Libya’s Political Settlement Problem

JAFAJ | ANALYSIS | SEPTEMBER 16, 2026

LIBYA’S POLITICAL SETTLEMENT PROBLEM

Elections, Elites, and External Mediation

Publication: JAFAJ MENA Political Intelligence Series

KEY JUDGMENT Libya’s latest UN-facilitated agreement is a procedural advance, not yet a political settlement. It addresses the reconstitution of the High National Elections Commission and unresolved legal questions surrounding presidential and parliamentary elections, while committing the parties to work toward elections within no more than 24 months. The agreement does not itself unify Libya’s executive authority, military and security institutions, public finances, or oil governance. Nor does it establish that the major factions will accept an electoral outcome that threatens their access to power, revenue, or protection. The emerging U.S. power-sharing initiative may help bridge the institutional divide, but it also raises a central legitimacy problem: whether Libya’s future government will derive its authority from a credible electoral process or from an externally encouraged bargain among entrenched political and security elites.

1. A Procedural Breakthrough Is Not a Constitutional Settlement

On August 30, representatives of Libya’s rival political camps signed an agreement under the auspices of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, or UNSMIL. The agreement emerged from the UN-backed “Smaller Convening,” also described as the “4+4” process.

The agreement focuses on two immediate institutional obstacles: reconstituting the Board of the High National Elections Commission and resolving outstanding constitutional and legal disputes surrounding presidential and legislative elections. It provides for presidential and parliamentary elections under a single executive authority and sets a timetable of no more than 24 months.

On September 15, UNSMIL announced that the House of Representatives had endorsed the agreement. That endorsement gives the process additional institutional weight, but it does not eliminate the need for further legal, administrative, and political decisions.

The distinction is fundamental. An agreement can establish a process without establishing the conditions required for that process to succeed. Libya’s previous election efforts failed not only because of missing legal provisions, but because political actors disputed who would control the state before, during, and after the vote.

2. The Legal Problem: Who Has Authority to Call, Conduct, and Certify an Election?

Libya’s electoral dispute is often described as a disagreement over election laws. That description is incomplete. The deeper legal problem concerns the allocation of authority among rival institutions that each claim a role in determining the country’s political future.

At minimum, a viable electoral framework must clarify:

• The legal basis for presidential and parliamentary elections.
• The powers and limits of the presidency, legislature, and executive government.
• The eligibility rules for presidential candidates and other senior officials.
• The sequencing of presidential and legislative elections.
• The authority responsible for appointing and supervising the elections commission.
• The procedure for resolving electoral disputes and appeals.
• The legal status of the interim executive during the campaign and after the vote.
• The mechanism for transferring power if a faction rejects the result.

These questions are interconnected. Candidate eligibility affects who will accept the rules. The sequencing of elections affects which institution controls the executive. The composition of the elections commission affects whether losing factions trust the count. The legal status of the interim government affects whether officeholders have an incentive to delay the vote.

A technically valid election can therefore remain politically illegitimate if the rules are perceived as having been designed to predetermine the result.

3. Libya’s Institutional Divide Is Not Simply East Versus West

Libya’s division involves competing institutions, rival chains of command, separate centers of economic authority, and armed groups that influence territory and public administration. The western Government of National Unity operates from Tripoli, while eastern Libya is dominated by the House of Representatives and forces associated with Khalifa Haftar.

The institutional fragmentation includes:

• Competing executive authorities and appointment systems.
• Rival legislative institutions.
• Separate military and security structures.
• Disputed control over public expenditure and financial institutions.
• Competition over the National Oil Corporation and oil-revenue distribution.
• Armed groups capable of influencing, obstructing, or coercing political decisions.

The UN roadmap is designed around this reality. Its central pillars are a viable electoral framework, institutional unification through a new government, and a structured dialogue covering governance, security, economics, reconciliation, and human rights.

The sequencing creates a dilemma. Elections require enough institutional unity to be administered nationally. Yet institutional unification negotiated entirely among existing power holders can become a substitute for elections.

4. The U.S. Initiative: Unification Through Elite Bargaining

For JAFAJ, the most important analytical distinction is between an executive bargain and a national settlement. An executive bargain may temporarily align powerful actors. A national settlement must also resolve the legal basis of elections, the chain of command, public-finance authority, oil-revenue distribution, judicial and legislative legitimacy, and the conditions under which transitional officeholders leave power. Without those elements, the initiative may reduce one form of fragmentation while institutionalizing another.

The U.S. role therefore requires careful differentiation between mediation, sponsorship, and political engineering. Mediation helps parties reach an agreement they can sustain. Sponsorship supplies diplomatic weight, incentives, and guarantees. Political engineering occurs when an outside actor effectively selects the institutional arrangement or officeholders it believes can stabilize the country. The public record presently supports describing the U.S. effort as an externally supported power-sharing initiative reported by major news organizations and analytical institutions. It does not yet support treating the proposal’s final structure, legal basis, or implementation guarantees as settled facts.

