THE MENA SECURITY-ENERGY ARC
JAFAJ MENA ECONOMIC, POLITICAL & PARLIAMENTARY INTELLIGENCE
September 29, 2026
SPECIAL REGIONAL SECURITY & ENERGY BRIEFING
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The security environment surrounding the Gulf is no longer a collection of separate conflicts.
Four developments are increasingly connected:
- U.S.–Iran military confrontation around the Strait of Hormuz.
- The completion of the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq.
- The renewed Houthi offensive in Yemen and its advance toward the Bab el-Mandeb.
- Saudi Arabia and the UAE attempting to repair their strategic relationship.
The economic consequences are equally connected.
Oil exports have recovered significantly, but remain below prewar levels. Shipping is operating through a combination of normal routes, alternative infrastructure and costly workarounds. Brent crude remains above $100 per barrel. Saudi Arabia is rebuilding export capacity through Yanbu and the East-West Pipeline, while the UAE continues to provide an alternative Gulf export infrastructure through Fujairah.
The result is a new regional equation:
MILITARY CONFLICT → SHIPPING RISK → OIL FLOWS → ENERGY PRICES → GOVERNMENT REVENUES → REGIONAL SECURITY
The central JaFaJ conclusion is that MENA’s energy system is adapting to military disruption, but the underlying security architecture remains fragile.
- THE FOUR-THEATER SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
- HORMUZ: THE PRIMARY ENERGY FLASHPOINT
The Strait of Hormuz remains the most important maritime security issue in the region.
The latest Kpler data reported by Reuters estimates that approximately 9.719 million barrels per day of crude moved through Hormuz in September. The broader regional export calculation reached 16.328 million bpd, compared with 19.513 million bpd in February.
That means September exports were approximately 3.185 million bpd below February, or roughly 84% of the February level.
The recovery is significant—but it does not constitute a return to normal.
Before the war, approximately 125 large commercial vessels per day passed through Hormuz, and the waterway accounted for roughly 20% of global daily crude oil and LNG supply.
The current system is increasingly dependent upon:
- naval protection;
- alternative export routes;
- ship-to-ship transfers;
- Fujairah;
- Oman;
- Saudi Red Sea infrastructure; and
- greater logistical coordination.
JAFAJ INDICATOR
The critical question is no longer simply:
“Is Hormuz open?”
It is:
“How much energy can pass through Hormuz safely, reliably and economically?”
That is a much more useful measure of regional resilience.
- OIL: RECOVERY WITHOUT NORMALIZATION
Kpler’s latest broader estimate puts September exports from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Iran at 16.328 million bpd.
February’s figure was 19.513 million bpd.
The difference:
3.185 million bpd
or approximately:
16.3% below February.
This distinction is important because an earlier Kpler calculation reported by Reuters placed September exports at 12.8 million bpd, approximately 6 million bpd below February’s 18.8 million bpd. That earlier figure used a narrower measurement. The later 16.328-million-bpd figure explicitly includes additional export routes and ship-to-ship transfers.
JaFaJ should use the newer 16.328-million-bpd figure as the headline regional export statistic and retain the 12.8-million-bpd figure only when explaining the earlier methodology.
III. SAUDI ARABIA: THE REGIONAL ENERGY BUFFER
Saudi Arabia is central to the recovery.
Kpler estimates September Saudi exports at approximately 5.4 million bpd, compared with 2.446 million bpd in August.
That represents an increase of approximately:
2.954 million bpd
or roughly:
121% month over month.
Ras Tanura shipments rose to approximately 3.6 million bpd, compared with 929,000 bpd in August.
But February’s Ras Tanura figure was approximately 6.411 million bpd.
The Saudi recovery therefore remains incomplete.
YANBU AND THE EAST-WEST PIPELINE
Saudi Arabia is simultaneously attempting to reduce its exposure to Hormuz.
The East-West Pipeline moves crude from the eastern oil fields across Saudi Arabia toward the Red Sea port of Yanbu.
The strategic value is obvious:
Every barrel exported through Yanbu is a barrel that can reach global markets without transiting Hormuz.
This makes Saudi pipeline infrastructure a national-security asset, not merely an energy asset.
- OIL PRICES: THE MARKET IS STILL PRICING WAR RISK
On September 29, Brent crude fell 1.86% to $103.32 per barrel, while WTI fell 2.11% to $90.65.
Despite the daily decline, Brent remained on track for an approximately 14% monthly increase, while WTI was headed for a roughly 5.6% monthly increase.
The market is therefore sending two messages simultaneously:
SUPPLY IS RECOVERING.
RISK HAS NOT DISAPPEARED.
Reuters reports that increased reliance on ship-to-ship transfers and alternative logistics remains less efficient and more expensive than normal transportation.
That creates a critical economic distinction:
Physical supply can recover before economic efficiency recovers.
- IRAQ: THE U.S. MILITARY WITHDRAWAL
The United States is completing the withdrawal of its remaining troops from Iraq by September 30, 2026.
The withdrawal ends a U.S. military presence that began in 2003. The timetable was originally agreed in 2024 and is now being implemented.
