The Government Surveillance Marketplace: The Business Of Watching The World

THE GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE MARKETPLACE

Who Buys Spyware, Who Finances the Industry, and How Pegasus Became a Global Instrument of State Power

JAFAJ INVESTIGATIVE REPORT | NOVEMBER 18, 2026

THE BUSINESS OF WATCHING THE WORLD

Governments once needed large intelligence agencies, physical surveillance teams, and years of investigative work to monitor a person. Today, a government with sufficient money can purchase commercial spyware capable of turning a smartphone into a surveillance device—potentially exposing its communications, location, photographs, contacts, and, in some circumstances, microphone and camera activity.

This is no longer simply a story about intelligence agencies. It is the story of a global marketplace in which private companies develop surveillance technology, investors and financial structures support the vendors, and governments acquire tools whose capabilities can exceed the oversight mechanisms designed to control them.

At the center of this marketplace is Pegasus, the sophisticated spyware developed by Israel’s NSO Group. But Pegasus is only one product in a much larger industry. Its competitors, customers, financiers, and international distribution networks raise a fundamental question: Who is watching whom, and who is accountable when governments misuse the technology?

The commercial spyware industry has created a new relationship between the private sector and national intelligence services. Governments no longer need to develop every surveillance capability internally. They can purchase it, license it, receive technical support, and operate it through specialized government units.

The result is a global marketplace in which surveillance capabilities once associated with major intelligence powers are increasingly available to governments willing and able to pay.

  1. WHAT THE TECHNOLOGY ACTUALLY DOES

Commercial mobile spyware is not ordinary monitoring software. It is designed to gain covert access to a target’s electronic devices, frequently without the person’s knowledge.

Depending on the product, the operating system, and the particular exploit, successful access can provide an operator with the ability to:

  • Read text messages and access messaging applications.
  • Retrieve photographs, files, contacts, and call records.
  • Collect location information and movement patterns.
  • Access communications and other information stored on a device.
  • Activate or access microphone and camera functions.
  • Monitor a person’s digital relationships and activities.

Some attacks require a person to click a malicious link. More advanced attacks can exploit vulnerabilities without requiring the target to take any action. These are commonly called zero-click attacks.

Pegasus has become particularly controversial because of its ability to exploit vulnerabilities in widely used mobile operating systems. The technology has evolved beyond the early versions that relied on deceptive text messages and links.

Amnesty International’s July 2026 technical investigation, drawing on internal NSO Group material disclosed through U.S. litigation, provides an unusually detailed account of how Pegasus operates. It describes a system in which NSO maintains important technical infrastructure, manages attack capabilities, and provides ongoing operational support to government customers.

That finding matters. Pegasus is not simply software delivered to a government and then forgotten. Its operation depends on a continuing relationship between the vendor and the customer. The company remains an important part of the surveillance process.

The distinction also matters for accountability: investigators may need to examine not only the government agency operating the system, but also the private company maintaining the infrastructure that makes the surveillance possible.

  1. THE MAJOR COMPANIES IN THE MARKETPLACE

Pegasus is the best-known commercial spyware product, but it is not the only one. Several companies have developed products intended for government intelligence, law enforcement, and security customers.

NSO GROUP — PEGASUS

<PRIVATE_PERSON>Israel-based NSO Group developed Pegasus, one of the world’s most sophisticated commercial mobile spyware systems. The company says it sells its technology to authorized government customers for legitimate law-enforcement and national-security purposes.

The company has repeatedly faced allegations that its products were used against journalists, human-rights defenders, political opponents, and other individuals who were not legitimate criminal or terrorist targets. NSO has disputed important aspects of the investigations and says it has policies intended to prevent misuse.

INTELLEXA — PREDATOR

Intellexa is an international commercial spyware consortium associated with founder Tal Dilian. Its Predator product has been linked to surveillance operations in multiple countries.

The U.S. Treasury Department describes Intellexa as a decentralized network of companies involved in developing, operating, and distributing commercial spyware. Its 2024 sanctions identified entities and individuals associated with the consortium, including companies operating in Greece, Ireland, and North Macedonia.

In February 2026, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists reported that a Greek court convicted Dilian and three others in connection with the country’s wiretapping scandal. The case illustrates that the commercial spyware business can generate legal consequences not only for government customers but also for the people operating the companies.

PARAGON SOLUTIONS — GRAPHITE

Paragon Solutions is another Israeli-founded surveillance technology company. Its Graphite spyware has been marketed to government customers, including democratic governments.

