drug trafficking produces money. Money creates incentives. Criminal organizations seek to protect profits. Armed groups seek revenue. Terrorist organizations require financing. None of those propositions proves that one organization finances another.

THE FIVE QUESTIONS

• WHO PRODUCES THE DRUG?
• WHO CONTROLS THE TRADE?
• WHO COLLECTS THE MONEY?
• WHERE DOES THE MONEY GO?
• DOES ANY OF IT REACH A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION?

The fifth question should never be assumed. It should be demonstrated through financial records, sanctions findings, court records, intelligence assessments, documented taxation or protection arrangements, asset seizures, credible investigative reporting, or multiple independent sources.

EVIDENCE STANDARD

DOCUMENTED — Supported by a primary government, court, UN, sanctions, financial-intelligence or similarly authoritative record.

STRONGLY CORROBORATED — Supported by multiple credible, materially independent sources, but without a definitive primary adjudication. Repeated reporting that traces back to one original source does not count as independent corroboration.

REPORTED / ALLEGED — Publicly reported, attributed to a named authority or source, or alleged but not independently established to the standard required for a definitive finding. Identify who made the claim.

NO CONNECTION ESTABLISHED — The evidence reviewed for this report is insufficient to establish the claimed relationship. This is not proof that no connection exists and should not be presented as an affirmative finding of absence.

WHAT SEIZURES CAN — AND CANNOT — TELL US

A seizure is an observation of enforcement activity. It is not a census of the drug market. A country reporting more seizures may have more trafficking, stronger enforcement, better intelligence, larger shipments, better reporting, or some combination of these factors. Conversely, low seizures do not prove a small market.

Terrorism Report should therefore avoid converting seizure weight directly into market size, revenue, organizational strength or terrorist financing. Those require separate evidence.

THE TERRORISM REPORT TEST

A drug market should be classified as a terrorism-financing case only when the evidence establishes a meaningful financial relationship between drug proceeds and a terrorist organization.

The preferred analytical sequence is:

• IDENTIFY THE DRUG.
• IDENTIFY THE PRODUCER OR SUPPLIER.
• IDENTIFY THE TRAFFICKER OR CONTROLLER.
• IDENTIFY THE REVENUE MECHANISM.
• IDENTIFY THE RECIPIENT.
• ESTABLISH THE FINANCIAL TRANSFER, TAX, PROTECTION PAYMENT OR OTHER BENEFIT.
• ESTABLISH THE TERRORIST STATUS OF THE RECIPIENT UNDER THE RELEVANT LEGAL OR ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK.
• RATE THE EVIDENCE.

THE BOTTOM LINE

MENA has a substantial and evolving illicit drug economy. Cannabis remains important. Hashish remains important. Captagon created an enormous regional trafficking market. Methamphetamine is becoming increasingly significant. And trafficking networks have demonstrated an ability to adapt when governments disrupt production.

But the existence of a drug market does not automatically make it a terrorism-financing market.

DRUG TRAFFICKING IS NOT THE SAME THING AS TERRORISM.

ORGANIZED CRIME IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY TERRORISM.

A DRUG TRAFFICKER IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY A TERRORIST FINANCIER.

The job of Terrorism Report is to determine when those worlds actually intersect.

 

 

RELATED TERRORISM REPORT RESEARCH

• DOES MENA HAVE DRUG CARTELS?
• CAPTAGON: THE SYRIAN DRUG ECONOMY
• HEZBOLLAH AND ILLICIT FINANCE
• FOLLOW THE MONEY: HOW TERRORIST FINANCING IS PROVEN
• MENA DRUG-TRAFFICKING COUNTRY PROFILES
• THE TERRORISM REPORT EVIDENCE STANDARD

SOURCE NOTES AND REFERENCES

Citation method: Bracketed numbers refer to the numbered source notes below. A citation supports only the specific proposition described in its source note; it does not validate every sentence in the surrounding paragraph. Country-level assessments are market-role judgments, not legal findings about a state or population. Government sanctions and designations are attributed to the issuing authority and are not presented as criminal convictions. Seizure statistics retain their reporting period, geography and measurement. “No connection established” means the reviewed public sources do not establish the relationship; it is not proof that no relationship exists. The country matrix now includes a source-basis column to make its evidentiary trail easier to audit.

Citation rule: Bracketed citations identify the source supporting the preceding factual claim. Where a source is a government sanctions action, the report treats the finding as a sanctions designation or government allegation rather than as a judicial conviction unless a court record independently establishes the fact.

