Iran’s Legislative Campaign Against “Foreign Influence”

From Hostile Media to Retaliation Legislation  

JaFaJ INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

DATE OF PRODUCTION: AUGUST 16, 2026

Prepared for JaFaJ | Middle East and North Africa Legislative Intelligence

KEY JUDGMENT

Iran’s August 16 legislation should not be viewed as an isolated media restriction. JaFaJ assesses that it is part of a broader effort to institutionalize the Islamic Republic’s response to the United States, Israel and perceived foreign influence.

The bill would criminalize specified communications with “hostile” foreign media, regulate certain contacts with foreign institutions, restrict unauthorized information sharing and scientific cooperation, and impose severe penalties for conduct allegedly directed by foreign intelligence.¹ Iranian lawmakers have also pursued separate measures involving retaliation against U.S. and Israeli leaders and a draft measure concerning “hostile” vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.²

The emerging pattern is broader than censorship. Information, foreign relationships, scientific cooperation, economic activity, retaliation and maritime access are increasingly being drawn into Iran’s national-security legislative framework.

CRITICAL CAVEAT: The August 16 measure is not yet final law. The Trump-related measures described in this brief are proposals or bills under consideration—not enacted laws. That distinction is central to credible legislative intelligence.

ASSESSMENT AT A GLANCE

• CURRENT STATUS — Parliament has advanced the August 16 foreign-influence bill; further parliamentary action and Guardian Council review remain.
• CORE SHIFT — “Foreign influence” is being extended beyond espionage and classified information toward ordinary relationships with foreign media, institutions, researchers and organizations.
• LEGISLATIVE PATTERN — Separate retaliation and Hormuz measures suggest that confrontation with the United States and Israel is also entering the parliamentary arena.
• PRACTICAL RISK — Iranian citizens, companies, universities, journalists and civil-society organizations may face greater uncertainty over which foreign relationships are permitted, reportable or criminal.
• KEY WATCH ITEM — How the final law defines “hostile” and “foreign influence,” and how authorities enforce those definitions.

WHAT HAPPENED ON AUGUST 16

Iran’s parliament advanced a bill designed to counter what it defines as foreign influence by criminalizing certain communications with media identified as hostile to the Islamic Republic. Reuters reports that the bill specifically targets U.S. and Israeli outlets and outlets funded by those countries.¹

Proposed penalties include six months to two years in prison for prohibited interviews or discussions. The legislation also requires notification for certain contacts with foreign media and institutions, creates penalties for unauthorized engagement with foreign embassies or organizations, restricts unsanctioned data sharing and scientific cooperation, and increases penalties for economic crimes conducted under foreign direction. Some provisions could carry prison terms of up to 30 years.¹

The measure still requires additional parliamentary action and, if approved, Guardian Council review.¹

WHY THIS IS NOT JUST A MEDIA LAW

The headline provision concerns interviews with hostile media. The more consequential question is how broadly the final law defines “foreign influence.”

The legislation reaches beyond journalists into foreign institutions, scientific cooperation, information exchange, economic activity and policy development. That changes the compliance problem: an Iranian citizen could potentially face legal exposure not because classified information was disclosed, but because of the foreign organization involved, the nature of the relationship, or an allegation that the relationship served a hostile foreign interest.

The potential reach includes:

• JOURNALISM — Foreign interviews and discussions may become criminally punishable.
• ACADEMIA — Scientific cooperation with foreign institutions may require authorization or fall within prohibited activity.
• BUSINESS — Foreign-directed economic activity may carry enhanced penalties.
• CIVIL SOCIETY — Contacts with foreign organizations or embassies may become regulated.
• POLICY — Proposals allegedly influenced by foreign intelligence could become criminal matters.
• INFORMATION — Unauthorized data sharing becomes part of the national-security perimeter.

THE 2025 LAW: THE FOUNDATION

The August legislation follows a 2025 law introduced after the Iran-Israel conflict that imposed tougher penalties for alleged cooperation with hostile states. The law is already being used against individuals accused of assisting or communicating with organizations classified by Iranian authorities as hostile.³

The clearest current example is photojournalist Yalda Moaiery, who was sentenced to 15 years in prison under the 2025 legislation. Reuters reports that authorities accused her of providing interviews and images to Western media, including CNN, and to U.S.- or Israeli-linked organizations deemed hostile.³

The case demonstrates the difference between a proposed law and a functioning legal architecture: Iran is already applying the preceding statute to conduct involving foreign media and foreign-linked organizations.