The strategic significance extends beyond Iraq.
Iraq sits on the northern flank of the Gulf security system and remains an important arena for competition between Washington and Tehran.
Reuters reports that some Iraqi officials and analysts are concerned that the absence of a U.S. military counterweight could create greater operating space for Iran-aligned armed groups and Islamic State sleeper cells.
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
The withdrawal should be tracked as a regional-balance event, not merely an Iraq event.
The relevant question is:
What replaces the U.S. security presence?
The answer will affect Iran’s regional influence, Iraqi sovereignty, militia activity and Gulf security calculations.
- YEMEN: THE SECOND MARITIME CHOKEPOINT
The most significant military development south of the Gulf is occurring in Yemen.
Houthi forces have advanced along the Red Sea coast and captured the strategic port city of Mokha and nearby islands, increasing their leverage around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Reuters reports that the Houthi advance has given the group positions overlooking Bab el-Mandeb and has exposed weaknesses within the anti-Houthi coalition.
The Bab el-Mandeb is one of the world’s critical maritime chokepoints.
Yemen’s internationally recognized government has warned that Houthi control threatens global commerce. AP reports that approximately 12% of global trade passes through the waterway.
THE HUMAN COST
AP reports that the latest escalation has produced:
- At least 838 deaths
- More than 3,600 wounded
- More than 145,000 displaced
- Thousands fleeing toward Djibouti
The UN envoy Hans Grundberg is attempting to prevent the conflict from expanding further and has held discussions with Houthi negotiators in Muscat and Saudi officials in Riyadh.
VII. HORMUZ + BAB EL-MANDEB = A TWO-CHOKEPOINT PROBLEM
This is one of the most important strategic conclusions for JaFaJ.
The two waterways protect different portions of the same global commercial system.
HORMUZ
Protects access to:
Persian Gulf → Arabian Sea → Indian Ocean
BAB EL-MANDEB
Protects access to:
Red Sea → Suez Canal → Mediterranean → Europe
A simultaneous disruption would therefore create pressure on:
- oil;
- LNG;
- container shipping;
- tanker insurance;
- freight rates;
- delivery times;
- inventories;
- inflation; and
- government budgets.
This is why Yemen belongs in a briefing about Hormuz.
They are geographically separate chokepoints but economically connected.
VIII. SAUDI ARABIA AND UAE: STRATEGIC RECONCILIATION
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are now attempting to repair a relationship that has deteriorated substantially over Yemen and broader regional policy.
UAE Vice President Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan traveled to Riyadh on September 29 to meet Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman.
The visit represents a significant diplomatic signal after months of tension.
The immediate issue is Yemen.
Saudi Arabia has become increasingly concerned about the Houthi advance and the weakness of anti-Houthi forces.
The UAE previously played a major role in Yemen but subsequently withdrew its troops and developed different relationships with Yemeni factions.
The current Houthi offensive has changed the strategic calculation.
JAFAJ SIGNIFICANCE
Saudi Arabia and the UAE possess complementary strategic capabilities.
SAUDI ARABIA
- Oil production
- East-West Pipeline
- Yanbu
- Large domestic market
- Defense spending
- Regional political weight
UAE
- Fujairah
- Global logistics
- Ports
- Financial services
- International investment
- Maritime infrastructure
Improved coordination could therefore have consequences extending beyond Yemen into energy security, shipping, investment, Sudan, Syria and Iran policy.
- THE FINANCIAL DIMENSION
Military disruption does not affect all Gulf governments equally.
SAUDI ARABIA
The IMF’s 2026 assessment projects:
- Government revenue: approximately 23.5% of GDP
- Government expenditure: approximately 27.2% of GDP
- Fiscal deficit: approximately 3.7% of GDP
- Public debt: approximately 32.1% of GDP
- Inflation: approximately 2.2%
The higher oil-price environment provides Saudi Arabia with additional revenue that can partially offset lower physical export volumes.
UAE
The UAE enters the crisis from a stronger fiscal position.
The IMF projects a general-government surplus in 2026, supported by oil revenue, conservative fiscal management and substantial financial reserves.
The UAE’s economic exposure is nevertheless broader than oil.
Its vulnerability includes:
- aviation;
- tourism;
- ports;
- logistics;
- real estate;
- financial services; and
- international trade.
JAFAJ CONCLUSION
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have different financial mechanisms for absorbing the shock.
Saudi Arabia can use oil revenue and fiscal capacity.
The UAE can draw on diversified trade, financial and sovereign-wealth assets.
Both therefore have more room to absorb disruption than smaller regional economies.
- THE NEW REGIONAL SECURITY EQUATION
The old Gulf equation could be summarized as:
IRAN + GULF STATES + U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE
The emerging equation is considerably broader:
IRAN
↓
IRAQ
↓
GULF
↓
HORMUZ
↓
UAE / OMAN
↓
BAB EL-MANDEB
↓
YEMEN
↓
RED SEA / SUEZ
This is increasingly a single economic-security corridor.
