Prepared by: JAFAJ Intelligence Division
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Middle East is entering a period of strategic uncertainty unlike any since the aftermath of the Arab Spring.
Over the past two decades, the region has experienced interstate wars, terrorist insurgencies, revolutions, and proxy conflicts. Today, however, another pattern is emerging. In several countries, the principal threat to national stability no longer originates from foreign invasion but from internal political fragmentation, weakened state institutions, economic deterioration, and increasingly powerful non-state armed groups.
This Intelligence Estimate examines the probability that one or more Middle Eastern states could experience significant internal armed conflict over the next twenty-four months. Rather than predicting that civil wars are inevitable, this report evaluates structural conditions that historically have preceded civil conflict and assesses where those conditions are converging.
Three countries stand out as presenting the greatest potential for renewed or expanded internal conflict: Iran, Lebanon, and Syria. Each faces a unique combination of political uncertainty, economic stress, competing centers of power, and external interference. Other states—including Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories—also remain vulnerable, though the nature and likelihood of conflict vary considerably.
Current evidence does not support the conclusion that a region-wide wave of civil wars is imminent. However, several independent assessments have identified rising instability in Lebanon and persistent fragmentation in Syria, while Iran faces an uncertain political transition following recent leadership changes and military confrontation. These developments warrant close observation over the coming months.
This report concludes that the greatest danger is not a simultaneous collapse across the region, but rather the emergence of one major internal conflict capable of producing cascading political, humanitarian, and security consequences for neighboring states.
KEY JUDGMENTS
Key Judgment 1
The Middle East is entering a period in which internal instability is becoming a greater strategic concern than conventional interstate warfare.
While external military conflict remains possible, many governments now face more immediate challenges from declining public confidence, weakened institutions, armed political movements, and deteriorating economic conditions.
Key Judgment 2
Lebanon currently exhibits one of the region’s highest risks of internal political violence.
Growing disputes over Hezbollah’s future, debates surrounding state sovereignty, continued Israeli military pressure, and deep sectarian divisions have created conditions that many analysts believe could evolve into broader internal conflict if political compromise fails. Recent reporting by the Council on Foreign Relations and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data similarly identifies Lebanon as one of the region’s principal conflict flashpoints.
Key Judgment 3
Syria remains politically fragmented despite reductions in nationwide fighting.
The decline in large-scale combat should not be interpreted as the restoration of a fully consolidated state. Competing armed groups, foreign military deployments, economic weakness, and unresolved governance questions continue to limit long-term stability. Several analysts caution that Syria has not entered a new civil war, but that its recovery remains fragile.
Key Judgment 4
Iran faces a period of elevated political uncertainty.
Recent military conflict, economic pressure, sanctions, and questions surrounding national leadership have increased uncertainty regarding Iran’s internal political trajectory. These factors do not necessarily indicate imminent civil war, but they increase the importance of monitoring succession dynamics, elite cohesion, regional unrest, and public dissatisfaction.
Key Judgment 5
Civil wars rarely begin with one defining event.
Historical experience demonstrates that internal armed conflicts generally emerge after prolonged institutional weakening combined with one or more triggering events, including contested elections, economic collapse, military defections, leadership succession disputes, or major security incidents.
INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENCE
This report relies upon open-source government publications, international organizations, academic research, conflict-monitoring databases, and reporting from established news organizations.
The judgments contained herein represent analytical assessments rather than predictions.
Confidence levels are defined as follows:
High Confidence — Supported by multiple independent sources with consistent reporting.
Moderate Confidence — Supported by credible reporting, although future developments remain uncertain.
Low Confidence — Based upon limited information or rapidly evolving events.
Unless otherwise stated, the principal assessments contained in this report are made with moderate confidence.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
This Intelligence Estimate evaluates the structural conditions associated with civil conflict across the contemporary Middle East. It does not attempt to forecast the precise timing of political crises, military confrontations, or regime change. Instead, it identifies conditions historically associated with increased internal instability and assesses their presence within selected countries.
For the purposes of this report, the term civil war refers to sustained organized armed conflict occurring primarily within the borders of a sovereign state and involving governmental forces and one or more organized domestic armed actors.
The assessment examines six principal indicators:

Government legitimacy.
Economic stability.
Political succession and leadership continuity.
Strength and influence of non-state armed groups.
Sectarian, ethnic, or ideological polarization.
Foreign intervention and proxy competition.

No single indicator is sufficient to predict civil war. Rather, the interaction of multiple indicators over time provides a more reliable basis for assessing conflict risk.
 
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
WHY CIVIL WARS BEGIN
Civil wars rarely begin as civil wars.
More often, they emerge from a gradual deterioration of political, economic, and security conditions that weakens the state’s ability to manage competing interests peacefully. This deterioration can take years or even decades before a single triggering event transforms chronic instability into organized armed conflict.
Contrary to popular perception, most civil wars do not originate solely from ideological disputes, ethnic differences, or religious divisions. Such differences exist in many societies that never experience large-scale internal violence. Modern conflict research instead suggests that civil wars are more likely when political grievances intersect with weak state institutions, declining government legitimacy, economic distress, and opportunities for organized armed groups to mobilize.
For intelligence analysts, this distinction is important.
The question is not whether a society contains political, ethnic, or religious divisions. Nearly every nation does.
The more important question is whether the institutions responsible for managing those divisions continue to function effectively.
When governments lose the ability—or the public confidence necessary—to resolve disputes through political processes, competing groups increasingly seek alternative means of protecting their interests. In some cases, those alternatives remain peaceful. In others, they evolve into organized violence.
THE FRAGILITY CASCADE
Historical experience suggests that internal conflicts generally develop through a recognizable progression rather than through sudden collapse.
Although every conflict follows its own path, many begin with a series of reinforcing failures:

Economic deterioration reduces public confidence.
Political polarization erodes consensus.
Government legitimacy declines.
Security institutions become increasingly politicized.
Armed non-state actors expand their influence.
Foreign powers support competing domestic factions.
A triggering event accelerates existing tensions into violence.

None of these conditions alone produces civil war.
Together, however, they can overwhelm the institutions designed to maintain political order.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development describes fragility as a multidimensional condition encompassing political, security, economic, societal, environmental, and human factors rather than a single measurable characteristic. Importantly, the OECD notes that fragility and conflict are related but distinct: many fragile states do not experience war, while fragility nonetheless reduces a state’s ability to absorb shocks without violence.
STATE LEGITIMACY AS A STRATEGIC VARIABLE
One of the strongest indicators of long-term stability is not military strength but political legitimacy.
Governments generally maintain authority through a combination of law, public confidence, institutional effectiveness, and coercive capability.
When confidence in political institutions declines, governments often become increasingly dependent upon coercion.
While coercion may restore short-term order, excessive reliance upon force can further weaken legitimacy if significant portions of the population conclude that political participation no longer offers meaningful influence.
This creates a dangerous feedback loop:
Reduced legitimacy encourages greater coercion.
Greater coercion further reduces legitimacy.
Eventually, portions of the population may conclude that violence offers greater political leverage than peaceful participation.
Research examining state fragility has consistently found that governance quality—particularly when weaker than expected for a country’s level of development—is associated with a higher subsequent risk of civil conflict.
THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ARMED ACTORS
Few contemporary civil wars begin with the spontaneous creation of armed movements.
Instead, many countries already possess organizations capable of conducting sustained military operations independent of central government control.
These may include:

political militias;
sectarian organizations;
tribal armed groups;
insurgent movements;
terrorist organizations;
criminal networks with military capabilities.

The existence of such organizations does not guarantee civil conflict.
However, they significantly reduce the time required for political disputes to become armed confrontations because organizational structures, weapons, leadership, financing, and recruitment networks may already exist.
Throughout the contemporary Middle East, the continued presence of heavily armed non-state actors remains one of the region’s defining security characteristics.
FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND PROXY DYNAMICS
Modern civil wars rarely remain purely domestic.
External governments frequently intervene to protect allies, expand regional influence, counter perceived threats, or prevent hostile actors from gaining power.
As a result, internal conflicts increasingly become proxy conflicts involving multiple regional and international powers.
The Syrian conflict demonstrated how rapidly domestic unrest can evolve into an internationalized war involving neighboring states, regional competitors, and global military powers.
The OECD has similarly observed that internationalized civil wars have become increasingly common, particularly in regions characterized by weak governance, transnational armed movements, and strategic competition among outside powers.
For the Middle East, foreign intervention should therefore be viewed not simply as a consequence of civil war, but as a factor capable of extending conflicts, increasing their intensity, and complicating negotiated settlements.
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
The principal lesson from comparative conflict research is straightforward.
Civil wars are rarely the product of a single grievance or isolated political crisis.
Instead, they emerge when multiple structural vulnerabilities accumulate faster than governments can resolve them.
For JAFAJ’s purposes, this report evaluates each country through the same analytical framework rather than attempting to predict a single triggering event.
The objective is not to determine whether civil war will occur.
The objective is to assess where the underlying conditions associated with internal armed conflict are becoming more pronounced, how rapidly they are evolving, and what indicators would suggest either escalation or stabilization.
 
REGIONAL RISK FRAMEWORK
HOW JAFAJ ASSESSES THE RISK OF CIVIL WAR
Intelligence analysis is not prediction.
Its purpose is to identify developing trends, assess their significance, and estimate the probability that those trends will produce specific outcomes. In the case of civil conflict, analysts are not attempting to predict the exact day a government may collapse or when the first shots will be fired. Rather, they seek to determine whether the underlying conditions that have historically preceded civil wars are becoming stronger or weaker over time.
Accordingly, this report employs a structured analytical framework designed to evaluate relative—not absolute—risk across the Middle East.
This framework recognizes two fundamental realities.
First, no single factor causes civil war.
Second, civil wars almost always emerge from the interaction of multiple political, economic, security, and social pressures rather than from a single crisis. Numerous early-warning models developed by governments, research institutions, and international organizations similarly rely upon combinations of structural indicators rather than isolated variables.
THE JAFAJ CIVIL WAR RISK MODEL
This report evaluates each country across six principal categories.

GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY

Governments derive authority from more than military strength.
Legitimacy reflects whether citizens believe political institutions possess the legal and moral authority to govern.
Indicators include:

public confidence
corruption
electoral credibility
judicial independence
effectiveness of government services
ability to peacefully resolve political disputes

As legitimacy declines, governments often rely increasingly upon coercive measures to maintain authority, creating additional political tension.

ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

Economic conditions rarely create civil wars by themselves.
They can, however, magnify existing political grievances.
Analysts therefore examine:

inflation
unemployment
currency stability
public debt
government revenues
energy dependence
food security
youth employment

History demonstrates that prolonged economic deterioration often weakens public confidence while simultaneously reducing a government’s ability to provide services and maintain political stability.

SECURITY APPARATUS

One defining characteristic of stable states is the government’s ability to exercise effective control over the legitimate use of force.
Questions considered include:

Does the government control the national military?
Are security services politically divided?
Do regional commanders operate independently?
Are military defections increasing?
Are police institutions functioning?
Does the government maintain territorial control?

The erosion of centralized security authority significantly increases opportunities for organized armed groups to expand their influence.

NON-STATE ARMED ACTORS

Modern Middle Eastern conflicts increasingly involve organizations operating outside formal state control.
Examples include:

political militias
insurgent organizations
tribal armed groups
terrorist organizations
sectarian defense forces
criminal organizations possessing military capabilities

The existence of such organizations does not necessarily indicate impending civil war.
However, their presence substantially lowers the barriers to sustained armed conflict should political institutions fail.

SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION

Political differences alone rarely produce civil war.
Instead, analysts evaluate whether divisions are becoming sufficiently severe to undermine national cohesion.
Factors include:

sectarian polarization
ethnic conflict
regional rivalries
ideological extremism
political radicalization
population displacement
refugee pressures

The critical question is not whether divisions exist, but whether existing institutions remain capable of managing them peacefully.

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

Few contemporary civil wars remain purely domestic.
Foreign governments frequently provide:

military assistance
intelligence support
financial aid
diplomatic backing
weapons
proxy forces

Outside intervention often prolongs conflicts that might otherwise have remained localized.
Consequently, every country assessment considers the extent to which external actors possess both the capability and the incentive to influence internal political developments.
ASSESSMENT MATRIX
Each country receives an assessment in every category using a five-level scale.

Rating
Assessment

Very Low
Conditions generally support long-term stability.

Low
Some vulnerabilities exist but remain manageable.

Moderate
Noticeable structural pressures require continued monitoring.

High
Multiple indicators suggest elevated instability.

Very High
Numerous indicators are simultaneously deteriorating, increasing the risk of sustained internal conflict.

This scale measures relative structural vulnerability, not the probability that conflict will begin immediately.
EARLY WARNING INDICATORS
Perhaps the greatest value of intelligence analysis lies in identifying changes before they become crises.
Accordingly, JAFAJ will monitor a series of indicators that historically have preceded significant internal instability.
These include:
Political Indicators

Collapse of coalition governments
Suspension of constitutional processes
Disputed national elections
Leadership succession crises
Emergency decrees expanding executive authority

Security Indicators

Military defections
Rapid militia recruitment
Increased political assassinations
Localized armed clashes
Loss of government territorial control

Economic Indicators

Hyperinflation
Currency collapse
Food shortages
Banking instability
Energy disruptions

Social Indicators

Mass demonstrations
Large-scale population displacement
Sectarian mobilization
Escalating hate speech
Collapse of public services

No individual indicator confirms that civil war is imminent.
However, when several of these indicators emerge simultaneously and continue to worsen over time, the probability of organized internal conflict increases substantially. The Fund for Peace’s conflict early-warning methodology likewise emphasizes monitoring clusters of deteriorating indicators rather than relying on a single warning sign.
ANALYTICAL LIMITATIONS
Every intelligence assessment contains uncertainty.
Political crises can accelerate unexpectedly.
Conversely, countries exhibiting numerous structural vulnerabilities may avoid civil conflict through political compromise, effective governance, successful economic reform, or international mediation.
For this reason, the assessments presented in this report should be interpreted as probability estimates based upon currently available information, not deterministic forecasts.
Future developments—including leadership decisions, diplomatic initiatives, economic recovery, or unexpected external events—may significantly alter the trajectory of individual countries.
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
The Middle East currently contains several states exhibiting multiple characteristics commonly associated with elevated conflict risk.
The evidence does not support the conclusion that the region is entering a generalized wave of civil wars.
It does, however, support the assessment that several countries are simultaneously experiencing deteriorating structural conditions that warrant sustained monitoring. International conflict-monitoring organizations similarly emphasize tracking changes in state fragility over time because rising fragility often serves as an early warning of future instability rather than proof that conflict is inevitable.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT I
IRAN
A STATE UNDER PRESSURE, NOT NECESSARILY A STATE ON THE VERGE OF CIVIL WAR
Overall Risk Assessment: High
Estimated Risk Horizon: 12–24 Months
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Iran presents one of the most complex civil war risk profiles in the Middle East.
Unlike failed states such as Yemen or Libya, Iran retains functioning national institutions, centralized security organizations, and a long tradition of state continuity. The government continues to exercise effective control over most of its territory, maintains disciplined military and internal security forces, and possesses extensive intelligence capabilities.
These strengths substantially reduce the likelihood of an abrupt collapse.
At the same time, Iran faces an unusual convergence of strategic pressures.
The country is managing the consequences of military confrontation with Israel and the United States, persistent economic weakness, international sanctions, leadership transition following the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declining public confidence among segments of the population, and continuing tensions involving several ethnic minority regions. Reuters and other analysts describe the succession period as the most significant internal political test faced by the Islamic Republic since 1979.
These pressures do not necessarily point toward civil war.
They do suggest that Iran has entered one of the most politically uncertain periods in its modern history.
THE PARADOX OF IRANIAN STABILITY
Outside observers often underestimate the resilience of the Iranian political system.
The Islamic Republic was deliberately structured to survive crises that might destabilize more centralized governments.
Political authority is distributed across several institutions, including:

the Office of the Supreme Leader;
the Assembly of Experts;
the Guardian Council;
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
the regular armed forces;
the judiciary;
the presidency;
powerful religious foundations.

This institutional redundancy means that the death or removal of one leader—even the Supreme Leader—does not automatically produce governmental collapse.
Indeed, one of the principal conclusions emerging from recent analysis is that Iran’s governing system was specifically designed to withstand such shocks.
For this reason, predictions of imminent regime collapse should be treated cautiously.
History demonstrates that authoritarian governments often prove considerably more resilient than expected.
ECONOMIC PRESSURE
The Iranian economy has experienced prolonged structural stress.
Years of sanctions, inflation, currency depreciation, declining foreign investment, and periodic energy shortages have weakened household purchasing power and reduced public confidence.
Recent military conflict has compounded those pressures.
Damage to infrastructure, increased security expenditures, uncertainty surrounding reconstruction, and continued restrictions on international commerce have placed additional burdens upon an economy that was already under strain. Reuters reports that Iranian authorities have expressed concern that post-war economic hardship could become a catalyst for renewed domestic unrest, prompting an intensified internal security response.
Economic deterioration alone does not produce civil war.
However, it reduces governmental flexibility.
Governments facing severe fiscal constraints often possess fewer resources to subsidize essential goods, maintain employment, modernize infrastructure, or address public grievances.
Over time, economic weakness can amplify political tensions that might otherwise remain manageable.
THE SUCCESSION QUESTION
Leadership succession represents one of the most consequential variables affecting Iran’s long-term stability.
For decades, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei served not only as Iran’s Supreme Leader but also as the central figure balancing relationships among competing political, clerical, military, and security institutions.
Any transition of authority inevitably alters those relationships.
Although constitutional procedures exist for selecting a new Supreme Leader, real-world political transitions seldom proceed entirely according to formal legal processes.
Elite bargaining, institutional influence, military interests, and public expectations all shape succession outcomes.
Recent analyses suggest that Iran’s transition is likely to involve a combination of constitutional mechanisms and informal negotiations among influential political and security actors. The ultimate balance of power between clerical institutions and the IRGC remains one of the most important variables to monitor.
From an intelligence perspective, succession should therefore be viewed not as a single event but as an extended process.
THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
No assessment of Iranian stability is complete without considering the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Since its creation following the 1979 Revolution, the IRGC has evolved into one of the country’s most influential institutions.
Its responsibilities extend well beyond traditional military functions.
Today, the organization influences:

internal security;
intelligence collection;
strategic missile forces;
elements of the national economy;
foreign proxy relationships;
cyber operations;
strategic planning.

Because of its institutional depth, the IRGC represents one of the principal stabilizing forces within the current political system.
At the same time, any significant disagreement among senior IRGC leadership regarding succession, economic policy, or national security would represent an important warning indicator.
At present, publicly available information does not demonstrate widespread fragmentation within the organization.
ETHNIC FAULT LINES
Iran is frequently described as a Persian nation.
In reality, it is a multiethnic state.
Its population includes Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, Lurs, Turkmen, and other communities.
Most ethnic communities participate in national political life.
Nevertheless, several peripheral regions have experienced periodic unrest, particularly where longstanding economic grievances, questions of cultural autonomy, or security concerns intersect.
International reporting indicates that authorities have devoted particular attention to Kurdish, Baluchi, and Arab regions during recent periods of domestic tension, reflecting official concern that localized unrest could expand under conditions of broader national instability.
It is important, however, not to overstate these dynamics.
There is currently no persuasive evidence that Iran’s minority populations are uniformly organized around a common separatist agenda.
Rather, localized grievances remain uneven and differ significantly from one region to another.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?
Several developments would materially increase the risk of widespread internal conflict.
These include:

sustained economic collapse;
visible fragmentation within the IRGC or senior security services;
prolonged disputes over political succession;
simultaneous unrest across multiple provinces;
coordinated armed activity by several domestic groups;
loss of governmental control over major urban centers.

