JaFaJ| MENA STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

THE U.S. ALLIANCE QUESTION

Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Limits of American Support

Strategic Analysis  |  September 12, 2026  |  MASTER 9.5 EDITION

 

KEY JUDGMENT
Jordan and Saudi Arabia are not preparing to abandon the United States. They are preparing for a relationship in which American military superiority remains indispensable but American political reliability is no longer assumed. Recent Saudi requests for U.S. help against Houthi threats, alongside Washington’s reported preference for intelligence and targeting support rather than direct strikes, illustrate the gap between capability and commitment. [1][2]

ASSESSMENT	The alliance is shifting from assumed permanence to continuous proof of value.

This report evaluates the alliance question through five tests: availability, deterrent scale, political sustainability, territorial applicability, and continuity after a crisis. It distinguishes formal alignment from practical hedging and separates documented developments from analytic inference.

Executive Summary

The United States remains Jordan’s principal external security partner and Saudi Arabia’s most capable military partner. Yet both governments increasingly distinguish American capability from American willingness to incur costs. That distinction is the central strategic problem.

• Jordan requires protection, economic stabilization, refugee assistance, and diplomatic space. Its vulnerability is amplified by geography, limited fiscal capacity, and domestic sensitivity to regional war.
• Saudi Arabia requires credible defense of territory, energy infrastructure, airspace, and maritime routes. It has greater resources than Jordan but remains dependent on U.S.-linked systems, intelligence, integration, and deterrence.
• Recent reporting indicates that Riyadh sought direct U.S. military action against the Houthis while Washington reportedly offered intelligence and targeting support but declined direct strikes. This is a concrete example of the difference between a partner’s requested response and Washington’s chosen response. [1]
• Alliance hedging is therefore rational rather than necessarily anti-American. China, India, Europe, Iran, and regional partners offer additional economic, diplomatic, or security channels, but none presently replaces the full U.S. security package.
• The most serious risk is gradual erosion of confidence: partners may continue cooperating with Washington while planning around uncertainty, diversifying procurement, and reducing exposure to any single external power.

Evidence Snapshot

Evidence	What it demonstrates	Analytic significance	Source
Saudi request for U.S. help against Houthis	Riyadh sought direct U.S. strikes; Washington reportedly limited its response to intelligence/targeting support.	Tests the credibility and scope of U.S. support during an active threat.	[1]
Saudi pipeline disruption	Drone attacks forced closure of a major East-West pipeline carrying roughly 4 million barrels/day around Hormuz.	Shows that alliance concerns involve economic infrastructure, not only military bases.	[2]
U.S. approval of $5 billion JDAM-ER sale	Washington approved a potential sale of extended-range precision munitions to Saudi Arabia.	Confirms continuing defense dependence and cooperation despite political friction.	[3]
Jordan aid framework	The FY2023–FY2029 MOU commits the United States in principle to seek at least $1.45 billion annually in economic and military aid, subject to appropriations.	Demonstrates that Jordan’s security relationship is also fiscal and institutional.	[4]
U.S.–Jordan security cooperation	State Department describes assistance, border security, military cooperation, and economic support as mutually reinforcing.	Supports the report’s broader definition of alliance value.	[5]
Saudi defense institutionalization	Saudi Arabia joined the National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program in 2025.	Shows that the relationship includes institutional military ties beyond arms sales.	[6]

1. The Alliance Problem

For decades, the U.S. relationship with Jordan and Saudi Arabia rested on an implicit bargain: Washington would provide military protection, intelligence, arms, training, and diplomatic backing; the partners would support regional stability, cooperate against terrorism, protect strategic trade routes, and remain aligned with core U.S. interests.

That bargain was never an unlimited treaty guarantee. The United States retains discretion over the timing, scale, and form of assistance. The practical question is whether partners understand those limits clearly enough to plan—and whether adversaries believe they can test them incrementally.

The current environment makes the distinction urgent. Missile and drone threats, attacks on energy infrastructure, maritime insecurity, Iranian pressure, militia activity, and uncertainty over Gaza have expanded the definition of what an ally may ask Washington to defend.

