MENA+1 INFLATION: THE REGION’S TWO-SPEED ECONOMY

HOW INFLATION, FOOD, CURRENCIES, ENERGY AND SUPPLY CHAINS ARE RESHAPING THE MIDDLE EASTERN ECONOMY

JAFAJ ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

September 19, 2026

Analytical economic brief. Not investment advice.

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Inflation in the MENA+1 economic universe is not a single regional phenomenon.

It is a multi-speed economic story in which countries exposed to the same regional energy, transportation and geopolitical shock are experiencing substantially different price outcomes.

Turkey’s August 2026 inflation rate was 31.51%. Egypt’s urban headline inflation was 14.5%. By contrast, Saudi Arabia reported 1.8%, Jordan 2.66%, and Morocco’s latest available July data showed a 0.6% year-over-year decline in consumer prices. Oman reported 3.4% inflation in August.

The Western comparison is equally revealing. August headline inflation was approximately 3.4% in the United States, 3.0% in Canada, 3.1% in the United Kingdom and 3.2% across the euro area. The OECD reported 4.1% year-over-year inflation across the OECD in July, with energy inflation remaining above 10%.

The resulting picture is not: MENA = high inflation; West = low inflation. It is: MENA = widely divergent inflation regimes.

Several MENA+1 economies currently have headline inflation below Western benchmarks, while Turkey and Egypt remain far above them.

The difference is explained by a combination of exchange-rate regimes, energy exposure, food-import dependence, domestic production capacity, fiscal buffers, monetary-policy frameworks, housing markets, supply-chain exposure, shipping routes, government price controls or subsidies, and the ability of governments and central banks to absorb external shocks.

The 2026 regional conflict has added another layer. The IMF reports that disruption to the Strait of Hormuz, energy infrastructure and regional transportation has increased the prices of oil, natural gas, fertilizer and metals while raising transportation and production costs. The Fund estimates that, on average, a 10% increase in crude-oil prices reduces growth by approximately 0.5 percentage point while increasing inflation by approximately one percentage point.

The food channel is particularly important. The IMF reports that four GCC economies — Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates — import more than 80% of their food consumption, while Oman and Saudi Arabia import more than 50%. Large food inventories provide a temporary buffer, but prolonged transportation disruption can erode that protection.

The currency channel is equally important. An identical increase in international energy or food prices can produce very different domestic inflation outcomes depending on whether a country’s currency is stable, pegged, managed or depreciating rapidly.

For the MENA+1 Economic Index, the appropriate conclusion is therefore not to create a single regional inflation number. The appropriate approach is to track inflation as one component of a broader macroeconomic vulnerability system incorporating food, energy, currencies, interest rates, fiscal capacity, trade exposure and supply-chain dependence.

1. THE CENTRAL FINDING: MENA IS A MULTI-SPEED INFLATION ECONOMY

The latest available data demonstrate an extraordinary range of price conditions.

Economy	Latest annual inflation	Latest period	Principal analytical issue
Turkey	31.51%	Aug. 2026	Persistent high inflation, energy, services and currency
Egypt	14.5%	Aug. 2026	Food, energy, currency and imported inflation
Oman	3.4%	Aug. 2026	Transport and food pressures
Jordan	2.66%	Aug. 2026	Transport and housing
Saudi Arabia	1.8%	Aug. 2026	Housing/utilities despite low headline CPI
Morocco	-0.6%	Jul. 2026	Food-price decline and deflation
Palestine	Mixed	Aug. 2026	Severe geographic divergence and disrupted markets

The Palestinian data require special treatment rather than a single headline interpretation. In August, the overall CPI increased 0.09% month over month, while the year-over-year CPI fell 34.25%; however, that aggregate is heavily affected by the extraordinary collapse in Gaza’s measured consumption and market conditions. In the West Bank, the CPI increased 3.27% year over year, while Jerusalem J1 increased 3.30%.

This is a critical methodological lesson: An inflation number can become economically misleading when the underlying market itself has been severely disrupted.

The same principle applies, in different ways, to other conflict-affected economies.

2. MENA+1 VERSUS THE WEST

The Western comparison provides an essential benchmark.