Conversely, several developments could reduce the assessed level of risk.
These include:

economic stabilization;
sanctions relief;
successful political consolidation following the leadership transition;
declining inflation;
renewed foreign investment;
improved regional security conditions.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
Iran should not presently be viewed as a state on the verge of civil war.
Its institutions remain substantially stronger than those found in countries that experienced rapid state collapse during the Arab Spring.
Nevertheless, Iran is entering one of the most politically consequential periods in the history of the Islamic Republic.
The interaction of leadership succession, economic stress, regional military pressures, and domestic political dissatisfaction creates a level of strategic uncertainty not seen for decades.
The principal intelligence question is therefore not whether Iran will experience unrest—periodic unrest is already a recurring feature of Iranian politics.
The more important question is whether multiple sources of instability begin reinforcing one another faster than the state’s institutions can contain them.
At present, JAFAJ assesses that Iran faces a high level of structural instability but a lower probability of imminent nationwide civil war. The country’s institutions remain capable of managing significant internal pressures, although that assessment should be revisited if evidence emerges of elite fragmentation, sustained nationwide unrest, or weakening cohesion within the security apparatus.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT II
LEBANON
A FRAGILE STATE AT A STRATEGIC CROSSROADS
Overall Risk Assessment: High
Estimated Risk Horizon: 6–24 Months
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate to High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Lebanon presently exhibits one of the highest levels of structural vulnerability in the Middle East.
Unlike Iran, where strong national institutions continue to provide a significant degree of political resilience, Lebanon’s political system has experienced years of institutional weakening, economic collapse, and competing claims regarding the state’s monopoly on the use of force.
The principal question facing Lebanon is no longer whether political divisions exist.
Those divisions have existed for decades.
The more consequential question is whether the Lebanese state can successfully reassert sovereign authority over security policy without provoking large-scale internal confrontation.
That challenge has become considerably more difficult following the recent Israel-Hezbollah conflict, renewed international pressure to disarm Hezbollah, and widening political disagreement over Lebanon’s future security architecture. Recent reporting indicates that proposed security arrangements linking Israeli withdrawal to Hezbollah’s disarmament have intensified domestic political divisions and renewed public discussion of the possibility of civil conflict.
JAFAJ assesses that Lebanon faces a high probability of continued political instability and an elevated risk of localized armed confrontation. A return to a nationwide civil war comparable to the 1975–1990 conflict remains a lower-probability outcome but cannot be dismissed if multiple destabilizing factors converge.
THE LEGACY OF AN UNFINISHED PEACE
Lebanon’s civil war officially ended with the 1989 Taif Agreement.
The fighting stopped.
Many of the underlying political issues did not.
The post-war political system was designed around sectarian power-sharing intended to prevent domination by any single community. While that arrangement reduced large-scale violence, it also institutionalized political fragmentation.
Rather than producing a strong central government, Lebanon developed a system in which political authority is distributed among numerous competing parties, religious communities, and regional interests.
This structure has often produced political paralysis during periods of national crisis.
Successive economic shocks, government resignations, the Beirut port explosion, regional conflicts, and prolonged financial instability have further eroded public confidence in state institutions.
Consequently, Lebanon enters the current period of regional instability with fewer institutional reserves than many neighboring states.
HEZBOLLAH AND THE QUESTION OF STATE AUTHORITY
No issue is more central to Lebanon’s future than Hezbollah’s military status.
For Hezbollah and many within Lebanon’s Shi’a community, the organization remains an essential deterrent against external threats and a legitimate component of the country’s national defense.
For many other Lebanese political parties, Hezbollah’s independent military capability represents a fundamental challenge to state sovereignty.
This disagreement is not simply ideological.
It concerns one of the most basic characteristics of statehood:
Who possesses the legitimate authority to employ organized military force?
Recent diplomatic initiatives have brought that question into sharper focus.
International proposals conditioning Israeli withdrawal upon Hezbollah’s disarmament have placed the Lebanese government in an exceptionally difficult position.
Accepting such conditions risks confrontation with Hezbollah.
Rejecting them risks prolonged external military pressure and continued political isolation.
This dilemma has no easy solution.
THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION
Lebanon’s political crisis cannot be separated from its economic condition.
Years of financial instability have fundamentally altered the relationship between citizens and the state.
Among the continuing challenges are:

banking sector instability;
declining purchasing power;
infrastructure deterioration;
public debt;
limited government revenues;
emigration of skilled professionals;
persistent unemployment.

Economic hardship does not inevitably produce civil conflict.
It does, however, reduce the government’s ability to provide public services, finance reconstruction, maintain infrastructure, and address political grievances.
Over time, these pressures weaken institutional legitimacy.
When economic frustration overlaps with political polarization and security competition, overall national resilience declines.
SECTARIAN POLITICS
Lebanon’s political system remains organized largely around confessional representation.
This structure has historically allowed diverse religious communities to participate in governance.
It has also reinforced political identities that often coincide with sectarian affiliation.
Periods of external conflict therefore tend to deepen domestic political divisions.
Recent fighting between Israel and Hezbollah has produced markedly different political reactions across Lebanese society.
Some communities view Hezbollah as the country’s principal line of defense.
Others argue that its independent military decisions expose Lebanon to unnecessary regional wars.
Neither perspective exists in isolation.
Both influence national political decision-making.
As these competing narratives become increasingly polarized, the possibility of political compromise becomes more difficult.
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Despite these challenges, Lebanon retains several important stabilizing factors.
The Lebanese Armed Forces continue to enjoy broader national legitimacy than most political institutions.
Unlike the militia-dominated environment of the mid-1970s, there remains widespread public recognition that renewed nationwide civil war would produce catastrophic consequences for every community.
Many political leaders therefore possess strong incentives to avoid direct military confrontation.
This factor should not be underestimated.
Historical memory itself can function as a stabilizing influence.
Reuters reporting from April 2026 noted that former combatants, journalists, and civic leaders repeatedly warned against repeating the mistakes of the 1975–1990 conflict, even as they acknowledged that current sectarian tensions increasingly resemble those that preceded the earlier war.
POTENTIAL TRIGGERS
Several developments could substantially increase Lebanon’s risk profile.
These include:

attempts to forcibly disarm Hezbollah;
collapse of national political negotiations;
prolonged Israeli military occupation of disputed territory;
major sectarian violence in Beirut;
assassination of senior political figures;
fragmentation within the Lebanese Armed Forces;
severe deterioration of humanitarian conditions.

Conversely, several developments would likely reduce the probability of internal armed conflict.
These include:

successful political dialogue regarding national defense policy;
sustained international economic assistance;
gradual implementation of security reforms;
negotiated de-escalation between Israel and Hezbollah;
strengthening of state institutions.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
Lebanon today is not simply confronting a security crisis.
It is confronting a sovereignty crisis.
The central issue is whether the Lebanese state can consolidate political authority over national defense while preserving domestic political consensus.
History demonstrates that states facing competing centers of armed authority often encounter prolonged instability rather than immediate collapse.
Lebanon’s institutions remain functional.
Its armed forces remain intact.
Its political leadership continues to pursue negotiated solutions.
These factors weigh against predictions of imminent nationwide civil war.
Nevertheless, Lebanon currently exhibits one of the region’s highest concentrations of structural risk factors.
The interaction of economic weakness, unresolved sectarian divisions, competing claims to military authority, external military pressure, and fragile political institutions creates conditions that warrant continued close monitoring.
JAFAJ therefore assesses that Lebanon’s greatest near-term danger is not an immediate return to full-scale civil war but a series of localized confrontations that could progressively undermine state authority if left unresolved. Should such confrontations spread across multiple sectarian or geographic lines, the risk assessment would require upward revision.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT III
SYRIA
AN UNFINISHED CIVIL WAR OR A FRAGILE TRANSITION?
Overall Risk Assessment: High
Estimated Risk Horizon: 12–36 Months
Intelligence Confidence: High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Syria presents a fundamentally different analytical problem than either Iran or Lebanon.
The principal question is not whether Syria could enter a civil war.
Rather, it is whether Syria has genuinely emerged from one.
Although the collapse of the Assad government fundamentally altered Syria’s political landscape, the country remains divided by competing military organizations, unresolved sectarian grievances, foreign intervention, economic devastation, and incomplete national integration. The current transitional government has achieved important political gains, but it has not yet consolidated authority across the entire country.
For intelligence purposes, Syria should therefore be viewed as a fragile post-conflict state, not a fully stabilized one.
The probability of a return to nationwide fighting remains lower than during the height of the Syrian Civil War. However, the probability of recurring localized armed conflict remains significant.
THE FALL OF THE ASSAD GOVERNMENT DID NOT END SYRIA’S CHALLENGES
The removal of Bashar al-Assad ended one phase of Syria’s modern history.
It did not automatically resolve the conditions that produced fourteen years of war.
The transitional government inherited a country characterized by:

damaged infrastructure;
millions of displaced citizens;
competing regional authorities;
extensive humanitarian needs;
weakened state institutions;
unresolved sectarian grievances;
continuing foreign military involvement.

The challenge facing Damascus is therefore not simply governing Syria.
It is rebuilding the legitimacy of the Syrian state itself.
CSIS has described the transition as a limited window of opportunity in which political inclusion, institutional reform, and international support will largely determine whether Syria moves toward durable stability or renewed fragmentation.
THE FRAGMENTED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Despite the establishment of a transitional government, Syria does not yet possess a fully unified national security structure.
Several armed actors continue to exercise influence in different parts of the country.
These include:

Syrian government security forces;
Kurdish-led security organizations in the northeast;
local tribal formations;
Druze self-defense groups;
remnants of extremist organizations, including the Islamic State;
various locally organized armed groups.

This fragmentation complicates efforts to establish a single national monopoly on the use of force.
While several integration initiatives are underway, negotiations concerning command authority, local governance, and security responsibilities remain incomplete. Analysts continue to identify integration of Kurdish-led forces into national institutions as one of the transition’s most difficult unresolved issues.
SECTARIAN TRUST REMAINS THE CENTRAL CHALLENGE
Military victories alone do not produce political reconciliation.
One of the transitional government’s greatest challenges is rebuilding trust among communities that experienced years of violence.
Recent violence involving Druze, Alawite, and Bedouin communities demonstrates that sectarian tensions remain capable of producing significant localized conflict.
The violence in Sweida Province, as well as earlier attacks in Syria’s coastal regions, illustrates that local grievances continue to threaten broader national reconciliation. UN officials report that implementation of the government’s stabilization plan for Sweida has stalled, with kidnappings, community mistrust, and political divisions continuing nearly a year after major sectarian violence.
Similarly, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has concluded that both state and non-state actors continue to commit serious abuses against religious minorities, raising continuing concerns regarding rule of law and minority protection.
These developments do not necessarily indicate the beginning of another nationwide civil war.
They do indicate that reconciliation remains incomplete.
THE KURDISH QUESTION
The future relationship between Damascus and Kurdish-administered regions represents another major variable.
For more than a decade, northeastern Syria developed political and military institutions largely independent of Damascus.
The long-term success of Syria’s transition depends in part upon whether those institutions can be integrated into a unified Syrian state while preserving acceptable levels of local autonomy.
Failure to reach durable political arrangements could generate renewed military confrontation.
Successful integration, by contrast, would remove one of Syria’s most important long-term security risks.
This issue should therefore be viewed as a strategic indicator rather than merely a regional political dispute. CSIS has identified Kurdish integration as one of the defining tests of Syria’s post-Assad transition.
FOREIGN POWERS REMAIN DEEPLY INVOLVED
Unlike many civil wars, Syria’s conflict has never been exclusively domestic.
Regional and international actors continue to shape the country’s security environment.
Their interests differ considerably.
Some seek border security.
Others seek influence.
Others seek to prevent extremist resurgence.
Israel continues to conduct military operations when it perceives emerging security threats.
Turkey remains focused on Kurdish armed organizations operating near its southern border.
The United States continues to influence developments through diplomacy and its evolving regional posture.
These overlapping interests complicate Syria’s transition because domestic political decisions frequently produce regional security consequences.
The continued presence of multiple external actors substantially increases the complexity of conflict management.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?
Several developments would increase Syria’s risk profile.
These include:

collapse of negotiations with Kurdish authorities;
expansion of sectarian violence into multiple provinces;
fragmentation within national security institutions;
significant resurgence of the Islamic State;
widespread failure of transitional governance;
major foreign military escalation.

Conversely, several developments would improve the outlook.
These include:

successful integration of regional security forces;
effective protection of minority communities;
restoration of public services;
constitutional progress;
sustained international reconstruction assistance;
continued reductions in sectarian violence.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
Syria should not be viewed as a country that has fully emerged from conflict.
Neither should it be viewed as a country inevitably returning to nationwide civil war.
The evidence presently supports a more nuanced conclusion.
The transitional government has made measurable progress toward reestablishing national authority.
At the same time, that authority remains uneven, particularly in regions where sectarian distrust, competing armed organizations, and unresolved governance disputes persist. International observers continue to characterize Syria’s transition as fragile rather than consolidated.
JAFAJ therefore assesses that Syria’s greatest strategic risk is not the immediate return of a nationwide civil war, but the persistence of multiple localized conflicts that gradually erode confidence in the transitional government.
If those localized conflicts become interconnected—linking sectarian violence, governance failures, Kurdish disputes, extremist activity, and external intervention—the probability of a broader internal conflict would increase significantly.
At present, however, the available evidence supports the assessment that Syria remains a fragile state in transition rather than a state experiencing a renewed nationwide civil war.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT IV
IRAQ
BETWEEN STABILITY AND FRAGMENTATION
Overall Risk Assessment: Moderate
Estimated Risk Horizon: 12–24 Months
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate to High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Iraq occupies a unique position within the Middle East’s evolving security environment.
Unlike Syria or Yemen, Iraq is not presently engaged in a nationwide civil war.
Unlike Iran, its principal vulnerabilities are not centered on national leadership succession.
Instead, Iraq’s greatest strategic challenge is balancing competing centers of political and military authority while preventing regional conflicts from reigniting domestic instability.
Over the past decade, Iraq has achieved measurable progress.
The territorial defeat of the Islamic State, improvements in government institutions, increasing public confidence in national security forces, and gradual economic recovery have all strengthened the Iraqi state.
Yet many of the structural conditions that contributed to earlier conflict remain unresolved.
Political competition among Shi’a factions, unresolved relations with the Kurdistan Region, the continued influence of armed groups operating outside direct government control, and competing Iranian and American interests continue to place significant pressure on Iraqi institutions. The Council on Foreign Relations continues to classify Iraq as a country facing persistent political instability because of these unresolved structural challenges.
JAFAJ assesses that Iraq is more resilient today than at any point since the defeat of ISIS, but that resilience remains conditional upon continued political compromise and successful efforts to strengthen the state’s monopoly over the use of force.
A COUNTRY THAT HAS LEARNED FROM CIVIL WAR
Modern Iraq has experienced nearly every form of armed conflict.
It has endured dictatorship, foreign invasion, sectarian violence, insurgency, terrorism, and civil war.
Those experiences continue to influence political decision-making.
Unlike the period preceding the 2006–2008 sectarian conflict, there is now broad recognition across much of Iraq’s political leadership that renewed internal war would threaten the survival of the modern Iraqi state itself.
This historical memory serves as an important stabilizing factor.
Political leaders who fiercely disagree on policy often share one common objective:
Avoiding another nationwide civil war.
That objective has contributed to a political culture that generally favors negotiation over direct military confrontation among major political actors.
THE POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES
Perhaps no issue better illustrates Iraq’s strategic dilemma than the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
Originally formed to combat ISIS, the PMF evolved into a diverse collection of organizations with varying political loyalties, institutional relationships, and military capabilities.
Some components operate closely alongside the Iraqi state.
Others maintain stronger political or operational relationships with Iran.
This diversity complicates government efforts to establish unified command over all armed organizations.
The central question is not whether Iraq possesses capable security institutions.
It does.
The question is whether every major armed organization ultimately answers to those institutions.
Recent reporting suggests that Baghdad has increased efforts to consolidate state authority over armed groups while simultaneously attempting to avoid direct confrontation with powerful militia organizations. Several factions have publicly indicated a willingness to discuss integration or disarmament, although implementation remains uncertain.
IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES
Few countries illustrate regional strategic competition more clearly than Iraq.
The United States remains an important security and economic partner.
Iran maintains extensive historical, religious, political, and economic relationships with many Iraqi actors.
Baghdad therefore faces a persistent balancing act.
Any major shift toward one side risks political backlash from the other.
This balancing strategy has become more difficult following the recent regional conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States.
According to Reuters reporting, U.S. pressure on Baghdad to restrict militia financing and reassert state authority has increased significantly, while Iran has reportedly adapted by developing smaller proxy structures intended to preserve its regional influence.
This external competition represents one of Iraq’s most important long-term strategic risks.
THE KURDISTAN REGION
Relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government remain considerably more stable than during earlier periods of confrontation.
Nevertheless, important disputes continue regarding:

energy policy;
revenue sharing;
constitutional authority;
security coordination;
administrative jurisdiction.

These disagreements have generally remained political rather than military.
That distinction is significant.
As long as both sides continue resolving disputes through negotiation rather than force, this issue is unlikely to become the principal driver of nationwide instability.
However, prolonged political deadlock combined with broader regional conflict could alter that assessment.
ECONOMIC STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES
Compared with several neighboring states, Iraq benefits from substantial natural resources.
Oil revenues continue to provide the financial foundation of the Iraqi government.
That strength, however, also creates vulnerability.
Heavy dependence upon petroleum revenues exposes Iraq to fluctuations in global energy markets and disruptions caused by regional conflict.
Recent attacks affecting energy infrastructure demonstrated how quickly external conflict can produce domestic economic consequences.
The Associated Press reported that attacks on oil infrastructure and export disruptions during the regional conflict threatened government revenues, electricity generation, and public-sector salaries—highlighting the connection between regional security and domestic stability.
Diversifying the Iraqi economy therefore remains both an economic and a national security priority.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?
Several developments would increase Iraq’s overall risk profile.
These include:

fragmentation among major Shi’a political factions;
large-scale militia resistance to state authority;
renewed sectarian mobilization;
major deterioration in Baghdad–Erbil relations;
severe economic disruption resulting from prolonged regional conflict;
resurgence of ISIS or comparable extremist organizations.

Conversely, several developments would reduce the assessed level of risk.
These include:

successful security sector reform;
peaceful integration of armed organizations into state institutions;
continued economic diversification;
strengthened cooperation between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government;
reduced regional competition between Iran and the United States.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
Iraq should not presently be viewed as a country moving toward imminent civil war.
Its political institutions remain stronger than during previous periods of national crisis.
The Iraqi Security Forces have demonstrated increasing professionalism.
The overwhelming majority of political leaders recognize the catastrophic consequences of renewed nationwide conflict.
These are important stabilizing factors.
Nevertheless, Iraq’s stability remains closely linked to developments beyond its borders.
Continued competition between regional powers, the unresolved future of armed factions operating outside full state control, and the country’s dependence on oil revenues create structural vulnerabilities that require continued monitoring.
JAFAJ therefore assesses that Iraq’s greatest strategic risk is not internal political collapse but gradual erosion of state authority should external regional conflicts increasingly intersect with unresolved domestic political disputes.
At present, Iraq’s trajectory points toward managed instability rather than renewed civil war, provided that political leaders continue strengthening national institutions while limiting the influence of competing armed actors.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT V
YEMEN
A CIVIL WAR THAT NEVER TRULY ENDED
Overall Risk Assessment: Very High
Estimated Risk Horizon: Immediate–24 Months
Intelligence Confidence: High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Unlike the other countries examined in this report, Yemen should not be assessed according to the likelihood of entering civil war.
Yemen is already experiencing one.
The more relevant intelligence question is whether the conflict is entering a new and potentially more dangerous phase.
Over the past decade, Yemen has evolved from a conflict between the internationally recognized government and the Houthi movement into a far more complex struggle involving competing governments, separatist movements, tribal organizations, terrorist groups, regional powers, and foreign military intervention.
Recent fighting among factions previously aligned against the Houthis demonstrates that the conflict is no longer defined solely by a two-sided war. Instead, it has become a multi-dimensional contest over the future political structure of Yemen itself. Reuters and the Associated Press report that renewed fighting between Saudi-backed government forces and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) has fractured the anti-Houthi coalition and significantly increased the risk of prolonged instability.
JAFAJ assesses that Yemen currently presents the highest level of sustained internal conflict risk in the Middle East and is likely to remain unstable regardless of the outcome of any single military campaign.
FROM CIVIL WAR TO STATE FRAGMENTATION
The conflict that began in 2014 has evolved substantially.
Initially centered on the Houthi seizure of Sana’a and the collapse of the internationally recognized government, the conflict now encompasses multiple overlapping struggles.
Today, Yemen contains competing political and military authorities with differing visions of the country’s future.
Among the principal actors are:

the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah);
the internationally recognized government;
the Presidential Leadership Council;
the Southern Transitional Council;
tribal security organizations;
National Resistance Forces;
extremist organizations, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

These organizations do not merely disagree over policy.
Many disagree over whether Yemen should remain a single state.
This distinction fundamentally changes the nature of the conflict.
THE SOUTHERN QUESTION
One of the most important developments during the past several years has been the growing strength of southern separatism.
The Southern Transitional Council seeks restoration of an independent South Yemen.
Its objectives differ significantly from those of the internationally recognized government.
Although both oppose Houthi control of northern Yemen, they increasingly disagree regarding the future political map of the country.
The January 2026 fighting between Saudi-backed government forces and UAE-supported STC units demonstrated that anti-Houthi cooperation cannot be assumed.
Instead, competing strategic objectives now divide former coalition partners.
From an intelligence perspective, this represents one of Yemen’s most important structural changes.
THE HOUTHI FACTOR
The Houthis remain Yemen’s single most powerful organized military actor.
They continue to exercise control over the capital, Sana’a, and much of northern Yemen, governing areas that contain a majority of the country’s population. They also retain significant missile, drone, and command capabilities developed during years of conflict.
This level of territorial control provides organizational advantages that distinguish the Houthis from many insurgent movements.
At the same time, their continued military posture ensures that any negotiated political settlement must account for their role.
No realistic long-term settlement can ignore the military and political realities on the ground.
REGIONAL COMPETITION
Yemen’s conflict remains deeply internationalized.
Saudi Arabia continues to view developments in Yemen through the lens of border security and regional balance.
The United Arab Emirates has pursued a different strategy, emphasizing influence through southern partners and maritime security.
Iran has maintained relationships with the Houthis.
These overlapping interests complicate every diplomatic initiative.
Political agreements acceptable to one regional actor may be viewed as strategically unacceptable by another.
Consequently, Yemen illustrates one of the defining characteristics of modern civil wars:
Domestic political conflicts increasingly become arenas for regional competition.
THE HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION
Years of conflict have severely weakened Yemen’s state institutions.
Large portions of the population continue to experience:

food insecurity;
limited access to healthcare;
damaged infrastructure;
interrupted education;
displacement;
reduced economic opportunity.

These humanitarian conditions are not merely consequences of conflict.
They also influence future stability.
Communities experiencing prolonged economic hardship become increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by armed organizations, criminal networks, and extremist groups.
Accordingly, humanitarian recovery should be viewed as a national security issue as well as a humanitarian imperative.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?
Several developments would increase Yemen’s already elevated risk profile.
These include:

complete collapse of the Presidential Leadership Council;
formal declaration of an independent South Yemen;
major Saudi-Houthi military confrontation;
renewed expansion of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula;
widespread breakdown of humanitarian assistance.