Paragon has presented itself as a more selective vendor, emphasizing that it serves a limited group of governments and prohibits targeting journalists and civil-society figures. The company confirmed in 2025 that the U.S. government was among its customers.

However, allegations concerning Graphite have also raised questions about whether contractual promises and vendor policies are sufficient to prevent misuse. In October 2026, WIRED reported allegations that Graphite had been used against journalists and activists in more than 20 countries.

THE BROADER MARKET

Other companies and vendors have supplied surveillance, interception, intrusion, and intelligence-gathering products. Some specialize in mobile spyware; others sell network monitoring, communications interception, or digital intelligence platforms.

The marketplace is not limited to one product or one country. It is an international ecosystem of software developers, exploit researchers, corporate holding companies, resellers, investors, and government procurement offices.

  1. WHICH COUNTRIES USE PEGASUS?

This is the most important question—and one that requires careful treatment.

There is no publicly available, independently verified master list of every government that has purchased Pegasus. NSO Group does not publish a complete customer list. Governments generally do not disclose the identity of their surveillance units, the number of licenses they hold, or the individuals they target.

Nevertheless, several major investigations have identified countries associated with Pegasus operations.

The 2021 Pegasus Project, coordinated by Forbidden Stories with technical support from Amnesty International, examined a leaked dataset containing more than 50,000 telephone numbers selected for potential surveillance by NSO customers. The investigation identified suspected government customers in countries including:

Country What the public investigations established
Mexico Extensive Pegasus targeting investigations, including journalists and political figures
Azerbaijan Journalists and other civil-society figures were identified among suspected targets
Kazakhstan Identified among suspected NSO customer countries
Hungary Journalists and other individuals were targeted; forensic evidence supported Pegasus infections
India Journalists and other prominent individuals were targeted; later forensic investigations confirmed infections
United Arab Emirates Identified among suspected NSO customer countries and linked to surveillance controversies
Saudi Arabia Identified among suspected NSO customer countries; activists and other individuals were targeted
Bahrain Identified among suspected NSO customer countries
Morocco Identified among suspected NSO customer countries, with extensive allegations involving journalists and activists
Rwanda Identified among suspected NSO customer countries
Togo Identified among suspected NSO customer countries

These findings do not mean that every government in the table has publicly acknowledged purchasing Pegasus. They reflect investigative findings based on leaked data, forensic examinations, and attribution research.

The distinction is essential: a suspected customer, an identified target, and a forensically confirmed infection are three different evidentiary categories.

The Citizen Lab’s earlier technical research identified suspected Pegasus operations associated with infrastructure in 45 countries. Its findings included countries across the Middle East, Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Americas.

That research identified suspected operations in Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Poland, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Uganda, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and Zambia.

This is a technical map of suspected Pegasus infrastructure and operations—not a verified list of purchasing governments. The research itself cautioned that geographic attribution can be affected by VPNs, satellite internet infrastructure, and other technical factors.

The important conclusion is that Pegasus was not confined to a handful of intelligence superpowers. Its suspected operational footprint extended across numerous regions, including countries with very different political systems and human-rights records.

  1. WHO ACTUALLY USES PEGASUS?

NSO Group has maintained that Pegasus is sold to government customers, not private individuals or ordinary commercial companies.

In practice, the government entities most likely to operate such systems include:

  • National intelligence and security services.
  • Domestic intelligence agencies.
  • Police and specialized criminal-investigation units.
  • Counterterrorism organizations.
  • Military intelligence services.
  • Other authorized government security bodies.

The identity of the specific agency operating Pegasus is often not public. In some countries, the relevant intelligence service has been identified through investigations or legal proceedings; in others, the evidence establishes a suspected government customer without identifying the operating unit.

The Pegasus Project identified journalists, human-rights defenders, lawyers, political figures, academics, businesspeople, doctors, and religious leaders among individuals whose telephone numbers appeared in the leaked dataset.

The investigation identified at least 188 journalists among more than 1,000 individuals whose numbers were identified by researchers. Amnesty International and its partners also conducted forensic examinations that confirmed infections or attempted infections in numerous cases.

The issue is not that every person on a target list was necessarily infected. The issue is that individuals whose work involved reporting, political activity, legal representation, or criticism of government policies appeared in datasets associated with government surveillance.

That creates a serious national-security and democratic-governance concern. Technology developed to investigate terrorism and serious crime can become an instrument for monitoring political competition, restricting journalism, and intimidating civil society.