A further issue is representation. The principal bargaining parties may possess coercive and institutional power, but they do not automatically represent Libya’s municipalities, civil society, women’s organizations, professional associations, displaced communities, or the full range of political constituencies. An agreement negotiated exclusively among elite actors may be easier to conclude, yet harder to legitimize. The UN’s stated commitment to a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned process makes inclusion a substantive requirement, not merely a communications preference.

The reported formula also raises a sequencing problem. If elite agreement precedes a credible electoral framework, it may provide the political cover needed to implement the UN roadmap. If it becomes a substitute for that roadmap, it could convert a temporary transition into a new settlement among incumbents. The relevant test is therefore not whether the proposed figures can agree on offices, but whether the arrangement contains enforceable deadlines, transparent appointment procedures, a defined division of powers, and a credible mechanism for transferring authority to elected institutions.

The central question, however, is whether the proposed arrangement would unify institutions or merely distribute control over them. A presidential council and prime minister can be legally designated without acquiring effective command over armed formations, control over public expenditure, authority over the Central Bank, or operational control over the National Oil Corporation. The difference between formal appointment and effective authority is decisive. Libya has repeatedly produced transitional bodies whose legal status was clearer than their practical capacity to govern.

That reported design addresses a real institutional problem. Libya’s executive divide is not merely a dispute over titles. Competing authorities have used parallel appointments, budgets, security relationships, and administrative networks to preserve political leverage. A bargain that places the major rival blocs inside one formally recognized executive could reduce the immediate incentive to maintain separate governments. It could also create a channel through which the United States, European governments, financial institutions, and energy companies engage a single interlocutor rather than multiple competing authorities.

The reported U.S. initiative should be treated as a proposed political arrangement—not as a completed agreement, adopted Libyan constitutional instrument, or announced U.S. policy framework. Public reporting describes an effort to bring the principal eastern and western power centers into a single executive formula, reportedly combining a presidential council led by Saddam Haftar with the continued service of Abdul Hamid Dbeibah as prime minister. The reported objective is to create a unified executive authority capable of controlling state institutions, stabilizing the oil sector, and preparing the country for elections.

5. The Constitutional Risk of a Managed Transition

A transitional government is legally and politically different from a permanent government. Its authority should be limited by a defined mandate, a transparent appointment process, and a binding endpoint.

Without those safeguards, transitional arrangements can create a self-reinforcing system:

• Officeholders control state funds and public appointments.
• Security leaders retain independent armed forces.
• Political actors use legal disputes to delay elections.
• Foreign governments recognize or finance rival institutions.
• Oil revenues provide resources for patronage.
• Candidates fear that losing office may expose them to prosecution, asset seizure, or physical danger.

Under those conditions, every faction has a reason to demand additional guarantees before accepting elections. The transition becomes longer, the institutions become more politicized, and the public becomes less able to determine the country’s leadership.

The relevant legal safeguard is therefore not merely a promise to hold elections. It is a set of enforceable rules governing who may exercise transitional power, for how long, under what oversight, and with what consequences for noncompliance.

6. Security-Sector Unification Is the Decisive Test

The UN Security Council has emphasized that progress toward elections must be accompanied by institutional unification, including a unified executive and unified military and security institutions.

This requirement is more than a security-sector reform objective. It is an electoral legitimacy requirement.

An election cannot be fully credible if:

• Candidates campaign under the protection of rival armed groups.
• Local commanders control access to polling stations.
• Voters fear retaliation for supporting an opposing faction.
• Security institutions answer to competing political authorities.
• A losing faction can use force to reject the result.
• Armed groups retain economic interests tied to political office.

Security-sector unification does not necessarily mean immediate demobilization of every armed actor. It does require a clear national chain of command, civilian oversight, legal accountability, and a credible process for integration, retirement, or disarmament.

Without those measures, elections may change officeholders without changing the underlying distribution of coercive power.

7. Oil: The Economic Incentive and the Political Trap

Libya’s oil sector is the country’s principal source of public revenue and a central reason external powers seek political stabilization. A unified authority could improve production planning, repair infrastructure, attract investment, stabilize public salaries, and support reconstruction.

Yet oil also sustains political fragmentation. Control over production sites, export terminals, budgets, and financial institutions gives rival authorities leverage over one another and over the public.