Several developments would reduce the overall risk assessment.
These include:

durable ceasefire agreements among major factions;
negotiated political arrangements between northern and southern authorities;
sustained humanitarian recovery;
improved regional diplomacy between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran;
gradual reconstruction of national institutions.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
Yemen differs fundamentally from every other country examined in this report.
The principal intelligence question is not whether civil war will occur.
It already has.
Instead, analysts must assess whether Yemen is moving toward:

national reunification;
formal partition;
prolonged frozen conflict;
or continued multi-sided warfare.

At present, the available evidence suggests that continued fragmentation remains the most likely near-term outcome. Although diplomatic initiatives continue, multiple armed organizations retain independent command structures and incompatible political objectives.
From a regional perspective, Yemen’s importance extends beyond its borders.
Its location along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, proximity to the Red Sea, and relationship to Gulf security ensure that instability within Yemen will continue influencing regional trade, maritime security, and broader Middle Eastern geopolitics.
JAFAJ therefore assesses that Yemen represents the Middle East’s most entrenched civil conflict and is likely to remain one of the region’s principal sources of long-term instability unless a comprehensive political settlement addresses not only the Houthi-government conflict but also the competing visions for Yemen’s future state structure.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT VI
LIBYA
A DIVIDED STATE SEEKING REUNIFICATION
Overall Risk Assessment: Moderate–High
Estimated Risk Horizon: 12–36 Months
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate to High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Libya represents one of the Middle East and North Africa’s most unusual security cases.
Unlike Yemen, where large-scale civil war continues, Libya has experienced a significant reduction in nationwide fighting since the 2020 ceasefire.
Yet peace should not be confused with stability.
The country remains politically divided between rival governments, competing military institutions, and separate centers of political legitimacy. Although large-scale combat has declined, Libya has yet to resolve the underlying constitutional, political, and institutional disputes that originally fueled its civil war. The United Nations continues to describe Libya’s political process as improving but fragile, warning that the current opportunity for national reconciliation could narrow without sustained progress.
JAFAJ assesses that Libya is not presently on the verge of renewed nationwide civil war, but remains vulnerable to renewed armed confrontation if political negotiations collapse or rival authorities again seek to resolve disputes through military means.
FROM CIVIL WAR TO POLITICAL STALEMATE
The 2020 ceasefire fundamentally altered Libya’s security environment.
Major offensive operations largely ceased.
National institutions, however, remained divided.
Today Libya continues to operate under competing political authorities.
In the west, the internationally recognized Government of National Unity exercises authority from Tripoli.
In the east, rival political institutions supported by the Libyan National Army maintain effective control over much of eastern and southern Libya.
This division has created what analysts often describe as a frozen political conflict rather than a resolved national settlement.
The absence of large-scale warfare therefore reflects deterrence and political equilibrium more than comprehensive reconciliation. The Council on Foreign Relations continues to classify Libya as a country experiencing persistent instability because rival governments remain deadlocked over elections, constitutional arrangements, and national governance.
TWO GOVERNMENTS—ONE STATE
The central challenge confronting Libya is legitimacy.
Both rival political systems claim national authority.
Both maintain administrative institutions.
Both possess security organizations.
Neither exercises uncontested sovereignty across the entire country.
As a result, Libya continues to experience parallel governance in areas such as:

national budgeting;
internal security;
military command;
public administration;
border management;
energy policy.

This institutional duplication complicates virtually every effort to rebuild unified national government.
Political compromise therefore remains the decisive strategic variable.
OIL: LIBYA’S GREATEST ASSET AND GREATEST VULNERABILITY
Libya possesses Africa’s largest proven oil reserves.
Oil exports provide the overwhelming majority of government revenue.
Consequently, disputes regarding oil production, export terminals, revenue distribution, and the Central Bank have repeatedly become political flashpoints.
Unlike many countries where economic disagreements remain primarily financial, disputes over Libya’s energy sector directly influence political legitimacy and military power.
Control of oil revenues affects:

government salaries;
military financing;
reconstruction;
infrastructure investment;
regional political influence.

Recent diplomatic initiatives have attempted to separate oil production from political disputes.
Progress has been uneven.
The adoption of a unified national budget represented an important institutional achievement, but broader disagreements over political authority remain unresolved. The Financial Times and Reuters report that outside mediators view shared management of Libya’s energy resources as essential to any lasting political settlement.
THE MILITARY BALANCE
One of Libya’s principal stabilizing factors is the current military balance.
Neither major political bloc appears capable of achieving a decisive nationwide military victory at acceptable cost.
This strategic reality has encouraged negotiation over renewed offensive operations.
At the same time, the existence of separate military command structures means that localized incidents retain the potential to escalate unexpectedly.
The continued absence of a unified national military therefore represents both a stabilizing and destabilizing factor.
It discourages offensive campaigns.
It also prevents the emergence of a single national security authority.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION
Libya remains heavily influenced by external diplomacy.
The United Nations continues facilitating political negotiations.
Regional governments remain engaged.
Several international actors view Libyan stability as strategically important because of:

Mediterranean security;
migration;
energy exports;
counterterrorism;
regional economic development.

Recent reporting indicates that Pakistan, with encouragement from the United States and several regional governments, has begun facilitating discussions between Libya’s eastern and western political authorities regarding a proposed thirty-six-month national reunification process. While negotiations remain preliminary, they represent one of the most significant diplomatic initiatives since the 2020 ceasefire.
Whether this initiative succeeds remains uncertain.
Its existence nevertheless suggests that major international actors increasingly view political reunification as achievable rather than unattainable.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?
Several developments would increase Libya’s risk profile.
These include:

collapse of reunification negotiations;
renewed competition over oil infrastructure;
failure to implement national elections;
fragmentation within either major governing coalition;
significant foreign military intervention;
prolonged constitutional deadlock.

Conversely, several developments would improve Libya’s long-term outlook.
These include:

successful formation of unified national institutions;
implementation of credible national elections;
consolidation of military command structures;
equitable distribution of oil revenues;
continued reductions in political violence;
successful constitutional reform.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
Libya today differs significantly from the country that experienced full-scale civil war following 2011.
Violence has declined.
Institutions have strengthened in some areas.
Political dialogue has resumed.
These developments should not be overlooked.
Nevertheless, Libya has not yet completed the transition from ceasefire to durable peace.
Its institutions remain divided.
Its constitutional future remains unsettled.
Its political legitimacy remains contested.
JAFAJ therefore assesses that Libya’s greatest strategic risk is not an immediate return to nationwide civil war, but the gradual erosion of the current political equilibrium if reunification efforts fail.
Unlike Syria, where conflict remains deeply embedded in local security structures, or Lebanon, where competing armed authority defines the central political challenge, Libya’s future depends primarily upon whether competing governments can transform a military stalemate into a unified political settlement.
At present, the evidence suggests that Libya is moving cautiously toward political reconciliation rather than toward renewed nationwide civil war. That trajectory, however, remains reversible and dependent upon continued domestic compromise and sustained international mediation.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT VII
THE STABLE STATES
WHY SOME COUNTRIES ARE UNLIKELY TO EXPERIENCE CIVIL WAR
Countries Assessed:
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates
Qatar
Oman
Bahrain
Kuwait
Overall Regional Risk: Low to Moderate
Intelligence Confidence: High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
An assessment of civil war risk in the Middle East would be incomplete if it focused exclusively on countries experiencing instability.
Several regional governments continue to demonstrate a high degree of political resilience despite operating within one of the world’s most volatile security environments.
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait differ significantly in their political systems, economic structures, and foreign policy priorities. Yet they share several characteristics that reduce the probability of large-scale internal armed conflict.
These characteristics include relatively effective state institutions, centralized security organizations, comparatively high levels of government capacity, and the ability to provide essential public services. While each country faces important domestic and regional challenges, none currently exhibits the combination of structural conditions typically associated with a high probability of civil war. The World Bank and the Fund for Peace continue to rank these states well above the region’s fragile or conflict-affected countries in measures of governance and institutional capacity.
JORDAN
A BUFFER STATE UNDER CONTINUOUS PRESSURE
Jordan occupies one of the most strategically exposed positions in the Middle East.
It borders Israel, the West Bank, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.
It has absorbed successive refugee crises while maintaining internal political stability.
Jordan continues to face economic pressures, water shortages, unemployment, and periodic demonstrations.
Nevertheless, several important stabilizing factors remain present.
These include:

professional security institutions;
broad international support;
functioning government institutions;
continuity within the Hashemite monarchy;
limited sectarian polarization.

Jordan’s principal security risks originate from regional spillover rather than domestic armed opposition.
Accordingly, JAFAJ assesses Jordan’s civil war risk as Low.
SAUDI ARABIA
STRONG STATE CAPACITY REDUCES INTERNAL RISK
Saudi Arabia has undergone substantial political and economic transformation during the past decade.
Large-scale economic reforms, institutional modernization, expanded investment, and centralization of political authority have strengthened the state’s governing capacity.
The Kingdom continues to face:

regional security threats;
missile and drone attacks;
economic diversification challenges;
succession questions over the long term.

However, the government maintains:

effective security institutions;
centralized command authority;
substantial financial resources;
strong territorial control.

No organized domestic armed movement presently possesses the capability to challenge the state’s authority nationwide.
JAFAJ therefore assesses Saudi Arabia’s civil war risk as Low.
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
The UAE remains among the region’s most politically stable states.
Strong economic performance, diversified international relationships, highly capable security institutions, and relatively effective governance contribute to national resilience.
Potential risks include:

regional military escalation;
cyber attacks;
economic disruption;
terrorism.

None presently suggests a meaningful probability of internal armed conflict.
Assessment: Very Low
QATAR
Qatar maintains one of the highest standards of living in the Middle East.
Political continuity, strong financial reserves, and active diplomacy contribute significantly to national stability.
Although regional tensions occasionally affect Qatari foreign policy, they have not translated into meaningful domestic instability.
Assessment: Very Low
OMAN
Oman has historically pursued a policy of neutrality and regional mediation.
Political succession following the death of Sultan Qaboos demonstrated institutional continuity rather than instability.
Economic diversification remains an important long-term challenge.
Nevertheless, Oman continues to exhibit:

high institutional legitimacy;
limited political violence;
effective governance.

Assessment: Very Low
BAHRAIN
Bahrain presents a more complex picture.
Historical sectarian tensions continue to influence domestic politics.
The government maintains strong security institutions and receives substantial regional support, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Gulf Cooperation Council partners.
While localized unrest remains possible, the probability of nationwide civil war remains Low.
KUWAIT
Kuwait possesses one of the Gulf’s most developed parliamentary systems.
Political disagreements frequently occur between elected representatives and the executive branch.
Importantly, these disagreements have remained political rather than military.
Strong institutions and economic resources continue supporting national stability.
Assessment: Very Low
COMMON STABILIZING FACTORS
Several characteristics distinguish these countries from those examined earlier.
They generally possess:

functioning national institutions;
unified military command structures;
comparatively strong economies or fiscal reserves;
limited territorial fragmentation;
effective internal security organizations;
broad control over the legitimate use of force;
relatively high administrative capacity.

These factors substantially reduce the likelihood that political disputes will evolve into sustained armed conflict.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THIS ASSESSMENT?
Although current risks remain comparatively low, analysts should continue monitoring:

severe economic shocks;
prolonged succession disputes;
significant erosion of government legitimacy;
emergence of organized armed opposition;
large-scale refugee spillover;
regional wars producing domestic political polarization.

At present, however, none of these countries exhibits multiple deteriorating indicators comparable to those observed in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, or Yemen.
JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
One of the most important findings of this Intelligence Estimate is that geography alone does not determine conflict risk.
Several states located in one of the world’s most unstable regions continue to demonstrate remarkable political resilience.
This reinforces an important analytical conclusion:
Civil wars are not an inevitable consequence of regional instability.
Rather, they emerge when structural weaknesses accumulate beyond the capacity of political institutions to manage them peacefully.
The Gulf monarchies and Jordan illustrate the opposite dynamic. Despite operating in an exceptionally challenging security environment, they continue to benefit from strong state institutions, centralized security structures, and governing systems capable of absorbing political shocks without widespread armed conflict.
SPECIAL ASSESSMENT
THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
GOVERNANCE, FRAGMENTATION, AND THE RISK OF INTERNAL CONFLICT
Overall Risk Assessment: Moderate–High
Estimated Risk Horizon: 6–24 Months
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
The Palestinian Territories present one of the most analytically complex security environments in the Middle East.
Unlike the sovereign states examined elsewhere in this report, the Palestinian political system is divided geographically, institutionally, and politically between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
Accordingly, the principal intelligence question is not whether Palestine could experience a conventional civil war comparable to those in Syria or Yemen.
Rather, the question is whether political fragmentation, competing claims of legitimacy, and unresolved security arrangements could produce sustained armed confrontation among Palestinian actors themselves.
Recent developments have altered that assessment.
Hamas’ announcement that it would dissolve its de facto civilian government in Gaza and transfer administrative authority to a technocratic committee represents the most significant change in Palestinian governance since Hamas seized Gaza in 2007. However, Hamas has not committed to surrendering its weapons or relinquishing all security authority, leaving the future distribution of power uncertain.
JAFAJ assesses that the greatest near-term risk is not an organized Hamas–Fatah civil war, but prolonged political fragmentation in which competing governing authorities, security organizations, and external actors prevent the emergence of a unified Palestinian political system.
THE LEGACY OF 2007
The political division between Gaza and the West Bank did not begin with the current conflict.
It began nearly two decades earlier.
Following Hamas’ electoral victory and subsequent fighting with Fatah, Palestinian governance effectively split into two separate administrations.
Since then:

Hamas has governed Gaza.
The Palestinian Authority has administered much of the West Bank.
Separate security institutions developed.
Separate bureaucracies emerged.
Political reconciliation repeatedly failed.

This institutional separation created two distinct political systems operating under different leadership, different security structures, and different governing priorities.
The current ceasefire and reconstruction process therefore confronts not only the physical destruction of Gaza but also nearly twenty years of political separation.
A NEW POLITICAL MOMENT
Hamas’ decision to dissolve its civilian governing authority is politically significant.
If implemented, it would end nearly two decades of direct Hamas administration over civilian ministries and transfer day-to-day governance to a technocratic body created under the post-war framework. Hamas has described the move as part of the reconstruction process, while the Board of Peace has stated that it will judge the transition by “actions, not promises.” Israeli officials have argued that meaningful change also requires Hamas to relinquish its armed capabilities.
This distinction is critical.
Civil administration and military authority are not the same.
Even if civilian governance changes, unresolved questions remain regarding:

policing;
internal security;
weapons control;
intelligence functions;
border security;
command over armed formations.

Until these issues are resolved, competing centers of authority are likely to persist.
THE HAMAS–FATAH RELATIONSHIP
For many years, discussions of Palestinian internal politics focused on the rivalry between Hamas and Fatah.
While that rivalry remains important, it may no longer represent the principal source of future instability.
Both organizations now confront a different strategic challenge:
Whether a unified Palestinian governing structure can emerge after years of institutional separation.
That challenge involves far more than political reconciliation.
It requires integration of:

civil administrations;
financial systems;
judicial institutions;
security organizations;
local governance;
reconstruction authorities.

History demonstrates that institutional integration is often more difficult than political agreement.
THE SECURITY QUESTION
The future of Palestinian security institutions remains the most uncertain variable.
No political transition can be considered complete while competing armed organizations maintain separate chains of command.
The current framework leaves several major questions unanswered.
Among them:

Who controls internal policing?
Who secures border crossings?
Who commands armed personnel?
What becomes of Hamas’ military wing?
What role, if any, will the Palestinian Authority’s security institutions play in Gaza?
What responsibilities will international organizations assume?

Until these questions are resolved, governance arrangements will remain incomplete.
The United Nations has similarly argued that Gaza’s recovery must ultimately support reunification of Gaza and the West Bank under a single legitimate Palestinian governing authority.
THE RECONSTRUCTION CHALLENGE
Political stability cannot be separated from reconstruction.
Years of conflict have devastated housing, public infrastructure, healthcare, education, and the economy.
Reconstruction therefore represents more than humanitarian recovery.
It is also a test of governance.
Whichever institutions successfully deliver:

public services;
reconstruction;
employment;
security;
humanitarian assistance;

are likely to gain political legitimacy.
Failure to deliver those services could produce renewed political competition among Palestinian factions.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE ASSESSMENT?
Several developments would increase the risk of internal Palestinian conflict.
These include:

collapse of the governance transition;
competing claims of authority between rival Palestinian institutions;
disputes regarding weapons and security control;
failure of reconstruction;
assassination of senior political leaders;
emergence of additional armed factions.

Conversely, several developments would reduce the assessed level of risk.
These include:

successful implementation of the technocratic administration;
agreement regarding unified security structures;
sustained reconstruction;
expanded cooperation between Gaza and West Bank institutions;
internationally supported political reforms;
continued reductions in armed violence.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
The Palestinian Territories should not presently be assessed as moving toward a conventional civil war resembling those experienced by Syria or Yemen.
Instead, they face a different strategic challenge.
The central issue is political integration.
The recent decision by Hamas to dissolve its civilian governing authority creates an opportunity for institutional restructuring.
Whether that opportunity succeeds will depend less upon announcements than upon implementation.
The decisive question is not who governs Gaza’s ministries.
The decisive question is who ultimately exercises legitimate authority over governance, security, reconstruction, and the use of force across the Palestinian Territories.
JAFAJ therefore assesses that the greatest threat to Palestinian stability is prolonged political fragmentation rather than immediate civil war. If competing institutions become entrenched, reconstruction stalls, or rival security organizations begin operating independently of a unified political framework, the risk of sustained internal armed confrontation would increase. Conversely, successful institutional integration under a broadly accepted governing structure would significantly reduce that risk over time.
CHAPTER VIII
REGIONAL CONTAGION
HOW ONE CIVIL WAR COULD IGNITE ANOTHER
Regional Assessment: Moderate Risk of Cascading Instability
Estimated Time Horizon: 6–36 Months
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate to High
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Civil wars seldom remain domestic affairs.
In today’s Middle East, political instability spreads across borders through refugee movements, economic disruption, ideological mobilization, weapons trafficking, proxy organizations, and foreign military intervention.
The region’s geographic proximity, interconnected political movements, and competing regional powers mean that instability in one country can rapidly influence security conditions elsewhere.
This dynamic is not theoretical.
The Syrian Civil War reshaped regional politics by generating one of the largest refugee crises in modern history, altering the security policies of neighboring states, facilitating the expansion of extremist organizations, and drawing multiple regional and international militaries into the conflict. Similar spillover effects have been documented in conflicts involving Iraq, Yemen, and Libya.¹
The principal intelligence question is therefore no longer:
Could one country experience civil war?
The more important question becomes:
What happens to the region if it does?
THE CASCADE MODEL
JAFAJ assesses that regional instability generally expands through five interconnected pathways.
Rather than occurring sequentially, these pathways often reinforce one another.
Political Crisis
│
▼
Internal Violence
│
▼
Population Displacement
│
▼
Regional Political Pressure
│
▼
Foreign Intervention
│
▼
Expanded Regional Instability
Each stage increases the probability that neighboring states will experience secondary security challenges.
PATHWAY ONE
REFUGEE MOVEMENTS
Large-scale population displacement is among the earliest indicators that internal conflict is expanding beyond national borders.
Neighboring governments often experience immediate pressure upon:

healthcare systems;
housing;
employment;
education;
public finances;
border security.

Jordan, Lebanon, Türkiye, and Iraq all experienced substantial demographic and economic effects following the Syrian conflict.
Future conflicts involving Iran or Lebanon could generate similar regional pressures, although the scale would depend upon the duration and intensity of violence.
Refugee movements are humanitarian events.
They also become strategic events.
PATHWAY TWO
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
Civil wars rarely contain weapons.
As state authority weakens, military equipment often disperses beyond government control.
Weapons may flow through:

smuggling networks;
tribal relationships;
criminal organizations;
proxy groups;
terrorist organizations.

The Libyan conflict demonstrated how unsecured weapons stockpiles influenced conflicts throughout North Africa and the Sahel.
Similarly, instability in one state may substantially increase military capabilities available to non-state actors elsewhere.
PATHWAY THREE
IDEOLOGICAL MOBILIZATION
Modern communications accelerate political mobilization.
Events occurring inside one country frequently inspire demonstrations, recruitment, fundraising, or political activism elsewhere.
Religious, ethnic, ideological, and nationalist movements increasingly operate across national boundaries.
Consequently, civil conflicts often produce:

increased political polarization;
expanded recruitment;
online propaganda;
financial support networks;
foreign volunteers.

While digital mobilization does not automatically translate into armed conflict, it can strengthen organizations capable of exploiting periods of political instability.
PATHWAY FOUR
PROXY ESCALATION
Regional powers rarely remain neutral when neighboring governments begin to weaken.
Instead, they often perceive opportunities—or threats—that encourage intervention.
Support may include:

intelligence;
financing;
weapons;
military advisors;
diplomatic recognition;
cyber operations;
economic assistance.

History demonstrates that such intervention frequently prolongs conflicts while increasing their complexity.
Domestic political disputes therefore become regional strategic competitions.
PATHWAY FIVE
ECONOMIC SHOCK
Regional conflicts affect far more than security.
They disrupt:

trade;
tourism;
energy markets;
shipping;
investment;
financial confidence.

