JAFAJ MENA LEGISLATIVE INTELLIGENCE

MOROCCO’S 2026 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

THE NEW POLITICAL CONFIGURATION, FIVE NATIONAL ISSUES, AND THE MENA REGIONAL EFFECT

ELECTION BRIEFING

September 26, 2026

Prepared for JAFAJ

Analytical policy brief. Not legal advice.

 

BLUF — THE ELECTION IN ONE PAGE

Morocco’s September 23, 2026 parliamentary election changed the internal hierarchy of the governing center more than it changed the strategic direction of the Moroccan state. PAM won 97 of 395 seats, followed by RNI with 66, Istiqlal with 65, and PJD with 54. The final result matched the provisional distribution. [1][2]

Because Article 47 of the Constitution directs the King to appoint the Head of Government from the party winning the most seats, PAM begins the government-formation process. It cannot govern alone: 198 seats are required for a majority. PAM + RNI + Istiqlal hold 228 seats, making continuity arithmetically possible. [1][3]

The most important domestic signal is not simply that PAM won. It is that RNI, which led the outgoing government, lost 36 seats while PJD recovered from 13 to 54. Turnout fell to 38.08 percent, from 50.86 percent in 2021. That combination points to a governing challenge centered on delivery, participation, and public confidence. [1][4]

The next government inherits an unusually large economic implementation agenda. IMF estimates put transport and tourism infrastructure investment during 2024–30 at about MAD 190 billion, roughly 11.9 percent of 2024 GDP, with the 2030 World Cup as a major driver. IMF projects 4.4 percent real GDP growth in 2026, while warning that unemployment remains a structural weakness. [5][6]

Israel is now an unusually important electoral-policy issue. On September 16, Israel and Morocco announced an upgrade toward full embassies, ambassadors, expanded direct flights, and investment-protection and double-taxation agreements. At the same time, PJD campaigned against normalization and the Gaza issue remains politically sensitive. The election therefore creates a potential tension between strategic/economic normalization and domestic political opinion. [7][8][9]

For MENA, the election matters because Morocco operates simultaneously in the Maghreb, Gulf, Sahel, Atlantic Africa, Europe and the Israel–Arab diplomatic system. The new government will not simply make domestic policy; it will implement a regional strategy whose economic consequences extend well beyond Morocco.

THE 2026 RESULT AT A GLANCE

PARTY	2026 SEATS	2021 SEATS	CHANGE
PAM	97	87	+10
RNI	66	102	−36
Istiqlal	65	81	−16
PJD	54	13	+41
Popular Movement	29	28	+1
USFP	26	34	−8
PPS	19	22	−3
Constitutional Union	17	18	−1

Source: Moroccan Ministry of the Interior and corroborating current election reporting. Full final distribution is listed in the source notes. [1][2]

TURNOUT IS A SECOND ELECTION RESULT

Official turnout was 38.08 percent among 15.8 million registered voters, compared with 50.86 percent in 2021 and 42.27 percent in 2016. The decline is therefore not a marginal fluctuation; it is a major participation change. [1]

Turnout should not be confused with the validity of the parliamentary result. It does, however, shape the political environment in which the next government must operate. Current reporting and pre-election analysis connect disengagement with employment, healthcare, education, purchasing power and frustration among younger citizens. The World Bank and IMF independently identify labor-market weakness as a major structural constraint. [4][5][6]

1. WHAT THE ELECTION ACTUALLY CHANGED

A CHANGE IN GOVERNING HIERARCHY — NOT NECESSARILY STRATEGIC DIRECTION

The most useful analytical distinction is between parliamentary power and strategic state direction. PAM moves from coalition partner to largest parliamentary party. RNI moves from first place to second. Istiqlal remains a major coalition actor. PJD returns as a substantial opposition force. Yet the monarchy remains central to strategic state policy, and the principal parties continue to operate within an established modernization and investment framework. [2][10]

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s post-election analysis similarly characterizes the result as a shift within an existing development framework rather than a choice between radically different national models. That is analysis, not a constitutional rule. [10]

THE COALITION MATH

CONFIGURATION	SEATS	READ-THROUGH
PAM + RNI + Istiqlal	228	Clear majority; preserves the basic outgoing coalition architecture with PAM now first.
PAM + RNI + PJD	217	Majority, but would combine the governing center with a resurgent Islamist opposition.
PAM + Istiqlal + PJD	216	Majority, but would substantially change the governing coalition.
PAM + RNI + Popular Movement	192	Five seats short of a majority.
PAM + RNI	163	Insufficient alone.
PAM + Istiqlal	162	Insufficient alone.