The reported U.S. initiative links political unification to expanded oil and reconstruction investment. That linkage may create incentives for compromise, but it also requires strict governance safeguards:

• Transparent contracts and procurement.
• Public reporting of oil revenue.
• Auditable national and regional budgets.
• Clear rules for the National Oil Corporation.
• Equitable regional distribution of public revenue.
• Independent oversight of reconstruction funds.
• Protection against using oil access as a political weapon.

The essential question is not simply how much oil Libya can produce. It is who controls the revenue, who audits it, and who benefits from it.

8. Europe’s Interests Can Support Stability—and Distort It

European governments have direct interests in Libya’s migration routes, energy supplies, maritime security, counterterrorism, and regional stability. These interests create strong incentives to support any arrangement that reduces immediate disorder.

That can produce a tension between short-term stability and long-term legitimacy. A government that protects oil infrastructure or reduces migration flows may receive international support even if its domestic authority remains contested.

External partners should therefore avoid treating Libya primarily as a migration-control platform, an oil supplier, or a security buffer. Libya also requires accountable institutions, functioning public services, secure property rights, and a government whose authority is accepted by citizens rather than merely tolerated by foreign powers.

9. What the Current Developments Establish—and What They Do Not

The current developments establish the following:

• A UN-facilitated agreement has been signed.
• The agreement addresses the elections commission and the electoral legal framework.
• The agreement sets a timetable of no more than 24 months for elections.
• The House of Representatives has endorsed the agreement.
• The United States is pursuing a parallel unification and investment strategy.
• Reported U.S. proposals involve a negotiated distribution of executive authority between eastern and western camps.

They do not yet establish that:

• The rival executive authorities have been unified.
• The final electoral laws have been enacted.
• The elections commission has been reconstituted in a manner accepted by all major factions.
• All major armed groups accept the process.
• Military and security institutions have been integrated.
• The reported U.S. power-sharing proposal has been formally adopted.
• Elections will definitely occur within the 24-month timetable.
• The public has accepted the proposed settlement.

The difference between a diplomatic announcement and a functioning settlement is implementation, enforcement, and public acceptance.

10. Indicators JAFAJ Should Monitor

The next phase should be assessed through observable institutional indicators rather than diplomatic language.

Electoral indicators

• Reconstitution and public acceptance of the High National Elections Commission.
• Formal enactment of the electoral laws.
• Clear candidate-eligibility rules.
• An independent appeals and dispute-resolution mechanism.
• A published electoral calendar with enforceable milestones.

Executive indicators

• One legally recognized executive authority.
• A defined mandate and expiration date for the transitional government.
• Transparent appointment procedures.
• Limits on executive control over public funds and security appointments.

Security indicators

• A unified chain of command.
• Civilian oversight of security institutions.
• Protection for candidates, voters, journalists, and civil society.
• Evidence that armed groups cannot veto political decisions through force.

Economic indicators

• Unified and audited public spending.
• Transparent oil-revenue reporting.
• Clear regional distribution formulas.
• Independent oversight of reconstruction and investment agreements.

Legitimacy indicators

• Participation by municipalities, women, youth, civil society, and displaced Libyans.
• Public consultation on the constitutional and electoral framework.
• Protection for peaceful criticism.
• Acceptance of electoral outcomes by the major factions.

JAFAJ Assessment

Libya’s new agreement is important because it addresses procedural barriers that have blocked elections. It is not sufficient because Libya’s crisis is not only procedural. It is a contest over sovereignty, coercive power, public revenue, legal authority, and political survival.

The U.S. initiative may help create a unified executive, but its legitimacy will depend on whether it is transparent, time-limited, legally grounded, and explicitly subordinate to a credible electoral process. A bargain that merely distributes offices among rival elites could reduce immediate conflict while preserving the causes of institutional division.

The UN process and the U.S. initiative should be judged by the same standard: whether they create institutions capable of surviving the departure of the individuals who currently dominate them.

A durable settlement requires five minimum conditions:

1. A credible and independent elections commission.
2. A clear and enforceable electoral framework.
3. A unified executive with a defined mandate and expiration date.
4. A security structure capable of protecting voters and accepting electoral results.
5. Transparent management of oil revenue and public spending.

CONCLUSION

LIBYA NEEDS A BRIDGE TO ELECTIONS—not ANOTHER PERMANENT TRANSITION

Libya’s latest agreement creates an opening, but an opening is not a settlement. The country still faces unresolved questions over legal authority, executive control, security-sector fragmentation, oil governance, and the legitimacy of any future government.

External mediation can help break a deadlock. It cannot, by itself, manufacture legitimacy. If the next government is created through a closed bargain among powerful factions, it may inherit the institutions of a state without gaining the public trust required to govern it.

The decisive test is whether the transitional arrangement is designed to end itself. A successful process must establish clear rules, measurable deadlines, independent oversight, and a credible path to elections whose results all major actors are required to respect.