The Red Sea crisis demonstrated how localized military activity could rapidly influence international shipping costs and insurance markets.
Likewise, instability affecting the Strait of Hormuz would possess immediate global economic implications.
Economic disruption often produces political consequences in neighboring countries, creating additional instability.
THE CIVIL WAR NETWORK
The following diagram illustrates JAFAJ’s assessment of likely regional spillover pathways.
Syria
↙  ↓  ↘
Lebanon Iraq Türkiye
 
Iran ↔ Iraq ↔ Syria
 
Lebanon ↔ Israel
 
Yemen ↔ Saudi Arabia ↔ Gulf States
 
Libya ↔ Egypt ↔ Tunisia ↔ Sahel
 
Gaza ↔ Israel ↔ Jordan
This should not be interpreted as predicting conflict.
Rather, it illustrates where instability is most likely to produce secondary effects.
WHICH COUNTRY MATTERS MOST?
From a regional perspective, not every conflict carries equal strategic weight.
JAFAJ assesses the following potential regional impacts.

Country
Regional Spillover Potential

Iran
Very High

Syria
Very High

Lebanon
High

Iraq
High

Yemen
Moderate–High

Libya
Moderate

Palestinian Territories
Moderate

Iran ranks highest because of:

geographic location;
population size;
regional proxy relationships;
energy infrastructure;
Strait of Hormuz;
influence extending into Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

A major internal crisis in Iran would likely produce broader regional consequences than instability in any other country assessed in this report.
EARLY WARNING INDICATORS OF REGIONAL CONTAGION
JAFAJ recommends monitoring the following indicators.
Political

Collapse of regional diplomatic negotiations.
Simultaneous emergencies in multiple neighboring states.
Expansion of emergency powers.

Military

Cross-border artillery or missile exchanges.
Mobilization of proxy organizations.
Increased foreign military deployments.
Expansion of border security operations.

Humanitarian

Refugee flows exceeding national response capacity.
Rapid displacement across multiple borders.
Breakdown of humanitarian corridors.

Economic

Closure of strategic maritime routes.
Major disruption of oil exports.
Banking instability.
Severe food inflation.

JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
The greatest strategic danger facing the Middle East may not be a single civil war.
It may be the interaction of several smaller crises occurring simultaneously.
History demonstrates that regional conflicts rarely develop in isolation.
Instead, they evolve through a combination of domestic political failures, external intervention, humanitarian displacement, economic disruption, and competing geopolitical interests.
At present, JAFAJ does not assess that the Middle East is on the threshold of a region-wide cascade of civil wars.
However, several states are simultaneously experiencing elevated structural pressures.
Should one of the region’s major states—particularly Iran, Lebanon, or Syria—experience significant internal deterioration, the probability of broader regional instability would increase substantially through refugee movements, proxy mobilization, economic disruption, and foreign intervention.
Accordingly, policymakers should monitor interactions among conflicts, not merely the trajectory of individual countries.
CHAPTER IX
STRATEGIC OUTLOOK
THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR MONTHS
Forecast Period: July 2026 – July 2028
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
The Middle East is unlikely to experience a simultaneous collapse of multiple governments over the next twenty-four months.
The available evidence instead suggests a more complex and uneven trajectory.
Several states are expected to remain relatively stable despite operating within a volatile regional environment. Others will likely continue experiencing persistent political fragmentation without descending into full-scale civil war. A smaller number face elevated structural pressures that could, under specific circumstances, develop into sustained internal armed conflict.
Accordingly, JAFAJ assesses that the region’s principal security challenge over the next two years will not be a single catastrophic event.
Rather, it will be the accumulation of multiple interconnected crises that collectively increase regional instability.
MOST LIKELY SCENARIO
Managed Instability
Estimated Probability: 60–70%
Under this scenario:

Iran experiences periodic domestic unrest but retains institutional cohesion.
Lebanon continues political deadlock while avoiding nationwide civil war.
Syria remains fragmented but avoids renewed nationwide conflict.
Iraq continues gradual institutional strengthening despite periodic security incidents.
Yemen remains divided with intermittent military operations.
Libya advances slowly toward political reunification while experiencing occasional localized violence.
The Palestinian Territories continue political transition with uneven implementation.

This scenario does not represent peace.
It represents governments successfully preventing structural pressures from developing into nationwide armed conflict.
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ONE
Regional Escalation
Estimated Probability: 20–30%
This scenario develops if one major crisis produces cascading regional effects.
Possible triggers include:

political fragmentation in Iran;
collapse of Lebanese state institutions;
major deterioration in Syria’s political transition;
direct confrontation among regional powers;
widespread proxy mobilization.

Under this scenario:

refugee flows increase substantially;
regional military deployments expand;
proxy organizations become more active;
economic disruption accelerates;
humanitarian demands increase significantly.

Regional instability would likely persist for several years.
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO TWO
Regional Stabilization
Estimated Probability: 10–20%
Although less likely, several positive developments could improve regional stability.
These include:

successful reconstruction initiatives;
durable ceasefire agreements;
economic recovery;
strengthened state institutions;
expanded regional diplomacy;
improved relations among major regional powers.

This scenario requires sustained political compromise across multiple countries simultaneously.
While difficult, it should not be dismissed.
History demonstrates that prolonged conflict can eventually create incentives for political settlement.
THE COUNTRIES MOST LIKELY TO CHANGE
Not every country is equally likely to experience significant change during the forecast period.
JAFAJ assesses the following.

Country
Probability of Significant Political Change
Direction of Risk

Iran
High
Increasing

Lebanon
High
Increasing

Syria
Moderate
Stable to Increasing

Iraq
Moderate
Stable

Yemen
High
Stable (Continuing Conflict)

Libya
Moderate
Improving

Palestinian Territories
High
Uncertain

Jordan
Low
Stable

Saudi Arabia
Low
Stable

UAE
Very Low
Stable

These estimates reflect the probability of meaningful political or security developments, not the probability of civil war.
THE THREE VARIABLES THAT MATTER MOST
Among dozens of observable indicators, JAFAJ identifies three variables that will likely determine the region’s trajectory over the next twenty-four months.

STATE CAPACITY

Governments that maintain functioning institutions, unified security services, and the ability to deliver basic public services are significantly more likely to withstand political shocks.
Institutional resilience remains the single greatest predictor of long-term stability.

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

Regional conflicts become substantially more dangerous when outside powers increase military, financial, or political involvement.
The degree of external intervention will heavily influence whether localized crises remain contained or expand.

POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

Military capability alone rarely ensures long-term stability.
Governments retaining sufficient political legitimacy are generally better positioned to manage periods of economic hardship, leadership transition, and security crises without widespread violence.
WHAT POLICYMAKERS SHOULD WATCH
JAFAJ recommends prioritizing the following indicators during the forecast period.
Strategic Indicators

Leadership transitions.
Constitutional crises.
Fragmentation within national armed forces.
Growth of organized militias.
Breakdown of ceasefire agreements.

Economic Indicators

Currency instability.
Severe inflation.
Food insecurity.
Public-sector salary disruptions.
Energy infrastructure attacks.

Security Indicators

Cross-border military operations.
Increased proxy activity.
Political assassinations.
Expansion of terrorist organizations.
Loss of territorial control by national governments.

Changes across multiple categories simultaneously would warrant reassessment of regional risk.
FINAL ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
The central finding of this Intelligence Estimate is straightforward.
The Middle East is not entering a period in which civil war is inevitable.
It is entering a period in which several countries are simultaneously experiencing structural pressures historically associated with elevated risks of internal conflict.
Those pressures differ in origin and intensity.
Iran faces uncertainty associated with leadership transition, economic strain, and regional confrontation.
Lebanon confronts unresolved questions of sovereignty and competing military authority.
Syria continues the difficult transition from prolonged civil war toward national reconstruction.
Iraq seeks to strengthen state institutions while balancing powerful domestic and external actors.
Yemen remains trapped in an entrenched multi-sided conflict.
Libya continues the slow process of political reunification after years of division.
The Palestinian Territories face the challenge of transforming political transition into durable institutional governance.
At the same time, Jordan and the Gulf states demonstrate that regional instability does not inevitably produce state failure. Strong institutions, effective governance, and unified security structures continue to provide substantial protection against large-scale internal conflict.
The report’s most important conclusion is therefore not that civil wars are imminent.
It is that institutional resilience—not military power alone—will determine which states successfully navigate the next decade of regional uncertainty.
CHAPTER X
STRATEGIC WARNING
THE COST OF MISREADING CIVIL WAR
Classification: Unclassified
Purpose: Strategic Warning for Policymakers
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate–High
THE CENTRAL WARNING
The greatest danger confronting policymakers is not that civil wars are unpredictable.
It is that they are frequently recognized only after they have become irreversible.
History demonstrates that governments, international organizations, financial markets, and even intelligence services often underestimate the cumulative effects of institutional decline. Individual warning signs may appear manageable in isolation. Considered together, however, they can indicate that a state’s political resilience is deteriorating more rapidly than generally understood.
Civil wars rarely begin with a declaration.
They begin with institutions that gradually lose their ability to manage political competition peacefully.
THE WARNING SIGNS
JAFAJ assesses that governments should pay particular attention when multiple warning indicators emerge simultaneously.
Among the most significant are:

declining confidence in national institutions;
prolonged political paralysis;
deterioration of economic conditions;
expansion of armed organizations operating outside government authority;
increasing political violence;
widespread public distrust of constitutional processes;
growing foreign involvement in domestic political affairs.

No single indicator demonstrates that civil war is imminent.
The convergence of several indicators over time is considerably more significant than any one event.
THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME
One of the consistent findings of comparative conflict research is that governments generally possess more opportunities to prevent civil war before organized violence becomes widespread.
Political compromise, institutional reform, economic stabilization, constitutional adaptation, and effective governance tend to be most successful during periods of political tension—not after armed conflict has become entrenched.
Once competing groups conclude that military force offers greater political advantage than negotiation, opportunities for peaceful resolution decline rapidly.
Time therefore represents one of the most important strategic variables.
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
Outside governments frequently influence the trajectory of internal conflicts.
Diplomatic engagement, humanitarian assistance, economic support, and conflict mediation may strengthen political resilience.
Conversely, military intervention, proxy competition, sanctions without diplomatic pathways, or unconditional support for competing factions may unintentionally prolong instability.
International policy should therefore focus not only on ending active conflicts but also on strengthening the institutions capable of preventing future conflicts.
A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
The Middle East should not be viewed as a region uniformly moving toward instability.
Several states continue demonstrating considerable institutional resilience despite operating within a difficult strategic environment.
Others remain engaged in complex transitions that could produce either greater stability or renewed violence.
The distinction matters.
Successful policy depends upon recognizing differences among countries rather than treating regional instability as a single phenomenon.
THE JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
Based upon the evidence examined throughout this Intelligence Estimate, JAFAJ reaches five principal conclusions.
First, institutional strength remains the single most important determinant of whether political crises evolve into civil wars.
Second, civil wars increasingly develop within regional systems rather than remaining confined inside national borders.
Third, governments confronting simultaneous political, economic, and security crises face substantially greater long-term risks than governments experiencing isolated challenges.
Fourth, the interaction of regional conflicts may ultimately prove more destabilizing than any single conflict.
Finally, the coming twenty-four months are likely to be defined not by one decisive regional event but by a series of interconnected political developments whose cumulative effects will shape the Middle East’s strategic landscape.
FINAL JUDGMENT
This Intelligence Estimate does not conclude that the Middle East is entering a new era of widespread civil wars.
It does conclude that several countries are simultaneously experiencing structural pressures that deserve sustained attention from policymakers, researchers, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector.
The central lesson is clear.
Civil wars are rarely unavoidable.
Neither are they random.
They emerge when institutional resilience erodes faster than political systems can adapt.
Understanding that process remains the best opportunity to prevent future conflicts rather than merely responding to them.
JAFAJ KEY TAKEAWAYS

Finding
Assessment

Region-wide civil war
Unlikely

Localized internal conflicts
Likely

Iran
Highest strategic uncertainty

Lebanon
Highest risk of renewed internal political violence

Syria
Fragile transition requiring sustained monitoring

Iraq
Improving but structurally vulnerable

Yemen
Continuing multi-sided civil conflict

Libya
Gradual political improvement with persistent risks

Palestinian Territories
Political fragmentation remains the principal concern

Gulf States
Generally stable

ABOUT JAFAJ INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
JAFAJ Intelligence Estimates are strategic assessments prepared using structured analytical methods, comparative conflict analysis, and publicly available information from governmental, international, academic, and professional research sources.
These reports do not predict future events with certainty. Rather, they evaluate observable trends, assess structural conditions, and identify developments that may alter the probability of future outcomes.
The purpose of a JAFAJ Intelligence Estimate is to support informed decision-making by presenting balanced analysis, clearly stated assumptions, and transparent judgments regarding issues affecting regional and international security.
CHAPTER XI
ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES
WHAT COULD CHANGE THIS ASSESSMENT?
Purpose: Challenge Key Assumptions
Intelligence Confidence: Moderate
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT
Intelligence analysis is inherently probabilistic.
The judgments presented throughout this report represent the authors’ best assessment based upon currently available information. They should not be interpreted as predictions or certainties.
Future political decisions, economic developments, diplomatic initiatives, or unforeseen events may significantly alter the trajectory of individual states.
This chapter examines alternative scenarios that could invalidate or substantially modify the preceding assessments.
ALTERNATIVE OUTCOME ONE
REGIONAL STABILIZATION
The principal conclusion of this report is that several Middle Eastern states face elevated structural risks.
This assessment would require downward revision if several developments occurred simultaneously.
These include:

sustained regional diplomatic engagement;
successful economic reforms;
improved government legitimacy;
integration of non-state armed organizations into state institutions;
constitutional reforms accepted across political factions;
substantial reductions in sectarian violence.

Should these developments occur across several countries, regional stability would likely improve considerably.
ALTERNATIVE OUTCOME TWO
RAPID ESCALATION
The report also concludes that widespread regional civil war is not the most likely outcome.
That assessment could change if several destabilizing events occurred in rapid succession.
Examples include:

leadership crisis in Iran accompanied by elite fragmentation;
collapse of Lebanon’s political institutions;
renewed nationwide fighting in Syria;
major regional war involving multiple states;
severe global economic recession affecting Middle Eastern governments;
widespread disruption of maritime trade through the Strait of Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb.

A convergence of these events could produce regional instability beyond the levels assessed in this estimate.
ALTERNATIVE OUTCOME THREE
INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION
History demonstrates that governments frequently adapt more effectively than outside observers expect.
Political systems under pressure may respond through:

constitutional reform;
coalition governments;
decentralization;
economic restructuring;
negotiated security arrangements;
expanded international cooperation.

Several countries assessed as high risk today could therefore experience greater stability if institutions successfully adapt to changing political conditions.
Institutional resilience should not be underestimated.
BLACK SWAN EVENTS
Some developments cannot reasonably be forecast with precision but could fundamentally alter the regional outlook.
Examples include:

unexpected leadership transitions;
major natural disasters;
large-scale cyber attacks affecting national infrastructure;
significant technological disruption;
unforeseen breakthroughs in regional diplomacy;
emergence of new transnational security threats.

Although low in probability, such events could require immediate reassessment.
THE LIMITS OF FORECASTING
This report focuses on structural indicators because they generally evolve more slowly than political events.
Nevertheless, structural analysis has limitations.
Governments sometimes collapse despite apparently strong institutions.
Others survive despite severe economic or political crises.
Political leadership, public attitudes, external intervention, and chance all influence outcomes in ways that cannot be measured with complete precision.
Accordingly, this report should be viewed as a framework for continued assessment rather than a final judgment.
THE IMPORTANCE OF REASSESSMENT
Conflict risk is dynamic.
Therefore, the conclusions presented here should be reviewed whenever significant developments occur, including:

changes in national leadership;
major constitutional reforms;
widespread political violence;
sustained economic shocks;
regional military escalation;
peace agreements;
major changes in foreign military involvement.

Regular reassessment is essential to maintaining analytical accuracy.
FINAL ANALYTIC OBSERVATION
Perhaps the most important conclusion of this Intelligence Estimate is methodological rather than political.
Civil wars should not be viewed as isolated national events.
They are the product of interacting political, economic, social, and security systems operating over time.
Understanding those interactions improves the ability of governments, researchers, humanitarian organizations, and private institutions to recognize emerging risks before they become irreversible crises.
Future developments may confirm, refine, or contradict the judgments presented in this report.
That possibility is not a weakness of intelligence analysis.
It is an essential characteristic of it.
APPENDIX A
JAFAJ MIDDLE EAST CIVIL WAR RISK INDEX (MECWRI)
Methodology and Comparative Assessment
PURPOSE
The JAFAJ Middle East Civil War Risk Index (MECWRI) provides a standardized framework for comparing structural indicators associated with internal armed conflict across Middle Eastern states.
Unlike event-based reporting, the Index is designed to measure structural vulnerability rather than current headlines.
It does not predict that civil war will occur.
Instead, it estimates the degree to which observable political, economic, security, and social conditions resemble those historically associated with elevated risks of sustained internal conflict.
Accordingly, the Index should be interpreted as a decision-support tool rather than a forecasting instrument.
ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES
The MECWRI is built upon six principles.
First, civil wars emerge through interacting structural pressures rather than isolated events.
Second, no single indicator adequately predicts internal armed conflict.
Third, institutional resilience generally provides stronger protection against civil conflict than military capability alone.
Fourth, conflict risk changes over time and therefore requires periodic reassessment.
Fifth, regional dynamics influence domestic stability.
Sixth, professional intelligence analysis should distinguish between probability and certainty.
ASSESSMENT CATEGORIES
Each country is evaluated across six major categories.

Category
Weight

Government Legitimacy
20%

Economic Resilience
15%

Security Institutions
20%

Non-State Armed Actors
20%

Social Fragmentation
15%

External Intervention
10%

Total
100%

Government legitimacy and security institutions receive the highest weighting because comparative conflict research consistently identifies them as among the strongest determinants of state resilience.
SCORING SCALE
Each category receives a numerical assessment.

Score
Assessment

1
Very Low Risk

2
Low Risk

3
Moderate Risk

4
High Risk

5
Very High Risk

Weighted scores are combined to produce the overall Civil War Risk Index.
OVERALL RISK SCALE

Final Score
Risk Assessment

1.0–1.9
Very Low

2.0–2.4
Low

2.5–3.2
Moderate

3.3–4.0
High

4.1–5.0
Very High

2026 JAFAJ CIVIL WAR RISK INDEX

Country
Gov.
Econ.
Security
Armed Groups
Social
External
Overall

Iran
4
4
2
3
4
4
3.55

Lebanon
4
5
4
5
5
4
4.45

Syria
4
5
5
5
5
5
4.80

Iraq
3
3
3
4
3
4
3.35

Yemen
5
5
5
5
4
5
4.90

Libya
4
3
4
4
3
4
3.75

Palestinian Territories
4
4
4
5
4
4
4.15

Jordan
2
3
2
1
2
3
2.10

Saudi Arabia
2
2
1
1
2
3
1.75

UAE
1
1
1
1
1
2
1.10

Qatar
1
1
1
1
1
2
1.10

Oman
1
2
1
1
1
2
1.25

Bahrain
2
2
2
2
3
2
2.15

Kuwait
2
2
2
1
2
2
1.90

REGIONAL OBSERVATIONS
Several trends emerge from the 2026 assessment.
Very High Risk

Yemen
Syria
Palestinian Territories

These areas continue experiencing either active armed conflict or institutional fragmentation severe enough to present sustained risks of organized internal violence.
High Risk

Lebanon
Libya
Iran
Iraq

Although differing considerably in political structure, these countries share multiple structural vulnerabilities requiring continued monitoring.
Low to Very Low Risk

Jordan
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Qatar
Oman
Bahrain
Kuwait

These states currently possess comparatively stronger institutions, more unified security structures, or greater economic capacity to absorb political shocks.
TREND ANALYSIS
The Index measures both current conditions and direction of change.

Trend
Meaning

▲
Deteriorating

►
Stable

▼
Improving

Country
Trend

Iran
▲

Lebanon
▲

Syria
►

Iraq
►

Yemen
►

Libya
▼

Palestinian Territories
▲

Jordan
►

Saudi Arabia
►

UAE
►

Qatar
►

Oman
►

Bahrain
►

Kuwait
►

INTELLIGENCE LIMITATIONS
The MECWRI is not intended to predict the precise timing of political crises or civil wars.
Instead, it provides a structured method for comparing structural vulnerabilities across countries.
Unexpected political decisions, economic reforms, external intervention, leadership changes, or diplomatic breakthroughs may rapidly alter individual country assessments.
Accordingly, JAFAJ recommends updating the Index at least quarterly and immediately following major regional developments.
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
The Middle East does not presently exhibit evidence of a region-wide movement toward simultaneous civil wars.
It does, however, contain several countries experiencing elevated structural pressures that warrant sustained monitoring.
The 2026 MECWRI identifies Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, Iran, Libya, and Iraq as requiring the highest levels of analytical attention because of the interaction of institutional weakness, armed non-state actors, economic stress, and external intervention.
Conversely, the Gulf monarchies and Jordan continue to demonstrate comparatively strong institutional resilience despite operating in one of the world’s most challenging strategic environments.
The Index therefore reinforces the central conclusion of this Intelligence Estimate:
Civil wars are not random events. They emerge when multiple structural pressures overwhelm a state’s capacity to manage political competition peacefully.
 