A credible alliance must answer five questions:

1. Will support be available when needed?
2. Will it be large enough to deter the attacker?
3. Will it be politically sustainable in Washington?
4. Will it extend to the partner’s territory, airspace, energy infrastructure, and shipping interests?
5. Will support continue after the immediate crisis ends?

2. Jordan: Security Dependence Without Strategic Freedom

Jordan occupies an unusually exposed position between Israel, the West Bank, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Its security environment is shaped by developments over which Amman has limited control, including cross-border trafficking, militia activity, conflict spillover, refugee pressures, and the risk that Jordanian territory could become a logistical or defensive platform in a wider war.

The United States remains indispensable to Jordan in military assistance, intelligence cooperation, border security, air defense, and economic support. The relationship is not merely military. The Congressional Research Service reports that the seven-year FY2023–FY2029 assistance framework commits successive U.S. administrations in principle to seek at least $1.45 billion annually in economic and military aid, subject to congressional appropriations. [4]

This structure creates both reassurance and vulnerability. Jordan receives a substantial strategic benefit from U.S. support, but its dependence limits its freedom to distance itself from Washington. At the same time, Amman must manage domestic political opinion and avoid appearing to be an extension of U.S. or Israeli military policy.

Jordan’s preferred U.S. role is therefore broader than weapons or deployments. It includes:

• Protection of airspace and critical infrastructure;
• Economic stabilization and energy security;
• Assistance with refugee pressures;
• Diplomatic efforts to prevent forced displacement;
• Clear assurances that Jordan will not be compelled to participate in unwanted military operations.

For Amman, the alliance fails if it protects military assets while allowing tourism, trade, public finances, refugee management, or domestic stability to deteriorate. Jordan’s alliance requirement is therefore best understood as security dependence combined with a demand for strategic restraint.

3. Saudi Arabia: The Powerful Partner That Still Wants a Guarantee

Saudi Arabia has greater financial resources, military capacity, and diplomatic flexibility than Jordan. It can purchase advanced weapons, invest in domestic defense industries, cultivate ties with China and India, and use energy policy as leverage. Yet it remains dependent on external partnerships for integrated air and missile defense, intelligence and surveillance, maritime security, advanced military technology, energy-infrastructure protection, and crisis coordination.

The relationship is also becoming more institutionalized. In 2025, Saudi Arabia joined the U.S. National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program, creating an additional channel for military-to-military cooperation beyond traditional arms sales. [6] In September 2026, Washington approved a potential $5 billion sale of Joint Direct Attack Munition–Extended Range systems to Saudi Arabia, demonstrating that defense cooperation continues even amid disagreement over crisis response. [3]

The Saudi calculation is straightforward: the United States remains the most capable military partner, but capability is not the same as commitment. Riyadh wants reliable security cooperation while preserving freedom to maintain relations with Beijing, Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, Pakistan, Turkey, and other actors.

Recent events make the distinction concrete. Reuters reported that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought U.S. military support against the Houthis, while Washington declined direct strikes and agreed to provide intelligence and targeting support. [1] The episode does not prove a collapse of the alliance. It does demonstrate that Saudi expectations and U.S. decisions may diverge at the moment of greatest stress.

The September pipeline attacks add an economic dimension. Reuters reported that a major Saudi pipeline carrying approximately 4 million barrels per day around the Strait of Hormuz was shut following drone attacks, creating a direct connection between territorial defense, energy security, maritime access, and global economic stability. [2]

4. The Limits of American Support

Escalation control

American leaders may hesitate to expand a conflict if direct action against Iran or its partners risks a wider regional war. This can produce a gap between what allies expect and what Washington is prepared to do.

Domestic political limits

Administrations must consider public opinion, congressional support, defense spending, casualties, and election-year politics. A commitment made by one administration may be interpreted differently by the next.

Competing global priorities

Washington must balance the Middle East against China, Russia, Europe, technology, and global supply chains. Regional engagement does not imply unlimited attention or resources.

Burden-sharing expectations

The United States increasingly expects partners to contribute financially, militarily, and diplomatically. Saudi Arabia can meet many expectations; Jordan cannot do so at the same scale.

Defense versus retaliation

Washington may intercept missiles, protect bases, or defend shipping without launching a broad retaliatory campaign. Allies may view that as prudent; adversaries may view it as an opportunity.