[1] UNODC, World Drug Report 2026 Data Portal — “Captagon” in the Near and Middle East. Key finding: the Near and Middle East accounted for 77% of global Captagon seizures in 2020–2024; production mainly in Syria and Lebanon. https://data.unodc.org/wdr2026search?f%5B0%5D=wdr2025_drug%3A1188&f%5B1%5D=wdr_2026_topic%3A1153

[2] UNODC, World Drug Report 2026 Data Portal — Methamphetamine supply in Near and Middle East/South-West Asia. Key findings on the shift toward methamphetamine and reported 2025 increases across Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE and Yemen. https://data.unodc.org/wdr2026?page=22

[3] UNODC, World Drug Report 2026 Data Portal — Cannabis resin seizures. Key findings on the post-2020 decline in resin seizures and North Africa/Morocco’s 2024 position. https://data.unodc.org/wdr2026?page=38

[4] UNODC, World Drug Report 2025, Key Findings. Used for findings published in that report about the historical Syrian role in Captagon production and the regional market. It is not cited here as proof of events or seizure totals after its publication date. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2025/WDR25_B1_Key_findings.pdf

[5] UNODC, Drug Trafficking Dynamics Across Iraq and the Middle East: Trends and Responses (2024). Key findings on Iraq’s role as a trafficking node, internal corridors, armed-group/transborder economic interests and Captagon seizures. https://iraq.un.org/en/274686-drug-trafficking-dynamics-across-iraq-and-middle-east-trends-and-responses

[6] U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC, Treasury Targets Hizballah Finance Network and Syrian Captagon Trafficking (16 October 2024). Government sanctions findings concerning Captagon production/trafficking and benefits to Assad-regime actors and allies including Hizballah. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2648

[7] FATF, Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring — Lebanon (2026). AML/CFT risks, terrorist-financing investigations, asset recovery and illicit cross-border movement of currency and valuables. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html

[8] FATF/MENAFATF, Jordan Follow-Up Report (2025). Technical compliance findings including terrorist-financing offence and targeted financial sanctions. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/FUR-Jordan-2025.html

[9] UNODC, UNODC in Libya 2024 Annual Report. Libya as a transit link for cannabis resin, cocaine, synthetic drugs and pharmaceuticals and connections among trafficking networks. https://www.unodc.org/romena/uploads/documents/2025/UNODC_in_Libya_2024_Annual_Report.pdf

[10] UNODC, World Drug Report 2022, Drug Market booklet. Historical trafficking routes involving Moroccan cannabis resin and North African corridors. https://www.unodc.org/res/wdr2022/MS/WDR22_Booklet_3.pdf

[11] UNODC, World Drug Report 2026 Data Portal — Methamphetamine supply in Near and Middle East/South-West Asia. Used for the portal’s route findings involving Afghanistan, Iran and onward destinations. This is the same primary UNODC data portal as [2], not an independent corroborating source. https://data.unodc.org/wdr2026?page=22

[12] UNODC, Drug Trafficking Dynamics in Libya and across North Africa: Trends and Implications (January 2026). Regional overview of trafficking routes and market dynamics, including Libya’s transit role and recorded cocaine seizures in 2024. https://libya.un.org/en/308283-unodc-releases-first-report-drug-trafficking-dynamics-libya-and-across-north-africa

[13] UNODC, “The impacts of drug trafficking,” in Drug Trafficking Dynamics in Libya and across North Africa: Trends and Implications (January 2026). Describes reported interactions between illicit drug revenues, taxation and influential criminal or armed groups; it does not establish that all such groups are terrorist organizations. https://doi.org/10.18356/9789211589580c006

[14] UNODC, “Drug trafficking trends in North Africa” (UNODC/HONLAF/31/3). Historical examples of cocaine seizures in Tunisia and reported routes toward Algeria and Libya. Use only for these dated examples, not as a current trend series. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?l=en&s=UNODC%2FHONLAF%2F31%2F3&t=pdf

[2, 11] UNODC, World Drug Report 2026 Data Portal — Methamphetamine supply in Near and Middle East/South-West Asia. Separate data-portal view for methamphetamine supply in the Near and Middle East/South-West Asia; use only for the exact country and route findings shown. https://data.unodc.org/wdr2026?page=17

SOURCE REGISTER AND CLAIM-TO-SOURCE MAP

Use this register to test whether a source supports the exact proposition being made. Source authority and claim fit are separate tests: an authoritative source may still be too old, too broad, or too indirect for a particular sentence.