  1. WHO FINANCES THE SPYWARE INDUSTRY?

The financing question is more complicated than identifying a single bank or investor. Commercial spyware companies frequently use private-equity ownership, holding companies, offshore corporate structures, private investors, and government contracts.

The financing of NSO Group provides a particularly revealing example.

FRANCISCO PARTNERS: THE EARLY PRIVATE-EQUITY INVESTMENT

In 2014, U.S.-based private-equity firm Francisco Partners acquired a majority stake in NSO Group. The transaction reportedly valued the deal at approximately $110 million to $130 million.

Francisco Partners held its majority position until 2019, when NSO’s founders and management, together with European investment firm Novalpina Capital, acquired the stake.

This is an important part of the history of the industry: a major U.S. private-equity investor once held control of the company behind Pegasus.

NOVALPINA CAPITAL AND NSO’S FOUNDERS

In 2019, Novalpina Capital became a major investor in NSO Group alongside its founders and management. Contemporary reporting placed the company’s valuation at approximately $1 billion.

Novalpina’s investment became controversial as allegations about Pegasus misuse expanded. The investment structure and subsequent financial difficulties also illustrate the risks associated with financing a company whose products can generate international diplomatic, legal, and human-rights controversies.

The 2019 transaction should not be confused with the company’s present ownership. Ownership, creditor arrangements, and financial control can change over time, and a complete current capital structure is not publicly established by the sources reviewed for this report.

INTELLEXA: A NETWORK OF COMPANIES AND INVESTORS

Intellexa demonstrates another model of financing.

Rather than operating as one straightforward corporate entity, the consortium has used a network of companies across multiple jurisdictions. U.S. Treasury sanctions identified companies and individuals associated with the development, management, and distribution of Predator.

The Atlantic Council’s 2024 analysis described a wider investor and corporate network, including the Aliada Group, based in the British Virgin Islands, and companies connected to Tal Dilian.

The significance is not simply that one investor financed one software product. The corporate structure can make it difficult to establish who owns the technology, who controls its distribution, who receives the revenue, and which entities ultimately benefit from government contracts.

PARAGON: PRIVATE-EQUITY CAPITAL ENTERS THE MARKET

Paragon provides another example of private capital entering the spyware business.

In December 2024, reporting identified U.S. private-equity firm AE Industrial Partners as the buyer of Paragon Solutions in a transaction reported to be worth at least $500 million, with the potential value described as higher if certain milestones were achieved.

By October 2026, WIRED reported that Paragon had been acquired by AE Industrial Partners and merged with REDLattice, another offensive cyber company owned by AE.

This development demonstrates that the commercial spyware market is not simply an Israeli or European technology story. U.S. investment capital has also played a role in the ownership and expansion of companies developing offensive cyber capabilities.

THE FINANCING QUESTION

The available evidence points to several sources of capital:

  1. Private-equity investment.
  2. Private investors and corporate holding companies.
  3. Founder and management ownership.
  4. Government licensing and procurement contracts.
  5. Revenue from maintenance, technical support, and system upgrades.
  6. Corporate financing arrangements and other private capital.

There is no reliable public accounting of the total money invested in the global commercial spyware industry. Nor is there a complete public list of the banks, lenders, beneficial owners, and financial intermediaries supporting every vendor.

That information gap is itself a policy problem. Governments can be held responsible for purchasing surveillance technology, but investors and corporate intermediaries can remain several layers removed from the actual use of the product.

  1. THE UNITED STATES: CUSTOMER, INVESTOR, AND REGULATOR

The United States occupies an unusual position in this marketplace.

American private capital has invested in companies connected to the commercial spyware industry. American government agencies have also purchased or contracted for surveillance products. At the same time, the U.S. government has imposed sanctions and export restrictions against companies accused of enabling abuses.

Paragon publicly confirmed that the U.S. government was a customer in 2025. Separately, reporting by WIRED documented a $2 million contract between U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Paragon Solutions in September 2024. The contract covered a configured technology solution, licensing, hardware, maintenance, and training; the public reporting did not establish that ICE necessarily deployed Graphite itself.

The U.S. government has also taken action against NSO Group and other commercial spyware vendors.

In November 2021, the U.S. Department of Commerce added NSO Group to its Entity List, citing evidence that the company supplied spyware to foreign governments that used it to target government officials, journalists, businesspeople, activists, academics, and embassy workers.

In March and September 2024, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on individuals and entities associated with Intellexa.

The policy contradiction is clear: the United States recognizes the danger of commercial spyware proliferation while American investors and government agencies remain connected to parts of the broader surveillance market.