Policy inconsistency

When statements, deployments, and actions do not align, partners may begin planning around uncertainty rather than assurance.

 

5. Jordan and Saudi Arabia Are Not Making the Same Calculation

Issue	Jordan	Saudi Arabia
Primary concern	Regime stability and conflict spillover	Territorial security and energy infrastructure
Economic vulnerability	High	Lower, but exposed to energy disruption
Military dependence	Very high	High in advanced systems and integration
Diplomatic flexibility	Limited	Extensive
Relationship with China	Growing but constrained	Expanding rapidly
Domestic political pressure	Highly sensitive to Palestinian and regional issues	Managed through state policy and economic priorities
Preferred U.S. role	Reliable protector and economic stabilizer	Strategic partner with clear deterrence commitments
Main fear	Being drawn into a war it cannot control	Being attacked while U.S. support remains conditional

Jordan seeks reassurance that it will not be abandoned or overwhelmed by regional spillover. Saudi Arabia seeks reassurance that its strategic assets and sovereignty will be defended without requiring exclusive alignment with Washington. Both value U.S. support, but they do not require the same form of it.

6. The Rise of Alliance Hedging

Alliance hedging means maintaining the U.S. relationship while developing alternative diplomatic, economic, and security channels. It is not equivalent to formal military realignment.

China

China offers trade, infrastructure, technology, energy-market access, diplomatic access to Iran, and an alternative to exclusive dependence on Washington. Its limitations are equally important. Beijing has generally avoided assuming the full military responsibilities of the United States in the Gulf. Its influence is strongest in economics and diplomacy, not in extended expeditionary defense, integrated air defense, or crisis response.

The strategic implication is complementarity, not replacement. Gulf states can use China to expand options without believing that China can provide the entire U.S. security package.

India

India is a strategic bridge between the Gulf, the United States, Europe, and Asia. Its relationships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, Russia, and Washington allow it to contribute to trade, technology, logistics, energy, and diplomatic communication. Its value lies in diversification and connectivity rather than extended military protection.

Europe and Regional Partners

European states may become more relevant in sanctions policy, maritime security, development finance, energy transition, and diplomacy, but Europe lacks the unified military capacity and political cohesion to replace the United States as the Gulf’s primary external security provider. Saudi Arabia’s 2026 defense agreement with Pakistan and Turkey further illustrates the search for additional security relationships rather than a simple transfer of allegiance. [7]

7. What Washington Should Understand

The United States should not interpret alliance diversification as betrayal. It is a rational response to uncertainty. Jordan and Saudi Arabia are not necessarily choosing Beijing over Washington; they are attempting to avoid a situation in which a single external power determines the limits of their security, economic options, or diplomatic freedom.

Washington should distinguish strategic flexibility from strategic ambiguity. Flexibility allows adaptation. Excessive ambiguity weakens deterrence and encourages partners to seek alternatives.

The U.S. competitive advantage is not simply military power. It is the combination of military capability, intelligence, technology, logistics, financial depth, institutional partnerships, diplomatic reach, and the ability to coordinate coalitions. That advantage is strongest when partners can predict the boundaries of American support.

8. Policy Options for the United States

Define the scope of defense commitments

Clarify what forms of support Washington is prepared to provide in response to attacks on territory, energy infrastructure, airspace, and maritime interests. This does not require an unlimited treaty commitment; it requires credible boundaries.

Strengthen integrated air and missile defense

Prioritize interoperable systems, early-warning networks, counter-drone capabilities, and protection for civilian energy and transportation infrastructure.

Separate security cooperation from political compliance

Partners should not have to demonstrate total agreement with every U.S. policy to receive legitimate defensive support. Security cooperation is more durable when based on mutual interests rather than political obedience.

Support Jordan’s economic resilience

Treat employment, energy costs, refugee assistance, water security, and trade access as components of national security. The existing aid framework provides an institutional foundation for this approach. [4][5]

Recognize Saudi diversification

Manage Riyadh’s relations with China, India, Pakistan, Turkey, and other powers as a feature of Saudi statecraft, not automatic evidence of strategic defection.

Maintain diplomatic channels during crises

Support regional communication channels even when Washington disagrees with the governments involved. Crisis diplomacy can reduce miscalculation and protect American personnel and partners.