• United States — approximately 3.4%
• Canada — approximately 3.0%
• United Kingdom — approximately 3.1%
• Euro area — approximately 3.2%

The OECD reported that headline inflation across the OECD was 4.1% in July, with energy inflation above 10%.

LOWER THAN THE WEST

Saudi Arabia, at 1.8%, is currently below the major Western benchmarks.

ROUGHLY COMPARABLE

Jordan’s 2.66% and Oman’s 3.4% are much closer to Western inflation than to the rates experienced by Turkey or Egypt.

SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER

Egypt and Turkey are in a fundamentally different inflation environment.

Turkey’s 31.51% rate is approximately nine times the U.S. rate. Egypt’s 14.5% rate is more than four times the U.S. rate.

The comparison demonstrates why the phrase MENA inflation is analytically inadequate without country-level context.

3. INFLATION METHODOLOGY: WHAT THE NUMBERS ACTUALLY MEAN

Inflation comparisons require methodological discipline.

The Consumer Price Index generally measures the change over time in the prices of a basket of goods and services purchased by households. But the baskets are not identical.

The IMF’s CPI database notes that national CPIs contain different expenditure divisions, weights and component structures, while harmonized indices are available for Europe.

HEADLINE CPI

The broad consumer-price measure.

CORE CPI

A measure designed to remove or reduce the influence of particularly volatile components.

FOOD INFLATION

The change in prices of food and non-alcoholic beverages.

ENERGY INFLATION

Fuel, electricity, gas and related energy costs.

MONTHLY INFLATION

The change from one month to the next.

YEAR-OVER-YEAR INFLATION

The change compared with the same month of the previous year.

CUMULATIVE/YEAR-TO-DATE INFLATION

The change over a defined period within the current year.

These measures answer different questions. A country can have falling annual inflation plus rising monthly prices, low headline inflation plus rapidly rising housing costs, or falling food prices plus rising transportation prices.

Therefore: Headline CPI is the starting point, not the complete analysis.

4. REPORTING-DATE PROBLEM

Cross-country comparisons also have a timing problem. Some countries publish August data quickly. Others publish later. Some datasets are available only through July at the time of publication.

JAFAJ should therefore use the phrase latest available national CPI reading rather than pretending that every country is measured on precisely the same date.

The report should also identify the reference month for every figure. This is particularly important for a recurring MENA+1 index.

5. THE ENERGY CHANNEL

Energy is the first major transmission mechanism.

• crude oil
• natural gas
• refined fuels
• fertilizer
• metals
• maritime insurance
• shipping
• aviation
• industrial inputs

The IMF reports that closure or disruption around the Strait of Hormuz has affected approximately one-fifth of global oil supply and roughly one-quarter of global LNG trade under normal conditions. The Fund also identifies fertilizer and helium flows among commodities exposed to the corridor.

The resulting transmission mechanism is:

ENERGY DISRUPTION → HIGHER OIL AND GAS PRICES → HIGHER FUEL AND ELECTRICITY COSTS → HIGHER TRANSPORTATION COSTS → HIGHER PRODUCTION COSTS → HIGHER FOOD AND MANUFACTURED-GOODS COSTS → HIGHER CONSUMER PRICES

But the impact is not uniform. Oil exporters can experience increased export revenues while simultaneously facing higher domestic costs. Oil importers experience the external price increase without the corresponding export-revenue benefit.

This is one of the fundamental economic divisions inside MENA+1.

6. FOOD INFLATION: THE UNDERAPPRECIATED RISK

Food deserves its own analytical category.

• fertilizer
• irrigation
• agricultural machinery
• refrigeration
• processing
• packaging
• trucking
• shipping
• storage
• retail distribution

The IMF identifies food-import dependence as a major vulnerability. Four GCC economies — Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE — import more than 80% of their food consumption. Oman and Saudi Arabia import more than 50%.

This produces a paradox. The Gulf economies may have substantial financial and energy resources, but that does not mean they are insulated from food inflation. Their vulnerability simply occurs through a different channel: import dependence + shipping costs + food commodity prices rather than primarily through domestic agricultural production.

Large inventories can provide temporary protection. But inventories are a buffer, not a permanent solution. If supply disruption persists long enough, inventories decline and replacement costs become increasingly important.