The arithmetic demonstrates why the election should not be described as producing a single-party mandate. PAM won first place; coalition construction remains decisive. [2][3]

2. THE TOP FIVE ISSUES THAT WILL DEFINE THE NEW GOVERNMENT

ISSUE ONE — GOVERNMENT FORMATION AND IMPLEMENTATION CAPACITY

PAM must translate first place into a functioning majority. The immediate questions are the appointment of the Head of Government, coalition agreement, cabinet allocation, parliamentary committees, and the first government legislative program.

Economic effect: coalition stability matters because Morocco is entering a high-spending implementation period. Delays in budgets, procurement, infrastructure or regulatory decisions can reduce the economic return on public investment. Continuity would favor ongoing projects; a fragmented coalition could increase political transaction costs.

JAFAJ indicator: watch the coalition agreement and the portfolios assigned to finance, investment, infrastructure, foreign affairs, interior, energy, employment, housing and African cooperation.

ISSUE TWO — JOBS, YOUTH AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

The election occurred against a labor-market problem that is larger than normal electoral politics. IMF reports 13 percent total unemployment in 2025, 37.3 percent youth unemployment among ages 15–24, and 25.2 percent of youth classified as NEET in 2025 Q3. [6]

Economic effect: Morocco can sustain headline growth while still failing to generate sufficient employment for younger workers. The IMF identifies private-sector dynamism, skills, labor-market reform and human-capital investment as central to durable job creation. [5][6]

Political effect: low turnout and the PJD recovery create pressure for measurable improvements in wages, services, education, healthcare and employment rather than only macroeconomic growth.

JAFAJ indicator: track the employment package, private-sector reforms, vocational training, female employment, SME finance and regional job creation.

ISSUE THREE — WORLD CUP INFRASTRUCTURE, FISCAL POLICY AND THE GROWTH MODEL

Morocco’s 2030 World Cup preparations are now a central economic policy vehicle. IMF estimates transport and tourism infrastructure investment during 2024–30 at MAD 190 billion, about 11.9 percent of 2024 GDP. [6]

Economic effect: public investment can raise productivity, tourism, logistics capacity and employment. The IMF and World Bank also warn that large investment programs carry financing, implementation and human-capital risks. [5][6]

The strategic question is whether stadiums, rail, airports, roads, hotels and urban infrastructure become durable productive assets rather than a temporary construction cycle.

JAFAJ indicator: monitor procurement, project financing, cost overruns, regional distribution, private-sector participation and post-2030 operating plans.

ISSUE FOUR — ISRAEL, GAZA AND THE ECONOMICS OF NORMALIZATION

Israel is the most politically sensitive external issue with a direct connection to Morocco’s new parliamentary configuration. On September 16, Israel and Morocco announced an upgrade toward full embassies and ambassadors, expanded direct flights, and agreements on investment protection and double taxation. [7][8]

At the same time, PJD campaigned against normalization with Israel. Current reporting notes that Gaza-related protests and public opposition to normalization have remained politically significant. [9][10]

Economic effect: deeper Morocco–Israel relations can expand trade, tourism, aviation, technology, investment and business links. A 2025 compilation of Israeli government trade data showed goods trade rising from $23 million in 2020 to $110 million in 2024, although those figures exclude services, defense and other categories. [11] The political risk is that regional escalation or domestic opposition can interrupt commercial expansion.

Strategic effect: Morocco must balance relations with Israel and the United States against its Arab, African and domestic political constituencies. The election does not itself determine foreign policy, but it changes the parliamentary environment in which normalization will be discussed.

JAFAJ indicator: watch embassy implementation, direct flights, investment and tax agreements, parliamentary statements on Gaza, PJD legislative initiatives, and any linkage between normalization and Western Sahara diplomacy.

ISSUE FIVE — ALGERIA, WESTERN SAHARA AND AFRICAN ECONOMIC EXPANSION

Morocco’s rivalry with Algeria remains intertwined with Western Sahara, Sahel diplomacy, European partnerships and African economic expansion. The new government inherits this strategy rather than creating it.

Economic effect: regional competition can influence energy access, trade routes, logistics, investment decisions and diplomatic alignment. Morocco’s African strategy—banking, telecommunications, infrastructure, logistics and Atlantic initiatives—also creates new markets and capital opportunities.

Strategic effect: the government’s ability to execute African policy matters because Morocco is positioning itself as a bridge among Europe, the Maghreb, the Sahel, West Africa and Atlantic markets.

