JAFAJ MENA ENERGY BRIEFING
September 29, 2026
Energy • Security • Trade • Strategic Infrastructure
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Middle Eastern oil exports are recovering sharply, but the regional energy system remains significantly below its prewar operating level.
Preliminary Kpler data reported by Reuters shows that crude exports from key Middle Eastern producers reached 16.328 million barrels per day (bpd) in September, the highest level since the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran began in late February. That remains approximately 3.2 million bpd below the February level of 19.513 million bpd—roughly 84% of pre-conflict volume. Kpler characterized current exports as just under 80% of pre-conflict levels, reflecting differences in measurement periods and methodology. [1]
The recovery is being supported by increased Saudi and UAE exports, renewed flows through the Strait of Hormuz, and the restoration of Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and Yanbu export operations. But the recovery remains dependent on workarounds, rerouting and elevated maritime-security measures.
The central JaFaJ finding: MENA’s oil system is proving more adaptable than the initial disruption suggested, but the Strait of Hormuz remains a critical strategic vulnerability.
- THE EXPORT RECOVERY IS REAL — BUT INCOMPLETE
September crude exports from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Iran are estimated at 16.328 million bpd, compared with 19.513 million bpd in February.
That represents a shortfall of approximately 3.185 million bpd.
At the September rate, the region is exporting approximately 84% of its February volume, leaving roughly 16% of prewar export capacity outside normal flow patterns.
The distinction is important.
This is not a return to normal. It is a recovery within a disrupted operating environment.
- SAUDI ARABIA IS DRIVING MUCH OF THE RECOVERY
Saudi Arabia is projected to ship approximately 5.4 million bpd in September, compared with 2.446 million bpd in August.
That represents an increase of approximately 2.95 million bpd, or roughly 121% month over month.
Saudi shipments through Ras Tanura also increased dramatically, reaching approximately 3.25 million bpd in September, compared with 929,000 bpd in August.
However, Ras Tanura remains below its February level of approximately 6.411 million bpd.
The numbers demonstrate both the scale of the recovery and the remaining disruption.
- HORMUZ IS OPENING — BUT NOT NORMAL
The Strait of Hormuz remains the central variable in the regional oil equation.
Reuters reported that September crude exports through Hormuz were expected to reach approximately 9.719 million bpd.
For perspective, before the conflict, the strait normally handled approximately 125 large commercial vessels per day, including oil tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and container ships.
The waterway is also associated with approximately 20% of global daily crude oil and LNG supply under normal operating conditions.
The strategic implication is straightforward:
The region can partially reroute oil. It cannot easily replace Hormuz.
- ALTERNATIVE ROUTES ARE BUYING TIME
Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline has become one of the most important alternatives to Hormuz.
The approximately 750-mile pipeline crosses Saudi Arabia from the country’s eastern oil-producing region to Yanbu on the Red Sea.
Its maximum capacity is approximately 7 million bpd, although it has historically not operated at that level for sustained periods.
Following attacks that disrupted the system in September, Saudi Arabia restarted the pipeline and resumed crude loading at Yanbu.
Current throughput was reported at approximately 3.5 million bpd, meaning the pipeline was operating at roughly 50% of its stated maximum capacity.
That is strategically significant.
Every barrel moved through Yanbu is a barrel that does not have to pass through Hormuz.
- THE COST OF RESILIENCE IS RISING
The alternative system has a price.
Ship-to-ship transfers, rerouting, additional security requirements and longer logistics chains make transportation less efficient.
Reuters reported September 29 that these workarounds were contributing to elevated crude prices even as export volumes recovered.
Associated Press reported that shipping costs had become particularly significant, with tanker charter rates rising sharply and shipping costs accounting for as much as 25% of the value of some oil cargoes under the disrupted operating environment. [2]
This creates a critical distinction:
Physical supply can recover before economic efficiency recovers.
That distinction matters for consumers, refiners, shipping companies and MENA governments.
- OIL PRICES REFLECT THE REMAINING RISK
Brent crude futures were approximately $103.32 per barrel on September 29, while West Texas Intermediate was approximately $90.65 per barrel.
Despite the day’s decline, Reuters reported that Brent was still on track for an approximately 14% monthly gain, while WTI was headed for a gain of approximately 5.6%.
The market is therefore pricing two realities simultaneously:
MORE OIL IS MOVING.
THE RISK OF ANOTHER DISRUPTION HAS NOT DISAPPEARED.
That combination explains why prices can fall on evidence of improving exports while remaining substantially higher than before the conflict.
- THE UAE IS ALSO PART OF THE ADAPTATION STORY
The United Arab Emirates has increased exports while benefiting from infrastructure that allows crude to bypass Hormuz.