7. FOOD INFLATION AND SOCIAL VULNERABILITY

The food issue becomes even more important outside the Gulf. Lower-income and fragile economies tend to devote a larger proportion of household expenditure to essential goods.

Consequently, a 5% increase in food prices does not have the same social significance everywhere.

The IMF specifically warns that fragile and conflict-affected economies with weaker social-protection systems are particularly vulnerable to higher energy, fertilizer and food prices.

8. THE SUPPLY-CHAIN CHANNEL

Inflation is increasingly a logistics problem.

• ships must travel farther
• vessels require more fuel
• insurance premiums rise
• ports operate below capacity
• cargo is delayed
• inventories become more expensive
• businesses hold larger safety stocks
• air cargo replaces maritime cargo
• trucking routes change

The result is cost-push inflation.

This is why the economic significance of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal extends far beyond oil. They are components of the world’s logistics infrastructure.

9. CURRENCY ANALYSIS: THE SECOND INFLATION ENGINE

Currency movements deserve substantially more attention than they receive in conventional inflation reporting.

A country importing $100 worth of goods faces a very different domestic cost depending upon the exchange rate. If the currency depreciates 20%, the domestic-currency cost of the imported product can increase substantially even before the international price changes.

CURRENCY DEPRECIATION → HIGHER IMPORT COST → HIGHER WHOLESALE COST → HIGHER RETAIL PRICE → HIGHER CPI

This is known as imported inflation. The effect is especially important for countries that import energy, food, pharmaceuticals, machinery, electronics and industrial inputs.

10. CURRENCY REGIMES MATTER

MENA+1 economies do not all manage their currencies in the same way. Broadly, the region contains exchange-rate pegs, managed arrangements, floating or more flexible currencies, and currencies operating under severe market pressure.

This matters because exchange-rate flexibility can function as either a shock absorber or a shock amplifier.

A flexible currency can adjust to an external shock, but a sharp depreciation can also increase imported inflation. A stable peg can reduce exchange-rate pass-through, but it requires monetary and foreign-exchange conditions capable of supporting the regime.

The IMF explicitly notes that inflation-targeting economies may need to allow exchange rates to act as shock absorbers, while financial-sector supervisors need to monitor liquidity and currency risks.

WHY TWO COUNTRIES CAN EXPERIENCE THE SAME OIL SHOCK DIFFERENTLY

Consider two hypothetical MENA+1 economies. Country A imports most of its energy and food and experiences currency depreciation. Country B exports energy, maintains a stable currency and possesses substantial fiscal reserves.

Both face a 20% increase in global oil prices. Their domestic inflation outcomes can be radically different.

Country A experiences: oil shock + currency shock + food shock + transportation shock.

Country B experiences: higher domestic costs + higher export revenue + greater fiscal capacity.

This is why the MENA+1 Economic Index needs to measure inflation and currency exposure together.

11. TURKEY: HIGH INFLATION WITH MULTIPLE DRIVERS

Turkey’s August inflation rate was 31.51%. Monthly CPI increased 1.84%.

The Central Bank of Türkiye reported that inflation was driven particularly by energy prices and their impact on transportation services, along with education and communication services.

Turkey therefore illustrates the difference between an external shock and an embedded inflation environment.

Energy can be the initial trigger. But once inflation spreads into services, wages, rents, expectations and domestic pricing behavior, it becomes a broader macroeconomic phenomenon.

Turkey’s inflation rate has been declining, but the absolute level remains exceptionally high. That distinction should remain central to JAFAJ reporting.

12. EGYPT: IMPORTED INFLATION AND FOREIGN-CURRENCY PRESSURE

Egypt represents another form of vulnerability.

Its August urban headline inflation rate was 14.5%, while core inflation was 14.9%.

• imported energy
• food imports
• exchange-rate movements
• foreign-currency availability
• shipping
• interest rates
• administered prices
• external financing

Egypt demonstrates how an external commodity shock can become a domestic inflation problem when it interacts with currency and financing conditions.

The critical variable is therefore not simply the price of oil. It is: OIL PRICE × EXCHANGE RATE × IMPORT DEPENDENCE.

13. SAUDI ARABIA: LOW HEADLINE INFLATION, SELECTIVE PRESSURE

Saudi Arabia’s August inflation rate was 1.8%. Housing-related costs were considerably higher. Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels increased 3.9%, while food and beverages increased 1.4% and transportation 2.0%.