JAFAJ indicator: monitor Western Sahara diplomatic recognition, Morocco–Algeria signaling, Sahel projects, Nador West Med, Atlantic Africa initiatives and new African investment agreements.

3. THE ISRAEL FACTOR — THE MOST IMPORTANT REGIONAL POLITICAL TENSION

The Israel relationship deserves separate treatment because it crosses diplomacy, security, economics, domestic politics and Morocco’s relationship with the United States.

THE RELATIONSHIP IS MOVING TOWARD GREATER INSTITUTIONALIZATION

On September 16, Israel’s Foreign Ministry reported that Israel and Morocco agreed to conclude investment-protection and double-taxation agreements by the end of 2026, expand flights operated by Moroccan airlines, and proceed with reciprocal high-level visits. A Reuters report the same day described the agreement as an upgrade toward full embassies and ambassadorial relations. [7][8]

This matters because it moves normalization from a primarily diplomatic framework toward a broader economic and institutional relationship. Investment protection, tax treatment and aviation are mechanisms that can create durable commercial constituencies.

BUT THE PARLIAMENTARY ENVIRONMENT IS MORE CONTESTED

PJD leader Abdelilah Benkirane reiterated opposition to normalization shortly before the election. Current election reporting also describes PJD’s campaign as strongly critical of ties with Israel. These are party positions and campaign claims, not evidence that a parliamentary majority exists to reverse normalization. [9][12]

The election therefore creates a dual-track system: the state can continue strategic normalization while a larger parliamentary opposition uses the relationship as a domestic political issue. The practical outcome will depend on what the government chooses to place before Parliament and how far economic agreements require legislative or budgetary action.

ISRAEL AND WESTERN SAHARA

The relationship also intersects with Morocco’s Western Sahara diplomacy. Israel’s recognition and diplomatic posture toward Morocco have been part of the broader strategic environment surrounding the Sahara question. For Rabat, therefore, Israel is not only a Middle East relationship; it is part of a wider network involving Washington, Gulf capitals, Europe and African diplomacy.

JAFAJ should avoid assuming that normalization automatically determines Western Sahara outcomes. The stronger analytical point is that the relationships are strategically connected: diplomatic recognition, security cooperation, investment and U.S. regional policy can reinforce one another, while Gaza-related political pressure can constrain the domestic political space for deeper normalization.

4. ECONOMIC IMPACT — WHAT THE NEW PARLIAMENT INHERITS

A. GROWTH

The IMF projects 4.4 percent real GDP growth for 2026 and 4.5 percent for 2027. The World Bank’s July 2026 update projected 4.2 percent growth in 2026. The difference reflects different modeling dates and assumptions; both point to continued expansion rather than recession. [5][13]

B. THE JOBS GAP

The major weakness is employment intensity. IMF data show youth unemployment above 37 percent and a large NEET population. This means infrastructure-led growth must be judged not only by GDP but by the number, quality and geographic distribution of jobs created. [6]

C. PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND FISCAL RISK

Morocco’s fiscal deficit narrowed to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2025, according to the IMF, while debt-to-GDP is projected to decline gradually toward 60.5 percent by 2031 under the IMF baseline. Large infrastructure spending nevertheless creates risks if projects rely excessively on public or state-owned-enterprise financing. [5][6]

D. ENERGY AND THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

The IMF and World Bank identify the wider Middle East conflict as an economic risk through energy and commodity prices, freight costs and global demand. Morocco’s import exposure makes regional shipping and energy disruptions relevant even when the country is not directly involved militarily. [5][13]

E. TRADE AND LOGISTICS

Nador West Med and Morocco’s transport investments could increase integration into regional trade and energy networks. IMF analysis identifies the port’s 2026 operationalization as a potentially important step in trade and logistics integration. [6]

5. WHAT THE NEW ALIGNMENT MEANS FOR THE MENA REGION

ALGERIA — THE PRINCIPAL MAGHREB STRATEGIC VARIABLE

The election does not remove the Morocco–Algeria rivalry. If PAM leads a government with RNI and Istiqlal, continuity is more likely than a strategic reset. The key variables are Western Sahara, Sahel competition, European relationships and energy/security positioning.

GULF STATES — CAPITAL AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have reasons to remain engaged with Morocco through investment, tourism, logistics, food systems and diplomacy. A stable coalition could make Morocco more attractive as an investment and regional operating platform.