Make commitments sustainable across administrations

Use congressional engagement, formal planning, and institutionalized defense arrangements to reduce the perception that every election may reverse the basic terms of cooperation.

9. Implications for MENA

Security

MENA states will continue to diversify defense relationships, procure layered air defenses, and invest in domestic military production.

Diplomacy

Regional governments will place greater emphasis on mediation, nonalignment, and relationships with multiple external powers.

Economics

Energy infrastructure, shipping routes, digital networks, and critical supply chains will be treated as strategic assets requiring protection from both military and economic disruption.

Politics

Arab governments will increasingly judge external partners by performance rather than rhetoric. Demonstrated behavior during a crisis will matter more than public declarations.

Regional order

The region is moving toward a system in which the United States remains central but no longer operates as the only meaningful external power. This is not a clean transition from American primacy to Chinese primacy; it is a more fragmented order in which regional states seek maximum options and minimum dependence.

10. Indicators to Watch

• Whether Washington converts intelligence and targeting support into a durable framework for defending Saudi energy and maritime infrastructure.
• Whether Saudi Arabia expands formal defense arrangements with Pakistan, Turkey, China, or other partners.
• Whether Jordan receives sustained economic and security support at or near the level contemplated in the FY2023–FY2029 assistance framework.
• Whether U.S. defense sales are accompanied by stronger operational integration, training, maintenance, and crisis-planning commitments.
• Whether Gulf governments publicly demand clearer U.S. guarantees or instead deepen quiet diversification.
• Whether adversaries test U.S. red lines incrementally against partner territory, infrastructure, or shipping.

Bottom Line

Jordan and Saudi Arabia still need the United States. The United States still needs Jordan and Saudi Arabia. But the alliance is changing from a relationship based largely on assumed strategic permanence to one based on continuous proof of value.

Washington’s military power remains unmatched in the region, but its political reliability is increasingly debated by its partners. Jordan will seek protection without being dragged into regional war. Saudi Arabia will seek deterrence without surrendering diplomatic independence. Both will maintain American ties while developing alternatives.

The strategic question is therefore not whether the United States is losing the Middle East. It is whether Washington understands that an alliance survives not merely because a partner needs it, but because the partner continues to believe that it will work when tested.

Evidence Development and Source Integration

The report’s central judgment is supported by a converging but uneven evidence base. The strongest evidence concerns the continuing depth of U.S. defense cooperation, the limits of U.S. crisis response, and the partners’ incentives to diversify. The report does not treat any single news account as proof of alliance collapse; instead, it uses multiple indicators to distinguish capability, commitment, dependence, and hedging.

Evidence-to-Judgment Matrix

Evidence	Source type	What is directly documented	What it supports	Confidence
Saudi request for U.S. action against the Houthis	Reuters reporting based on named/anonymous officials	Riyadh sought direct U.S. military action; Washington reportedly limited assistance to intelligence and targeting support.	Supports the distinction between U.S. capability and U.S. willingness to escalate.	Moderate
Saudi pipeline disruption	Reuters energy reporting	Drone attacks disrupted a major Saudi pipeline route carrying approximately 4 million barrels per day around Hormuz.	Supports the claim that alliance credibility includes energy infrastructure and economic continuity.	Moderate
$5 billion JDAM-ER potential sale	Reuters reporting on U.S. approval	Washington continued approving advanced weapons sales to Saudi Arabia despite political friction.	Supports continuing defense dependence and institutional cooperation.	High for the sale; limited for deterrence effect
FY2023–FY2029 Jordan assistance framework	Congressional Research Service	The United States committed in principle to seek at least $1.45 billion annually, subject to appropriations.	Supports the claim that Jordan’s alliance is fiscal, economic, and institutional—not only military.	High
U.S.–Jordan security cooperation	U.S. Department of State	U.S. assistance includes security cooperation, border security, military support, and economic assistance.	Supports the broader definition of alliance value used in the report.	High
Saudi National Guard Bureau partnership	U.S. National Guard Bureau	Saudi Arabia entered the State Partnership Program in 2025.	Supports the conclusion that the relationship extends beyond arms sales into institutional military ties.	High
Saudi–Turkey–Pakistan defense cooperation	Reuters reporting	Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan announced a defense arrangement during regional turmoil.	Supports diversification and additional security channels, but does not prove replacement of the U.S. relationship.	Moderate