- JAFAJ MASTER INDICATOR SET
The JaFaJ team should track the following indicators every week.
ENERGY
- Brent
- WTI
- Regional oil production
- Regional oil exports
- Saudi exports
- UAE exports
- Iranian exports
- Hormuz flows
- Yanbu flows
- Fujairah flows
MARITIME
- Hormuz vessel passages
- Bab el-Mandeb passages
- VLCC rates
- War-risk insurance
- Ship-to-ship transfers
- Suez traffic
FINANCE
- Saudi fiscal balance
- UAE fiscal balance
- Public debt
- Foreign reserves
- Sovereign wealth assets
- Currency movements
- Inflation
SECURITY
- U.S. troop deployments
- U.S. withdrawals
- Iranian attacks
- Houthi attacks
- Tanker incidents
- Missile/drone launches
- Maritime security incidents
POLITICAL / PARLIAMENTARY
- Parliamentary votes
- Emergency legislation
- Defense appropriations
- Energy legislation
- Sanctions
- Budget actions
- Diplomatic agreements
XII. JAFAJ REGIONAL RISK MATRIX
| THEATER | CURRENT CONDITION | ECONOMIC CHANNEL |
| Hormuz | Active military confrontation | Oil, LNG, shipping |
| Iraq | U.S. withdrawal | Security, oil, investment |
| Yemen | Houthi offensive | Shipping, insurance, Saudi security |
| Bab el-Mandeb | Increasing Houthi leverage | Red Sea/Suez trade |
| Saudi Arabia | Export recovery | Oil revenue, fiscal capacity |
| UAE | Reconciliation effort | Trade, ports, investment |
| Regional oil market | Recovering but disrupted | Energy prices/inflation |
| Gulf infrastructure | Diversifying | Resilience/capital spending |
JAFAJ BOTTOM LINE
The major development is not simply that oil exports are recovering.
It is that the MENA economic system is adapting to a military environment that remains unsettled.
Saudi Arabia is rebuilding alternative export capacity.
The UAE retains strategically important maritime infrastructure.
Hormuz is carrying substantially more oil again, but at greater security and logistical cost.
Yemen has emerged as a second major maritime threat around Bab el-Mandeb.
The United States is simultaneously reducing its military footprint in Iraq.
And Saudi Arabia and the UAE are attempting to repair a relationship whose deterioration has complicated the Yemen conflict.
These developments are connected by geography, energy and security.
THE JAFAJ FORMULA
REGIONAL SECURITY → SHIPPING → OIL FLOWS → PRICES → GOVERNMENT REVENUE → FISCAL CAPACITY → POLITICAL STABILITY
That is the framework JaFaJ should use to monitor the region.
The most important question for the coming weeks is therefore not simply whether fighting continues.
It is whether the regional system can maintain energy exports, maritime commerce and fiscal stability while operating under sustained military risk.
ENDNOTES & SOURCES
- Reuters/Kpler, September 29, 2026. Regional crude exports estimated at 16.328 million bpd in September versus 19.513 million bpd in February; September Hormuz flows estimated at 9.719 million bpd. The calculation includes Hormuz, ship-to-ship transfers, Fujairah, Oman and Red Sea routes.
- Reuters/Kpler, September 28–29, 2026. Earlier/narrower calculation placed September regional exports at 12.8 million bpd, approximately 6 million bpd below February’s 18.8 million bpd. Saudi exports were estimated at 5.4 million bpd.
- Reuters, September 29, 2026. Brent crude at approximately $103.32 and WTI at approximately $90.65; Brent remained on track for an approximately 14% monthly gain.
- Reuters, September 29, 2026. U.S. forces completing withdrawal from Iraq by September 30 after more than two decades.
- Reuters, September 16, 2026. Houthi advances along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and capture of territory overlooking Bab el-Mandeb.
- Associated Press, September 29, 2026. UN envoy Hans Grundberg’s meetings with Houthi negotiators and Saudi officials; reported humanitarian consequences of the renewed fighting.
- Associated Press, September 24, 2026. Yemen’s government warning of the economic consequences of Houthi control around Bab el-Mandeb; approximately 12% of global trade passes through the waterway.
- Financial Times, September 29, 2026. UAE Vice President Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed’s Riyadh visit and Saudi-UAE reconciliation effort.
- Reuters, September 10, 2026. Background on the strategic importance of Bab el-Mandeb and Houthi efforts to increase control over the Yemeni Red Sea coast.
- Reuters, September 29, 2026. Oil-market effects of alternative transportation routes and ship-to-ship transfers.
SOURCE DISCIPLINE
JAFAJ distinguishes reported facts, preliminary data and analytical assessment. Oil-export statistics derived from Kpler vessel-tracking data are preliminary and subject to revision. The 12.8-million-bpd and 16.328-million-bpd figures should not be treated as contradictory without considering their different methodologies and coverage. Military casualty and displacement figures are attributed to the cited organizations and should be treated as reported estimates rather than independently verified JaFaJ totals.
JAFAJ | MENA ECONOMIC, POLITICAL & PARLIAMENTARY INTELLIGENCE