ISRAEL — NORMALIZATION UNDER GREATER DOMESTIC SCRUTINY

The larger PJD parliamentary presence gives anti-normalization politics a stronger institutional voice. At the same time, the state-level relationship with Israel is moving toward deeper institutional and commercial ties. The result is not necessarily reversal; it is a more politically contested normalization process.

PALESTINE AND GAZA — THE DOMESTIC/FOREIGN-POLICY BRIDGE

Gaza has become a channel through which regional war enters Moroccan domestic politics. The government must manage relations with Israel and the United States while responding to public and opposition pressure over Palestinian issues. The new Parliament provides more space for that debate.

SAHEL — MOROCCO’S COMPETITION WITH ALGERIA FOR REGIONAL RELEVANCE

Morocco’s banking, logistics, infrastructure and diplomatic networks give it tools that do not depend solely on military power. The government’s ability to finance and execute these projects will affect the regional balance.

EUROPE — MIGRATION, SECURITY AND TRADE

Morocco remains a central European partner on migration, counterterrorism, trade and investment. The election matters because coalition stability and economic performance determine whether Rabat can deliver on long-running bilateral commitments.

ATLANTIC AFRICA — THE NEW SOUTHERN ECONOMIC AXIS

Morocco’s Atlantic initiatives seek to connect West African economies to ports, finance, energy and logistics. The new government will be judged on implementation, not announcement.

ARAB SYSTEM — A BRIDGE BETWEEN DIFFERENT BLOCS

Morocco can operate across Gulf, European, African and Arab diplomatic networks. Its value as a bridge state increases when it can maintain relationships with actors that do not always share the same regional priorities.

6. MENA IMPACT MATRIX

ACTOR / REGION	IMPACT	PRIMARY CHANNEL	JAFAJ WATCH
Israel	High	Normalization, aviation, investment, security, Gaza politics	Embassies; flights; tax/investment agreements; parliamentary opposition
Algeria	High	Western Sahara, Sahel, European diplomacy	Diplomatic signaling; security; economic competition
Gulf	High	Capital, investment, energy, diplomacy	UAE/Saudi/Qatar projects and political coordination
EU	High	Migration, trade, security, energy	Spain/France/EU implementation
Sahel	High	Banking, logistics, infrastructure, diplomacy	New projects and access corridors
West Africa	Medium–High	Atlantic logistics, finance, investment	AASP and port connectivity
Palestine/Gaza	High	Public opinion, opposition politics, Arab diplomacy	Parliamentary debate and normalization policy
Egypt/Arab system	Medium	Diplomatic coordination and investment	Arab League and bilateral initiatives

7. GOVERNMENT-FORMATION SCENARIOS — NOT OUTCOME PREDICTIONS

These are institutional configurations derived from the seat arithmetic, not predictions about which coalition will form.

SCENARIO A — PAM + RNI + ISTIQLAL

228 seats. This is the cleanest continuity configuration mathematically. It would preserve the three-party governing structure while changing its internal hierarchy. The likely policy question would be how portfolios and influence are redistributed.

SCENARIO B — PAM BUILDS A BROADER COALITION

PAM could seek additional partners to broaden its parliamentary base. This could provide greater legislative redundancy but also increase coalition-management costs.

SCENARIO C — A DIFFERENT MAJORITY FORMULA

PAM could construct a majority without RNI or with PJD. Such a configuration would materially change the political character of the government and would deserve close monitoring. Current reporting says PJD has indicated it will remain in opposition. [2]

8. THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE AGENDA JAFAJ SHOULD WATCH

• Government program and coalition agreement.
• 2027 budget architecture and infrastructure allocations.
• Employment and private-sector reform package.
• Healthcare and education implementation measures.
• Housing and urban-development legislation.
• 2030 World Cup procurement and infrastructure financing.
• Energy diversification and exposure to Middle East commodity disruptions.
• Migration and border-security policy following the Ceuta crisis.
• Morocco–Israel agreements on investment protection, double taxation, aviation and diplomatic missions.
• Western Sahara-related diplomatic and economic measures.
• Sahel and Atlantic Africa investment programs.
• Nador West Med and associated logistics/industrial development.

9. JAFAJ BOTTOM LINE

Morocco’s 2026 election is best understood as a redistribution of political responsibility inside an enduring strategic framework. PAM’s 97 seats give it first place and the first opportunity to form a government. RNI and Istiqlal remain powerful coalition actors. PJD’s recovery gives the opposition substantially more institutional weight. Turnout, however, exposes a deeper problem: the distance between formal electoral participation and the expectations of younger citizens.