This is an important case because it demonstrates that low national inflation does not mean that households face no cost pressure.

Saudi Arabia’s oil-export position also gives it fiscal characteristics fundamentally different from those of an oil-importing economy.

But the Kingdom is not immune to infrastructure disruption, shipping costs, insurance costs, imported food prices, construction costs, housing demand and logistics disruption.

14. OMAN: A USEFUL GULF COUNTEREXAMPLE

Oman’s August inflation rate was 3.4%, with January-August inflation averaging 2.9%. But the composition is striking.

Transport prices increased 8.5% and food and non-alcoholic beverages increased 7.0%. Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels declined 0.6%.

Oman demonstrates why headline CPI alone can conceal meaningful sectoral inflation.

The country has moderate overall inflation while experiencing substantial transportation and food pressure.

15. JORDAN: MODERATE INFLATION WITH TRANSPORT AND HOUSING PRESSURE

Jordan’s August inflation rate was 2.66%. But transportation contributed approximately 1.12 percentage points and rents approximately 0.76 percentage points.

This demonstrates how a relatively moderate headline inflation rate can still contain significant pressure in essential household categories.

Jordan’s experience also illustrates the importance of distinguishing between headline stability and household expenditure pressure.

16. MOROCCO: A DEFLATIONARY OUTLIER

Morocco’s July CPI declined 0.6% year over year. Food prices fell 3.7%, while non-food prices increased 1.9%. Transportation prices increased 4.1%.

Morocco is therefore an important counterexample.

The country demonstrates that the same broad regional environment can produce food deflation + transportation inflation + overall CPI decline.

17. PALESTINE: WHY CONFLICT-DISLOCATED DATA REQUIRE SPECIAL TREATMENT

Palestine demonstrates the extreme limits of conventional CPI interpretation under severe market disruption.

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reported that the August CPI increased 0.09% month over month, but declined 34.25% year over year at the aggregate level. Gaza alone experienced a 58.39% year-over-year decline in the measured CPI.

That number should not be interpreted as conventional deflation.

• destruction of markets
• disappearance of normal consumption
• shortages
• displacement
• changes in product availability
• changes in household consumption patterns
• administrative or humanitarian pricing
• geographic fragmentation

This is a critical methodological warning for JAFAJ: Not every negative CPI number represents an improvement in household purchasing power.

18. INFLATION AND THE COST OF LIVING ARE DIFFERENT

Inflation measures the rate of change in prices. Cost of living measures the broader economic burden of maintaining a household.

An economy can have 2% inflation and an extremely high cost of living. Another can have 10% inflation while still having lower absolute prices.

For JAFAJ, the proper questions are:

1. How quickly are prices increasing?
2. Which prices are increasing?
3. Which prices are falling?
4. What happened to prices over the preceding years?
5. Are wages keeping pace?
6. What share of household income is spent on food?
7. What share is spent on housing?
8. What share is spent on transportation and energy?

CPI provides only part of the answer.

19. MONETARY POLICY: A COUNTRY-SPECIFIC RESPONSE

The monetary-policy section should not treat interest rates as a universal solution to inflation.

The correct analytical question is: What type of inflation is a country experiencing, and what monetary-policy framework does that country use?

An economy experiencing demand-driven inflation may respond to tighter monetary policy by reducing domestic demand. But an economy experiencing a temporary oil-price shock cannot produce more oil simply by raising interest rates.

The policy challenge becomes more complicated when an external shock produces both higher inflation and lower growth. That is a potential stagflation environment.

The IMF therefore emphasizes that the appropriate monetary response depends on country-specific frameworks and starting conditions, particularly the persistence of inflation and the credibility of monetary institutions.

FIVE QUESTIONS FOR JAFAJ

9. What is driving inflation — demand, supply, currency, food, energy or a combination?
10. Is the shock temporary or becoming embedded?
11. How does the exchange rate operate — peg, managed or flexible?
12. What is the fiscal-policy response — subsidies, transfers or controls?
13. Does the central bank have credibility and room to act?

This framework is more useful than simply stating whether a central bank should raise or lower rates.