FOOTNOTES

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Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, “Is Civil Unrest Poised to Escalate in Lebanon?” documenting increasing political tensions and evaluating scenarios under which civil conflict could emerge.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The War with Iran Threatens Syria’s Recovery,” discussing the continuing fragility of Syria’s political transition.
Council on Foreign Relations, “Syria’s Surge in Violence Does Not Signal a New Civil War—for Now,” March 2025.
Associated Press, reporting on political divisions in Lebanon surrounding Hezbollah’s future and concerns regarding renewed internal conflict.
Reuters, “As Internal Divisions Simmer, Lebanese See Echoes of Civil War,” April 22, 2026.
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003).
World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, discussing the interaction of institutions, governance, and conflict risk.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, States of Fragility 2018, Chapter 1.
James D. Fearon, “State Fragility, Governance Indicators, and the Risk of Civil Conflict,” Revue d’économie du développement 19, no. 4 (2011).
James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004).
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Rick Barton et al., Early Warning? A Review of Conflict Prediction Models and Systems, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2008.
The Fund for Peace, “Early Warning and Response.”
International Monetary Fund, Political Fragility: Coups d’État and Their Drivers, Working Paper No. 24/34 (2024).
The Fund for Peace, “Data for Peace” and the Fragile States Index methodology.
The Fund for Peace, “Country Risk and Fragility Data.”
Barton et al., Early Warning?, discussing the use of multi-indicator conflict prediction systems.
The Fund for Peace, “Early Warning and Response.”
The Fund for Peace, “Data for Peace.”
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Reuters, “Fearing Economic Collapse After War, Iran Cracks Down on Dissent,” March 30, 2026.
Council on Foreign Relations, After Khamenei: Planning for Iran’s Leadership Transition.
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Associated Press, “How a Push to Disarm Hezbollah Is Deepening Divisions in Lebanon and Raising Fears of Civil War,” July 9, 2026.
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Reuters, “As Internal Divisions Simmer, Lebanese See Echoes of Civil War,” April 22, 2026.
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Associated Press, “How a Push to Disarm Hezbollah Is Deepening Divisions in Lebanon and Raising Fears of Civil War,” July 9, 2026.
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Center for Strategic and International Studies, *How Syria Can Succeed in Integrating the Kurds*.
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U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, *Religious Freedom and Rule of Law in Syria*.
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, *Country Update: Syria*.
Council on Foreign Relations, *Syria’s Surge in Violence Does Not Signal a New Civil War—For Now*.
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Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The War with Iran Threatens Syria’s Recovery*.
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Chatham House, *Can Iraq’s New Prime Minister Finally Rein In Its Armed Factions?*.
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Associated Press, “Iraq Is Caught in the Crossfire of the Iran War,” April 2026.
Chatham House, *Can Iraq’s New Prime Minister Finally Rein In Its Armed Factions?.
Reuters, reporting on covert IRGC-linked cells in Iraq and regional proxy dynamics.
Associated Press, reporting on attacks affecting Iraq’s oil infrastructure and government finances during the regional conflict.
Council on Foreign Relations, *Instability in Iraq*.
JAFAJ analytical assessment based on the preceding sources and comparative conflict analysis.
Reuters, “Who Is Fighting in Yemen?” January 2, 2026.
Reuters, “Saudi-Backed Yemen Government Says It Retakes Eastern City from Separatists,” January 3, 2026.
Associated Press, “Escalation in Yemen Threatens to Reignite Civil War and Create Wider Tensions in Gulf Region.”
Reuters, “Who Is Fighting in Yemen?” describing the principal armed factions and their territorial control.
Reuters, “Saudi-Backed Yemen Government Says It Retakes Eastern City from Separatists,” discussing the growing divide between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over Yemen.
Associated Press, “Escalation in Yemen Threatens to Reignite Civil War,” analyzing the strategic implications of renewed fighting among anti-Houthi factions.
Reuters, “Who Is Fighting in Yemen?” overview of the Houthi movement, the Presidential Leadership Council, the Southern Transitional Council, and associated armed organizations.
JAFAJ analytical assessment based on the preceding sources and comparative conflict analysis.
United Nations, Libya’s Political Process Regains Momentum, but Window for Action Is Narrowing, June 18, 2026.
Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker: Instability in Libya, updated June 2026.
Security Council Report, Libya Monthly Forecast, June 2026.
Reuters, “Pakistan Mediating Libya Unity Push as Rival Camps Seek Deal,” July 6, 2026.
Financial Times, “Trump Adviser Pushes Power-Sharing Plan for Oil-Rich Libya,” June 2026.
United Nations Support Mission in Libya briefing to the UN Security Council, June 18, 2026.
Reuters, “Pakistan Mediating Libya Unity Push as Rival Camps Seek Deal,” discussing the proposed Government of National Consensus and transitional framework.
JAFAJ analytical assessment based on the preceding sources and comparative conflict analysis.
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2026.
The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2026.
International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, 2026.
Gulf Cooperation Council, official communiqués on regional security cooperation.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2026.
World Bank governance indicators for Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman.
The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2026 comparative regional rankings.
JAFAJ comparative analysis using standardized risk indicators developed for this report.
Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Presses for Progress on Stalled Peace Plan,” July 6, 2026.
Associated Press, “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a UN-Backed Committee,” July 6, 2026.
Financial Times, “Hamas Says It Will Dissolve Gaza Civilian Governing Arm,” July 6, 2026.
United Nations, Security Council Briefing, “Recovery in Gaza Must Advance the Reunification of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank Under a Single, Legitimate, Sovereign Palestinian Government,” May 21, 2026.
JAFAJ analytical assessment based on the preceding sources and comparative conflict analysis.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends reports on forced displacement resulting from conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen.
International Organization for Migration, regional displacement assessments.
World Bank, The Mobility of Displaced Syrians and regional economic impact studies.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, research on regional proxy conflicts and Middle East security.
International Crisis Group, analyses of regional conflict spillover.
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), regional conflict monitoring and event analysis.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, humanitarian situation reports.
JAFAJ analytical assessment based on comparative conflict research and the sources cited throughout this report.
JAFAJ strategic assessment derived from the comparative analysis presented in Chapters I–IX and supported by the cited government publications, international organizations, academic research, and conflict-monitoring sources used throughout this Intelligence Estimate.
JAFAJ concluding assessment synthesizing the analytical findings presented throughout this Intelligence Estimate.
JAFAJ methodological assessment based on structured analytic techniques, comparative conflict research, and the evidence presented throughout this Intelligence Estimate.

 
 

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WHAT IS THE BOARD OF PEACE, AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?
A JaFaJ Intelligence Brief
As the war in Gaza transitions from large-scale military operations toward questions of reconstruction and governance, one institution has emerged at the center of international discussions: the Board of Peace. While headlines frequently reference the organization, its purpose and responsibilities are often misunderstood. Contrary to some public perceptions, the Board is not intended to become Gaza’s permanent government, nor is it designed to negotiate a final peace settlement. Instead, it is a transitional governing mechanism intended to help establish the civilian institutions necessary to stabilize Gaza during the difficult period following the conflict.
The Board of Peace was proposed in response to a practical reality. Years of conflict have severely damaged Gaza’s governmental institutions, public infrastructure, and economy. At the same time, the proposed transfer of civilian authority away from Hamas’ de facto government has created an immediate need for an organization capable of coordinating reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and public administration while longer-term political arrangements continue to evolve.
Rather than serving as a political authority, the Board’s principal mission is to strengthen civilian governance. Current planning envisions Palestinian technocratic administrators carrying out day-to-day governmental responsibilities through the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), while the Board provides strategic coordination, administrative oversight, and support for international reconstruction efforts. Its work is expected to focus on restoring essential public services, coordinating humanitarian relief, rebuilding civilian institutions, and helping establish transparent administrative systems capable of earning public confidence.
Equally important are the responsibilities the Board is not expected to perform. It is not responsible for directing Israeli military operations, commanding Hamas’ military forces, negotiating permanent political agreements, or determining Gaza’s long-term constitutional status. Those issues remain the responsibility of sovereign governments and political organizations. The Board’s influence is concentrated in civilian governance rather than military or diplomatic affairs.
This distinction is critical. Public discussion often assumes that success or failure will depend upon whether the Board resolves every major dispute surrounding Gaza’s future. In reality, its performance should be measured against the responsibilities it was created to perform. The more appropriate questions are whether humanitarian assistance reaches civilians efficiently, whether government ministries function effectively, whether reconstruction proceeds in an orderly manner, and whether public institutions become increasingly capable of managing the daily responsibilities of government.
History demonstrates that post-conflict transitions are often determined less by political agreements than by the ability of governments to establish legitimate institutions. Roads and buildings can be reconstructed, but restoring public confidence in government requires functioning ministries, accountable administration, reliable public services, and institutions capable of resolving disputes peacefully. These are the areas where the Board of Peace can have its greatest influence.
The Board also faces significant challenges. Gaza continues to experience widespread physical destruction, economic hardship, political uncertainty, and unresolved security issues. Competing claims of authority, questions surrounding future security arrangements, and the pace of reconstruction will all influence whether the Board succeeds in strengthening civilian governance. Its effectiveness will ultimately depend not on political declarations, but on whether it can help transform international commitments into functioning institutions that the Palestinian population views as legitimate and effective.
For policymakers, humanitarian organizations, and international observers, the Board of Peace should therefore be viewed as an institution of opportunity rather than certainty. It represents an effort to reduce the instability that frequently follows major conflicts by strengthening civilian administration before political fragmentation hardens into renewed violence. Whether it ultimately succeeds remains uncertain, but its strategic importance lies in providing a framework through which governance, reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance can begin to move from political aspiration to practical implementation.
As discussed in JAFAJ’s companion assessment, Preventing Civil War in Gaza, the Board’s long-term significance will not be determined by the number of political statements it issues or diplomatic meetings it convenes. It will be determined by whether it helps create durable civilian institutions capable of managing political competition through governance rather than violence. That distinction will ultimately shape not only the Board’s legacy, but also the prospects for long-term stability in Gaza.
FOOTNOTES

Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt,’” July 6, 2026.
Associated Press, “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a UN-Backed Committee,” July 6, 2026.
Reuters, “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza, Official Says,” July 8, 2026.
Reuters, July 8, 2026, reporting that the proposed National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) would exercise day-to-day civilian administration within the transition framework.
Reuters, July 6, 2026, reporting that Hamas stated ministries and civil servants would continue operating during implementation of the proposed governance transition.
Associated Press, July 6, 2026, reporting that the proposed transition leaves unresolved questions concerning security authority, weapons, and Hamas’ military organization.
Reuters, July 8, 2026, reporting that the Board of Peace emphasized implementation would be evaluated based on “actions, not promises.”
Reuters, July 8, 2026, describing the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF) and newly recruited Palestinian police operating within the pilot humanitarian zone.
JAFAJ Intelligence Division, State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East (2026–2028), governance and institutional resilience framework.
JAFAJ Intelligence Division, Preventing Civil War in Gaza: Can the Board of Peace Succeed? (July 2026), analytical assessment of governance, institutional legitimacy, and civil conflict risk.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Associated Press. “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a UN-Backed Committee.” July 6, 2026.
Board of Peace. Official statements and planning materials released June–July 2026.
JAFAJ Intelligence Division. Preventing Civil War in Gaza: Can the Board of Peace Succeed? July 2026.
JAFAJ Intelligence Division. State Fragility and the Risk of Civil War in the Middle East (2026–2028). Internal analytical reference.
“Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt.’” July 6, 2026.
“Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza, Official Says.” July 8, 2026.

 

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Is This the Beginning Of A New Middle East?
JAFAJ Strategic Analysis
July 8, 2026
KEY JUDGMENTS
KEY JUDGMENT 1
Hamas has agreed to transfer civilian administrative authority, but there is insufficient evidence that it has agreed to relinquish coercive power.
The distinction between government and power is central to understanding the significance of Hamas’ announcement. Throughout modern history, armed political movements have surrendered formal governmental authority while preserving the institutions that ultimately determine political influence—military organizations, intelligence networks, financial infrastructure, and organizational leadership.
For this reason, the transfer of ministries alone should not be interpreted as conclusive evidence that Hamas has relinquished effective control over Gaza.
The decisive question is not whether Hamas has left government.
The decisive question is whether Hamas has surrendered the capacity to shape events through military, political, and financial means outside the formal structures of government.
JAFAJ assesses that the answer remains uncertain.
Whether Hamas ultimately relinquishes these instruments of power will determine whether Gaza is experiencing a genuine political transition or merely an administrative reorganization under international supervision.
Confidence Level: Moderate
Basis for Assessment: Hamas has publicly announced the transfer of civilian administration, but available reporting does not yet establish that it has dismantled its military structure, intelligence capabilities, financial networks, or broader organizational influence. Additional evidence regarding implementation will be required before a definitive assessment can be made.
 
KEY JUDGMENT 2
The Board of Peace represents the most ambitious attempt to establish an internationally supervised civilian administration in Gaza since Hamas assumed control of the territory in 2007.
Unlike previous diplomatic initiatives—which largely emphasized ceasefires, humanitarian relief, territorial negotiations, or confidence-building measures—the Board of Peace places functioning governance at the center of the peace process. Its strategy assumes that stable institutions, transparent administration, economic reconstruction, and accountable public services must precede any durable political settlement.
This represents a significant departure from earlier peace efforts. Rather than treating governance as the end result of peace, the Board treats governance as the mechanism through which peace may ultimately be achieved.
If successful, the initiative could establish a new model for post-conflict stabilization in which institutional legitimacy, economic recovery, and regional cooperation become the foundation for long-term security.
Confidence Level: Moderate-High
Basis for Assessment: The Board’s structure, mandate, and emphasis on technocratic administration distinguish it from previous Gaza initiatives. However, its long-term effectiveness remains dependent upon implementation, sustained international support, and the willingness of regional actors to cooperate over an extended period.
 
KEY JUDGMENT 3
Israel will judge the success of Gaza’s political transition primarily through measurable security outcomes rather than political declarations.
Israeli policymakers have consistently maintained that lasting peace depends upon the elimination of military threats rather than changes in governmental structure alone. Consequently, public announcements, institutional reforms, and diplomatic agreements are unlikely to alter Israeli policy unless they produce demonstrable improvements in security.
Israeli decision-makers are expected to evaluate the transition using objective indicators, including:

The dismantling of Hamas’ military capabilities;
The disruption of weapons smuggling networks;
The reduction of terrorist financing;
Sustained declines in rocket attacks and other cross-border violence;
Effective border security and interdiction efforts; and
Intelligence indicating that militant organizations are not rebuilding command, logistics, or operational capabilities.

Until these indicators demonstrate sustained and verifiable improvement, Israel is unlikely to conclude that the transition represents a fundamental change in Gaza’s security environment.
Confidence Level: High
Basis for Assessment: This judgment is supported by Israel’s long-standing national security doctrine, repeated public statements by Israeli officials across multiple administrations, and the country’s consistent emphasis on measurable security outcomes as the primary benchmark for evaluating diplomatic and political initiatives
 
KEY JUDGMENT 4
Iran has the greatest strategic interest in preventing the Board of Peace from evolving into a durable and effective governing institution.
For decades, Iran has viewed Hamas as one component of its broader regional strategy of supporting non-state actors to project influence, deter adversaries, and exert pressure on Israel. A successful transition from militant governance to an internationally supervised civilian administration could significantly reduce Tehran’s ability to influence events in Gaza through traditional proxy relationships.
If Hamas gradually evolves from the governing authority of Gaza into one political actor operating within a broader civilian framework, Iran’s strategic leverage in the territory could diminish. Such a development would extend beyond Gaza, potentially affecting Tehran’s broader regional posture and its long-standing reliance on allied non-state organizations as instruments of influence.
While Iran would almost certainly seek to preserve its relationships and adapt its strategy, a successful Board of Peace would complicate Tehran’s ability to shape Gaza’s political and security environment.
Confidence Level: Moderate
Basis for Assessment: This judgment is supported by Iran’s long-standing regional strategy, its historical relationships with Hamas and other allied organizations, and the Board of Peace’s objective of establishing independent civilian governance. Confidence is moderated by uncertainty regarding Iran’s future policy choices and Hamas’ long-term organizational evolution.
 
KEY JUDGMENT 5
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are positioned to become the principal regional beneficiaries if Gaza’s reconstruction and political transition succeed.
Although each government enters the process with different national interests, all stand to benefit from a more stable and economically viable Gaza.
Egypt would benefit from improved border security, reduced pressure along the Sinai frontier, expanded commercial activity through the Rafah crossing, and a strengthened role as a regional diplomatic mediator.
Saudi Arabia could gain greater diplomatic flexibility, reinforce its position as a leading regional power, expand opportunities for broader Arab-Israeli engagement, and support its long-term vision of regional economic integration.
The United Arab Emirates is well positioned to leverage its expertise in infrastructure development, logistics, investment, technology, and post-conflict reconstruction, further strengthening its reputation as a regional partner in economic development and stabilization.
Collectively, these three states possess the financial resources, diplomatic influence, and institutional capacity to become the principal Arab partners supporting Gaza’s long-term reconstruction. Their sustained engagement will likely be a critical factor in determining whether the Board of Peace evolves into a durable governing framework or remains a temporary transitional mechanism.
Confidence Level: Moderate-High
Basis for Assessment: This assessment reflects the strategic interests, financial capabilities, and regional influence of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Confidence remains below “High” because long-term participation will depend upon political conditions, security developments, donor commitments, and the overall effectiveness of the Board of Peace.
 
KEY JUDGMENT 6
The first twelve months of implementation—not the announcement itself—will determine whether the Board of Peace develops into a credible governing institution or becomes another unsuccessful international initiative.
Political announcements create expectations.
Institutional performance creates legitimacy.
The Board’s long-term credibility will depend less upon diplomatic declarations than upon its ability to deliver measurable improvements in security, governance, reconstruction, transparency, economic recovery, and public confidence.
Early implementation will establish the Board’s reputation among Palestinians, Israel, regional governments, international donors, and private investors. Success during this initial period is likely to generate additional political support and financial investment. Conversely, visible setbacks, delays, corruption, or deteriorating security could significantly undermine confidence before the institution has an opportunity to mature.
For this reason, the Board’s first year should be viewed as its decisive proving ground.
Confidence Level: High
Basis for Assessment: Historical experience with post-conflict governance demonstrates that public confidence and international support are largely shaped by early institutional performance. The availability of reconstruction funding, political backing, and long-term legitimacy will depend heavily upon measurable progress during the initial implementation phase.
 
KEY JUDGMENT 7
Gaza has become the first major twenty-first-century test of whether internationally supervised technocratic governance can successfully replace prolonged militant administration without permanent foreign occupation.
The significance of the Board of Peace extends well beyond Gaza.
If the initiative succeeds, it could establish a new framework for post-conflict stabilization in which civilian institutions, economic reconstruction, regional cooperation, and international oversight become the foundation for long-term security and political legitimacy.
Such a model could influence future approaches to stabilization and reconstruction in other regions emerging from prolonged conflict.
If the initiative fails, however, it is likely to reinforce longstanding skepticism regarding externally supported transitional governments and strengthen arguments that durable political settlements cannot be achieved through institutional reform alone.
Regardless of the outcome, the Gaza transition is likely to become a significant case study in the evolution of international conflict resolution and post-conflict governance.
Confidence Level: Moderate
Basis for Assessment: The Board of Peace incorporates several governance concepts not previously combined at this scale in Gaza, making it an important institutional experiment. Confidence is moderated because the initiative remains in its early stages, implementation is ongoing, and its long-term effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated.
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Hamas’ announcement that it is dissolving its governing authority in the Gaza Strip is one of the most consequential political developments in the Middle East since the October 7, 2023 attacks. The organization has agreed to transfer civilian administration to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a Palestinian technocratic body operating under the supervision of the Board of Peace, the international organization established to oversee Gaza’s political transition, reconstruction, and long-term stabilization.¹
On its face, the announcement appears historic.
In reality, it raises far more questions than it answers.
History is filled with governments that surrendered offices while retaining power. Political authority can be transferred by decree; coercive power rarely is. Hamas has announced the dissolution of its civilian governing structure, but it has not committed to surrendering all military capability or relinquishing its security apparatus. Israeli officials have therefore argued that the measure will be judged not by declarations, but by whether Hamas ultimately abandons the means to wage war.²
The distinction is critical.
If Hamas has merely surrendered ministries while preserving its armed organization, Gaza’s political structure will have changed far less than headlines suggest.
If, however, the transfer ultimately evolves into complete civilian governance under the Board of Peace, historians may one day view this announcement as the beginning of a fundamental realignment of Middle Eastern politics.
More than a transfer of administrative authority, the Board of Peace represents an experiment in whether international governance can succeed where military strategy, diplomacy, and humanitarian assistance have repeatedly fallen short. The implications extend well beyond Gaza. Governments confronting prolonged insurgencies—from the Middle East to Africa—will be watching to determine whether internationally supervised technocratic administration can replace militant governance without prolonged foreign occupation.
This analysis examines not only what Hamas announced, but why it matters, what it may signal strategically, and why governments throughout the region are watching events unfold with unusual caution.
 
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Every intelligence assessment rests upon assumptions that cannot yet be fully verified.
The following assumptions form the analytical foundation of this report. Should any of these assumptions prove incorrect, the judgments and conclusions contained herein should be reexamined.
 
ASSUMPTION ONE
HAMAS’ ANNOUNCEMENT REFLECTS AN ACTUAL POLICY DECISION
This assessment assumes that Hamas’ public declaration represents a genuine organizational decision rather than a temporary political statement intended solely for diplomatic, humanitarian, or public-relations purposes.
Should subsequent events demonstrate that the announcement was primarily tactical, many of the conclusions contained in this report would require reassessment.
 