That does not establish that every American investment or government contract involves abusive surveillance. It does, however, demonstrate the need for consistent procurement standards, investment transparency, and meaningful oversight.

  1. THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: A HIGH-STAKES MARKET

The Middle East and Africa deserve particular attention.

Both regions contain governments confronting genuine security challenges, including terrorism, organized crime, armed conflict, cross-border trafficking, and political instability. Intelligence services have legitimate reasons to investigate serious threats.

But the same technology can also be used to monitor opposition politicians, journalists, activists, lawyers, and business competitors.

The Pegasus investigations identified suspected customers and operations across both regions. Countries identified in the Pegasus Project included Bahrain, Morocco, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Togo. Other technical research identified suspected operations in countries including Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Uganda, and Yemen.

These findings should not be treated as proof that every country purchased Pegasus. They demonstrate the geographic reach of suspected operations and the difficulty of establishing who controls the systems.

For governments in the Middle East and Africa, the policy challenge is twofold:

First, states need modern intelligence capabilities to confront terrorism and organized crime.

Second, the acquisition and operation of those capabilities must be subject to national law, judicial authorization where required, independent oversight, and enforceable restrictions against political abuse.

A government that cannot demonstrate how its surveillance systems are authorized and monitored risks undermining the very public confidence that national security institutions are supposed to protect.

  1. THE VENDOR’S PROMISE: CAN PRIVATE COMPANIES POLICE THEMSELVES?

NSO Group has repeatedly argued that Pegasus is intended for legitimate government investigations and that it maintains procedures to prevent misuse. Other vendors have made similar commitments.

The problem is that the commercial incentive is to sell powerful technology to governments that can afford it.

A company’s internal compliance policy is not the same thing as independent public oversight. A contractual promise not to target journalists does not guarantee that a government customer will comply. And a vendor’s decision to terminate a customer after abuse has occurred does not undo the damage to the person whose device was compromised.

Amnesty International’s 2026 technical analysis adds another dimension: NSO’s continuing involvement in the operation and maintenance of Pegasus means that the vendor cannot be treated as a passive software manufacturer.

The company provides important technical infrastructure, supports attack capabilities, and maintains systems necessary for the product to function.

This creates a direct responsibility to know how the technology is being used, investigate credible allegations, and take meaningful action when misuse is identified.

The international community should not accept a system in which a private company sells a surveillance capability, receives recurring revenue, and then claims that responsibility for its use rests entirely with the government customer.

  1. JAFAJ ANALYSIS: SURVEILLANCE IS NOW A COMMERCIAL EXPORT

The government surveillance marketplace has changed the balance of power between states and individuals.

A government no longer needs to develop every intelligence capability within its own borders. It can purchase capabilities from an international vendor, obtain technical support from specialists, and use the product through a relatively small number of trained operators.

This creates three major risks.

FIRST: THE PRIVATIZATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Surveillance capabilities traditionally associated with government intelligence agencies are increasingly developed, maintained, and supported by private corporations.

The companies may operate internationally, maintain infrastructure across several jurisdictions, and rely on investors who have no direct role in the government’s surveillance decisions.

SECOND: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE

A government can potentially use technology developed abroad to monitor individuals at home or overseas. This creates difficult questions involving sovereignty, diplomatic relations, jurisdiction, and international human-rights obligations.

The targeting of journalists, activists, and political figures also raises the possibility that technology purchased for national security can be repurposed for domestic political advantage.

THIRD: THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IS PART OF THE SECURITY EQUATION

Private-equity firms, holding companies, investors, and government procurement contracts can sustain the market.

The financial system is therefore not separate from the surveillance problem. It is one of the mechanisms that allows the industry to grow.

If governments want to control the misuse of commercial spyware, they must examine not only the technology but also the ownership, financing, licensing, and distribution networks behind it.

  1. FIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION

JAFAJ identifies five priorities for governments seeking to regulate commercial spyware without eliminating legitimate intelligence capabilities.

  1. CREATE A NATIONAL SURVEILLANCE PROCUREMENT REGISTER

Governments should maintain a confidential, independently audited register identifying every commercial spyware product purchased, the government agency operating it, the legal authority for its use, and the designated oversight body.

  1. REQUIRE BENEFICIAL-OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE

Companies selling high-risk surveillance technology should disclose their beneficial owners, parent companies, major investors, corporate affiliates, and authorized resellers to relevant export-control authorities.