20. THE FISCAL POLICY CONNECTION

• fuel subsidies
• food subsidies
• cash transfers
• price controls
• tax reductions
• strategic inventories
• public procurement
• targeted assistance

These measures can reduce immediate household pressure, but they also have costs.

A government that subsidizes fuel may reduce measured inflation while increasing its fiscal burden. A government that subsidizes food can protect consumers while transferring price pressure to the public budget. A government that uses price controls may suppress measured CPI while creating shortages or distortions.

Consequently: LOW CPI DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN LOWER ECONOMIC COST. The cost may simply have moved from households to the government budget.

21. MENA+1’S FIVE INFLATION TRANSMISSION CHANNELS

CHANNEL 1 — ENERGY

Oil, gas and electricity.

CHANNEL 2 — FOOD

Agriculture, fertilizer, food imports and retail prices.

CHANNEL 3 — LOGISTICS

Shipping, ports, aviation, insurance and transportation.

CHANNEL 4 — CURRENCY

Exchange-rate depreciation and imported inflation.

CHANNEL 5 — DOMESTIC POLICY

Interest rates, subsidies, taxes, transfers and price controls.

These five channels interact. A shock rarely remains in one category.

22. WHY THE WEST MATTERS TO MENA+1

The economic relationship works in both directions.

The West depends on MENA for oil, gas, petrochemicals, fertilizer, minerals and trade corridors.

MENA depends on Western economies for investment, technology, machinery, pharmaceuticals, financial services, tourism and consumer markets.

The 2026 energy shock demonstrates the relationship. The IMF describes the conflict as a regional shock that became a global economic shock through energy, commodity, trade and transportation channels.

The ECB has likewise modeled scenarios in which prolonged Middle Eastern energy disruption produces second-round effects on European inflation, including through food prices.

The economic relationship is therefore circular:

MIDDLE EASTERN DISRUPTION → GLOBAL ENERGY PRICES → WESTERN INFLATION → WESTERN MONETARY POLICY → GLOBAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS → MENA CAPITAL FLOWS AND CURRENCIES

The inflation story does not stop at the border.

23. WHY IRAN IS NOT INCLUDED

Iran is intentionally excluded from the MENA+1 inflation index universe.

This is a methodological decision, not a geographic judgment and not an assessment of Iran’s economic importance.

Iran remains highly relevant to regional economic analysis because of its energy production, currency, trade relationships, sanctions exposure, financial-system restrictions and regional economic influence.

However, the MENA+1 Economic Index is designed around a defined economic and investment universe.

Including Iran would require a separate methodology because of its extensive sanctions exposure, multiple exchange-rate conditions, restrictions on international financial transactions and differences in market accessibility.

Accordingly: Iran is treated as an external regional economic factor rather than a constituent of the MENA+1 index universe.

This distinction should be applied consistently throughout the MENA+1 project.

24. WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE MENA+1 ECONOMIC INDEX

Indicator	Measurement
Headline Inflation	Annual CPI
Core Inflation	Underlying CPI
Food Inflation	Food and non-alcoholic beverages
Energy Inflation	Fuel, gas and electricity
Currency	Annual change vs. USD
Interest Rate	Policy rate
Real Interest Rate	Policy rate less inflation
GDP Growth	Current/recent growth
Fiscal Capacity	Debt, deficit, reserves
Energy Exposure	Import/export dependence
Food Exposure	Food-import dependence
Shipping Exposure	Hormuz/Red Sea/Suez dependence
Supply-Chain Risk	Logistics vulnerability
Social Vulnerability	Food/energy expenditure exposure

25. THE NEW MENA+1 INFLATION METHODOLOGY

For future editions, JAFAJ should classify inflation using four dimensions rather than a single number.

DIMENSION 1 — PRICE LEVEL

How high is headline inflation?

DIMENSION 2 — PRICE MOMENTUM

Is inflation accelerating or decelerating?

DIMENSION 3 — PRICE COMPOSITION

Are food, energy, housing or services driving the change?

DIMENSION 4 — INFLATION VULNERABILITY

How exposed is the economy to another external shock?

A country with 3% inflation and severe currency vulnerability is not necessarily in the same economic position as a country with 3% inflation, a stable currency, large fiscal reserves and low import dependence.

This creates a much stronger analytical model.