The country’s Fujairah facilities on the Gulf of Oman provide an important alternative outlet outside the strait.
This creates a broader regional pattern:
Saudi Arabia is expanding the usefulness of Red Sea infrastructure.
The UAE is utilizing Gulf of Oman infrastructure.
Both reduce dependence on a single maritime chokepoint.
This is not merely an emergency response. It could influence future infrastructure investment.
- THE STRATEGIC QUESTION IS NOW INFRASTRUCTURE
The most important long-term consequence may not be the September export numbers themselves.
It may be what governments do with the lessons learned from the disruption.
The crisis has demonstrated the value of:
- Red Sea export terminals;
- cross-country pipelines;
- Gulf of Oman facilities;
- additional tanker capacity;
- diversified shipping routes;
- protected maritime corridors; and
- redundant energy infrastructure.
The economic calculation is changing.
Redundancy used to look like excess capacity. In a regional crisis, redundancy becomes strategic capacity.
- WHAT THIS MEANS FOR MENA
The current oil recovery suggests that Gulf producers possess greater logistical flexibility than the initial disruption implied.
But the data also demonstrates that the system remains vulnerable.
Three conclusions emerge.
FIRST — HORMUZ REMAINS CRITICAL
Approximately 9.719 million bpd of September crude exports are projected to move through Hormuz, according to the Reuters/Kpler data.
Alternative routes reduce dependence on the strait; they do not eliminate it.
SECOND — SAUDI INFRASTRUCTURE HAS BECOME A REGIONAL SECURITY ASSET
The East-West Pipeline is no longer simply an oil transportation system.
Its strategic value is directly tied to the ability of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf producers to maintain exports when maritime routes are threatened.
THIRD — THE REGION IS BUILDING A MORE EXPENSIVE FORM OF RESILIENCE
Diversification can protect supply, but it comes with higher transportation, insurance, security and infrastructure costs.
The post-conflict MENA energy system could therefore be more diversified—but also more expensive.
JAFAJ ASSESSMENT
The September data changes the story from “Middle Eastern oil exports are collapsing” to “Middle Eastern oil exports are recovering under abnormal conditions.”
That is an important distinction.
At approximately 16.328 million bpd, regional crude exports have recovered substantially from the disruption but remain below the 19.513 million bpd February level.
Saudi Arabia’s recovery is particularly significant, with September shipments projected at approximately 5.4 million bpd, more than twice its August level.
The East-West Pipeline and Yanbu are providing additional resilience, while UAE infrastructure provides another pathway around Hormuz.
But the recovery has not eliminated the strategic importance of the strait.
The MENA energy system is adapting. It is not yet normalized.
For JaFaJ, the key indicator to watch is therefore not simply daily oil production.
It is the percentage of regional exports that can reach global markets without relying on Hormuz—and the cost of doing so.
That is the more meaningful measure of MENA energy resilience.
ENDNOTES
[1] Reuters / Kpler, September 29, 2026. Florence Tan, “Mideast oil exports rebound in September as Saudi Arabia boosts shipments.” Kpler estimated September crude exports from key Middle Eastern producers at 16.328 million bpd, versus 19.513 million bpd in February. The dataset includes Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Iran and incorporates Hormuz, Red Sea and other export routes.
[2] Associated Press, September 2026. “Gulf nations have found ways to keep oil flowing through the Iran war, but the costs are mounting.” AP reported that Gulf producers activated alternative pipelines and routes while tanker and shipping costs increased substantially.
[3] Reuters, September 29, 2026. “Oil falls as investors focus on Middle East supply.” Reuters reported Brent at approximately $103.32 per barrel and WTI at approximately $90.65, while noting that Brent remained on track for a roughly 14% monthly gain.
[4] Reuters, September 29, 2026. “Saudi resumes Yanbu oil loading after pipeline restart.” Saudi Arabia resumed crude loading at Yanbu after restarting the East-West Pipeline.
[5] Reuters / Kpler, September 29, 2026. September Hormuz crude exports were estimated at approximately 9.719 million bpd. Reuters also reported that the strait historically handled approximately 125 large commercial vessels per day and approximately 20% of global daily crude oil and LNG supply.
[6] Reuters, September 22–24, 2026. Reporting on the Saudi East-West Pipeline indicated that the pipeline had been restarted following attacks and that Saudi Arabia was rebuilding throughput before the resumption of Yanbu exports.
SOURCE DISCIPLINE NOTE
This briefing distinguishes Kpler preliminary shipping data, Reuters reporting, and AP reporting from JaFaJ’s own analytical conclusions. Export figures are estimates rather than final customs or government statistics and may change as vessel-tracking data are revised.
JAFAJ | MENA ECONOMIC, POLITICAL & PARLIAMENTARY INTELLIGENCE