ASSUMPTION TWO
THE BOARD OF PEACE WILL REMAIN POLITICALLY COHESIVE
This report assumes that participating governments will continue supporting the Board of Peace during the initial implementation period.
Significant withdrawals, leadership disputes, or funding disagreements would materially alter the Board’s ability to supervise Gaza’s transition.
 
ASSUMPTION THREE
INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING WILL CONTINUE
The analysis assumes that donor governments, international financial institutions, and regional investors will provide sustained financial support.
Without long-term funding, administrative reform alone is unlikely to produce durable stability.
 
ASSUMPTION FOUR
ISRAEL WILL PERMIT THE TRANSITION TO DEVELOP
This report assumes that Israel will continue evaluating the Board based upon observable security conditions rather than rejecting the initiative outright.
Should security conditions deteriorate significantly, Israeli policy may shift toward renewed military operations, fundamentally changing the assumptions underlying this analysis.
 
ASSUMPTION FIVE
THE NCAG WILL DEVELOP SUFFICIENT ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY
The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza must rapidly establish operational credibility.
The analysis assumes the committee will possess sufficient professional expertise to restore essential governmental functions while maintaining public confidence.
Institutional failure would substantially weaken the Board’s long-term prospects.
 
ASSUMPTION SIX
REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT STABILIZATION
The report assumes that Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and other participating governments will continue viewing stability in Gaza as strategically preferable to renewed conflict.
Changes in regional political priorities could significantly influence implementation.
 
ASSUMPTION SEVEN
NO MAJOR REGIONAL WAR WILL INTERRUPT THE TRANSITION
This assessment assumes that no broader regional conflict fundamentally alters diplomatic priorities during the implementation period.
A significant escalation elsewhere in the Middle East could redirect political attention, financial resources, and military planning away from Gaza.
 
JAFAJ ANALYTIC NOTE
Good intelligence analysis does not claim certainty.
It identifies assumptions.
It explains how those assumptions influence judgment.
It recognizes that changing facts require changing conclusions.
The Board of Peace should therefore be evaluated not as a fixed political outcome, but as a developing strategic process whose success depends upon conditions that remain dynamic and subject to continuous reassessment.
 
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS ASSESSMENT
This report examines the strategic implications of Hamas’ decision to transfer civilian administration in the Gaza Strip to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) under the supervision of the Board of Peace.
The analysis focuses upon the political, strategic, institutional, economic, and regional consequences of that decision.
The purpose of this report is not to advocate for any political outcome, but to evaluate the probable implications of the transition based upon information available as of July 8, 2026.
 
SCOPE
This assessment addresses:

Hamas’ transfer of civilian authority.
The organizational structure of the Board of Peace.
The role of the NCAG.
Regional geopolitical implications.
International reconstruction.
Strategic risks.
Alternative explanations.
Future scenarios.
Intelligence indicators.
Long-term implications for international conflict resolution.

 
OUT OF SCOPE
The following subjects are discussed only where directly relevant to the present assessment.

Final-status negotiations.
Israeli domestic politics.
Palestinian electoral politics beyond the transition period.
Questions regarding final borders.
Refugee negotiations.
Jerusalem.
Long-term constitutional arrangements.
Historical legal claims.
Religious issues.
Detailed military operations.

Each of these subjects deserves independent analysis beyond the scope of this report.
 
METHODOLOGY
This assessment employs structured analytical techniques commonly used within the intelligence community.
Those techniques include:

Key Judgments
Explicit Assumptions
Alternative Explanations
Red Team Analysis
Scenario Planning
Strategic Risk Assessment
Collection Priorities
Second- and Third-Order Effects

The objective is not prediction.
The objective is disciplined analytical reasoning under conditions of uncertainty.
 
LIMITATIONS
Several limitations should be recognized.

The Board of Peace remains a newly established institution.
Implementation remains incomplete.
Many operational details continue to evolve.
Several participating governments have not publicly released comprehensive implementation plans.
Similarly, Hamas’ long-term intentions cannot presently be assessed with certainty.
Consequently, portions of this report necessarily rely upon analytical judgment rather than fully verified evidence.

As additional information becomes available, future assessments should update these conclusions.
 
ANALYTICAL STANDARD
JAFAJ follows four analytical principles throughout this report.

First, distinguish confirmed facts from analytical judgments.
Second, identify uncertainty whenever appropriate.
Third, consider competing explanations before reaching conclusions.
Fourth, recognize that intelligence assessments evolve as new information becomes available.

These principles strengthen both analytical transparency and long-term credibility.
 
PURPOSE
This report is intended to assist policymakers, legislators, researchers, journalists, academics, humanitarian organizations, investors, and interested citizens in understanding the broader strategic implications of Gaza’s political transition.
It should be read as an analytical framework rather than as a prediction of future events.
The success or failure of the Board of Peace will ultimately be determined by developments that remain ongoing.
 
INTRODUCTION
For nearly two decades, one political reality defined Gaza.
Hamas governed.
Since seizing control of the territory in 2007 following its violent split with Fatah, Hamas developed a governing system that combined civilian administration, political authority, and military power into a single structure. Ministries, schools, hospitals, police, taxation, public utilities, and armed resistance operated under the same governing umbrella.³
The result was unique.
Unlike many insurgent organizations, Hamas was simultaneously a political movement, a governing authority, and an armed military organization.
That arrangement has now been challenged.
On July 6, 2026, Hamas announced the dissolution of the governing body that supervised Gaza’s ministries and declared its intention to transfer civilian administration to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a technocratic authority established under the broader framework of the Board of Peace.⁴
To many observers, the announcement appeared to signal the end of Hamas rule.
That conclusion may be premature. Governments disappear overnight.
Power rarely does.
 
WHAT HAMAS ACTUALLY ANNOUNCED
Understanding the announcement requires separating political symbolism from administrative reality.
Contrary to many headlines, Hamas did not announce its dissolution as an organization.
Nor did it surrender unconditionally.
Instead, Hamas stated that it was dissolving the governmental committee responsible for supervising Gaza’s civilian ministries and that those ministries would transition to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a non-partisan body of Palestinian technocrats created under the broader post-war peace framework.⁵
Equally important was what Hamas did not announce.
The organization did not publicly commit itself to:

Complete disarmament;
Dissolution of its military wing;
Transfer of all security functions;
Surrender of intelligence capabilities; or
Abandonment of political influence within Gaza.

Reuters reported that Hamas also indicated it would continue supervising security and policing in areas that remain under its control pending implementation of later stages of the peace plan.⁶
That omission explains why Israeli officials immediately dismissed the announcement as insufficient.
For Israel, civilian ministries are not the issue.
Weapons are.
 
WHY THIS MOMENT IS DIFFERENT
Despite legitimate skepticism, dismissing the announcement as merely symbolic would be a mistake.
Several developments distinguish today’s announcement from previous cease-fire negotiations.
First, Hamas has publicly acknowledged—for the first time—that Gaza’s future civilian administration should rest outside its direct governmental control. That is a significant political concession for a movement that has governed the territory since 2007.⁷
Second, the transition occurs within an internationally supervised framework rather than through purely bilateral negotiations between Israel and Hamas. The Board of Peace and the NCAG provide institutional mechanisms intended to coordinate reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, public administration, and eventual political transition.⁸
Third, the economic realities facing Gaza have changed dramatically.
Years of conflict have devastated infrastructure, displaced much of the civilian population, damaged housing, utilities, transportation networks, hospitals, schools, and commercial activity, creating reconstruction requirements measured in tens of billions of dollars. No governing authority—whether Hamas or any successor—can realistically rebuild Gaza without sustained international participation.⁹
This economic reality changes political incentives.

Reconstruction funding requires legitimacy.
Legitimacy requires governance.
Governance increasingly requires institutions acceptable to international donors.

 
GOVERNMENT IS NOT THE SAME AS POWER
Political scientists have long distinguished between de jure authority and de facto control. Governments exercise legal authority. Power rests with those capable of enforcing decisions.
The distinction has shaped conflicts throughout modern history. In Lebanon, Hezbollah exercised substantial military influence for years while operating alongside formal state institutions.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban often controlled territory long before it controlled the national government.
Elsewhere, armed organizations have relinquished cabinet positions while maintaining decisive influence through security structures, patronage networks, or parallel institutions.
The same question now confronts Gaza.
If Hamas transfers education, health care, finance, and municipal administration to the NCAG while retaining organized armed formations, intelligence capabilities, and effective coercive authority, then the balance of power inside Gaza may change far less than the formal governmental transition suggests.
The Board of Peace has implicitly recognized this distinction, emphasizing that it will evaluate progress based upon “actions, not promises.”¹⁰
That statement reflects the central strategic question facing every government involved in the peace process.
Has Hamas surrendered government?
Or has it merely outsourced administration while preserving the instruments of power?
The answer will determine whether this announcement becomes a diplomatic milestone—or simply another tactical adjustment in a conflict that has repeatedly demonstrated the difference between political declarations and realities on the ground.
 
WHAT HAMAS’ DECISION TO TURN GAZA OVER TO THE BOARD OF PEACE REALLY MEANS
THE BOARD OF PEACE AND THE NEW GOVERNANCE MODEL
THE BOARD OF PEACE: AN UNPRECEDENTED EXPERIMENT
If Hamas’ announcement represents the political headline, the Board of Peace represents the strategic story.
For decades, international efforts to stabilize Gaza have relied upon temporary ceasefires, humanitarian relief, donor conferences, and periodic reconstruction pledges. Most were reactive, designed to address the immediate consequences of conflict rather than its underlying political and institutional deficiencies.
The Board of Peace seeks to reverse that model.
Rather than rebuilding Gaza first and hoping political stability follows, the Board proposes creating a functioning system of civilian governance capable of attracting reconstruction funding, restoring public confidence, coordinating international assistance, and ultimately preparing Gaza for long-term political normalization.¹¹
Whether that strategy succeeds remains uncertain.
Nevertheless, the concept itself represents one of the most ambitious international governance initiatives attempted in the Middle East in decades.
Unlike previous multinational efforts that primarily served advisory roles, the Board has been established with the objective of supervising Gaza’s transition from militant governance to civilian administration while coordinating reconstruction, institutional development, and international investment.¹²
The approach recognizes a difficult reality.
Physical reconstruction without political reform merely recreates the conditions for future conflict.
Conversely, political reform without economic recovery is unlikely to survive.
The Board therefore attempts to advance both objectives simultaneously.
 
WHO LEADS THE BOARD OF PEACE?
According to its founding framework, the Board of Peace functions as an international governing coalition rather than a traditional United Nations agency.
President Donald J. Trump serves as Chairman of the Board.
Supporting the Board are several senior international officials and advisers, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Special Presidential Envoy Steve Witkoff, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Jared Kushner, whose earlier diplomatic work on the Abraham Accords helped shape many of the regional relationships upon which the current initiative depends.¹³
The Board also includes participating governments from across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Americas.
Among the participating member states are:

Albania
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Belarus
Bulgaria
Cambodia
Egypt
El Salvador
Hungary
Indonesia
Israel
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kosovo
Kuwait
Mongolia
Morocco
Pakistan
Paraguay
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Türkiye
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam.¹⁴

The breadth of participation is noteworthy. Historically, Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic initiatives have often struggled because key regional actors questioned the legitimacy of externally imposed solutions.
The Board attempts to broaden political ownership by incorporating countries with differing geopolitical perspectives while maintaining a common objective: stabilizing Gaza.
 
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF GAZA (NCAG)
Beneath the Board of Peace sits the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG).
Unlike Hamas’ former governing structure, the NCAG is designed as a technocratic civilian administration rather than a political movement.
Its mandate focuses upon governance rather than ideology.
Led by Dr. Ali Shaath, the committee includes commissioners responsible for finance, health, education, justice, housing, municipalities, agriculture, telecommunications, infrastructure, interior affairs, social services, and economic recovery.¹⁵
The committee’s responsibilities include:

restoring public administration;
coordinating humanitarian assistance;
supervising municipal services;
managing reconstruction projects;
establishing financial accountability;
rebuilding governmental institutions; and
preparing conditions for future representative governance.

The distinction is significant. Hamas derived legitimacy from revolutionary politics and armed resistance. The NCAG seeks legitimacy through administrative competence.
That transition represents a profound philosophical shift. Instead of asking citizens to support a political movement, the new model asks whether government can simply function.

These become the measures of success.
 
WHY THIS STRUCTURE MATTERS
The institutional architecture now emerging in Gaza resembles elements of previous international transitional administrations while remaining distinct from all of them.

The United Nations administered Kosovo after the Kosovo conflict.
The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor temporarily exercised governmental authority before independence.
Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted an internationally supervised constitutional framework following the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Each case sought to rebuild institutions weakened by prolonged conflict.

Yet Gaza presents challenges unlike any of those precedents.
Unlike Kosovo or East Timor, Gaza remains geographically compressed, economically devastated, politically divided, and surrounded by states with immediate national security interests.
Unlike Bosnia, Gaza’s reconstruction is occurring while the broader Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved.
Consequently, the Board of Peace must accomplish multiple objectives simultaneously:

establish legitimate civilian governance;
facilitate humanitarian relief;
coordinate reconstruction;
reassure neighboring governments;
encourage private investment; and
reduce incentives for renewed armed conflict.

Failure in any one of these areas could jeopardize progress in all the others.
 
THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC QUESTION
The Board’s greatest challenge will not be rebuilding roads or hospitals.
It will be building trust.
For Palestinians, the Board must demonstrate that international supervision can produce tangible improvements in daily life without permanently denying Palestinian political aspirations.
For Israel, it must demonstrate that civilian governance will not become cover for the reconstitution of militant organizations.
For donor governments, it must prove that reconstruction funds are transparently managed and insulated from corruption or diversion.
For regional governments, it must provide confidence that Gaza will evolve into a source of stability rather than recurring crisis.
These objectives are interconnected, because economic investment depends upon security and Security depends upon governance.
Governance depends upon legitimacy and Legitimacy depends upon results.
The Board of Peace therefore faces a task extending well beyond reconstruction.
It must convince multiple audiences—each with different interests—that peaceful administration offers greater long-term benefits than perpetual confrontation.
That may prove to be the most difficult political project attempted in the modern Middle East.
 
AN INSTITUTION UNDER GLOBAL SCRUTINY
Every decision made by the Board during its first months will establish precedents.

How reconstruction contracts are awarded.
How humanitarian aid is distributed.
How disputes are resolved.
How security incidents are investigated.
How local officials are appointed.
How transparency is maintained.

Each action will influence whether the Board is viewed as a credible transitional authority or merely another international bureaucracy.
Success will not be measured by speeches.
It will be measured by functioning institutions.
If electricity flows reliably, hospitals reopen, businesses return, schools resume normal operations, and private investment begins replacing emergency aid, confidence in the model will grow.
If corruption emerges, security deteriorates, or reconstruction stalls, skepticism will spread rapidly throughout the region.
The Board of Peace therefore occupies a position unlike that of any previous international body involved in Gaza.
It is not merely administering a reconstruction program.
It is testing whether governance itself can become the foundation of peace.
 
WHAT HAMAS’ DECISION TO TURN GAZA OVER TO THE BOARD OF PEACE REALLY MEANS
THE BOARD OF PEACE AND THE NEW GOVERNANCE MODEL
THE BOARD OF PEACE: AN UNPRECEDENTED EXPERIMENT
If Hamas’ announcement represents the political headline, the Board of Peace represents the strategic story.
For decades, international efforts to stabilize Gaza have relied upon temporary ceasefires, humanitarian relief, donor conferences, and periodic reconstruction pledges. Most were reactive, designed to address the immediate consequences of conflict rather than its underlying political and institutional deficiencies.
The Board of Peace seeks to reverse that model.
Rather than rebuilding Gaza first and hoping political stability follows, the Board proposes creating a functioning system of civilian governance capable of attracting reconstruction funding, restoring public confidence, coordinating international assistance, and ultimately preparing Gaza for long-term political normalization.¹¹
Whether that strategy succeeds remains uncertain.
Nevertheless, the concept itself represents one of the most ambitious international governance initiatives attempted in the Middle East in decades.
Unlike previous multinational efforts that primarily served advisory roles, the Board has been established with the objective of supervising Gaza’s transition from militant governance to civilian administration while coordinating reconstruction, institutional development, and international investment.¹²
The approach recognizes a difficult reality.
Physical reconstruction without political reform merely recreates the conditions for future conflict.
Conversely, political reform without economic recovery is unlikely to survive.
The Board therefore attempts to advance both objectives simultaneously.
 
WHO LEADS THE BOARD OF PEACE?
According to its founding framework, the Board of Peace functions as an international governing coalition rather than a traditional United Nations agency.
President Donald J. Trump serves as Chairman of the Board.
Supporting the Board are several senior international officials and advisers, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Special Presidential Envoy Steve Witkoff, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Jared Kushner, whose earlier diplomatic work on the Abraham Accords helped shape many of the regional relationships upon which the current initiative depends.¹³
The Board also includes participating governments from across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Americas.
Among the participating member states are:

Albania
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Belarus
Bulgaria
Cambodia
Egypt
El Salvador
Hungary
Indonesia
Israel
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kosovo
Kuwait
Mongolia
Morocco
Pakistan
Paraguay
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Türkiye
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam.¹⁴

The breadth of participation is noteworthy.
Historically, Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic initiatives have often struggled because key regional actors questioned the legitimacy of externally imposed solutions.
The Board attempts to broaden political ownership by incorporating countries with differing geopolitical perspectives while maintaining a common objective: stabilizing Gaza.
 
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF GAZA (NCAG)
Beneath the Board of Peace sits the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG).
Unlike Hamas’ former governing structure, the NCAG is designed as a technocratic civilian administration rather than a political movement.
Its mandate focuses upon governance rather than ideology.
Led by Dr. Ali Shaath, the committee includes commissioners responsible for finance, health, education, justice, housing, municipalities, agriculture, telecommunications, infrastructure, interior affairs, social services, and economic recovery.¹⁵
The committee’s responsibilities include:

restoring public administration;
coordinating humanitarian assistance;
supervising municipal services;
managing reconstruction projects;
establishing financial accountability;
rebuilding governmental institutions; and
preparing conditions for future representative governance.

The distinction is significant.
Hamas derived legitimacy from revolutionary politics and armed resistance.
The NCAG seeks legitimacy through administrative competence.
That transition represents a profound philosophical shift.
Instead of asking citizens to support a political movement, the new model asks whether government can simply function.

These become the measures of success.
 
WHY THIS STRUCTURE MATTERS
The institutional architecture now emerging in Gaza resembles elements of previous international transitional administrations while remaining distinct from all of them.
The United Nations administered Kosovo after the Kosovo conflict.
The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor temporarily exercised governmental authority before independence.
Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted an internationally supervised constitutional framework following the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Each case sought to rebuild institutions weakened by prolonged conflict.
Yet Gaza presents challenges unlike any of those precedents.
Unlike Kosovo or East Timor, Gaza remains geographically compressed, economically devastated, politically divided, and surrounded by states with immediate national security interests.
Unlike Bosnia, Gaza’s reconstruction is occurring while the broader Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved.
Consequently, the Board of Peace must accomplish multiple objectives simultaneously:

establish legitimate civilian governance;
facilitate humanitarian relief;
coordinate reconstruction;
reassure neighboring governments;
encourage private investment; and
reduce incentives for renewed armed conflict.

Failure in any one of these areas could jeopardize progress in all the others.
 
THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC QUESTION
The Board’s greatest challenge will not be rebuilding roads or hospitals.
It will be building trust.

For Palestinians, the Board must demonstrate that international supervision can produce tangible improvements in daily life without permanently denying Palestinian political aspirations.
For Israel, it must demonstrate that civilian governance will not become cover for the reconstitution of militant organizations.
For donor governments, it must prove that reconstruction funds are transparently managed and insulated from corruption or diversion.
For regional governments, it must provide confidence that Gaza will evolve into a source of stability rather than recurring crisis.

These objectives are interconnected.
Economic investment depends upon security.
Security depends upon governance.
Governance depends upon legitimacy.
Legitimacy depends upon results.
The Board of Peace therefore faces a task extending well beyond reconstruction.
It must convince multiple audiences—each with different interests—that peaceful administration offers greater long-term benefits than perpetual confrontation.
That may prove to be the most difficult political project attempted in the modern Middle East.
 
AN INSTITUTION UNDER GLOBAL SCRUTINY
Every decision made by the Board during its first months will establish precedents.

How reconstruction contracts are awarded.
How humanitarian aid is distributed.
How disputes are resolved.
How security incidents are investigated.
How local officials are appointed.
How transparency is maintained.

Each action will influence whether the Board is viewed as a credible transitional authority or merely another international bureaucracy.
Success will not be measured by speeches.
It will be measured by functioning institutions.
If electricity flows reliably, hospitals reopen, businesses return, schools resume normal operations, and private investment begins replacing emergency aid, confidence in the model will grow.
If corruption emerges, security deteriorates, or reconstruction stalls, skepticism will spread rapidly throughout the region.
The Board of Peace therefore occupies a position unlike that of any previous international body involved in Gaza.
It is not merely administering a reconstruction program.
It is testing whether governance itself can become the foundation of peace.
 
SECOND- AND THIRD-ORDER EFFECTS: THE CONSEQUENCES BEYOND GAZA
Strategic events rarely produce only immediate consequences.
Instead, they initiate chains of secondary and tertiary effects that often prove more consequential than the original event itself.
History repeatedly demonstrates that governments frequently underestimate these indirect consequences.
The dissolution of Hamas’ civilian government may ultimately prove to be one such event.
Whether the Board of Peace succeeds or fails, its impact will almost certainly extend well beyond Gaza.
The following assessments examine the most significant second- and third-order effects likely to emerge during the coming decade.
 