RETALIATION ENTERS THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA

Iranian lawmakers have also pursued legislation aimed at formalizing retaliation against U.S. and Israeli leaders.

In May, Ebrahim Azizi, chairman of Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said lawmakers were preparing a plan titled “Counter-Action by the Military and Security Forces of the Islamic Republic.” Iranian reporting said the proposal included a €50 million reward for the killing of U.S. President Donald Trump.⁴

In July, Tehran MP Amir-Hossein Sabeti separately urged Parliament to prioritize a bill titled “Revenge on Trump and Other U.S. and Israeli Leaders.” IranWire reported that Sabeti said the bill had been registered in Parliament’s legislative system and should be placed high on the agenda.⁶

The evidence does not establish that either proposal has become law. They should instead be treated as evidence that retaliation has entered the parliamentary process and that some lawmakers are seeking to translate confrontation with the United States and Israel into formal legislative instruments.⁴⁻⁶

That distinction matters. A political threat and a legislative proposal are not the same thing. But the movement from rhetoric toward legislation is itself an intelligence signal.

THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ BILL

The legislative campaign also extends into maritime power.

On August 6, Reuters reported that an Iranian parliamentary committee was reviewing a preliminary bill that would bar U.S., Israeli and other “hostile” vessels from transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The draft reportedly included fines of up to 20 percent of a vessel’s cargo value for violations.⁷

The measure remains at the draft/committee stage, not enacted law. Its significance is strategic: it would attempt to translate Iran’s leverage over a critical international waterway into a formal legislative instrument.⁷

THE EMERGING LEGISLATIVE ARCHITECTURE

Viewed together, the measures point toward a broader framework:

• INFORMATION — Criminalize specified contact with hostile media and expand controls over information exchange.
• FOREIGN RELATIONS — Control or require reporting or approval for certain foreign contacts.
• SCIENCE & DATA — Restrict unauthorized scientific cooperation and data sharing.
• ECONOMIC ACTIVITY — Increase penalties for foreign-directed economic conduct.
• RETALIATION — Move threats against U.S. and Israeli leaders into parliamentary proposals.
• MARITIME POWER — Seek legislative authority over vessels deemed hostile in the Strait of Hormuz.

This is the central JaFaJ assessment: Iran appears to be moving from episodic retaliation and security measures toward a more durable legislative architecture for managing foreign influence and confrontation.

BUSINESS, ACADEMIC AND CIVIL-SOCIETY IMPLICATIONS

The practical impact will depend on final statutory language and implementing rules. Nevertheless, the direction is significant for organizations with Iranian counterparts.

For businesses, the immediate risk may be that Iranian partners, employees or contractors become legally constrained from interacting with foreign organizations. For universities and researchers, restrictions on scientific cooperation and data exchange could make ordinary international collaboration more difficult. For journalists and civil-society organizations, the combination of the 2025 law and proposed August legislation increases uncertainty over interviews, source relationships and foreign institutional contacts.

The compliance question is therefore changing from:

“What information is prohibited?”

to:

“Which foreign relationship is permitted, reportable or criminal?”

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

• FURTHER PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW — Watch article-by-article consideration, amendments, definitions, exemptions and the final vote on the foreign-influence bill.
• GUARDIAN COUNCIL REVIEW — If Parliament approves the bill, watch whether the Guardian Council accepts, revises or rejects specific provisions.
• IMPLEMENTING DEFINITIONS — Watch which agencies determine whether a media outlet, institution, vessel or foreign organization qualifies as “hostile.”
• RETALIATION BILLS — Track whether the Trump-related proposals advance into formal plenary consideration and whether their reported financial provisions survive.
• HORMUZ BILL — Watch the committee report, vessel definitions, enforcement authority, penalties and final legislative status.
• ENFORCEMENT — Track additional prosecutions under the 2025 law. Enforcement will reveal how broadly Iran interprets “hostile cooperation.”