How the Evidence Should Be Read

• Documented fact: a reported request, agreement, sale, aid framework, or institutional partnership.
• Analytic inference: what that event suggests about expectations, dependence, deterrence, or hedging.
• Not established by the evidence: that Jordan or Saudi Arabia is abandoning Washington, that China can replace the U.S. security role, or that one episode proves a permanent policy shift.
• The evidence is strongest when independent source types converge—for example, official assistance documents establish the depth of the relationship while Reuters reporting illustrates how that relationship is tested during a crisis.
• The report assigns greater weight to official documents for commitments and institutional arrangements, and uses reputable reporting for private requests, disputed decisions, and rapidly developing events.

Confidence Assessment

Overall confidence: Moderate to high. Confidence is high that U.S. defense, assistance, and institutional relationships with Jordan and Saudi Arabia remain substantial. Confidence is moderate regarding private partner assessments of American reliability because those judgments are often inferred from behavior, requests, procurement decisions, and diplomatic diversification rather than stated publicly. Confidence is also moderate regarding the long-term consequences of recent crisis-response decisions; those consequences will depend on follow-on actions, not one episode alone.

Source-Integration Corrections

• Each major factual proposition is now tied to a numbered source marker at the point of use.
• The Evidence Snapshot has been expanded into an Evidence-to-Judgment Matrix that distinguishes direct documentation from analytic significance.
• Official sources are used for aid commitments, institutional programs, and government policy; Reuters is used for rapidly developing events and reported private discussions.
• The report explicitly limits what the evidence can prove, reducing the risk of treating diversification as abandonment or a single crisis as a permanent realignment.
• The references are retained as a source record, while the new evidence section explains why each source matters to the argument.

References and Source Notes

[1] Reuters, “Saudi Crown Prince Sought U.S. Military Help from Trump with Houthis, Sources Say,” September 11, 2026; and Reuters, “Houthi Advance in Yemen Puts U.S. in a New Bind,” September 12, 2026.

[2] Reuters, “Saudi Pipeline Outage Threatens Loss of 4% of Global Oil Supply,” September 13, 2026; see also Reuters, “New Attacks in Hormuz and Saudi Test Nerves as War’s Spread Worsens Oil Disruption,” September 13, 2026.

[3] Reuters, “U.S. Approves Potential Sale of Joint Direct Attack Munitions-Extended Range to Saudi Arabia for $5 Billion,” September 4, 2026.

[4] Congressional Research Service, “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations,” January 8, 2026.

[5] U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation With Jordan,” January 20, 2025.

[6] U.S. National Guard Bureau, “U.S., Saudi Arabia Strengthen Ties Through State Partnership Program,” August 22, 2025.

[7] Reuters, “Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan Pledge Mutual Defence as Middle East Turmoil Escalates,” August 7, 2026.

[8] Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “U.S.-Saudi Defense Cooperation: Next Steps,” accessed September 2026.

[9] Middle East Institute, “Integrated Air and Missile Defense Will Enhance Security in the Middle East,” background analysis.

[10] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “In MENA, America and China Converge More Than Diverge,” July 1, 2026.

Endnotes

1. Throughout this report, “alliance” is used broadly to include formal defense cooperation, security assistance, intelligence relationships, arms sales, diplomatic coordination, and economic support.
2. The United States’ ability to defend a partner does not automatically establish a legal obligation to do so in every circumstance.
3. Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic diversification should be distinguished from formal military realignment. Expanding ties with China, India, Pakistan, and Turkey do not, by themselves, indicate an intention to replace U.S. security cooperation.
4. Jordan’s vulnerability is intensified by its geography, economic constraints, and exposure to Palestinian, Syrian, Iraqi, and Israeli-Palestinian developments.
5. China’s growing influence in the Gulf is strongest in trade, infrastructure, energy, technology, and diplomacy. Its willingness to assume direct military responsibility remains more limited.
6. The principal strategic risk is not an immediate collapse of the U.S. alliance system but the gradual erosion of confidence caused by uncertainty, inconsistent signaling, and unfulfilled expectations.