26. THE 2026 JAFAJ INFLATION WATCH LIST

1. OIL AND GAS

Are energy prices remaining elevated?

2. STRAIT OF HORMUZ

Are transportation and energy flows normalizing?

3. FOOD

Are fertilizer and food commodity prices passing through to consumers?

4. CURRENCIES

Are vulnerable currencies depreciating?

5. CORE INFLATION

Is inflation spreading beyond energy and food?

6. SERVICES

Are wages, rents, transportation and other domestic services sustaining inflation?

7. FISCAL RESPONSE

Are governments absorbing inflation through subsidies, transfers and price controls?

These indicators will tell JAFAJ whether the 2026 shock is temporary or becoming structural.

27. THE BIGGER ECONOMIC QUESTION: TEMPORARY SHOCK OR EMBEDDED INFLATION?

A temporary supply shock can produce a short-lived increase in inflation.

Embedded inflation is different. It develops when businesses raise prices, workers seek higher wages, governments increase spending, consumers change purchasing behavior, inflation expectations rise, currencies weaken, companies build larger inventories and contracts incorporate higher expected costs.

The process can become self-reinforcing.

The IMF’s modeling shows why the duration of the energy shock matters. The longer disruption continues, the greater the potential for higher inflation to combine with weaker economic growth.

28. CONCLUSION

The MENA+1 inflation story in September 2026 is not a story of one regional inflation rate. It is a story of economic divergence.

Turkey and Egypt remain far above Western inflation levels. Jordan and Oman are much closer to Western inflation conditions. Saudi Arabia currently has lower headline inflation than the United States, Canada, Britain and the euro area. Morocco’s latest available data show annual deflation.

Conflict-affected economies require additional methodological caution because conventional CPI can cease to represent normal household market conditions.

At the same time, the West is experiencing its own energy-related inflation pressures.

The result is a two-way transmission system: MENA affects Western inflation through energy and supply chains. Western monetary and financial conditions affect MENA through currencies, capital flows, trade and financing costs.

The most important lesson is therefore methodological. Headline inflation is necessary but insufficient.

A serious MENA+1 economic analysis must examine: inflation + food + energy + currency + interest rates + fiscal capacity + supply chains + trade exposure.

The region’s economies do not face the same inflation problem. They face different combinations of the same global shocks.

That is why country-level analysis matters. It is also why inflation should become a permanent component of the MENA+1 ECONOMIC INDEX.

The central question for the remainder of 2026 is no longer simply: Is inflation going up?

It is: Where is inflation coming from, how is it being transmitted, who is absorbing the cost, and is the shock becoming embedded in the economy?

That is the question JAFAJ should continue to track.

ENDNOTES AND SOURCES

1. International Monetary Fund. Regional Economic Outlook Update: Middle East and Central Asia — War in the Middle East: Economic Spillovers and Policy Challenges, April 2026.
2. International Monetary Fund. Consumer Price Index database.
3. Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye. September 2026 Monetary Policy Committee summary.
4. Jordan Department of Statistics. August 2026 CPI release.
5. Saudi Arabia General Authority for Statistics. August 2026 CPI.
6. Oman National Centre for Statistics and Information. August 2026 CPI.
7. Morocco Haut-Commissariat au Plan. July 2026 CPI.
8. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. August 2026 CPI.
9. OECD. Consumer Prices, OECD — Updated September 8, 2026.
10. European Central Bank. ECB Staff Macroeconomic Projections for the Euro Area, September 2026.
11. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. August 2026 Consumer Price Index.
12. Statistics Canada. August 2026 Consumer Price Index.
13. UK Office for National Statistics. August 2026 Consumer Price Index.
14. Eurostat. August 2026 euro-area inflation.
15. Methodological note: Cross-country inflation figures are presented using the latest available national headline CPI measure unless otherwise specified. Reporting dates, CPI baskets, weights, geographic coverage and treatment of volatile categories differ among statistical agencies. Figures should therefore be interpreted as a comparative economic snapshot rather than as a mechanically harmonized ranking.
16. MENA+1 universe note: Iran is excluded from the MENA+1 Economic Index universe by methodological design. It remains an external regional economic factor because of its energy production, trade relationships, sanctions exposure and financial-market significance.