JaFaJ TAKE

Iran’s August 16 legislation is important not because it creates another restriction on foreign media, but because it potentially expands the legal definition of foreign influence into ordinary international activity.

The bill reaches toward media, universities, scientific organizations, foreign institutions and information exchange. The Trump-related proposals and Hormuz draft broaden the picture further, suggesting that elements within Iran’s legislative system are attempting to translate confrontation with the United States and Israel into formal parliamentary instruments.

The evidence does not justify saying Iran has enacted a law authorizing the assassination of President Trump. It does justify saying Iranian lawmakers have proposed legislation involving a €50 million reward for his killing and that another bill targeting Trump and other U.S. and Israeli leaders has been registered for consideration. That distinction is essential to credible intelligence reporting.

JaFaJ WATCH: FIVE QUESTIONS THAT MATTER

1. HOW BROADLY will the final law define “foreign influence”?
2. WHO will determine which foreign organizations, media outlets and institutions are “hostile”?
3. WHICH relationships will require notification or approval?
4. WILL the retaliation and Hormuz proposals advance beyond the committee or proposal stage?
5. HOW will authorities use the 2025 law and any new legislation in actual enforcement?

BOTTOM LINE

The central issue is no longer simply whether Iran will punish espionage. Iran is testing how far its legal system can extend the concept of foreign influence into ordinary international activity.

If the August legislation becomes law substantially as proposed, Iran could have additional statutory mechanisms to regulate who Iranians communicate with, which foreign institutions they work with, what information they exchange and which activities are considered foreign-directed.

For Washington, American companies, universities and international institutions, the immediate intelligence question is straightforward:

HOW BROADLY WILL IRAN DEFINE “FOREIGN INFLUENCE”—AND HOW MUCH LEGITIMATE INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY WILL FALL INSIDE THAT DEFINITION?

SOURCE DISCIPLINE

This brief distinguishes enacted law, legislation advanced by Parliament, committee-stage drafts and reported proposals. It does not describe a proposal as enacted law. Reuters is the principal independent source for the August 16 bill, the 2025-law enforcement case and the Hormuz draft. Iranian media and Iran-focused outlets are used for the reported Trump-related legislative proposals where those details were not independently available in the primary legislative record. The analysis separates verified legislative status from JaFaJ analytical inference.

ENDNOTES

1. Reuters, “Iranian parliament advances bill to curb foreign influence,” August 16, 2026. Reuters reports that the bill would criminalize communications with hostile media, regulate contact with foreign media and institutions, restrict data sharing and scientific cooperation, and provide penalties potentially reaching 30 years; further parliamentary review and Guardian Council approval are required.
2. Reuters, “Iranian parliamentary committee reviews draft bill to bar US, Israeli ships from Hormuz,” August 6, 2026; Iran International, “Iran parliament working on bill that proposes €50m reward for killing Trump,” May 14, 2026; IranWire, “Iranian MP Proposes €50 Million Bounty for Trump,” May 15, 2026.
3. Reuters, “Iranian photojournalist faces 15 years in prison over images, reporting,” August 12, 2026. Reuters reports that Yalda Moaiery was sentenced under a 2025 espionage law introduced after the Iran-Israel conflict and describes allegations involving Western media and U.S.- or Israeli-linked organizations.
4. Iran International, “Iran parliament working on bill that proposes €50m reward for killing Trump,” May 14, 2026; IranWire, “Iranian MP Proposes €50 Million Bounty for Trump,” May 15, 2026. The proposal was attributed to Ebrahim Azizi, chairman of Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee.
5. Reuters, August 16, 2026, and the Iran-focused reporting cited in Note 4. The available reporting establishes the proposal’s reported existence and legislative status, not enactment.
6. IranWire, “Iran MP Demands Parliament Prioritize ‘Revenge on Trump’ Bill,” July 10, 2026. The report states that Tehran MP Amir-Hossein Sabeti urged Parliament to prioritize review of a bill known as “Revenge on Trump and Other U.S. and Israeli Leaders.”
7. Reuters, “Iranian parliamentary committee reviews draft bill to bar US, Israeli ships from Hormuz,” August 6, 2026. Reuters reports that the committee was reviewing a preliminary bill and that proposed fines could reach 20 percent of a ship’s cargo value.