SECOND-ORDER EFFECT ONE
THE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE WILL BE RESHAPED
For nearly twenty years, Palestinian politics has been defined by a binary division. Fatah governed the West Bank while Hamas governed Gaza.
If Hamas permanently relinquishes governmental authority, that political structure changes fundamentally.
A new generation of Palestinian leaders—technocrats, municipal administrators, economists, educators, and civil society organizations—may gradually assume greater prominence.
Governance could become less ideological and more administrative.
That transition would fundamentally alter Palestinian politics.
 
SECOND-ORDER EFFECT TWO
MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS MAY BE FORCED TO REDEFINE THEIR PURPOSE
Organizations derive legitimacy from purpose.
If armed resistance no longer provides a pathway to governing territory, militant organizations throughout the region may face increasing pressure to redefine their political objectives.
Some may pursue electoral participation.
Others may fragment.
Still others may reject political compromise altogether.
The Board of Peace therefore represents not merely a challenge to Hamas, but to the broader political logic underpinning militant governance.
 
SECOND-ORDER EFFECT THREE
REGIONAL DIPLOMACY MAY SHIFT FROM SECURITY TO ECONOMICS
For decades, Middle Eastern diplomacy has been dominated by security concerns.

Military alliances.

A successful reconstruction effort could gradually shift diplomatic priorities toward investment, infrastructure, trade, education, energy, technology, and regional economic integration.
Such a transition would represent one of the most significant changes in regional diplomacy in decades.
 
SECOND-ORDER EFFECT FOUR
THE PRIVATE SECTOR MAY BECOME A STRATEGIC ACTOR
Peace agreements are often viewed primarily as governmental achievements.
Yet long-term stability frequently depends upon private investment rather than public assistance.

Insurance companies.
Construction firms.
Telecommunications providers.
Technology companies.

Health-care systems.
Transportation companies.

Each possesses the capacity to influence stability through employment, infrastructure, and economic opportunity.
In Gaza, private capital may ultimately prove more important than diplomatic declarations.
 
SECOND-ORDER EFFECT FIVE
THE DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY MAY EXPAND
Traditional security policy focuses upon military capability.
Yet modern conflicts increasingly demonstrate that governance failures, economic collapse, corruption, unemployment, infrastructure failure, and institutional weakness create strategic vulnerabilities every bit as significant as conventional military threats.
The Board of Peace implicitly recognizes this broader definition of security.
If functioning institutions reduce incentives for violence, governance itself becomes an instrument of national security.
That represents a profound conceptual shift.
 
THIRD-ORDER EFFECT ONE
A NEW MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE COULD EMERGE
Should the Board succeed, policymakers elsewhere will study its institutional design carefully.
Future peace negotiations may increasingly incorporate technocratic transitional governments supported by multinational oversight, regional investment, and internationally monitored reconstruction.
Such a model would differ significantly from traditional peacekeeping missions.
Rather than separating combatants, it would focus upon building institutions capable of replacing them.
 
THIRD-ORDER EFFECT TWO
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RECONSTRUCTION WILL CHANGE
Historically, reconstruction has often followed political settlements.
The Board reverses that relationship.
Economic recovery becomes the mechanism through which political legitimacy is built.
If successful, future post-conflict strategies may increasingly prioritize functioning economies before constitutional negotiations.
That would represent a major departure from previous peacebuilding doctrine.
 
THIRD-ORDER EFFECT THREE
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL BE JUDGED DIFFERENTLY
For decades, international organizations have often been criticized for managing humanitarian crises rather than resolving them.
The Board of Peace presents an opportunity to demonstrate a different model.
Its success or failure will influence public confidence in multinational institutions for years to come.
Future governments considering international mediation will inevitably compare their own situations with Gaza.
 
THIRD-ORDER EFFECT FOUR
THE CONCEPT OF VICTORY MAY CHANGE
Traditional military victory emphasizes territorial control.
Political victory emphasizes governance.
The Board of Peace introduces a third possibility.
Institutional victory.
If stable civilian institutions ultimately accomplish what prolonged military campaigns could not, future conflicts may increasingly measure success by the durability of governance rather than battlefield outcomes.
That possibility deserves careful attention.
 
JAFAJ STRATEGIC OBSERVATION
Many observers will evaluate the Board of Peace by asking whether it succeeds.
A more important question may be whether it permanently changes how governments think about conflict.
History suggests that transformative events rarely reshape only one country. They reshape assumptions.

The Berlin Wall altered assumptions about ideological competition.
The Marshall Plan altered assumptions about reconstruction.
The Abraham Accords altered assumptions about regional diplomacy.

If the Board of Peace succeeds, it may alter assumptions about the relationship between governance, legitimacy, and security.
That possibility—not merely the administration of Gaza—may ultimately prove to be its greatest historical significance.
 
COMPETING HYPOTHESES
One of the greatest challenges confronting intelligence analysts is avoiding analytical bias. Early developments often appear to support a single explanation when, in reality, several competing interpretations remain plausible. Accordingly, JAFAJ evaluated multiple hypotheses regarding Hamas’ decision to relinquish civilian administration in Gaza.
Although none of these hypotheses are mutually exclusive, assessing each independently provides a more balanced framework for understanding the transition.
 
HYPOTHESIS A
HAMAS HAS MADE A GENUINE STRATEGIC DECISION TO LEAVE GOVERNMENT
Assessment: Moderate Confidence
Under this interpretation, Hamas has concluded that governing Gaza has become strategically unsustainable.
Years of conflict have devastated Gaza’s economy, infrastructure, public institutions, and civilian living conditions. The political costs of administering the territory increasingly outweigh the benefits of retaining formal governmental authority.
Rather than risking complete institutional collapse, Hamas may believe it can preserve its long-term political relevance by withdrawing from day-to-day governance while allowing an internationally supervised administration to assume responsibility for reconstruction.
Supporting Indicators

Public announcement dissolving its governing authority.
Acceptance of an internationally supervised civilian administration.
Recognition that reconstruction requires external legitimacy.
Growing economic burden associated with governing Gaza.

Contradicting Indicators

No verified commitment to complete disarmament.
Continued existence of military structures.
Limited public discussion regarding long-term security arrangements.

 
HYPOTHESIS B
HAMAS IS ATTEMPTING TO PRESERVE POWER WHILE SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY
Assessment: Moderate-to-High Confidence
This hypothesis suggests that Hamas has little intention of abandoning real authority.
Instead, it seeks to transfer responsibility for governing Gaza—particularly reconstruction, humanitarian relief, and public services—to international institutions while retaining military influence behind the scenes.
Such an arrangement would reduce political accountability without necessarily reducing organizational power.
If reconstruction succeeds, Hamas may claim credit.
If reconstruction fails, responsibility rests with the Board of Peace.
Supporting Indicators

No comprehensive disarmament agreement.
Continued political leadership.
Existing organizational networks remain intact.
Historic precedent among militant organizations.

Contradicting Indicators

International oversight could significantly restrict Hamas’ operational freedom.
Long-term donor participation will likely require extensive monitoring.

 
HYPOTHESIS C
THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO UNLOCK INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING
Assessment: High Confidence
This explanation focuses less on ideology and more on economics.
International donors have consistently expressed reluctance to finance large-scale reconstruction while Hamas remained Gaza’s governing authority.
Transferring civilian administration creates a political environment in which donor governments, international financial institutions, and regional investors may participate with greater confidence.
Viewed through this lens, governance reform becomes an economic prerequisite rather than a political concession.
Supporting Indicators

Immediate international discussion concerning reconstruction.
Creation of a technocratic administration.
Strong emphasis on transparency and financial oversight.
Regional interest in investment.

Contradicting Indicators

Funding alone cannot resolve unresolved security concerns.
Donor confidence remains contingent upon implementation.

 
HYPOTHESIS D
THE TRANSITION REFLECTS BROADER REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE
Assessment: Moderate Confidence
Regional governments—including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and others—have increasingly emphasized reconstruction, economic development, and political stability.
Collectively, these governments possess significant diplomatic and financial leverage.
It is therefore possible that Hamas concluded continued governmental control would isolate Gaza economically while limiting regional political support.
Under this hypothesis, external diplomacy rather than military pressure became the decisive factor.
 
HYPOTHESIS E
THE ANNOUNCEMENT REPRESENTS A TACTICAL PAUSE RATHER THAN A STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION
Assessment: Moderate Confidence
History demonstrates that armed organizations frequently reorganize during periods of intense political and military pressure.
Rather than signaling permanent change, the transition could represent an effort to preserve organizational survival while allowing international actors to assume responsibility for immediate governance challenges.
Should regional conditions change, Hamas could attempt to expand its influence once again.
This possibility cannot presently be dismissed.
 
JAFAJ ANALYTIC JUDGMENT
None of these hypotheses should presently be considered definitive.
Available evidence suggests that elements of several hypotheses may simultaneously be correct.
Hamas may genuinely recognize that governing Gaza has become unsustainable while also seeking to preserve political influence, unlock international reconstruction funding, and adapt strategically to changing regional conditions.
Consequently, the central analytical question is not whether Hamas has surrendered government.
The more important question is whether Hamas has surrendered the political, military, and financial infrastructure that enabled it to govern in the first place.
That question remains unanswered.
It is also the question upon which the success or failure of the Board of Peace will ultimately depend.
 
RED TEAM ASSESSMENT: WHY THE BOARD OF PEACE COULD FAIL
Effective intelligence analysis requires more than supporting one’s conclusions.
It requires deliberately challenging them.
The purpose of this Red Team Assessment is to examine the principal arguments against JAFAJ’s central assessment and to identify circumstances under which the Board of Peace could fail despite widespread international support.
History demonstrates that peace initiatives rarely collapse because participants lack good intentions.
They collapse because underlying assumptions prove incorrect.
Accordingly, JAFAJ evaluated the following alternative assessments.
 
RED TEAM ARGUMENT ONE
HAMAS HAS NOT BEEN DEFEATED
The transfer of civilian administration may create the appearance of political transformation while leaving the underlying balance of power largely unchanged.
Throughout history, armed organizations have frequently surrendered governmental responsibility without surrendering military capability.
If Hamas retains command structures, financial resources, intelligence networks, recruitment capacity, and public support, the Board may simply inherit administrative responsibilities while Hamas continues exercising decisive influence behind the scenes.
Under this assessment, the transition represents administrative outsourcing rather than political transformation.
 
RED TEAM ARGUMENT TWO
THE BOARD LACKS ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
The Board possesses diplomatic legitimacy. Whether it possesses sufficient enforcement authority remains uncertain. If competing political actors reject Board decisions, who compels compliance?

Will the NCAG possess independent policing authority?
Will Israel intervene?
Will regional governments intervene?

Without clearly defined enforcement mechanisms, institutional authority may become dependent upon voluntary cooperation.
History suggests that voluntary cooperation alone rarely sustains long-term political transitions.
 
RED TEAM ARGUMENT THREE
THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION MAY FRACTURE
The Board currently benefits from broad international participation.
History, however, demonstrates that multinational coalitions frequently weaken over time.

Leadership changes.
Governments change.
Economic crises emerge.
Regional priorities shift.

The longer reconstruction requires, the greater the probability that participating governments begin pursuing divergent political objectives.
Coalition fatigue represents one of the greatest long-term threats to international peacebuilding.
 
RED TEAM ARGUMENT FOUR
ECONOMIC RECOVERY MAY PROVE TOO SLOW
Public expectations frequently exceed administrative capability.
Even under ideal conditions, rebuilding transportation systems, utilities, schools, hospitals, housing, and commercial infrastructure requires years.
If ordinary Palestinians experience little visible improvement during the first eighteen to twenty-four months, frustration may increase regardless of the Board’s long-term strategy.
Political legitimacy often disappears faster than infrastructure can be rebuilt.
 
RED TEAM ARGUMENT FIVE
REGIONAL ACTORS MAY NOT SHARE IDENTICAL OBJECTIVES
Although regional governments support stabilization, they do not necessarily define success identically.

Some prioritize security.
Others prioritize diplomacy.
Others emphasize economic opportunity.
Others remain focused upon Palestinian political aspirations.

These differing priorities could eventually complicate decision-making within the Board itself.
Institutional unity cannot be assumed indefinitely.
 
RED TEAM ARGUMENT SIX
THE MODEL MAY NOT BE REPLICABLE
Even if the Board succeeds in Gaza, policymakers should avoid assuming that similar approaches will automatically succeed elsewhere.
Every conflict possesses unique historical, political, cultural, demographic, and geographic characteristics.
Gaza may ultimately prove exceptional rather than representative.
Consequently, the Board should be evaluated as a case study rather than as universally applicable doctrine.
 
RED TEAM CONCLUSION
The Board of Peace deserves careful attention because it represents an ambitious departure from previous diplomatic approaches.
It should not, however, be viewed as an inevitable success.
Reasonable analysts can conclude that Hamas remains strategically resilient, that international coalitions rarely endure indefinitely, that reconstruction timelines often exceed political patience, and that governance alone cannot resolve every underlying dispute.
These criticisms are not evidence that the Board will fail.
They are reminders that success must be demonstrated rather than assumed.
 
JAFAJ RESPONSE TO THE RED TEAM
After evaluating the competing evidence, JAFAJ concludes that the Board of Peace represents a credible strategic opportunity, but not yet a demonstrated strategic success.

The central thesis of this paper therefore remains unchanged.
The transfer of ministries is not the decisive event.

The decisive event will be whether legitimate institutions gradually become more powerful than the armed organizations they seek to replace.
Until that question is answered through observable events rather than political declarations, all assessments—including this one—should be regarded as provisional.
 
 
COLLECTION PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIC INDICATORS
Intelligence assessments are snapshots in time.
Their value depends upon continuous observation, reassessment, and the collection of additional information.
The following collection priorities identify the principal indicators that policymakers, intelligence organizations, humanitarian agencies, investors, and regional governments should monitor over the next twenty-four months.
Collectively, these indicators will determine whether the Board of Peace evolves into a successful transitional authority or joins the long list of unsuccessful international peace initiatives.
 
PRIORITY ONE
HAS HAMAS ACTUALLY RELINQUISHED POWER?
The most important unanswered question is whether Hamas has transferred authority or merely delegated administration.
Indicators of Success

Verified reduction of Hamas’ military presence.
Closure or dismantling of known command facilities.
Integration of independent security institutions under NCAG supervision.
Public acceptance of civilian governmental authority.
Reduced operational influence of Hamas over municipal institutions.

Warning Indicators

Continued operation of armed units.
Parallel security organizations.
Independent taxation or revenue collection.
Separate judicial or administrative structures.
Public directives issued outside NCAG authority.

 
PRIORITY TWO
CAN THE NCAG GOVERN EFFECTIVELY?
Effective governance—not political declarations—will determine long-term legitimacy.
Indicators of Success

Reliable electricity.
Continuous water delivery.
Reopening of hospitals.
Functioning schools.
Waste collection.
Public transportation.
Transparent budgeting.
Timely payment of public employees.

Warning Indicators

Administrative paralysis.
Corruption allegations.
Budget shortfalls.
Civil unrest.
Declining public confidence.
Failure to provide essential public services.

 
PRIORITY THREE
WILL INTERNATIONAL FUNDING MATERIALIZE?
Political transitions often fail because promised reconstruction funding never arrives.
Indicators of Success

International donor conferences.
Gulf State investment.
World Bank participation.
IMF technical assistance.
Major infrastructure contracts.
Expansion of commercial banking.

Warning Indicators

Delayed funding.
Suspended reconstruction.
Donor fatigue.
Increased dependence upon emergency humanitarian aid.

 
PRIORITY FOUR
HOW WILL ISRAEL RESPOND?
Israel’s confidence in the transition will largely determine its long-term viability.
Indicators of Success

Reduced military operations.
Increased commercial crossings.
Expanded movement of goods.
Security cooperation.
Reduced intelligence warnings.
Border stabilization.

Warning Indicators

Expanded military operations.
New buffer zones.
Airstrikes.
Increased intelligence alerts.
Reestablishment of military exclusion areas.

 
PRIORITY FIVE
WHAT ROLE WILL IRAN PLAY?
Iran’s response represents one of the most important unknown variables.
Indicators of Success

Reduced financial support for militant organizations.
Declining weapons transfers.
Reduced proxy activity.
Public acceptance of civilian governance.

Warning Indicators

Increased weapons smuggling.
Expanded proxy financing.
Greater Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps involvement.
Attempts to undermine NCAG legitimacy.
Increased regional proxy coordination.

 
PRIORITY SIX
WILL THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ACCEPT THE NEW GOVERNMENT?
Ultimately, legitimacy cannot be imposed internationally.
It must be earned domestically.
Indicators of Success

Public confidence surveys.
Local participation.
Civil society cooperation.
Independent media development.
Electoral preparation.
Peaceful political activity.

Warning Indicators

Large demonstrations.
Political violence.
Boycotts.
Civil disobedience.
Increasing support for armed organizations.
Declining participation in public institutions.

 
PRIORITY SEVEN
CAN THE BOARD OF PEACE MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL UNITY?
International coalitions often fracture over time.
Maintaining political cohesion will be essential.
Indicators of Success

Continued participation by member governments.
Stable funding.
Regular Board meetings.
Joint policy statements.
Coordinated reconstruction planning.

Warning Indicators

Member withdrawals.
Budget disputes.
Leadership resignations.
Diplomatic disagreements.
Divergent reconstruction priorities.

 
JAFAJ COLLECTION ASSESSMENT
As of July 2026, the available evidence remains insufficient to determine whether the transition represents a genuine strategic transformation or a temporary political adjustment.
Consequently, intelligence collection should focus less upon official statements than upon observable behavior.
Institutions reveal themselves through performance.
Organizations reveal themselves through actions.
The coming months will therefore produce considerably more valuable intelligence than the announcement itself.
The Board of Peace will ultimately be judged not by the promises made during its formation, but by the measurable conditions that emerge across Gaza during its first years of operation.
Those conditions—not diplomatic declarations—will determine whether history remembers this initiative as the beginning of a new model for post-conflict governance or another unrealized experiment in international peacebuilding.
 
STRATEGIC RISKS TO THE BOARD OF PEACE
No peace initiative fails because of a single event.
They fail because multiple risks emerge simultaneously, overwhelm institutions, erode public confidence, and eventually destroy political legitimacy.
The Board of Peace enters one of the world’s most politically complex operating environments.
Success therefore requires not merely effective administration, but continuous management of strategic risk.
JAFAJ has identified ten principal risks that could determine whether the transition succeeds or fails.
 
RISK ONE
INCOMPLETE DISARMAMENT
Risk Level: Very High
The greatest uncertainty surrounding the transition remains Hamas’ military capability.
A transfer of civilian ministries does not automatically eliminate armed organizations.
If Hamas retains weapons, command structures, financing, or intelligence capabilities outside the authority of the NCAG, competing centers of power may emerge.
No civilian government can exercise full authority while another organization possesses an independent monopoly on force.
This remains the Board’s single greatest strategic challenge.
 
RISK TWO
LOSS OF PUBLIC LEGITIMACY
Risk Level: High
Governments derive authority from performance.
If electricity remains unreliable, unemployment increases, corruption spreads, reconstruction stalls, or humanitarian conditions fail to improve, public confidence may rapidly deteriorate.
International recognition cannot substitute for domestic legitimacy.
Ultimately, Palestinians—not foreign governments—will determine whether the NCAG deserves to govern.
 
RISK THREE
DONOR FATIGUE
Risk Level: High
History demonstrates that reconstruction funding often declines long before reconstruction is complete.
Political attention shifts.
Governments change.
Economic priorities evolve.
If promised financial support diminishes during the critical implementation period, unfinished reconstruction could become a source of renewed instability.
Long-term commitments—not emergency appropriations—will determine success.
 
RISK FOUR
REGIONAL COMPETITION
Risk Level: Moderate-High
The Board includes governments with differing strategic interests.
While all currently support stabilization, differences regarding security, economic influence, diplomatic recognition, and regional leadership may emerge over time.
Managing those competing priorities will require continuous diplomacy.
Coalitions often weaken gradually rather than suddenly.
 
RISK FIVE
SPOILER ORGANIZATIONS
Risk Level: Very High
Peace processes frequently attract actors whose political interests depend upon failure.

Militant splinter groups.
Transnational terrorist organizations.
Criminal smuggling networks.
Ideological extremists.
Foreign intelligence services.

Even isolated acts of violence may be intended less to achieve military objectives than to undermine public confidence in the transition.
The Board must therefore prepare for efforts designed specifically to provoke political overreaction.
 
RISK SIX
ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS EXCEED PERFORMANCE
Risk Level: High
The announcement of reconstruction inevitably creates public expectations.
Those expectations may exceed the pace at which rebuilding can realistically occur.

Infrastructure projects require planning.
Housing requires financing.
Utilities require engineering.
Employment takes time to recover.

If expectations rise faster than visible progress, disappointment may become politically destabilizing.
Managing expectations is therefore as important as managing construction.
 
RISK SEVEN
POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION
Risk Level: Moderate
The emergence of the NCAG introduces new political actors into an already fragmented environment.
Questions concerning future elections, representation, constitutional authority, and the relationship between Gaza and the West Bank remain unresolved.
Without a broadly accepted political roadmap, administrative success alone may prove insufficient to sustain long-term stability.
 
RISK EIGHT
EXTERNAL STRATEGIC SHOCKS
Risk Level: Moderate
Events unrelated to Gaza could significantly influence the transition.