Ref.	Source / publication	Date / period	Claims supported	Limits / caveats	Source class
[1]	UNODC, World Drug Report 2026 Data Portal — “Captagon” in the Near and Middle East Open primary source — Open primary source	2026 portal; seizure period 2020–2024	77% of reported global Captagon seizures in the Near and Middle East; historical production mainly in Syria and Lebanon.	Seizure share, not production share, market value, or terrorist-financing revenue.	Primary multilateral source
[2]	UNODC, World Drug Report 2026 Data Portal — Methamphetamine supply in Near and Middle East/South-West Asia Open primary source — Open primary source	2026 portal; reported 2025 seizure trends	Increasing importance of methamphetamine in ATS seizures and country-level reported seizure changes.	Partial seizure data; not direct measures of prevalence, production, revenue, or terrorist-financing links.	Primary multilateral source
[3]	UNODC, World Drug Report 2026 Data Portal — Cannabis resin seizures Open primary source — Open primary source	2026 portal; 2024 data highlighted	Regional cannabis-resin seizure trends, including North Africa/Morocco.	Seizure data do not independently establish total cultivation or output.	Primary multilateral source
[4]	UNODC, World Drug Report 2025, Key Findings Open primary source — Open primary source	2025 publication; historical findings available at publication	Historical Syrian role in Captagon and context before the December 2024 transition.	Cannot establish post-publication production volumes or post-transition routes.	Primary multilateral source
[5]	UNODC, Drug Trafficking Dynamics Across Iraq and the Middle East: Trends and Responses Open primary source — Open primary source	2024 publication; core period 2019–2023	Iraq seizure trends, trafficking corridors, origins of Captagon seizures where known, regional dynamics.	Do not append later seizure totals without a separate source; corridor or armed-group context does not prove terrorist financing.	Primary multilateral source
[6]	U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC, Treasury Targets Hizballah Finance Network and Syrian Captagon Trafficking Open primary source — Open primary source	16 October 2024	Specific U.S. government sanctions findings concerning named actors and alleged links among Captagon trafficking, regime-linked actors and Hizballah.	Attribute findings to Treasury; sanctions/designations are not criminal convictions.	Primary government source
[7]	FATF, Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring Open primary source — Open primary source	19 June 2026	Lebanon’s AML/CFT action plan and requested improvements, including risk assessment, asset recovery and terrorist-financing investigations.	Not evidence that drug proceeds finance a terrorist organization.	Primary intergovernmental source
[8]	FATF/MENAFATF, Jordan Follow-Up Report Open primary source — Open primary source	2025	Technical compliance and legal-framework findings as described in the report.	Technical compliance ratings do not prove a specific trafficking network or transaction.	Primary intergovernmental source
[9]	UNODC, UNODC in Libya 2024 Annual Report Open primary source — Open primary source	2025 publication; reports 2024 activities	UNODC programme context and trafficking issues covered by the annual report.	Not a complete census of Libya’s illicit markets or national market size.	Primary multilateral source
[10]	UNODC, World Drug Report 2022, Drug Market booklet Open primary source — Open primary source	2022; historical route context	Historical cannabis-resin routes and North African trafficking context.	Historical background only; not a current 2026 trend series.	Primary multilateral source
[11]	UNODC, World Drug Report 2026 Data Portal — Methamphetamine trafficking flows Open primary source — Open primary source	2026 portal	Regional/inter-regional flow findings involving South-West Asia and neighbouring destinations.	Do not infer a single unified network without specific evidence.	Primary multilateral source
[12]	UNODC, Drug Trafficking Dynamics in Libya and across North Africa: Trends and Implications Open primary source — Open primary source	January 2026; Libya trends cover 2020–2024	Libya’s transit role, North African trafficking patterns, and estimates tied to recorded 2024 cocaine seizures.	Seizure value is not total market value or net proceeds.	Primary multilateral source
[13]	UNODC, “The impacts of drug trafficking,” in Drug Trafficking Dynamics in Libya and across North Africa Open primary source — Open primary source	January 2026; pp. 30–31	Reported ways illicit drug revenues or taxation have supported the influence of some criminal, armed or other groups in Libya.	Does not mean all groups are terrorist organizations or that every stream is terrorism-linked.	Primary multilateral source
[14]	UNODC, “Drug trafficking trends in North Africa” (UNODC/HONLAF/31/3) Open primary source — Open primary source	Historical, date-specific examples	Specific reported seizure and route examples involving Tunisia and routes toward Algeria or Libya.	Historical examples only; not a current trend series.	Primary multilateral source

SOURCE AUDIT, SCOPE AND PUBLICATION LIMITATIONS

The source register records each source’s intended evidentiary use and principal limits. Official UNODC, FATF and U.S. Treasury sources are used for the specific claims identified in the notes; this does not mean every sentence has been independently verified against every source. Before republication, confirm each in-text citation against the exact supporting passage and review the country matrix row by row. The 77 percent Captagon figure refers to reported global seizures during 2020–2024; the Iraq seizure series refers to 2019–2023; the Libya report examines trends from 2020–2024; and historical North African route examples are not current trend measurements. Seizure data are incomplete and enforcement-dependent. Sanctions designations are not criminal convictions. This is a public-source analytical feature, not a comprehensive forensic audit of every actor, transaction or country.