Economically, the incoming government inherits a favorable but demanding position. Growth is strong, inflation is comparatively contained, infrastructure investment is accelerating, and Morocco is building major logistics and tourism capacity. But the labor market remains structurally weak, especially for youth, and large infrastructure programs create fiscal and implementation risks. [5][6]

Regionally, Israel is the most important new political complication. Morocco and Israel are moving toward deeper institutional and commercial relations at exactly the moment that Gaza remains highly salient to Moroccan politics. The PJD’s resurgence gives anti-normalization politics a stronger parliamentary platform, while the state-level logic of normalization has acquired new economic and diplomatic momentum. The resulting tension is likely to be managed rather than resolved by the next government.

The second major regional variable is Algeria. The election does not appear to offer a reason to expect a fundamental reversal of Morocco’s Western Sahara policy or its broader African strategy. Instead, the question is whether the new government can execute that strategy while simultaneously meeting domestic economic demands.

For JAFAJ, the election should therefore be treated as the beginning of a four-year implementation cycle—not the end of an electoral story. The key intelligence targets are coalition composition, ministerial allocation, budgets, employment outcomes, World Cup infrastructure, Israel normalization, Western Sahara diplomacy, Algeria relations, Sahel policy and African investment.

10. SOURCE DISCIPLINE AND REFERENCES

Citation standard: bracketed source numbers identify the principal documentary basis for factual claims. Analytical judgments are identified as JAFAJ analysis or framed as scenarios. Current facts are dated to September 26, 2026.

[1] Kingdom of Morocco, Ministry of the Interior / Maroc.ma, “2026 Legislative Elections: PAM Leads with 97 Seats According to Preliminary Results,” September 24, 2026; official election portal. Turnout: 38.08%; 395 seats; final distribution.

[2] Al Jazeera, “PAM wins big in Morocco parliament elections but falls short of majority,” September 26, 2026. Final results, coalition implications, PJD position and government formation.

[3] Kingdom of Morocco, 2011 Constitution, Article 47. Appointment of the Head of Government from the party winning the most seats in the House of Representatives.

[4] Arab Reform Initiative, “Morocco’s 2026 Legislative Elections Amid Rising Voter Apathy,” September 2026.

[5] International Monetary Fund, “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2026 Article IV Consultation, and Mid-Term Review Under the Flexible Credit Line Arrangement with Morocco,” March 25, 2026.

[6] International Monetary Fund, Morocco: 2026 Article IV Consultation and Review Under the Flexible Credit Line Arrangement, IMF Country Report No. 26/072, 2026.

[7] Reuters, “Israel and Morocco agree to upgrade diplomatic ties, Israeli government says,” September 16, 2026.

[8] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “FM Sa’ar holds a trilateral diplomatic summit in New York,” September 16, 2026.

[9] Middle East Monitor, “Morocco: Benkirane reiterates opposition to normalisation with Israel,” September 18, 2026.

[10] Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, “Parliamentary elections in Morocco,” September 2026.

[11] Heritage Foundation, Abraham Accords Event Booklet, 2025, Morocco–Israel trade table based on Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. Goods trade only; excludes services, defense and other categories.

[12] Al Jazeera, “Morocco’s PJD: what has the party learned ahead of the 2026 election?” September 20, 2026.

[13] World Bank, “Public Investment Powers Morocco’s Strongest Growth in a Decade — with Digital Transformation as the Next Horizon,” July 23, 2026.

SELECTED ONLINE SOURCES

Official Morocco election portal: https://www.maroc.ma/en/moroccos-2026-legislative-elections

Morocco official results: https://www.maroc.ma/en/news/2026-legislative-elections-pam-leads-97-seats-according-preliminary-results-minister-interior

Al Jazeera final-results analysis: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/26/pam-wins-big-in-morocco-parliament-elections-but-falls-short-of-majority

IMF Morocco 2026 Article IV: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/03/25/pr26089-morocco-imf-concludes-2026-aiv-consultation-and-mid-term-rev-under-fcl-arrangement

World Bank Morocco Economic Update: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/07/23/public-investment-powers-morocco-s-strongest-growth-in-a-decade

Reuters on Morocco–Israel upgrade: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-morocco-agree-upgrade-diplomatic-ties-israeli-government-says-2026-09-16/

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: https://embassies.gov.il/usa/en/news/fm-sa-ar-holds-trilateral-diplomatic-summit-new-york-16-sep-2026

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung: https://www.kas.de/en/country-reports/detail/-/content/parliamentary-elections-in-morocco