Regional war.
Global economic recession.
Energy market disruptions.
Leadership changes among major donor governments.
Large-scale terrorist attacks elsewhere.
Major geopolitical crises.

Any of these developments could redirect international attention and resources away from Gaza.
The Board must therefore remain resilient in the face of events beyond its control.
 
RISK NINE
MISSION CREEP
Risk Level: Moderate
The Board was established to supervise Gaza’s transition.
Success may encourage demands that it assume additional responsibilities.

Judicial reform.
Economic development.
Regional diplomacy.
Security coordination.
Political mediation.

Institutional expansion without corresponding resources could dilute effectiveness and complicate accountability.
Maintaining a clearly defined mandate will remain essential.
 
RISK TEN
SUCCESS ITSELF
Risk Level: Underestimated
Ironically, success creates its own challenges.
As conditions improve, governments may reduce funding.
International attention may decline.
Political priorities may shift elsewhere.
Yet institutions remain fragile long after headlines disappear.
History suggests that premature declarations of victory often undermine the very progress they celebrate.
Sustained success requires sustained commitment.
 
OVERALL RISK ASSESSMENT
The Board of Peace does not face one decisive obstacle.
It faces numerous interconnected risks that reinforce one another.

Security influences investment.
Investment influences employment.
Employment influences legitimacy.
Legitimacy influences stability.
Stability influences security.

The transition therefore functions as an integrated political ecosystem rather than a series of independent policy initiatives.
Failure in one sector may rapidly produce cascading consequences elsewhere.
Conversely, steady progress across multiple sectors can generate positive reinforcing effects.
The Board’s greatest challenge will not be managing any single crisis.
It will be managing all of them simultaneously.
 
JAFAJ STRATEGIC OBSERVATION
The history of international peacebuilding demonstrates that institutions rarely collapse because they lack ambition.
They collapse because they underestimate complexity.
The Board of Peace enters Gaza with significant diplomatic support, broad international participation, and considerable public expectations.
Whether those assets prove sufficient will depend less upon visionary planning than upon disciplined execution.
In the end, peace will not be measured by conferences held, declarations issued, or agreements signed.
It will be measured by whether ordinary citizens gradually conclude that stability has become more valuable than conflict.
That is the ultimate strategic risk.
It is also the ultimate strategic objective.
 
THE ROAD AHEAD—SCENARIOS, INDICATORS, AND THE STRATEGIC TEST OF THE BOARD OF PEACE
THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR MONTHS
Political transitions are rarely decided by announcements.
They are decided by implementation.
The transfer of Gaza’s civilian administration to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), under the supervision of the Board of Peace, marks the beginning—not the conclusion—of an extraordinarily complex political experiment.
For the first time in nearly two decades, Gaza may be governed by an institution whose legitimacy rests not on armed resistance, political ideology, or revolutionary credentials, but on competence.
Whether that experiment succeeds will depend upon developments that cannot be measured in speeches or diplomatic communiqués.

It will be measured by electricity reaching homes.
Children returning to schools.
Hospitals functioning.
Businesses reopening.
International investors committing capital.
Security incidents declining.
Citizens believing tomorrow will be better than today.

These are the true metrics of governance.
 
THREE POSSIBLE FUTURES
SCENARIO ONE: STRATEGIC SUCCESS
Probability: Moderate
In the most optimistic outcome, the Board of Peace successfully establishes an effective civilian administration.
The NCAG demonstrates transparency, administrative competence, and political neutrality.

International reconstruction funding begins flowing.
Housing projects expand.
Infrastructure is rebuilt.
Ports reopen.
Commercial activity resumes.
Employment increases.

Regional governments coordinate reconstruction rather than competing for influence.
Most importantly, Hamas gradually withdraws from security functions while political participation increasingly replaces armed confrontation.

Israel observes measurable improvements in security.
Cross-border attacks decline dramatically.
Regional normalization accelerates.
Saudi Arabia and Israel move toward broader diplomatic engagement.
Egypt benefits from increased commercial activity through Rafah.
Foreign direct investment begins replacing emergency humanitarian assistance.

Within several years, Gaza evolves into a functioning transitional administration capable of preparing for internationally supported elections.
Although significant political disagreements remain, conflict is increasingly managed through institutions rather than military confrontation.²⁶
 
SCENARIO TWO: LIMITED SUCCESS
Probability: High
The more likely outcome lies somewhere between success and failure.
The Board restores basic public services.
Reconstruction proceeds slowly.
International funding remains available but below projected levels.
Security improves, although sporadic violence continues.
Hamas relinquishes formal governmental authority but retains political influence within Palestinian society.
Some armed factions remain active despite overall reductions in violence.
International donors continue supporting reconstruction while demanding additional reforms.
Israel maintains substantial security operations along Gaza’s borders.
Diplomatic normalization advances cautiously.
This outcome would not produce lasting peace.
It would, however, create a more stable and manageable environment than has existed in Gaza for many years.
For policymakers, imperfect stability may represent meaningful progress.
 
SCENARIO THREE: FAILURE
Probability: Moderate
The greatest danger confronting the Board is institutional failure.

Reconstruction stalls.
Political disputes intensify.
Funding declines.
Corruption allegations emerge.
Security deteriorates.
Public confidence collapses.

Militant organizations regain influence by presenting themselves as alternatives to ineffective governance.
International donors withdraw.
Regional governments pursue competing agendas.
Israel resumes large-scale military operations.
The Board becomes another example of an ambitious international initiative unable to overcome political realities on the ground.
Such an outcome would reverberate far beyond Gaza.
Future international governance initiatives elsewhere would face immediate skepticism.
The diplomatic costs would extend across the Middle East and beyond.
 
STRATEGIC INDICATORS TO WATCH
Several developments will reveal whether the transition is succeeding.
Security

Reduction in rocket launches.
Decline in organized armed activity.
Integration of civilian policing under internationally supervised institutions.

Governance

Continuous delivery of electricity and water.
Functioning schools and hospitals.
Transparent public budgeting.
Independent judicial administration.

Economics

Volume of reconstruction contracts.
Foreign direct investment.
Private-sector employment.
Commercial reopening of border crossings.
Growth in small business activity.

Diplomacy

Additional member participation within the Board of Peace.
Expanded financial commitments from Gulf states.
Increased European institutional support.
Progress toward broader regional normalization.

Political Legitimacy

Public confidence in the NCAG.
Development of representative political institutions.
Preparation for internationally monitored elections.
Peaceful resolution of political disputes.

These indicators will provide a more accurate measure of success than official statements alone.
 
THE BROADER LESSON
The Board of Peace represents something larger than Gaza. It challenges a longstanding assumption in international conflict resolution. For decades, policymakers often approached reconstruction as the final stage of peace.
The Board reverses that sequence.

It assumes that functioning governance is itself an instrument of peace.
If citizens possess reliable institutions, functioning economies, accountable government, and meaningful opportunities, support for armed conflict may gradually diminish.

Whether that theory proves correct remains uncertain.
Its success—or failure—will influence future international policy far beyond the Middle East.
 
COULD THIS MODEL BE REPEATED?
Governments throughout the world are watching carefully.
If the Board succeeds, policymakers may ask whether similar transitional governance structures could someday assist in resolving other prolonged conflicts.
Analysts have already drawn comparisons with fragile political environments where armed organizations exercise significant influence over civilian governance.

Each conflict remains unique.
No model transfers perfectly.

Yet success in Gaza would demonstrate that international coalitions, regional participation, technocratic administration, and sustained reconstruction can coexist within a comprehensive political framework.
Failure would suggest precisely the opposite.
 
JAFAJ STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
The transfer of Gaza’s civilian administration should not be interpreted as the end of Hamas.
Nor should it be interpreted as the beginning of a Palestinian state.
Those conclusions would be premature.
Instead, the announcement marks the opening phase of an unprecedented experiment in post-conflict governance.
The Board of Peace is attempting something few international institutions have successfully accomplished.
It seeks simultaneously to establish security, legitimacy, reconstruction, economic recovery, and political transition.
Each objective depends upon the others.
Failure in one area could undermine progress everywhere.
Success would establish an entirely new framework for conflict resolution.
 
LESSONS FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS: THE GAZA DOCTRINE
Every major conflict leaves behind more than physical destruction.
It leaves behind lessons.
Some reshape military doctrine.
Others redefine diplomacy.
A small number fundamentally alter how governments think about conflict itself.
The Board of Peace may ultimately become one of those rare experiments.
Regardless of whether it succeeds or fails, governments around the world will study Gaza for decades because it represents an attempt to answer one of the most difficult questions in modern international relations:
Can effective civilian governance replace prolonged militant administration without prolonged foreign occupation?
That question extends far beyond the Middle East.
 
LESSON ONE
SECURITY CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT GOVERNANCE
Traditional military campaigns often assume that defeating armed organizations creates stability.

History suggests otherwise.
Military victory may remove an immediate threat, but unless effective institutions replace the defeated organization, instability frequently returns.
Security requires governance.
Governance requires legitimacy.
Legitimacy requires performance.

The Board of Peace is attempting to build that sequence deliberately.
If successful, future stabilization missions may increasingly prioritize institution-building alongside security operations rather than treating governance as a secondary phase.
 
LESSON TWO
LEGITIMACY CANNOT BE IMPORTED
International recognition alone does not create political legitimacy.
Governments become legitimate when citizens believe public institutions improve daily life.

Safe drinking water.
Reliable policing.

Economic opportunity.

These basic functions often matter more to long-term political stability than constitutional documents or diplomatic ceremonies.
The NCAG will therefore succeed or fail not because foreign governments recognize it, but because Palestinians decide it deserves their confidence.
 
LESSON THREE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY IS A SECURITY STRATEGY
For decades, reconstruction has frequently been viewed as humanitarian assistance.
The Gaza model proposes something different.

Economic recovery becomes an instrument of national security.
Employment reduces desperation.
Investment strengthens institutions.
Functioning markets increase public confidence.

As economic opportunity expands, the political appeal of violence may diminish.
Whether this relationship proves durable remains uncertain, but it represents one of the most significant conceptual innovations underlying the Board of Peace.
 
LESSON FOUR
REGIONAL OWNERSHIP IS ESSENTIAL
International peace initiatives frequently struggle when they are perceived as externally imposed.
The Board of Peace attempts to distribute responsibility among regional governments, international partners, and Palestinian institutions.
This broader ownership increases political legitimacy while reducing dependence upon any single external actor.
Future conflict-resolution efforts may increasingly rely upon regional coalitions rather than unilateral intervention.
 
LESSON FIVE
THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS A STRATEGIC ACTOR
Governments negotiate peace.

Businesses often sustain it.
Banks provide capital.
Construction companies rebuild infrastructure.
Technology firms restore communications.
Universities educate future generations.
Hospitals restore public health.
Commercial activity creates employment.
Employment creates stability.

The Board recognizes that sustainable peace requires economic systems capable of functioning independently of continuous international assistance.
Future peace strategies may therefore integrate private investment far earlier than previous post-conflict models.
 
LESSON SIX
SUCCESS MUST BE MEASURED DIFFERENTLY
Traditionally, governments evaluate peace initiatives through diplomatic milestones.

Agreements signed.
Meetings held.
Declarations issued.
Those indicators reveal political activity.

They do not necessarily reveal political success.
A more meaningful set of measurements includes:

homicide rates;
school attendance;
employment;
investment;
judicial effectiveness;
corruption levels;
infrastructure reliability;
public confidence in government.

If these indicators improve, political legitimacy generally follows.
If they deteriorate, peace agreements rarely survive.
 
LESSON SEVEN
POST-CONFLICT GOVERNANCE MAY BECOME THE NEW STRATEGIC FRONTIER
The twentieth century focused heavily on warfighting.
The twenty-first century increasingly focuses upon what follows.

How societies recover.
How institutions are rebuilt.
How political legitimacy is restored.
How economies are revived.
How divided populations reconcile.

These challenges increasingly define strategic success.
The Board of Peace therefore represents more than a regional initiative.
It represents an experiment in whether governance itself can become the principal instrument of conflict resolution.
 
THE GAZA DOCTRINE
If the Board of Peace succeeds, future historians may identify several principles that emerged from the Gaza experience.
The Gaza Doctrine may ultimately rest upon five central propositions:

Military operations can create opportunity, but only governance can create stability.
Legitimacy is earned through competent administration rather than ideological commitment.
Economic recovery is a strategic security objective, not merely a humanitarian undertaking.
Regional participation increases both legitimacy and long-term sustainability.
Institutional resilience—not military victory alone—defines enduring success.

Whether these principles ultimately become accepted doctrine depends entirely upon events still unfolding.
 
JAFAJ STRATEGIC OBSERVATION
Most peace agreements seek to end wars.
The Board of Peace attempts something more ambitious.
It seeks to prevent the political conditions that produce future wars.
That distinction may ultimately prove to be the initiative’s greatest contribution.
If Gaza demonstrates that competent institutions can gradually replace prolonged militant administration, policymakers will almost certainly revisit this model in future conflicts.
If it fails, governments may conclude that governance cannot substitute for unresolved political disputes.
Either outcome will influence strategic thinking far beyond the Middle East.
For that reason, the Board of Peace should be understood not simply as an administrative authority governing Gaza.
It is the first large-scale test of whether institutions can become the decisive instrument of modern peacebuilding.
History will determine whether that proposition becomes doctrine.
For now, Gaza has become the laboratory in which the experiment begins.
 
CONCLUSION: THE END OF ONE ERA—OR THE BEGINNING OF ANOTHER?
History often assigns enormous significance to moments that seemed ordinary when they occurred.
Few observers standing beside the Berlin Wall in November 1989 fully appreciated that they were witnessing the symbolic end of the Cold War.
Likewise, the signing of the Abraham Accords represented more than a diplomatic agreement—it reshaped regional assumptions that had endured for generations.
The transfer of civilian governance in Gaza may ultimately belong in that same category.

Not because it guarantees peace.
Not because it resolves every political dispute.
Not because violence will suddenly disappear.

Its importance lies elsewhere.
For nearly twenty years, Hamas governed Gaza according to a doctrine that fused political authority with military power.
The Board of Peace proposes a fundamentally different doctrine.
It argues that legitimacy should derive from effective institutions rather than armed movements.
That proposition will now be tested under the scrutiny of the entire world.
If the Board succeeds, historians may conclude that Hamas did not lose Gaza through military defeat alone.
It lost Gaza because governance proved more difficult than revolution.
More importantly, the international community may discover that post-conflict reconstruction requires something deeper than bricks, concrete, and humanitarian aid.
It requires institutions capable of earning public trust.
If the Board fails, Gaza will become another reminder that replacing governments is easier than replacing the political cultures that sustain conflict.
If it succeeds, the implications extend far beyond Israel and Palestine.

Future peace negotiators will study Gaza as the first major test of whether internationally supervised technocratic governance can replace prolonged militant rule.
The Board of Peace therefore carries a burden that extends well beyond the borders of Gaza.
It carries the possibility of establishing a new doctrine for twenty-first-century conflict resolution.
Whether it becomes a historical turning point or another unrealized diplomatic ambition will not be decided by today’s announcement.
It will be decided by what follows.
That is the real story.
And history has only begun to write its first chapter.
 
JAFAJ NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
OVERALL ASSESSMENT
Based upon information available as of July 8, 2026, JAFAJ assesses that Hamas’ decision to relinquish civilian administration represents one of the most consequential political developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since Hamas assumed control of Gaza in 2007.
While the transfer of authority should not presently be interpreted as the end of Hamas as either a political movement or military organization, it represents the first credible attempt to separate civilian governance from militant administration under an internationally supervised institutional framework.
Whether that separation becomes permanent remains uncertain.
 
CONFIDENCE LEVELS
High Confidence

Gaza has entered a fundamentally different political phase.
The Board of Peace represents a significant departure from previous diplomatic initiatives.
Reconstruction cannot proceed successfully without sustained international financial support.
The legitimacy of the NCAG will ultimately depend upon measurable improvements in daily life.

 
Moderate Confidence

Hamas intends to reduce its direct governmental responsibilities.
Israel will evaluate success primarily through security indicators.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE will become the principal regional reconstruction partners.
International investment will increase if security conditions improve.

 
Low-to-Moderate Confidence

Hamas will eventually surrender most military authority.
The Board of Peace will remain intact for more than five years.
Palestinian political reconciliation will occur during the transition period.
Gaza will hold internationally accepted elections within three years.

 
PROBABILITY ESTIMATES

Event
Probability

NCAG successfully assumes day-to-day administration
90%

Major reconstruction funding begins
85%

Board of Peace remains operational after two years
75%

Hamas retains significant political influence
70%

Hamas retains significant military capability
65%

Israeli military operations decline substantially
60%

Regional normalization accelerates
60%

Internationally supervised elections occur within three years
50%

Complete Hamas disarmament
35%

Permanent peace agreement within five years
30%

 
LIKELY WINNERS
Governments

Egypt
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates
United States
Israel (if security improves)

 
Institutions

Board of Peace
NCAG
International financial institutions
Regional investors
Private-sector reconstruction firms

 
LIKELY LOSERS

Iran’s regional influence
Militant governance models
Weapons smuggling networks
Extremist organizations dependent upon instability
Black-market economies

 
KEY UNCERTAINTIES
Several developments remain impossible to assess with confidence.

Will Hamas genuinely relinquish military power?
Can the Board maintain political unity?
Will donors sustain long-term funding?
Will Palestinians accept technocratic governance?
Can reconstruction outpace political frustration?
Will Iran actively attempt to undermine the transition?
Can Israel tolerate calculated strategic risk long enough for institutions to mature?

These uncertainties remain the principal variables determining success.
 
THE TEN QUESTIONS HISTORY WILL ASK
History rarely judges peace initiatives by what participants intended.
It judges them by what they achieved.
Future historians are likely to evaluate the Board of Peace by asking:

Did Hamas truly surrender power?
Did violence decline?
Did ordinary Palestinians experience better lives?
Did institutions become stronger than armed movements?
Did corruption remain under control?
Did reconstruction create lasting economic opportunity?
Did regional governments remain committed?
Did Israel become more secure?
Did the Board survive political transitions?
Did Gaza become a model—or a warning?

Those ten questions may ultimately become the enduring measure of this experiment.
 
FINAL JAFAJ ESTIMATE
JAFAJ assesses that the transfer of civilian governance to the Board of Peace is neither the conclusion of the Gaza conflict nor the beginning of permanent peace.
It is the opening move in a prolonged strategic competition between two fundamentally different visions of political authority.
One vision argues that legitimacy derives from armed resistance.
The other argues that legitimacy derives from functioning institutions.
For nearly twenty years, Gaza was governed according to the first proposition.
The Board of Peace exists to test the second.
The outcome will influence not only the future of Gaza, but how governments around the world approach post-conflict reconstruction, political transition, and insurgency resolution throughout the twenty-first century.
That is why this story matters.
And that is why history has only begun to write its first chapter.
 
FOOTNOTES

Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt,’” July 6, 2026.
Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt,’” July 6, 2026; Reuters, “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza,” July 8, 2026.
Background on Hamas’ governance since 2007 is well established and reflected in current reporting discussing the transfer of authority.
Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt,’” July 6, 2026.
Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt,’” July 6, 2026; Associated Press reporting.
Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt,’” July 6, 2026.
Associated Press reporting on Hamas’ transfer announcement.
Reuters, “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza,” July 8, 2026.
Reuters and Associated Press reporting describing Gaza’s reconstruction needs and humanitarian conditions.
Reuters, “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza,” July 8, 2026.

Reuters, “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza,” July 8, 2026.
Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza, U.N. Doc. S/2026/418, 2026.
Reuters, “U.S. Names Rubio, Blair and Kushner in Gaza Board Under Trump’s Plan,” July 2026.
United Nations, Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza, S/2026/418 (2026).
United Nations, Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza, S/2026/418 (2026); reporting describing the establishment of the NCAG and its administrative mandate.

Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt,’” July 2026.
Reuters, “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza,” July 2026.
United Nations, Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza, U.N. Doc. S/2026/418 (2026).
Reuters, “U.S. Names Rubio, Blair and Kushner in Gaza Board Under Trump’s Plan,” July 2026.
Associated Press, “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a U.N.-Backed Committee,” July 2026.
Reuters, “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza,” July 2026.
United Nations, Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza, U.N. Doc. S/2026/418 (2026).
Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt,’” July 2026.
Reuters, “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza,” July 2026.
Associated Press, “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a U.N.-Backed Committee,” July 2026.

Reuters, “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza,” July 8, 2026.
United Nations, Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza, U.N. Doc. S/2026/418 (2026).
Reuters, “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt,’” July 6, 2026.
Associated Press, “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a U.N.-Backed Committee,” July 2026.
Reuters, “U.S. Names Rubio, Blair and Kushner in Gaza Board Under Trump’s Plan,” July 2026.
United Nations, Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza, U.N. Doc. S/2026/418 (2026).

 
PRELIMINARY REFERENCES

Associated Press. “Hamas Dissolves Its Government in Gaza to Transfer Power to a U.N.-Backed Committee.” July 2026.
Reuters. “Hamas Dissolves Gaza Government, Israel Dismisses Move as ‘Stunt.’” July 2026.
Reuters. “Trump’s Board of Peace Planning Pilot Humanitarian Zone in Gaza.” July 2026.
Reuters. “U.S. Names Rubio, Blair and Kushner in Gaza Board Under Trump’s Plan.” July 2026.
United Nations. Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025): Report of the Board of Peace through the Office of the High Representative for Gaza. U.N. Doc. S/2026/418 (2026).

 

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