  1. ESTABLISH INDEPENDENT AUTHORIZATION AND AUDITING

The use of intrusive mobile spyware should require specific legal authorization, documented investigative necessity, and independent review. Governments should maintain auditable records of targeting decisions and system access.

  1. CREATE INTERNATIONAL REPORTING STANDARDS

Governments and vendors should publish annual transparency reports identifying the number of licenses issued, the categories of authorized government customers, the number of misuse allegations investigated, and the corrective actions taken.

Sensitive operational details can remain confidential without concealing the existence of the surveillance program.

  1. HOLD VENDORS ACCOUNTABLE FOR KNOWING MISUSE

A vendor should not be permitted to rely exclusively on a government customer’s contractual assurances. Companies should be required to investigate credible allegations, preserve relevant records, cooperate with lawful inquiries, and suspend access when serious violations are substantiated.

THE BOTTOM LINE

Pegasus is not simply a controversial piece of software. It is a symbol of a much larger transformation in the relationship between government, private capital, intelligence services, and personal privacy.

The marketplace is international. The technology is commercially developed. The customers are governments. The financial backers include private-equity firms and other investors. The people exposed to the consequences may be journalists, political opponents, activists, business leaders, diplomats, or ordinary citizens.

The central question is no longer whether governments should possess sophisticated surveillance capabilities. Governments have legitimate security responsibilities, and modern intelligence tools can serve legitimate purposes.

The question is whether the international community can establish meaningful rules governing who may purchase these systems, who may operate them, who finances their development, and what happens when they are abused.

A government should have the ability to investigate terrorism and serious crime. It should not have an unchecked ability to turn every citizen’s smartphone into a potential intelligence source.

The surveillance marketplace is already global. The accountability system has not caught up.

SOURCE DOCUMENTATION

  1. Amnesty International Security Lab, “Inside Pegasus: The Evolution of the World’s Most Notorious Spyware System,” July 16, 2026.
    https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2026/07/inside-pegasus-the-evolution-of-the-worlds-most-notorious-spyware/
  2. Forbidden Stories, “About the Pegasus Project,” July 18, 2021.
    https://forbiddenstories.org/about-the-pegasus-project/
  3. Amnesty International, “Forensic Methodology Report: How to Catch NSO Group’s Pegasus,” July 2021.
    https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/
  4. The Citizen Lab, “Hide and Seek: Tracking NSO Group’s Pegasus Spyware to Operations in 45 Countries.”
    https://citizenlab.ca/research/hide-and-seek-tracking-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-to-operations-in-45-countries/
  5. Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), “Israeli-Made Spyware Used to Monitor Journalists and Activists Worldwide.”
    https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-pegasus-project/israeli-made-spyware-used-to-monitor-journalists-and-activists-worldwide
  6. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Members of the Intellexa Commercial Spyware Consortium,” March 5, 2024.
    https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2155
  7. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Enablers of the Intellexa Commercial Spyware Consortium,” September 16, 2024.
    https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2581
  8. Atlantic Council, “Markets Matter: A Glance into the Spyware Industry,” April 22, 2024.
    https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/markets-matter-a-glance-into-the-spyware-industry/
  9. International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, “Greek Court Convicts Intellexa Founder Tal Dilian, Three Others in Wiretapping Scandal,” February 2026.
    https://www.icij.org/news/2026/02/greek-court-convicts-intellexa-founder-tal-dilian-three-others-in-wiretapping-scandal/
  10. TechCrunch, “Spyware Maker Paragon Confirms US Government Is a Customer,” February 4, 2025.
    https://techcrunch.com/2025/02/04/spyware-maker-paragon-confirms-u-s-government-is-a-customer/
  11. WIRED, “ICE Signs $2 Million Contract With Spyware Maker Paragon Solutions,” 2024.
    https://www.wired.com/story/ice-paragon-solutions-contract
  12. WIRED, “The Secrets of a US Spyware King,” October 1, 2026.
    https://www.wired.com/story/the-secrets-of-the-us-spyware-king/
  13. Times of Israel, “NSO Founders, Management Buy Stake in Firm from Francisco Partners,” February 2019.
    https://www.timesofisrael.com/nso-founders-management-buy-stake-in-firm-from-francisco-partners/

EDITORIAL NOTE: Country references are deliberately classified as documented customers, suspected operators, or locations associated with technical indicators. These categories are not interchangeable. The article does not claim that every country identified in technical research purchased Pegasus, nor that every person on a leaked target list was infected. Financial information reflects publicly reported historical transactions and identified corporate relationships; it is not a complete current accounting of each company’s capital structure.

 

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