Libya does not need another indefinite transition. It needs a legally grounded bridge from divided authority to accountable national government.

JAFAJ KEY JUDGMENTS

• Libya’s August 30 agreement is a procedural advance, not yet a constitutional or political settlement.
• The House of Representatives’ endorsement strengthens the process but does not guarantee implementation.
• The reported U.S. power-sharing initiative may help unify institutions while creating risks of elite entrenchment and weak public legitimacy.
• The legal framework must address not only election procedures but also executive authority, candidate eligibility, sequencing, appeals, and transfer of power.
• Security-sector fragmentation remains the decisive obstacle to an election whose results can be enforced.
• Oil investment can encourage cooperation but must be accompanied by transparent contracts, audited revenues, and independent oversight.
• The 24-month timetable should be treated as a commitment to monitor, not as a confirmed election date.
• The central measure of success is whether Libya develops institutions that can outlast the factions and families currently controlling them.

ENDNOTES

1. United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), “UNSMIL Welcomes Agreement on Next Steps Towards National Elections,” August 30, 2026, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/en/news/unsmil-welcomes-agreement-on-next-steps-towards-national-elections.
2. United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), “UNSMIL Welcomes House of Representatives’ Endorsement of the Smaller Convening Agreement,” September 15, 2026, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/en/press-releases/unsmil-welcomes-house-of-representatives-endorsement-of-the-smaller-convening.
3. United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), “UN Security Council Press Statement on Libya,” September 8, 2026, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/en/press-releases/un-security-council-press-statement-on-libya.
4. United Nations Support Mission in Libya, “Political Roadmap,” accessed September 16, 2026, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/en/political-roadmap.
5. Reuters, “Libya Rivals Agree Roadmap for Elections Within 24 Months at UN-led Talks,” August 30, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/libya-rivals-agree-roadmap-elections-within-24-months-un-led-talks-2026-08-30/.
6. Financial Times, “Trump Adviser Pushes Power-Sharing Plan for Oil-Rich Libya,” June 17, 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/f5c43a41-3fa1-486e-a592-7933bc1bdcbd.
7. Al Jazeera, “Oil for Unity: What Is the US Mediation Plan in Libya?” July 8, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/8/oil-for-unity-what-is-the-us-mediation-plan-in-libya.
8. Chatham House, “Why US Plans for Power-Sharing in Libya Will Not Work,” July 2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/07/why-us-plans-power-sharing-libya-will-not-work.
9. Atlantic Council, “Libya Doesn’t Need Another Elite Bargain,” July 1, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/libya-doesnt-need-another-elite-bargain/.
10. European External Action Service, “Joint Statement of the European Union and the United States on Progress in the UN-Facilitated Political Process in Libya,” August 30, 2026, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/libya-joint-statement-european-union-and-united-states_en.

SOURCE QUALITY NOTE

Primary institutional claims are anchored in official UNSMIL and United Nations materials. The August 30 UNSMIL statement establishes the agreement’s subject matter and timetable; the September 15 statement establishes the House of Representatives’ endorsement; and the September 8 Security Council statement establishes the separate requirement for unified executive, military, and security institutions.

These official statements establish what was announced or endorsed. They do not, by themselves, establish implementation, public legitimacy, security-sector integration, or the certainty of elections. The article therefore distinguishes procedural commitments from demonstrated institutional outcomes.

Reuters is used for contemporaneous reporting and political context. Financial Times and Al Jazeera are used for reported details concerning the U.S. initiative, including the proposed distribution of executive authority and the reported relationship between political unification, oil governance, and investment. Because no final public agreement or constitutional instrument is cited for the U.S. proposal, its details are deliberately described as reported or proposed.

Chatham House and the Atlantic Council are used as attributed analytical sources. Their interpretations are not presented as primary facts; they are tested against concrete questions involving legal authority, appointment procedures, inclusion, public finance, security command, oil revenue, and the transfer of power.

The principal evidentiary limitation is the absence of a publicly available final text for the reported U.S. power-sharing arrangement. Its legal basis, selection mechanism, enforcement guarantees, relationship to the UN roadmap, and degree of Libyan acceptance remain unresolved. That uncertainty is itself central to the analysis.

Future JAFAJ updates should verify the complete signed Smaller Convening text, final HNEC provisions, electoral-law amendments, the procedural status of all required institutional endorsements, any official U.S. written proposal, and measurable implementation through appointments, budgets, security-chain changes, oil-revenue reporting, and published electoral milestones.

SOURCE AND EDITORIAL NOTE

This analysis distinguishes official statements, reported proposals, and JAFAJ assessment. The reported U.S. power-sharing concept remains subject to confirmation and should not be described as a formally adopted settlement unless an official agreement is published.