This report is a regional analytical overview, not a criminal indictment of any country, community or organization. Country roles differ substantially. Public seizure data are incomplete. Sanctions designations are not equivalent to criminal convictions. Media reports can be useful leads but should not be treated as definitive evidence without corroboration. The absence of public evidence is not proof that a relationship does not exist.

Terrorism Report should update this article when UNODC, FATF/MENAFATF, national authorities, courts, sanctions authorities or credible independent investigations materially change the evidentiary picture.

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• 1. Post-transition Captagon production. Determine whether observed seizures reflect legacy stockpiles, relocated production, or resumed manufacture. Do not choose among these explanations without dated facility, precursor, laboratory, shipment or financial evidence.
• 2. Methamphetamine route attribution. Confirm the exact origin, transit sequence and destination for each dataset. Regional trend lines do not establish that methamphetamine networks are identical to Captagon networks.
• 3. Drug proceeds and armed actors in Libya and Yemen. Identify the named group, revenue mechanism, location, period and beneficiary. Distinguish direct trafficking, taxation, protection payments and incidental territorial control.
• 4. Financial nexus. Prioritize court records, asset freezes, beneficial-ownership information, suspicious transaction reporting where public, payment records and independently corroborated investigations over inference from geography or association.
• 5. Country-matrix maintenance. Treat the added source-basis column as a traceability aid, not as a substitute for checking each cited source passage. Revisit entries when newer national seizure data, court findings or UNODC/FATF reporting becomes available.

FINAL CLAIM-VERIFICATION CHECKLIST

☐ Does the source directly support the exact claim, rather than merely discussing the same topic?

☐ Are the publication date, event date, seizure period and geographic scope correct?

☐ Does the text distinguish seizures from production, market size, revenue and net proceeds?

☐ Are sanctions/designations attributed to the issuing authority and distinguished from convictions?

☐ Does any terrorist-financing claim identify the actor, financial mechanism and recipient?

☐ Are repeated reports traced to one original source rather than miscounted as independent corroboration?

☐ Are missing or uncertain data labeled as uncertainty rather than proof of absence?

 

 

CITATION TRACEABILITY AND SOURCE VERIFICATION NOTE

Verification date: 11 October 2026. This audit checked that the cited primary-source pages resolve in public search results and that the visible source descriptions match the reported subject matter. It is not a forensic verification of every sentence or an independent validation of every underlying dataset.

Confirmed against public source pages: UNODC WDR 2026 Captagon finding (77% of global reported seizures in 2020–2024); UNODC WDR 2026 methamphetamine supply finding (including Iran/Afghanistan and onward-route discussion); UNODC WDR 2026 cannabis-resin seizure finding; UNODC Iraq trafficking report; U.S. Treasury’s 16 October 2024 sanctions release; FATF Lebanon increased-monitoring statement dated 19 June 2026; FATF Jordan 2025 follow-up report; UNODC Libya 2024 annual report; and the UN in Libya January 2026 release describing the Libya/North Africa report.

Traceability changes made: all source-note URLs are clickable; generic source-register link labels were replaced with actionable source links where a matching reference could be established; reference [15] was removed as a duplicate of the methamphetamine supply/route material already represented by [2] and [11]; [11] now explicitly states that it is part of the same UNODC portal and is not independent corroboration.

Remaining verification limits: the World Drug Report portal is interactive and its pages may change; country-matrix entries still require claim-by-claim review against the exact source passages; historical North African routes must not be represented as current trends; and the Libya chapter’s discussion of armed actors supports an investigative lead, not a blanket terrorist-financing conclusion. No unsupported claim should be treated as verified solely because it has a hyperlink.

Editorial rule: a citation is adequate only when it supports the specific nearby claim, including its date, geography, drug category and measurement. Portal seizure figures are not market-size estimates; sanctions findings are not criminal convictions; and repeated references to one UNODC portal do not count as independent corroboration.